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MVtr.'VA
O li-
•ft.
THE ROYAL NAVY
A HISTORY
FKOM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE TRESENT
•MV«S^I
c
■,>*fM^^^ f*^^:-i^»^
A History
From the Earliest Times to the Present
By
Wm. Laird Clowes
Felloru of Kings College, London ; Gold MedaUist U.S. Naval Institute ;
Hon. Member of the R.C/.S. Institution
Assisted by
■ Sir Clements Markham. K.C.B., F.R.S.
Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S.N.
Mr. H. W. Wilson
Col. Theodore Roosevelt, late Assist. Sec. U.S. Navy-
Mr. L. Carr Laughton
etc.
Twenty-five Photogravures
an, I
Hundreds of Full Page and other
Illustrations
Maps, Charts
Iji Five Volumes
Vol. III.
LONDON
Sampson L.ow, M.vrstox and Compan\-
limiti:d
^t. JSuiigtau'si ©oiiSf, .-fcttn- !£niir, ii.C.
1 898
LONDON :
TRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED,
STAMFOUD STREET ASP CIIARIXG CROSS.
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME III.
Some of the causes which contnbiited to delay the appearance of
the second vohime of this History of the Eoyal Navy, have con-
tributed to delay the appearance of this, the third. The progress
of the work has, as before, been hampered by my ill-health and
my enforced residence in the high Alps during the greater part
of the year. A certain amount of delay, moreover, has resulted
indirectly from the recent war between the United States and
Spain. Captain A. T. Mahan, whose critical narrative of the
major operations of the AVar of the American Kevolution fills
about a third of the present volume, was employed in the service
of his country^ at Washington during the late conflict, and was
thus prevented for a time from devoting his attention to other
matters. So much of the delay as has been caused by his pre-
occupation will, I am sure, be readily forgiven, seeing that he
has now been able to revise proofs, etc., which mirst otherwise
have been sent to press without his final imprimatur. This book
has much to say concerning the beginnings and the early exploits
of the United States' Navy, which, in the days of Hull and
Decatur, proved itself to be as capable and chivalrous an
opponent as Great Britain ever had to meet upon the seas, and
which since, — and not only in the days of Tatuall, — has shown
itself as true and loyal a friend to Britain and her Navy, in peace
time, as it was gallant a foe in war. I cannot, therefore, refrain
from expressing here a sentiment which, in the course of the late
short but brilliant struggle, must have welled up often in the
' I should mention that my other American collaborator, Mr. Theodore Eoosevelt,
resigned his appointment as Assistant Secretary of the U. S. Navy, in order to take au
active part in the war, and, having obtained a commission as Lieut.-Colonel of the now-
famous " Hough Riders," fought with very distinguished bravery before Santiago
de Cuba. He has since been elected Governor of the State of New York.
r?(C"'t^>^
6C775
VI INTliOnUCTIuN TO VOLUME 7/7.
heart of many a Biiton. We triumph wherever the race wins
fresh glories ; and we feel proud in the thought that the victory
has heen gained by men speaking our speech, hearing our names,
.sharing our blood, and inspired by the traditions bequeathed e(jually
to both nations by Howard, Drake, Hawkins, Blake, Boscawen and
Hawke. Not to us has it fallen in these recent years to illustrate
those traditions, and to add to them fresh epics. Yet, since our
brothers of the New World have shown themselves at Manilla and
Santiago the same men that they were at Mobile and New Orleans,
we are surely justified in hoping that we, should the hour for action
come again, shall be alile to prove that our branch of the old stock
retains, in a similar manner, the old grit and the old sea virtues.
Although, as I have said, the progress of the work continues to
be somewhat delayed by my personal disabilities, I am not conscious
that the book suffers in any other way in consequence of my ill-
health. Thanks to my numerous and indefatigable helpers and
■correspondents, I am not, in spite of my necessary absence from
home, obliged to forego reference to any documents, state papers, or
books which ought to be consulted. Happily, too, most of the
materials for my part of the work were collected, and, to some
extent, set in order, ere I became a prisoner here ; and although, of
course, I still very often have to appeal for further particulars to the
public libraries, the Eecord Office, private muniment rooms, and
other storehouses of fact, there is, I find, remarkably little supple-
mentary research of this kind which cannot be carried out for me
by my assistants. It is a longer process, and a costlier, but not, I
hope, a less effective one.
I make this exj)lanation because some friendly critics who have
been so good as to point out certain small eiTors of omission or
commission in the previous volumes, have generously hinted their
conviction that, were I not the invalid I mifortunately am, these
errors would not have appeared. If I really believed that my state
of health were mcompatible with the carrying out of the work in
hand, I should assuredly try to find someone else to take over my
duties and responsibilities. But the fact is that such errors as I
have had brought to my notice, — and fortmiately they are neither
serious nor numerous, — are inevitable imperfections in any book of
this nature ; for, paradoxical though it be, I can safelj' assert that
in nothing is it so impossible to attain to absolute correctness and
finahty as in a critical record of historic facts. The difficulty
INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME III. vii
would Ijesct ine equally, were I sound instead ol' sick, and in Jjondon
instead of in Switzerland. There are conflicts of evidence which
appear irreconcilaljle ; there are original authorities which cannot
be laid hands upon, or which even the most studiously careful will
by chance overlook ; and there are many questions, the discussion of
which cannot be seriously attempted in a work to which limits have
been set. I am sure that some at least of the critics to whom I
have alluded, have made the mistake of supposing that it is because
of my condition and my position that I have ignored this witness'
testimony on a court-martial, have seemed to pay little or no heed
to the statements contained in that document, or have failed to
enter upon such and such an interesting, biat wide point of criticism.
I am obliged to say that such shortcomings as are to be found in
these volumes are due, for the most part, to very different causes.
Firstly, I am restrained by the space at my command from touching
upon many subjects with which I should otherwise like to deal at
length, and from entering upon long discussions as to the credibility
of evidence. The same consideration even obliges me to omit many
footnotes and references which I should otherwise gladly include.
Secondly, I am guided by the conviction that anyone who aspires
to complete a book so voluminous as this History, must perforce
proceed upon principles somewhat similar to those which Dr.
Johnson sketched in a very famous passage.
" Failures,'' he wrote, " however frequent, m.ay admit of extenuation and apology.
To have attempted much is always laudable, even wlien the enterprise is above the
strength tliat midertakes it. To deliberate whenever I doubted, to enquire whenever I
was ignorant, would have protracted the undertaking without end, and perhaps without
improvement. I saw that one enquiry only gave occasion to another, that book referred
to book, that to search was not always to find, and to find was not always to be
informed ; and that thus to pursue perfection was, like the first inhabitants of Arcadia,
to chase the sun, which, when tliey had reached the hill where he seemed to rest, was
still beheld at the same distance from them."
If, to put matters in other words, one were determined, in an
undertaking of this kind, to be content with nothing short of absolute
completeness and finality, neither the initiator, nor, after his death,
any of his successors, would live long enough to finish the work.
I make bold to recommend this reflection to all my critics, and
especially to one of them, who, in his review of my second volume,
said, speaking of the account there given of the first Dutch War
(1652-.54), that it was "premature." I do not doubt that it will be
possible, say a hundred years hence, to write a better and completer
VlU INTRODUGTION TO VOLUME HI.
history of that war than can be written now ; hut to admit so mucli
is surely not the same thing as to agree that a history, carefullj'
written now, and illustrated with scores of previously unpu):)lished
facts, is written too soon. It is surely not " premature " to brush
away even a single published error or misconception concerning the
course of our naval history ; and, I think, I may safely say that this
volume and those volumes which have preceded it, — although they,
too, possibly contain many errors on minor points, — give, upon the
whole, a much fairer and more accurate version of that history than
has been hitherto presented. One dares not hope for — much less
can one wait for, — absolute finality. But, by means of an under-
taking planned and carried out as this one is, in accordance with
the principles set forth in my General Preface, one may at least be
instrumental in enlarging general knowledge of a great subject, and
in rendering impossible the future acceptation of some of the gross
and astonishing misstatements on naval matters which one finds in
almost every English history. I have no wish to say here anything
unkind about any of my brother men of letters : but I cannot
abstain from citing from one particular book a few misstatements of
the sort to which I allude, in order that it may be seen that the
present work is not " premature," and that there does exist alreadj'
a real necessity for something of the kind. I speak of a book, dealing
with English history generally, and consisting of upwards of eleven
hundred large pages of small type. It bears the imprint of reputable
publishers ; and upon the title-page are the names of two distin-
guished universitj' men, one of whom is described as a lectiu'er on
modern history, and the other as a late professor on history, in a
well-known English college. The second edition of this book, dated
1885, is responsible for the following extraordinary statements,
among others.
Of Admiral Edward Vernon (1), it is said that he was a "rear-
admiral at twenty-four," and that he " failed in his attempt to
seize Porto Bello, from an insufficiency of force." The truth is
that Vernon was made a vice-admiral in 1739, when he was fifty-
five, that he had never before held flag-rank, and that, far from
failing at Puerto Bello, he brilliantly captured that place on
November *22nd, 1739, "with six ships only," as may be seen on
reference to pp. 51-57 of the present volume.
Surely there is some unconscious supprcssio i^eri in the assertion
that, "foiled in his attempt to catch tlie Spanish treasure-ship.
INTBOnUCTION TO VOLUME HI. IX
Anson bailed west\v;inl liuiu Anicric;i with the Centurion, his sole
remaining ship, and arrived at 8pithead in June 1744." The story
of what really happened, and of liow the Manilla galleon was taken,
will be found on p. 328 of this volume.
Episodes, localities, and individuals are curiouslj' jumbled and
confused in the following passage : — " On tlie 1st of June, 1794, the
division of the Channel fleet commanded by Lord Howe attacked
and utterly defeated the French fleet off the Hyeres Islands. In
this action Hood played a conspicuous part, and in the following
August he was created Baron Bridport, in the Irish peerage." It is
true, of course, that a great battle was fought on " The Glorious
First of June," 1794 ; but it was fought, not off the Hyeres Islands,
which lie near Toulon, in the Mediterranean, but off' Ushant, near
the mouth of the British Channel. The only important action
fought off Hyeres during the war of 1793-1802 was fought in July,
1795, by a British fleet under Admiral William Hotham (1). That
force was not a division of the Channel fleet, nor were the French
utterly defeated on the occasion. Moreover, Lord Bridport was not
upon the scene.
Rodney is described as " the son of a naval oiScer of some
renown." Henry Eodney, his father, is usually supposed, neverthe-
less, to have been a country gentleman, living at Walton-on-Thames.
It is further said of Eodney that, while he was residing in France,
" offers were made by the French to tempt him to desert his
country ; but he rejected the overtures, and was rewarded in 1778
by being promoted to be an admiral." It is news that promotion in
the Navy has ever been a reward for a flag-of&cer's refusal to become
a traitor : yet, seeing that when Eodney was made an Admiral of
the White, on January 29th, 1782, he was still in France, and that,
according to the generally accepted story, he owed his ability to
return to England to the fact that a French gentleman lent him the
necessary money, it is difticult to believe that the authorities at
Whitehall, if they had ever suspected him of treasonable prochvities,
could have felt sure, when they promoted him, that their suspicions
were baseless.
Of Sir Charles Napier it is said : " in 1829 he was employed off"
the coast of Portugal in the Galatea. He supported the Constitu-
tionalists ; defeated the fleet of Don Miguel, and settled Donna
Maria on the throne. Don Pedro was unbounded in his gratitude :
created him Viscount of Cape St. Vincent ; gave him all the
X INTRODUCTION TO VOIJJME III.
l*ortugiie&e orders, and named him adminil-in-cliiel'." From this it
would certainly appear to the ordinary reader that, while com-
manding H.M.S. Galatea, Napier took an active part in the internal
affairs of Portugal and defeated Don Miguel ; and that, in conse-
quence of his action, he was given command of Don Pedro's fleet.
Yet, in fact, Napier quitted the Galatea early in 1832; succeeded
Sartorius in counnand of Don Pedro's fleet in 1833, and did not,
until he was already serving in that capacity, defeat Don Miguel.
I might, if it were worth while, cite scores of other misstate-
ments, equally astonishing, from the book in question, and from
other recent works dealing with Enghsh history. Surely, when
such misstatements are being circulated broadcast, it is not
" premature " to put forward a Naval History which, though it
may possibly contain errors on obscure points of fact or criticism,
and though it make no pretence to be absolutely complete and
final, has been, at least, prepared with a vast amount of care,
which is the outcome of reference, — not, of course, to all existing
original authorities, but to many thousands of unpublished docu-
ments, private and public, and to many thousands of printed
histories, biographies, official papers. Navy lists, pamphlets and
periodicals ; and which has involved research in, and, in some
cases, special journeys to, not merely many parts of England, but
also France, America, Spain, Holland, Russia, Denmark and Italy.
For Chapters XXVI, XXVII, and XXX, of the present volume,
and for the appendix and some of the notes to Chapter XXXI, I am
directly responsible. Sir Clements Markham contributes Chapter
XXIX ; Captain Mahan, Chapter XXXI, and Mr. L. Carr Laughton,
Chapter XXVIII, and the appendix thereto.
Captain Mahan desires me to express here, on his behalf, very
cordial thanks to Professor J. K. Laughton, K.N., who has kindly
assisted him in many ways in the preparation of Chapter XXXI, in
the present volume.^ With regard to that chapter, I ought to point
out that the plan, on p. 375, of the naval attack on Fort Moultrie,
Charleston, in 1770, will be found to differ, in some small and un-
important details, from Captain Mahan's description of the disposi-
tions of the ships and of the guns in the works. Seeing, however,
that the plan in question is based upon a contemporary di'awing
' "He kiuJly pfaced at my disposal numerous notes made by liim at tlie Record
Office. These liave been of great, and indeed of indispensable assistance in the
narrative." — Letter of Captain Mahan to W. L. ('.
INTUODUCTION TO VOLUME 111. XI
made upon the spot l)y a British naval ollicer, and intended to
accompany and illustrate the dispatch of Commodore Sir Peter
Parker (1), I have deemed it to he of more than suflicient interest
to warrant its reproduction. For its inclusion, however, Captain
Mahan is not responsible. Among other supplementary illustrations
which I have ventured to add to his chapter, is the valuable note on
p. 396. It is l)ut a brief note ; but it represents the results of many
days' labour ; and we should not have been able to obtain the
figures contained in it, had we not had the co-operation of Colonel
H. Hozier, Secretary of Lloyd's, who most kindly allowed some of
the clerks in his office to compile the table from the original
documents.
To Lord Vernon, for information concerning his distinguished
kinsman, Admiral Edward Vernon (1), and to Captain Thomas
Suckling, E.N. (retd.), I desire also to express special thanks.
I regret that, owing to the fact that more than one chapter
of the present volume has extended to greater length than was
originally intended, I have found it impossible to conclude the
history of the period 176'2-1793 with Mr. H. W. Wilson's account
of the minor operations of the War of American Revolution. That
account will form the first chapter of Vol. IV, which, since most
of it is already in type, will, I hope, be in a condition for publication
very early in the year 1899.
W. L. C.
Davos-am-Platz, Switzerland.
Nov. 1898.
ERRATA.
The reader is requested to correct the following errors, the presence of which was
not discovered until after the greater part of the volume had been sent to press.
P. 9, at end of the iahh, in the two lower lines, under Cables,
for Diameter of bower cables, read Circumference of Viovver cables.
P. 37?i, line ifrom hottom,
for Captain James Eeid, read Commander James Pieid.
„ line 2 from hottom,
for Christopher, read Tobias.
P. 380, line 5,
for Admiral Lord Howe, read Vice-Admiral Lord Howe.
P. .387, line 21,
for Caulfield, read Caulfeild.
P. 406, ill tahle in note, tinder Vigilant,
for Com. Hugh Cloberry Christian, rmd Com. Biabazon Christian
P. 471, line 18,
for Thomas Graves (1), read Thomas Graves (2).
P. 473, line 25,
for Caulfield, read Caulfeild.
„ line 26,
for Bonovier, read Bonavia.
P.'474, line 2 from bottom,
for Caulfield, read Caulfeild.
P. 505, in 2nd col. of tahle,
for Capt. George Murray, read Capt. Hon. George JIurra}'.
for Capt. IJobert Sutton, I'ead Capt. Bobert Manners Sutton.
P. 538, line 14,
for Bichard Hughes, Bart. (2), read Richard Hughes (3j, Bart.
„ in first foot-note,
for Bichard Hughes, Bart. (1), read Bichard Hughes (2), Bart.
P. 546, in ard col. of note,
for Ileros, read Eeros.
P. 550, *;; line 8 of ith col. of table,
for Lapalliere, read Lapelliere.
P. 554, line 35,
for Batacalo, 7-ead Batticaloa.
P. 557, line 12,
for Batacalo, read Batticaloa.
CONTENTS
VOLUME III.
CHAPTER XXVI.
r.\OE
Civil History of the Royal Navy, 1714-17G2 .... 1
CHAPTER XXVII.
Military History of thh Royal Navy, 1714-1762 :
Major Operations ........ 24
CHAPTER XXVIII.
Military History of toe Royal Navy, 1714-1762 :
Minor Operations ........ 250
Appendix to Chapters XXVII. and XXVIII. :
Losses of the Belli<;erent Powers —
(a) Losses of H.M. Ships from 1714-1763 . . . 310
(h) Losses of the French Navy, 1744-48 and 1755-62 . 312
((•) Losses of the Spanish Navy, 1718-19, 1739-48,
and 1762 314
CHAPTER XXIX.
Voyages and Discoveriks, 1714-1762. ..... 316
CHAPTER XXX.
Civil History of the Royal Navy, 1763-1792 .... 325
XVI CONTENTS OF VOLUME HI.
CHAPTER XXX T. .
I'AGK
Military History of the Koyal Navv, 17fi-i-1792 :
Major Operations ........ 353
Appendix to Ch.\pter XXXI. :
Llst of British Flao-Ofkicers on the Active List, 1762-1793 5G5
INDEX ,5G9
LIST OF ILLUSTKATIONS.
VOLUME III.
FULL-PAGE PHOTOGRAVURES.
George, Lord Anson, Admiral of the Fleet
George Brydges, Lord Rodney, Admiral .
Captain James Cook, R.N.
Richard, Earl Howe, Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Edward Huohes, K.B., Admiral .
. Front wpiece
Fdrinij iwrfp 242
34G
406
r,.r,o
FULL- PAGE ILLUSTRATIONS.
H.M.S. "Grafton," pitted with a jury ruddek, etc., for
her voyage to Englakd, after the storm off Loris-
nouRO, 17-t7. (Rwh Hervey's ' Naval History ) . Fdchiij [laiji? 1G9
Attack on Fort Moultrie, 1776 ..... Paijc .37-5
Part of North America and the North Atlantic, and
the West Indies .......,, 377
New York Harbour, and Neighbourhood . . . ,, 381
Martinique ........... 485
India and Ceylon ......... 544
ILLUSTRATIONS IN THE TEXT.
\,Tlir illiiKtrnlimis IIii/m nnirki'ij (') arc taken from 'A Naval Exitositar,' bij Tliainax Bih'ii Bhinrkhy :
Luinhii, 1750.] I
P.\nE
iTop 1
The French " Invincible," 74
The Spanish " Glorioso," 74
The French "Terrirle," 74
Hadley's Quadrant .
6
6
8
13
XVIU
ILLUSTRATIONS.
' Royal Standakd, of George II. .
CoMMEMouATivE Medal OF Mathews's Action, 1744
iSiu John Norris, Kt., Admiral ok the Fleet .
George Byng, Viscount Torrington, Admiral of the Klki
Commemorative Medal of Hyng's Victory', 1788
Admiral Nicholas Haddock ....
Admiral Ed\vaed Vernon. ....
Attack on Puerto Bello, 1739
Admiral Sir Charles Knowles. . .
Commemorative Medal of Operations at Cartagena,
The Neighbourhood of Toulon
Sir William Rovvlev, Admiral of the Fleet
Mathews's Action off Toulon, 1744 .
Admiral Thomas Mathews ....
Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Warren
Commemorative Medal of Anson's Victory, 1747
Admiral Sir Charles Knowles.
Port Louis, Hispaniola .....
Byng's Action, 1756, I., 2 p.m. .
Byxg's Action, 1756, XL, 2.30 p.m.
Byng's Action, 1756, III., 3 p.m.
Admiral the Hon. John Bvng ....
Vice-Admiral Charles Watson.
Captain Maurice Suckling, R.N.
Admiral Sir Charles Saunders
Admiral Sir George Pocock ....
Rear-Admiral Richard Kempenfelt .
The Harbour of Louisbourg ....
CoMME.MORATIVE MeUAL OF THE CaPTURE OP LoUISBOURG, 1758
Commemorative Medal op the Battle of Quiberon, 1759
Sib Peter Parker, Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral Sir Richard King
' Bittacle, or Binnacle, 1750 .
1 Voyal Block .....
' Ships' Fire-Engines, 1750
'Log, 1750
Hand Screw, or Jack, 1750
Signature of Richard, Earl Howe, Admiral of the Fleet
Comme.mobative Medal of Keppel's Action, 1778
Lake Champlain ......
;Manceuvres of Howe and d'Estaing .
Admiral Aui:u.stus Viscount Keppel.
PAGE
23
25
28
31
39
49
53
56
60
73
92
93
98
99
114
127
133
134
149
149
150
159
162
166
170
173
180
184
185
222
237
240
255
256
309
316
324
325
353
355
407
418
ILLUSTJUriONS.
XIX
Kkppel's Action off Ushant, 1778, T., 2.30 p.m.
Keppel's Action off Ushant, 1778, II., 6 p.m.
Admiral the Hon. Samuel Barrington
Northern Part of St. Lucia .
Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker (1) .
Byron's Action off Grenada
Admiral Harriot Arbutunot .
Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (2)
lloDNEY and de Guichen, April 17tii, 1780, I., 8 to 9 a.m
Rodney and de Guichen, April I'tii, 1780, II., noon to 1 p.m.
Rodney and de Guichen, May 15th, 1780
Cornwallis and de Ternay, June 20th, 1780
Admiral the Hon. Sir William Cornwallis
Commemorative Medal of the Capture of St. Eusta
Part of the Windward Islands
Arbuthnot and des Touches
Graves and de Grasse ....
Hood and de Grasse, January 2.5th, 1782, I.
Hood and de Grasse, January 2.5tii, 1782, II
Hood's Anchorage at St. Kitt's, 1782
Rodney and de Grasse, April 9th, 1782, I., 9.45 a. m
Rodney and de Grasse, April 9Tn, 1782, II., noon
Commemorative Medal of Rodney's Victory, 1782
Rodney and de Grasse, April 12th, 1782, A.
Rodney and de Grasse, April 12th, 1782, B.
Rodney and de Grasse, April 12Tn, 1782, C.
Rodney and de Grasse, April 12th, 1782, D.
SUFFREN AND JoHNSTONE, PoRTO PrAYA, 1781
Suffren and Huches, February 17th, 1782
SUFFREN AND HUCIHES, ApRIL 12Tn, 1782 .
Suffren and HuciHES, July Gth, 1782
SuFFKEN and Hu(;hes, September ord, 1782
r>Af:n
119
121
127
4:}0
433
436
441
444
455
457
465
475
470
480
483
491
498
514
515
517
522
523
524
52G
527
528
529
547
551
553
555
559
NAVAL HISTOEY.
CHAPTEE XXVI.
CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1714-1762.
Administration of the Navy — The Admiralty Board— The Sick and AVoundad Board —
The Admiralty Buildings— The Navy Office— The Navy Pay Office— First Lords
and Secretaries of the Admiralty, and Principal Officers of the Navy, 1714-1702 —
Naval Expenditure — Increase in various classes of ships — State of the fleet in 1714,
1727, 1752 and 1760 — The introduction of the true frigate — The dimensions of ships
— Conjplements — Small arms — Anchors — Gahles — Method of computing tonnage
— Service ordnance — The armament of ships — S(ime typical men-of-war — Cost of
men-of-war in 1719, 1733 and 1741 — Hadley's quadrant — Harrison's timel<eeper
— Coppering — Sail-cloth — The Eddystone Light — Lighthouses — Lightships — Tlio
King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions — Pilots — Smugglers — Vernon on
smugglers and their dangers — Repression of piracy — The Articles of War —
Greenwich Hospital — The encouragement of seamen — Prize money — Bounties to
seamen — Pay and half-pay — Officers' servants — Promotion to flag-rank — Super-
annuation of Captains — The establishment of uniform for officers — The rough life
of the service — The character of officers — Immorality i>n tlie lower deck — Health
of the Navy.
TAUKING the i^eriod 1714-17(32 very little change
^^ took place in the character of the machinery
whereby the Eoyal Navy was administered. That
machinery had attained a certain degree of perfection,
and was in fairly good working order. The Act of
William and Mary,^ which specified and defined the
functions of the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High
Admiral of England, continued to be the authority in virtue of which
the Admiralty Board acted; and the patent granted to her Admiralty
Board by Queen Anne was substantially reproduced from time to
time as fresh Boards succeeded one another. In the civil depart-
ment, the most important alteration was the appointment, in
1740, of a Sick and Wounded Board. The sick and hurt seamen
of the Navy had been looked after by a Commission in the reign
' 2 W. & M., sess. 2, c. 2.
VOL. III. B
2 CIVIL lIlSTOltV, 171.4-17G2. [1714-1762.
of Willi.iiu III. ; ))ut in 1092 the business Ixad been translerred to
the (Commissioners of the Register Office, and thence, in 1702, to
another separate Commission, which had lasted until ITI-'i. There-
after, for some years, things remained unsettled ; but in 1740, in
consequence of the war with Spain, a Commission was specially
granted to three persons, who were entrusted not only with the care
of sick and wounded seamen, but also with the superintendence of
medical stores supplied for the use of the Navy, the management of
naval hospitals ashore and afloat, the examination and appointment
of naval surgeons, and the maintenance and exchange of prisoners
of war. From 1745 to 1749, this Board consisted of four instead
of three Commissioners ; from 1749 to 1755, of two only ; from
April to November, 1755, of three, as at first ; and from 1755 to
1763, of four. Its offices were on Tower Hill.
The old Admiralty buildings at Wallingford House fell into decay
about the year 1722, when the office of the Commissioners was
temporarily transferred to a house in St. James's Square. The
older part of the present Admiralty buildings in Whitehall, was
completed and occupied in 1725, though not until 1760 was the
colonnade or screen built across the street-side of the court-j'ard to
mitigate the unpleasant effect produced by the attenuated propor-
tions of the columns on the western side of the square. The Navy
Office remained during the period at the corner of Seething Lane
and Crutched Friars ; and the Navy Pay Office was in Old Broad
Street.
The succession of the more important administrative officers was
as follows : —
First Lord op the Admiralty.
Oct. 14, 1714. Edward, Eari of Orford, Admiral.
Ap. 16, 1717. James, Earl of Berkeley, Admiral.
Aug. 2, 1727. George, Viscount Torrington, Admiral.
June 21, 1733. Sir Charles Wager, Kt., Admiral.
Mar. 19, 1742. Daniel, Earl of Winchelsea.
Dec. 1744. John, Duke of Bedford.
Feb. 20, 1748. John, Eari of Sandwich.
June 22, 1751. George, Lord Anson, Admiral.
Nov. 20, 1756. Richard, Eari Temple.
Ap. 1757. Daniel, Earl of Winchelsea.
June 30, 1757. George, Lord Anson, Admiral.
June 19, 1762. George, Eari of Hahfax.
Oct. 16, 1762. George Grenville.
1711-1762.]
nilNCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE KAVY.
Seceetaky of the Admiralty.
Feb.
Dec.
Josiah Burchett.
1742. Thomas Corbett.
1751. John Clevlaiul (with,
John Mihaes).
Treasdkeb of the Navy.
John Aislabie.
1718. Hichard Hampden.
1720. Sir Geo. Byng, Kt., Adni.
1724. Hon. Henry ]?attee Byug.
■ 1725. William Corbett.
1734. Arthur Onslow.
1742. Thomas Clutterbuck.
1742. Sir Charles Wager, Kt.,
Admiial.
1743. Sir John Rusbont, Bart.
1744. George Doddington.
1749. Hon. Henry Bilson Legge.
1754. George Grenville.
George Doddington.
George Grenville.
George Doddington.
George Grenville.
William Wildman, Vis-
count Barrington.
1755
1756
April
1757
June
1757
17G2
April
Jan.
ilar.
Mar.
Feb.
Nov.
June
Dec.
Mar.
June
Aug.
Controller of the Navy.
Sir Charles Wager, Kt.,
Eear-Admiral.
1718. Thomas Swanton (1),
Captain, R.N.
1722. James Mighells, Vice-Ad-
miral.
1734. lUchard Haddock (2),
Captain, E.N.
12, 1749. Savage Mostyn, Captain,
E.N.
1755. Edward Falkingham (1),
Captain, E.N.
1755. Charles Saunders, Cap-
tain, R.N.
1756. Digby Dent (2), Captain,
R.N.
1756. George Cockburne, Cap-
tain, R.N.
Surveyor of the Navy.
William Ijee.
1715. Jacob Ackworth.
1746. Joseph Allin.
— fThonias Slade.
' ■^■'•\ William Bateley
as assistant and deputy,
Clee
V OF THE Acts.
Samuel Atkins.
May
1719.
Tempest Holmes
Sept.
1726.
Thomas Pearce.
April
1743.
John Clevland.
Aug.
1746.
Robert Osborne.
July
1747.
Daniel Devert.
Jan.
1761.
Timothy Brett.
Mar.
1761.
Edward Mason.
Nov.
Aug.
\ Fel).
Mar.
Dec.
Aug.
Mar.
Nov.
Nov.
June
July
Nov,
17.-
Controller of the TREAsaREu's
Accounts.
Dennis Liddell.
1717. Richard Burton.
17, 1727. Sir George Saunders, Kt.,
Captain and Rear-Adui.
1735. George Purvis, Captain,
R.N.
1740. John Philipson.
1743. William Corbett.
1753. Richard Hall.
r. 1761. Timothy Brett.
Controller of the Victualling
Accounts.
Benjamin Timewell.
1714. Eichard Burton.
1717. John Fawler.
1744. Francis Gashry.
1747. Robert Osborne.
Controller of the Storekeeper's
Accounts.
Thomas Jennings, Cap-
tain, R.N.
1714. Charles Cornwall, Cap-
tain, R.N.
Thomas Swanton (1),
Captain, E.N.
William Cleveland, Cap-
tain, R.N.
Robert Byng.
1739. John Philipson.
George Crowle.
Eichard Hall.
George Adams.
Hon. William Bateman,
Captain, R.N.
B 2
July
1716.
April
1718.
May
1732.
May
1739.
Mar.
1740.
Mar.
1752.
Aug.
1753.
Mar.
1761.
Nov.
Dec.
Jan.
E,\TK.\ CoMMISSIONKllS.
Isaac Towne.sen(l, < 'n|jtaiii,
K.N.
Lawrence ^V^ii!;llt, ('ap-
tain, E.N.
171-). .Tolm Fawlcr.
1717. Thomas Colby.
1727. Sir George Saunders, Kt.,
Captain, 1!.X.
CIVIL niSTOUY, 1711-1702.
June
[I714-17G2.
\~ti\. Artliur Scott, Cai)tain,
K.N.
N'ov. 1755. Thomas Cooper, Captain,
R.N.
Jan. 17'!]. Thomas Hanway, Caj)-
tain, K.N.
Portsrnouth : —
Nov. 1714. Isaac Townesenil, Captain,
R.N.
M.iy 1720. Sir Isaac Townesend, Kt., I ]^^j. 1729. Richard Hughes (1),
Captain, R.N
1731. Robert Byng.
1732. Lord Vere Beauclcrk, Cap-
tain, R.N.
1738. George Crowlc.
1740. Francis Gashry.
Aiiril •;, 1743. James Comjiton, Captain,
R.N.
April (1, 1743. Alexander Geddes, Cap-
tain, K.N.
1744. James Oswald.
174G. Edward Falkinghani (1),
Captain, R.N.
1747. John Russell.
1755. Thomas Cooiser, Captain,
R.N.
1755. Arthur Scott, Captain,
R.N.
1756. Digby Dent (2), Cap-
tain, R.N.
1750. Hon. William Bateman,
Captain, R.N
May
May
May
Mai-
Jan.
May
July
Feb.
Nov.
Mar.
May
Dec.
Captain, R.N.
Feb. 175!. Richard Hughes (2),
Captain, K.N. (Bart.
1773).
Phjrnuiith : — •
Nov. 1714. Sir William Jumper, Kt.,
Captain, R.N.
Mar. 1715. Thomas Swauton, Caii-
tain, R.N.
July 1716. Francis Dove, Captain,
K.N.
April 1726. Sir Nicholas Trevaniou,
Kt., Captain, R.N.
Dec. 9, 17:57. Matthew Norris, Captain,
K.N.
Jan. 173i<. Philij) Vanbrugh, Captain,
R.N.
Oct. 1753. Frederick Rogers, Captain,
R.N. (Bart. 1773).
Beptfvvd and Woohcich ' : —
_ .^■. r, • Henrv Greenhill.
1756. Digbv Dent (2), Caiitam, ,, or- T-it rri " ti-u i r.
° •, , .^.■" ' ' May 26,1(44. Thomas \\ horwood, Cain
R.^ . (agaui). J ' ^ ■ T, XT
^ " ^ tarn, R.N.
Jan. 1745. Edward Falkingham (1),
Captain, R.N.
May 1746. James Compton, Captain,
R.N.
Dee. 1747. William Davies, Captain,
K.N.
Jan. 1761. Edward Mason.
Mar. 1761. Sir Richard Temple.
Mai-. 1761. Sir John Bentley, Cap-
tain, R.N.
Commissioners at H.^I. Dock-
yards, ETC.
f'hntham : —
Nov. 1714 James Littleton, Captain
and Rear-Admiral.
Gihraltar ami Minorrn : —
Dec. 10, 1742. Eilward Falkingham (1),
Captain, R.N.
Mar.
July
April
1722. Thomas Kempthorne, Jime 20, 1744. Thomas Trefusis, Captain,
Captain, R.N.
R.X.
1730. Thomas Mathews, Cap- ; Feb. 25, 1747. John Towry, Captain,
tain, E.N.
R.N.
1742. Charles Brown, Captain, j June 22, 1750. Charles Colby, Captain,
R.N.
R.N.
' The business of these Yards was conducted by the Commissioners in Loudon,
after the death of Captain Davies on February 16th, 1759.
1714-1762.]
THE NAVY ESTIMATES.
The following statement of the sums annually voted by Parlia-
ment for the " extra " and for the " ordinary " expenses of the
Royal Navy, and of the number of seamen and Marines authorised
for each year, is taken from Derrick's ' Memoirs of the Rise and
Progress of the Royal Navy.' ' It should be explained that the
money voted under the head of " extra," was almost invariably
used for building or repairing ships, for providing furniture and
stores for such vessels, or for improving the Royal Dockyards ; but
that, occasionally, portions of the money were employed for the
replenishment of the supplies of hemp, timber, etc., when the
quantities in hand happened to be low, and for other special
services : —
Year.
E.xtra.
Ordiuary.
No. of Seamen
and Marmes.i
Year.
Extra.
Oidiuaiy
Xit. of Seamen
and Marines.!
£
£
£
£
1715
237,277
233,471
((a) 10,000
\(h) 16,000
1739
1740
222,689
199,704
12,000
35,000
1716
230,623
233,849
10,000
1741
184,691
40,000
1717
200,761
226,799
10,000
1742
188,7.56
40,000
1718
165,317
224,857
10,000
1743
188,558
40,000
1719
88,494
212,638
13,. 500
1744
192,834
40,000
1720
79,723
217,918
13,500
1745
200,479
40,000
1721
50,200
219,049
10,000
1746
198,048
40,000
1722
218,799
7,000
1747
196,259
40,000
1723
216,388
10,000
1748
208,827
40,000
1724
214,622
10,000
1749
285,878
17,000
1725
214,295
10,000
1750
197^896
293,625
10,000
1726
212,181
10,000
1751
140,257
290,302
8,000
1727
199,071
20,000
1752
100,000
277,718
10,000
1728
205,561
15,000
17.53
280,206
10,000
1729
206 , 025
15,000
1754
100,000
278,747
10,000
1730
120^618
213,168
10,000
1755
100,000
280,288
12,000
1731
212,034
10,000
1756
200,000
219,021
.50,000
1732
60^000
212,885
8,000
1757
200,000
223,939
55,000
1733
104,003
211,495
8,000
1758
200,000
224,421
60,000
1734
202,670
20,000
1759
200,000
238,491
60,000
1735
198,914
.30,000
1760
200,000
232,629
70,000
1736
30^167
217,269
15,000
1761
200,000
258,624
70,000
1737
50,000
219,201
10,000
1762
200,000
272,226
70,000
1738
40.000
222 , 885
J- (c) 10,000
t(rf) 20,000
1 The cost of these was in addition to the sums specifier! in the " Extra " and ' ' Ordinary " columns,
(a) Number to Midsummer. (&) Number from Midsummer to December 31st. (c) Number to April 10th.
{iT) Number from ,\pril luth to December 31st.
For several years after the death of Queen Anne, the number of
ships belonging to the Royal Navy showed no increase, but rather
a slight diminution. Nevertheless there was, even in those days,
an increase in the total tonnage. But, from the death of George I.
1 4tu. Loufkin, 1806.
CIVIL niSTOJ!); 1711-17'i2.
[17I4-17G2.
onwards, the Navy grew enormously There was no tendency to
add to the number of the first and second rates — vessels which
were only useful for special purposes, and which, as late as the
middle of the eighteenth century,' it was customary to lay up
every winter. Of the third, fifth, and sixth rates, and of the
sloops, on the other hand, increasingly greater numbers were built.
The third rates were the vessels which experience showed to be,
upon the whole, most serviceable for the line-of-battle. The fifth
and sixth rates were the ships with which the country found it
could best deal with the enemy's cruisers ; and the sloops were
THE FRKNcit III riiicibJe, 74. THE SPAXISH GIvrioso, 74.
Taken hi/ I'uii'-Aclininil Anson, 1747. Taken bij the KusseU, 80, 1747.
{From Ihe drawinijs by Clianiock.)
the natural foes of small privateers, and the natural agents for
the general policing of the seas. That the number of fourth rates
did not increase is attributable to the gradual discovery of the
fact that fifty and sixty-gun ships, while too small and hght for
the line-of-battle, were too large and heavy for ordinary cruising
pui-poses. They continued to be built in small numbers, chiefly
because they were suitable craft for service in the colonies, and, as
flagships, on the less important stations, in war, and almost every-
where in peace ; and, because they continued to be built, they
occasionally found their way into the line-of-battle. But occupying,
' \'eruun"s correspondeuce with the Admiralty in 1745 is full of references to the
danger of keeping three-deckers at sea during the winter mouths.
1T14-1TG1'.]
STRENGTH OF THE FLEET.
as they did, an intermediate position Ijetween the linc-oi-biiitlesliips
and the regular cruiseris, and belonging positively to neither, their
value was limited in l)i>th directions.
The " state " of the fleet at four different dates during th(! period
now under review is given below ; —
Rates oit Classes.
First-rates, 100 guns .
.Sfciiml-ratos. 84 to 90 guns .
Tliiril-ratcs, (J4 to 80 guns .
Fuurtli-rati'S, 50 ' to (iO guns.
Ships of tlic line, or of 50 guns ^
and upwards .... I
Death of
Queen Aiiue.
Aug. 12th, 17U.
Burthen
Tons.
131
12
Fifth-rates, 30 to 44 guTis .
Sixth-rates, 10 - to 30 guns .
Sloops, 8 to 20 guns .
Bombs
Fireships
Busses
Storeships
Hospital ships
Yachts j 15
Hoys, lighters, transports . 13
Hulks S
Ships under the line, or of ) , , ,.
less than 50 guns . . . (■ ^"
Total ships of all classes . i247
11,703
19,323
47,708
Death i)f
George I.
June lOtb, 1727.
No.
51,379, 04
130,173124
19,836
0,(31
8G9
597
263
"516
1,521
1,009
5,774!
Burthen
Tons.
Peace.
Dec. 31st, 1752.
Burthen
Tons.
12,945 5
20,125 13
47,9.58
."50,754
131,782132
15,0G5 39
9,700 39
1,390
417
1,057
37,046109
167,219233
546
532
1,378
1,216
7,719
39,080159
9,602
21,2.50
65,277
69,1.55
Death of
George II.
Oct. 25th, 1700.
Burthen
Tous.
9,958
22.825
109,494
07,901
165,284155 : 210,177
28,813: 54
19,129' 61
8,036
1,104
678
iil95
2,037
8,648
39,173
31,618
12,859
4,117
2,337
242
1.554
2,791
1,518
2,761
11,957
69,640 257
170,802 291 I 234,924412
110,927
321,104
1 The 50-guu ships were not couuted as of the liue-of-battle after about 1756.
- l\Iost ships of under 20 ginis were cuuute.t as sloops, ^'.t'., Commanders' commands, after ahout ITou.
The Seven Years' War (1756-1762) saw the introduction to the
service of a class of vessel which, for nearly a hundred years after-
wards, was of the highest value. This was the regular frigate,
built to cruise at good speed, and carrying a . reasonably heavy
armament on one deck. There had previously been no vessels
that thoroughly fulfilled this ideal. The forty -four, and even the
forty-gun ships of an earlier date were cramped two-deckers ; and
below them, until after 174.5, there was nothing more formidable
than the wretched twenty-gun ship, carrying nine-pounders as her
heaviest weapons. Genuine frigates, mounting twenty-eight guns,
began to be built about 1748 ; but still no larger gun than the nine-
pounder found a place in them. The twelve-pounder thirty-two-
gun frigate appeared at about the same time, the earliest examples
8
CIVIL IIISTOBY, 1714-1702.
[I714-I7C2.
being the Adventure (1741), and Diana, Juitu, Suuthuinj)tun, and
Vestal (1757). Then came the twelve-pounder thirty-six-gun frigates,
the best British fighting cruisers of the days before the accession of
George III. The first of these, the PaUan and the Brilliant, were
built under the superintendence of Sir Thomas Slade in 1757. Yet
even they were inferior to thirty-six-gun frigates which were in
possession of the French at about the same time. In a table
given hereafter, the student will find materials for comparing the
British Brilliant, 36, of 1757 with the French Aurore, which was
captured from her original owners in 1758, and added to the Royal
Navv as the Aurora, 3(5.
THE Terrible 74. taken from the i-kench, 1747.
(Fnnn a dniwir/g hij John Chantuc.k.)
The first half of the eighteenth century witnessed repeated
efforts to establish unvarying standards of size, tonnage, and
armament for each of the classes of men-of-war then in most
general use. At least two of these efforts — those of 1719 and
of 1745 — met with considerable success ; and the rules tentatively
adopted in each of those years were for some time largely, though
not exclusively, adhered to in the construction of ships. But it was
probably discovered that to aim at rigorous uniformity was to check
improvement ; and, after about the year 1755, all efforts in this
direction were wisely relinquished. Seeing, however, that many
vessels were built according to these successive "establishments,"
1714-17Gli.]
EUTABLISHMKNliS AND liATEH.
9
it may not l)e deemed improper to give here some particulars of
them : —
■Ih
ee-deckers.
'J
wo-det-kers.
24
98
t
20
'^^5
No. of guns ....
100
and
80
74 70 : 64 60 53
44
40
i^
90
1 ! i
1719
Length ou gundeck, ft. in.
174 0
164 0 158 0
. . 151 0 . . 144 0 134 0
124 0
106 0
Length of keel for ton i
nape,' ft. in j
140 ?
132 5128 2
.. |123 2 .. 117 7
109 8
101 8
87 9
Breailth, extreme, ft. in. .
50 0
47 2 44 6
.. ] 41 6 ..
39 0
36 0
33 2
28 4
Depth in hold. it. in. . .
20 0
IS 10 18 2
..17 4 ..
16 5
15 2
14 0
9 2
Burthen in ions
1869
1666 1350
.. 1 1128 [ ..
an
756
594
--^
374
1733
Length on gundeck, ft. in.
1V4 0
166 0 158 0
151 0 ..
144 0
134 0
124 0
106 0
§
Length of keel for t(»u-|
nage. ft. in J
140 7
134 1
127 8
122 0, ..
116 4
108 3
100 3
85 8
p
Breailth, extreme, ft. in. .
50 0
47 9
45 5
43 5] ..
41 5' 38 6
35 8
30 6
a
5
Depth ill Iiold, ft. in. . .
20 6
19 6
18 7
17 9 ..
16 11 15 9
14 6
9 5
Burthen in tons . . .
1869
1623
1400
1224 1 ..
1068 853
678
- -
429
■^
1741
Length on gundeck, ft. in.
175 0
163 0 161 0
154 0 ..
147 0 140 0
126 0
••
112 0
Length of keel for ton-j
nage, ft. in j
142 4
137 0 130 10
125 6 ..
119 9 113 9
1
102 6
••
91 6
A
Breadth, extreme, ft. in. .
50 0
48 0 46 0
44 o' ..
42 0
40 0
3G 0
32 0
■^
Depth in hold. ft. in. . .
21 0
20 2, 19 4
18 111 ..
IS 1
17 2i
15 5i
H 0
Burthen in tons . . .
1892
1079
1472
165 0
1291 j ..
1123
968
706
498
1745
Length on gundeck, ft. in.
178 0
170 0
160 0 .. 150 0 144 0
133 0
113 0
Length of keel for tou-|
nage, ft. in J
144 6i
138 4134 101
131 4 ..
123 Oijn7 8i
108 10
93 4
Breadth, extreme, ft. in. .
51 0
48 6 47 0
45 0 ..
42 8
41 0
37 0
32 0
\
Depth in hold, ft. in. . .
21 6
20 6 20 0
19 4 ..
1< 6
17 8
16 0
11 0
Burthen in tons . . .
2000
1730 1585
1414 . .
1191
1052
814
• •
508
(
1719
Complement of men . .
780
680
620
440 ' ..
365
2S0
190
130
?'
I7:w
11 H )1 • -
850
750
600
480
400
300
250
140
■i)
1741
>1 H >) • •
850
750
600
4«0
400
300
250
140
(
1745
.•
860
750
650
000
520
470
180
420
350
280
160
/
1745
fMusket:^, bayonets, cavt-l
\ ridge-boxes . . ■. ./
200
200
200
120
100
SO
a'/
Piiii-s -of pistols ....
50
50
50
50
40
30
20
Poie-axes (l)oarding-axes)
50
50
50
50 ..
40
35
50
i
Swords (cutlasses) with i
belts (
200
200
200
200 . .
140
120
80
\
Hand ^ Hades ....
200
200
200 , ..
1.0, ..
100
100
31-5
100
!l
1719
f Weight of bower auchors, )
i cwts )
77
67-5 1 61-5 ..
51-5
.. 46-5 1 39-5
21
^TA^ (Weight of bower audiurs, i
^^*^ 'I cwts f
81
73-5 1 69-5 69-5
58-7
.. 53
49
40-5
29-5
Jl
1719
/Diameter of bo*er cables, t
i in /
23
22
21
19-5
18-5
17-5
■•
16
..1 14
6\
1745
fDiameter of bower cables.l
I in )
24
23
22
22
21
,.
20
19
17-5
15
I In 1719 IbL- uicthod of deteruuuiug the length of keel for tonnage, and the rule for ooluimting tonnage, were
settled by the Lords of the Admiralty as follows : —
" On a straight line with the lower part of the rabbit of the keel ere.t a perpendieidar or square line to the
upper edge of the wiug transjm, at the afterpart of the plauk ; and, at the stern, to the forepart of the plank at
5th8 p^rt of the height of the wiug transom. The length between the said perpendiculars, added to -„»^"' of the
extreme breadth (allowing for the stern and stern post without the rabbit), from which subtract ,^'Vths of the
height of the wiug tran,s<jm for the rake abaft, and also ^'i>» of tue main breadth for the rake afore, leaves
the length of the keel for tonnage. Multiply this by the breadth, ami the product by half the breadth, and
divide by 94. The result gives the tonnage."
A simpler and more commonly-used method, both before and after tlo- official adoption of the above highly-
conventional formula, was: to multiply the length of the keel into the e.Ktreme breadth of the ship withiu-board,
taken along the midship beam, and to multiply the product by the depth of the hold from the plank joining to the
keelson upwards to the main deck ; and to divide the last product by 94. The result gave the burthen in tons.
See Derrick ; ' Mems. of the Roy. Navy,' 301 ; Falconer, * Diet, of the .Marine ' ; Willett, in ' Archa'ologia,' ii. 154.
The last erroneously says that the nnmber to be divided by was 96.
The establishments of 1733 and 1741 were proposed, but never
10
CIVIL II] STORY, 1714-1702.
[17U-17G2.
officially adopted. Many ships were nevertheless bnilt in accord-
ance with them.
The establishniont of 174.5 was generally adhered to for about
ten years. There was never afterwards any regular estabbshnient
so far as dimensions were concerned.
The mode in which these and other vessels of the period were
armed can be seen at a glance on reference to the tables on the
following pages.
Although practically all the ships of the Navy were armed ac-
cording to a regular "establishment" as thus indicated, many vessels
were built upon lines which differed from any of the " establish-
ments " for dimensions and tonnage ; and it is therefore well to give
particulars of a few craft, both British built ships and prizes taken
from the enemy and added to the service, which may be regarded
either as typical specimens of the best home constructions of the
time, or as models, the capture of which drew the attention of
British constructors to points wherein foreign designers excelled
them. These will be foixnd on page 12.
The estimated cost of building and equipping a ship of each of
the principal classes, and of storing her with eight months' boat-
swain's and carpenter's stores, according to the Navy Board Regula-
tions, was, in 1719, 1733, and 1741 respectively : —
Guns.
171'J
1733
1741
R.ME.
Cost
OF
Total
Cost
ready
for Sea.
Cost
OF
Total
Ci«t
ready
for Sea.
Cost
of
Total
Hull,
Masts and
Yards.
Kigging
aud
•Stores.
Hull,
Masts and
Yards.
Eigg'ng
and
Stores.
Hull,
Masts and
Y'ards.
Rigging
aud
Stores.
Co,.t
ready
for S^a.
I
100
32,707
£
7,476
£
40,183
£
32,725
£
7,957
40,682
£
33,110
£
8,050
£
41,151
TT
00
26,622
6,264
.32,886
27,591
6,897
34,488
28,543
7,1.35
35,678
111
HO
21,937
5,400
27,337
22,7,50
5,950
28,700
23,920
6,256
30,176
70
17,202
4,512
21,714
18,666
5,202
23,868
19,687
5,488
25,175
IV
60
1 14, 027
3,804
17,831
15,753
4,539
20,292
16,564
4,786
21,350
.50
'10,192
3,020
13,212
11,753
3,625
15,140
13,064
4,117
17,185
V
40
I 6,355
2,356
8,731
7,254
2,881
10,1.35
7,554
3,003
10,557
VI
20
3,216
1,496
4,712
3,689
1,823
5,512
4,282
2,117
6,399
Many improvements which increased the material efficiency of
the Royal Navy were made in the period 1714-1762. One of these
was the invention of the reflecting quadrant, an invention usiially
associated with the name of Doctor Hadley, and introduced by him
XT14-17G1'.] GUNS. 11
l'AI!'J'li'tI|,Ai;S (IF Sf.KVK'K OuNS (EsTABI.TSIlMENT OF 171.'!).'
CHAKGES.
Wiii'iagr-
Nature.2
Ijeugth.
Wcigbt.
Calibre.
-
Allow-
Proof.
Service.
Saluting.
Scaling.
ance.
Ft.
In.
Cwt.
111.
Lb. 055.
Lb. oz.
Lb. 07,.
Lb.
oz.
In.
42-pomuler
10
0
G5
7-03
25 0
17 0
11 4
3
4
■35
32-poundei-
i)
G
55
6-43
21 8
14 0
9 1
»>
12
" 'V\
24-pounder (a)
9
6
50
5-84
18 0
11 0
7 0
2
0
•;iO
(i)
9
0
46
! '
, ,
,
, ,
18-pounder («)
9
(i
42
5-3
15 0
9 0
(i (.)
1
8
'27
(i)
9
0
39
, ,
12-pouiider (a)
9
6
.",(;
4-i;4
12 0
6 0
4 12
1
0
•24
• „ (?')
9
0
32
, ,
J J
(«)
H
6
31
, ,
9 -pounder (o)
9
0
28-5
4-22
9 0
4 8
4 i)
12
•22
(i)
8
6
27
, ^
J '
(c)
H
0
2fi
, ,
, ,
('^)
(
G
24
, ,
» )
(.e)
1
0
23
, ,
(i-poimder (a)
9
0
24-5
;m;7
G 0
3 0
3 0
8
•111
(h)
8
6
22
, ,
, ,
(v)
8
0
21
, ,
) )
(d)
1
G
20
, ,
> '
,
(«)
t
0
19
, ,
, ,
, ,
(/)
i;
G
17
, ,
, ,
4-pouiider
;V22
4 0
2 0
2 0
6
■is
3-pounder
4
G
7
2-91
3 0
1 S
1 8
4
•14
i-pouudei' ^ .
'■'
i;
1-r.
I -(III
s
1
-1
1
1 From Mouutaine, 'Practical Sea-Guuner"s Cfmipaniou,' 174".
- The reference letters in this column refer to the similar letters employeil in the next table (Disposition of Guns).
3 These were swivels, usually inounteil on the bulwarks, etc., anil sometimes referred to as patereroes.
Disposition of the Gcxs ls the vaiiious Cl.%.sses op H. M. Smrs, 171G. 1743. 17;"i7.
I Low er Deck.
Deck.
Classes op Ships.
Kg. Prs. I No. I Prs.
Upper Deck.
Quarter
Deck.
No. Prs. No. Prs.
100 .'lius.
90
80
74
70
(large class) .
(ordinary class)
„ (large class) .
„ (ordinary c4nss)
„ (large class) .
„ (ordinary class)
C4 ,
GO „ (large class) .
,, (ordinary class)
58
(small class) .
50 „ (large class) .
1716 28
1743
1757
1757
1716
1743
1757
1757
1716
1743
1757
1757
1757
171G
1757
1743
1737
1757
1716
1757
17.37
1743
1757
{''3">«
42 or
32
42 28
' 42 I 28
32 I 30
32 j 26
> 32 26
32 , 26
32 26
32 I 2G
32 1 26
32 I 26
32 I ..
32 ..
24 ..
32 ..
32 ..
24 , ..
24 ..
24 ..
24 ..
24 I ..
24(a)| ..
1 24 I . .
24 I 28
24(a) 28
1 24 28
j 18 30
18 26
18(a) 26
18 I 26
18 24
12 I 24
18(6)
12
24
24
30
28
26
28
26
2G
26
26
26
26
24
22
12
12
6
4
12(.0
12
G(f)
4
12
12
G
4
12
;i
1(1
6
12(/.)
10
G((()
12
1)
(i
10
4
4
i;
li
ti
d(u)
4
6 ((0
6
4
G
24
12
9
4
18
14
9
4
12
14
G
4
18
12
9
2
IS (i) 10
12 10
12
'J
12
9
12(a)
12
•JOI) 2
6 2
G 2
6 2
G 2
6 2
G((/) 2
6 2
G(a)
(J
1)
G
G(c)
6
!)
I)
G
9
9 0')
G
G
G
G
<;
G(;,)
6
12
CIVIL lIISTOItY, 1714-1762.
Disi'ijsiTiON (IK THE GrN.s, ETC. — Continued.
[1714-1TG2.
Classes of Sllirs
50 guns (ordinary class)
44
40
36
32
30
28
24
20
14
12
10
8
,. (liirjrt! ('lass) .
,, (ordinary class)
,, (ship-rigged)
III
Lower Deck.
Middle
Deck.
Upper Deck.
(^uarUrr
Deck.
Forecastle.
No.
Pre.
No.
Pre. 1 No.
Pre.
No. Prs.
No.
Pre.
1716
22
18
.. 1 22
9
4 6
2
6
1743
1757
22
24(h)
18
.. ! 22
.. 22
12(c)
9
4
4
6(e)
6
2
2
6(c)
6
1757
20
18
.. 22
9
2
6
1743
1757
20
20
18(6)
18
20
20
9(c)
9
4
6(/)
4
c'
1716
20
12
.
20
6
..
1757
26
12
8
6
2
6
1757
26
12
4
6
2
6
1716
8
9
.. 20
6
2
4
17.i7
24
9
4
3
1757
1716
2
9(e)
20
20
9(e)
6
2 3
1743
20
9
1757
20
9
1757
14
6
1757
12
4
1757
10
4
1757
8
3
TyI'
CAL SUIPS OF WaH, 1
'14-1762.
Length of
Ship.
Dat.' of
Launch
1
—
Beam. Depth.
Hurthen
in Tons.
Where, and by whom Built.
12
Deck, i '"«'•
ft.
in. : ft.
in.
ft.
in. ft.
in.
Royal Sovereign 100
1728
175
0
140
7 50
3i20
1
1883
Chatham, J. EosewcU.
Boyal George
100
1756
178
0
143
5J51
9*21
6
2047
Woolwich, J. Pownall.
Bartkur
90
1716
163
0
131
9' 47
3 IS
6
1565
Deptford.
Blenheim
90
1761
176
1
142
3 49
1 21
0
1S27
AVoolwieb. J. Pownall.
Cornwall
80
1726
158
0 il2S
2 44
6 IS
2
1350
Deptford.
Primess Amelii
I ' 80
1757
165
0 ll33
0 47
3 20
0
1579
Woolwich, J. Pownall.
Invhicihle .
74
*1747
171
3 il39
Oi-19
3 21
3
1793
*Takeu from the French.
Terrible. .
74
*1747
164
1 ,133
11*47
3 20
7i
1590
*TfiUen from the French.
Mars
74
1759
165
6 1134
4 46
3 19
9
1556
Woolwich. .1. Pownall.
Princesa
70
*1740
165
1 ll30
3 49
8 22
3
1709
*Tal£en from the Spaniards.
Monmouth .
70
1742
151
0 123
2 43
5 17
9
1225
Deptford.
Dorsetshire .
70
1757
162
0
134
4S44
10 19
8
1436
Portsmouth. E. Allen.
Captain .
64
1743
151
0
122
0 43
6 17
9
1230
Woolwich, J. Holland.
Fhjmnuth .
60
1722
144
7
118
0
39
(1 16
5
954
Chatham.
lit pan .
60
1758
155
5
128
0
42
7 IS
7
1242
Woolwich, J. Pownall.
Conquistador
60
*1762
155
9 128
6
43
3 19
3
1278
*Taken from theSpaniards.
Oxford . .
50
1727
134
6 109
10
36
3 15
2
767
Portsmouth.
Bomney .
50
1752
146
0 1120
Si 30
4*17
2
1046
Woolwich. J. Harris.
Ludlow Castle
44
1744
126
10|'103
8 36
3' 15
5i
725
Thames.
Phainix .
44
1759
140
9 ill6
10J37
1|16
0
856
Thames. M. Batsou.
Brilliant .
36
1757
128
4 [106
2; 35
8 12
4
718
Plymouth.
Aurora .
36
*1758
144
0 ills
9 38
Si 15
2
946
*Taken from the French.
Juno
32
1757
127
10 107
Oi34
3 11
10
667
Thames, Alexander.
Crescent .
32
*175S
130
5 107
6i35
9 11
2
731
*Taken from the French.
Co rent ry
28
1757
118
43 97
OA 34
OJIO
6
599
Beaulieu, H. Adams.
Doljihiu.
24
1751
113
0 93
4 32
1 11
0
511
Woolwich. Fellowes.
Gibraltar .
20
1756
107
SJ 88
0 30
4 9
8
430
Beaulieu, H. Adams.
Scorpion
14
1746
91
2 74
11*26
4 12
0
276
Beaulieu.
Furnace^ lu iiuli
14
1740
91
6 73
111
26
4 11
0
273
Thames.
Terror, bomb
8
1759
91
6 : 74
1*
27
8 12
1
301
Harwich, Barnard.
Princess Angus
a' vt.
1710
73
8 1 57
7A
22
61 9
6
155
Deptford. J. Allen.
Boyal Charlotte
v(.
174!)
90
0 ' 72
2l 24
7 11
0
''32
Dc|itt'ord. .7. Holland.
ITlil.]
IIAIiTi rSON'S TIMEKEEl'Kli.
13
about 17.'51. ]!at after Hadley's doatli, there was found ainoiii^' liis
papers a dnciiinent in the handwritin<,' of Sir Isaac Newton, con-
taining a drawing and description of an instrument somewhat
similar to Hadley's ; so that, apparently, the credit of the innova-
tion should he divided between these men of science, if not given
altogether to the elder of them.
The efforts which had been made under Queen Anne to induce
inventors to turn their attention to the perfection of methods for
discovering the longitude at sea, were continued ; and in 1753 a new
HADLEV S QUADRANT.
{From Juh/t liohcrtwu's ^ Elinncnta of Navigatiuti^ Luitdoit, 1742. >
Act was passed in furtherance of the desired object. In 1761 the
Board of Longitude decided to give official trial to the timekeepers
of Mr. Harrison, a watchmaker who had produced a clock or
chronometer of unusual accuracy ; and at the instance of the Board,
the Admiralty placed the Deptford, 50, Captain Dudley Digges, at
Mr. Harrison's disposal for the purpose. The ship, with Harrison
on board, sailed from Portsmovith on November 18th ; and, both at
Madeira and at Jamaica, it was found that the timekeeper which
had been experimented with still showed the correct time. From
Jamaica, Harrison returned to England in the Merlin, 14, Captain
]4 rjvjL JiisTonr, 1711-1702. [1755.
Eichard Carteret. On March •2:Siil, ITIi'i, the Mrrlin fell in with
the Essex, G4, Captain Alexander Schombei'g, which had been off
Scilly on the preceding evening. Her reckoning agreed exactly with
that of the timekeeper ; and on the '26th, when Harrison reached
Portsmouth, he found that his instrument, in spite of much shaking
owing to had weather, had lost only 1 minute 54 'o seconds since it
had left England more than four months earher. This result mai'ked
a great advance upon anything that had been attained up to that time.
It was at about the same time that the experiment of coppering
ships' bottoms to preserve them against the w'orm was first officially
tried in the Navy. In 1761, the Alarm, 32, was so treated, but,
although the effect was found to be satisfactory, the general
introduction of the improvement was impeded for several years,
owing to the galvanic action which was set up between the copper
and the iron bolts of the vessel's hull, and to the evils which this
action wrought. The difficulty was ultimately got over by using
only copper fastenings in the under-w"ater portion of ships'
hulls ; yet it was not until 1783 that this measure of precaution
was ordered to be generally adopted, and, until then, copper
sheathing, while applied to specimens of every class of ships,
was very far from being universal in the service.
To encourage home manufactures, it was enacted in 1746 that
every ship built in Great Britain or in the American colonies should,
when first prepared for sea, be provided wdth a suit of sails made of
cloth woven in Great Britain, under penalty of £50 ; and that every
sailmaker in Great Britain or the plantations should, upon failing
to place his name and address legibly and fully upon each new sail
made by him, be fined ^10.
After the burning of Budyard's wooden tower in 1755, the
lessees of the Eddystone Light, by the advice of the Eoj'al Society,
placed the work of constructing a new" lighthouse in the hands of
John Smeaton, F.E.S., a distinguished engineer. Smeaton built
his tower entirely of stone, dovetailing every block into its neigh-
bours, and so making the column practically solid. Operations were
begun on August 5th, 1756 ; the first stone was formally laid on
June 12th, 1757, and the last on August 24th, 1759 ; and a hght
from twenty-four candles, weighing five to two pounds,* was shown
' Smeaton invented a timepiece, wliich struck a single blow every half hour,
and so warned the keejiers to snufl' these candles. The original now belongs to the
Corporation of Trinity House.
1731.] KING'S REGULATIONS AND ADMIIIALTI INSTRUCTIONS. 15
from the rock on October llitli, 175i), aiul thenceforward every iiiglit
until 1810, when the candles gave place to oil lamps and reflectors.
Smeaton's tower, it is almost needless to add, remained effective
until, in 1879-81, owing to the base on which it stood having been
seriously shaken by the sea, a new tower, Douglass's, had to be
built on a neighbouring rock, i'ai't of Smeaton's tower was there-
upon removed, and reconstructed on Plymouth Hoe.
Several other lighthouses which were in their day triumphs of
engineering, were erected during the first half of the eighteenth
century. One of the best known towers, that on the island of
Skerries, near Holyhead, dates from 1730. At about the same time,
also, lightships began to be placed round the coasts. The one first
moored in Enghsh waters was fitted out in 1731 by Mr. Eobert
Hamblin for the Nore Sand, at the mouth of the Thames ; the next,
in 1736, by Mr. Daniel Avery for the Dudgeon Shoal, Norfolk.
Until 1730, every commander-in-chief, with the sanction of the
Admiralty, issued his own code of instructions. In that year the
volume of material provided by the accumulations of lapsed codes
was in some measure digested ; many additional instructions were
set forth ; the principles of naval usage were crystallised ; and
in 1731 there appeared the first issue of ' The King's Regulations
and Admiralty Instructions.' This book has since been revised at
intervals, but it remains in substance very much what it was in
1731, and most of the important alterations that have been made in
it are merely such as have been necessary to bring it into confoiTuity
with modern ideas and modern conditions.^
In 1717, the rate of pilotage for pilots of Deal, Dover, and
Thanet, taking charge of ships in the Thames and Medway, was
fixed by Act of Parliament at ten shillings per foot of draught. The
Act was subsequently amended with a view to prevent these pilots,
who, of coirrse, possessed exceptional opportunities for smuggling,
from engaging in that pursuit. The repression of smuggling, indeed,
was a burning question during the whole of the period now under
review, and especially in war time. The smuggler, besides being a
professional cheater of the revenue, was, of necessity, a man of lax
patriotism and easy conscience, and one whose success depended
upon his maintenance of good relations with both sides of the
' 'The King's Eegulations and Ailuiiialty Instructions' contain, as it were, the
civil code of the Navy. The penal code is supplied by the Xaval Discipline Act.
Sue p. 17, infra.
16 CIVfL HISTORY, 1714-17i;2. [1745.
Chatinel. He was, consequently, ever available as a spy. The
frequency with which he impeded, and sometimes even confounded,
the operations of the Navy, appears in the correspondence of several
of the flag-officers of the time ; and there is very little doubt that
the many treacherous betrayals, which, in the reigns of the first two
Georges, prevented the secret carrying out of naval plans and
combinations, were, as often as not, attributed to grave Jacobite
and French sympathisers, when they were really the work of
persons owning no more serious political conviction than that he
who paid duty was a fool. There are several pregnant references
to this subject in the letters of Admiral Edward Vernon, who was
in command in the Downs at the time of the young Pretender's
descent in 1745. Advocating the more extensive recruiting of the
Navy from the seaport towns, he writes of men who " are now
thought to he principally employed in the ruin of their country by
the smuggling trade, and as daily spies to give the enemy intelligence
of our proceedings," and goes on to say : —
"I can't but tliink it a seasonable time to suggest to their Lordships tliat there are
said to be in tliis town of Deal not less than twn hmidred able young men and seafaring
people who are known to have no visible way of getting a living but b,y the infamous
trade of smuggling, many keeping a horse and arms to be ready at all calls. At Dover,
it is conjectured, there may be four hundred : at Eanisgate and Folkestone, three
hundred each. And it is said that, within these three weeks, no less than nine cutters
at a time have gone off from Folkestone to Boulogne; and it is conjectured that, from
the town of Folkestone only, a thousand pounds a week is run over to Boiilogne in the
smuggling wa.y. And, about six or seven days past, a Dover cutter landed goods in the
niglit under the Castle, that was carried off by a party of sixty horse, and the cutter
supposed to have done it came into Dover pier next day ; and, though most believed it
was she, no one proceeded against them in any inquiry about it. This smuggling has
converted those employed in it, first from honest, industrious fishermen, to lazy, drunken,
and profligate smugglers, and now to dangerous spies on all oiu- proceedings, for the
enemy's daily information." '
And again : —
" Captain Scott, in the Badger, is just returned from his cruise off the coast of
Sussex. On the 25th of last month he was informed of a cutter being going from
Fairleigh to Boulogne that night ; but she was gone over before he could get there.
t)n the 3rd of this month, he got sight of the French dogger privateer, and chased him,
and neared him as the other was edging down to get to leeward of him ; and, when he
got within shot of him, he exchanged some guns with him; but the other, getting
afore the wind and hoisting her studding sails as the night was coming on, he soon lost
sight of him. He has the repute there of being a confederate with the smugglers, and a
convoy to them. I send you enclosed Captain Scott's day's work, when he seized two
of the smugglers' boats, in which you have the names of the two reputed notorious
' Letter of November 13th, 1745. Letter Book in Author's Coll.
1749] rill': AirncLEs of wail 17
smugglers tlu-y belong to: wliich are Ueorge Harrison and Zebuloii Morphet; ami a
copy of the Collector of Oustoms' certiticate that they are reputed as such. And a
little before that, above a hundred horse had been upon the shore to carry off goods
brought by another cutter ; and, by all accounts, they carry on as great an intercourse
with tlie French now as they did in time of profound peace with them : by which they
are undoubtedly their daily spies to inform them of all our proceedings. I am informed
there are lawyers who say, as the laws now stand, such an intercourse with his
Majesty's enemies is now by our laws high treason ; and, if so, I should think we want
a speedy proclamation to inform these infamous wretches that it is high treason ; and
they shall be prosecuted as such ; for, surely, no nation but this would suffer itself to
be daily betrayed with impunity."
While smuggling and smugglers' treachery at home engaged the
attention of the authorities, piracy required, once more, their
energetic interference in the West Indies ; and on September 5th,
1717, a proclamation was issued, offering a pardon for piracies
committed before January 5th, 1717, to all such pirates as should
surrender themselves withiri a twelvemonth. After the expiration
of that period of grace, a reward would be paid to any of his
Majesty's officers, by sea or land, upon the legal conviction of a
pirate taken by him. The rewards promised were : tor a captain
(master) iilOO ; for any officer from a lieutenant down to a gunner,
£40 ; for any inferior officer, £30. Any private seaman or other man
who should deliver up a pirate captain (master) or " commodore,"
would, upon the offender's conviction, be entitled to ,£'200.
In 1749, there was brought in "a Bill for amending, explaining,
and reducing into one Act of Parliament, the laws relating to the
Navy." One of the results of this Bill, had it been passed in its
original form, would have been to subject officers on half-pay to
martial law. The measure was, in consequence, strongly opposed
and petitioned against. The upshot was that the obnoxious clauses
were deleted. The Bill then passed ; all older laws for the govern-
ment of the Navy were repealed ; and, in place of them, the first
regular Articles of War ^ were estabhshed. In the same year, another
Act authorised the Admiralty for the first time to grant commissions
to flag-officers, or officers commanding-in-chief, to assemble courts-
martial in foreign parts.
The changes and alterations which more intimately affected the
' This was the Consolidation Act of George II. 22. It was based upon the Act of
13 Car. II. c. 9. Being found to be too stringent, it was amended in 19 Geo. III.
In the amended form, it is the foundation of the existing Articles of War; which, in
almost exactly their present guise, date from 1847. The proper name of the measure is
The Naval Discipline Act. It receives small alterations and amendments from time
to time.
VOL. III. C
18 CIVIL IlISTOUY, 1714-1701.'. [1711-1762.
personnel of the Eoyal Navy between 1714 and 1762, were numerous.
The more important of those relating chiefly or exclusively to the
seamen may be first noted.
In 1735 an Act ^ appropriated the forfeited Derwentwater estates
to the completion and support of Greenwich Hospital, and extended
the benefits of the Hospital so as to allow maimed merchant seamen
to participate more fully in them. A little later two naval Acts were
passed. One was for procuring a better supply of seamen to serve
in the Navy ; for permitting merchant vessels to be navigated by-
foreign seamen in a proportion not exceeding three-fourths of the
crew ; and for giving the right of naturalisation to such foreigners,
after two years' service in British ships. The other was to prevent
the impressment of seamen aged fifty and upwards, or aged less
than eighteen ; of foreigners serving in merchant vessels ; of sea
apprentices of under three years' service ; and of all persons under-
going their first two years' service at sea.^ In 1749, Mr. Henry
Pelham brought in a Bill to revive the sj'stem of registering seamen ;
but, it being violently opposed, he withdrew it. In 17-58, another
Bill, brought in by Mr. George Grenville, though opposed in the
Upper House, was ultimately carried. It provided in general for
the encouragement of naval seamen, and, in particular, for the
establishment of more regular and frequent payment of wages ; and
for enabling seamen to remit money for the support of their wives
and families by means of tickets payable in cash on demand by any
collector of customs or excise. An Act of 1747 authorised masters
of merchant vessels to detain from the wages of their seamen
sixpence a month, as a provision for the widows and children of
men drowned.
On April 3rd, 1744, a royal declaration assigned to the officers
and crews of men-of-war all property in prizes taken by them : and,
to the officers and crews of privateers and letters of marque, such a
proportion as might be conceded to them by the agreement of the
owners. It also provided that shares not claimed within three years
should go to Greenwich Hospital.
Bounties to seamen were several times offered. In 1734, the
rate was '20s. for an able-bodied seaman, and 15s. for an able-bodied
landsman. lu 1740, it was 4'2s. for an able-bodied, and 30s. for an
ordinary seaman. In 1742, it rose to 100s. for an able-bodied, and
60s. for an ordinary seaman ; and it was further ordered that the
' 8 Geo. II. c. 29. ^ 13 Qg^^ ji_ g_ 3_
IT^O.j OFFICERS' PAY. 19
widows of such bounty men as should be killed on service were to be
granted a sum equivalent to a year's pay of their late husbands. In
the same year, apparently to keep down rivalry, pay in the merchant
service was, for a time, restricted by Act of Parhament to a
maximum of 35s. a month.
The pay of officers remained as it had been at the conclusion of
the period 1660-1714 ; but the position of officers of nearly every
rank was improved in various ways. Surgeons were, for the first
time, given half-pay in 1729 ; and, in 1749, an increased number,
both of surgeons and of masters, were granted half-pay. The
number then entitled to it was, in each case, fifty, of whom the first
thirty received 2s. &d., and the remaining twenty, 2s. a day.
The number of domestics and servants allowed to officers had been
considerably reduced at the end of the seventeenth, but was again
increased in the first half of the eighteenth century ; and, in 1740, it
stood thus : — '
Adniiral nf the Fleet . ,50, of whom 16 only to be borne as servants on the books.
Admiral .... 30, „ 12
Vice-Admiral . . . 20, „ 10
Rear- Admiral . . . 15, „ 10 „ „ „
Captain . . . . -t jier 100 of the complement.
1, in ships having GO men or above.
Lieutenant, Master, \
Second Master, Pur- 1
ser, Surgeon, Chap- j
lain and Cook, each '
Boatswain, Grunner,-! 2, in ships having 100 men or upwards, and 1 in ships
":}
Carpenter, each. ./ liaving between 100 and GO.
This generous allowance of servants permitted captains to take to
sea with them young gentlemen who aspired to the position of
officer ; and the better captains usually benefited the service by
having with them a large proportion of "servants" of that kind,
training under their own eyes. Yet, even captains who were heartily
devoted to the interests of their profession, took with them to sea, in
those days, many retainers of a class that would, nowadays, be
deemed very superfluous in a man-of-war. Tailors, barbers, footmen
and fiddlers, followed their patron. As late as 1785, Commodore
Edward Thompson, who, it is true, always had his quarter-deck
crowded with such young gentlemen as were destined, a few years
later, to shine in the front ranks of the service, had a painter on
his personal staft', and used to smnmon the poor artist on deck at
' And so remained until April, 1794.
c 2
'20 CIVIL HISTORY, 1714-1701^. [1718.
strango hours to record impressions of sunrise efl'ects or nocturnal
storms.
In 1718, it was, for the first time, formally oi'dered that captains
should, if duly qualified, be promoted by seniority to flag-rank, and
so onward to the rank of full admiral. But since, in those days,
the entire flag establishment consisted only of nine officers, viz., an
Admiral of the Fleet, an Admiral of the White, an Admiral of the
Blue, and Vice and Rear-Admirals of the Red, White and Blue
respectively, captains soon began to grow very old ere, in con-
sequence of deaths above them, they became eligible for advance-
ment. If, also, the order had been loyally carried out — which it
was not — and had not been followed by other modifications, it
would presently have resulted in a flag-list composed exclusively
of officers too aged to go afloat. The threatened evil was fended
off by the gradual increase of the flag-list in 1743 and subsequent
years, and by the provision, in 1747, of arrangements in virtue of
which senior captains, indisposed, or too infirm, to accept active
flag-rank, might be superannuated as rear-admirals, with pay at
the rate of 17.s. Gf7. a day. The first officers to be superannuated
under this scheme were captains of 1713, or, to put it otherwise,
captains of thirty-four years' service in that rank. Some of them
were septuagenarians.
The estabhshment of a regular uniform for certain officers of the
Eoyal Navy dates from 1748. Three years earlier, some officers
appear to have petitioned the Admiralty for the boon ; and, in 1746,
sundry captains, at Anson's wish, prepared tentative coats from
which a uniform pattern might be selected. But, though a captain
may have designed the uniforms which were finally adopted. King
George II. himself decided upon the colours of them. Having
noticed the Duchess of Bedford, wife of the First Lord, riding in
the Park in a habit of blue, faced with white, his Majesty chose
blue and white for the first uniform dress of his officers. The
innovation applied only to admirals, captains, commanders, lieu-
tenants, and midshipmen, and the wearing of the new uniform was
made compulsory, as regards these ranks, by an order dated April
14th, 1748. But there were difficulties in the way of obedience.
Patterns were not sent to foreign stations, nor were the regulations
sufficiently explicit to enable officers, by their aid only, to instruct
their tailors concerning what was required. It is therefore probable
that, for several years, the order was not fully carried out.
1748.] OFFWEUh' UNIFOIiM. 21
Admiralty patterns of these uniforms were lodged at the Navy
Ofdce and the Dockyards, hut they have not hecn preserved. A few-
coats, waistcoats, breeches and hats, for captains and lieutenants,
were, however, found at Plymouth, in 1S4(), and are now in the
Eoyal United Service Institution.
" The hats are three-cornered in shape ; one is trimmed with silver or tarnished gold
lace ; and both bear the silk cockade instituted by George I. Lace and frills being
then worn, there are no collars to the coats. They are made of thick blue cloth ; the
lappels, which button back, are blue ; but the cuffs of the captain's coats are white,
and the sleeves of all are purposely made short to allow the laced sleeves of the white
kerseymere waistcoats to show beyond. There are two kinds of buttons, one flat,
bearing a rose ; the other round and plain. Although we have not the patterns,
pictures of the dress of the admirals and midshipmen have come down to us, the
embroidery and lace on those of the flag officers being most elaborate." '
Some written advice, given by Edward Thompson,- in 1756, to a
relative who was about to enter the Navy, throws light upon the
condition of young gentlemen in the men-of-war of the time.
" Here," he says, " are no back doors through which you can make your escape,
nor any humane bosoms to alleviate your feelings ; at once you resign a good table for
no table, and a good bed for your length and breadth ; nay, it will be thought an
indulgence, too, to let you sleep where day ne'er enters, and where fresh air only comes
when forced." ..." Your light for day and night is a small candle, which is often
stuck at the side of yoiu- platter at meals, for want of a better convenience ; your
victuals are salt, and often bad ; and, if you vary the mode of dressing them, you must
cook yourself. I would recommend you always to have tea and sugar ; the rest you
must trust to, for you'll scarce find room for any more than your chest and hannuock,
and the latter at times you must carry upon deck to defend you from small shot,
unless you keep one of the sailors in fee with a little brandy (which is a good friend
at sea, but always drink it mixed with water.") . . . "Low company is the bane of
all young men ; but in a man-of-war you have the collected filths of jails. Con-
demned criminals have the alternative of hanging, or entering on board. There's not
a vice committed on shore but is practised here. The scenes of horror and infamy on
board of a man-of-war are so many and so great that I think they must rather disgust
a mind than allure it. I do not mean, by this advice, to have you appear a dull
inactive being, that shudders amidst these horrors. No ; I would wish you to see them
in their own proper shapes, for, to be hated, they need to be seen." ..." You will
find some little outward appearance of religion — and Sunday prayers I — but the con-
gregation is generally drove together by the boatswain (like sheep by the shepherd),
who neither spares oaths nor blows." "
' ' The British Fleet,' 500. The first Admiral's uniform is well shown in the
portrait of Lord Anson, forming the title-page to this volume. This was painted
between 1748 and 1761.
- Died Commodore on the West Coast of Africa, January 17th, 1786. He edited
some old writers ; wrote plays, stories, and songs ; and was a friend, and also
probably a benefactor, of Dr. Samuel Johnson.
^ ' Seaman's Letters,' i. 147.
22 CIVIL HISTORY, 171 1-1762. [1756.
Concerning subordinate officers, and the abuse of power by
superiors, Thompson wrote : —
" The disagreeable circumstances and situations attending a subaltern officer in the
Navy are ho many, and so hard, that, had not the first men in the service passed the
dirty road to preferment to encourage the rest, they would renounce it to a man. It is
a most mistaken notion that a youtli will not be a good officer unless he stoops to the
most menial offices ; to be bedded worse than hogs, and eat less delicacies. In short,
from having experienced such scenes of filth and infamy, such fatigues and hardships,
they are sufficient to disgust the stoutest and the bravest, for, alas! there is only a little
hope of promotion sprinkled in the cup to make a man swallow more than he digests
the rest of his life. The state of inferior officers in his Majesty's service is a state of
vassalage, and a lieutenant's preferment the greatest in it ; the change is at once from
a filtliy maggot to a shining butterfly. Many methods might be introduced to make
the lower officers of more consequence on their duty, and their lives more agreeable to
themselves ; for that power of reducing them to sweep the decks, being lodged in the
breast of a captain, is often abused through passion or caprice ; besides, it is too
desjiotic an authority to exercise on a man who has the feelings of an Englisliman.
" We are likewise to recollect that all commanders of men-of-war are not gentle-
men, nor men of education. I know a great jjart are brave men, but a much greater,
seamen. I allow the maxim of learning to obey, before we command ourselves ; but
still there is no reason to be vulgar, for we are to consider these young people are the
active machines of duty, the wheels which give motion to the main body ; and it is
absolutely necessary to give them authority in their office to carry on the duties of the
ship : but rendering them low in the eyes of the jieople creates a contempt for
midshipmen in general, and turns that necessary respect due to them into contempt.
" I propose to warrant this body of officers, and make them answer to the Board of
Admiralty for their conduct. They should possess a third table in the ship, and have
the countenance of their superiors. This would enliven their servitude, and make
them of consequence on their duty." '
But some improvement was alread}- to be noticed, for Thompson
continues : —
" The last war, a chaw of tobacco, a rattan, and a rope of oaths were sufficient
qualifications to constitute a lieutenant ; but now, education and good manners are
the study of all ; and so far from efl'eminacy, that I am of opinion the present race
of officers will as much eclipse the veterans of 1692 as the polite the vulgar." ^
There was, however, as yet little improvement either in the code
of morals, or in the sanitary provisions on board his Majesty's ships.
There is evidence that, towards the end of the seventeenth century,
women were systematically canied to sea in the proportion of so
many per company of Marines ; and Thompson, writing in the
middle of the eighteenth, after describing the unsavoury persons
and dwellings of the negroes of Antigua, goes on : —
" But bod smells don't hurt the sailor's appetite, each man possessing a temporary
lady, whose pride is her constancy to the man she chooses ; and in this particular they
' ' Seaman's Letters,' i. 140. ^ lb. 1-14.
1750.] SOCIAL CONDJTION O/'' 'J'JJIC NAVY. 28
are strictly su. I liavc known 350 wonion sup ami sleup ou buard ' on a Sunday
evening, and return at, daylurak tii tlieir diiTerent plantations." "
As for sanitation, suffice it to say, by way of example, in addition
to the many cases which will be cited in the two following chapters,
that, in 1756, at the time of the outbreak of war with France, when
she had been on no long cruise, and had been exposed only to the
hardships of a few months of service in the Channel, the Stirling
Castle, 64, Captain Samuel Cornish, arrived at Portsmouth with four
hundred and eighty men, of whom two hundred and twenty-five
were the pressed refuse of gaols and scum of streets. She was full
of fever and other sickness, and, when the diseased had been sent
ashore, but one hundred and sixty men remained for duty. Less
than three months later, when, having filled up her complement in
England, she had proceeded to New York, Edward Thompson
wrote from her : " We have now one hundred and fifty-nine people
ill in fluxes, scurvies, and fevers." Two months afterwards, ashore
at English Harbour, Antigua, he added —
" I have been l(jng declining with the white flux, and, for recovery, am stuffed into
a small room with twenty-six people ; but am now in better health. I officiate as
chaplain, and bury eight men in a morning. Fluxes and fevers are the reigning
distemper, and both I attribute to the water drunk by the seamen, which is taken out
of tanks or cisterns, built by Admiral Kuowles. It is all rain water, and covered
close up, which, for want of air, breeds poisonous animalcute, and becomes foul and
putrid. The melancholy effects it produces might be in a great manner prevented by
boiling the water before it is issued, or ordering the peopJe to do it. This would
destroy the vermin, and correct the putrefaction. I am convinced from long observa-
tion that most of the distempers in southern climates arise from the water drunk, as
ship sicknesses do from the bilge water ; which is evidently proved in leaky shijis
being always healthful. I therefore recommend to all officers, naval and mercantile,
to let in salt water every day, and boil their fresh, for the good of themselves and
cargoes."
' He speaks of H.M.S. Stirliny Castle, 64, carrying 480 men.
^ ' Seaman's Letters,' ii. 24.
( 24 )
CHAPTEE XXVII.
Military History of the Eoyal Navy, 1714-1 7()2.
major operations.
Accession of Greorge I. — Trouble with Sweden — Xorris to the Baltic — Co-operation
with Holland, Denmark, and Russia — A Swedish consjnracy — Byng to the Baltic
in 1717 — The Quadruple Alliance — Irritation of Spain — Byng to the Mediterranean
in 1718 — Spanish operations in Sicily— The battle off Cape Passaro — The British
and Spanish accounts — Mahan's comments — War with Spain — Projected invasion
of England — Dispersal of the Spanish fleet — The Ross-shire fiasco — Reduction of
Sicily — Peace with Spain — Norris in the Baltic in 1718 — Alliance with Sweden —
Norris in the Baltic in 1719, 1720, and 1721 — Peace between Russia and Sweden
— The Treaty of Vienna — The Treaty of Hannover — Jennings to the coast of
Spain — Wager to the Baltic — Hosier to the West Indies — Sickness in the fleet —
Death of Hosier, Hopsonn, and St. Loe — Wager relieves Gibraltar — Norris in the
Baltic— Death of George I. — The Treaty of Seville— Difficulties in the New
World — Xorris to Lisbon — Haddock to the Mediterranean — Spanish depredations
— Jenkins's ears — Reprisals granted — War with Spain — Anson's expedition —
Edward Vernon — Vernon to the West Indies — Capture of Puerto Bello — Enthusiasm
in England — Co-operation between France and Spain — Vernon reinforced — France
holds her hand — Vernon at Chagres — Vernon again reinforced — Death of Cath-
cart — Beauclerk and de Boisgeroidt — Unsuccessful cruises of Haddock, Balchen,
and Korris — Junction of the French and Spanish fleets in the Mediterranean —
Vernon's difficulties with Wentworth — Attack upon Cartagena — Early success
— Failure of the attempt — Attack on Santiago de Cuba — Abandonment of the
plan — Criticism of the scheme — The commanders censured — Projected exjiedition
against Panama — Collapse of the venture — Recall of Vernon and Wentworth —
Lestock joins Haddock in the Mediterranean — Lestock's character — Mathews
commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean — Friction between Mathews and Lestock
— Blockade of Toulon — Martin at Kaples — Martin to Alassio — Ogle in the West
Indies — Repulse of the attack on La Guayra — Repulse at Puerto Cabello — France
supports Spain — Norris in the Channel — Escape of de Roquefeuil — -War with
France and Spain — The Dutch join Great Britain — Disposition of the fleets —
Navarro and de Court leave Toulon — Mathews's action off Toulon — Suspension
and trial of Lestock — Trials of captains — The court-martial and the Lord Chief
Justice — Trial of Mathews — Rowley in the Mediterranean — Gabaret escapes him —
Hardy blockaded— Balchen relieves him — Loss of the Victory — Barnet in the
East Indies — Davers at Jamaica — French intrigues in North America — Annapolis
summoned in vain — Schemes of the Pretender — He lands in Scotland — -His escape
— Capture of Louisbourg — Townsend to the West Indies — Afiairs in the Mediter-
ranean— French failures in North America — Lestock on the coast of France —
Peyton and La Bourdonnais — Fall of Madras — Duplicity of Dupleix — Lisle and
de Conflans — Disgrace of Mitchell — Medley in the Mediterranean — French ex-
pedition to Cape Breton — Anson's action with de La Jonquiere — Hawke defeats
de L'Elenduere — Trial of Captain Fox — Exhaustion of France — Boscawen to the
1714.]
DIFFICULTIES IN THE NO /IT//.
25
East Indies — Failure at Pmidiclierry — Peacu of Aix-la-Cliu])(;!le — Surrender of
Madras — Knowles takes Port Louis— Attempt on Santiago de Culja— Kuowles's
victory off Havana — Trial of Knowles— Pocoek takes a French convoy — Losses
during the war — Terms of the peace — French aggressions — Kejipol to North
America— French designs on Canada — Boscawen to North America — Capture of
the Alcide and Lyi — Threatened invasion — French expedition to Minorca —
Operations against Angria — Success of Holmes — Koconnaissance of Brest — British
weakness in the Mediterranean — Byng ordered to Minorca — Byng's action with
de La Galissonniere — The dispatches — Byng superseded, tried, and executed —
Conclusions on his case — Fall of Minorca — Watson takes Calcutta — Fall of
Chandernagore — D'Ache to the East Indies — Forrest's action with de Kersaiut —
Expedition to Louisbourg — Misfortunes of the fleet — The expedition abandoned —
Escape of du Revest — Expedition against Kochefort — Pocock's action ofl" Cudda-
lore — Capitulation of Fort St. David — Pocock's action off Negapatam — With-
drawal of d'Ache — Kempenfelt relieves Madras — Siege and capture of Louisbourg
— Boscawen and du Chaffault — Marsh to West Africa — Keppel takes Goree —
Capture of the OrpUee and Fovdroyanl — Hawke at He d'Aix — Howe's expedition
to the French coast — Capture of Cherbourg — Disaster at St. Cas — Renewed Frencli
preparations — Pocoek again engages d'Aclie — The Dutch at Chinsura — Failure at
Martinique — Operations at Guadaloupe — The conquest of Canada — Saunders in
the St. Lawrence — Boscawen to the Mediterranean — Boscawen defeats de La Choe
— Rodney off Le Havre — Blockade of Brest — Hawke defeats de Conflans —
Blockade of Pondicherry — Hurricane in the East Indies — Fall of Pondicherry —
Norbury's action in the West Indies — French attempt against Quebec — Montreal
occupied — Elliot defeats Thurot — Boscawen and Hawke in Quiberon Bay —
Further operations in the East Indies — Keppel's expedition against Belleisle — The
Family Compact — War with Spain — Capture of Manila — Conquest of Martinique
— Conquest of Grenada and St.. Lucia — Pocoek reduces Havana — Misfortunes of
Pocock's fleet — De Terney at Newfoundland — Recapture of St. John's — The raid
on Buenos Ayres — Enforcement of the right of search — The Treaty of Fontaine-
bleau — Results of tlie Seven Years' War.
Althoi'gh, at
the accession
of George I.,
Great Britain
was at peace
with all the
world, the re-
lations of the
country with
certain north-
ern powers
were far from
being satisfac-
tory ; and from
the first it was foreseen that difficulties were hkely to arise, and
to call for the active employment of the Navy towards their solution.
POPUL Ati MEDAL COMMKJIOl: ATIVK OF -II.VTIIKWS S ACTION OFF TOULON
FEBRUARY IItH, 1744, AND OF THE FRUSTHATIOS OF THE
THREATENED INVASION OF ENGLAND AT ABOUT THE SAME TLME.
(From an orlfiinal kindlii lent by B.S.H. Captain I'lince Lutiis of
Baltntliny, li.A'.)
26 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-1702. [1716.
Sweden had not yet allied herself with Eussia, and was, in fact,
still at war with her and with Denmark ; and Swedish privateers
had seized many British ships which were alleged to contain arms,
ammunition, and stores, destined, in contravention of treaty, for
the service of the Tsar. Remonstrances had been made by the
British minister at Stockholm, but they had produced no results.
The Dutch, who had similar causes of complaint against the
government of Charles XII., found it equally difficult to obtain
either redress or apology ; and it was therefore determined by Great
Britain and Holland to despatch a combined fleet to the Baltic in
1715 to intimidate the Swedes, and to convoy, and prevent further
undue interference with, the trade.
The British contingent, under Admiral Sir John Norris (B.) and
Eear-Admiral Sir Thomas Hardy (B.), was made up of twenty ships
of the line, besides a few small craft. It sailed from the Nore on
May 18th, and, reaching the Sound on June 10th, there joined the
Dutch contingent of twelve sail under Eear-Admiral Lucas de Veth.
The merchantmen were escorted to their ports, but nothing of
importance happened during the rest of the year. In 1716, Sir
John, unwilhng to adopt strong measures against Sweden unless
he had the gravest reasons for doing so, sent an officer to Stockholm
to inquire whether or not the practice of seizing British and Dutch
ships was to be persisted in. A vague and ambiguous reply being
returned, it was determined by the allied commanders, in pursuance
of orders from home, to make a demonstration of an exceptional
nature. A Danish squadron lay at Copenhagen. There also lay a
Eussian squadron under the Tsar Peter himself. After the necessary
negotiations had taken place, it was agreed that, while the Dutch,
then under Commodore Hendrik Grave, with five British men-of-
war, should coavoy to their destinations such merchantmen as had
followed the fleets, the British, Eussian, and Danish squadrons,
forming for the moment a single fleet, should proceed up the Baltic,
in order to let it be seen that, rather than permit any further
meddling with her trade, Great Britain w'ould take active part
against Charles XII. The Tsar Peter became, for the nonce, com-
mander-in-chief ; Norris assumed command of the van, and Count
Gyldeulove,' the Danish admiral, took the rear under his orders.
' Ulrich Christian Gyldenliive, known in England as Count Gueldenlew, was a
natural brother of King Frederick IV. of Denmark, and had commanded the Danisli
fleet at the time of Kuoke's operations against Copenhagen in 1700.
171G.] THE IIANNOVElilAN ENTANGLEMENT. 27
The confederate fieet assembled in Kjoge Bay, and thence
proceeded to Bornhohii, where, learning that the Swedes had
retired to Karlskrona, unwiUing to hazard an action, tlic Tsar gave
directions that the convoys might continue their voyages to their
various ports. He then, with his squadron, sailed to the coast of
Mecklenburg. Norris and Gyldenlove took measures for collecting
the homeward-bound trade, most of which joined them at Bornholm
on November 9th, and with them entered the roadstead of Copen-
hagen on the day following. The remaining merchantmen, chiefly
Dutch, anchored there on the 12th. Sir John Norris left behind
him in the Baltic Captain William Cleveland, with seven ships, to
act, if necessary, in concert with the Danes ; and, with the rest of the
fleet, he retunied to England. On his voyage he met with terrible
weather, and, although he succeeded in preserving his convoy, he
had the misfortune to lose the Auguste, 60, and the Garland, 'li}
The fleet arrived at the Nore on November S'.Jth, 1716.
The ostensible reasons for this Baltic expedition have been given
above. It must be borne in mind, however, that the situation, as
between Great Britain and Sweden, was exacerbated by the fact
that George I., besides being King of Great Britain, was Elector of
Hannover. In his latter quality he had purchased from Denmark
territories which had been conquered from Sweden ; and, in order to
defend these, he had declared war against Sweden, and carried on
the conflict at a time when, in his quality of King of Great Britain,
he was at peace with Charles XII. The Swedish monarch did not
scruple to charge King George with having prostituted the honour
of the British flag in order to serve the interests of Hannover ; and,
although it may be that Charles, in his natural resentment, failed to
do exact justice to his opponent, it cannot be denied that the
personal union of the crowns of Great Britain and Hannover, if not
in 1715-16, at least on many subsequent occasions, led Great Britain
into ventures which, had her own interests only been consulted, she
would never have embarked upon.
The irritation of Sweden was increased by Norris's demon stratioia
in the Baltic ; and one of the results was that, soon afterwards,
' So say all historians, but no authority can be found for one part of the statement.
The Auguste, Captain Kobert Johnson, ran ashore, it is true, on November lOtli,
her captain and most of her people being saved. The Garland, however, remained
in commission, under Captain Ellis Brand, until February 22nd, 1717 ; from which
fact it may be concluded that, if she went ashore, she did not at once become a total
loss. There seems, too, to have been no court-martial. MS. List in Author's Coll.
28
MAJUli OFEliATIOSa, 1714-17G2.
[1717.
certain Swedish diplomatists, including the minister in London,
associated themselves in plots, having for their object the further-
ance of the cause of the Pretender. The discovery of these intrigues
aroused the liveliest indignation throughout Great Britain ; and vk^hen
Parhament met in 1717, it was formally resolved by the House of
Commons to introduce a Bill to authorise the King to prohibit
commerce with Sweden "during such time as his Majesty shall
think it necessary for the safety and peace of his kingdom." On
SIR JOHN NOBHIS, KT., ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET.
(From fhc iiict(,rc hi/ Sir G. Enflhr, hii pt'riins!--i(in of H. C. Xorris, Esq.)
March '2nd, the Bill having in the meantime been jjassed, a
proclamation in accordance with its provisions was made pubUc.
To properly enforce the prohibition, it was requisite to send another
fleet to the Baltic ; and on March 30th, twenty-one ships of the line,
with frigates and fireships, sailed for Copenhagen under Admiral Sir
George Byng. A few days later, though in face of strong opposition,
the Government obtained a grant of a quarter of a million sterling to
enable the King " to concert such measures with foreign princes and
1718.] THE QUADSUI'L/i ALLIANCE. 29
states as may prevent any charge and appreliensicjn from the designs
of Sweden for the future."
Byng agreed upon a plan of united action with Denmark, and
made various dispositions to ensure the carrying out of the objects
for which he had been sent to sea ; but his proceedings were, upon
the whole, uneventful, the Swedes not venturing outside their ports.
Eeturning at the beginning of winter, he arrived in the mouth
of the Thames on November 15th. A note of such small services
as. were performed by the cruisers of the fleet will be found in the
next chapter. In the meantime, thanks largely to the good offices
of France and Eussia, the difficulties in the north were for the
moment smoothed over, although, for many years afterwards, they
remained a source of much anxiety and expense to the Com-t of
St. James's.
" But this," aays Campbell, " was not the unly affair ol' consequeuce that employed
the thoughts of the admiuistration. We were then in close confederacy with the
Emperor and France; and, in conjunction with these Powers, had undertaken to settle
tlie affairs of Europe on a better foundation than the Treaty of Utrecht left tliem.
AVith this view, the Triple Alliance was concluded on January 4th, 1717 ; and, that
not answering the end expected from it, we next entered, as will be shown, into the
famous Quadruple Alliance,' which was intended to remedy all these defects, and to
fix the general tranquillity for ever. Yet, by unforeseen accidents to which human
policy will be always liable, this alliance proved the cause of an immediate war
between us and Spain, and, in its consequences, was the source of all the troubles that
disturbed Europe from the time of its conclusion ^ to the peace of Aix-la-Chapello."
The terms of the alliance were decided upon some months before
the treaty was actually signed. It was determined that Spain
should restore Sardinia to the Emperor, and that the King of Spain
should renounce his claim to succeed to the French crown, while the
Emperor was to renounce his claim to what had been guaranteed to
Philip V. under the Treaty of Utrecht, and Philijj was to surrender
his claim to the Netherlands and to the Italian possessions of the
Emperor. In return for Sicily, the Emperor was to hand over
Sardinia to the King of Sicily, and was to recognise the right of
the House of Savoy to succeed to the crown of Spain in the event
of the failure of the heirs of Philip V. France and Great Britain
undertook to assist the Emperor to acquire Sicily ; and France and
the Empire undertook to maintain the Protestant succession in
Great Britain.^
' Of Great Britain, France, Holland, and the Empire.
2 August, 1718.
' Koch & SchoU, ' Hist, des Traites de Paix.'
30 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1702. [1718.
The arrangement was excessively displeasing to Bpain ; and no
sooner had the House of Savoy transferred Sicily to the Emperor
than Spain, whose policy was then controlled by Cardinal Alberoni,
made preparations for attacking that island. Great Britain made
corresponding preparations for enforcing the provisions of the
still unsigned treaty, and, early in 1718, commissioned a large
number of ships. The Spanish minister in London remonstrated.
George I. rather bluntly replied that it was not his intention to
conceal the object of his armaments, and that he purposed to send
Sir George Byng to the Mediterranean with a powerful force " to
maintain the neutrahty of Italy against those who should seek to
disturb it."
In March, 1718, Byng was accordingly appointed Commander-in-
Chief in the Mediterranean ; and on May 24th he received his written
instructions. They were not as explicit as might have been wished ;
but they appear to have been explained and supplemented in the
course of an interview which the Admiral, ere he left London, had
with Lords Sunderland and Stanhope, and Mr. Secretary Craggs.^
He was, upon his arrival upon his station, to inform the King of
Spain, the Viceroy of Naples, and the Governor of Milan, that he had
been sent to sea to promote all measures that might best contribute
to the arrangement of such differences as had arisen between the
two crowns, and to the prevention of any further violation of the
neutrality of Italy, which he was to see preserved. He was also
to enjoin both parties to abstain from acts of hostility, so that
negotiations for peace might be begun and concluded. But, should
the Spaniards persist, after all, in attacking the Emperor's territory
in Italy; or should they land in any part of Italy for that pm-pose; or
should they endeavour to make themselves masters of Italy (which
would be a step towards the invasion of the kingdom of Naples),
Byng was, to the best of his power, to hinder and obstruct them. If,
however, they were already landed, he was to try by amicable means
to induce them to abandon their project, and was to offer to help
them to withdraw their troops ; and, should all his friendly offices
prove ineffectual, he was to defend the territories attacked, by
keeping company with, or intercepting, Spanish ships and convoys,
and, if necessary, by openly opposing them.
Sir George Byng sailed from Spithead on June 15th, 1718, with
twenty ships of the line, two fireships, two bomb vessels, a store-
' iSee a letter from Craggs in Campbell, iv. 3-18.
1718] BYNG TO TIIK MEDITERRANEAN. 31
ship, a hospital-ship, and two tenders, and, passing Lisbon, sent the
Rupert in thither for intelHgence. Being off Cadiz on June 30th, he
despatched the Sivperbe with a letter to the British minister at
Madrid, desiring him to inform the King of Spain of the presence
of the British fleet, and of the instructions under which it was to
act. The Spanish reply, returned after some delay, was curtly to
the effect that Byng might execute his sovereign's orders. The
GEORGE BYNG, VISCOUNT TOIIKINGTON, ADMIK.\L OF THE FLEET.
[From T. llunhnikni^ fugyiivinij iiftcr tht portrait tni Sir G. Ki/ctlrr.i
minister. Colonel Stanhope, continued, almost up to the very
outbreak of hostilities, to endeavour to induce Spain to give way ;
and in the meantime, foreseeing the probable futility of his efforts,
he did his best to warn British merchants in the Spanish ports to
take such measures as would protect their property against the
results of any sudden rupture.
Sir George, who had to contend with unfavourable winds, did
32 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1702. [1718.
not make Cape Spartel until July 8th. He was there rejoined by
the Rupert and the Superhe, and learnt that Spain had been making
great preparations for war, and that a considerable Spanish fleet had
quitted Barcelona on June 18th for the eastward. Off Gibraltar,
the Admiral was joined by a small division of ships under Vice-
Admiral Charles Cornwall. The fleet subsequently watered at
Malaga, and thence proceeded to Port Mahon, where it landed
troops and took off the soldiers who had been in garrison there.
It sailed again on July 25th, upon receipt of news that the Spanish
fleet had been sighted on June 30th near Naples ; and on August 1st
it anchored in the Bay of Naples. Sir George had previously taken
care to apprise the imperial Viceroy, and the governor of Milan, of
his arrival in the Mediterranean.
The Spaniards had not been idle. They had landed the Marques
de Lede in Sicily ; and, except the citadel of Messina, the whole
island bad quickly fallen to him with little or no resistance. The
citadel was held by Savoyards; and as Savoy, under the terms of the
understanding, was presently to surrender Sicily to the Emperor, it
could scarcely be expected that the fortress would hold out for long.
In these circumstances, the imperial Viceroy of Naples hurriedly
embarked two thousand German troops ' on board the British ships,
and requested Sir George Byng to endeavour to throw them into
Messina citadel, and the neighbouring Fort Salvatore. The fleet
quitted Naples on August 6th, and on August 9th arrived off the
Faro of Messina.
The Spaniards were besieging the place which Byng desired to
relieve ; but Sir George does not seem to have known how near their
fleet was to him. Indeed, he had some reason to suppose that it
was endeavouring to avoid him. Instead, therefore, of moving
onwards to Messina and striking at once, he sent ashore the Captain
of the Fleet, George Saunders, with a letter to the Marques de Lede,
proposing a cessation for two months of the operations on shore, and
adding that, unless a truce were agreed to, he would use aU his force
" to prevent further attempts to disturb" the dominions w^hich his
master stood engaged to defend. De Lede replied that he had no
powers to treat, and that he intended to carry out his orders. Upon
receiving this answer. Sir George weighed, with a view to place his
fleet in front of Messina and to relieve the garrison of the citadel.
' These troops, under General Wetzel, were, before the battle ofl' Cape Passaro, set
ashore at Eeggio.
ITIK.] BATTLE OF CAl'K J'A.'iSAJtO. 38
The story of what followed is given in tlie foniial relations which
will be presently printed.
"The engagement which ensued can," says Mahaii, "scarcely be called a battle
and, as is apt to happen in smli atTairs, wlien the parties are cm tlio verge of war, but
war has not actually been declared, tliere is some doubt as to liow far tlie attack was
morally justifiable on the part of the English. It seems pretty sure that Hyng was
determined beforehand to seize or destroy the Spanish fleet, and that as a military man
he was justified by his orders. The Spanish officers had not made up their minds to
any line of conduct ; they were much inferior in numbers, and, as must always be the
case, Alberoni's hastily revived navy liad not within the same period reached nearly
the efficiency of his army. The English a[>pr()ached threateTungly near : one or more
Sjianish ships opened fire: whereupon tlie Knglish, being to windward, stood down ami
made an end of them. A few only escaped. . . ."
The forces in face of one another were, aw Captain Mahan
indicates, as unequal in numbers as in discipline. Over leaf is a
comparative statement of them. Tlie ships of the British fleet are
arranged according to Sir George Byng's order of battle, in which
the Cauterhuvij was to lead with the starboard, and the Rochester
with the larboard tacks on lioard. The exact order of the Spaniards
cannot be determined.
Sir George Byng, in liis despatches,' thus describes the events of
August 10th, and the following days : —
From on' iuiaiih Tin-; Barfleur, off of Syi!Aci;sa,
Auyust 6th (O.S.).
" Early in the morning, on the thirtieth of July,- as we were standing in for
Messina, we saw two scouts of the Spanish fleet in the Faro, very near us ; and, at the
same time, a felucca, coming oft' from the Calabrian shore, assured us they saw from
tlie hills the Spanish fleet lying by. Upon which the Admiral stood through the Faro
after the scouts, judging they would lead us to their fleet; which they did; for, before
noon, we had a fair sight of all their ships as they were drawing into line-of-battle.
" On our approach, they went from us large, but in their order of battle, their fleet
consisting of sis and twenty men-of-war, great and small, two fii'eships, four bomb
vessels, seven galleys, and several ships with stores and provisions.
"The Admiral ordered the Kent, Superhe, (jraftun, and Or/o rd, he'mg the best
sailers in the fleet, to make what sail they could to come up with the Spaniards ; and
that the ships which could get headmost, and nearest to them, should carry the lights
usually worn by the Admiral,' that he might not lose sight of them in the night ;
while he made what sail he could, with the rest of the fleet, to keep up with them. It
being little wind, the Spanisli galleys towed their heaviest sailers all night.
"The thirty-first,* in the morning, as soon as it was day, they finding us pretty
near up with their fleet, the galleys and smaller ships, with the fireships, bomb vessels.
' Sent home by liis son, Pattee Byng. Oazette, No. C()73.
■■' Le. August 10th, N.S.
' An Admiral commanding in chief carried three lights on the poop and one lii;lit
in the main-top.
■* I.e. August 11th, N.S.
VOL. III. D
34
MA.lOIt Ol-EIiATIONS, 1714-17G2.
[1718.
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1718.] JilWO'S DESPATCH. 35
and storeslii]is, sepanited tVum llio iiiliiiiial iiiul bii;.^er slii]is, and slnnd in I'm' llic sliiire :
after whom the Adininil sent C'aptain Walton, in tlie ('anlerlmri/, witli the Ar(/i/le and
six ships niuie. As tliose ships were conung up with them, one of the Spaniards ' fired
a broadside at the Argyle. 'J'he Admiral, seeing those ships engaged with tlie S]iaiush,
which were making towards the shore, sent orders to Captain Walton to rendezvous,
after the action, at Syracusa (where the Viceroy for the King of Sicily was, with a
garrison). The like orders he despatched to the flags, and to as many ships as were
within his reach, that place being defended against the Spaniards, and being the most
proper port on that coast for the Heet to gather togetlier again.
"We held on our chase after the Spanish admiral, witli three of his rear-admirals,
and the biggest ships, which stayed by their flags till we came near them. The
captains of the Kent, Superhe, Orafton, and Orford, having orders to make what sail
they could to place themselves by the four headmost ships, were the first that came up
with them. The Spaniards began, by firing their stern-chase[rs] at them : but they,
having orders not to fire unless the Spanish ships repeated their firing, made no return
at first. But, the Spaniards firing again, the Orford attacked the Santa Rosa, which,
some time after, she took. The St. CTi«r/es - struck next without much opposition,
and the Kent took possession of her. The Grafton attacked the Prince of Asturias,
formerly called the Cumberland,^ in which was Rear- Admiral Chacon: but, the Breda
and Captain, coming up, she left that ship for them to take, which they soon did ; and
stretched ahead after another sixty-gun ship, which was on her starboard while she
was engaging the Prince of Asturias, and ke]>t firing her stern-chase into the Grafton.
"About one o'clock, the ^e«< and iS'tt^o'te engaged the Spanish admiral,* which,
with two ships more, fired on them, and made a running fight imtil about three ; when
the Kent, bearing down upon her, and under her stern, gave her a broadside and went
away to leeward of her. Then the Supterbe put for it, and laid the Spanish Admiral on
board, falling on lier weather quarter : but the Spanish admiral shifting her helm and
avoiding her, the Swperhe ranged up under her lee quarter; on wliich she struck to her.
At the same time, the Barfteur being within shot of the said Spanish adndral astern,
inclining on her weather quarter, one of their rear-admirals,'' and another sixty-gun
ship, which were to windward of the Barfleiir, bore down and gave her their broad-
sides, and then clap'd upon a wind, standing in for the land. The Admiral, in the
Barfleiir, stood after them till it was almost night. But, it being little wind, and they
galing from her out of reach, he left pursuing them, and stood away to the fleet again ;
which he joined two hours after night. Tlie Essfx took the Jutio ; the Montarju and
Rupert took the Volante. Vice-Admiral Cornwall followed the Grafton to support
her; but, it being very little wind and the night coming on, the Spaniard galed away
from the Grafton.
" Rear- Adndral Delavall, with tlie Royal OaA-, chased two ships that went away
more leewardly than the rest, (one of them said to be Rear-Admiral Cammock'') but
we, not having seen them since, know not the success. The ship whicli suffered most,
with us, was the Grafton, the captain of which, though he had not tlie fortune to take
' The San. Isidoro, 46. '' San Carlos.
^ The Cnmherland, 80, Captain Richard Edwards (a), had been taken by the French
in 1707. See Vol. II. p. 513. In Spanish hands she carried a lighter armament than
she had been built for.
* Real San Felipe. ^ Apjiarently the San Luis.
* George Cammock had been a post-captain in the Royal Navy until 1714, and had
repeatedly distinguished himself. Owiug to his Jacobite leanings, he had been
dismissed the service, and had entered that of Spain. The Pretender afterwards
appointed him Admiral of the White. He is said to have died in banishment at
Ceuta. Chariiock, iii. 221.
D 2
36 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1718.
;iiiy particvilnr ship, yet was engaged witli several, behavc<l liiinself very iiiucli like an
ollicer and a seaman, and bid fair for stopping the way of those four ships that he
pursued; who escaped, not through his fault, but failure of wind ; and liis own sails
and rigging were much shattered."
'e-o"
"Fhom on jiOARi) TJii: IIiii-JIkut, at ska,
Amjust Ith (O.H.).
"Just now is returned one of the eight ships which the Admiral sent with Captain
Walton to pursue those of Spain that went in with the shore, with a letter ' from that
Captain, dated the fifth instant, giving an account that he, witli the said ships, had
taken one Spanisli rear-admiral of sixty guns, one man-of-war of four and fifty, one of
forty,- which gave the Argyle the first broadside, one of four and twenty, one ship
laden with arms, and one bomb-vessel ; and had liurut one man-of-w'ar ai four and
fifty guns, two of forty each, one of thirty, one fireship, one bomb-vessel, and one
settee.' At the writing of this letter. Captain Walton was making into Syracusa.
The ship which brought this letter saw Rear- Admiral Delavall last night ; who liad
taken the Isahela, a ship of sixty guns, with which he was standing in likewise for
Syracusa ; to which place we are now going ;- and hope to get in there this night.
" When the Admiral lias joined the ships absent from the fleet, and which we
judge are now in Syracusa with their prizes, he designs to send Vice-Adniiral
Cornwall, in the Argyle, with seven or eight ships more, to carrj' the ships taken to
Port Mahon, to be secured there till his Majesty's pleasure be known. He will also
put ashore, in Sicily, the Sjianish admirals and commanding officers, with as many of
the common prisoners as will not be necessary to help navigate the ships taken."
What may be regarded as an official Spanish narrative of the
battle, and of the circumstances which led up to it, was compiled by
the Marques de Beretti-Landi, and published at the Hague. It is
interesting, as well as fair, to append the following translation of
part of it : —
"On August 'Jth, in the morning, the English Meet was discovered oil" the tower of
Fai'o. Towards night it lay by, ofl' Cape della Metelle, opposite the tower in question.
The Spanish fleet was at the time in the Strait, but was without the detachment
commanded by Rear- Admiral Don B. de Guevara, and some shijjs and frigates which
had been sent to other places. As the intention of the English Admiral in thus
approaching was unknown, the Spanish Admiral determined to quit the Strait, and to
' The letter liere alluded to is the famous one which, erroneously, has so often been
cited as a model of modest brevity and sailor-like conciseness. As given by Campbell,
it runs: "Sir, we have taken and destroyed all the Sjmnish ships and vessels which
were upon the coast, the number as jjer margin. I am, etc., G. Waltok." Even
Mahan, following Campbell and Charnock, accepts this docked version of the letter as
genuine, and comments upon its shortness ; yet, as a matter of fact, the real letter is
one of some little length, and the above quotation forms only the first paragraph of it.
Walton's blunt brevity is as mytliical as certain well-known stories which are
associated with FiJiitenoy and Waterloo.
" The San Jsidoro, 46.
^ Some of the vessels here said to have been burnt by Walton were undoubtedly in
reality fired by Mari to save them from capture. It comes, however, almost to the
same thing.
1718.J THE al'ANJSH HTOUY. 37
collect his forces ott' Cape Spartivuntu, taking with him his vessels laden with stores,
his object being the better to prepare against the designs of the English, seeing that an
utTicer who had been sent by Sir George Byng to the Marques de Lede had not
returned. This officer had had orders to suggest to the Marques a suspension of
hostilities for two months; but tlie Marques had replied that he could do nothing
without directions from his Court. And although it was believed that a courier had
been despatched with the suggestion to Madrid, the Spaniards were unwilling to risk a
surprise from the English fleet, and a, resort to such tactics as might be prompted by
pertidy.
" On the morning of the 10th, the Kuglish fleet advanced furtljer into the Faro, and
was saluted by all the Spanish ships and vessels lying there. It is to be here noted
that although Admiral Byng had convoyed to Reggie some transjiorts having on board
troops ' of the Archduke, the officer who had been sent to the Marques de Lede
declared that this was not for hostile purposes, but merel}' to secure from any insults
the transports which were under his protection.
"The Spanish fleet sent out two light frigates to reconnoitre the English fleet ; and
although these perceived that the English, whose designs were not understood, made
all possible sail to close with the Spaniards, whose Admiral was ignorant whether tlie
English came as friends or as enemies, yet the Spaniards, who were two leagues from
the strangers, decided to withdraw towards Cape Passaro under easy sail, in order that
there might be no pretence that they anticipated hostilities. Soon afterwards a calm
supervened, and thus the ships of both fleets fell among one another ; whereupon the
Spanish Admiral, witnessing the danger, caused his ships of the line to be towed avN'ay
from the English with a view to collecting them in one body. Yet he did not permit
the galleys to commit any unfriendly act, such as they nught have committed with
advantage while it remained calm. When the Marques de Marl was near the land and
was separated from his consorts in the rear and from the frigates and transports of his
division, the weather changed, so that he strove in vain to regain the main body of the
Spanish fleet. But the English, with dissimulation, held on their way, trimming their
sails so as to secure the wind, and to cut ofl" the Marques de Marl's division. When
they had at length succeeded in this, they attacked him with six ships, forcing him to
separate from the rest of the fleet and to retire towards the shore. As long as it was
jiossible, the Marques defended himself against seven ships of the line, and, when he
was no longer able to resist, he saved his people by running his vessels aground.
Some of them were burnt under his own direction : others were taken by the enemy.
" The rest of the English fleet, consisting of seventeen sail of the line, fell upon the
Real San Feli^ie, Principe de Asturias, San Fernando, San, Carlos, Santa Isahehi,
and San Pedro, and the tVigates Santa Bosa, Perla, Juno, and Volante, which
continued to make for Cape Passaro; and as, owing to their inferiority of force, they
drew off in line, the English attacked their rearmost ship with four or five vessels, and
cut her off. They did the same in succession with other ships, which, in spite of the
fact that they made all the sail they could, were unable to avoid being captured-
Thus, every Spanish vessel being separately fought by five, six, or seven of the enemy,
the English finally subdued the Peal San Felipe,^ Principe de Asturias, San Carlos,
Santa hahela, Santa Rosa, Volante, and Juno, though each offered a bloody and
determined resistance.
" While the Real San Felijie was engaged with the English, Rear- Admiral Don
Balthazar de Guevara returned from Malta with two ships of the line, and, heading for
the Peal San Felipe, passed tlie English ships which were then alongside her, firing
upon each. He then attacked such of Admiral B_vng's vessels as followed the Peal
' Under General Wetzel.
'^ Admiral Castaileta subsequently died of his wounds at Port Mahon.
38 MAJOIt OI'F.HATIONS, 1714-1702. [1718.
Sun Felipe. Tliese, being very iiiiicli damaged, drew off in ilie night, and, after the
action, remained fifty leagues at sea for three or four day.s not only to repair the
Spanish shijis which they h.«l ca])tured, and which were most severely mauled, but
also to make good their own damages. Admiral Byng, therefore, eould not enter
Syracuse until August Ulth or ITth, mid then oidy with much ilifficult}'." '
After giving some account of the services of individual ships and
captains, the account continues : —
" Such is the story of the action ofl' Abola, or the Gulf of I'Ariga, in tlie Malta
Channel, between the Spanish and English fleets. The English ships, thanks to ill
faith and superior strength, were able to beat the Spanish vessels singly, one by one :
but it may be conceived, judging from the defence made by the latter, that, had they
acted in unison, the battle might have ended more advantageously for them.
" Immediately jfter the action, a captain of the English fleet, on behalf of Admiral
Byng, arrived to make a complimentary excuse to the Marques de Lede, and to assure
him that the Spaniards had been the aggressors, and that the battle ought not to be
considered to constitute a rupture, siting that the English did not take it as doing so.
But it was replied that Spain, ou the contrary, must hold it to constitute a formal
rupture ; and that the Sjianiards would do the English all possible damage and ill, by
ordering the commencement of reprisals. In pursuance of this, several Spanish
vessels, and Don Guevara's division, have already seized certain EnglLsh ships." *
" It is difficult," comments Mahan, " to understand the importance attached by some
writers to Byng's action at this time in attacking without regard to the line-of-battle.
He had before him a disorderly force, much inferior both in numbers and discipline.
His merit seems to lie rather in the readiness to assume a responsibility from which a
more scrupulous man might have shrunk ; but in this, and throughout the campaign,
he rendered good service to England, whose sea power was again strengthened by the
destruction not of an actual but a possible rival : and his services were rewarded hy a
peerage." ■'
It will be well to conclude the history of the major operations of
the Spanish War ere turning to the work done in the meantime by
British fleets in the Baltic, where a state of unrest continued for
several years.
Sir George Byng, after having taken measures to enable the
imperial troops to attack the Spaniards in Sicily, and to gradually
make themselves masters of the island, proceeded to Malta, and
brought away some Sicilian galleys, which, under the Marchese de
Kivarole, had been blockaded there by Eear-Admiral Camniock. He
returned to Naples on November ^nd. In the interval, Eear-Admiral
Guevara, as related in the narrative of the Marques de Beretti-
Landi, entered Cadiz, and seized all the English ships there, while
' Tiiere are, of course, discrepancies between the Spanish and the British accounts
as here given ; but, upon the whole, tlie two agree unusually well.
^ For the translation, I am indebted U< Dr. Henry Lopes.
' Not, however, until September Oth, 1721, when he was made Baron Byng of
Southill, and Yiscovmt Torrington.
171',).]
.SPANJSn HA ID ON SCOTLAND.
39
British merchants and their effects were laid hands upon in Malaga
and other ports of Spain. Reprisals followed immediately, yet war
was not formally declared until December 17th, 1718.
Spain, though weak, was exasperated and obdurate, and was
even more unwilling than at first to accept the terms dictated to her
by the Quadruple Alliance. She therefore collected a considerable
armament at Cadiz and Corunna, and boldly projected an invasion of
the west of England by troops to be led by James Butler, the
attainted Duke of Ormonde. A fleet, under Admiral of the Fleet
James, Earl of Berkeley,^ and Admiral Sir John Norris, was fitted
out, and cruised in the Channel in April ; and troops were con-
centrated, especially in the west country and in Ireland ; but, long
MEDAL (.UMMKJIOKATIVK OF llYXItS VICTOHY 01--K CAPE I'ASSAIIO.
[Frotil an iiriijiiml kindhi lent hij II.S.H. Captain Primr Loilh of Batteiibciy, S-^'-)
ere these preparations had been completed, the Spanish expedition
had been dispersed by a violent and long-continued storm, and the
scheme had been rendered abortive. Three frigates and five trans-
ports, however, conveying, among others, the Earls of Marischal and
Seaforth, and the Marquis of TuUibardine, persisted in their design,
and, pushing on to the coast of Ross-shire, there landed about four
hundred men. These were joined by fifteen or sixteen hundred
Jacobite Scots ; but they had no success. Their depot at Donan
Castle was taken and destroyed by the Worcester, Enterprise, and
Flaniboruitf/Ji, and they themselves were soon afterwards defeated
' So appoiuteil on Mai-fh 21st, ITIU. He was then also Vice-Adrairal of Great
Britain and First Lord of the Admiralty, and he hoisted his flag witli no fewer than
three captains under him, viz.. Vice- Admiral James Littleton (1st) ; Captain Francis
Hosier (2nd, or Captain of the Fleet) ; and the captain of tlie llag<hip.
40 MAJOR Ol'KJlATJONS, 1TH-17(;2. [171'J.
iit Gleiisliiel, wliercupoii tlu; Spanish auxiliaries surrendered at
discretion.
Sir Geoi-ge Byng sailed IVoiu Port Mahon for Naples early
in tlu! spring ol' J71'.), and, thenceforward, co-operated with the
Imperialists in the complete reduction of Sicily. In August, when
that reduction was nearly accomphshed, a dispute arose between the
Admiral and the allies as to the disposal of the Spanish ships that
still lay in the ports of the island. As a settlement of the question,
so far as it concerned the ships at Messina, Sir George proposed to
General Count de Merci, the Imperiahst commander, that a batteiy
should be erected, and that the vessels should he destroyed at their
anchors. De Merci pleaded lack of orders ; but Byng, insisting that
no commander needed specific instructions to destroy the property
of an enemy, gained his point, in spite of the opposition of the
Savoyards ; and most of the ships were duly bombarded and burnt
or sunk. The citadel of Messina, and the remaining vessels, were
handed over to the Imperialists by capitulation on October 7th, 1719.
The Spanish troops in the island were not permitted to evacuate it,
and were kept, by the fleet on the one hand, and by the Imperiahsts
on the other, in much discomfort ; and this fact, combined witli
the persuasive force of an expedition which was fitted out against
Vigo under Vice-Admiral Mighells and Viscount Cobham, and which
will be described in the next chapter, at length induced the King of
Spain to agree with the Quadruple Alliance. A cessation of arms
resulted in February, 1720 ; and, soon afterwards, both Sicily and
Sardinia were evacuated under the terms of a convention, the former
going to the Empire, and the latter to Savoy.' Thus the objects for
which Great Britain had entered into the war were attained. The
wisdom of British interference is a matter which it is unnecessary
here to discuss.
The difficulties with Sweden, suspended for the moment in 1717,
again became acute in 1718, and led to the dispatch of Admiral Sir
John Norris once more to the Baltic. He sailed from the mouth of
the Thames on April '28th, and from Solebay on May 1st, with a
squadron composed of ten sail of the line,' a bomb ketch, and a
' Authorities for tlie War of tlie Quadruiile Alliance : ' Accouut of the Esped. of
the Brit. Fleet to Sicil}' ' ; ' Annals of K. George IV.' ; ' Historical Register ' ; ' C'ori)S
Univ. Diplomatique,' viii. pt. I. ; Chandler's ' Dehates,' v. and vi. ; ' Merc. Hist, et Pol.'
xliv. and xlv. ; ' Mem. pour servir a I'Hist. de I'Espagne,' iii. ; Letters of Earl
Stanhope, Alberoni, Beretti-Landi, etc. ; London Gazette.
^ CuinherJand, 80, (flag). Captain William Faulknor; Ijurliiujham, 70, Captain
1721).] EXPEDITIONS TO THE IIALTIC. 41
fireship, with Eear-Adiiiii'al James Migliells as second iu couiuiaiul,
and with a nniuber of merchantmen in convoy. Upon his arrival off
Copenhagen, he was joined by a Danisli K(|iiadi'(iii, with whicli lie
cruised to the northward; but as the Swedes, upon his approach,
shut themselves up iu their ports, no naval action resulted. Sweden
was, however, by no lueans intimidated by the action of the Allies.
She made peace with the Tsar ; and, having thus freed herself from
anxiety in one direction, turned with renewed energy to prosecute
the land war with Denmark, whose territories she invaded with
two considerable armies. In this campaign, although it was upon
the whole successful, Sweden suffered the loss of her brave but
quixotic king. Charles XII. was killed by a cannon ball at
the siege of Frederikshald on December 11th, 1718. Sir John
Norris, with the fleet, had returned to England in the month of
October.
After the death of Charles XII. and the accession of Queen
Ulrica Eleanora '■ the policy of Sweden changed. She entered upon
very friendly relations with Great Britain, and, on the other hand,
was attacked by her late ally and Great Britain's old friend, Peter
the Great. The Russians ravaged the Swedish coasts until, a fresh
British fleet having been entrusted to the command of Sir John
Norris in June, and having joined the Swedish fleet in September,
1719, the enemy was obliged to take refuge in the harbour of Keval.
A little later, the old quarrel between Sweden and Denmark was
settled by British mediation : - but when Norris, in order to avoid
being frozen up there, left the Baltic in November, Sweden and
Russia remained unreconciled, in spite of the efforts which had been
made by Lord Carteret — afterwards Earl Granville — the British
minister at Stockholm, to pacify them.
In 17'20 Russia's attitude continued as before, and Sir John
Norris went back to the Baltic to protect Sweden during the open
weather. He sailed on April l(5th ; was joined in May by a Swedish
squadron under Admiral Baron Wachtmeister ; and, after cruising off
Tudor Trevor ; Hampton Cuurt, 70, Captain Robert Coleman ; Prince Frederick, 70,
Captain Covill Mayne; Salisbury, 50, Captain John Cockburne (1); Defiance, 60,
Captain Joseph Soanes ; Winchenter, 50, Captain James Campbell (1) ; Guernsey, 50,
Captain Charles Hardy (1) ; and Windsor, 60, Captain Francis Piercy. These were
afterwards joined by a few other vessels.
Whose fousort, Friedricli of Hessen-Cassel, was presently chosen king, to the
great annoyance of Russia.
'■^ Thougli the formal treaty of peace was not signed until tlie summer of 1720.
42 M A.I on (tPEUATIOSS, ITM-lTfJli. [1725.
lieval, returned to England in November/ In 1721, Sir Jolui was
employed in the same way, his mission being, however, not only to
protect Sweden, but also to lend moral support to the mediatory
efforts of the British minister at Stockholm. He sailed from the
Xore on April 13th with a fleet of twenty-one ships of the line, two
fireships, three bombs, and two tenders, and with Eear-Admiral
Francis Hosier (W.), and Eear-Admiral Edward Hopsonn (B.), in
command under him. His appearance in the Baltic undoubtedly
favoured the conclusion of peace between the belligerents : and on
September 10th hostilities between Sweden and Russia wei"e
formally terminated by the Treaty of Nystadt. Sir John dropped
anchor at the Nore on October 20th. During these various ex-
peditions to the north he seldom had occasion to fire a gun in anger,
and his proceedings were throughout of an uneventful and un-
exciting character ; yet, thanks to his tact, patience, and diplomatic
ability, and to the recognised strength and efficiency of the forces
under him, he was able to exercise a very weighty influence upon
the councils of the northern powers, and to peaceably biing about
results which a less capable officer might have failed to secui'e even
by fighting for them.
From 1721 onwards, for four or five years, the Xavy had no
great tasks assigned to it ; but the Treaty of Vienna, concluded on
April 20th, 1725, between Spain and Austria, introduced new
sources of trouble to Europe. By a secret article of that treat}',
marriages between the houses of Spain and Austria were arranged,
and both countries pledged themselves to assist the restoration of
the Stuarts, and to compel, if necessary by force, the retrocession of
Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain. To oppose these schemes. Great
Britain, France, and Prussia entered, on September 3rd, 1725, into
the Treaty of Hannover ; whereupon, Spain began to intrigue with
Russia ; and, as the Empress Catherine, the successor of Peter the
Great, was by no means amicably disposed towards Great Britain
and her allies, it became advisable, in 1726, not only to send a fleet
to the coast of Spain, but also to dispatch once more a strong force
to the Baltic. In addition to these fleets a squadron was got ready
for the West Indies.
The fleet destined to check the immediate designs of Spain was
entnisted to Admiral Sir John Jennings (W.), who was afterwards
' In a storm in the North Sea, the Monck, 50, Captain the Hon. George Clinton,
was driven ashore near Golston on Nov. 24th, and lost ; but all her people were saved.
1726.] WAGL'/i TO rilE JiALTIC. 43
joined by Keai--Admiiiil Edward Hopsonii (K.)- ^ir John, with
nine ships of the hne, sailed from St. Helen's on Jnly 'JOtli. T\u:
appearance of the British so nmch disquieted tlu; S2)aiiiards that, for
the moment, they abandoned their hostile projects : and in October,
Jennings was able to return to England, leaving Hopsonn, with a
reduced squadron, as commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean.
The Baltic fleet, under Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Wager (R.) and
Eear-Admiral Sir George Walton (B.), consisted of twenty ships of
the line, a twenty-gun ship, two fireships, and a hospital ship. It
quitted the Nore on April 17th, and, proceeding to Copenhagen and
Stockholm, obtiiined the co-operation of Denmark and the friendly
support of Sweden. A Danish squadron, under Kear-Admiral Bille,
joined Sir Charles in May, and, with him, proceeded to the Gulf of
Finland. The Russians had, in and about Cronstadt, a considerable
force under the General-Admiral Apraxine, Vice-Admiral Thomas
Gordon,' and a rear-admiral said to have been an Englishman : "
but, although they were much inclined to issue forth and defy the
alhes, Gordon succeeded in dissuading them from this suicidal
course ; and eventually the ships were laid up. Wager displayed
throughout great tact and diplomatic ability. In the autumn he,
like Jennings, returned to England, anchoring off the Guufleet on
November 1st.
Vice-Admiral Francis Hosier ■' (B.) was given command of the
squadron for the West Indies. He sailed from Plymouth on
April 9th with seven men-of-war, and, after a tedious passage,
arrived off the Bastimentos, near Puerto Bello, on June 6th. He
was then or thereafter joined by several vessels which were already
on the station, and by others from home. These brought u]i liis
total force to a strength of sixteen ships.''
' Tliuiiias Gordon, a captain of 1705, severed his connection with the Britisli Navy
at the death of Queen Anne, and entered that of Russia, in which he was at once given
flag-ranl<. Other Jacobite naval officers, notably the gallant Kenneth, Lord Duflus,
took the same service at aliout tlie ■••anie time.
^ Some authorities specify him as Rcar-Adnaral Saunders, an ex-Master and
Commander in the British Navy.
' Francis Hosier. Commander, 1694. Captain, IGSXi. nistinguished himself as
captain of the Salisbury, 1707-171.3. Rear-Admiral, 1720. Second in command in
the Baltic. Vice-Admiral, 1723. Died Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies,
August 23rd, 1727.
■* Fu., three third-rates, tlie Bmiii, JSerwick, and I.ema: ; eight fnurth-ratcs, the
liipov, Leopard, Sitperhe, Nottiiuiliam, Diuikirk, Dragon, Tiijcr, and Portland ; one
fifth-rate, the Diamuud ; and three sixth-rates, the Greyhouvd, Winchehea, and
/{apjiij.
44 MA.JOll OPEllATIOI^S, 17M-17G2. [iTliT.
The appearance ol' the British fleet in the West Indies gave great
uneasiness to the Spaniards ; and, as soon as it was reported, the
treasure-ships, which were then ready to make their voyage to
Europe, were unloaded, and their cargo of pieces of eight and other
valuables was placed on shore in security, part at Havana and part
elsewhere. The men-of-war which were to have convoyed the
treasure-ships were, moreover, laid up at Puerto Bello ; and it was
determined that, so long as a powerful British force remained in the
neighbourhood, no attempt should be made to dispatch the annual
flota to Spain ; although, of course, the non-arrival of the usual
supplies would inevitably put the mother country to immense
inconvenience.
The governor of Puerto Bello sent a civil message to the Vice-
Admiral desiring to know the reason for the unexpected visit. The
real reason was that the galleons might be watched : but as there
lay in Puerto Bello at the time a South Sea Company's ship, the
Royal George, and as this vessel would probably have been detained
if Hosier had at once proclaimed the nature of his mission, the reply
returned was to the effect that the fleet had come to convoy the
lioijal George. The governor thereupon took measures to faciUtate
the early departure of that ship ; and, when she had joined the fleet,
he politely requested the Vice-Admiral, seeing that the ostensible
reason for the presence of the force had ceased to exist, to withdraw
from off the port. But Hosier then answered that, pending the
receipt of further orders, he purposed to remain where he was ; and,
that his intentions might no longer be in doubt, he stationed a ship
of the line within gun-shot of the castle, and suffered no vessel to
enter or leave the port wdthout being strictly examined. He
maintained this blockade for six months, his ships in the mean-
while becoming daily more and more distressed by the ravages of
epidemic and other diseases ; and when, on December 14th, 1726, he
proceeded to Jamaica, his command was so completely enfeebled
that he had the greatest difficulty in navigating it into harbour.
The Vice-Admiral refreshed his people and, to the best of his
ability, made up his weakened complements to their full strength ;
and in February, 1727, he stood over to Cartagena, where some
galleons then lay. Until August he cruised upon his station ; but
his instructions were of a nature which prevented him from being
of much use to his country. They authorised him to make reprisals
siibject to certain restrictions, but not to make war ; and although
\12--2U.'\ MORTALITY IN THE WEtiT INDIEH. 4;')
the Spaniards, after a time, began to seize the property of British
merchants and to detain and condemn British vessels. Hosier was
obUged to content himself with demanding a restitution which the
Spaniards refused, and which he was unable to compel. During
that period disease was even more rife throughout the fleet than it
had been in the previous year ; and, after thousands of officers and
men had perished miserably, the misfortunes of the expeditimi
culminated on August 23rd, when Hosier himself died.'
His death has been attributed to anxiety and chagrin, but it
was, in fact, caused by fever. Nor is it astonishing that the fleet
was then little better than a floating charnel-house. Tlie most
elementary prescriptions of sanitary science seem to have been
neglected, and there is perhaps no better illustration of the extra-
ordinary indifl'erence to the simplest laws of health than the fact
that in that hot and pestilent climate the Vice-Admiral's body was
given a temporary burial-place in the ballast of his flagship, the
Breda, where it remained, a necessary source of danger to all on
board, until it was despatched to England, late in the year, on board
H.M. snow Happy, Commander Henry Fowkes. Hosier's death left
Captain Edward St. Loe,^ of the Siipcrbf. (iO, as senior officer on the
station.
St. Loe pursued the same policy as Hosier had followed, and pre-
vented the sailing of the galleons, until he was superseded by Vice-
Admiral Edward Hopsonn, who arrived at Jamaica on January '29th,
1728. Hopsonn died of fever on board his flagship the Leopard, 50,
on May 8th, leaving St. Loe once more senior officer. But by that
time the difficulties with Spain were in a fair way of adjustment.
It was still, however, necessary to keep a large force in the West
Indies ; and ere it was materially reduced, St. Loe also fell a
sacrifice to the climate and to the insanitary condition of the ships.
He died on April 22nd, 1729.^
It is doubtful whether any other British fleet has ever suffered
from disease so severely as that of Hosier suffered in 1726-27. Its
horrible experiences made a deep and lasting impression upon the
nation,^ and it may be hoped that they have had the effect of
^ Hosier had been promoted on August 11th to be Vice-Admiral of the White. At
tlie time of his death, a commission empowering the Governor of Jamaica to knight
him is said to have been on its way out. Charnock, iii. 139.
^ St. Loe fiew a broad pennant.
^ Having been promoted on March 4th, 17'iii, to be Rear-Admiral uf the Blue.
' See, for exanqile, Glover's popular ballad, 'Admiral Hosier's Ghost.'
46 MAJOl! OI'EIIATIONS, J 7 14-1 7(52. [1727.
iiupresHiiig upon all later British admirals the supreiue importance
of taking systematic and rif^orous measures for preserving the health
of their men. During the two years immediately following Hosier's
first arrival off the Bastimentos, the fleet, the nominal complement
of which never, roughly speaking, exceeded 4750 persons,' lost, in
addition to two flag officers and seven or eight captains, about fifty
lieutenants, and four thousand suljordinate officers and men, by
various forms of sickness.
The attitude of Great Britain 'with regard to the galleons pro-
voked Spain to make great preparations for a siege of Gibraltar ;
and as that fortress was neither thoroughly armed nor properly
held, corresponding measures had to be taken for its protection.
A squadron of six men-of-war and two sloops - was fitted out at
Portsmouth towards the end of 1726 ; seventeen companies of
troops and large quantities of provisions and ammunition were
embarked ; and on December 24th Vice-Admiral Sir Charles
Wager (E.) hoisted his flag in the Kent, 70, and took command.
He sailed on January 19th, 1727, and on February 2nd, having
picked up the Stirling Castle, 70, on his way out, arrived in
Gibraltar Bay, where he found Eear-Admiral Edward Hopsonn (E.),
who had remained upon the station during the winter.^ As the
Spaniards, fifteen thousand strong, were seen to be working hard,
troops, guns, and stores were landed ; but no actual hostilities took
place until after February 10th, when the enemy began a new
battery within half gunshot of some of the defences of the place.
Colonel Jasper Clayton, the Lieutenant-Governor, made a spirited
remonstrance ; but the Conde de las Torres, the Spanish commander-
in-chief, returned an unsatisfactory and truculent answer; where-
upon fire was opened from the Mole Head, and from Prince's
' Uiu-iug much of the time the total complement was not more than 3.300 officers
and men. If there had not heen at Jamaica ]ileniy of men whose ships happened
to he laid up there owing to the difficult)- with Spain, the deficiencies could not
have heen made good, and the fleet must literally have become an array of immobile
and impotent hulks.
'' Kent, 70, Lenox, 70, Berwick, 70, Royal Oak, 70, Portland, 50, Tiger, 50,
Hawk, 6, and Cruiser, 6. The Torhaij, 80, and Poole, fireship, 8, followed on
March Otli.
^ Hopsonn had with him the Burford, 70, York, GO, Winchester, 50, Culchester, 50,
Swallow, 60, Dursley Gallei/, 20, and Thunder, bomb, 4. A few days later the
Solfhny, bomb, 6, which had been ciuising, joiued. The Berwick and Lenox were
detached to the West Indies on February 13th, and the Portland and Tif/er on
April 21st. On the other hand, several fresh vessels arrived from England and
elsewhere at various times.
ITl'T.] iilEOK OF <lll!l!Al/rAR. 47
and Willis"« batteries; and 8ir Charles Wa<,'er, on tin; evening,' oT
the 11th, sent the Tiger, 50, Durslei/ Gallci/, 20, and So/r/xn/,
bomb, 6, to throw a flanking fire ujion llic Spanisli lines IVoni
the eastward.
From that day the Spaniards prosecuted th(! siege in earnest ;
but as they had nothing larger than boats and small settees afloat
in the Bay, they accomplished very little. Sir Charles, while
always leaving a few vessels to enfilade the Spanish attack, fre-
quently cruised in the Strait and oft' Cadiz ; and on those occasions
his vessels made prizes of several merchairtmen . On March 11th,
moreover, the lioijal Oak, 70, being detached, took the new Spanish
man-of-war, Nuestra Sefiora del Bosario, 46, which was on her way
from Santander to Cadiz ; and, in the meantime, the small craft
employed by the enemy within the Bay were from time to time
nearly all seized. So mattei^s went on, until, on June 16th, Sir
Charles Wager, having heard that the preliminaries of peace had
been agreed to, ordered a cessation of hostilities.'
"But," says Smollett, '•when the siege was on the [Kiiiit ni lieino- entirely raised,
and the preliminaries ratified in form, Spain started new difficulties and urged new
pretensions. The Spaniards insisted that a temporary suspension of arms did not
imply an actual raising of the siege of Gibraltar. . . . Upon this, hostilities began
between the ships of the two nations ; and Sir Charles Wager continued to cruise on
the coasts of Spain, after the cessaiion of arms at Gibraltar. . . . However, after many
cavils and delays, the preliminary articles were at last signed at Madrid on Febrviary
24th,- above eight months after the death of King George the First, by the ministers
of the Emperor, England, Spain, France, and the States ; which opened the way to
the Congress." ''
Sir Charles Wager, with part of his fleet, reached Spithead on
April 9th, on his return from the Mediterranean. During his
absence there, Admiral Sir John Norris (B.), Eear- Admiral Salmon
Morrice (W.), and Kear-Admiral Eobert Hughes (1) (B.), with twelve
ships of the line and several smaller ones, made another demonstra-
tion in the Baltic, in order to induce the Empress of Bussia to
refrain from attacking Sweden. The fleet reached Copenhagen
on May l'2th, 1727, and its appearance in northern waters created
so powerful an impression that Russia, in spite of the fact that
she had already threatened Sweden in definite terms, laid up her
ships and abandoned her designs. Sir John returned without having
had occasion to fire a shot.
' Sir Charles utilised the leisure which this cessation gave him by proceeding to
Tangier, and renewing the peace with MaroccO.
'' 1728. ^ Begun at Soissons on June 1st, 1728.
48 MA.IOll Ol'EHATIONfi, 17U-17C2. [1720.
The death of George I., which had occurred at Osnabriick on
June 11th, 17'27, made no difference to the foreign policy of Great
Britain. George II., in his first message to Parhament, while
expressing a hope that peace would be re-established as a result
of the deliberations then in progress, pointed out that it was still
necessary to continue the preparations for war. Eleven ships had
already been commissioned in January ; and, as the sincerity of
Spain remained in some doubt, fifteen more were commissioned in
June, 1728. When Parliament re-assembled in January, 1729, the
Congress at Soissons had failed to devise tenns of peace that were
satisfactory to all the numerous parties concerned, and the Spaniards
in the West Indies were more troublesome than ever to British
trade. But the manifest determination of the King to stand by
his allies ; his plainly-expressed intention to preserve his " undoubted
right to Gibraltar and the island of Minorca" ; ^ his assurance that
he would secure satisfaction for Spanish depredations in the West
Indies ; and his orders, issued on May 25th, for the commissioning
of twenty sail of the line and five frigates,- were not without
effect ; the result being that, by the Treaty of Seville, concluded
on November 9th, 1729, Great Britain, Spain, and France, who
wei'e subsequently joined by Holland, became defensively allied.
Gibraltar was not mentioned in the treaty ; and the fact that
it was not mentioned was regarded as a tacit renunciation of the
claim of Spain to the Kock ; but, in some other respects, the
settlement was disadvantageous to Great Britain,^ and, upon
the whole, it was beneficial rather to France than to any other
comitry.
During the peace which followed, Admiral Sir Charles Wager,''
in 1731, assisted the Marques de Mari in convoying a large body of
Spanish troops to Leghorn, in order to place Don Carlos de Bourbon
in possession of Parma and Piacenza, to which, under the terms of
the treaty, the Prince had become entitled by the death of the
Duke of Parma. Yet, notwithstanding this friendly co-operation
between Great Britain and Spain in Europe, the relations between
' Answer of the Iviiig tu the Coramuiis, March 25th, 172!J.
^ These were presently joined at Spithead by fourteen Dutch ships under Vice-
Adnural van Soramelsdijck.
^ Tt did not, fur example, secure satisfaction for the Spanish depredations in tlie
West Indies.
* He had his flag in the Naraur, 'JO. Hear- Admiral Sir John Balchen. Kt. (W.),
in the Norfulk, 80, was second in command.
1735.]
run ruGA l a tininTEi).
49
the representatives of the two countries in the New World became
ever more and more strained. And even in Eiu'ope very menacing
clouds arose when, in 17315, the death of Augustus II., Elector of
Saxony and King of Poland, brought about a hostile combination
of France, Spain, and Sardinia against tlie Empire. Great Britain,
as a necessary measure of precaution, connnissioned no fewer than
ADMIRAL XK'HOLAS HADDOCK.
(From Ffihei'^s I'lifimviinj aftir tin' jniint'niit hi/ T. (^ihsufu
rcpirm'ntiiitj Httdtlock ivhin Jlnir-Admjnrl nf !}ir Jlnl, 17ii.^.)
eighty-six^ ships of war early in 1734, recalled British sailors from
the service of foreign powers, and offered bounties to seamen.
In 1735, a dispute having broken out between Spain and Portugal,
the latter power solicited British aid against the Spaniards ; and,
in response, a large fleet, under Admiral Sir John Norris, with
Vice- Admiral Sir John Balchen (R.), and Eear-Admiral Nicholas
^ Bi'ingmg up the total miinljer iu commission to one Iniudred and twentj'.
VOL. III. E
50 MAJOJ; OPEL-ATIONS, 1714-1762. [1738.
liaddock' (W.), was dispatched to Lisbon, sailing from Spithead on
May 27th, and reaching the Tagus on June 9th. The demonstration
was made not only in the general interests of peace, but also in
the particular interests of the many British merchants whose welfare
was more or less dependent upon the safety of the then homecoming
Portuguese flota from Brazil ; and it was so efficacious that an actual
rupture between the two countries was prevented.
Yet Spain was not to be permanently intimidated. After Fi-ance,
going behind the backs of her allies, had patched up, vastly to her
own benefit, her differences with the Empire by the treaty of
December 28th, 1735, Great Britain, awaking to the fact that she
had been neglecting her own peculiar business in order to be ready
to intervene on behalf of powers that deserved no such kindness at
her hands, once more turned her attention to the outrages which
had for j'ears been committed upon her commerce by the Spaniards
in the West Indies. In 1737 she sent Kear-Admiral Nicholas
Haddock to the Mediterranean with a squadron, the appearance of
which was intended to lend weight to the demands which she then
felt it necessary to make. Spain haggled and temporised. In reply
to an address from the Commons, King George II., on March 6th,
1738, said : "I am fully sensible of the many and unwarrantable
dej)redations committed by the Spaniards,- and you may be assured
I will make use of the most proper and effectual means that are in
my power to procure justice and satisfaction to my injured subjects,
and for the future security of their trade and navigation."
Still, however, Spain temporised. A paper presented to Parlia-
ment in 1738 showed that since the Treaty of Seville the loss
caused to British merchants by the operations of the Spaniards
had been upwards of i'140,000, that fifty-two British vessels had
been taken and plundered by them, and that British seamen had
been very cruelly treated. This caused much excitement. Then
came the examination by the House of persons who had, or were
alleged to have, suffered at the hands of the Spaniards. Among
these persons was Richard Jenkins, sometime master of the Bebecca,
brig, of Glasgow. He declared that his craft had been boarded by
a guarda-costa, whose captain had wantonly cut off one of the
' Nicholas Haddock. Burn, 168G. Captain, 1707. Eear-Admiral, 173-1. Vice-
Admiral, 17-11. Admiral. 1744. Died, 1746.
^ Accounts of some of tliese, and further notes about Jenkins, -vvill be found in the
next chapter.
1739.] JENKINS'S EARS. 51,
deponent's ears, and handed it to him with the insolent remark :
" Garry this home to the King, your mastcir, whom, if he were
present, I would serve in lik(! fashion." " The truth of the story,"
says Mr. Lecky, " is extremely doubtful." It has even been said
that Jenkins lost his ear at the pillory. Yet the indignation ai-ousc;(l
by the man's deposition was general ; and popular opinion grew
uncontrollable when it became known that, upon having been
asked by a member what were his feelings at the moment of
the outrage, Jenkins had replied: "I recommended my soul to
God, and my cause to my country."
Spain at length agreed to make some reparation, and to settle
outstanding differences. The convention to this effect was sub-
mitted to Parliament in 1739, and, after a most stormy debate,
approved of ; yet, when the time came for it to be carried out,
fresh difficulties cropped up, and Spain, possibly because she had
gained by negotiation all the delay which she deemed necessary to
enable her to perfect her preparations, silently declined to play
her promised part. At about the same time, owing to the pre-
carious state of affairs, the British consuls at Malaga, Alicant,
and other Spanish ports, were compelled to advise British merchants
and vessels to depart thence with all haste.
Great Britain was to be satisfied only by the adoption of strong
measures ; and on July 10th, 1739, the King issued a proclamation
in which he set forth that the Spaniards had committed depredations,
and that they had promised and failed to make reparation ; and in
which he authorised general reprisals and letters of marque against
the ships, goods, and subjects of the King of Spain. Half-hearted
endeavours were made at the last moment to preserve peace ; but
Spain declared that she regarded the making of reprisals as a
hostile act ; France reminded the world that she was bound to
look upon the enemies of Spain as her own foes ; and Holland
averred that, if called upon to do so, she could not but observe
the spirit of her treaty of alliance with Great Britain.
The British minister presently withdrew from Madrid, and the
Spanish minister from London ; the British squadrons abroad were
reinforced ; ' numerous ships were commissioned ; stringent measures
were adopted to procure the necessary number of seamen for the
' Information as to the state of affairs was also sent to Commodore Charles Brown,
who was senior officer at Jamaica, and who at once began reprisals. For an account of
them, see next chapter.
E 2
52 MA.Iol: (irKUATlOSS, 1714-17GL'. [1739.
tieet; letters of marque were aiiiiouiiced on July 'Jist' as ready for
issue by the Admiralty ; and on October 'iSrd, 1739, war was
formally declared against Spain, which put lorwaid hvr own
declaration on November '28tli.
The power of Spain was then most vulnerable in the AVest
Indies and the Pacific. An expedition under Captain George Anson,
of whose proceedings an account will Ik; found in Chapter XXIX.,
was prepared for the Pacific, but did not sail until the autumn of
1740. Dispatched primarily for warlike purposes, and originally
intended to co-operate with another force under Captain James
Cornwall, Anson's command, owing to various adventitious circum-
stances, gained for its leader an even more brilliant reputation as
a navigator than as a fighting officer ; and the history of it falls
naturally among the chronicles of the great British voyages. But an
expedition to the West Indies, which was entrusted to Vice-Admiral
Edward Vernon (1), (B.),' was, from beginning to end, entirely a
fighting venture ; and as it was not without effect upon the issue
of the war, it may fitly be described here, although it led up to no
fleet action, and although it did not, to any appreciable extent,
directly strengthen the maritime position of Great Bi-itain.
Edward Vernon was a blunt, well-intentioned, honest, and very
popular officer, whose chief service faults were that he could not
always control either his tongue or his pen, and that he was too
fond of vulgar applause. He had served in the West Indies for
several years after his first appointment as a post-captain, and
was generally believed to have an intimate acquaintance with the
whole of that station and with the weak points of the Spanish
position there. He had also been for a long time member of
Parliament for Ipswich and for Penryn ; and, in the course of one
of the debates upon the depredations of the Spaniards, he had taken
upon himself to declare in strong terms that the Spanish possessions
in the West Indies might be reduced -with great ease, and that
Puerto Bello,' in particular, might be taken by a force of six
^ Edward Vernon was born in 1G8-1, and became a Post-Captain in 1706, and a
Vice-Admiral, witliout liaving ever been a Rear-Admiral, on .July 9th, 1739. Having
captured Puerto Bello, etc., in that and the next year, he led an attack upon Cartagena
in 1741. In 1745 he attained the rank of Admiral, but, in the following year, owing,
among other things, to his fondness for pamphleteering, he was struck off the list of
flag-oflScers. See note on p. Ill, i»/ra. He died iu 1757.
^ Puerto Bello stands on the north side of the Isthmus of Darien, and is abou
seventy miles from Panama. It has a considerable bay and good anchorage.
173'J.]
VERNON 10 THE WEST INDIES.
53
ships of the hue. He said, moreover, that he would gladly venture
liis life and reputation upon the success of such an enterprise, if
only he were permitted to attempt it. Vernon was popular in the
country, and troublesome to the ministry ; and the Government,
anxious to be temporarily rid of him, and perhaps equally ready
to take credit for his triumph or to rejoice over his disgrace,
promoted him, and gave him exactly the mission and force which
he had demanded.
AimiKAI, EDWAUD VERNON.
iFroin McAnkll's I'/tijntri/hj tttlir the portrait bij T. (liiiiixhorunaU, li.A.')
Vernon sailed from Portsmouth on July 24th, 1739,^ with four
ships of seventy guns, three of sixty, one of fifty, and one of fort)*.
Of these, he presently detached three of the seventies, viz., the
Lenox, Captain Covill Mayne, Elizabeth, Captain Edward Falking-
ham (1), and Kent, Captain Thomas Durell (1), to cruise for a month
off Cape Ortegal, and to look out for some treasure-ships which were
daily expected in Spain. The vessels were to return afterwards to
' Hu ilid uot, liowever, leave Plymouth until August .'inl.
54 MAJOR OrEItATlONti, 1714-1762. [1739.
England. He also detached the Pearl, 50, Captain the Hon.
Edward Legge, to cruise for three months between Lisbon and
Oporto. With the rest of his force he crossed the Atlantic, reaching
Jamaica on October 23rd.' There he was joined by the senior
officer already on the station. Commodore Charles Brown, whose
broad pennant was in the Hampton Court, 70.
On the voyage out Vernon took every opportunity of disciplining
his men, and of exercising them both at the heavy guns and at small
arms ; and there is little doubt that, under his direction, his small
squadron rapidly became, for its size, the most efficient that Great
Britain had sent to sea for many years.
The intelligence received by the Vice-Admiral was to the effect
that the Spanish galleons were about to make rendezvous at
Cartagena, and to proceed thence to Puerto Bello, where they would
exchange their European goods for the gold and silver which had
been sent for the purpose from Panama. The news that the bullion
was already at Puerto Bello determined A'ernon to lose no time in
attacking that place. He obtained pilots, embarked two hundred
soldiers under Captain Newton, and, on November 5th, 1739, sailed
from Port Eoyal." On the following day he issued the following
instructions to his captains : —
" Ujiou making the land at Puerto Bello, and having a fair wind to favour them,
and daylight for the attempt, to have their ships clear in all respects for imm'ediate
service ; and, on the proper signal, to form themselves into a line of battle, as directed ;
and, being formed, to follow in the same order of battle to the attack, in the manner
hereafter directed. And as the north shore of the harbour of Puerto Bello is
represented to the Admiral to be a bold steep shore, on which, at the first entrance,
stands the Castillo de Ferro, or Iron Castle, Commodore Brown, and the ships that
follow him, are directed to pass the said fort, within less than a cable's length distant,
giving the enemy as they pass as warm a fire as possible, both from great guns and
musketry. Then Commodore Brown is to steer away for the Gloria Castle, and anchor
as near as he ]iossibly can to the eastermost part of it, for battering down all the
(lefences of it, but so as to leave room for Captain Maj'ne, in the Worcesttr, to anchor
astern of him against the westermost bastion, and to do the same there ; and to follow
such orders as the Commodore may think i)roper to give him for attacking the said
castle. Captain Herbert, in the Sonmch, after giving his fire at the Iron Castle, is to
push on for the castle of San Jeronimo, lying to the eastward of the town, and to
anchor as near it as he possibly can, and batter it down ; and Captain Trevor, in the
Strafford, following the Admiral, to come to an anchor abreast of the eastermost
part of the Iron Castle, so as to leave room for Captain Waterhouse, in the Princess
Louisa, to anchor astern of him, for battering the westermost part of the (/astle; and
' Having called in the meantime at Antigua and St. Kitt's.
- With the ships mentioned in the table infra, and the Sheerness, 20, Captain Miles
Stapleton. This vessel was preseutlj" detacheil to reconnoitre Cartagena.
1739.]
VERNON AT PUKItTd BKLJA).
coiitinuu there till the service is euuipleloil, aiul make lliemselves masters of it: tlie
youngest officers to follow the further orders of the elder in the further prosecution of
the attack : and, if the weather be favourable for it on their going in, each ship,
besides having her long-boat towing astern, to have her barge alongside to tow the
long-boats away with such jiart of the soldiers as can conveidently go in them, and to
come under the Admiral's stern, for his directing a descent with them, where he shall
find it most proper to order it. From the men's inexperience in service, it will be
necessary to be as cautious as possible to prevent Imi'i-y and confusion, and a fruitless
waste of powder and shot. The captains are to give the strictest orders to their
respective otlicers to take the greatest care that no gun is fired but what they, or those
they particularly appoint, first see levelled, and direct the firing of; and tliat they shall
strictly prohibit all their men from hallooing and ntaking irregular noise that will only
serve to throw them into confusion, till such time as the service is performed and when
thej' have nothing to do but glory in the victory. Such of the ships as have mortars
and cohorns on board are ordered to use them in the nttacU."
Link oi^ Batti.k at the AxrACK ox Pitekto I'.ki.i.d, Xllv^:^^'.l■:l^ I'lsr, ITMii.
Ships.
'timmaiiders.
Hampton Court,
Norwich
Worcester .
Burford
Strafford
J^riucess Loiiitui^
Commodore (!haiies Brown,
.'aptain Digby Dent, (ii ).
„ Richard Herbert.
„ Perry Mayne.
Yice-Adiiiiral Edward Vernon, (B.).
C'a]itain Thomas Watson (1).
„ 'Phomas Trevor.
,, Thomas Waterhouse.
The squadron sighted Puerto JJello in the night of November ^Oth,
and chased into harbour some small vessels, which apprised the
enemy of Vernon's presence on the coast. That he might not be
driven to leeward, the Vice-Admiral anchored about six leagues from
the shore. Early on the '21st he weighed, and, the wind being
easterly,^ he plied to windward in line of battle ahead. At about
2 P.M., the Hampton Court, being close to the Iron Castle, began the
attack, and was well seconded by the Noncivh and Worcester. The
fire of the enemy, vigorous at first, gradually lessened. Seeing this,
Vernon, who was rapidly approaching, signalled for the manned
boats to go under his stern, and then ordered them to land beneath
the walls of the castle. In the meantime, the Burford, which had
come abreast of the castle, had received and returned a very heavy
fire. The men in her tops forced the enemy to abandon his lower
battery, whereupon the landing-party made an assault, and, by
climbing into the embrasures upon one another's shoulders, the men
entered, and quickly carried the work, most of the defenders of
' This prevented tlie attack from being carried out in tlie jiresci'lbed manner.
56
MJJdj; (tl'KHJ'nONS, I7M-1702.
[1739.
wliicli fled to the town, tliout^h ;i few Kbut tliuinselves ux) in the
keep, whence they presently shouted appeals for quarter.
By that time night had come on. Owing to the wind, Commo-
dore Brown and his division had been unable to get up the bay and
attack the castles of Gloria and San Jeronimo, and his ships, having
fallen to leeward, were obliged to anchor, ready to proceed at
daybreak should the wind permit. The lUirford and Htrafford,
Attack on Pcekto Bei.lo, Xovember 21st., 1739.
{Fj'om a plan hij Com. Jamt'n Bt'ntonc kindly lent by Lord Vernon.)
C. Warcester.
D. Noririeh.
E. Biirfurd.
F. Hnoipton Court.
G. Strafford.
H. Princess Louisa.
1. Two tenders,
-fir. Two Spanish giiarda-eostas.
21. Three trading sloops.
0. Boats on their wav to land soldiers.
which were just within reach of the heaviest guns in Gloria, were
fired at all night, but received little damage beyond the wounding of
the former's fore topmast. The fire was returned wdth effect from
the lower deck of the Burford. Early in the morning of the 2'2nd,
the Vice-Admiral went on board the Hampton Court, and, after he
had consulted with his ofiicers, directed steps to be taken for warping
his ships up the harbour during the night, in order to be able to
17.51I.] VEItNUN ON TIIK SPANISH MA FN. 57
attack Gloria and San Jeronimo on tiio I'oUovving day. But these
measures proved to be unnecessary. The Spanish governor, Don
Francisco Martinez de lletez, hoisted a white flag, and sent out a
boat with a flag of truce to convey to Vernon the terms on wliicli
the place would be surrendered. These terms were deemed in-
admissible by the Vice-Admiral, who drew up others which he was
prepared to grant. He allowed the governor only a few hours in
which to make up his mind; yet, well within the specified time, the
terms were accepted. Captain Newton, with two hundred soldiers,
was sent to take possession of the town and castles ; and detachments
of seamen boarded the vessels in port. The crews of these had, it
appeared, landed during the previous night, and committed various
outrages. The garrison was allowed to march out with the honours
of war, and to carry off two cannon with ten charges of powder for
each. The inhabitants were permitted either to remove or to remain,
and were promised security for their goods and efl'ects. The ships '
were surrendered absolutely, though their crews were permitted to
retire with their personal effects. And, contingent upon the due
performance of all the stipulations, the town, the clergy and the
churches were guaranteed protection and immunity in their privi-
leges and properties."
Public money to the amount of ten thousand dollars was found
in the place, aird at once distributed by Vernon among his men.
There were also taken forty pieces of brass cannon, ten brass fleld-
pieces, four brass mortars, and eigliteen brass patereroes, besides
iron guns, which were destroyed, but not carried oft". The fortiflca-
tions were then demolished — a work which needed the expenditure
of one hundred and twenty-two barrels of captured Spanish powder,
and which occiipied three weeks. ^
On November '27th, the Diamond, 40, Captain Charles Knowles,
and on November 29th, the Wiitchur, (50, Captain George Berkeley,
and the Anglesey, 40, Captain Henry Keddish, joined the flag from
the Leeward Islands ; and on December 6th, the Sheerness, '20,
1 One of them, a snow, was commissioned as tlie Triumph, sloop, by Commandei-
James Eentone, wlio was sent home with Vernon's dispatches. Another prize was
renamed the Astriea, 12.
2 The loss on the British side during tlie attack was almost incredibly small, the
liurfurd and Worcester having each three killed and five wounded, and the Hampton
Court having one man mortally wounded.
= In the service Captain the Hon. Edward Boscawen assisted as a volunteer. His
shiji, the S/wi-fham, 20, was at the time unfit for sea.
58 MAJOR OPJ^nATIONS, 1714-1702. [1739.
Captain Miles Staplc^ton, wliicli liad been detaclied to reconnoitre
Cartagena, returned. While the Vice-Admiral still lay at Puerto
Bello, be sent to Panama a demand for the release of certain servants
of the South Sea Company, who were confined in that city ; and,
although Vernon, being on the wrong side of the isthmus, was
scarcely in a position to have hacked up his demand by force, the
governor, who seems to have been greatly impressed by the easy
captuie of Puerto Bello, saw fit to comply. The Vice-Admiral
sailed on December 18th for Jamaica.
The news of the success was hailed with great joy in England,
and Vernon was voted the thanks of both Houses, and the freedom
of the City of London in a gold box. Commander James Eentone,
the bearer of the intelligence, was presented with two hundred
guineas, and made a post-captain. The Ministry realised that it
could do nothing more popular than follow up the blow already
struck, and it at once arranged to send to Jamaica, if possible in the
early autumn, a strong military force composed of two regiments of
infantry, and six newly-raised regiments of Marines — the whole
under Major-General Lord Catbcart — to be employed by Vice-
Admiral Vernon in the prosecution of further designs against the
Spaniards in the AVest Indies and Central America. It was also
decided to endeavour to recruit in the North American Colonies a
corps of three thousand men, to be commanded by Colonel Spottis-
wood,' and to be sent to Jamaica to strengthen the hands of Lord
Catbcart upon his arrival.
In the interval, the Spaniards, thoroughly alanned for the
security of their empire in the New World, sent to the West Indies
a strong squadron,- with troops and stores, under Admiral Don
liodrigo de Torres. They also jsrevailed upon France to proclaim
not only that she was in strict alliance with Spain, but also that she
could not suffer Great Britain to make new settlements or conquests
in the West Indies ; and this proclamation was succeeded by the
dispatch across the Atlantic of three French squadrons. One, of
four ships of the line, under the Chevalier de Nesmond, left Brest on
July '28th. A second, of eighteen sail, under the Marquis d'Antin,
quitted the same port towards the end of August, and, soon after its
departure, suffered so severely in a storm, that two or three of its
' This officei' unfortunately died in A'irginia ere the troo]is which lie had ccjllected
couUl be embarked.
- This sailed from Spain on .Jidy lOtli, 17+0.
17J0.] VEBNON AT CARTAGENA. 59
best vessels bad to return. The tliird, of fifteen sail, under tbe
Marquis de La Roche-AUard, weij^died from Toulon on August 25tb.
Wben be bad passed tbe Strait of Gibraltar, tlu; Marquis opened
bis orders, and, in pursuance of them, sent back to port four
of bis largest sbips. Proceeding with tbe rest, he made a junc-
tion with tbe other squadrons at Martinique in September and
October.
But tbe force there assembled was formidable chiefly on paper.
The vessels were not in good condition, and they were both ill-
manned and ill-found. Many of them bad been much damaged by
bad weather ere they arrived ; and when they essayed to move in
company from Martinique to Hispaniola, they fell in with another
storm which caused serious losses, and reduced them to a condition
of impotence.
That they had been sent out to co-operate with Spain is
certain. But before they bad an opportunity of co-operating,
reinforcements had reached Vernon : and tbe situation in Europe
had been changed by tbe death of tbe Emperor Charles VI., on
October '20th, and by the accession of tbe Elector of Bavaria as
Charles VII. France then decided to hold her band, to recall her
squadrons,' and to postpone her definite rupture with Great Britain.
It is not necessary, therefore, to further follow tbe movements of tbe
French. As for tbe Spanish squadron under Don Rodrigo de
Torres, it reached San Juan de Puerto Rico in a sorely-damaged
condition in September, and there slowly refitted. In course of time
it went on to Cartagena, threw additional troops into the town, and,
leaving a detachment under Don Bias de Leso in the roadstead,
proceeded to Havana.
Vernon's squadron, on its voyage from Puerto Bello to Jamaica,
was dispersed and shattered by a storm. All the vessels, neverthe-
less, reached Port Royal by February 6th, 1740, except the Triumph,
sloop, which had foundered off Sambala Keys, bi;t tbe officers and
men of which had been saved. Tbe Greenwich, 50, Captain Charles
Wyndbam, with four bombs, some firesbips, and several other
craft, was found in harbour. The Vice-Admiral did all that lay in
his power to speedily refit his command, but, finding that tbe
Burford would take some time to prepare for sea, be transferred his
flag from her to the Strafford, 60, and sailed on February 25th with
tbe greater part of his force, leaving tbe rest of it, under Commodore
' Except a few sliips left .'it Hisiiaiiinhi uiuler tlie Conitc de liuquefeuil.
(iO
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17G2.
[1740.
Charles Erowii, lor the protection of Jamaica. His deteriuination
was to bombard Cartagena.
On March 1st, the Vice-Admiral sighted the land near Santa
Martha, and, having detached the GrecnwicJi, ^jO, to ply to windward
of that place, to intercept any vessel that might be bomid thither, he
bore away ; and, on the evening of the 3rd,' anchored in nine fathoms
off Playa Grande, in the open bay before Cartagena. On the 4th
vice-.\dmii:al sir charlks knowles.
iFrom Fabci's mczzutiiit after thf pnrtraif bij T, Hudson.)
and 5th he reconnoitred the place, and made his dispositions ; and on
the 6th he ordered in the bombs Alderney, 8, Commander James
Scott, Terrible, 8, Commander Edward Allen, and Cumberland, 8,
Commander Thomas Brodrick,- with the tenders Pompey and
Goodly, and other craft to assist them, to bombard the town. This
' On which day be had been joined by the Fnhnoutli, 50, Captain William
Douglas.
^ This officer, who died a Vice-Admiral in 1769, in later life spelt his name
Broderick ; but it was, properly, Brodrick.
iTlO.] VEBNON AT CIIA(1RE8. 61
they did until \) a.m. on the 7th, receiving no dainii^^e whatsoever,
and probably doing little, although they terril)ly frightened the
inhabitants. It is difficult to understand why Vernon made this
demonstration, for he knew well that the force which he had with
him was insufficient to take the city. It has been suggested that
his action was intended as a reply to an insulting letter which he
had received from Don Bias de Leso, and this is certainly a plausible
explanation, for the quick-tempered Vice-Admiral was ever fully
as eager to resent a slight offered to himself as he was to resent
one offered to his country. It does not, however, appear that the
bombardment of Cartagena assisted, in the slightest degree, the
general policy which Vernon had been sent westward to carry out.
From Cartagena he coasted along the Gulf of Darien, exchanging
shots with Bocca Chica as lie passed, and making observations
concerning the defences of the various towns. He detached the
Windsor, 60, Captain George Berkeley, and the GreenicicJi, 50,
Captain Charles Wyndham, to cruise off' Cartagena with the object
of looking out for the galleons and of intercepting three Spanish
ships of war which, he had heard, were about to attempt to join
Don Bias de Leso there. Vernon then proceeded to Puerto Bello
to refit and water his squadron. He was rejoined on March 13th
by the Diamond, 40, Captain Charles Knowles,^ an officer in whom
he appears to have reposed exceptional confidence. Knowles was
ordered to go on board the Success, fireship, 10, Commander Daniel
Hore," and, accompanied by one of the tenders, to move round to
the mouth of the River Chagres, there to reconnoitre and to make
soundings with a view to reporting on the manner in which the
fort of San Lorenzo and the town of Chagres might best be
attacked. Measures were also taken to blockade the estuary. The
Vice-Admiral obtained much information and assistance from an
English pirate or buccaneer named Lowther, who, in consequence,
received the King's pardon and permission to return home.
On March 2'2nd the Strafford,^ the NonvicJi, the three bomb
ketches, and the small craft, put to sea from Puerto Bello, instruc-
tions being left for the other vessels to follow as soon as possible.
' Charles KnowleB. Born, 1702. Captain, IToT. Eear-Ailrairal, 1747. Coiii-
niander-in-Chief at Jamaica, 1748. Captured Port Louis, Hlspaniola. Defeated
Eeggio off Havana, October 1st, 1748. A'ice- Admiral, 1755. Admiral, 1758. Baronet,
17G5, and Rear-Admiral of Great Britain. Served lUissia, 1770-1774. Died, 1777.
■•^ Or Hoare.
' In wliich tlie Yice-Adnjiral still Hew liis flair.
G2 MAJOR OI'EltATIONS, 1714- 17G2. [1740.
The Strafford met witli a slight uccident on the passage, and was
detained i'or a few licnirs, hut the Norwich, by order, proceeded with
the remaining craft, and by 3 p.m. Captain liichard Herbert, with
the assistance of Captain Knowles, had not only placed his bombs
in position, but had begun to bombard Fort San Lorenzo. The
Diamond also opened fire in the evening; and, during the night, the
Strafford, Princess Louisa, and Falmouth, arrived and took up their
stations.' The ships maintained a leisurely fire from their heavier
guns until March '24th, when the governor of the place, Don Juan
Cailos GutieiTez de Zavallos, surrendered. Captain Knowles took
possession in the course of the afternoon.
A large amount of booty, including cocoa, Jesuit's bark, and
wool, valued at ±70,000, besides plate, etc., was captured. Two
guarda-costas, found in the river, were destroyed ; all the brass
guns and patereroes - in the defences were embarked in the
squadron ; and, after the works had been demolished, Vernon
quitted the river on March 30th. He was rejoined on the 31st
by the Windsor and Greenwich from before Cartagena, and on
April 2nd by his old flagship, the Burford, from Jamaica. After
making dispositions, which proved to be vain, for intercepting the
new Spanish viceroy of Santa Fe, who was on his way out from
Ferrol, the Vice-Admiral returned to Jamaica, sending Captain
Knowles home with dispatches.
A little later, Vernon, advised from Lisbon of the Spanish
preparations for sending out the squadron under Don Rodrigo
de Torres, and of the actual departure from Cadiz of a squadron,
the supposed destination of which was the West Indies, put to sea
again, hoping to fall in with the enemy ; but, having encountered
bad weather, and having failed to get any news of his foe, he
returned to Port Eoyal on June '21st. During the summer his
cruisers were active, but he was himself detained in port by lack
of supplies. On September 5th, however, a number of store-ships,
convoyed by the Defiance, 60, Captain John Trevor, and the Tilhwry,
60, reached him, and on October 3rd he was able to put to sea once
more. On the 19th he fell in with eight transports, convoyed by the
' The ships engaged in the attack on Chagres were the Strafford, 60, Princess
Lottisa, 60, Falmouth, 50, Noru-ich, 50, Diamond, 40, Aldrrney, Terrible, and
Cumbe.rhuid, hombs, and Pomjiey and Goodly, tenders. The commanders of all these
have already been named. In addition, there were the fireships, Success, 10, Com-
mander Daniel Hore, and Eleanor, 10, Commander Sir Robert Henley, Bart.
^ There were eleven brass guns and as nianv iiatereroes.
ITIO.] OCILE JOINS VERNON. (J3
Wolf, sloop, lU, Coiuuiandcr W illiam Daiidridgc, and ladcju willi
troops from North America.' These he escorted to Jamaica. Soon
afterwards he heard of the arrival at Cartagena of Don Kodrigo de
Torres, and at Martini(]ue of the Manpiis d'Antin ; and not having
force sufficient to justify him in risking an encounter at sea with his
known enemies, even if they were not assisted by his suspected ones,
he remained at Port Royal, anxiously awaiting news of the jjroniised
reinforcements from England.
These reinforcements, which included the transports carrying
Lord Cathcart's army, were to have been under the orders of
Vice- Admiral Sir John Balchen. But Balchen's division of men-
of-war consisted only of one 3rd-rate, five 4th-rates, and one
Gtli-rate ; and when, after the armament had actually put to sea
and had been driven back to port by contrary weather in August,
tlie Ministry learnt wliat powerful squadrons Spain and France had
dispatclied across the Atlantic, it was decided to make new arrange-
ments. Balchen's orders were cancelled, and a very much larger
and entirely different squadron, under Sir Chaloner Ogle (1), was
appointed to escort the troops. The change of plan necessarily
involved much delay, and it was not until October '2Gth that the
fleet at length sailed.
It cleared the Channel ; but on October 31st, when it was about
seventy leagues to the westward of the Start,- it met witli a heavy
gale, in which the Buckiughani, 70, Captain Cornelius Mitchell,
Prince of Orange, 70, Captain Henry Osborn, and Stq)crhe. 60,
Captain the Hon. William Hervey, were so badly damaged that the
first had to be sent back to Spithead, and the others had to proceed to
Lisbon under convoy of the Cumberland, 80, Captain James Stewart.
In spite of these deductions the fleet still consisted of upwards of
twenty 3rd and 4th-rates, besides several frigates, fire-ships, bombs,
etc., under fiear-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle (1), Kt. (B.), and
Commodore Richard Lestock (2), together with transports carrying
about 9000 troops, ^ under Major-General Lord Cathcart, and
Brigadier-Generals Thomas Wentworth, John Guise, and William
Blakeney. It anchored on December 19th, 1740, in Prince Rupert's
' These troopis had taken part iu the fruitless attack on St. Augustine, Florida, some
account of which will be found in the next chapter.
2 In lat. 17° 54' W.
^ I.e. the 1.5tli and 2-lth regiments of foot, six regiments of Marines under Colonels
Fleming, Robinson, Lowther, Wynyard, Douglas and Moreton, and some artillery and
miscellaneous detacliments.
(11 MAJOR OPEHATIONS, 17U-17G2. [1740.
liay, Dominica ; and, on tlic loUowing day it had to lament the
loss, by dysentery, of the mihtary commander-in-chief.^
Sir Chaloner weighed again for St. Kitt's, his general rendez-
vous, on December 27th, and thence steered for Jamaica. On the
passage thither, being ofi' the western end of Hispaniola, he sighted
liiur large vessels, and signalled to the Prince Frederick, 70, Captain
Lord Aubrey Beauclerk, Orford, 70, Captain Lord Augustus Fitzroy,
TAon, ()0, Captain Charles Cotterell, Weymouth, 60, Captain Charles
Knowles, and two more ships of the line, to proceed in chase. At
4 P.M. the strangers - hoisted French colours ; but as they did not
shorten sail, it was 10 r.M. ere the headmost British ship, the Prince
Frederick, got up with them. She hailed them, first in Enghsh and
then in French, and then, having failed to get an answer, fired into
one of the ships, which promptly returned a broadside. The Orford
next got into action ; and she and the Prince Frederick engaged the
chase for about an hour and a half before the remaining ships could
approach within gunshot. The Weijmoidh was the third to overhaul
the strangers ; and, upon her arrival on the scene. Captain Knowles
boarded the Prince Frederick, and expressed his conviction that the
enemy was French. Lord Aubrey Beauclerk thereupon made the
signal to desist ; yet, as the enemy continued firing, the engagement
was renewed for about half an hour. At daybreak Lord Aubrey sent
an officer on board the senior ship of the chase, and at length it was
satisfactorily established that the strangers were indeed French, and
not, as Lord Aubrey had at first believed, Spaniards sailing under
French colours. The Prince Frederick lost four killed and nine
wounded ; the Orford, seven killed and fourteen wounded ; and the
Wei/moiitJi, two killed; and all three vessels were much damaged
aloft.
The French, who bitterly complained of the manner in which
they had been treated, suffered much more severely. They declared
that, upon being hailed, they had at once replied ; and modern
French writers seriously contend that the true cause of the action
was the refusal of their senior officer to send a boat to Lord
Aubrey, when he called for one. It is possible, seeing how un-
favourable to Great Britain was the attitude of France at the time,
' Lord Cathcart was succeeded in the command by General AVentwortb, a far less
experienced and competent officer.
'■' Ardent, di, CuTptam d'Ei>ma\ ie Boisgeroult: J/ercucp, 54-, Captain des Herbiers
de I'Etenduere ; Diamant, 50, Captain de Poisins ; and Parfaite, 46, Captain
d'Estonrnel. Gueriu, iv. 242. These vessels formed part of d'Antin's sqiia'lron.
1710.] BALCHEN'S CHUJSK. ()5
that neither Ogle nor Lord Aubrey was prepared to exercise much
forbearance with the French, and that the action was the result of
provocation and irritation on lioth sides. The squadrons, however,
parted with mutual apologies ; and Lord Aubrey proceeded to rejoin
Sir Chaloner Ogle, who arrived at Jamaica on January 9th, 1741,
and there placed himself under the orders of Vice- Admiral Vernon.
It is necessary to return for a time from the West Indies, and to
look at the course of events elsewhere.
The outbreak of war had found Eear-Admiral Nicholas Haddock
(R.) commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean. Under him was
Eear-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle (1) (B.). At first. Haddock blockaded
the Spaniards in Cadiz, but he was soon drawn off by the foulness
of his ships and by the requirements of Minorca, which, it was
supposed, might be attacked from other Spanish ports ; and while
he and Ogle were at Port Mahou, such Spanish ships ^ as had been
lying at Cadiz slipped out, under Don Roderigo de Torres, and sailed
to Ferrol. Not long afterwards, when it appeared that Minorca was
in no danger, and that the Spaniards in the Mediterranean were
weaker than had at first been believed, Ogle, with a strong division,
was sent home by Haddock. He arrived in England on July 7th,
1740, and, as had been shown, went out later in the year - to
reinforce Vice-Admiral Vernon. No event of importance occurred
in the Mediterranean during the rest of 1740.
Nearer home, much was designed but little was effected. On
April 9th, Vice-Admiral John Balchen (R.) was dispatched from
Plymouth to intercept a Spanish treasure fleet which, escorted by
a squadron under Admiral Pizarro, was on its way home from
America. Balchen cruised in the very track which Pizarro had
intended to take ; but the Spaniards, learning of the British
Admiral's station and design, sent out a fast dispatch vessel which,
warning Pizarro, caused him to make for Santander by way of the
Lizard and Ushant, instead of for Cadiz by way of Madeira, as he
had originally purposed. He consequently took his convoy safely
into port. To defeat Balchen, Spain in the meantime fitted out and
sent to sea a superior force under Admiral Pintado, who, however,
failed to find his enemy, and, upon his return, was disgraced.
Balchen, against whose conduct no objections were ever alleged,
' 'I'heso were they whicli subsequently proceeded to the West Indies, as lias lieen
already related.
- He first, h<i\vever, cruised for a short time under Sir John Xorris. .SVe infra.
VOL. III. F
<>0 MAJOR OPKliATlONS, 1714 17HL'. [1741.
went back to port, having done little but capture the Princeaa, 70.'
Later in the year he commanded a squadron in the Channel.
The large concentration of Spanish force at Ferrol, and the
knowledge that Spain cherished plans for aiding the Pretender in
a descent upon (^-reat Bi'itain or Ireland, led to the assemblage of a
large fleet- at Spithead. It was entrusted to Admiral-of-the-Fleet
Sir John Norris, and, undo- liini, to Admiral Philip Cavendish (B.),
and Kear-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle (1) (B.). Sir John, who hoisted
his flag first in the Victori/, 100, and afterwards — the Victory having
been disabled by collision with the Lion,^ 60 — in the Boyne, 80, had
secret instructions ; but what they were is, even now, not certainly
known. It is supposed by some that he had orders to attack Fen-ol,
but this is upon the whole unlikely. It is more probable that his
force was designed merely to convoy outward-bound merchantmen
until clear of the Channel, and to be ready for any special service
that might appear desirable. The Admiral of the Fleet took to
sea with him as a volunteer Prince William Augustus, Duke of
Cumberland,^ second son of George II. The fleet sailed from
St. Helen's on July 10th, but was three times driven back into port
by contrary weather : and on Aiigust '28th, Sir John, being then in
Torbay, hauled down his flag and departed for London with the
young Duke.
In 1741 the proceedings of the fleets in home waters were equally
luiinteresting. In July, and again in October, the Admiral of the
Fleet and Admiral Philip Cavendish put to sea with a considerable
force and cruised off the north coast of Spain ; but, beyond picking
up a few small prizes, the command did nothing. It returned to
Spithead on November 0th.
In the Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral Haddock, who was from
time to time reinforced from England, endeavoured to prevent the
junction of a Spanish squadron which lay in Cadiz with the French
fleet which la}- in Toulon, and to intercept the transport of Spanish
trooiDS from Barcelona to Italy. But he failed in both objects.
While Haddock was refitting at Gibraltar, the Tordon fleet, under
' For au account of her capture, .s«- uext chapter.
- Made up of one ship of 100 guns, eight ships of SO, five of 70, seven of 60, and
one of 50, besides smaller craft.
' The Vidori/ carried away her head and bowsprit : tlie Lion lost Iter foremast,
and twenty-eight men who were tln'own overboard by the shock.
* Tlie victor of Culloden, then in his twentieth year. This short cruise seems to
have decided him to adopt a mihtary instead of a naval career.
1741.] IIADDUCK MISSES NAVAUllO. 07
M. La Bruyere de Court, weiglied and steered towards tlie Strait ;
and Don Jose Navarro, from Cadiz, issued forth to meet and join
hands with it. Haddock suffered Navarro to pass by him,' and only
went in cliase when it was too lii.l(; to ]>r('vciit tlie accomplishment
of the junction. His advanced frigates sighted the allies off Cape
de Gata on December 7th, 1741, and the British and Spanish fleets
were distantly visible one from the other on the following morning ;
but at that time the junction was actually being effected. The
Vice-Admiral called a council of war which, in view of the fact that
French neutrality could not be depended upon,- judged it inadvisable
to continue the pursuit. Soon afterwards the French and Spanish
fleets proceeded to Barcelona and eml)arked 1.5, 00() men, who were
thence transported to Orljetello, in Tuscany, there to act against the
allies of Great Britain. The ill-success both of Norris and of
Haddock was doubtless due rather to the nature of the instnictions
given to these officers by the Ministry than to any fault on the
part of either. Popular indignation rose high, especially when it
became known that the passage of Spanish reinforcements to Italy
had not been prevented : and the general discontent on this subject
contributed much to the fall of Sir Robert Walpole's administration.
In the West Indies, as has been said. Sir Chaloner Ogle joined
Vice-Admiral Vernon at Jamaica on January 9th, 1741. A fleet
such as had never before been assembled in the waters of the
New World was now at the disposal of the British commander,
who, unlike his fellow-admirals in Europe, had very full powers to
act as he might deem best for the advantage of the service.
" Bfetter," says Beatson, "had it been for Great Britain if his
powers had been more limited ; for, had he been directed to proceed
immediately against the Havana, there can be no . doubt but he
would have succeeded in reducing that place before the hurricane
months set in. His instructions pointed strongly at this as the
most proper place to commence his operations : and letters from the
most able and well informed of his friends^ in England strongly
enforced this idea."
' Hadtkick, wliii had Itt't cruisers to watch Cadiz, seem.s ti) liave been very ill-serveil
by Ids scouts.
^ ,The Frauco-Siiainsli tieet outnumbered tlie British by nearly two to one.
^ " 'Take and hold,' is tlie cry. Tliis points plainly to Cuba, and if the people of
Faigland wei-e to give you instructions, I may venture to say, ninety-nine in a hundred
would be for attacking that island." Pulteney to Vernon, August 17, 1740, in ' Letters
to an Honest Sailor.'
F 2
68 MAJOR OI'EIIATIOAS, 1714-17C2. [1711.
It would seem that, up to the day of Ogle's arrival, Vemon had
formed no distinct plans for the future. He had been looking
forward to talking over everything with Lord Cathcart, in whom
he had reason for placing the highest confidence. But Cathcart
died, and Wentworth, who took his place, was an officer of veiy
inferior ability, for whom Vernon, from the first, entertained dislike
and distrust. Wentworth, it is fair to add, did not deserve this.
He appears to have been sensible, if not very able ; and he was
certainly anxious to do for liis country the best that lay in liis
power.
As the result of a council of war held on January 10th,' it was
determined to proceed with the whole force to windward to observe
the motions of the French at Port Louis in Hispaniola. Vernon
formed his large fleet into three divisions, one under himself, one
under Ogle, and one under Commodore Bichard Lestock. Part of
the force got out of harbour on January '22nd, but the whole did not
make an offing until January 29th. On February 8th it was off
Cape Tiburon, the western point of Hispaniola. There the Vice-
Admiral was rejoined by the Wolf, 10, Commander William
Dandridge. She had been sent ahead to gain intelligence, and
she reported that there were in Port Louis nineteen large ships, one
of which had a flag at the main, and another a broad pennant flying ;
but, when the fleet arrived off the place on the 12th, it was found
that Dandridge had been mistaken," and that there were in port only
some unrigged merchantmen and a large frigate. Three days later
Vernon obtained permission from the governor of Port Louis to
wood and water the fleet, and learnt that the Marquis d'Antin
had returned to Europe. At another council of war it was
decided, mainly in deference to Vernon's representations, to attack
Cartagena. The fleet, therefore, weighed on January 25th, the
WcijDioiifh, GO, Captain Charles Knowles, Experiment, 20, Captain
James Eentone, and a sloop, being sent ahead to sound the coast
and to find a safe anchorage for the huge flotilla, which consisted,
with the transports, of a hundred and twenty-four sail.
Vernon dropped anchor in the Bay of Playa Grande ^ on
March 4th, and at once made such a disposition of his small craft
' There were present, in addition to Vernon and Ogle, Oovernur Trelawney of
Jamaica, and Generals Wentworth and Guise.
" He was misled by a haze which prevailed when he made his reconnaissance.
^ It is to the windward df Cartagena, between it and Point Canoa.
ITU.] CARTAGENA. <i!>
as to suggest that he intended them to cover a diseniharkali(jn ol
the army. This had the desired effect. It drew a large part of the
enemy's troops down to the shore in that neighliourliood, and
induced them to hegin throwing up intrenchments there.
But no actual attack was made until March 9th, and in tiie
meantime the Spanish garrison of four thousand men, besides
negroes and Indians, and the naval force under Don Bias de Ijeso,
perfected its preparations for defence.
The following description of Cartagena, as it then was, is mainly
from Beatson : — ^
'I'lie city is in a great measure siirroumled by water. It is divided iiitu two
unequal parts, the city of Cartagena, and its suburb, called Xiniani. The walls of the
former are washed by the waves of the Bay of Mexico ; but, on account of some rocks,
and perpetual surf, there is no approaching it on that side. The water on tlie outside
of the harbour is seldom smooth, so that landing is at most times difficult. The only
entrance to the harbour is upwards of two leagues to the westward of the city, between
two narrow peninsulas, the one called Tieriva Bomba, the other called the Baradera.
This entry is called Boca Chica, or the Little Mouth, and is so narrow that only one
ship can enter at a time. It was defended, on the Tierra Bomba side, by a fort called
San Luis, a regular square, with four bastions, mounted with eighty-two pieces of
cannon and three mortars; but the counterscarp and glaces were not completed. To
this were added Fort San Felipe, mounted with seven guns, and Fort Santiago, of
fifteen guns, and a small fort of four guns, called Battery de Chamba. These served as
outworks to Fort San Luis. On the other side of the harbour's mouth lies a fascine
battery,^ called the Baradera ; and, in a small bay at the back of that, another battery
of four guns. And, facing the entrance of the harbour, on a small, flat island, stood
Fort San Jose, of twenty-one guns. From this fort to Fort San Luis, a strong boom,
made of logs and cables, was laid across, fastened with three large anchors at each end;
and just behind the boom were moored four ships of the line. Beyond this passage lies
the gi'eat lake or outer harbour of Cai-tagena, several leagues in circumference, and
land-locked on all sides. About mid-way to the town, it grows narrower ; and, within
less than a league of it, two points project into the lake from the inner harbour. ( >n
the northmost of these was a strong fort called Castillo Grande, being a regular square
with four bastions, defended to the land by a wet ditch and glacis proper. The face of
the curtain, towards the sea, was covered by a raveliu, and a double line of heavy
cannon. The number of guns in this fort was fifty-nine, though there were embrasures
for sixty-one. On the opposite point was a horseshoe battery of twelve guns, called
Fort Mancinilla. In the middle, between these two forts, is a large shoal with otdy a
lew feet of water on it. On each side of this were sunk large ships. At the end of the
inner harbour stands the city of Cartagena, on two flat sandy keys or islands, well
fortified to the land, and with lakes and morasses running round it. On the fortifica-
tion of the city are mounted one hundred and sixty guns, and on those of the suburbs,
one hundred and forty. South of the city, about a quarter of a mile from the Ximani
gate, stands Foi-t San Lazar, on an eminence about fifty or sixty feet high. It is
composed of a square of fifty feet, having three demi-bastions, and two guns in each
' ' Nav. and Mil. Mems.' iii. 24.
'^ It was for fifteen 2-1-pounders ; Imt these seem not to have been mounted until
after operations had been begun.
70 MAJOJt OPEIiATlONS, 1714-1702. [1741.
face, oue iu eacli llaiik, ami three in each curtain. It completely commands the town ;
but there is a hill about t'nur liuiulrcd yards IVoni it whicii overlooks and commands it
entirely.
Early in the iiioriiiug o! March 'Jth, Sir Chaloner Ogle, who hail
shifted his flag from the Bussell, 80, to the Jersey, (50, Captain I'citer
Lawrence, and who had General Wentworth with him, moved with
his division,^ towards the mouth of the harhour. He was presently
followed by Vice-Admiral Vernon and his division,- convoying the
transports full of troops. The third division,^ under Commodore
Lestock, was left at anchor, so as to distract the attention of the
enemy.
The Princess Amelia, 80, was specially told off to attack Battery
de Chamba, and the Norfolk, 80, Ihissell, 80, and Shrewsburij, 80,
were similarly told off to batter forts Santiago and San Fehpe. As
the division of Ogle approached, Chamba opened fire, but was soon
silenced by the Princess Amelia, Captain John Hemmiugton. At
about noon the Norfolk, Captain Thomas Graves (1), Russell, Captain
Hany Norris, and the Slireivsbury, Captain Isaac Townsend,
anchored in their assigned positions and fired so vigorously that
both the forts opposed to them were rendered untenable within an
hour. They were then taken possession of by landing parties.
Generals Wentworth and Guise, and Colonel Wolfe also landed soon
afterwards, and on that day and the 10th, most of the troops were
put ashore. These initial successes were gained at little cost. Only
six men were killed on board the Norfolk and Bussell, and although
the Shrewsbury had her cable shot away and fell into a position
where she lay for seven hours under a most infernal fire from two or
three hundred guns she had but twenty killed and forty wounded.
She received, however, two hundred and forty shot in her hull, and
of these sixteen were between wind and water.
The following days were employed in landing guns and stores ; in
forming a camp in a somewhat ill-chosen position, before Fort San
' Princesft Amelia, 80, Windsor, 60, I'ui/i-, (JO, Norfolk, 80, Russell, 80, Shrews-
bury, 80, Ripon, 60, Lichfield, 50, Jersey, 60, Tilbury, 60, Experiment, 20, Sheer-
ness, 20, Vesuvius, fireship, IWrible, bomb. Phaeton, fireship, and Goodly, tender.
- Orford, 70, Princess Louisa, 60, Worcester, GO, Chichester, 80, Princess Caroline
(flag), 80, Tnrhay, 80, Strafford, 60, Weymouth, 60, Deptford, 60, Burford, 70,
Squirrel, 20, Shoreham, 20, Eleanor, 10, Seahorse, 20, tlie fireships Stromholu, Success,
Vulcan and Cumherland, the tender Pomjipy, and a brig.
' Defiance, 60, Dunkirk, 60, Lion, 60, Prince Frederick, 70, Boyne, 80, Hiinipton
Court, 70, Falmouth, 50, Montagu, 60, Suffolk, 70, ^4s^-oeo, 12, Wolf, 10, the fireships
j£tna and Firebrand, and the Virgin Queen, tender.
ITil.] ATTACK ON CARTAGENA. 71
Liuis ; and in (]uaii'el8 between Wcntworlli and Vernon, wlio was
dissatisfied with the manner in whieh tlii^ engineers ihd their work,
and who used unbecoming language to tlie military commander-in-
chief. As the camp was exposed to the fire of the Spanish fasciae
battery on the Baradera side, an attack upon this was made on the
night of March li)th, when tlie hoats of the fleet, under Cai)tain
Thomas Watson (1), of the Princess Caroliite, Captain Harry Norris,
of the Russell, and Captain Charles Colby, of the Boijne, landed a
party of five hundred seamen and soldiers commanded by Captains
the Hon. Edward Boscawen, of the Hhurrham, William Laws, and
Thomas Cotes,' E.N. The party was put ashore about a mile to
leeward of the Baradera Battery, under the very muzzles of a
masked battery of five guns that had been thrown up on the beach ;
but, although a little confused at first by the hot fire which was
opened from this, the men promptly rushed it, and then, pushing on,
carried the Baradera Battery itself, and, suffering very little loss,
spiked the guns, and set the carriages, fascines, platforms, magazines
and guard-houses, on fire.
This well-managed exploit relieved the army before San Luis ;
but there was much sickness in the camp, the works did not progress
with the expected rapidity, and Vice-Admiral Vernon grew daily
more impatient and irritable. To add to his annoyance, the
Spaniards partially refitted the abandoned Baradera Battery, and
again began to fire upon the camp from it. They were driven out
by the Ripun, 60, Captain Thomas Jolly, which later prevented any
further attempts from being made to mount guns there. The main
British battery opened against Fort San Luis on the morning of the
21st ; and on that and the next day a furious fire was maintained on
both sides.
On the morning of March '23rd, a general attack upon all the
forts and batteries was begun. Commodore Lestock, with the
Bo//ne, 8U, Captain Charles Colby, Princess Amelia, 80, Captain
John Hemmington, Prince Frederick, 70, Captain Lord Aubrey
Beauclerk, Hampton Court, 70, Captain Digby Dent (2), Suffolk,
70, Captain Thomas Davers, and Tilbury, 60, Captain Robert Long,
engaged the Spanish forts, batteries and ships,- there not being room
to bring more vessels to bear upon the enemy's defences. The
' 'I'lie military ofticers were Captains .James Murray and \\'ashingtoii.
- (jidicia, 70, flag of Don Bias de Leso ; Sun Carlos, 66, Africa, 60, ami
San FcUpr, (iO.
72 MAJOll OPEHATJONH, 1714-1702. [1741.
Boijue suffered so severely that she had to be called off at night ; the
Fri)ice Frederick, which lost her captain/ and the Hampton Court,
very much shattered, had to be recalled on the following morning.
The other ships did excellent service, and were less injured ; yet it
was found expedient to withdraw even these on the 24th. During
this attack, the chief engineer was mortally wounded : on the other
hand, Fort San Luis was breached, and General Wentworth, who
went in person to view the effect of the bombardment, determined to
assault the place on the night of March 25th.
Vernon undertook to make a diversion on the Baradera side,
and, in the afternoon of the 25th, landed Captain Charles Knowles
and some seamen near the I'emains of the fascine batterj'. The
assault was then made with complete success, and with the loss of
but a single man. Owing to the fall of Fort San Luis, the Spaniards
had to scuttle or burn the Africa, San Carlos, and San Felipe, and
they were thrown into so much confusion that Captain Knowles,
taking advantage of it, apparently upon his own authority, pulled
across to Fort San Jose, on the island, and stormed it without the
slightest difficulty. Still unwilling to let shp what seemed to be so
splendid an opportunity for dealing serious blows, he, w'ith Captain
Thomas Watson, forced a way within the boom, and boarded and
took the Galicia, TO.'* They also destroyed the boom, so that on the
morning of the 26th part of the British fleet entered the lake. A
few days later, it passed up to the narrow entrance leading to the
harbour proper,^ and, upon its approach, the enemy abandoned
Castillo Grande, sank two line-of-battleships* which had been moored
in the channel, and blew up Fort Mancinilla. Such was the general
situation on March 31st. ^
All would, doubtless, have continued to go well, but for the
unhappy dissensions between the Yice-Admiral and the General. The
siege had caused much disease, especially among the troops, which,
on March 25th, had lost about five hundred men, and had about one
thousand five hundred more sick on board the hospital-ships Princess
Boijal and Scarboroiu/li. The fleet w'as considerably less unhealthy ;
yet, while the fleet had plenty of water, and, very often, fresh meat
' Whose place was taken by Captain the Hon. Edwaril B(jscawen.
^ She was towed out.
* Called the Surgidero, or Anchorage.
* C'ojiijuistador, 66, and Dragon, 60.
'■ On April 1st Vernon sent home a sanguine dispatch which leached the Duke of
Xewcastle on May 17th, and caused general exultation.
1741.] attach: on UAllTAOKNA. 73
and turtle, the army sometimes suffered from absolute want.
Vernon seems to have forgotten that troops and seamen alike served
a common sovereign and a common cause. He took no measures
for supplying water to the army ; he refused Wentworth's reasonable
request that two or three small craft should be told off to catch
turtle for the use of the sick ; and, speaking generally, his relations
with his military colleague were unaccommodating; boisterous, and
overbearing. Wentworth, in consequence, became disgusted, and,
rather than seek the co-operation of so bearish and dictatorial a man
as Vernon, he sometimes stood sullenly aloof, regardless of the
magnitude of the public interests involved.
On April 1st the Vice-Admiral moved his bomb-ketches, covered
MK1J.\L COMMEMOIiATIVE OF THE DESTRUCTION OF SOME OF THE DEFENCES OF
CARTAGENA BY VICE-ADMIHAL EDWARD VERNON, MARCH, 1741.
(Fniin an ori'jinal ki/idlif lent bij H.S.H. Ca/jtairr Fhnri' Lnr/i.^ uf Btttfintuni, li.X. )
by the Experiment, '20, Captain James Kentone, and the Shoreham.
20, Captain Thomas Brodrick,^ into the Surgidero ; and Commodore
Lestock, who had re-embarked the troops from Tierra Bomba, joined
Vernon off Castillo Grande. On the 2nd, three lireships took up
their station within the Surgidero in order to protect a projected
landing of troops at a place called La Quinta. On the 3rd, the
Weymouth, 60, Captain Charles Knowles, also passed the narrows ;
and, early on the morning of the 5th, General Blakeney, with about
one thousand five hundred men, was set ashore, and presently
pushed forward towards Fort San Lazar, the only remaining
outwork of Cartagena. Some resistance was encountered, but the
enemy eventually retired. On the 6th, more of the army dis-
' Who had succeeded Captaiu the Hon. E. Boscaweu.
74 MA.IUl! DPKItATlOSS, 1714-17(i2. [l"!l.
cuibailcud, and, liaviiig joined Blakeney's brigade, encamped with it
on a plain about a mile from San Lazai-.
On the 7th, a niilitarv council of war came to the conclusion that
Fort San Lazar ought not to be attempted until a battery should be
raised against it, and that the reduction of the w-ork would be greatly
facilitated by the co-operation of the bomb-ketches and a ship of the
line with the arm)'. Vernon, on being informed of this, testily
leplied that he strongly disapproved of waiting for the erection of a
battery, and that, if a battery should be erected against so paltry a
fort, he felt sure that the enemy would not wait for it to be made
ready for action ; but, in his answer, he paid no attention to the
council's suggestion as to the co-operation of the ships ; nor could
Wentworth induce the Vice-Admir'al to order his vessels to cover a
detachment of troops which had been posted with a view to cutting
oft' communication between Cartagena and the country at its back.
In short, it appears that Vernon believed that the army could do,
and ought to do, all that remained to be done, and that Wentworth,
with wiser intuition, knew that only by co-operation could the
desired results be attained. But sickness increased ashore, water
grew daily scarcer, and the Spanish defences became hourly more
formidable ; and, in an evil moment, at the pressing instance of
Vernon, and against the better judgment of some of the land officers,
the storming of San Lazar was ordered, and was attempted before
daybreak on April 9th. Things were mismanaged ; officers were
confused by lack of detailed instructions, and the assault was repulsed
with heavy loss.'
Operations were continued for two daj's longer ; but on the 11th
a council of land officers decided that, " without a considerable
reinforcement from the fleet, it would not be possible to go on with
the enterprise." Vernon still shut his ears to the suggestions of his
military colleagues ; and when the council, having received from him
a very non-pertinent answer, reassembled, it desired that the Vice-
Admiral would make arrangements for re-embarking the forces and
stores, since it appeared, from his silence concerning the material
point, that no reinforcement was to be looked for. On the 14th,
after some further interchange of messages, a general council of war,
consisting of the sea as w^ell as of the land officers, met on board the
flagship. The conference was stormy ; and, in the course of it,
A^ernon quitted his cabin in a passion. After his departure. Sir
' l"he loss was 179 killed : 459 woundeil, many mortally; and 10 taken prisoners.
1741.] WlTlIDItAWAh FJlOiV CARTAGENA. 75
Chaloner Ogle gave reasons for ob)(!cting to diseiiibai'k the seamen
frona the fleet ; and Vernon, who sat in his stern-walk within hearing,
interjected a remark to the effect that, if the men were set ashore,
some of them would inFiillibly desert to the enemy. The Vice-
Admiral then returned to his cabin, and the council unanimously
determined that the troops and guns should be re-embarked. In
pursuance of this decision, the guns, stores, and baggage were
reshipped on the 15tli, and the troops, only 356i) of wliom remained
fit for duty, on the lOth.
Vernon, who may, by that time, have begun to feel uneasy
concerning the effect which so signal a miscarriage would have upon
his reputation,' made a last, but quite useless effort, against the
town. Having fitted up his prize, the Galicia, as a floating battery
of sixteen guns, and having fortified her with earth or sand, he
caused her to be warped in as near as possible to the town. During
the morning of the Kith, under the command of Captain Daniel
Hore, she fired into the place continuously for seven hours. She
was then so damaged that she was ordered to cut her cables and
drift out of gunshot, but she grounded on a shoal, and had to be
abandoned." She lost six killed and fifty-six wounded. But for
the happy chance that she grounded, she would probably have sunk
with all hands, for she had received twenty shot between wind and
water.
As soon as the works which had been already taken had been
dismantled and destroyed, the wretched remains of the expedition
sailed for Jamaica, where the fleet arrived on May 19th, and where
it found a welcome convoy from England awaiting it. Commodore
Lestock, with many of the heavier ships ^ and five frigates, was soon
afterwards sent home in charge of the trade. Vernon, chiefly in
consequence of his dislike to be further associated with Wentworth,
wished to go home also ; but the ministry, which adroitly flattered
him, persuaded him to remain.
' It is also suggested that A'ernon desired to convince Gener.Tl Wentwnitli, by
actual experiment, that ships could not operate with success against the town. But, if
so, the experiment was not a fair one. The OaUcia did not get near the walla because
she approaclied them at the wrong point. Elsewhere there was deep watei- within
pistol-sh(.)t of the ramparts. Smollett, vii. 287.
^ She was subsequently burnt by the British.
' Princess Caroline, 80, Bussell, 80, Norfolk, 80, S/n-eivshury, SO, Princess Amelia,
80, Torhay, 80, Chichester, 80, Hamilton Court, 70, Barfoid, 70, Windsor, 60, and
Fiihiiuufh, .')0. Vernon transferred his (lag to the TSnyne, 80.
76 MAJOR Ol-EliATlUN!i, ITH-ITUL'. [1741.
The next attempt of the fleet in the West Indies was against
Santiago de Cuba. The home Government would have preferred
to see Havana attacked, but the place was strong, and the squadron
of Don Bodrigo de Torres lay in the port. Governor Trelawney,
of Jamaica, urged an expedition, across the Isthmus of Darien,
against Panama, but gave way to the representations of Vernon,
Ogle, Wentworth, and Guise, all of whom voted for Santiago de
Cuba as the town which, upon the whole, offered the brightest
prospects of success. On June 25th, therefore. Captain James
Kentone, in the Uipon, GO,* was dispatched to reconnoitre the
harbour and its defences, and on June 3()th the fleet - put to sea.
The Vice-Admiral left at Jamaica the Suffolk, 70, Strafford, 60,
Dunkirk, 60, Bristol, 50, Lichfield, 50, and Vulcan, 8, under
Captain Thomas Davers, to protect the island and its trade, and
ordered the York, 60, Augusta, 60, and Depfford, 60, which were
refitting at Port Koyal, to be completed for sea, and to be sent after
him, as soon as possible.
A spacious harbour lying near the south-east end of Cuba, and
then known as ^yalthenham Bay,^ was selected as the general
rendezvous ; and there the expedition dropped anchor on July 18th.
This harbour is about sixty-five miles to the eastward of Santiago,
which occupies the head of a much smaller bay, and which has
a well-defended narrow entrance, closed at that time by means of
a substantial boom. Santiago was supposed to be impregnable from
seaward, and the leaders of the fleet and army decided to attack it
overland from Cumberland Harbour. To facilitate this operation,
Vernon despatched some cruisers to watch twelve Spanish sail
of the line which la^' at Havana, and which constituted a " potential "
fleet of decidedly dangerous strength. He also sent other vessels
to blockade Santiago ; and across the mouth of Cumberland Harbour
he stationed six of his largest ships, so that, should any enemy
approach, the transports within could not be reached without a
' Captain Thomas Jolly bad died iu May. Lord Augustus Fitzroy, of the Orford,
70, had also fallen a victim to the climate soon after the arrival of the fleet at Jamaica.
^ Boyne, 80, flag of Vernon, Camherlwid, 80, flag of Ogle, Grafton, 70, Kent, 70,
Worcester, 60, Tilbury, 60, Montagu, 60, Chester, 50, Tiger, 50, Shoreiiam, 20, Experi-
ment, 20, Sheerness, 20, Alderney, bomb, Strombolo, Phaeton, and Vesuvius, fireships,
Bonetta and Triton, sloops. Princess Boyal and Scarborough, hospital ships, and
Pompey, tender, besides about 40 transports carrying 3400 troops.
^ Re-named Cumberland Harbour by Vernon. It is the bay between Punto de
(i\iantaiianio and Caimamtra.
1741.] TIIK FIASCO IN CUBA. 11
severe struggle. But iii tlie luoantinu! W(!iitwortli lost heart. He
landed, but he did not go far. The country IxU'ort' hiiu was thickly
wooded ; his men had rapidly become sickly ; he found great
difficulty in dragging his guns along with him ; and, although
Vernon assured him that, if he pressed on, he should find ships
before Santiago ready to co-operate with him, the General declined
to advance any further. The Vice-Admiral in person went round
to Santiago with a view to seeing whether, after all, he could not
devise some method of capturing it from the sea ; but he was obliged
to agree that the venture offered no chances of success. The whole
scheme, therefore, was abandoned, the troops being re-embarked on
November 20th, and the fleet quitting Cumberland Harbour for
Jamaica on November 28th.
This abortive enterprise was as ill-conceived as it was pusillani-
mously attempted. It was the professed desire of the ministry in
England, and of the naval and military chiefs on the spot, to
conquer Cuba.' Havana was then, as it is now, the capital and heart
of the island ; and Santiago was a comparatively insignificant place
of less strategic and commercial importance than to-day. Yet it was
determined to avoid Havana, and to attack Santiago, in spite of the
fact that at Havana lay the strong squadron of Don Kodrigo de
Torres. Sane strategy would have dictated firstly the annihilation
or neutralisation of that formidable "potential" fleet, and secondly
the dealing of a blow at the heart instead of at the extremities of the
island. That Don Eodrigo lay fast, and did not come out, affords no
justification of the British action. He might have elected to come
out ; and, had he done so, he might, with his superior force, have
crushed Vernon, who would have been hampered by the presence
of his transports and by the necessity of looking to their safety. As
for the pusillanimity with which the descent was attempted, it is
sufficient to say that Wentworth lay for about three months, almost
inactive, within three or four days' march of Santiago ; that there
was at no time any considerable body of Spanish troops between him
and that city ; that the landward defences of Santiago were known
to be contemptible ; and that the delay involved the sacrifice of
more men than would have perished in any active operations that
could have been necessary to secure the fall of the place.
' Settlers were actually iuvited to cross from North America, and were jirumiseil
grants of land in the island. — Speech of Gov. Shirley at Boston, Sept. 23rd, 1741. The
re-naming of places by the Britisli leaders was also significant.
78 • MAJOIl (JPEIIATIONS, ]71-!-lT<12. [iTtl.
The Ministry censui-ed botli Venujii and Wentworili, yet (jnly
with mildness, and chiefly on account of the personal quarrels which
had been allowed to spring up between them. The Duke of
Newcastle, on October 31st, wrote to Vernon : —
"His Majesty has coiiiiimnded me tu acquaint yuu and (ieneral Wentworth tliat
he sees with great ci>nceni the heals and animosities tliat have arisen hetween his
officers by sea and land, contrary to his orders, whereby tlie service cannot but greatly
sufi'er ; and I am ordered to recommend to you in the strongest manner carefully to
avoid the like for the future, and that, in case of any difi'erence of opinion, all acrimony
and AViirriitli of ex]iressioTi should be avoided."
After the collapse of the undertaking had become known in England,
neither Admiral nor General received from the Government any
much stronger blame than this. Yet one, if not both, should have
been recalled. It was obvious, even to their best friends,' that they
could not work satisfactorily one with the other. Unhappily, they
were allowed to embark together upon further adventures.
The transports from Santiago reached Jamaica in safetj', while
the fleet cruised for a time off Hispaniola in order to protect the
arrival of an expected convoy ^ from England. After a time, the
Vice-Admiral left part of his force, under Cai)tain Cornelius Mitchell,
of the Kent, 70, to look for the convoy, and proceeded to Jamaica,
where a council of war was held on January 8th, 174'2. The council
eventuallj' decided to adopt a plan which had been submitted to it
by Lowther, the ex-buccaneer, who knew the country well. This
involved a landing at Puerto Bello, and a march across the isthmus
to Panama, with three thousand soldiers, five hundred negroes, and
four hundred friendly Mosquito Indians. But many delays occm-red.
In the interval, Lowther, in the Triton, sloop, convo}-ed by
Captain Henry Dennis in the Exjjeriment, went to the Mosquito
coast to procure information and to make arrangements with the
natives. The Triton was for this service disguised as a trader. As
for Vernon, who was terribly impatient at the slowness with which
the land forces were being got ready, and who had learnt that
Spanish reinforcements were on their way to Cartagena, he occujjied
some of his spare time in making a cruise off Cartagena, with the
' Piilteney"s amiable appeals to A'ernuu to control liis temper were almost pathetic.
See especially Pulteney's letter of Nov. 17th, 1741, in 'Letters to an Honest Sailor.'
- The convoy, consisting of the Oreenwich, 50, »S'^. Albans, 50, and Foi; 20, with
transports containing about two tnousand troops, reached Jamaica on January 15th,
without having sighted Mitchell's squadron.
1711'.] FAlLlIllEti Oh' VERNON AND WENTWORTII. 79
object of suggesting to tlie eucniy that lu; wms coiitniijiliiiing a iu:\v
attack upon that place. Sir Clialoner Ogle, wlio liail been left hcliimi
at Jamaica to bring on the main bndy of the expeditionary forces,
was not able to sail until the middle ol' Maicli, 171'2. On the 'iHth
of that month, he rejoined the Vice-AdmiraJ, and the fleet ^ then
made the best of its way to its destination.
The Experiment and Triton had been directed to make rendezvous
with the fleet off the Bastinientos Islands, in what is now called the
Gulf .of San Bias. On March 'J(3th, Vernon detached the Montagu,
Captain William Chambers, to look for those vessels, and to order
them, in case they should be fallen in with, to join a detachment
which was to land a body of troops at Nombre de Dios, at the
head of the gulf of San Bias.- The fleet sighted land near the
Bastimentos on March '28th, but, seeing nothing of the Expcrhumt
and Triton, passed on to Puerto Bello, and, entering the harbour
in line of battle, dropped anchor there before nightfall, without any
opposition on the part of the Spanish Governor, who fled with such
troops as he had.
Lowther's report, received when the fleet was at Puerto Bello, had
the effect of convincing General "VVentworth that the design against
Panama was impracticable ; yet Wentworth was so lacking in tact
that, instead of communicating his decision directly to A'ernon, he
mentioned it casually to Governor Trelawney, the result being that
A^ernon's first intimation that the expedition was destined to be a
failure was conveyed to him in the form of a private request from
Trelawney for a passage back to Jamaica. Wentworth's views were
formally adopted at a council of war at which seven military officers
were present, and were ratified at a general covincil composed of
three military and two naval officers. A^ernon and Ogle formed the
minority, and could do notliing but acquiesce, although the A'ice-
Admiral was strongly of opinion that, seeing that Panama had in
earlier years been taken from across the isthmus by Sir Henry
Morgan with five hundred buccaneers, it might be taken again by
the much larger forces which were at the disposal of the British
' Boyne, 80, flag of Vernon, Cumhcrland, 80, flag of Ogle, Keni, 70, Or/ord, 70,
IVorcester, 60, Defiance, GO, York, 60, Montagu, 60, St. Alhans, 50, and Grcenu-ich, 50,
with three fireships, two hospital ships, and abo\it forty transports. Covernor
Trelawney, as a colonel, was with the troops.
^ This landing was never cft'ected. The Jixjicriinent and Triton rejoined the fleet
at Puerto Bello.
so MAJoit opehations, r,u-\nvi. [1742.
leaders in 1742. The fleet, therefore, quitted Puerto Bello for
Jamaica on April 3rd, having effected nothing.'
Indeed, the only important advance made in the West Indies in
the course of the year was the annexation and settlement of lioatan
Island, in the bay of Honduras, by an expedition ^ from Jamaica
convoyed by the Lichfield, 50, Captain James Cusack, and the
Bonctfa, sloop, Commander William Lea. Nor is it astonishing
that so little was done. The Admiral and the General were on
worse terms than ever, and their quarrels were taken up by all
around them. Even Ogle and Trelawney fell out. So scandalous
a state of things was terminated, after it had endured far too long,
by the arrival at Jamaica on September '23rd of the Gibraltar, 20,
Captain Thorpe Fowke, with orders for both Vernon , and Went-
worth to return to England. Vernon sailed in the Boyne, 80, on
October 18th, leaving Sir Chaloner Ogle in command of the station ;
and Wentworth, with the remnants of the army, departed soon
afterwards, under convoy of the Defiance, 60, Captain Daniel Hore,
and the Worcester, 60, Captain William Cleland.
In the Mediterranean, where there had been scarcely a large
enough naval force for the due protection of trade, and for the due
observation of the declared and the suspected enemies of Great
Britain, Vice-Admiral Nicholas Haddock had been joined, in
February, 1742, by a considerable reinforcement under Commodore
Kichard Lestock (2), who, on March 13th following, was promoted
to be Rear-Admiral of the White. ^ According to Charnock, Lestock,
during this period, " exhibited some proofs of that impatient temper
and improper professional pride which, afterwards becoming infinitely
more apparent, cannot but be condemned even by those who are so
warmly attached to him as to insist that no part of his conduct was
ever injurious or prejudicial to the cause and interests of his native
country."* Haddock, owing to ill-health, had to resign his
command and return to England ; '" and, pending the arrival in the
Mediterranean of his successor, Lestock officiated as commander-in-
chief. Lestock acted with some energy against the enemy, whom
' The British cruisers were, Imwever, very .succes.sful, as will be seen in the next
chapter.
^ Which reached Eoatan ou August L'3rd.
' He was further advanced to he Hear of tlie Red, on August 9th, 1743, and Vice
of the AVhite, on December 7th, 1743.
' ' Biog. Kav.' iii. 340.
^ Which he reached in the Roebuck, 40, on Ma}' 2Gth, 1742.
17-12.] LESTOCK'S ciiahacteh. 81
he obliged to postpone an intended embarkation of troops ; but, on
the other hand, he again allowed his unfortunate temper to get the
better of him. In view of what happened at a later date, it is
desirable to reprint here from Charnock ' an order and certain letters
which will explain not only Lestock's peremptory methods, but also
his interpretation, at that time, of some of the duties of subordinate
commanders when in face of the enemy.
]in.\H-Al)MlU.\L LeSTOCK TO CoMM.WDEU .TaMUS IIoDSEI.L, OF TIU':
Ann GalUty, fiuesiih'.
"Captain Hod sell : Go to the Lenox, Nass'in, Royal Oah, L'oinney, a.m\ ])i-ayo».''
Tell them I am the centre from whence the line of battle is to he formed, and, if any
ship or ships cannot get into their stations, I am to find remedy for that ; but those
who can, and do not, get into their stations are blanieable ; and a line of battle is not
to be trifled with nor misunderstood. Go with this yourself to the several captains,
from. Sir, 5'our most humble servant, lUcliard Lestock. Nevtune, at sea. April 14th,
1742. P.S. — An enemy in sight would not admit of this deliberation."
Capt,\in Cuktis Barxet, of tub Dragon, to Rear-Admiral Lestock.
"I thought that all the ships of a fleet or squadron were to sail in their proper
divisions. 1 have heard and read of divisions ge;ting late into the line, not in time
to have any part in the action ; but never knew till now that it was my duty to leave
the flag, or officer representing one, in whose division I am, without a particular order
or signal. I therefore kept my station in the division, not with a design to trifle with
the line of battle. I am, etc., C. Barnet."
Kear-Admiral Lestock to Captain Curtis Barnet.
" I have your letter of the 15th inst., in answer to wine I sent you and several
other ca]itaius by Captain Hodsell ou the 14th inst., at the time the signal was out for
the line of battle abreast of each other. Yoiu' not getting into line wlien you could
have done it, gave me that occasion by the fireship.
"You say you thought that the ships of a fleet or squadron were to sail in their
proper divisions ; and you have heard and read of divisions getting late into the line,
not in time to have any part of the action ; but never till now knew that it was your
duty to leave the flag, or officer representing one, in whose division you are, without a
particular order or signal.
"Let us suppose that you are in a division, and that a signal for the line of battle
is made; and tliat the commanding ship of that division, by bad sailing, could not
get into the line, though all the rest of the squadron could have got into the line, but
did not. That division makes one-third of the sqnadron.
" Now : is it your duty to see two-thirds of the squadron sacrificed to the enemy,
when you could, but did not, join in the battle? An admiral, in such a case, would
either leave the bad sailing ship for one that could get into the action, or would send
' ' Biog. Nav.' iv. 213 et seg. Charnock says : " Mr. Lestock appears in his
vehemence of rage to have been guilty of a few literary omissions and mistakes, which
we have supplied and corrected." The present editor has adopted some of Charnock's
emendations and made others, chiefly with respect to punctuation.
^ The Dragon, 60, Captain Curtis Barnet.
VOL. III. G
82 MAJOIl OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1742.
you such orders ;is should just ify you at a court-martial lor not corning into the action
when you could have done it. Captain Rowley,' indeed, has not the power either to
shift his- -ship, or to stop you with him.
" Such an account would lell Init ill to our country after the Kss of a battle. But
I hoj^e such a thing can never hajipen to an Englishman ; and the punishment inflicted
on a breach of the 12th article of the Statute of Charles the Second upon those who
withdraw, or keep back, or do not come into the fight and engage, would be what
must follow in such a case.
"So I will say no more of trifling nor misunderstanding of a line of battle ; as
these are, and must be, the consequences of a not trifling want of duty in the weighing
of circumstances in regard to battle : for that is the cause why lines are formed.^
" The 13th article of the Fighting Instructions ' leans that way also. So, having, I
think, answered your letter, I am. Sir, your most humble servant, Richard Lestock.
Nepimic, at sea. April IGth, 1742."
Captain Curtis IJakxkt to liiCAR-AnMiRAi, Lkstock.
•• Dragnn, April 16th, 1742.
" Sir, — As you have given yourself the trouble to answer the letter I thought
necessary to write in excuse for my continuing in my station in the division of which
1 am, when you made the signal for the line of battle abreast, and in it are pleased to
say : ' Is it your duty to see two-thirds of the squadron sacrificed to the enemy, when
you could, and did not, join in the battle?' I answer that I should readily concur
in punishing rigidly any man who could, and did not, join in the battle. But, as the
commanders of divisions will, I imagine, always expect that the captains, in their
respective divisions, should, in anything like the late case, take directions from them,
and, as we are to supipose every officer of that distinction neither wanting in zeal or
capacity, I can make no doubt that such orders would be immediately given as would
be most essential for his Majesty's service; and that a signal or order might be
expected for the ships to make sail into the line if the commander of the division
could not get up with his own ship, and did not think proper to remove into another.
Without such an order or a proper signal, I could not in my conscience condemn any
man for i-emaiuing with his division, or think that he fell under the 12th article of the
Statute of Charles the Second, or the 13th of the Fighting Instructions ; for a man in
his station cauuot be said to withdraw, keep back, or not use his endeavours to engage
the enemy in the order the admiral has prescribed. In this manner I should judge,
were I to sit at a court-martial on such an occasion ; but in this manner shall no
longer act, since you have been pleased to tell me Cajjtain Rowlej' has not the power
to shift his ship or stop me.
" I presume there are instances both of whole divisions going down to the enemy
too soon, and of coming in so late as to have no part in the action ; but I never heard
that the private captains who kept their stations in those divisions fell under the least
censure; and, as I was neither called nor sent from the division by order or signal, I
bad no apprehension of being blameable.
' Afterwards Admiral of the Fleet, Sir AVilliam Rowle}' : then senior officer of
Barnet's division. Lestock meant that, as there was no flag-officer of the division,
there was no jiossible question as to what was Barnet's duty.
^ I.e., " After all, I will not speak of this as trifling, for it is far too light a word to
apply to so serious a subject."
' " As soon as the Admiral shall hoist a red flag on the flagstaff at the fore-topmast
head, and fire a gun, every ship in the fleet is to use their utmost endeavour to engage
the enemy, in the order the Admiral has prescribed unto them."
1742.] MATIIEWfi TO THE MKDJTKnilANKAN. 83
"Willi luguiJ to what you are ]ileaseil to say of seeing the squach'oii sacrificed to
the enemy, that cannot happen while yuii, Sir, command it, who will never go down
to the enemy in an improper mnniicr. witli more sail than the ]]riiicipal ships of the
line can keep you company. . . ."
Lestock had, undoubtedly. Loped to be continued as commander-
in-chief in the Mediterranean ; but Vice-Admiral Thomas Mathews
(K.) ' was appointed to that post on March 25th, 1742, and, having
hoisted his flag in the Naiiiar, 90, sailed on April 16th, ^ and arrived
at Gibraltar on May 7th. Lestock was hurt, and he is said to have
foolishly showed his resentment by neglecting to obey instructions
to send a frigate to meet Mathews. For this supposed omission
Mathews publicly reprimanded Lestock as soon as the two flag-
otiicers met.'' From that moment the junior seems to have regarded
his senior with scarcely-disguised hostility.
Mathews was a good oflicer, as strict in obeying as he was in
enforcing discipline, and a jealous, yet not intemperate, believer in
the dignity of the great position to which he had been called by his
country. He was, moreover, a highly honourable man, of con-
spicuous gallantry. Lestock, on the other hand, was ever more
ready to enforce than to obey the laws of discipline. In his eyes,
his own person was fully as dignified as any rank or place with
which his country could invest him. " Unconciliating in his
manners, austere when in command, restless when in a subordinate
station, he had," says Charnock, "fewer friends than fell to the lot
of most men, and that number, which was gradually diminishing,
his behaviour never appeared of a nature to recruit." His courage
has not been questioned, but his abilities, which were considerable,
were contracted and neutralised by a petty meanness of spirit and
smallness of view that prevented him from ever commanding either
confidence or respect. That Mathews disliked Lestock cannot be
gainsaid.^ Almost every naval officer of the day dishked Lestock.
' Thomas Mathews ; horn, lUTO ; captain, 1703 ; took the Bien Aime, 26, in 1707,
and the Olorkux, 44, in 1700 ; commanded the Kent at Cape Passaro, in 1718 ;
Commissioner at Chatham, 1736 ; Vice-Admiral and Commander-in-Chief in the
Mediterranean, 1742 ; Admiral, 1743 ; fought a spirited hut jiartial action oil" Toulon,
1744 ; dismissed the service, 1746 ; died, 1751.
- In Company with the Friiicess Caroline, 80, Norfolk, 80, and Bedfonl, 70.
^ Lestock alleged that he had sent a frigate, which had failed to fall in with
Mathews. It is admitted that, in this instance, no matter what were the tacts as to
the frigate, the Vice-Admiral behaved with somewhat unnecessary warmth.
* When he accepted his appointment, he stipulated that Lestock should be speedily
recalled, but the stipulation was afterwards either forgotten or misunderstood. —
Beatson, i. 153.
G 2
84 MAJOR OI'ERATIONH, 1714-17G2. [1742.
But Mathewa was the last man in the world to allow his private
disliives to interfere with his duty.
The Vice-Admiral met the Rear- Admiral and part of the fleet at
Villa Franca on May 27th. He at once instituted a strict watching
blockade of Toulon, where a Spanish, as well as a French force, lay.
This blockade was maintained chiefly by the division of Lestock,
whose headquarters were off Hyeres, while Mathews himself
remained in reserve at Villa Franca, ready to sail upon the receipt
of news that the enemy was at sea. In June, five S])aiiish galleys,
which were to have escorted some Spanish troops to Italy, and
which were laden with ammunition and stores, ventured to quit the
shelter of Fort Ste. Marguerite, and crept round under the coast as
far as the Gulf of St. Tropez. Captain Harry Norris, of the
Kingston, 60, with a small detachment, blockaded them there, and
when, although they were in a neutral port, they fired on him, he
effected their destruction.^ Other Spanish vessels were destroyed at
Palamos, Mataro, and elsewhere.
In July, 1742, the Vice-Admiral, who had intelligence that the
King of Sicily had dispatched a body of troops to the assistance of
the Spaniards in Italy, ordered Commodore WiUiam Martin, with a
small squadron,^ to Naples, to endeavour to induce the King to
withdraw his forces, and to adhere to a declaration of neutrality.
Should the King refuse, Martin was to bombard the city. The
squadron arrived, and anchored in the Bay on August 19th ; and
Martin sent ashore Commander de I'Angle with an ultimatum, and
a demand for an answer in half-an-hour, unless, indeed, the King
could not be reached within that time. After very little delay, the
required assurance was given on the 20th, and the squadron there-
upon departed, to the great relief of the Neapolitans. The incident,
most creditably managed by Martin, would, perhaps, have had
comparatively little importance, had not the same prince who, in
1742, was King of Sicily, become, in 1759, King Carlos III. of
Spain. He then remembered against Great Britain the coercion
which had been employed against huu by the Commodore, and,
towards the end of the Seven Years' War, and during the War of
• ' For details of this, see next chapter.
^ Ipswich, 70, Commodore William Martin, Panther, 50, Captain Solomon Gideon,
Oxford, 50, Captain Lord Harry Powlett, Feotraham, 40, Captain Eichard Huglies (2),
Dursley Oallcy, 20, Commander Merrick de I'Angle; and the bombs, Carcass, 8,
Lieut. John Bowdler, Salarnand'-r, 8, Lieut. John Philhpson, and Terrible, 8, Lieut,
the Hon. George Edgcuml.ie ; besides four tenders.
1743.] ATTACK ON J, A (lUAYllA. 85
Anieric.LU Ilevolutioii, never ceiiscd to do all tliat lay in his power to
ruin the naval might which ha,(l tlins liiuniliatcd liini.
Commodore Martin rejoined the flag, and was soon afterwards
again detached to destroy certain storehouses and magazines at
Alassio, in the territory of the repubhc of Genoa. These, which
were known to he destined for the use of the Spaniards, were all set
on fire by a landing-party from the ships.
In 1743, the blockade of Toulon was continued, and Admiral
Mathews, as before, exerted himself to the utmost to hinder the
operations of the Spaniards in the Italian peninsula, and the trans-
mission thither of stores and reinforcements from Spain. But the
transactions on the station were not of sufficient importance to
deserve description in this chapter. They are, therefore, relegated
to the next.
One of the first actions of Sir Chaloner Ogle (1) ' after he had, as
has been seen, been left as commander-in-chief in the West Indies,
upon Vernon's recall, was to organise an expedition against the
Spanish settlements at La Guayra and Puerto Cabello, on the coast
of Caracas, in what is now Venezuela. These were reported to be
almost defenceless, and to be at the mercy of the fleet. Ogle
entrusted the conduct of the expedition to Captain Charles Knowles,
in the Suffolk, 70, and gave him directions to proceed first to
Antigua, there to take under his orders such additional vessels as
could he spared, and to embark a certain number of troops.
Knowles carried out these instructions, and on February 12th, 1743,
sailed for La Guayra. After touching at St. Christopher, he arrived
off his port of destination on the 18th.
It is quite true that when Ogle first contemplated the descent
upon the coast of Caracas, La Guayra was almost defenceless.
Unfortunately, the Admiral suffered his projects to become known,
and the Spanish governor of the place, with great promptitude and
vigour, thereupon set himself to work to repair the fortifications, to
build new ones, to raise extra forces, and to obtain fresh supplies of
ammunition. -
When, consequently, on February 18th, the squadron began the
attack at about midday, a warm and formidable opposition was met
' Promoted to be Vice-Admiral of the Red on Avigiist 9tli, and Vice- Admiral of the
White on December 7th, 1743.
'^ Some of this ammunition was obtained from tlie Dutcli Governor of Curacoa,
who, by handing it over, committed an imwarrantable breach of the Dutch under-
standing; with Great Britain.
86
MAJOI! OPERATIONS, 17H-17G-J.
[1743.
with. There was a swell which prevented the vessels from
approaching within ahout a mile from the forts, and the landing of
the troops was found to be impracticable. Yet, although an attempt
to burn the shipping in harbour, by means of armed Vjoats, failed as
a result of confusion of orders, and although the ships suffered badly,
it looked, at 4 o'clock p.m., as if the fire of the batteries was about
to be silenced. But at that hour, a chance shot cut the cable of the
Burfonl, which was anchored at the head of the British line. The
Burford drove on board the Norwich, and forced )>oth her and the
Eltham. out of station, the three vessels drifting almost helplessly to
leeward. This re-encouraged the enemy, and although, up to
nightfall, the attack was pluckily continued, the Biitish, after the
accident, had much the worse of the encounter, and were ultimately
obliged to draw off. La Guayra was severely damaged ; a magazine
was blown up by a shell from the Comet, and about seven hundred
Spaniards were killed and wounded. Yet, in spite of the gallantry
of the assailants, the day ended with their decisive repulse. The
composition of Knowles's squadron, and the damage and loss
sustained by each ship, are shown in the following table : —
Ships.
3
5
Curomauders.
ll
Com-
plement.
'5
5
Suffolk. .
70
Cajjt. Charles Knowles .
97
380
30
80
Burford
70
„ Franklin Lushingtou .
73
380
24
50
Aorunch .
50
„ Thomas Gregorv (1) .
7
250
1
11
Advice .
50
„ Elliot Smith ....
10
250
7
15
Assistance .
50
„ Smith Callis ....
41
250
12
71
hWiam
40
„ Richard Watkins (actins;).
44
210
14
55
Lively .
20
„ Henrv Stewart (actin»)
10
120
7
24
Scarhorouqh
20
Commander Lachlin Leslie .
3
120
2
OWr . .
14
„ John Ga^e .
V
45
f1^im^^f,^M^\^^\\
fi
Rii-hara Tyrrell. .
0
4(1
I Shot iu the hull uuly are intliided.
Captain Lushington, of the Burford, a most excellent officer, was
mortally wounded by a chain-shot, which carried off one of his legs
at the thigh. He died at Cura(,'oa on February •23rd, two hours
after he had been landed there. The Burford, Eltham, and
Assistance, were almost completely disabled ; the flagship had
fourteen guns dismounted ; and the squadron, as a whole, was, for
the moment, unserviceable. It, therefore, proceeded to Cura9oa
to refit.
1743.] liEl'in.S^K AT rVKRTO CAJIh'L/JK 87
As soon as liu ])a(l rcfittc-d, :uid had supplemented liis ratlicr
reduced forces by taking on board a few Dutch volunteers, Captain
Knowles, in pursuance of tiie C'.oniinander-in-Cbief's design, turned
his attention to Puerto Cabelio. He sailed on March '20th, but,
owing to a strong lee current, could not anchor in the neighbourhood
of his destination until April 15th.
Puerto Cabelio was even better prepared to receive him than La
Guayra had been. There were in the place three hundred regular
troops, twelve hundred seamen belonging to the vessels in port, and
a large body of negroes and Indians. The Spaniards had hauled all
their smaller craft up to the head of the harbour out of gunshot, and
had moored a ship of sixty, and another of forty guns, in good
defensive positions, while they had placed a large vessel ready for
sinking in the mouth of the liarbour. Newly-erected fascine
batteries flanked the entrance, and two more, one mounting twelve,
and the other seven guns, occupied a low point called I'unta Brava.
These last, in the opinion of Knowles, were ill-placed, and might be
easily taken, and then employed against the fortress itself. He
therefore, after having held a council of war, ordered in the Lively
and Elthaiii, on the afternoon of the 16th, to cannonade the Punta
Brava works, and prepared a landing-party, consisting of Dalzell's
regiment, all the Marines of the squadron, and four hundred seamen,^
which, as soon as the batteries should be silenced, was to storm
them, while the Assistance lay anchored within pistol-shot of the
shore to cover a retreat, should one be necessary.
The Lively and Eltham effected their part of the work by about
sunset. All firing then ceased. As it grew dark the storming-party
landed, and began to march along the beach towards the batteries,
Knowles accompanying the advance in his galley. Just before
11 P.M. the foremost troop seized one of the batteries ; but, at that
moment, the Spaniards, being alarmed, began to fire from the other
works, and, to the mortification of the British leaders, so blind a
panic seized the men that they retired pell-mell in the most absolute
confusion, and did not regain their self-possession until they were
once more on board the ships.
After this disgraceful repulse, another council of war was held on
April '21st, and, in pursuance of the resolutions then come to, a
general attack from seaward was made upon the place on the
morning of the '24th. The Assistance, Bur-ford, Suffolk, and
' The whole being under Major Lucas, of Dalzell's Eegiment.
88 MAJOn Ol'EllATlONS, 1714-17(;2. [1743.
Noririvli were told off to liiitter the luaiii work, and the Scar-
l)oniin/l/, Liri'lij. and I'JIIIkiiii, to attack the fascine hatteries at the
entrance of the harhour. Fire was opened at about 11 a.m., all the
ships taking up their stations * as well as they possibly could, except
the Norwich, which apparently hesitated to get into close action.
Seeing this, Knowles very promptly sent Captain Henry Stewart
(acting), of the Livchj, to supersede Captain Thornas Gregory, who
was put under arrest." Thenceforward, the engagement was hotly
maintained until the close of day, when the enemy's fire slackened,
and it became evident that his batteries had suffered severely. He
reopened fire, however, after dark, and so badly mauled the ships —
some of which had, by that time, expended nearly all their ammuni-
tion— that, soon after 9 P.M., Knowles made the signal to cut cables,
and drew off his shattered vessels.
The ships actually engaged in this disastrous affair were, saving
the Advice, Otter, and Comet, the same as had been engaged at La
Guayra, but some of them were differently commanded. Captain
Bichard Watkins had been promoted from the Elthatn to the
Burford, vice Lushington, killed; Captain Pliilip Dui'ell (1) had suc-
ceeded Captain Watkins in the Eltham ; and, after the supersession
of Captain Gregory, Commander John Gage, of the Otter, assumed
command of the Livchj. The loss of the squadron was about two
hundred men killed and wounded. The ships refitted under shelter
of the Kej's of Barbarat, and were there rejoined by the Advice,
which had been detached on scouting duty on March 23rd. On
April '28th it was determined that the force was no longer in a con-
dition to attempt anything more against the enemy ; and, after an
exchange of prisoners had been carried out, the ships belonging to
the Leeward Islands' station ^ returned thither, and the rest of the
squadron proceeded to Jamaica. Captain Knowles, in the autumn,
cruised off Martinique, and, soon afterwards, went home to
England.
Late in 1743, the excited condition of parties in England, and
' In til is they were impeded by the sinking of the Spanish vessel in the harbour's
nioHtli.
- He was latei- sent to Enghand and court-rnartialled at Spithead for misbehaviour.
(C. M. Sept. 17th, 1743.) The court dismissed liim from the service ; but, after distin-
guishing liimself iis a volunteer, he was restored to his rank as from Xov. 12tli, 17-15.
He ended his life in a duel.
^ Where Commodore (later Vice-Admiral Sir) Peter Warren commanded, witli his
broad'pennant in the Superbe, GO.
1744.] IIOSrJLlTY OF FltANCK. 89
the widespread dissatisfaction tliere at the iiianiuT in wliicli the
interests of Great Britain had, according to the views of many, been
sacrificed to those of Hannover, encouraged France to take up an
active, instead of a merely benevolent attitude, with reference to the
cause of Spain. ^ France was further encouraged in the same
direction by the growing jealousy with which tlie Emperor, the
King of Prussia, and their allies, regarded the pretensions of Maria
Theresia, Queen of Hungary, and by the results of the secret
negotiations which were set on foot at Frankfurt-on-Main with the
object of checking the alleged ambitions of that very able princess.
France, therefore, concluded at Fontainebleau an offensive and
defensive family alliance with Spain, each party guaranteeing the
possessions and claims of the other, and agreeing that no peace
should be concluded until the restoration of Gibraltar by Great
Britain. France also despatched reinforcements to the aid of Philip
in Savoy ; directed M. La Bruyere de Court, Lieutenant-General of
the French squadron in Toulon, to co-operate with the Spanish
squadron which, under Don Jose Navarro, had so long lain blockaded
there by Admiral Mathews ; and, early in 1744, sent forth from
Brest Lieutenant-General de Eoquefeuil, with nineteen men-of-war,^
to cruise in the Channel.
The objects of France were manifold. She desired, firstly, to
expel Great Britain from the Mediterranean, and then, by sending
her own Mediterranean fleet to join her squadrons in the Channel,
to annihilate British superiority in those waters as well : she hoped,
next, to oblige Great Britain to recall her troops from the Continent,
and to desist from supporting on shore the cause of Maria Theresia :
and, finally, she looked forward to fomenting revolution in England,
and to restoring to the throne the exiled family of Stuart, by means
of an invasion from Dunquerque.
The assumption by France of this actively hostile attitude had
the happy effect of partially calming the violence of party rage in
Great Britain. The command of the Channel Fleet ^ was given to
Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Norris, with Vice-Admiral Sir
Charles Hardy (1) (B), and Bear- Admiral \Yilliam Martin (B), as his
' The Treaty of "Worms, September 1743, leagued together Great Britain, Holland,
Austria, Saxony, and Sardinia. This was met, in October 1743, by the Treaty of
Frankfurt, which banded together France, Prussia, Hessen Cassel, and the Pfalz.
^ These were presently joined by some from Eochefort.
' This presently included twenty-five ships of 50 guns and upwards, and twenty-
four frigates and small craft.
!t() MAJOl! OI'KIIATIONS, 1711-1702. [1741.
immediate subordinates. Norris wished to go in seaiuh of M. de
Roquefeuil, but, it being feared that the latter might possibly pass
the British fleet at night, or in thick weather, and so get to
Dunquerque, where a French army was awaiting his escort, the
Commandei--in-Chief was ordered to proceed with his whole strength
to the Downs. De Eoquefeuil was sighted off the Eddystone on
February 3rd, with, it would appear, sixteen ships of fifty guns and
upwards, and seven frigates and smaller craft. A little later,
believing Norris to have taken refuge in Portsmouth, he detached
five vessels, under M. de Barrailh, to Dunquerque, and himself
anchored off Dungeness on February •24th.
De Barrailh seems to have passed Nonis in the night. The
latter, learning of De Eoquefeuil's presence to the westward,
weighed, and, although the wind was contrary, worked up towards
him. At that moment the position of the French was extremely
precarious. But, when he was not much more than six miles from
the enemy, Norris was obliged by the tide, which made strongly
against him, to anchor. De Eoquefeuil thereupon got all his anchors
apeak, and, as soon as the tide set in his favour, ordered his ships
to weigh, and make independently for Brest. Many of the captains
were too apprehensive to literally obey the command. Most of them
cut or slipped, in order to lose as little time as possible; and, a
strong north-westerlj' gale springing up, they went off at a great
rate. The gale increased to a storm, and a fog supervened. The
French reached Brest, ship by ship, in a more or less crippled
condition, and Norris, hopeless of being able to overtake them, and
having himself suffered considerably, returned to the Downs, and
thence despatched his three-decked ships to Spithead, where they
could lie in greater safety from the weather.^
In the meantime, the French flotilla before Dunquerque had
experienced the full effects of the storm ; and several transports with
troops and stores on board had foundered, or had been driven ashore.
"When news arrived of the flight of de Boquefeuil, de Barrailh also
returned to Brest ; and, there being no longer any prospect of a
successful invasion of the United Kingdom, the rest of the French
troops were disembarked, and the Young Pretender, who had been
with them, returned to Paris. De Eoquefeuil died on board his
flagship, the Superbe, 76, on March 8th, and was succeeded in the
' Sir John Norris soon afterwards hauled down his flag for the last time. He was
succeeded in command of the Channel Fleet by Sir John Balclien.
17-14.] CO-OriaiATION OF IIOLl.AND. !)1
command by the Chef d'Escadre, later Vice-Admiral, Blonet de
Camilly, who was directed to <,niard tlK; French coasts and to detach
de Barrailh to cruise off the Scilly Islands. In spite of the nature
of these events, war was not formally declared by France until
March '20th.' A counter-declaration was returned by Great Britain
on the 31st" of the same month.
The outbreak of formal hostilities enabled the British Government
to request Holland, under the stipulations of the treaty, to supply a
naval force to co-operate with the British fleets. The States-General
had already, in view of war, equipped some ships of forty-foixr guns
and upwards ; and they presently sent these and others, a few at
a time, to the Downs, under Lieutenant-Admiral Hendrik Grave,'' in
the Haarlem, 74, Vice-Admiral AVillem 'T Hooft, in the Dordrecht,
54, Vice-Admiral Cornelis Schrijver, in the Damiateu, 64, and
Eear-Admiral Jacob Keijnst, in the Leeuwenhorst, 54. As the
names and force of the ships are wrongly given in all English
histories, they are here copied from De Jonge : — *
Haarlem, 72, JJuidrecht, 04, Damiateu, (U, Leeua-tnliurft, 54, Delft, iA, Assen-
delft, 54, Edam, 54, BeekvUet, 54, Oorcum, 41-, Oud 'I'ijHngen, 44, Middelburg, 44,
Goiiderak, 44, Bnderode, 54,^ Tholen, 64,^ Zierikzce, G4,' Goes, (i4,'' Kasteel van
Medemblik, 54,^ Bamhorst, 54,° Prins Friso, 54,'' Vrieslcnd, CA.^
Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (1) (E) was sent southward with
a squadron to escort the trade to Lisbon and some storeships to
Gibraltar ; Admiral Sir John Balchen and Vice-Admiral William
Martin (B) cruised with a fleet in the Channel ; and Sir John
Balchen subsequently sailed with Martin and Vice-Admiral James
Stewart (E) '^ to release Hardy's convoy, which was reported to have
been blocked up in the Tagus by a French squadron. A small force,
under Commodore Curtis Barnet, was also despatched to the East
Indies ; and Vice-Admiral Thomas Davers proceeded to the West
Indies to relieve Sir Chaloner Ogle. The operations of these officers
will be followed later. First, however, some attention miist be
' By ordinance dated March 15th.
- By ])roclamation dated March 29tli.
' Botli Beatson, i. 184, and Ilervey, iv. 257, fur sunic iinexpLained reason, call this
officer "Admiral Baccarest, or Baccherest." The contingent was officially styled the
Auxiliary Squadron.
■* ' Nederl. Zeewezen,' iv. 182.
^ These did not join until late in the year.
° Stewart, Hardy, and Martin were not promoted t<i the raid;s here given until
June 23rd.
92
MA.IOIl (ll'ERATIONH, 1714-1702.
[1744.
paid to the work oi' the Navy in the Mediterranean, wliere the
earliest fleet action of the war was fought.
Admiral Thomas Mathews,^ being then at Turin,- was informed
on Deceml^er 30th, 1743, that de Koquefeuil had sailed from Brest.
The intelligence was incori'ect, Irat it induced him to suspect that
co-operation between the Brest and Toulon squadrons was intended.
He therefore sent orders to Minorca that all ships there were to put
to sea at once. A little later, he heard that M. La Bruyere de
Court and Don Jose Navarro purposed to quit Toulon together on
January '20th ; and, hastening to Villa Franca, he embarked to join
Vice-Admiral Lestock, off Hyeres. Upon arriving there early in
■'me n I t e j< r .1 y e >i *
Too/' <t &^ a It^ut
January, 1744, he found himself at the head of only twenty sail
of the line, four of which mounted but fifty guns apiece ; but on
the 11th he was reinforced by the Elizabeth, 70, Berwick, 70,
Priiiccsa, 70, and Marlborough, 90 ; on Februar}' 3rd, by the
Somerset, 80, Warwick, 60, and Dragon, GO; on February 10th, by
the Boyne, 80, and Chichester, 80, which had been sent out from
England ; and on the 11th, on the very eve of the battle, by the
jRoi/al Oak, 70. In the interval, he kept himself admirably informed,
by means of his frigates, of the motions and designs of the enemy.
' He was pronwted to be Admiral of the White by tlie Guzetie of February 18th, 1744.
- Where he had been concerting measures with the Sardinian Government for the
defence of the Italian coasts.
17-J4.]
MATIUCWS AND TIIK A 1.1.1 EH.
9.3
On February 9tli, the coniLincd fleet appeared under sail in the
outer road of Toulon, and there formed a line of battle. Mathews
had already unmoored and shortened in cable, and at 10 A.M. he
weighed, the wind being westerly. Half an hour afterwards, he
formed his line of battle ahead, and then plied to windward between
the islands and the mainland, as if inviting the enemy to bear down
on bim. At night, having stationed cruisers to watch the foe, be
SIR Wn.l.IAJI ROWLEY, K.l!., ADJIIRAI. OF THE FLEET.
anchored in Hyeres Bay. That evening, when Vice-Admiral
Lestock visited bis chief on board tbe Namur, Mathews seems to
have received bim coldly, and to have presently desired him to
return to his own ship.
At dawn on February 10th, tbe British weighed with a land
breeze ; and at 7 A.M., tbe wind being from E. or E.S.E.,^ Mathews
' At tliat time tlie allies had, or aiipeareJ to liave, a westerty wind.
!'4 MA.IOI! Dlr-KnATIOS'S, 1711-1762. [17.44.
signalled for his tieet to draw into line of battle ahead with the wind
large, and for Lestock's division to lead with the starboard tacks
on board. Both A^ce-Admiral Lestock and Eear-Adrniral M''illiam
Eowley repeated the signal, but, as the wind was very light, and
there was a hea\^' swell from the westward, there was much
difficulty in getting out of the bay in anything hke the prescribed
order ; and for some hours many of the ships had to tow with their
boats in order to keep clear of one another. The enemy was seen
at a distance of twelve or fifteen miles to the S.W. At 1 p.m.
Mathews again signalled for the line of battle ahead ; and at 2 p.m.
he hoisted a blue flag at the mizzen-topmast head, and fired a gun.'
He brought to ; the junior flag-officers repeated the signal ; and the
whole fleet brought to with the larboard tacks on board. The wind
was then so light as to be almost imperceptible, and the swell drove
the ships nearer and nearer to the island of Porquerolles. But at
3 P.M., when there was a nearly easterly breeze, Mathews signalled
for the line of battle abreast,- and then stretched with his division to
the south-west, Vice-Admiral Lestock stretching to the west, and
Eear-Admiral Eowley making all possible sail with a view to
extending the fleet and forming line of battle. Yet, towards evening,
most of the ships were still out of station ; Eowley's division was
scattered, and was far astern of Mathews's ; and neither Mathews's
nor Lestock's division was in line. The allies, on the contrary, were
in admirable order, at a distance of between four and five miles,
M. de Court being in the centre, M. Gabaret in the van, and
Don Jose Navarro in the rear.
Soon after nightfall, Mathews signalled to bring to, the most
windwardly ships to do so first and to lie by with their larboard
tacks on board. The fleet accordingh- brought to close to the alhes,
and, during the night, lay well in sight of them, the wind varying
in the eastern quarter. The Essex, 70, and Winchelsea, 20, were
told off to watch the enemy, and to signal intelligence as to any
movement on his part ; but these ships do not appear to have
observed that, after the moon had set, the allies made sail, and thus
' " When the fleet is sailing before the 'vvind, and the Admiral would have them
bring to with the starboard tacks on board, he vnQ. hoist a red flag at the flagstaff on
the mizzen-topmast head, and fire a gun ; if to bring to with the larboard tack, a blue
flag at the same place, and fire a gun ; and every ship is to answer with the same
signal." — ' Sailing Instruction,' ix.
^ Hoisting the Union and a pennant at the mizzen-peak, and firing a gun. —
' Fighting Inst.' ii.
1744.] TIIK DATTT.K OFF TOULON. 05
increased tlieir distances I'l-om (Ik; lii'itisli, \sli(), in the meantime, had
drifted between the enemy and Toulon, and lay with Cape Hide
about twelve miles to the N.N.W. At dawn, at least nine miles
intervened between the headmost and tiie sternmost ships ol'
Mathews's connnand ; and tlie vaiious divisions were not in close
order. Neither were the allies as well stationed as M. de Court
must have desired. Not more than six miles, however, represented
the extreme length of their line.
As soon as he realised how^ far he was from the Admiral, Lestock
oh his own responsibility made sail; but when, at 6.30 a.m.,
Mathews ordered the fleet as a whole to do the like, Lestock was
still five miles astern. M. de Court had already signalled for the
line of battle upon a wind ; and the allies at that time, now with
their topsails and now with their IViresails set, were stretching in
fairly good order to the southward. The British followed, but, says
Beatson : —
"As the leiir divi.siou was at su great a distance tVuiu fhe centre, and tiie vau not so
close as it should have been, the Admiral, at 7.30 a.m., made the signal for Rear-
Admiral Rowley and his division to make more sail — which signal the Vice-Admii-al
repeated ; and, soon after, the like signal was made for the Vice-Adniiral and his
division. At S a.m. the Admiral made the signal for the fleet to draw into a line of
battle, one ship abreast of the other, with a large wind ; and, half an lioin- after, he
made the signal for the fleet to draw into a line of battle, one ship ahead i>f another.
These signals were repeated by the junior flags."
Yet it took some time to form the line ; and, in the meanwhile,
M. de Court seemed inclined to avoid a general action, and to
endeavour to draw the British towards the Strait. Mathews divined
his opponent's intention to be either to escape altogether, or to
proceed without fighting until, reinforced by the squadron from
Brest, he should be in a condition to go into battle with superior
forces in his favour. Mathews was, of course, unwilling to allow-
either object to be attained ; and it was for that reason that, at
about 11.30 A.M., when, as has been hinted, the order of battle was
still very incompletely formed, the Admiral hoisted the signal to
engage.
The fleets which were about to be opposed one to anotlier were
constituted as follows ; — ^
' The lists are taken, with sliglit alterations, from those in Beatson and Schomberg,
and from the evidence in the courts-martial. It would appear, however, that some of
the Spanish ships practically formed part of the allied centre.
!»()
M A.J on OPERATIONS, 17U-J762.
[1744.
Sliips.
Commanders.
/ Stirling Castle .
Warttnck .
A'asmu .
liarjteur .
Princess Caroh'ni
Ite}~wick .
Chichester
Boyne.
Kingston .
Oxford. 50 .
Feversham, 40
Winchefsea, 20
/ Ih-agon .
Bedford .
Somerset .
Princesa .
Norfolfc .
Marlborough.
■S ( Dorsetshire .
JCssex ....
Jliqyert
Jiotjal Oalc .
Guernsey, 50 .
Salislmri/. 50 .
Durslei/ GaUi-ij,
Anve Galle;/ f.s.
Sutherland h.i
■' IS . , .
90 765
70 480 I Thomas Cooper.
60 400 Temple West.
"0 ,480 , James Lloy-l.
iRear-Adm. William Rowley,
(Merrick tie I'Aiigle.
SO 600 : Heury Osborii.
"0 4s(j Eiiwaril Hawke.
HU (iOO I William hilko-s.
80 6(tO I RoftiamI l-rogmnre.
CO 400 I John Lovet.
. . 300 I liord Hairy Powlett.
.. 250 j Ji)bn Watkin8(2).
.. !l25 William Marsh.
60 4U0
70 4.^0
80 600
74 550
80 600
90 780
80 (iOO
70 480
60 4UU
70 480
300
300
125
45
I Charles Watson.
i Hon. George Townshend.
I (Icorge Sclater.
I Iiol)eitPett.
j Hon. John Forbes.
lAdm. Tbomas Slalbews,
{ (B.).
, l.lobn Uussel.
.Fames (.'oniwaH.
, (icorge Burrish.
Riibard Norris.
.lolm Ambrose.
I Edmnnd Williams.
! Samuel Cornish.
Peter Osborn.
Giles Richard Vanbnigb.
— Mackie, (Com.).
/Alexander Lord Colville,
I I (Com.).
Dutihirl- .
Cambridgt .
Torbay . . .
Xeptune .
liassell
/itickinghaiu.
Elizabeth. . .
Jiereiige .
Nonsuch, 50 .
Bomne'/t 50
Diamond, 40 .
Mercury f.s., 8
60 400
80 600
80 600
90 770
80
Charles Wager Pnrvis.
Charles Drummoud.
John Gascoigne.
( Vice-Adm. R. Lestock, (W.).
(George Stepney.
600 ' Robert Long.
480 I John Towry.
480 I Joseph Lingen.
4'*0 ! George Berkeley.
300 Edmund Straage.
31)0 i Henry Godsalve.
250 James Hodsell.
45 I M. Peadle, (Com.).
Note. — The Burford, 70, Captain Richard Watkins,
several vessels not of the line, were absent from the fleet.
Ships.
lior^e .
Toulouse .
hue d'Orlf-ans
JSapyrance
Trid^.nt
Commanders.
esif M. Ue iJamaquart.
600
800 M. d'Orves.
820 >]. Cabaret (Chef d'Eec).
M. de Cavlus.
Alcion
54
500
11. de Vautlrcull.
A'luiUjn .
48
500
Kole . . .
64
650
11. d'AllK-rt.
AtalavU, 20
A firpshlp, «
Farietix ,
60
600
M. de Gravier.
Se'rieax . .
1 64
650
Fei-me . . .
74
800
M. de I)esorqua't-
TIgre . . .
50
550
M. de Sauriiis-Mnrat.
Terrible . .
74
850
Adm. de Court.
Saint Esprit .
74
SOU
Diamaitt . .
50
550
M. de Marrilart.
SoUde . . .
64
650
M. de Cbateauneuf.
Fltur. 20 .
Xeplii/r. 20.
A fireship, H
A fileship, »
Orietite . . . I 60 I 600
Amtrica . . . i Co ' 600
^'f^plu^lo ... 60 600
Podcr . . . . I 60 600
Constante. . . 70 , 750
BealFelijte . . ill4 1350
Sercult-S . . . C4 650
Alcitin- ... 58 600
BriUante . . . i hO 600
San Fernando . 64 650
Sobiero . . . I 60 600
Jsabela ... SO 900
lolage, 20 . .
A firesbip, 8 . , | |
1 A French officer. Captain Lage de Cueilli, also
exercised some executive authority on board.
- Some lists omit this vessel, and substitute for her the
Betiro, 54.
Dun M. de Vileiia.
I)on A. Petru'be.
Pon H. Olivares.
Don R. Errntia.
Don. A. Eturiago.
(Adm. Don Jose Navarro.
(Don N. Geraldine.i
I Ion C. Alvario.
Don J. Rentorin.
Don B. de la Barrida.
Conde de Vega Florida.
Don J. B. Castro.
Don I. Dntabil.
Captain Mahan's account of this action ^ is far too brief to be
of much vahie to the student. What he writes should, however,
be here quoted, since it describes in a few words the general
lines upon which the battle, such as it was, was fought. After
mentioning the issue of the allied fleets from the port of Toulon,
he continues : —
"The English fleet, which had been cruising oft' Hyeres in observation, chased, and
on the nth its van and centre came up with the allies ; but the rear division was then
several miles to windward and astern, quite out of supporting distance. The wind
was easterly, both fleets heading to the southward ; and the English had the weather-
' Infl. of Sea Power,' 265.
1711.] THE BATTLE OFF TOULON. 97
gage. Tiie numbers were nearly e([iial, the Knglisli having twenty-nine to tlie allied
twenty-seven ; ' but this advantage was reversed by the t'aihue (j1' the Eiiglish rear to
join. The course of the Kear-Adnnral lias been generally attributed to ill-will t(jwards
Mathews; for, although he proved that in liis separated position he made all sail to
join, he did not attack later on when he could, on the plea that the signal for the line
of battle was flying at the same tirne as the signal to engage; meaning that lie could
not leave the line to fight without disobeying the order to form line. This technical
excuse was, however, accepted by the subsequent court-martial. Under the actual
condition, Mathews, mortified and harassed by the inaction of his lieutenant, and
fearing that the enemy would escape if he delayed longer, made the signal to engage
when his own van was abreast the enemy's centre, and at once bore down himself
out of the line and attacked with his flagship of ninety guns the largest ship in the
enemy's line, the Eoyal Philip of one liundred and ten guns, carrying the flag of the
Spanish admiral. In doing this he was bravely supported by his next ahead and
astern. The moment of attack seems to have been judiciously chosen; five Spanish
ships had straggled far to the rear, leaving their admiral with the support only of his
next ahead and astern, w'hile three "^ other Spaniards continued on with the French.
The English van stood on, engaging the allied centre, while the allied van was without
antagonists. Being thus disengaged, the latter was desirous of tacking to windward of
the head of the English line, thus putting it between two fires, but was checked by
the intelligent action of the three leading English captains, who, disregarding the
signal to bear down, kept tlieir commanding position and stopped the enemy's attempts
to double. For this they were cashiered by the court-martial, but afterwards restored.
This circumspect but justifiable regard of signals was imitated without any justifica-
tion by all the English captains of the centre, save the Admiral's seconds already
mentioned, as v^ell as by some of those in the van, who kept up a cannonade at long
range while their Commander-in-Chief was closely and even furiously engaged. The
one marked exception was Captain Hawke, afterwards the distinguished admiral, who
imitated the example of his chief, and, after driving his first antagonist out of action,
quitted his place in the van, brought to close quarters a fine Spanish ship that had
kept at bay five other English ships, and took her — the only prize made that day.
The commander of the English van, with his seconds, also behaved with spirit and
came to close action. It is unnecessary to describe the battle further. . . ."
After having, at 11.30 a.m., hoisted the signal' to engage,
Mathews stood on, but overhauled the enemy only very gradually.
At 1 P.M., the Naviur was abreast of the Real Felipe, and the
Barjieur, of the Terrible. Half-an-hour later, the Namur bore
down within pistol-shot of the Bcal Felipe, and began to engage her
furiously, and the Barjieur presently did the same with the Terrible.
Lestock's division was still far astern, and to windward, and,
according to the evidence at the court-martial, could not have then
been up with the centre, unless Mathews had shortened sail and
waited for it.
' This statement seems to be a little misleading. According to the lists already
given, the British liad in line twenty-eight shi]js, and the allies the same number. But,
in addition, the British had five .50 and two 40-gun ships, for which the allies had no
equivalents. The guns in line on each side were : British, 2080 ; Allies, 1822.
2 Qy. " four."
^ This was repeated by liowley, but not hy Lestock, who was at a great distance.
VOL. III. H
iJ8
MA.IOn OPERATIONS, 1711-1702
[1741.
The Nainiir was well supported by the Mdrlbdrongli, which
attacked the I.sahi'hi,^ and by the Norfolk, which attacked the
ConsttDife. The Princesa, Bedford, Dragon, and Kingston fired into
the I'odcr, and the Nephino,^ America, and Oriente, after exchanging
rather distant broadsides with the same British ships, passed on
with tJio rear of the French part of the allied fleet. The remaining
Spanish ships were, at
first, considerably astern
of their station, but, as
the breeze freshened, they
came up, and, towards the
end of the action, assisted
the Real Felipe. Lestock
made some effort to pre-
vent this, but the wind
was still very hght with
him, and he was also im-
peded by the swell, so that,
although he had all sail
set, his efforts were vain.
The Barfleur^ got to
close quarters with the
Terrible, and was much
assisted by the Princess
Caroline*^ and the Ber-
tvick. The Chichester and
Boyne also threw in their
fire, but they were not
close enough to the enemy
to do much execution. As
for the leading ships of the van — the Stirling Castle, Warwick and
Nassau — they did not bear down to the enemy at all, although the
signal for- them to do so was flying. They chose to disregard it,
and to keep their wind, in order, as was afterwards explained or
suggested, to prevent the French froua doubling upon the head of
the British column.
' Tlie Isabela, which lost uearly three liuiKh'ed killed and wounded, had by that
time moved up to the position next astern of the Heal Felipe.
- The Ntptuno lost nearly two hundred killed and wounded.
^ The Barfieur had twenty-tive killed, and twentj- wounded.
■* The Priiicess Caroline had eight killed, and twentv wounded.
MATHEWS s ACTION OFF TOULON,
FEBRUARY llTH, 1744.
British. Maek : Freneh, icliite ; Spanish, sluidcd.
[Mathews's flagship, the Xamiir. is the centre one of tlie
three rearmost Britisli ships that are closely engaged.
Hawke's ship, the Beriinck, is the rearmost one of the
larger closely engaged gronp. She has already silenced
the Ptidcr, which lies head to wind astern of her.]
1744.]
THE BATTLE OFF TOULON.
99
The hottest part oi' the uclioii was, in the- uuiiuitiuu.', being
waged l)y the ships immediately about Mathews. The Norfolk ^
drove the Constante out of the hue, a shattered wreck, but was
herself too much damaged to pursue her. The Nainur and Marl-
borough were, at one moment, so close to one another that Mathews,
to avoid being fallen on board of by his eager second, was ol)liged to
fill his sails, and draw a little ahead. Tlie Ndiiuir was tlien scarcely
ADMIli.^L THOMAS MATHEWS.
(From T. Ftilwra nirinirin.i ii/Irr llir i«,iiniit h,i Arnidpht (1743).)
under control, owing to the rough handling which she had received,
and could give little help to the Marlburough, which, fought by her
captain, and afterwards by his nephew. Lieutenant Frederick
Cornwall, in the inost magnificent manner, was very sorely
pressed. None of the vessels immediately astern of her volunteered
to assist her in the least, but, keeping their wind, fired fruitlessly at
an enemy who was beyond the reach of their shot ; and, in spite of
Tlie NorfiiJk had nine killeil, and thirteen wounded.
H -1
100 MAJOR OPBllATIONS, 1714-1762. [1744.
the fact that the Spaniards Ijetrayed every desire to meet them in
the most handsome manner, few British captains properly took up
the challenge. The most brilliant exception was Captain Edward
Ilawke, of the Berwick, who, noticing how the Poder had vainly
endeavoured to draw on some of his reluctant colleagues, quitted his
station, and bore down upon her. His first broadside did her an
immense amount of damage, and, in twenty minutes, when she had
lost all her masts, she was glad to strike.
The Beal Felij}e ' was disabled, but the Spani.sh ships of the rear
were crowding up to her assistance, and Lestock remained afar off,
so that it looked as if the British strength about the Spanish admiral
would not suffice to compel her to haul down her colours. In these
circumstances, Mathews ordered the Anne Galley, fireship, to go
down and burn the Heal Felipe, and, seeing that the Marlborough'''
was in no condition to help herself, he further signalled for the boats
of the British centre to tow her out of the line.
The Anne Galley was handled with great ability and gallantry.
As she bore down on the Real Felijje she was received with a well-
directed fire from such guns as that crippled ship could bring to
bear, and with a more distant cannonade from the Spanish vessels
astern of the flagship. Commander Mackie, match in hand, stood
alone upon the deck of his little craft, ready to fire her at the proper
moment. Most of his crew were alongside in a boat, which was
waiting to take him on board. The rest, by his orders, had taken
shelter from the storm of shot that hurtled across the fireship. But
the Anne Galley, struck repeatedly between wind and water, was
already sinking. Moreover, a Spanish launch, crowded with men,
was approaching to board her, and tow her clear. Mackie felt that,
at all hazards, he must endeavoiTr to destroy the launch, and, in
spite of the fact that his decks were littered with loose powder, that
his hatches and scuttles were open, and that his funnels^ were
uncapped, he fired his waist guns at the boat. This was fatal.
The blast from the guns set fire to the loose powder ; and, while the
A)ine Galley was still too far from the Beal Felipe to seriously
damage her, she prematurely blew up, and then sank, carrying down
' Tlie Real Felipe bail about five bundred nun killed and wounded.
^ The Marlhorough lost Captain Cornwall, and forty-two men killed and one
bundred and twenty wounded.
^ Funnels: in a firesbip, tubes leading from the deck to the main body of explosives
in the hold.
1744.] THE /!ATTL;<; off TOULON. 101
Commandur Miickii!, a liuiiicMiiiiit, a luato, a gunner, and two
quartermasters.
In the meantime, M. do Court, wlm, owing to tlie confusion and
smoke, seems to have supposed that the Spaniards were much more
closely pressed than was actually the case, tacked to their assistance.
Eear-Admiral Rowley tacked too, and followed the allied centre.
Very soon afterwards, Mathews, to quote the words of Beatson —
" hauled down the signal to engage the enemy, and also the signal for the lino of
battle ; making the signal to give over chase ; but, at half-past five o'clock, he made
the signal for the fleet to draw into a line if battle ahead. There was then but little
wind, and so great a swell that the ships could only wear. The Admiral wore, and
formed the line of battle on the larboard tack. This last manoeuvre of the Admiral's
appears to have been made with a design to collect his fleet, draw them out of the
confusion they were in, and ari-auge them in a proper order for battle, which he had
every reason to think would be speedily renewed ; the French squadron being now at
hand, and in an e.xtremely well-formed line. They crowded, however, to the assistance
of the Spaniards. The Foder, prize, being dismasted, and being unable to follow the
British fleet when they wore, was retaken by the French squadron, she having on
board a lieutenant and twenty-three men belonging to the Berwick. The Dorsetshire,
Fssex, Rupert, and Boyal Oak, wearing at the time the Admiral did, brought them
nearer to the sternmost ships of the Spanish squadron, which had by this time joined
tlieir admiral in a close line. In passing each other, being on contrary tacks, a short
action took place, in which the Namur, Dunkirk, and (Jrtnhri'lye joined, but with
little execution on either side. Daylight was almost gone, and the British fleet passed
on, leaving the confederate fleet astern."
Owing to the condition of the Namur s ' masts, Mathews, at
about 8 P.M., shifted his flag from her to the Russell, and intimated
the fact of the change to Lestock and Eowley. On the morning of
the 12th, when the wind was E.N.E., the enemy was seen about
twelve miles to the S.W. At about 7 a.m., the Somerset, which
had become separated from her consorts in the night, fell in with,
and for half-an-hour engaged, the Hercules, which had likewise
straggled from her friends ; but, the Hercules being assisted by some
French ships, the Somerset had to draw off and rejoin her division.
At 9 A.M. Lestock ordered his squadron to chase to the S.W., and
crowded sail ahead of the fleet. At 11 p.m., Mathews signalled for
the fleet to draw into line of battle abreast, and then brought to on
the starboard tack in order to collect his command. In the after-
noon, the British fleet, in admirable order, was going down on flie
enemy, which was retreating in some confusion before the wind, the
Spaniards being ahead of, and to leeward of the French, and the
' The A»m»/' liad eight killed and twelve wounded. Among the latter was
Cniitain liussel, who lost his left arm, and wlio subsequently died at Port Mahou.
102 MAJOR Ol'Ji RATIONS, 1714-1762. [1744.
Heal Felipe still bearing Navarro's Hag, although she was in tow of
another vessel. As for the Poder, she fell so far astern that the
enemy fired her to prevent her from again falling into British hands ;
and, in the course of the following night, she blew up. But, in the
meantime, Mathews, at about 5.30 p.m. on the l'2th, had ordered his
fleet to bring to, there being no more than a light wind from the
N.E., and by 10 p.m. that night the enemy was out of sight.
On the 13th, Mathews again chased to the W. and W.S.W. ; but
at U A.M. he ordered the pursuit to be relinquished, his reasons, as
afterwards explained, being, that he saw no prospect of bringing the
allies to action ; that, if he had continued to follow them, he would
have been drawn towards the Strait's mouth, and would have left
Italy entirely unprotected ; and that, as his instructions were
stringent as to the protection of Italy, he was unwilling to risk
leaving the way clear for the transport thither of a large number of
troops which he had reason to believe had been collected for that
purpose in the ports of Spain. Yet it was unfortunate that the
Admiral did not persist. Had he pressed the chase, he must
inevitably either have picked up several of the crippled ships ^ of the
allies, or have obliged de Court and Navari'o to accept action on
disadvantageous terms in order to cover their lame ducks.
After having relinquished the chase, Mathews tried to beat back
in the face of strong contrary winds, but failed ; so, first showing
himself in Eosas Bay, with a view to letting the Spaniards know
that he was observing their motions, he ran for Port ]\lahon. Upon
reaching that harbour, he suspended Vice-Admiral Lestock, and sent
him to England.
Both in France and Spain, as well as in Great Britain, there
was great disgust at the result of the battle off Toulon. In France,
Admiral de Court, in consequence of Navarro's representations, was
superseded. De Court in a letter to the Bishop of Eennes, who
was then Ambassador from France to the Court of Madrid, said,
" It was not I, my lord, who forced M. Navarro to fight against all
laws of war and prudence ; it was not I who separated his ships
from him and drove him into danger ; but when he had taken so
much pains, after all I could do, to get himself beaten, it was I who
came to his assistance and gave him the opportunity to get away,
which otherwise he never could have had." De Court was at the
time an officer of nearly eighty years of age.
' Four, at least, and probably more, were sei'iously tlisablecl aloft.
1745.] THE COURTS-MAJiTUL. ID."!
In Great Britain, Lestock's nii\villin^'n(!ss to sit (]uictly under
his suspension led to a succession ol' courts-martial. These were
preceded by an enquiry by the House of Commons, which began on
March l'2th, 174.5, and lasted until tin- middle of April. The King
was then addressed to order a court-nuu-tial into the conduct of
Admiral Mathews, Vice-Admiral Lestock, the captains of a number
of ships, which had been engaged in the battle off Toulon, and the
lieutenants of the Dorsctaliiir. In his reply his Majesty said,
" I am sensible how much depends on preserving an exact
discipline in the fleet, and of the necessity there is of bringing
to justice such as have failed in their duty on this important
occasion." In the meantime, Mathews, in pursuance of orders
from England, had resigned his command and returned home,
leaving the fleet under the orders of Vice- Admiral William Eowley.
The court-martial first assembled on board the London at
Chatham on September '23rd, 1745, under the presidency of Sir
Chaloner Ogle (1), Kt., Admiral of the Blue. The officers brought
before it were the Heutenants of the Dorsetshire , who were charged
with having advised their Captain, BiuTish, not to bear down upon
the enemy. They were all acquitted. On September 25th Burrish's
trial began, and sentence was delivered on October 9th. The court
declared, " That by reason of Captain Burrish lying inactive for
half-an-hour when he might have assisted the Marlhorongh, and
not being in line with the Admiral when he first brought to, he is
guilty of a part of the charge exhibited against him, as he did not
do his utmost to burn, sink, or destroy the enemy, nor give the
proper assistance to the Marlborough till after the message he
received from the Admiral : that he is guilty on the 12th and
13th Articles of the Fighting Instructions, and that therefore the
court adjudge him to be cashiered and forever rendered incapable
of being an officer in his Majesty's Navy." Captain Edmund
Williams, of the lioijal Oak, was next tried on four charges. The
court found that Captain Williams had failed in his duty by not
being in line with the Admiral, and by keeping to the windward of
the line during the greater part of the action, and not within proper
distance to engage with any effect during the most part of the time
he was engaged : but, in regard of his long service and his eyesight
being very defective and other favourable considerations, the court
was unanimously of the opinion that all this greatly weighed in
mitigation of the punishment due, and therefore only adjudged
]U4 MAJOR OVKRATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1745.
him unfit to be employed any more at sea, Init recommended him
to the Lords Commissioners of tlie Admiralty to be continued
on half-pay according to his seniority. This recommendation their
Lordships corajjlied with.'
Captain John Ambrose, of the Rupert, was tried on October 18th.
In his case the court found that he had failed in his duty in not
engaging closer while he was engaged, when he had it in his power :
but in regard that both before and since the action he had borne
the character of a vigilant officer, and that his failure in action
seemed to have resulted from mistaken judgment, the court onl}'
sentenced him to be cashiered during His Majesty's pleasure, and
mulcted of one year's pay for the use of the Chest at Chatham. He
was presently restored to his rank, and was in 1750 superannuated
as a rear-admiral, dying in 1771. Captain William Dilkes, of the
Chichester, had to answer the charge of not bearing down and
engaging the enemy closer when he had it in his power so to do.
The court found the charge proven, and dismissed him from the
command of his ship, but he also was afterwards restored to his
rank, though relegated to the half -pay list.^ Captain Frogmore, of
the Boyne, who was to have been tried with these officers, had died
on November 8th, 1744, while still abroad.
At a rather earlier date. Captain Norris, of the Essex, who had
been accused by his own officers of bad behaviour during the battle,
had demanded and obtained a court-martial at Port Mahon, but, as
he had previously resigned his command and was on half-pay, the
court, after much debate, considered that it had no jurisdiction.
The account of the proceedings, and a strongly-worded protest from
the accusing officers, having been sent to England, the Admiralty
ordered Norris to come home to stand his trial ; but on his way he
seized the opportunity to abscond at Gibraltar, thus, it must be
feared, admitting his guilt. He died in deserved obscurity.
Vice-Admiral Lestock had brought charges of his own against
Captains Kobert Pett, George Sclater,^ Temple West, Thomas
Cooper, and James Lloyd. In consequence of his complaints of
their misconduct, these five captains were tried in due course. The
first two were acquitted, the last three cashiered ; but as the
offences of which the latter had been convicted did not reflect
' Eduniud Williams, wlio was a caiitain of 1734, subsequently became a super-
aunuated rear-admiral, and dit-d in 1752.
^ Captain Dilkes died in I75(j. ^ Or Slaughter.
1745.] LESTOOK ACQUITTED. 105
upnii tlieir professional honour or cajiacity, and as tlicir case was
considered a hard onc^, tlie ]vii),u at once restored them to their
former rank in the service. After an adjournment of the court,
the trial of Vice-Admiral Lestock himself began at Deptford on
board the Priiicr of Ontiif/e, and, Sir Chaloner Ogle being in ill-
health, Rear-Admiral Perry Mayne officiated as president. The
other flag-officer in attendance was Kear- Admiral the Hon. John
Byng, who, a few years later, was shot for his behaviour in the
action off Minorca. Lestock urged in his defence that he could
not have engaged without breaking the line, and that he was not
authorised to do this because, though the signal for engaging had
been made, that for the line-of-battle was still flying. He was
mianimously acquitted. The truth is, that he took shelter through-
out behind purely technical excuses, which availed hiin, although he
had acted in opposition to the spirit of his earlier correspondence
with Barnet, that a subordinate should go to the length of quitting
his station, even without orders, for the sake of joining and
supporting the main body of the fleet in action. In short, for
reasons of his own — and they are not hard to formulate — he chose
to forget his broad duty to his country, and his comrades in aims,
rather than depart from the narrow letter of his instructions.
During Lestock's trial a very remarkable occurrence happened.
On May 15th the president of the court was arrested by virtue of
a writ of capias, issued by Sir John Willes, Lord Chief Justice of
the Common Pleas, in consequence of a verdict which had been
obtained by Lieutenant George Frye, of the Marines, against
Sir Chaloner Ogle, Rear-Admiral Perry Mayne and others, for
false imprisonment and maltreatment in the West Indies, resulting
from an illegal sentence passed upon him by a court-martial.
The arrest of their president so incensed the members of the
court that, oblivious of the fact that the civil law must always
of necessity take precedence of the military, they passed resolutions
in which they spoke of the Lord Chief Justice of the Common
Pleas with violent disrespect. These resolutions they forwarded
to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, who laid them before
the King. His Majesty was somewhat hastily advised to express
his displeasure at the insult which had been offei"ed to the court-
martial ; but he, like the Lords Conmiissioners of the Admiralty,
had little idea of the great authority vested in the Lord Chief
Justice of the Connuon Pleas, who, as soon as he heard of the
106 MAJOR OPEIiATTONS, 1714-1762. [1745.
resolutions of the court-martial, promptly ordered each member
of it to be taken into custody. He was beginning to adopt further
measures to vindicate liis ofHce, when the episode was happily put
an end to by the submission of the offending officers.
The trial of Admiral Mathews began on June Kith, 174G, iiear-
Admiral Perry Mayne, as before, being president, and Rear-Admiral
the Hon. John Byng being of the court. Lestock exhibited fifteen
charges against his superior. Once more the advocates of a broader
interpretation of the instructions were defeated by the advocates
of the strict letter. It is perhaps well that in those days it was so,
for, for several years previously, naval discipline had been none too
good. Mathews, whose anxiety to do his best against the enemies
of his country cannot be denied, though his wisdom may be, heard
his fate on October 22nd, when the following sentence was passed
upon him : —
" The court having examined the witnesses produced, as well in supixjrt of the
charge as in behalf of the prisoner, and having thoroughly considered their evidence,
do unanimously resolve tliat it appears thereby that Thomas Mathews Esq., by divers
breaches of duty, was a principal cause of the miscarriage of his Majesty's fleet in the
Mediterranean in the month of February 1744, and that he falls under the 14th Article
of an Act of the 13th of Charles II., for establishing articles and orders for the better
government of his Majesty's Navy, sliips of war and forces by sea : and the court do
unanimously think fit to adjudge the said Thomas Mathews to be cashiered and
rendered incapable of any employ in his Majesty's service."
There is no question that, from a purely legal point of view,
Mathews deserved his punishment, but it is equally undoubted that
Lestock's conduct throughout was really far more reprehensible
than that of the superior officer. Mathews blundered, but his
intentions were good. Lestock clung tightly to the dead letter of
his duty ; but his intentions were contemptible, for, in effect, he said
to himself, " My superior is making a mess of this affair. I will
stick fast to my instructions and let him, and even the fleet and
country, go to ruin before I will strike a blow to help him. I shall
then be safe, and he, whom I happen to regard as my private enemy,
will pay the penalty." '
' The minutes of these courts-martial are enormously voluminous, and the
pamphlets called forth by the action off Toulon are extremely numerous. See
especially : ' A Partic. Account of the late Action ... by an officer in the Fleet,' 8vo,
1744 ; ' Captain Gascoigne's Answer,' etc., 8vo, 1746 ; ' Admiral Mathews's Hemarks
on the Evidence,' etc. ; ' Defence made by J. Ambrose,' etc., 8vo, 1745 ; ' Case of
Captain G. Burrish,' etc., Svo, 1747 ; ' A Narrative of the Proceedings of H.M. Fleet,'
etc., Svo, 1745 ; ' Vice-Admiral L — st — k's Account,' etc., 1745 ; ' Yice-Admiral
Lestock's Piecapitulation,' etc., 1745.
1744.] BALCIIEN'S J, A ST SEnVJ(JI<:. 107
Mathews, after tho fi^'ht oil' 'I'oiildii, liiul mlittod at Port Malioii,
and had then detached Captain UoWcrt Lonj,', with a small division,
to cruise off the Itahan coast and to intercept supplies for the
Spanish army there. Mathews himself put to sea as soon as
possible, and on June 14th, 1744, drove ashore and destroyed a
number of French transports near Marseilles. In fact he and his
cruisers were very active until his return to England in September.
His successor. Vice- Admiral Wilham Eowley, had many objects
which he was compelled to keep in view. He had to guard Italy
from the French and Spaniards, coming by way of the sea ; he had
to observe a French squadron from Brest, which lay at Cadiz ; lie
had to watch a French fleet at Toulon ; he had to keep his eye on the
Spanish squadron at Cartagena ; above all, he had to protect British
trade. At that time Admiral de Torres was expected in Spain with
a valuable convoy of treasure ships from Havana ; and on the other
hand, as has been mentioned, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (1) had
gone southward with a convoy bound for Lisbon and Gibraltar.
The French and Spaniards, anxious to facilitate the safe arrival
of de Torres, and, if possible, to intercept Hardy, arranged that the
Toulon squadron should put to sea, and join with the Spanish at
Cartagena, and with the French at Cadiz. Admiral Gabaret,
therefore, left Toulon on September '20tli with sixteen sail of the
line and four frigates. Bowley, who was then at Minorca, with
only a part of his forces, did not hear of this till October 7th. He
at once put to sea in chase ; and, as soon as he realised that the
enemy's plan involved an attempt upon a division of Hardy's convoy,
which had reached Gibraltar, Rowley made for Spain. Although
he ultimately found the merchantmen safely under the liock, he
thereby managed to miss the enemy.
Hardy had sailed in April 1744, and, having sent his main convoy
into the Tagus, whence it was to proceed by divisions to points
further south, he returned, and re-anchored at St. Helen's on
May 20th. But scarcely had he quitted Lisbon when the transports
and store-ships, which he had left there, were blockaded in the
river by the French squadron, under M. de Kochambeau, from
Brest. As the stores were much needed by the Mediterranean fleet,
Admiral Sir John Balchen, with his flag in the Victory, and with
a considerable force, was detached from the Channel to relieve the
blockade. He sailed on July 28th, made several j)rizes, compelled
de Eochamheau to return to Cadiz, and then escorted to Gibraltar
108 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17(i2. [1744.
that part oi' the convoy which was siibsequeiitiy found there by
Rowley.
Balchen returned; Init on October 3rd his command was over-
taken by a violent storm and was dispersed. Several ships were
much damaged and were at times in great danger ; but all of them,
except the Victory, safely reached Plymouth on October 10th.
The Victory, which was at that time considered the finest ship in
the world, had become separated from her consorts on October 4th,
and was never again seen. It is supposed that she struck on the
ridge of rocks called the Caskets, near the island of Alderney, seeing
that on the night l)etween the 4th and 5th of October the booming
of guns was heard, both by the people in charge of the Casket Light
and by the inhabitants of Alderney. The wind, however, was so
strong that no boat could venture in the direction whence the
sounds proceeded. The Victory's crew, including her Admiral,' her
Captain, Samuel Faulknor," her officers, and about fifty young
gentlemen volunteers, amounted to iipwards of one thousand souls,
all of whom perished. The loss of the ship was at that time
imputed to some defects in her construction, but it is probable that
this really had nothing to do with it, and that the disaster must
be attributed solely to the storm and thick weather which prevailed
at the time.
Owing to the situation of affairs with France, a small squadron
of four ships, imder Commodore Curtis Barnet, sent at the request
of the directors of the East India Company to the East Indies, had
sailed on May 5th, 1744, from Spithead. In January following,
after having taken measures to intercept home-coming French ships
from China, and after having disguised his own vessel, the Deptford,
60, Captain John Philhpson, and the Preston, 50, Captain the Earl
of Northesk (1), Barnet was so fortunate as to take in the Strait of
Banca the French Indiamen Dauphin, Herculr, and Jason, each of
30 guns.
The Commodore had not long left England when the successful
return of Commodore Anson suggested to the British Ministry that
it might be easy to capture the next treasure-ships bound from
Acapulco to Manilla ; and a despatch to that effect was sent to
Barnet by the Lively, 20, Captain Elliot Elhot. But the activity
' Sir John Balclien was then in his seventy-sixth year.
^ A captain of 1736, and a member of one of the most distinguished of British
naval families.
17-J4.] THE FltENCII IN NOIITII AMKRU'A. 109
and Uiroatcuiu^' attitude oi' tlio I'^rench in India prevented tlie
scheme from being carried out ; and, after his squadion had taken
a few other French ships, Barnet went to Madras and confined
himself mainly to observing and harassing the enemy in the Bay
of Bengal.
Vice-Adniiral Thomas Davers was sent with reinforcements to
Jamaica to relieve Sir Chaloner Ogle in 1744 ; but the French and
Spaniards were so strong on that station, and so many battleships
were carried home with him by Ogle, that Davers had to restrict
himself to the defensive. His cruisers, however, made several prizes
and the French failed in their only important enterprise, an attack
on Anguilla.
The war which broke out in 1744 was destined to have an
important influence on the fate of the British and French empires
in North America. At first the French there were very active, and
the British were extremely indifferent to their own interests. In
consequence of this, the French territories, which had been handed
over to Great Britain by the Treaty of Utrecht, were neglected and
were badly affected to the new government. They were, indeed, full
of active French sympathisers. The natural outcome was a scheme,
hatched by the French, to take advantage of the dissatisfaction,
and to deprive Great Britain of part at least of her new possessions.
M. de Quenel, who was then Governor of Cape Breton, fitted out
a small armament from Louisbourg and put it under the command
of Captain Duvivier. The native Indians gave, or at least promised
to give him some assistance. The armament made first for Canso,
where the French arrived on May 11th. They were joined by
two hundred Indians, and by many disaffected inhabitants. The
place was held by a company of the 40th Regiment, but, as it was
indefensible, it presently surrendered. The French demolished
such fortifications as existed, and set the place on fire. M. Duvivier,
who, in the meantime, had been reinforced by five hundred Indians,
proceeded with all his forces to Annapolis Eoyal. This important
position, like Canso, was in a very neglected state ; I)ut it was saved
by the activity and patriotism of the New Englanders.
Governor Shirley and the Assembly of Massachusetts, well
knowing the consequence of Nova Scotia to Great Britain, en-
couraged the raising in New England of a Iwdy of volunteers,
which, promptly dispatched to Annapolis, arrived before the French
made their appearance. When, therefore, M. Duvivier, who landed
110 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1745.
on June •2nd, smainoned the town, lie was informed that it would
1)0 defended to the last exti'emity ; and, although he made some
preparations for an assault, the strength of the defenders so deeply
impressed him that he finally returned to Louisbourg without
attempting anything further.
This activity of the French suggested to the Governor and
Assembly of New England a project for the conquest of Louisbourg,
which was then the chief French base in North America. A re-
quest was made to the home Government to the effect that, as the
necessary naval forces could be sent more quickly from the West
Indies than from England, Commodore Peter Warren might be
detached from the former station to co-operate with a colonial
expedition. To this the Government agreed, and orders were issued
accordingly. The Assembly of Massachusetts raised £27,000 for the
service. Troops were collected and confided to the command of
Mr. WiUiam Pepperel, of Kittery, Maine ; and, though no fewer
than 38-50 volunteers were assembled and sufficient transports and
stores for their accommodation were provided, all was done vpith so
great secrecy that the enemy seems to have suspected nothing. But
as this expedition did not sail till 17-4o, the histor}^ of its proceedings
must be for the present deferred.
While Great Britain was fully occupied with her foreign foes she
had to contend wath not less dangerous enemies at home, for France
in 1745, at a time when the greater part of the British army was on
the Continent, engaged in supporting the schemes of the House of
Austria, suddenly transported the Young Pretender to Scotland.
France did not believe that Prince Charles Edward would be
successful, nor did she ever mean to assist him very actively ; but
she realised that he might cause a most useful diversion. With a
slender retinue the Prince embarked at St. Nazaire on board a small
vessel, the Dentelle, which was lent him by a Mr. Walsh, who was
a merchant of Nantes but was of Irish extraction. He had arms for
about 2000 men and about £2000 in money, and he sailed on
July 7th. When off BeUe Isle he was joined by the Elisabeth, 64,
which had orders to escort Prince Charles Edward round Ireland to
the Hebrides. On July 9th, in lat. 47^ .57' N., the little expedition
was discovered by the Lion, 58, Captain Piercy Brett (1), which
immediately gave chase. At 5 o'clock the Lion ran alongside and
poured a broadside into the Elisabeth at short range. The two vessels
continued warmly engaged until 10 o'clock, when the Lion had
1745.] i''i!jyaj<: and tuk yovnq phetendf.r. Ill
suffered so severely in lier rigging tli:it slie was incapiil)ie of milking
sail. The Elisahetli, on the contrary, had suffered chiefly in her
luiU; and, although it is reported that several of her gun-ports were
knocked into one, she was able to get away. The smaller vessel at
the beginning of the action had endeavoured to assist her consort,
but had soon been beaten off by the Lion's stern-chasers; and,
when she saw that the Elisabeth had failed of success, she crowded
sail and made her escape. The Lion, whose complement was 440
men, lost 55 killed and 107 wounded, of whom seven ultimately
died. The French lost 65 killed and 186 dangerously wounded.
Prince Charles pursued his voyage and reached the coast of
Lochaber at the end of July. The Young Pretender, on landing,
was dissuaded by his best friends from pursuing his adventure ; but
he persisted, and they then gave way and joined him. For a time
he had some success, but he was too fond of pleasure to act with the
necessary energy, and presently the British Government began to
recover from its first amazement. A regular plan of defence was
elaborated. Admiral Edward Vernon (1),' with a squadron, was sent
' It shovild liere be inentioued that Vernon's ultimate disgrace arose out of this
appoiutmeut of his to the command in the Downs. He had with him but very few
ships, and in a letter of November 16th, 1745, to the Earl of Sandwich, he said : " It
must have made an odd appearance in the Bye of the World to have seen two Tlag-
Officers lye so long in the Downs with but one forty-gun ship lo form a line of battle
with." This paucity of command, condiined with the fact that he had no commission
as a ()ommandcr-in-Chief, was the origin of liis discontent. He was also irritated by
the conduct of the Admiralty which, in the same letter, he stigmatises in rather strong
language. Things came to a head when, on December 1st, Vernon wrote to the
Admirali}': "I have read, with great surprise, the long paragraph in j'our letter
informing me their Lordships don't approve of my having appointed a Gvmner to the
Poole when the necessity of the Service required it, and his Matie's Service must have
suffered for the want of it; and acquainting me, it is their Lordships' directions I
should withdraw the Warrants that I gave to them for his Majesty's Service. I must
say with concern, in answer to it, that I did not expect to have been treated in such a
contemptuous manner, and that 1 can hardly conceive it to be their directions till I see
it from under their hands in an Order for me to do it, and shall now entreat the favour
of their Lordships that, if they think it deserves an Order, they will please to direct it
to my Successor to put in Execution, as I must, in sucli case, intreat the favour of
their Lordships to procure me His Majesty's leave to quit a Command I have long
thought too contemptibly treated in regard to the rank I hold for His Majesty's honour
and service, and I should rather chuse to serve His Majesty in the capacity of a private
man in the Militia, than to permit the rank I hold in His Majesty's Service to be treated
w'ith contempt, which I conceive to be neither for our Royal Master's honour or Service.
A private Captain over two ships on any foreign service exercises the power of filling up
all vacancies mider him, and it is for his Matie's Service he should be empowered to do so.
When I attended the Regency, I was spoke to as a person of confidence that was tu have
had the Chief Command at home. Their Lordsliips' Orders of the 7th August seem'd to
design me for such, tho" that was speedily altered by those of tlie 14th, and I always
11- MA.JOlt OrEHATIONS, 17l4-17i;2. [1745.
to the Downs to watch the motions of the French at Dunquerque
and Calais, and he from time to time detached squadrons under the
command of Commodores Thomas Smith and Charles Knowles,
who intercepted many small vessels destined for the rebels. At the
su.spected there was something lujkiiig under tlic avoiding to call me Commander-in-
Chief anywhere, but only Admiral of tlie White, tho', at the same time, Letters had
]iassed thru" my hands, directed to Vice-Admiral Martin (whom, by my first orders, I
was lo take under my Command), stiling him Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's
Ships ill tlie Soundings. But your letter, Sir, has now explained the whole to me."
The controversy led the Admiralty to quote what it believed to be a ]>recedent for its
action, whereupon, in a letter of December (ith, Vernon wrote : "I am now come to the
last part of your letter in answer to mine of the first, and was ])leased to find you had
quoted the precedent of Sir John Nurris's case in the year 1740. Sir John Norris
thought it right to appoint two officers on a vacancy that happened under his command,
and, I dare answer for him, would not have thought it right ; but, as he judged it for
his Majesty's Service, and that his ]iredecessors had done it before him, and I don't
think anyone will say that Lord Orfurd, Sir George Kooke, Sir Clowdisley Shovell, Lord
Aylmer, Lord Berkeley, Lord Torrington, and Sir Charles Wager, have not done the
same. Sir John Norris thought it so much a right in him, that, when a pirson was
sent down by the Board to supersede a warrant granted by him, he sent the person
back with his warrant, and he was not received while he commanded, but when the
service was over, and he returned to town, their Lordships superseded him, so that his
acquiescence was necessity, not approbation. And I hope the haughty temper of the
noble Lord that presided at the Board at that time, will not be thought a fit precedent
to be followed by their Lordships." Again, on December 13th : " As to what I am so
politely acquainted with, that their Lordships have appointed a gunner to the Poole
after my liaving informed their Lordships that I had warranted the gunner of the
Sheeniess to that ship, I must acquaint you in answer — it was what I little expected — ■
and that I am determined to follow the example of Sir John Norris, and not permit that
indignity to be put on me while I remain in command here, but when he arrives, shall
civilly send him back again. That officer that don't pique himself on supporting his
own honour, and the dignity of the commis.sion he holds under his Majesty, may not
be the likeliest to defend the honour of his Prince and the Security of his Country
against the face of his enemies, and I will, therefore, never take the fatal step of
abandoning my own honour." And on December 14th : " A private Colonel in the
Army, who has no command but his regiment, shall be allowed to fill up most of the
vacancies for ensigns in his regiment, and the poor slighted admiral bearing his
Majesty's flag at main-topmast head, and in actual command, shall be denied the
filling up the low vacancy of a gunner ! " The only result of this condition of things
was Vernon's supersession, on December 26th. He was succeeded by Vice-Adm. Wm.
Martin (1). Immediately after his supersession, he engaged in controversial pamphlet-
eering, and, according to general belief, was responsible for two somewhat plain-spoken
pamphlets, respectively entitled, ' A Specimen of Naked Truth from a British Sailor,'
and 'Some Sensible Advice from a Common Sailor, to whom it might have Concerned,
for the Service of the Crown and Country.' He was summoned to the Admiralty to
deny the authorship of these productions, but as he did not choose to do so, he was
informed, on April 11th, 1746, that the King had been pleased to direct their Lordships
to strike his name from the list of flag-officers. Thus ended the service career of a
great and honourable officer, who owed his fall to his petulance and pugnacity. — Letter-
book in Author's Coll. ; the pamphlets above mentioned ; and ' Original Letters to an
Honest Sailor ' (published by Vernon after his dismissal from the service).
1745.] ESCAPE OF THE YOU NO PRETENDER. 113
Nore Captain the Hon. Edward Boscawen commanded : at Ply-
mouth, Captain Savage Mostyn. A further squadron cruised in the
Channel under Vice-Admiral William Martin (1) ; and Eear-Admiral
the Hon. John Byng went northward, and, by means of his cruisers,
greatly annoyed the rebels on the Scots coast.
The Young Pretender reached Derby, but then lost heart and
retreated to await reinforcements. In Scotland for a time he won
more successes, but the assured British command of the sea really
made his enterprise almost hopeless from the first ; for even his
private sympathisers in France could not aid liini with supplies,
such vessels as they dispatched being almost invariably snapped up
by British cruisers. Yet individual loyalty, after the disaster at
Culloden, saved the Prince from capture, in spite of the fact that
the Government had set a price of £'30,000 upon his head. He
reached the Hebrides, and, after suffering great distresses, was taken
on board a French privateer, the BcUoiic, on September '20th, 174(3.
This vessel had been sent on purpose from St. Malo by some of his
French friends. She reached Eoscoff, a small port in Brittany, on
September 29th, not, however, without having very narrowly
escaped captm'e by a British cruiser in the Channel. It is worth
mentioning that she was at least the third vessel which had been
sent to Scotland to rescue him. Two large French privateers, one
of 34 and the other of 32 guns, had anchored off the coast of
Lochaber in the previous April, with the object of picking up
fugitives from the rebel army. They had Ijeen there discovered by
Captain Thomas Noel of the Greijhound, 20 ; but, though he had
been joined by the Baltimore and Terror sloops, and had then
attacked them, they had succeeded in beating him off and in
carrying away several of the rebel chiefs.
The expedition against Louisbourg assembled at Boston, Massa-
chusetts, and the troops were there embarked, with all the necessary
stores, on board eighty transports. It was convoyed by eight
privateers of twenty guns, and ten small vessels ; and it sailed on
March 20th, 174.5, arriving at Canso on April 4th. This was
immediately after it had become known in New England that
Commodore Warren had received orders to co-operate in the iinder-
taking. The expedition reached Canso before the Commodore,
and Mr. Pepperel wisely employed his time in exercising and
drilling his troops. Meanwhile Mr. John Eons, master of the
Shirley Galley, the largest of the privateers, proceeded off the
VOL. III. I
114
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-17G2.
[1745.
harbour of Louisbourg to intercept supplies intended for the place.
That he did so was fortunate, for the French Government, hearing
of the projected attack, had hastily despatched the Benommce, 32,
one of its fastest frigates, commanded by the celebrated Kersaint, ^
with dispatches for Louisboiu-g. On April 18th, she sighted Eous's
blockading squadron, which very pluckily attacked her and forced
■^ w-
VICE-ADMIRAL SIR PETER WARBEX, K.B.
(From a lilhograph bij BitUei/ H: the ' Xaval Clironick; 1804.)
her .to fly, greatly disabled. In her flight she encountered some
transports, which, escorted by a privateer, were on their way to join
Pepperel. These she attacked, but the privateer defended them so
well that once more she made sail and got awaj'. The Renommee
had finally to retmn to France without having effected her purpose.
Commodore Warren's squadron from the West Indies reached
' A biographical note concerning this gall.mt officer will be found on pp. 219, 220 of
the present volume.
1745.] CAPTUIil': OF LOUISBOURG. 115
Canso on April 22nd and 23rd, and consisted of His Majesty's ships
Superb, 60, Captain Thomas Somers, bearing the Commodore's broad
pennant; Eltham, 40, Captain Philip Durell (1) ; Launceston, 40,
Captain Warwick Cahuady ; and Mermaid, 40, Captain James
Douglas (1). In the course of the subsequent operations, it was
joined by several other vessels. Warren lost no time in landing
and in conferring with Mr. Pepperel. Returning on board, he sailed
again, and effectually blockaded the harbour of Louisl)ourg. The
troops at Canso were re-embarked on April 2'Jth, conveyed to Gabarus
Bay, near Louisbourg, and landed on the morning of the 30th. The
French garrison was discontented and mutinous, and its officers
were tyrannical and corrupt, so that M. do Chambon, the Governor,
feared to attack the invaders after they had indicted one small check
upon him. Thus, the expedition had leisure to establish itself
ashore and to rapidly become disciplined and formidable. In the
meantime, the Renommee had returned to France with the news
of what was going on, whereupon the French Government hastily
despatched the Vigilante, 64, with stores for the threatened fortress.
She was, however, intercepted and captured by Warren's squadron
on May 19th. A general attack by land and sea upon Louisbourg
was imminent, when on June 28th the place surrendered. The
British lost during the operations only 101 killed, while the French
loss was 300.
AVith Louisbourg fell the whole of Cape Breton. The conquest
was of immense importance. It not only destroyed a nest of French
privateers, but it also relieved the British fishermen on the banks
of Newfoundland from much dangerous rivalry. Moreover, it had
a great moral effect upon the Indians throughout North America.
Those who had taken part in it were fittingly and liberally rewarded.
Warren was promoted to be Eear-Admiral of the Blue, Governor
Shirley, of Massachusetts, was made a colonel, and Mr. William
Pepperel, besides also being made a colonel, was created a baronet of
Great Britain. Nor were the sailors neglected. The Hlnrlcij GuUeij
was purchased by the Government, and added to the Navy as a
post ship ; and her late master, Mr. John Rous, was presented with
a post-captain's commission and appointed to her. Finally, the
Colonists were reimbursed by Parliament for all the expenses which
they had incurred in connection with the expedition.
The despatch of Vice-Admiral Thomas Davers with reinforce-
ments to the West Indies has already been mentioned. Upon
I 2
116 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1745.
the French Ministry hearing of it, it also sent thither a strong
reinforcement, under the ChevaHer de Caylus, who arrived at
Martinique on March '28th, 1745. Xo sooner was the British
Ministry advised of its departure, than it ordered Vice-Adiuiral
WiUiam Eowley, then in command in the Mediterranean, to detach
to the West Indies a considerable division under Vice-Adniiral
Isaac Townsend (2), who left Gibraltar on August 2nd, and arrived
off Martinique on October 3rd. He fell in, on October 31st, with a
squadron of shi];)s of war and store ships, destined to further
reinforce the French ; and, chasing it, ultimately took or destroyed
upwards of thirty out of about forty sail.
In the Mediterranean, Vice-Admiral William Bowley blockaded
the Spaniards in Cartagena, while Kear-Admiral Henry Medley
watched the coasts of Italy and prevented supplies from reaching
the Spanish Ai-my there. Commodore Henry Osbom observed the
French Brest squadron, which lay at Cadiz. When Genoa threw
in her lot with the House of Bourbon, Commodore Thomas Cooper
was detached to bombard the ports of that Eepublic, and he caused
several of them to suffer very severely. The difficulties of Genoa
induced the Corsicans to make an effort to throw off the Genoese
yoke and to seek British and Sardinian assistance ; whereupon
Commodore Cooper went to Corsica, and on November 17th, 1745,
anchored off Bastia. The place was bombarded until the 19th,
when the ships rehnquished the attack, and withdrew, Cooper
despairing of the arrival of the promised Corsican assistance. But
his action was a little ]5remature ; for one of the rebel chiefs, the
Marchese de Kivarole, had already arrived, and, just after the
disappearance of the British, threatened the town with such good
effect, that the Chevalier de Mari, the representative of Genoese
authority, finding the defences untenable in consequence of the
damage that had already been received by them from the British
squadron, carried off his garrison by sea. A little later Commodore
Cooper sent to Corsica Captain the Hon. George Townshend, who
discovered that the Genoese held only a few towns, and that the
island was in a fair way of falling into the hands of the patriots.
The success at Louisbourg directed attention to the importance
of British interests in North America, and in 1746 suggested fresh
undertakings in that quarter. An attack on Quebec was projected,
and it was proposed to utilise for the purpose the colonial troops,
which had done so well at Cape Breton in the previous year,
1746.] THE FRENCH IN NORTH AMERICA. 117
strengthening them of course by means of large detachments from
England. Preparations were made, and troops were assembled at
Portsmouth and even embarked ; but various causes detained the
fleet at Spithead until too late in the season, and the enterprise was,
for a time, abandoned. Kumours of the intentions of the Govern-
ment had, as was usual in those days, promptly reached the ears of
the French Ministry, which decided to retaliate for the threatened
British invasion of Canada by a descent upon Nova Scotia. In
pursuance of this determination a large force was sent across the
Atlantic under the Due d'Anville.
British public opinion had Ijeen much attracted l)y the Quebec
idea, and was greatly disgusted by the failure of the expedition to
sail. To pacify the people, it was hinted that the troops which
had been assembled were not to remain unemployed ; and, a
little later, as will be seen, they were directed upon the coast
of France.
The French fleet of eleven sail of the line and fifty-gun ships,
three frigates, three fireships and two bomb-vessels, under the Due
d'Anville, with transports and storeships containing 3500 troops,
sailed from Brest on June '2'2nd, 1746, and arrived off the coast of
Nova Scotia on September 10th. But on its passage it was much
damaged and weakened by a violent storm. Vice-Admiral Isaac
Townsend, who was then at Louisbourg, had with him an inferior
force, but had the advantage of assistance from New England, and
of a well fortified base. The sudden death of d'Anville depressed the
spirits of the French expedition, and although the enemy did land, he
soon decided not to prosecute the object for which he had crossed the
Atlantic. D'Anville's successor, M. Toiu'nel, a man of impetuous
temper, could not agree with the resolutions of the majority of his
officers ; and, considering that if he retreated he would be dis-
honoured, he solved his own difliculties by committing suicide, while
at the same time he complicated the confusion into which his un-
fortunate command had fallen. M. de La Jonquiere succeeded him ;
but by that time, owing to delay and neglect, the troops had been
almost exterminated by scurvy and by a small-pox epidemic. Some
succour was therefore sent to Quebec, and the rest of the expedition,
in a very bad case, returned to Europe. On the voyage several of
the vessels composing it were snapped up by British cruisers.
The troops which had been assembled at Portsmouth for the
undertaking against Quebec were, as has been said transported to
118 MAJOR OPEHAriONS, 1714-1702. [1746.
the coast of France. Commaud of thein had been given to Lieut. -
General the Hon. James St. Clair, chiefly for the reason that,
besides being an excellent officer, he had made a special study of
the military position in Canada. When the destination of the
expedition was altered, the command, perhaps unwisely, was not
changed. The fleet destined to convoy the army was -entrusted to
Admiral Bichard Lestock (B.) The idea of the Government was
that a descent upon the coast of Brittany might induce the French,
who were very powerful in Flanders, to detach part of the army
which was operating there under Marshal Saxe. But the affair
was wretchedly managed. The General had no special knowledge ;
the troops were unprepared for the service ; and no maps of the
country to be attacked were provided. St. Clair asked for a map of
Brittany, and the Government sent him, by express, a map of
Gascony. Nor had the coast been properly reconnoitred. It was
little known to any of the British naval officers of the time, and
the charts of those days were very indifferent.
Lestock detached Commodore Thomas Cotes to look in at Port
Louis and neighbouring places, and to find some convenient spot
for landing near Lorient. With the main body of the fleet he
himself sailed from St. Helen's on August .5th, but did not clear
the coast of England until September 14th, nor reach that of France
till September 19th, when Cotes rejoined him. A landing was in
time effected, and the troops began to advance upon Lorient ; but
the country was a close one, and greatly facilitated the guerilla
operations of the French. Lorient, nevertheless, appeared to be
disposed to treat ; and it would no doubt have surrendered to the
British commander if he had been inclined to deal leniently. Yet
as he would accept all or nothing, the place sturdily prepared to
defend itself. The siege was begun in a partial and ineffectual way ;
but so many necessary supplies were wanting that progress was
very slow, and, though the sailors from the fleet co-operated with
marvellous energy, the enterprise was at last concluded to be
impracticable and the troops were re-embarked, very sickly from
the consequences of exposure, on September 30th. At a council of
war the project of a landing in Quiberon Bay was discussed and
rejected, but on October 1st, Lestock received so favourable a report
from Captain Thomas Lake of the Exeter, of the anchorage there,
that he and General St. Clair decided, in spite of the resolutions of
the council of war, to proceed and there await reinforcements from
ITir..] LA JWURDONNAIS TO INDIA. 119
England, meanwhile harassing the enemy whenever possible. The
fleet sailed, and some troops were landed and works erected ; but,
after hesitation and paltering, the forces were re-embarked. Mean-
time the isles of Houat and Hoedic had been reduced and the
fortifications upon them destroyed. The troops were ultimately
sent under convoy to Ireland, and Lestock, with the bulk of the
fleet, returned to England. No glory was won, but the expedition
partially attained its original object, for orders were actually sent to
Marshal 8axe from Paris, directing him to despatch troops to
Brittany. These did not, however, reach him until he had so well
established his position in Flanders as to be well able to afford to
weaken himself.
At the time of the commencement of the active alliance between
the French and Spaniards, M. La Bourdonnais, governor of the Isle
of France, happened to be at Versailles. He was a most far-sighted
administrator and capable soldier, and, had his advice been followed,
the fate of India might have been very different from what it has
been. He advised his Government to send a strong squadron to the
Indian seas, so as to be ready for all eventualities. A squadron of
five sail of the line was accordingly collected, and command of it
was entrusted to La Bourdonnais himself. He was given great
powers over the officers of the French East India Company in
India ; and the Company became anxious concerning its rights and
privileges as soon as he had sailed. The directors persuaded the
French Ministry that hostihties in India were not likely, and that,
the representatives of the two countries there being exclusively
traders, it was unwise in the highest degree to provoke ill-will where
neutrality would, in all probability, be observed if no aggressive
measures were taken. The squadron was accordingly recalled ; but
La Bourdonnais himself proceeded, and, with the slender resources
he possessed, he assembled a motley squadron, which included only
one king's ship, the Achille, 70. With her and seven other vessels,
armed merchantmen, he sailed for the coast of Coromandel.
Commodore Curtis Barnet, who had gone to Madras in the
beginning of 1746, would have been a worthy opponent even for so
great a man as La Bourdonnais ; and he was preparing to take
active measures against the French, when, on April 29th, he died.
His successor, Commodore Edward Peyton, was apparently a less
energetic and capable officer. He was cruising between Fort St.
David and Negapatam when, on June '2.5th, he sighted the French
120
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17G'-'.
[1746.
squadron.' M. La Bourdounais, though conscious that his ships in
strength of aiinament and in discipHne were very inferior to the
British, decided to utilise the only superiority which he possessed,
the superiority in men, and to attempt to board. During the earher
part of the day there was little breeze ; and Peyton, who probably
grasped the idea of the French admiral, kept as near the wind
as possible, so that the two fleets were unable to come to close
action. Not until four in the afternoon did they begin to engage ;
and even then the firing was maintained at such a distance that
little damage was done to either side. Peyton might have an-
nihilated his foe had he ventured sufficiently close to take full
advantage of the stouter scantling of his ships, and of the heavier
guns which they carried. But he did not attack \\ith dash ; and at
dusk the action ceased, the British having lost fourteen men killed
and forty-six wounded, and the enemy twenty-seven killed and fifty-
three wounded. The Biitish vessel which suffered chiefly was the
Medway's Prize. On the other side, the Insula ire was so badly
mauled that, immediately after the action. La Bourdonnais had to
order her away to repair. Peyton's behaviour gave great umbrage
to the East India Company ; but no one ever brought any specific
charge against the commodore. Commodore Thomas Griffin (1)
afterwards superseded him, put him under arrest, and sent him
home ; but the matter went no further.
' Squadrons of Cojimoiiore Peytox and M. La Bourdoxnais ix
THE Actios of June 2.jtu, 17-iG.
Ships.
BHmsH.
Commanders.
Medway
Preston .
Winchester .
Harwich
Medway^ s Prize
Lively ,
60
50
50
50
40 i
20 ll
270
Commod. Edward Pevtou.
Cajit. Henr.v Ru.sewell.
„ George, Earl of Xortliesk.
„ Lord Thomas Bertie.
„ Philip Carteret (1).
Thomas Griffin (2), actg.
Nathaniel Stephens.,
acts.
.Ships.
Guns 1 o „
Achille
74
Due d: Orleans 56
Bourhon .
56
Neptune .
54
Phenix .
54
St. Louis .
44
Lys . .
40
Tnsulaire
30
60
26
36
34
34
30
34
28
282
Some French, accounts mention another armed vessel, the Renomiaee, 28, as ha\'ing
been with La Bourdonnais, in addition to the ships named above. The British official
account also mentions a ninth ship, name unknown, mounting, however, 20 guns only.
All tlie French ships, however, except the Achille, were merely improvised men-of-war,
and were, in that respect, greatly inferior to the British.
1746.] PEYTON'S INEFFICIENCY. 121
The activity of La Bourdonnais was hampered by the jealousy
of M. Dupleix, Governor in India for tiie French East India
Company. Dissensions continually arose owing to the natural
complications of authority ; and the naval commander could obtain
.scarcely any help from the civil one. La Bourdonnais, neverthe-
less, made shift to refit, and on July 24th sailed again from
Pondicherry and worked to the southward. On August 6th he
sighted the British squadron, which was returning from Trincomale,
where it had refitted. Peyton avoided action, and, after three days
of futile manoeuvres, made sail and disappeared. This conduct
encouraged La Bourdonnais to plan an attack upon Madras. He
was taken ill and had to remain at Pondicherry ; but his squadron
appeared before the place on August 15th ^ and bombarded it. The
guns, however, produced little effect upon the town ; nor did the
French succeed in an attempt to capture the Princess Mary, East
Indiaman, which lay in the road.
One of the objects of the British squadron in the East Indies
was of course to be a protection to British settlements and British
trade; yet it did not proceed to the succoiir of Madras. Peyton,
lying in Pulicat Eoad, thirty miles to the northward, heard, on
August 2.5th, of what had happened in the previous week ; but,
instead of going to the rescue of the threatened town, he went
to Bengal, his excuse being that the Medway's Prize was very leaky
and needed repairs. La Bourdonnais was thus induced to proceed.
On September 3rd his squadron disembarked troops, and on the
7th a bombardment of Madras by land and sea was begun. On
the 10th the place capitulated, upon the understanding that it
should subsequently be ransomed. On September 27th, while still
before Madras, La Bourdonnais was reinforced by three ships of
the line from Europe, the Centaure, 74, Mars, 56, and Brillant, 50.
His operations were still hampered by the interference of Dupleix ;
but, on October 1st, he was able to send ofJ two of his vessels with
booty, etc., to Pondicherry. It was fortunate that he did so, for
otherwise he would probably have lost almost all his squadron. On
the night of October 2nd there was a great storm ; and, in the course
of it, the Due d'OrJeans, Phenix, and Lys foundered, and about
twelve hundred men were lost with them. Two prizes, the Mermaid
and the Advice, shared the same fate, and the flagship, AchiUe, and
' An account issued by the Hon. E. I. C. says that the enemy appeared at Madras
on August 10th.
122 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1746.
two other vessels were dismasted. In fact, every craft in the road-
stead either sank or suffered most severely.
In regard to the promised ransom of the town, La Bourdonnais
behaved throughout like a man of honour ; but Dupleix seems
never to have intended that the conditio as should be carried out ;
and when La Bourdonnais had gone to Mauritius, on his way home
to France, Dupleix, to the astonishment of many even of his own
officers, caused the treaty to be declared void. The arrival of
Commodore Thomas Griffin (1) fi'om England soon afterwards, com-
pelled the French to desist from a projected attack on Fort St.
David, and to withdraw nearly all their forces to Pondicherrj-.
On the Leeward Islands' station, Vice-Admiral Isaac Townsend
commanded at the beginning of 1746 ; but very early in the year
he was ordered to proceed with the greater part of his squadron
to Louisbourg. He sailed from St. Kitt's in Januarj', and, on his
way, met with so violent a storm that all his ships except two,
the Princesa and Ipswich, were obliged to return, and those two,
ten-ibly disabled, had to bear away for England. The Ipswich,
which reached Pljrmouth on April '22nd, was only saved by a
most In'illiant display of seamanship, after her crew had suffered
great hardships.
When Vice-Admiral Townsend had refitted, he again sailed for
Louisbourg, leaving Commodore the Hon. Fitzroy Henry Lee in
command in the West Indies. Lee was ultimately superseded by
Commodore the Hon. Edward Legge. Both Lee and Legge were
uufortmaate in their attempts to intercept French convoys, several
of which, under the care of M. de Conflans, escaped them. On
one occasion, as will be seen, Conflans would have come off badly
but for the cowardice of Commodore Cornehus Mitchell. On
another occasion, he fell in \\ith the British Leeward Islands'
convoy, escorted by the Severn, 50, Captain William Lisle, and
the Woolwich, 50, Captain Joseph Lingen. Lisle, who was the
senior officer, ordered the convoy to disperse and each vessel to
shift for herself. Conflans, in the Terrible, 74, with another ship
of the hne, chased him, and after three hours' action, obhged the
Severn to strike ; but the Woolwich got away, and none of the
convoy were taken. Lisle's action was considered so creditable
that, after his exchange, he was at once given the command of
a larger ship, the Vigilant, 64.
At Jamaica, Vice-Admiral Davers commanded until his death ;
174f;.] MITCHELL'S INEFFICIENCY. 123
but, being very ill \\illi gout, had to depute Captain Cornelius
Mitchell to go in search of M. do Conflaus, who was expected with
a convoy of ninety merchantmen at Cape Fran<,'ois. Mitchell had
four sail of the line, a frigate, and a sloop ^; Conflans had l)ut four
vessels in all"; and Mitchell's superiority, though small, should,
perhaps, have sufficed. Mitchell sighted the convoy on August 8rd
off Cape St. Nicolas ; but, as promptly as possible, he ordered his
ships to close, and held a council of war. It was thereupon resolved
to wait till daylight before bearing down upon the enemy ; but, on
the following morning, Mitchell was so backward in bringing on
an engagement, in spite of the evident willingness of Conflans, that
at 4 P.M. the squadrons had not exchanged a shot. At that hour
everything was in his favour, and the breeze was fair ; but he
hauled to the wind and shortened sail. The enemy, after he had
recovered from his astonishment, gave chase ; and his headmost
ship overhaiiled the Lenox, 64, at about 8 p.m., and fought her,
without result, for an hour and a half. Mitchell that night ordered
his ships to proceed without lights, and laid his course for Jamaica,
where, on October 16th, owing to the death of A^ice-Admiral Davers,
the command devolved upon hnu. His behaviour having been
represented to the Admiralty, he was siiperseded, and was tried
at Jamaica by court-martial on January '28th following. The court
convicted him of cowardice and neglect of duty ; but less severe
than many of the naval courts of that period, sentenced him only
to be mulcted of five years' pay, adjudging him at the same time
to be incapable of again serving in the Navy.
In the Mediterranean during 1746 a large fleet, under Vice-
Admiral Henry Medley and Eear-Admiral the Hon. John Byng,
offered much assistance to the Austrians and their allies, and co-
operated with success with the army which, under General Browne,
crossed the Var on December 1st. A detachment of small vessels
under Captain Hugh Forbes, of the Phceuix, 20, and Commander
William Martin (2), of the Terrible, 6, lent valuable aid to the
troops. Medley also blockaded Antibes, assisted in the capture of
Ste. Marguerite, and lent help to the insurgents in Corsica.
The year 1747 was upon the whole very successful for Great
Straffurd, 60, Capt. Cornelius Mitchell ; Lenox, 64, Capt. Peter Lawrence ;
Plymouth, 60, Capt. Digby Dent (2) ; Worcester, 60, Capt. Thomas Andrews (2) ;
Milford, 44, Capt. Edward Rich ; and Drake, 14, Commander Edward Clark (1).
- Terrible, 74; Niptune, 74; Alcion, 50; and Oloire, 40.
124 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-1762. [l7-!7.
Britain, although it witnessed some check to the cause of Britain's
aUies in the Mediterranean. The Austrians were obliged, by
Marshal Belleisle, to recross thje Var; and the Genoese succeeded
in defeating the patriots in Corsica, and in driving them to the
interior of the island. On the other hand, Vice-Admiral Medlej^
not only maintained the blockade of Cartagena, but also intercepted
a French expedition from Toulon to Genoa. Medley died in Vado
Bay on August 5th, when Eear-Admiral the Hon. John Byng
succeeded to the command.
In the East Indies, Bear-Admiral Thomas Griffin kept M.
Dupleix on the defensive, and, at Madras, took and burnt the
Nej^tune, 34, which had been left there by M. La Bom-donnais.
At Jamaica, Captain Digby Dent (2) commanded until the amval of
Eear-Admiral Charles Knowles. On the Leeward Islands' station,
Commodore the Hon. Edward Legge commanded until his death
on September 9th, 1747, and was succeeded by Captain George
Pocock. On each of these stations the cruisers were successful as
well as active, but all the great naval transactions of the year
happened on the Atlantic coasts of Europe.
France fitted out two considerable squadrons ; one under the
Marquis de La Jonquiere, intended for the recoveiy of Cape Breton,
and the other under M. Grou de St. Georges, of the French East
India Company's service, for co-operation in the conquest of British
settlements on the coast of Coromandel. It was arranged that, in
order the more surely to escape the dangers presented by British
naval superiority in the home seas, the two squadrons should depart
from France together and proceed for some distance in company.
The projects of the French were known in England ; and a
squadron, under Vice-Admiral George Anson and Eear-Admiral Peter
Warren, was specially fitted out to checkmate them. The forces
which were ultimately opposed one to the other are set forth in the
note^ (p. 12.5). The French had with them a convoj', which brought
the total number of their sail up to thirty-eight. M. de St. Georges
left Groix in March, but, after suffering some losses from British
cruisers and from very bad weather, had to put into the road of
Isle d'Aix. La Jonquiere there joined him and the two finally sailed
on April 29th. Anson and "Warren had left England on April 9th
and had proceeded off Cape Finisterre, where, on May 3rd, the Cape
bearing S.E., distant twent.v-foin leagues, they sighted the French.
La Jonquiere thereupon caused twelve of his best ships to shorten
1747.]
ANSON AND HE LA JONQUlkUE.
125
sail and form a line of hattU; ahead, while the rest stretched to the
westward and crowded every possible stitch of canvas. Anson also
made signal for a line of battle, believing apparently that he was in
the presence of a more fonnidable squadron than was really before
him ; but, at Warren's instance, he substituted the signal for a
general chase. La Jonquiere was but ill-supported. Several of the
French East India ships, especially the Vigilant and Modeste, and
later the Thetis and ApoUun, looked to nothing but the idea of saving
themselves. It is useless to examine the tactical details of an action
of this kind. Suffice to say, that, after a running fight lasting from
4 to 7 P.M., in which several of the French captains behaved with
great courage and others conducted themselves with equal cowardice,
all the ships which had remained in the French line struck. At
7 P.M. Anson brought to, and detached the Monmouth, Yarmouth
and Nottingham in pursuit of the convoy, which then bore W. by
S.W., distant about five leagues, and which had been followed and
observed during the action by the Falcon. These ships captured the
Vigilant, the Modeste and the Dartmouth, once a British privateer,
together with six of the convoy. Night saved the rest.
' Action between Vice-Admiral Anson and M. de La Jonquieke,
May 3rd, 1747.
The account of the action, as well as the following list, is based upon the British and
French dispatches, and especially upon the papers of La Jonquiere in the Archives
de la Marine, and upon the rejiort of La Galernerie.
Hiarisn.
Fj.lCN
11.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
iVice-Admiral George
Diantant- . . .
30
Capt. de Hocquart.
Prince Gmrge . .
90
} Anson.
Philibert'S . .
30
„ Larr.
(Oapt. John Bentley.
Vigilant ■'2. . .
20
„ Vauueulon.
1 Rear- Admiral Peter
{ Warren.
Chimene 3 . . .
30
.'
Devonshire'^ . .
66
nuUs "- (en fli'it") .
52
„ Macarty.
leapt. Temple West.
Jason- ....
50
„ Beccait.
Namur^. . . .
74
f „ Hon. Edward Bos-
t cawen.
Serieux - . . .
64
( M. de La Jonquiere, Capt,
( d'Aubigny.
M&nmoilth .
64
,, Henry Harrison.
Invincible- . . .
V4
Capt. Grou de St. Georges.
Prince Prederiik .
64
„ Harry Nnrris.
Apollon'3 . . .
30
„ No81.
Tarmouth l
64
„ Piercy Brett (1).
Thetis^' . . .
22
„ Massou.
Princess Louisa .
60
,, Charles Watson.
Modeste^' . . .
IS
„ Thiercelin.
Nottingham . .
60
,, Philip de .^umarez.
Gloirc^ ....
40
,, de Saliez.
Defiance I . . .
611
,, IhuniasGrenville.
Pembroke^ . . .
60
,, Thomas Fincher.
Emeraude* . . .
40
f ,, de la Jonquiere de
I TafTauel.
Windsor I . . .
60
„ TlioniasHanway.
Centurion l . . .
50
,. Peter Denis.
J Dartmouth-* . .
18
?
Falkland . . .
50
( „ Bloomfleld Barra-
( dell.
/Iristoli . . .
50
; „ Hon. William
( Montagii.
Ambuscade . . .
40
,, John Montagu.
1-alcon ....
10
/Commander Richard
I Gwynn.
Vulcan (flreship) .
8
(Commander William
1, Pettigrew.
1 I'bese ships only were engageil.
- Taken.
3 These ships beloDged to the Freuch East India Company.
4 With the convoy but not in line of battle.
126 MAJUn OFERATIoys, 17U-17(i'_>. [1747.
The battle, considering its nature, was a costly one. The French
lost about 700 killed and wounded, and the British, .520. Among the
French officers killed was Captain de Sahez, and among those
wounded were La Jouquiere himself and d'Aubiguy, his flag captain.
On the British side Captain Thomas Grenville, of the Defiance,
was killed, and Captain Boscaweu, of the Namtir, wounded. The
victors found specie to the value of i;800,000 on board the prizes.
For this service Anson was created a peer, and Warren, a K.B. All
the men-of-war taken, and also the East Indiaman Thetis, were
purchased into the Koyal Navy. The name of the Serieux was
changed to Intrepid, and that of the Diamant to Isis.
The victory was valuable if not exactly brilliant. Commenting
upon it, and upon the other great action of the year. Captain Mahan
says :
"Two encounters between Englisli and French .squadrons happened during the year
1747, completing the destruction of the French fighting navy. In both cases the
EngHsh were decidedly su]ierior, and though there was given opjrartunity for some
brilliant fighting by particular captains, and for the displa}- of heroic endurance on the
jiart of the French, greatly outnumbered, but resisting to the last, only one tactical
lesson is afforded. This lesson is that, when the enemy, either as the result of battle,
(.jr from original inequality, is greatly inferior in force, obliged to fly without standing
on the order of his flying, the regard otherwise due to order must be, in a measure at
least, dismissed, and a general chase ordered." . ..." In both cases, the signal was
made for a general chase, and the action which resulted was a mi'Ue. There was no
opportunity for anything else; the one thing necessary was to overtake the running
enemy, and that could only certainly be done by letting the fastest or best-situated
ships get ahead, sure that the speed of the fattest pursuers is better than that of the
slowest of the imrsued, and that, therefore, either the latter must be abandoned, or the
whole force brought to bay."
It would appear that in 1747 the Admiralty had begun to be
better served by its intelligence officers than it had been earlier in
the war ; and it is not the least merit of the administration that, on
several important occasions, it was able to bring superior forces to
bear upon its enemies. Anson's success was one result of this fore-
knowledge ; the success of Captain Thomas Fox, to be noted in the
next chapter, was another ; that of Kear-Admiral Edward Hawke,
now to be recounted, was a third.
Information was received in England that France w^as collecting
in Basque Eoad a huge convoy for the West Indies, and that a
squadron of men-of-war had sailed from Brest to pick it up and
escort it to its destination. Thereupon a squadron, under Hawke,
was despatched from Plymouth to intercept it. It left Plymouth
Sound on August 9th. The French left Isle d'Aix on October 6th ;
1747.]
HAWKE AND DE VETENDUERE.
127
and, on October 14tb at 7 a.m., were sighted in lat. 47" 49' N. and
long. 1° 2' W., off Finisterre. Hawiie made signal to chase, but at
8 A.M., seeing the enemy's ships to be very numerous, many of tliem
being large, he, as a measure of prudence, formed a line of battle
OOMMEMUKATIVE MEU.\L OF ANSON's VICTUHY, 1|47, AN]l OF HIS
CIRCDMNAVIGATION OF THE WORLD, 1740-44.
(From an vriijiintl kinilbj lent hij II.S.H. Caiitnin Pr'uiee Luui.i uf BiiUeiiierg, R.X.)
ahead.' There were in fact no fewer than 252 merchantmen with
the French squadron. Commodore de I'Etenduere, who at first
mistook the British for part of his own convoy, no sooner discovered
his mistake than he ordered the merchantmen to make the best of
their way under the care of the Coiiteiif, 64, and himself also formed
a line of battle ahead. These manreuvres informed Hawke as to
' Action between Eeak-Aumiral Hawke and M. de i/Etenduere,
October 14Tir, 1747.
Ships.
Devonshire .
K'-nt . . .
Edinbinyh .
Yaniiontk .
Mmviitoath .
Princess Louisa
Windsor.
Lion .
Tilhnrij .
jyottintfkam
Jh'Jiance
Eagle . ,
Gloucester .
Portland
I Guns.
Commauders.
60
liu
6U
so
50
{Rear-Admiral Edward
Hanke.
Capt. John Moore (1).
,, Thomas Fox.
,, '1'bitiii.is Cotes.
,. I 'balit'^ Saunders.
,, H'lity Ilanisou.
„ I'liaiie^ ^\'at>ou.
,, Thomas Hallway.
„ Atthiir Soitl.
,, Kol:iertHarlaud(2).
,. PhiHp df Sauniarez.
„ Johu iJeutley.
i ,, George Brydges
\ Rodney.
„ Philii) ImreU(l).
,, Charles Stevens.
and some frigates.
Fkench.
Ships.
Guns.
Comniuuilers.
pi. des Herbiers de
Timnant. . . .
80
1 rEtemiuere, Oief
) d'Escadre.
(Capt. DucbaBFault.
Intn'pide . . .
74
,, de Yaudieuil.
TridentK . - .
64
„ d'Arablimont.
Terrible i , . .
(4
„ du Guay.
Monarqut i . . .
74
,, de La iJedovere.
Stvin-n 1 . . . .
56
,, du llouvet.
Fougueux i . . .
64
„ de Vig;uault.
Neptune i . . .
74
„ de Fromeuiieres.
Castor'i ....
26
„ d'Ossonviile.
i'ontenfi . . .
1)4
- AVith the couvoy.
128 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1747.
the nature of the force before him, and induced him to haul down
the signal for the line and to again make that for a general chase,
following it half-an-hour later with the signal to engage. A running
fight resulted. The French behaved with great spirit but were over-
powered by sheer weight of numbers. They had in line but eight
ships and of these six were taken. Towards night the Intrepide and
Tonnant, finding that the day was lost, set all sail with a view
to escaping. Their intention was perceived by the Yarmouth,
Nottingham and Eagle, which, at the instance of Captain Saunders
of the Yarmouth, and on their own responsibility, followed. These
ships engaged the fugitives for an hour, in the course of which
Captain Saumarez ' of the Nottingham fell. The two French ships,
.though very badly damaged, succeeded in getting into Brest. At
dark Hawke brought his ships to ; and in the morning, at a council
of war, it was decided, in view of the mauled condition of the British
squadron, not to pursue the convoy. The Weazel, sloop, was,
however, despatched to the West Indies, to apprise Commodore
Pocock of the approach of the French ; and thanks to this precaution,
many of their ships were ultimately taken. -
The French loss in the action was about 800 killed and w^ounded,
among the former being Captain de Fromentieres of the Neptune.
The British lost 154 killed, including Captain Saumarez, and 558
wounded. As nearly all the vessels captured had been dismasted,
it took some time to refit them ; but on October 31st, Hawke had
the satisfaction of carrying them and his squadron into Portsmouth.
A little later he was made a K.B. for his services. All the prizes,
except the Neptune, were purchased into the Eoyal Navy.
Hawke in his despatch had occasion to complain of Captain
Thomas Fox of the Kent, who, in the action, when ordered by
signal to make sail ahead after the Tonnant and to engage her, had
failed to obey. Captain Fox was consequently tried by court-martial
at Portsmouth on November '25th upon the charge that " he did not
come properly into the fight, nor do his utmost to distress and
damage the enemy, nor assist his Majesty's ships which did."
Fox's personal courage was not impeached ; and there is no doubt
' Philip Saumarez, or de Saumarez. Born, 1710. Commander, 1741. Captain,
1743. Killed, as above, October 14th, 1747. He had served vnth. Anson in his voyage
round the world, and had distinguished himself greatly, when already commanding
the Nottinyhaiii, by his capture of the Mars, 64, in 1746. A monument to him is in
Westminster Abbey.
'^ See next chapter.
1747.] CRITICISM OF THE ACTION. 129
that his faihire to obey orders was chiefly due to the faulty system
of signals then in use. Both his first lieutenant and his master
mistook the signal for close action for one to proceed to the assist-
ance of the Admiral ; and he acted accordingly. The trial lasted
until December 'i'ind, when the court came to the conclusion that
" he had been guilty of backing his mizen-top-sail and leaving the
Tonnant, contrary to the 10th and 11th Articles of War." He was
acquitted of cowardice, but, because he had paid too much regard to
the advice of his officers, contrary to his own better judgment, he was
sentenced to be dismissed from the command of the Kent. Captain
Fox, whose post-captain's commission dated from August 6th, 1737,
and who always had been a good officer, was never again employed,
but was superannuated as a Kear-Admiral in 1749. He died
in 1768.
Criticising the battle. Captain Mahan ' says :
" If . . . Hawke showed in liis attack the judgment and dash which always
distinguished that remarkable officer, it may be claimed for Commodore I'Etenduere that
fortune, in assigning him the glorious disadvantage of numbers, gave liim also the
leading part in the drama, and that he failed nobly."
Troude, the French naval critic, remarks ' of de TEtenduere that :
"he defended his convoy as on shore a position is defended, when the aim is to save
an army corps, or to assure an evolution. He gave himself to be crushed. After an
action that lasted from midday to 8 p.m., the convoy was saved, thanks to the obstinacy
of the defence, and 250 ships were secured to their owners by the devotion of I'Eten-
duere, imd of the captains under his orders. This devotion caimot be questioned, for
eijht ships had but few chances of surviving an action with fourteen ; and not only did
tlie commander of the ei'j;ht accept an action which he might possibly have avoided,
liut also he knew how to inspiie his lieutenants with trust in himself, for all supported
the fight with honour, and yielded at last, slKuving the most indisputable proofs of their
fine and energetic defence."
"The whole affair," concludes Mahan, "as conducted on both sides, affords an
adiniriible study of how to follow up an advantage, original or secured, and of the
results that may be obtained by a gallant, even hopeless defence, for the furtherance of
a particular object."
The squadron of Anson and Warren, as well as that of Hawke,
cruised in the Channel and Bay after the actions above narrated,
and took numerous prizes : but an account of such smaller engage-
ments as were fought in the course of the year may be reserved for
the next chapter.
The war had been very costly to France. The French Navy had
' ' Influence of Sea Powei,' 272.
- ' Bats. Nav. de la France.'
VOL. III. K
130 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1748.
been almost crushed, and Fi-euch maritime trade had been ahnost
ruined, though the armies of France had been successful on land.
But all the Powers engaged were to some extent weary of the
conflict ; and it was thei-el'ore felt, when a Congress met at Aix-la-
Chapelle to consider the terms of an arrangement, that there was
every prospect of the conclusion of a satisfactory peace. In the
meantime, Great Britain did not relinquish, nor even diminish, her
preparations to continue the struggle. In 174K, as in previous years,
all ships, as they became ready for sea, were put into commission.
Squadrons were sent to cruise at various times in home waters,
under Vice-Admirals Sir Peter Warren and Sir Edward Hawke, and
Eear-Admiral William Chambers. Commodore the Hon. George
Townshend watched the coast of Flanders ; Vice- Admiral the Hon.
John Byng remained in the Mediterranean ; and in the West Indies
Rear-Admiral Charles Knowles and Commodore George Pocock, let
slip no opportunity of annoying the enemj'.
Eear-Admiral the Hon. Edward Boscawen had been sent out in
1747, as Commander-in-Chief, to the East Indies, and had taken
with him reinforcements to the station. Before his arrival, Eear-
Admiral Thomas Grifiin (1) had received three additional ships from
England, so that his squadron consisted of three 60's, three 50's,
three 40's, and one 20, and was considerably superior to the French
force in the same seas. But Mr. Griffin had been outwitted and
out-manceuvred by the French commander-in-chief, M. Bouvet,
who, in spite of him, had thrown troops into Madras.
The French ministry was warned of Boscawen's departure from
England ; and M. Dupleix, being advised from home, took such
measures as he could to meet the Eear-Admiral, who had with him
six ships of the line or 50"s, and four smaller craft, and who
convoyed eleven ships of the East India Company with 1500
soldiers on board. Boscawen reached the Cape of Good Hope in
March, 1748, and was there joined by six Dutch East Indiamen,
having on board 400 troops. On May 18th he sailed again, and on
June 'JBrd, after a troublesome vo}'age, sighted Mauritius, which he
had decided to make an attempt upon. The island had been
informed by Dupleix of its danger, and was to some extent prepared,
though it was but ill garrisoned. On the 2.5th, after having
reconnoitred the coast, Boscawen decided to abandon the project
and to proceed to Coromandel. Had he known how few troops were
in the island, he would certainly have persisted, and would probably
17-lS.]
B08CAWEN IN TIIIC EAST INDIES.
131
have been successful ; for the works, though strong, could not be
properly manned.^
The Dutch convoy parted company at Mauritius, and proceeded
for Batavia ; and Boscawen, on June '27th, sailed for Fort St. David
(Cuddalore), where he arrived on July '29th. There he met Rear-
Admiral Griffin, who, in the meantime, had been promoted to be
Vice-Admiral, and who soon afterwards returned to England by way
of Trincomale with part of his command.
Besides the naval force, Boscawen had under him many
armed East Indiamen, and 3'240 troops, including sepoys but not
including Marines. Indeed, he was m a position to dispose of
5'2'20 men to act on shore ; and, in addition, 2000 native auxiliary
cavalry were placed at his service for the contemplated siege of
Pondicherry, whither Boscawen presently proceeded. Leaving
Captain William Lisle in command of the squadron, he landed to
direct the operations on shore. Early in August the army closed
round the town, which was closely blockaded from seaward by
the Exeter, Chester, Pembroke and Swallow. An assault upon one
of the outlying works was repulsed with loss on August 12th, but the
siege was formally begun and some successes were gained. The
engineers upon whom Boscawen was obliged to depend were, how-
' Rear-Admihal the Hon. Edward Boscawen's Squadi!(in, which arrived
OFF Mauritius in June, 1748.
Ships.
Gims.
).'(.iiiinauii('is.
■
f Rear- Admiral Hon. Edward Boscawen.
tCaptain Samuel Marshall (1).
Namur ... '^■'
It
Vigilant
64
„ William Lisle.
Beptford
(iO
I'lKPiiias Lake.
Pembroke
GO
„ 'I'liomas Fincher.
Ruby
50
„ Joseph Knight.
Chester .
50
„ Richard Sjjry.
Deal Castle
24
„ John Lloyd (2).
Smallou)
16
Commander John Rowzier.
Basilisk (bomb)
8
„ William Preston.
Apollo (hospital ship)
20
Lieutenant Robert Wilson.
The above, proceeding
Exeter .
York .
Harwich
Preston .
Lively .
found on the East Indies Station, the following
60
60
50
50
20
Captain Lord Harry I'owlett.
„ Thnothy iMucella.
„ Philip Carteret (1).
„ William Adams (1).
„ Nathaniel Stephens, actg.
in addition to the other vessels, which, upon Boscawen's arrival, returned home or went
elsewhere.
K 2
lo2 MAJOR OPKIIATIONS, 17H-I762. [1748.
ever, incompetent ; and little progress was made, though the JJufiUisk,
bomb, threw some shells into the place. In the operations Ensign
Clive, afterwards Lord Ciive, gained his first military distinction.
As the siege threatened to be a protracted one, Boscawen ordered
Captain Lisle to begin a general bombardment from the ships of
the squadron ; but, owing to the shallows, these could not approach
near enough to do much damage. The business, however, cost the
life of Captain William Adams (1), then commanding the Harwich.
In the meantime the weather was bad, and the troops were sickly;
and, as the neighbourhood of the town was liable to be completely
flooded at the beginning of the rainy season, the siege was raised
at the beginning of October, the sick being removed to the ships,
and the army retiring overland to Fort St. David. The expedition
cost the lives of 1065 British, and of only about 200 French. The
fiasco reflected no disgrace upon Boscawen, and was entirely due
to the incapacity of the engineers and some of the military leaders.
Nevertheless, it greatly lowered Biitish prestige with the natives,
and led to some serious defections.
Boscawen learned in November of the cessation of hostilities
between Great Britain and France, but was ordered to remain on
his station until advised of the final conclusion of peace. Part of
the squadron went to Acheen, and part to Trincomale, to avoid the
monsoon, and the whole returned in January, 1749, to Fort St.
David, where it lay maintaining an observant attitude, while
M. Bouvet, with the French forces, lay at Madras, or as it was
then often called. Fort St. George, 120 miles to the northward.
But the British did not remain wholly idle, and in April ships
were detached to assist the East India Company in a war with the
King of Taxajore. While this service was being performed, a violent
hurricane WTecked the Pemhrolce and Namur. The former lost her
captain,' and all hands except fourteen, 330 in all ; the latter lost
520 souls, though the admiral, captain, and a few ofiicers, being on
shore, fortunately escaped. Two East Indiamen were also wrecked.
In August, in pursuance of the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, which
had been concluded on April 18th, 1748, Madras, in a dismantled
condition, was surrendered to the British.
In the West Indies, in Februarj', 1748, Eear-Admiral Charles
Knowles, with a squadron and detachment of troops, left Port
' Tliis was on April \?A\u Captain Tlionjas Fincher's post-commission dated from
Deeemlier Gtli, 17-15.
1748.]
KNOWLES AT rOUT LOUJH.
133
Koyal to make an attack on Santiago de Cuba ; but, the winds
blowing persistently from the north, the ships could not make that
place. Knowles therefore determined to attack Port Louis, on
the south side of Hispaniola. The squadron ' arrived there on
ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES KNOWLES, DART.
{From an cngravimj hy Bidlfi/.')
' British Squadron at the Capture of Port Louis, Hispaxiola, 1748.
Sbips.
Guns.
Men.
C'omnmnilprs.
Cornwall.
80
600
(■Rear-Admiral Charles Knowles
(.Captain Eichard C^hadwick.
(B.).
Plymouth
60
400
))
Digby Dent (2).
Elizahetli .
70
480
J)
Polycarpus Tavlor.
Canterbury .
60
400
David Brodie.
Strafford .
60
400
James Kentone.
Warwick .
60
400
Thomas Innes.
Worcester
60
400
Thomas Andrews i^'S).
Oxford .
50
300
Edmond Toll.
Weazel
6
102
Merlin .
6
100
134
MAJUll OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1748.
March 8tb, and was at once ordered by signal to cannonade the
fort, which mounted seventy-eight guns, and was garrisoned by
600 men. A warm engagement resulted, and in the height of it
the enemy sent out a fireship, which was designed to fall on board
the Cornwall or the Elizabeth. She was towed off by the boats
of the fleet, and left to burn out and explode innocuously. The
British boats then boarded and brought away two other craft,
which had been prepared as
fireships. The action con-
tinuing, the Spanish fire after
a time languished, and the
Kear- Admiral sent a summons
to the governor, who, first
taking some time for reflection,
suri'endered upon terms. The
place was then taken posses-
sion of. The squadron lost
only 70 killed and wounded,
but among these was Captain
Eentone,^ of the Strafford, and
Captain William Cust,''^ of the
Bofiton, who, with the Eear-
Admiral's permission, was
serving as a volunteer on board
the Elizabeth. The enemy
lost inO killed and wounded.
With the place were captured
three ships, a snow, and three
privateer sloops. The fort was
burnt, it not being advisable
to retain it ; and, the conditions
of wind being at length more favourable, the Eear-Admiral decided
to prosecute his scheme against Santiago de Cuba.
The place had been much strengthened since the time of
Vernon's attack upon it ; and, as the appearance of the British had
been anticipated, all possible precautions had been taken. Knowles
arrived before the town on April 5th, and, the mode of procedure
having been determined. Captain Dent of the Plymouth, as senior
James licntone ; cominaudei', 1739 ; captain, 1740.
William Cast ; commander, 1746 ; captain, 1747.
1748.]
KNOWLES'S ACTION OFF J/AVANA.
135
captain, claimed and ol)laincd the lionoui' ol leading in. He was
seconded by the flagship. When the Pli/mouth had approached
close to the harbour's mouth it was seen that the passage was
obstructed by a boom, backed by vessels held ready to be used as
tireships. The nearest forts were cannonaded and the fire was
returned ; but Dent, having taken the opinion of his officers, came
to the conclusion that it was impracticable to proceed, and so
reported to the Bear-Admiral, who thereupon drew off and went
back to Jamaica.
Dent's apparent hesitation on this occasion was taken exception
to by Knowles ; and, in consequence, the captain of the I'li/iiioiit]/
was court-martialled on his return to England, but he was honour-
ably acquitted.
Later in the year Knowles was informed that the Spanish Plate
fleet was expected at Havana from Vera Cruz. He therefore
detached Captain Charles Holmes, in the Lenox, to convoy a great
body of trade, which had been collecting to sail for England ; and
himself went to cruise off the Tortuga Banks in search of the enemy.
The convoy under Holmes sailed from Jamaica on August 2.5th ;
and, being prevented from getting through the Windward Passage,
had to bear away for the Gulf of Florida. On September '29th it
sighted seven large ships, which were presently recognised to be
Spanish men-of-war.' Holmes signalled the convoy to disperse
and to look to its own safety, while he endeavoured to draw the
attention of the enemy to his own ship ; and, knowing where the
Rear- Admiral was cruising at the time, he succeeded, under press of
sail, in joining him on the following morning, when he reported what
had occurred. Ivnowles instantly went in quest of the Spaniards,
Order of Battle of the British and Spanish Squadrons in tiik
ArxioN OFF Havana, On-niiFR 1st, 1T!S.
Bkitish.
Sl'ANISil.
Sbips.
1 Guns.
Commauders.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Tilbuni . . .
. ' 60
Capt. Charles Powlett.
Iiimvcihle . .
. ' u
Rear- Admiral Spinola-
Siraffurd . .
liO
„ David Bvudie.
Conquistador .
. 1 64
Dou de Sail Justo.
1 Rear -Admiral Charles
Africa . . .
. ' 74
Vice- Admiral Reggiu.
Cornwall . .
SO
I Kuuwles.
Drai/6n . . .
64
Don de La I'a^:.
(Capt. Polycarpus Taylor.
Nttiioa Eapaiio .
. 1 64
Don Barrella.
Lenox . . .
70
,, Charles Holmes.
Meal Familia .
(34
Don Furre-stal.
Warwick . .
00
,, Thomas lunes.
Canterbury. .
(iO
,. Edward Clark (1).
GaUja 1 . . .
M
Dou Garrecocha.
Oxford 1 . . .
'M\
., KdiiKaidTull.
1 N..t hi
the line.
136 MAJOR OPEIIATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1748.
aud sighted them early in the morning of October 1st between
Tortuga and Havana. The Spaniards at once formed a line ; yet
the British, though they had the advantage of the wind, edged down
only very gradually, and it was 2 o'clock before either side fired.
The distance was then too great for much damage to be done, but
at about 2.80 p.m., the two squadrons being nearer, a brisk action
was begun. The Spaniards seem to have been in good order and
close together, but the Wancick and Canterbiuij were far astern
of station, so that for nearly two hours the British had but four
ships opposed to six of the Spanish. During this time the Cornwall
engaged the Africa at pistol range, and was so gallantly received
that in half an hour she was obliged to fall astern and quit the line,
having lost her main-topmast and received other damage to her
rigging. Soon afterwards the Conquistador, also much damaged
aloft, di'opped astern of her consorts and fell nearly where the
CornicaU lay refitting. Knowles lost no time in attacking her, and
quickly killed her captain ; but that officer's successor fought the
ship bravely until she had thrice been set on fire by shells from
the eight cohorns,^ which the CornicaU, unlike most of her class,
carried. Not until then did he surrender. The Lenox had taken
the Cornwall's place and had warmly engaged the Africa; but
other Spanish ships succoured their admiral, and Captain Holmes
was hard pressed for about an hour until he was relieved bj^ the
Warwick and Canterburi/. The action then became general and
fierce, and so continued until about 8 p.m., when the Spanish drew
off towards Havana, closely pursued. All, however, escaped except
the Conquistador. The Africa, owing to her damaged condition,
had to anchor before she reached port ; and, being discovered by
the British two days after the action, was burnt by the Spaniards
to save her from capture. The enemy lost 86 killed and 197
wounded ; the British had 59 killed and 120 wounded. But whilst
the Spaniards had several officers of rank included in each category
the British had none in either.
Knowles continued to look out for the Plate fleet, but in vain.
In the course of time he learnt from a prize that the preliminaries
of peace had been concluded and that hostilities were to cease,
whereupon he returned to Jamaica. When he went home to
England he comj)lained of Holmes for having left the convoy,
' ('i)li()ni, a small mortar, so named from its inventor, Menno van Coehoorn, the
Dutch military engineer (born 1641 ; died 1704).
1718.] KNOIVLES'S COURT-MAliTIAL. 137
oblivious of the fact that, had IJolnies not rejoined the llaj,', tJie
victory off Havana could not have been gained. Holmes was most
honourably acquitted. On the other hand, some of the captains
of the squadron complained of the conduct of the Kear-Admiral, who
was in consequence tried on board the Charlotte yacht, at Deptford, by
a court-martial which sat from the 11th to the '20th December, 1749.
It appeared that while Rear-Admiral Knowles was standing for the
Spanish fleet he might, by a different disposition of his squadron,
have begun the attack simultaneously with six ships, and might
have begun it earlier in the day. It appeared too, that, owing to
the method which he pursued, he had begun to attack with only
four ships. Upon these points the court condemned him ; and it
was also of the opinion that, in order proj)erly to conduct and direct
the operations of his command, he ought to have shifted his flag
from the ConuniU to some other vessel, after the former had
been disabled. For the rest, the proceedings amply vindicated the
Rear-Admiral's personal courage. The sentence was thus worded :
" The court uiiaiiimously agree tliat llear-Adniiral Knowles falls under part of the
14tli Article of War, being guilty of negligence, and also under the 23rd Article. The
court therefore unanimously adjudge him to be reprimanded for not hringing up
the squadron in closer order than he did, and for not beginning the attack with so
great a force as he might liave done; and ahio for not shifting his flag, on tlie Cornwall's
being disabled."
On the Leeward Islands' Station, Commodore Pocock learned
by the arrival of the Weazel, sloop, despatched to him by Hawke,
of the approach of the large convoy, which had been under the
escort of M. de I'Etenduere ; and, although he had not time to
collect the whole of his squadron to intercept it, his ships, and the
privateers on the station, succeeded in capturing no fewer than
thirty-five sail of it.
In the Mediterranean, where Eear-Admiral the Hon. John Byng
commanded, the British fleet was too strong for the French and
Spanish to attempt at sea anything of importance before the
conclusion of the peace. The British hampered the passage of
reinforcements to the allied armies at Genoa, by arming a number of
small craft and entrusting them to lieutenants, who cruised with
great success inshore, and intercepted many transports. On the
peace being concluded, Byng returned to England with most of the
larger ships of his fleet.
In the home seas Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hawke went on
138 M A.I on Ol'KliATJONti, 1714-17G2. [174'J.
a cruise with a considerable squadron in the month of January ;
and, ere he returned to port, made several prizes, including the
Magnaiiiiiic, 74, an account of the capture of which will be found in
the next chapter. liear-Admiral Sir Peter Warren, in April, also
went on a cruise ; but in May both he and Hawke were recalled to
England upon the settlement of the preliminaries of peace.
" In the course of the war," says Beatson,' " the British captured
from the Spaniards 1'249 ships, and from the French 2185, making
in all 3434. The Spaniards captured from the British 1360, and the
French 1878, making together 3238, being 196 fewer than w'hat had
been taken by the British." Yet, in spite of this, the general balance
was in favour of Great Britain, for not only were several of the
Spanish prizes extraordinarily valuable, but also the British mer-
chant marine, on account of its superior strength, was far better
able than either the French or Spanish to suffer great losses without
being seriouslj' crippled. The main gain to Great Britain by the
war was the reduction of the French navy to proportions which, for
the time, were no longer formidable. The peace itself benefited
her but little, for, in accordance with it, all conquests made by any
of the combatants were to be restored. On the other hand, the
point which had been the chief occasion of the war — the right of
British ships to navigate the American seas without being searched
— was not touched upon, and i^emained unsettled. The right to the
province of Nova Scotia, or Acadia, was to be left to be discussed by
commissioners appointed for the piu-pose. This last matter, never
having been properly arranged, was, as will soon be shown, pro-
ductive of another bloody and expensive war.
The first care of France after the conclusion of peace was to
reorganise and revive her navy. Great numbers of ships were laid
down at home ; and contracts were placed abroad, especially in
Sweden, for the construction of others. None of the ambitious
projects of King Louis were surrendered. He had merely accepted
peace in order the better to prepare for the realisation of his designs.
Nor did the French agents invariably take the trouble to obey the
spirit of the treaty. As early as 1749 the French Governor of
Martinique seized and fortified the neutral island of Tobago ; and
the place was not evacuated until grave international comphcations
threatened to arise out of the matter. Again, in 1751, the French
contemplated aggressions on the "West African coast, and only
' ' Xav. anil Milit. Mems.," i. -414.
1754.] OPERATIONS DURING Till-: PILWE. 139
desisted when Captiiiii Matthew Jiucklc (1), of the Asui.staiicc, 50,
informed M. Perrier de Salvert, the French commodore, that if he
persisted in his designs of building a fort at Annamaboe, the British
would look upon it as a breach of the peace and would repel force by
force.
French aggression in other (piarters was not always checked
with equal promptitude. M. dc^ La Jonquiere, the French com-
mander-in-chief in North America, and M. de La Galissonniere,
Governor of Canada, hatched between them a project for tampering
with the Indians of North America and for gradually driving British
settlers out of that continent ; and French officers occupied British
territory in Nova Scotia and built forts there. Kemonstrances were
made, and in 1750 commissioners were appointed to adjust the
disputes ; but nothing came of their conferences. Still, while Great
Britain herself remained almost indifferent, the Colonists at last
took up the question. Virginia raised 400 men and £10,000 for the
defence of its inland borders, and confided the command of its
troops to Major George Washington.' The French Canadians,
iowever, in spite of the heroism of the Americans, captured them
and their commander on July 8rd. Thereupon the colonial
governors held a congress and agreed upon a common plan of
defence; and the Ministry at home, shamed into action, sent troops
under General Braddock to the assistance of the Colonists. These
were convoyed to America in 1754 by two 50-gun ships'" under
Commodore the Hon. Augustus Keppel. Such signs assured the
French that, if they persisted in their policy, an open rupture could
not but result : and they therefore endeavoured to associate Spain
with them in the coming quarrel ; but their schemes were foiled by
the watchfulness of Sir Benjamin Keene, the British ambassador at
Madrid.
In India, where M. Dupleix still governed Pondicherry, the
French were as aggressive as elsewhere ; and, in consequence,
hostilities between the two East India Companies were almost
unceasing, so that the peace in that quarter was a merely nominal
one. Clive in this contest won great successes and opened up to
' This was the begiuuing of the great Washiugtou's iuilit;iiy career. See ^^'alpole :
' Mems. of George II.,' i. 347 ; and ' Corresp.,' iii. 73.
'' Centuriun, Ca\it. the Hon. Aug. Keppel; and Norwich, Capt. the Hon. Samuel
Barrington. In the latter, Adam Diuaeau, afterwards Lord Duncan, served as acting
lieutenant. — Keiipel : ' Life of Keppel," i. 201.
140 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1755.
the British East India Company such a vision of future wealth and
glory as induced it to beg the Ministry at home to assist it in pre-
serving its rapidly growing superiority over its French I'ival. In
response the Government in 1754 despatched Kear-Admiral Charles
Watson with a force which, as ultimately constituted, consisted of
the Kent, 70, Cumberland, 66, Tiger, 60, Salisbury, 50, Bridf/e-
water, 24, and Kingfisher, 16. France at the same time sent out
a squadron of neai-ly equal strength; but, before the ships arrived,
Dupleix had been recalled, and the French in India had adopted
a more peaceable policy, which might have led to permanent
harmon}^ between the two Companies had not the outbreak of war
elsewhere precluded such a consummation.
The despatch of General Braddock to America led France to
throw off her mask and to assemble a large expedition at Brest and
Eochefort, destined for Canada. Great Britain in reply prepared
for war ; and on March 11th, 1755, a proclamation was issued
offering bounties for seamen and able-bodied landsmen. On
March 14th thirty-five sail of the line and numerous small craft
were commissioned ; a hot press for men was instituted in each of
the chief ports, and fifty companies of Marines were ordered to be
raised.
The French expedition left Brest under the convoy of twenty-
five sail of the line, commanded liy ^l. de Macnamara, who, after
seeing it fairly to sea, returned with nine sail, leaving the rest of the
command to M. Dubois de La Motte, who later detached four sail of
the Hne and two frigates to Louisbourg, and proceeded with the rest
of the fleet to Quebec. The British Ministry was only vaguely
informed as to these movements, and sent to North America Vice-
Admiral the Hon. Edward Boscawen with but eleven sail of the line,
a frigate, and a sloop, convoying two regiments. He sailed from
Plymouth on April '27th, 1755, with instructions to protect the
British colonies and to attack the French squadron wheresoever he
should find it. An intimation of what instructions had been given
was, at the same time, communicated to the French ambassador,
who replied that the king his master would consider the first gun
fired at sea in a hostile manner to be a declaration of war. "When
it became known how greatly superior a French force had gone to
America, a reinforcement of six sail of the line and a frigate, under
Rear-Adniiral Francis Holburne, was sent to Boscawen ; and the
necessary arrangements were so quickly made that Holburne sailed
17o5.] CRUISE OF BOSCAWEN. Ill
on May 11th and joined Boscawen off the Banks of Newfoundlaiul
on June '21st.
The mihtary operations in North America of the force under
General Braddock need Jiot be followed in detail. HulHce it to say
that an American expedition against Niagara Fort miscarried ; that
Colonel William Johnson, a colonial officer, on his way to occupy
Crown Point, defeated a considerable French force which had
attacked him ; and that Braddock himself, while leading an ex-
pedition against Fort Duquesne,^ was routed and killed. A com-
bined naval and military expedition under Captain John Rous, R.N.,
and Lieut. -Colonel Monckton, against French forts in Nova Scotia,
took Fort Beau Sejour, which was renamed Fort Cumberland, and
several other works ; and was completely successful with but little
loss.
The fleets of Boscawen and Dubois de la Motte did not
meet, although four French line-of-battle ships, which had become
separated from their consorts, were chased by the British on
June 6th. For a time they escaped in a fog ; but on June iSth,
when the weather cleared, three of the French vessels were again
visible and a general chase was ordered. The Dunkirk, 60, Captain
the Hon. Richard Howe, assisted by the Torhaij, 74 (Boscawen's
flagship). Captain Charles Colby, after a brisk action took the
Alcidc, Captain de Hocquart ; and the Drfiaiice, 60, Captain Thomas
Andrews (2), and Fotigucnx, 64, Captain Richard Spry, took the Li/s,
which, though pierced for 64 guns, had only 22 mounted. The third
ship got away owing to the return of the fog.
When Boscawen discovered that the French had safely reached
Quebec, and that his own fleet was very sickly, he left Rear-Adniiral
Holburne with a small squadron to blockade Louisbourg, and went
to Halifax to refresh his men. But the epidemic of putrid fever
could not be checked; and, before Boscawen, with the main part of
his squadron, got home to England, the ships had lost 2000 people.
Captain Spry, with a few vessels, was left to winter at Halifax.
Boscawen and the rest of the fleet anchored at Spithead on
November 4th. It should be added that M. Dubois de la Motte
returned to France without adventure, and that the vessels which
he had sent into Louisbourg escaped and rejoined him at the time
when the British blockading squadron had been driven from its
station by bad weather.
' l)n the site of what is lunv Pittslnira.
142 MAJOR OPEItATlONS, 1714-17G2. [17oC.
The capture of the Alckle and Jjijti produced gi-eat excitement in
France, and fanned the flame of war in England ; but although
hostilities thereupon ))egan, formal war between Great Britain and
France was not declared until May 18th, 1756, upon the receipt in
London of the news of the French invasion of Minorca.
In the summer of 1755, Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hawke and
Eear-Admiral Temple West, with a strong squadron, put to sea in
hopes of intercepting the Comte du Guay, who was expected back
from the West Indies after having carried reinforcements to the
Leeward Islands. But the enemy avoided them, and re-entered
Brest without loss ; whereupon Hawke returned to Spithead. The
fleet soon afterwards sailed again under Vice- Admiral the Hon.
John Byng and Eear-Admiral Temple West, Ijut re-anchored at
Spithead on November '21st. When Parliament met in November,
the addresses in reply to the speech from the throne were very
warlike, and France, which had previously believed that the gi-eat
body of Englishmen was averse to hostilities, made efforts to
negotiate : but too late.
Early in the new year, troops were assembled on the French
coast as if for an invasion of Great Britain ; and a fleet was collected
at Brest. The threat of invasion produced almost a panic in
England, and in February the Ministry increased the alarm by-
issuing a foolish proclamation, ordering the proper officers, in case
the French should land, to cause all horses, oxen and other cattle,
which were fit for draft or burden and not actually used in the
interest and defence of the country, and all other cattle as far as was
practicable, and all provisions, to be driven or removed at least
twenty miles from the point at which such an attempt should be
made. The Government also unwisely detained at home a large
fleet, while it left America and the West Indies and the Mediter-
ranean very insufficiently guarded. It did not realise that Great
Britain is best protected from invasion by the activity and efficiency
of her Navy at sea. France took advantage of the alarm and con-
fusion to quietly embark at Toulon about 16,000 men, imder the Due
de Bichelieu, and to send them to Minorca, convoyed by a strong
squadron under M. de La Galissonniere. The expedition landed at
Ciudadella on April 19th.
Before proceeding to give an account of the operations of the
war, it may be well to say something of an expedition, which, under
Eear-Admiral Charles Watson, rendered valuable service to commerce
1756.] OPERATIONS AGAINST A NO II I A. 143
by destroying the power of a most dangerous pirate in the East
Indies. This pirate, Tulagee Angria by name, was the representative
of a family which for about a hundred years had committed outrages
on tlie Mahratta coast, and had accjuired both wealth and territory.
Angria was feared not only by the natives of India, but also by
European traders, and even by the East India Company ; and he
had extended his authority from the small island stronghold of
Severndroog over a large stretch of coast, which included the town
and port of Geriah. In 1734 Angria had taken the East Indiaman,
Derby, richly laden, and later the Restoration, 20, armed ship, and
the French Jupiter, 40. He had also ventured to attack Commodore
William Lisle, who had two ships of the line and several other
vessels in company ; and he had wrought much damage to the
Dutch trade. He was by origin a Mahratta, but he had thrown off
his allegiance ; and the Mahrattas had long urged the East India
Company to assist in effecting his downfall. More than one attempt
had been made to destroy him, but in vain ; when, in 1755, an
agreement of the East India Company, the British Government and
the Mahrattas led to the fitting out against the pirate of a force,
which finally secured the desired object. Mr. James, Commodore
of the East India Company's ships in India, sailed in March with
the Company's ships Protector, Sivallow, Viper, and Triumph, and
attacked and captured Severndroog, afterwards delivering it up to the
Mahrattas. He also took Bencote (Fort Victoria), the most northerly
port in Angria's dominions.
In November Eear- Admiral Watson reached Bombay, and further
operations were begun. James, with the Protector, Revenge, and
Bomhaij, went to reconnoitre Geriah, Angria's chief stronghold ;
and, upon his retm-n on December 31st, the Eear-Admiral sent His
Majesty's ships Bridgewater and Kingfisher, with some of the
Company's armed vessels, to cruise off the port. James joined them
on January '27th, 1756, with the Protector, and Guardian ; and the
Eear-Admiral, with Eear-x4dmiral George Pocock as second in
command, and with Lieut. -Colonel Clive in command of the troops,
followed with his squadron, arriving on February 12th. In addition
to the King's and Company's ships, there was a contingent of Mahratta
craft, which, however, did httle or nothing. Angria, terrified at the
force arrayed against him, fied to the Mahrattas to try to make
terms, and left Geriah under the orders of one of his brothers-in-law.
His offers and promises induced the Mahrattas to withdraw their
144 MAJOn OI'EHAriONS, 1T14-ITG2. [175C.
active co-operation, in retui-n for an undertaking to put them in
possession of the place ; and the hrother-in-law would have carried
out this arrangement but that Watson refused to be satisfied with
anj'thing short of the destruction of the pirate's stronghold.
In the afternoon of February 12th, the garrison having refused
to surrender, the squadron weighed and stood in in two divisions :
one to attack the fort and the other to attack Angria's fleet and
dockyard. A brisk cannonade resulted. The shipping was soon
burnt, and part of the town was set on fire. After about three
hours, the enemy's guns were nearly silenced, and the British guns
in consequence ceased also ; but, soon afterwards, firing was re-
commenced, and not until 6.30 p.m., the engagement having begun
at about 1.30 p.m., did the pirates cease to make further resistance.
Troops were then disembarked under Clive, ready to take possession ;
and during the night, lest the enemy might again take heart, the
bombs occasionally shelled the fort. In the morning Watson
summoned the garrison and was refused ; whereupon the bombard-
ment was again recommenced. At length a flag of truce was hung
out, and an offer of submission was made ; but, as it was not com-
plete and unconditional, fire was renewed. The governor then
surrendered unconditionally. On the morning of the 14th, Clive
marched into the place. Not more than twenty men were killed
and wounded on the British side in the affair. The victors found
in the fortress two hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, six brass
mortars, and a large quantity of stores and ammunition, besides
about i-100,000 sterling in rupees and ±'30,000 worth of valuables.
Ten Englishmen and three Dutchmen, who had been enslaved by
Angria, were released. The pirate fleet which was burnt at Geriah
consisted of one ship, eight grabs or galleys, and a large number of
armed row-boats called gallivats. At the end of April Watson left
the coast of Malabar, and on May 14th arrived off Fort St. David.
In North Ameiica the Earl of Loudoun commanded the British
land forces, but, before he could take the field, the French had won
several successes and had made themselves masters of the British
armed vessels on Lake Ontario.
It has been mentioned that Commodore Spry had remained at
Nova Scotia after the return of Boscawen to England in 1755.
Commodore Charles Holmes, convoying some troops from Cork, was
sent out with a reinforcing squadron, and assumed command. With
the Grafton, Notthujliani, Hornet and Jamaica he cruised off
175G.] THREATS OF INVASION. 145
Louisbourg in July, and nearly succeeded in cutting off a small
French force ; and on the following day he fought another French
force, which, however, also got away.
On the Leeward Islands' station Commodore Thomas Frankland
commanded ; and, although he fought no action, and rendered himself
very unpopular, his cruisers greatly annoyed the enemy. On the
Jamaica station, the squadron was under the orders of Bear-Admiral
the Hon. George Townshend ; but it was so small that he had to
remain almost entirely on the defensive. It, however, prevented the
French from carrying out an intended attack on Jamaica.
At home, the threat of invasion continued to cause popular
uneasiness, and in January, 1756, Vice-Admiral Henry Osborn
was sent to sea with a large squadron to convoy outward-bound
merchantmen, and, on his return, to reconnoitre Brest. He would
have been better employed in reinforcing the fleet in the Mediter-
ranean, for, although the enemy had sixteen ships of the line in
Brest and Rochefort, it was discovered that these could not be
ready before May ; and in the meanwhile. Great Britain had eight
ships of the line and twenty-three frigates quite ready, and thirty-
two ships of the line and five frigates nearly ready for sea in the
home ports.
Nor was the threat of invasion ever a serious one. The French
knew too well that the project at that time was hopeless. Upon the
return of Osborn, Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hawke was sent with a
squadron to cruise off Brest, and was reinforced in April by additional
ships under Eear-Admiral Francis Holburne. But these precautions
were taken too late, for Vice-Admiral d'Aubigny had left Brest for
Martinique on January 30th, and M. de Beaussier had sailed on
February 19th for San Domingo. Yet Hawke, ere he came back
to England in May, made many valuable prizes. He left Holburne
to cruise before Brest ; and Holburne was presently joined by Vice-
Admiral the Hon. Edward Boscawen, who assumed command of the
united fleet of eighteen ships of the line, six 50-gun ships and two
frigates.
This demonstration naturally induced the French squadron to
keep within its harbour; but some of Boscawen's vessels engaged
stragghng French ships. The invasion scare still continuing, the
Vice-Admiral took effectual means to put an end to it. He sent
the Hunter, cutter. Lieutenant Cockburn, to reconnoitre Brest.
Mr. Cockburn ran close into the harbour's mouth, and then with
VOL. III. '^
146 MAJOR OPERATTONS, 1711-1702. [175C.
five companions, got into ii bout iind rowed into the port in tlie
dark. He reported that he had found there only nine ships of war
of 50-gims or under and six large merchantmen. Boscawen and
Holburne returned to England in November, leaving Kear-Admirals
Savage Mostyn and Harry Noiris before Brest, chiefly to intercept
such of the enemy's ships as might be coming home from abroad.
The blockading force was afterwards entrusted to Vice-Admiral
Charles Knowles, who came hack to port with most of it in
Decemljer. His departure was somewhat prematm-e, in that it
enabled M. de Kersaint to get out with a small force for the coast
of Africa, and M. de Beauffremont to escape with another small
force bound for the West Indies. It also allowed some small
cruising squadrons to proceed to sea in safety.
The British Ministry was very negligent in the matter of
Minorca. It is quite clear that as early as October, 1755, it had
received intelligence that the expedition prepainng at Toulon was
destined for that island ; and that French reports to the same effect
reached it in November and December, as well as later.' Yet it
took no proper measures for the defence of the place, the reason
apparently being that, at that time, it undervalued the importance of
the position. The military command of the island was in the hands
of General AVilliam Blakeuey, an officer in his eighty-second year,
who was so infirm that when Port Mahon was besieged by the Due
de Richelieu, he, though mentally very active, was obliged to spend
great part of his time in bed. The garrison also was very weak,
and most of the officers belonging to it were on leave until some
time after the French expedition had sailed from Toulon. More-
over, the British squadron in the Mediterranean, including as it did
only three ships of the line and a few small craft, was a seiious
danger rather than a source of strength.
Yet at length public opinion in England insisted that something
must be done; and on March 11th, 1756, Vice-Admiral the Hon.
John Byng was appointed to the command of a fleet, which was
then ordered to proceed to Minorca. The position of second in
command was given to Rear-Admiral Temple West. But this fleet,
which should have been a large and powerful one, was by no means
of formidable proportions. It consisted only of ten sail of the line ;
and even those few ships were not fitted out without the greatest
difficulty and friction. At that late date the Ministry seems to have
' Kesols. of Ho. of Conims., May 'ivA, 1757.
175G.] BYNG TO THE MICDITEUltANKAN. 147
been still blind to the importance of Minorca. There were at the
moment twenty-seven ships of the line uruising in the Channel and
Bay of Biscay, twenty-eight ships of the line in commission at
home, and many small craft, whicb might bave been detailed for
the service. But Byug was not permitted to utilise any of these,
or to draw crews from them ; and his mission was evidently
regarded as a wholly subsidiary one. He was directed to take on
board the absent officers of the Minorca garrison and a reinforce-
ment of troops, consisting of the Eoyal Regiment of Fusiliers,
under the command of Colonel Lord Robert Bertie. To make
room for tliese men, all the Marines belonging to the squadron were
sent on shore, with the result that, had Byng been successful in
throwing troops into Port Mahon, he would, owing to the absence
of Marines from his sliips, have been in a condition uniit for sub-
sequently fighting an action at sea.
The Vice-Admiral prepared his fleet with as much dispatch as
possible, and sailed from St. Helen's on April 6th, arriving at
Gibraltar on May 'ind. He was there joined by some of the ships,
which, under Captain the Hon. George Edgcumbe, were already in
the Mediterranean ; and he received intelligence that the Toulon
squadron had landed a French army in Minorca, and that the enemy
was already in possession of almost every strong position in the island.
Byng communicated to General Fowke, the Governor of Gibraltar,
an order from home to the effect that, subject to certain conditions,
a detachment from the garrison, equal to a battalion of men, was
to be embarked on board the fleet. But General Fowke and his
advisers came to the conclusion, firstly, that it would be extremely
dangeroiis, if not impracticable, to throw succour into Port Mahon ;
and secondly, that the garrison of Gibraltar was already too weak to
spare the specihed detachment without danger to itself. Yet as the
fleet was in great want of men, and as Edgcumbe's ships had left
their Marines, and some of their seamen, in Minorca to assist in the
work of defence, the Governor permitted 1 captain, 6 subalterns,
9 sergeants, 11 corporals, .'j drummers and '200 privates to embark,
it being represented to him that, without such reinforcement,
several of the ships would be absolutely unable to go into action.
Captain Edgcumbe, with his little squadron, had been obliged to
retire from off Minorca upon the appearance of the French. He
had left behind him Captain Carr Scrope of the Dolpliin, who
commanded the naval detachment on shore, and who was to
L 2
148
MAJOR OPERATIONS, lTU-1762.
[1756.
act as signal officer in the event of the appearance of a British
squadron before the island. Ere Byng, with an easterly wind,
sailed from Gibraltar on May 8th, he had been joined by the whole
of Captain Edgcumbe's little force, excepting the Fhaniix, which
had been blockaded at Paliua, Majorca, by two French frigates,
and which was only able to get out upon the appearance of the
British fleet off that island. The wind was for the most part
easterly until 9 p.m. on the 18th, when a brisk northerly breeze
sprang up ; and the squadron, having sailed large all night, sighted
Minorca at daybreak next morning. Byng at once sent ahead the
Phoenix, Chesterfield and Dolphin to reconnoitre the mouth of
Mahon Harbour, to pick up intelligence, and to endeavour to send
ashore a letter to General Blakeney. Captain the Hon. Augustus
John Hervey, the senior officer of the advanced squadron, drew in
with the shore and endeavoui'ed to communicate with the castle of
St. Philip ; but, before he could effect anything, the enemy's fleet
appeared in the S.E., and the detachment had to be recalled.
Vice-Admiral Byng then stood towards the foe and made the
signal for a general chase. Both squadrons ^ made sail towards one
' The British and Fre.\-ch Fleets in the Action off Minorca, Mat 20th, 175(5.
llKMI&H.
ll-.EN.
„.
Ships. 1
Guns.
Commanders.
Ships.
Gnns. Flag-Officers.
Dejiance . . .
60
fCapt. Thomas Andrews
I (2). !
Or pit re ....
Sippopotame .
64
60
Portland^ . . .
50
„ Patrick Baird.
Pedoutable . . .
Sage
,. fM. de Glandevez (Chef
iMncaster . . .
66
f „ Eon. George Edg-
• cumbe.
I*
64
I d'Escadre).
iKear-Admiral Temple '
Guerrier . . .
14
Buckingham
68
\ We5t(R). ;
Pier
50
(Capt. Michael Everitt.
Foudroyant. . .
/M. de La Galissouuiere
I (Lieut.-Geueral).
Captain ....
64
„ Charles Catford.
84
Intrepid . . .
64
„ James Young (1").
Tthnu'raire . . .
V4
f ,, Frederick Com-
t wall.
Content ....
64
Revevgt ....
64
Lion
64
Princess Louisa i .
60
„ Thrtmas Noel.
CouronTie . . .
74
(M. de La Clue (Chef
I d'Escadre).
Trident ....
64
„ Philip Durell (1).
iVice-Adm. Hon. John
Triton ....
64
Eamillies . . .
90
{ Byng(E).
Culloden . . .
M
ICapt. Arthur Gardiner.
„ Henry Ward.
FltlGATlS, EIC.4
Kingston . . .
60
„ WmiamParry(2).
Junon ....
Hose
46
26
Frigates, etc.
Gracieitse . . .
26
Bept/ordi'. . .
Chesterfield i . .
60
40
„ John Amherst.
„ John Llojd (2).
Topaze ....
Nymphe ....
24
26
Phmnix''- . . .
20
f „ Hon. Augustus
\ John Hervey.
i'b7-(«nei . . .
14
Com. Jervis Maplesdeu.
Experiment^ . .
20
Capt. James Gilchrist.
Dolphin i . . .
20
Com. Benjamin Marlow.3
1 Were iu the Meditevrauean iimler Capt. the Hon. G. Edgcumbe, hefore Acimiral Bjmg's arri\al.
2 The Deptford, haviug heeu origiually placed iu the Hue between the Culloden and the Kiiuji^ion^ and then
removed from it, was later ordered to take the place of the dit^abled Intrepid.
3 Capt. Carr Scrope being on service ashore at Port Slahon.
4 La Galissouuiere mentions only four French frigates as having been present.
1750.]
BYNO'S ACTION OFF MINORCA.
149
another; aud at '2 p.m. the Briti.sli Commander-in-Chief made the
signal for a Hne of battle ahead. But, the wind dropping, this
order could not be properly carried
out. In the meantime he took the
precaution of reinforcing such of the
ships as were most weakly manned,
by means of drafts from the frigates ;
and he directed that the Pluriiix,
which had been reported as unfit for
general service, should be made ready
to act as a fireship in case of necessity.
At about six o'clock in the evening
the enemy advanced in order, with
twelve ships of the line and five
frigates ; the van being commanded
by M. Glandevez, the centre by M. de
La Galissonniere, and the rear by M.
de La Glue. An hour later the French
tacked, and went away a distance of
about six miles, with a view to gaining
the weather-gage ; and Byng, to pre-
serve that advantage, tacked likewise
On the following morning two tartans,
which had been sent out by M. de
Eicheheu with soldiers to reinforce
M. de La Galissonniere, were chased
by the British ships, one of them
being taken by the Defiance, and the
other escaping. That morning at
daybreak, the weather was hazy, and
the enemy was not at once seen ; but,
a little later, he came in sight in
the S.E.
Captain Mahan's account of the
action which followed may be here
quoted, as it admirably summarises
what occurred.
byng's action, may 20Tn, 175G.
I— At 2 P.M.
British, black,- French, while.
[The angle of approach "was somewhat
greater than as shown in the plans.]
dyng's action, may 20th,
n— At 3.30 P.M.
BritLsh, binck : French, ivhite.
ilntrepitl should he flying up into the
wind. She is here represented as before
the wind.]
"The two fleets," lie writes, "having sighted each other on the morning of
May 20th, were found after a series of manoeuvres both on the port tack, with an
easterly wind, lieadiug southerly, the French to leeward, between the English and the
150
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1756.
liarbour. Bviig ran down in line aliead oft' the wind, tlie Frencii remaining by it, so
tliat when tlie former made the signal to engage, tlie fleets were not itarallel, but
formed an angle of from 80° to 40° (PI. I.). The attack wliicli ]?yng I).y his own account
meant to make, each ship against its opposite in the enemy's line, difficult to carry out
under any cii-cumstances, was here further impeded by the distance between the two
rears being much greater than that l)etween the vans ; so tliat liis whole line could not
come into action at the same moment. When the signal was made, the van shijis kept
away in obedience to it, and ran down for tlie French so nearly liead on as to sacrifice
their artillery fire in great measure (PL II.). They received three raking broadsides
and were seriously dismantled aloft. The sixth
English ship" {Intrepid) "counting from the
van, had her foretopmast shot away, flew U]i
into the wind, and came abacK, stopping and
douliling up the rear of the line (PI. III.). Then
undouljtedly was the time for Bj-ng, having
committed himself to the fight, to have set the
example and borne down, just as Farragut did
at Mobile when his line was confused by the
stopping of the next ahead ; but according to
the testimony of the flag-captain, Mathews's
sentence deterred him. ' You see. Captain
Gardiner, that the signal for the line is out, and
that I am ahead of the ships Louisa and
Trident' (which in the order should have been
ahead of him). ' You would not have me, as
admiral of the fleet, run down as if I were going
to engage a single ship. It was Mr. Mathews's
misfortune to be prejudiced by not carrying
down his force together, which I shall endeavour
to avoid.' The aflair thus became indecisive;
the English van was separated from the rear
and got the brimt of the fight. One French authority blames Galissonniere for not
tacking to windward of the enemy's van and crushing it. Another says he ordered the
movement, but that it could not be made from the damage to the rigging ; but this seems
improbable, as the only injury the French squadron underwent aloft was the loss of
one topsail-yard, whereas the English sufl'ered very badly. The true reason is probably
that given and approved by one of the French authorities on naval warfare. Galisson-
niere considered the support of the land attack on Port Mahon paramount to any
destruction of the English fleet, though he thereby exposed his own. ' The French
navy has always preferred the glory of assuring or preserving a conquest to that,
more brilliant perhaps, but actually less real, of taking some ships ; and therein
it has approached more nearly the true end that has been proposed in war.' The
justice of this conclusion dejiends upon the view that is taken of the true end
of naval war." '
byng's action, mat 20th, 1756.
in.— 3 P.M.
The losses (see following page^) in killed and wounded were
nearly equal ; but the French lost no officers of rank, whereas in
Byng's fleet Captain Andrews, of the Defiance, was killed, and
Captain Noel, of the Princes>; Louisa, was mortally wounded.
The British ships also suffered much more than the French in
' ' Iiifl. i.f Sea Power u]iou Hist.,' 28G, 2S,.
1756.]
BYNG'S ACTION OFF MINORCA.
151
their masts, yards and rigging ; so much so, in fact, that Byng
deemed it right, before venturing to do anything further, to call a
council of war on board the Jiaiiii/Jirx, and to suninion to it not
only the naval officers, but also several of the land officers who
were on board the ships. The questions debated in this couiicil,
and the conclusions arrived at, were as follows : —
1. Wliether an attack on the French fleet ijave any iirospect of relieving Mahon ?
Eesolved : It did not.
2. AVliether, if there were no French lieet cruiKing at Miiioica, (lie British Heet
could raise the siege? Resolved: It could not.
o. Whether Gibraltar would not be in danger, shouM any accident befall Piyng"s
fleet? Piesolved : It would be in danger.
4. Whether an attack by the British fleet in its present state U]ion that of the
French woidd not endanger Lribraltar, and expose the trade in the Mediter-
ranean to great hazards ? Re.solved : It would.
5. Whether it is not rather for His Majesty's service that the fleet should proceed
immediately to Gibraltar? Eesolved: It should proceed to Gibi-altar.
As a result, the squadron sailed for Gibraltar, and, on the way,
occupied itself in repairing such damages as could be repaired at
' The losses in killed and wounded in the two lleets were as follows: —
BKrrisH.
.Ships.
Defiance .
Portland
Lancaster
Biichimjlmm .
Cii'ptain. .
Intrepid .
Princess Louisa
Totals
ICilleil.
14
G
1
Woimdeil.
45
20
14
Fkench.
•Ships.
6
>\0
9
36
13
42
165
Orphee
Ilippopotame
Ii'ei/i)ittahle
Sa</e .
Guerrie.r .
Fier .
Foudroyaiit
Temirairv
Conten t .
Lion .
Couronnc
Triton .
Totals
10
26
0
10
(1
0
S
0
43
0
4
•>
10
0
15
5
19
v>
7
0
3
.5
14
136
London Gazette of June 26th, 1756. Lists in Beatsou, iii. 118, put the total losses
at — British, 43 killed, 168 wounded ; French, 38 killed, 181 wounded. La Galissonniere
puts the French loss at 38 killed, and 1 15 wounded. It may be that 26 French were
killed outright, and that 12 more died of their wounds. No two accounts of the
number of wounded can be expected to agree exactly, some enumerators naturally
including among the wounded men with only slight injuries.
152 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1702. [1756.
sea. At the Eock the Admiral ^ found reinforcements,''* which had
been sent out to him under Commodore Thomas Bi'oderick,^ the
Ministry, after Byng's departure from England, having apparently
realised for the first time the full extent of the danger in the
MediteiTanean.
It was unfortunate for Byng that the first detailed news of what
had happened off Minorca reached the Government through French
channels. M. de La Galissonniere's dispatch cannot now be found
in the Ai-chives de la Marine in Paris, and possibly it no longer
exists ; but a copy of it, or a translation, reached the Secretary
of the Admiralty some time before Byng's own dispatch arrived
in England ; and upon the former the Government took action,
recalling Byng and West, and sending out Vice-Admiral Sir
Edward Hawke and Eear-Admiral Charles Saunders to supersede
them. The important part of this dispatch of La GaUssonniere's *
is as follows : —
" At half-past two in the afternoon the two squadrons were in line of battle and
began the engagement. The English consisted of eighteen sail, of which thirteen were
of the line, and ours, of twelve sail of the line and four frigates. The action lasted
almost three hours and a half, but was not general during the whole of the time. The
English ships that had suffered most from our broadsides got away to the windward,
out of gunshot. They continually preserved this advantage that they might keep
clear of us as they pleased. After having made their greatest efforts against our rear
division, which they found so close and from which they received so hot a tire that
they could not break in upon it, they made up their itdnds to sheer oft', and did not
appear again during the whole of the next day, the 21st. Speaking generally, none of
their ships long withstood the fire of ours. Our vessels suftered but little. They were
repaired in the night, and on the following moi-ning were fit for action." ..." Our
total killed was thirty-eight, and wounded one hundred and fifteen."
' On Jime 4th, 1756, Byng was promoted to be Admiral of the Blue.
^ Heinforcement despatched to Admiral the Hon. John B\-ng under Commodore
Broderick ; —
ships. 1 Guus. Commau'iei:s.
Prince Georije.
Ipswich
NassMi
Hampton Court
Isis.
80
fCommod. Thomas Broderick.
\Capt. Abraham North.
64 j „ Richard Tyrrell.
64 [ „ James Sayer.
64 I „ James Webb.
50 I „ Edward Wheeler.
^ This officer, who was born in 1704, and died a A'ice-Admiral in 176ii, usually
spelt his name Broderick. It was, however, properly spelt Brodrick.
■* As published in the journals of the time.
1756.] BVNG'S DISPATCH. J 53
It may here be pointed out, in passing, that this report makes
the British fleet to have been considerably superior to the French,
whereas if there were any real difference between them it was only
a very slight one ; and that it does not agree, in other respects, with
the facts as they are now accepted.
Before going further, it is right to print the dispatch which Byng
addressed to the Admiralty on May 2.5th, and in which he gave his
version of what had haj)pened. It is right also to say that the
Admiralty, after receiving this dispatch, kept it for some time
before making it public, and that, when it did publish it, gave
it to the world in a mutilated condition. The complete dispatch
was printed by Byng after his return to England, and ran as
follows : —
RttmiUies, off MinOec.\, May 'Ibtli, 17511.
" Sir, — I have the pleasure to desire that you will acquaint their Lordships that,
having sailed from Gibraltar the 8th, I got off Mahou the| I'Jth, having been joined by
his Majesty's ship Phcenix off Majorca two days before, by whom Iliad confirmed the
intelligence I had received at Gibraltar, of the strength of the French fleet, arid of their
being off Mahon. His Ma/esty's colours were still flying at the castle of St. Philip ;
and I could perceive several bomb-batteries 'playing on it from different parts. French
colours I saw flying on the ivest part of tit. Philip. I dispatched the Phcenix,
Chesterfield, and Dolphin ahead, to reconnoitre the harbour's mouth; and Captain
Hcrvey to endeavour to land a letter for ileneral Blakeney, to let him know the fleet
was here to his assistance ; though every one was of the opinion tve coidd be of no use
to him; as, by all accounts, no place was secured for covering a landing, could we have
spared the people. The Phoenix was also to make the private signal between Captain
Hervey and Cajjtain Scrope, as this latter would jindoubtedly come off, if it were
practicable, having hpt the Dolphin's barge with him : but the enemy's fleet appearing
to the south-east, and the wind at the same time coming strong off' the land, obliged me
to call these ships in, before they could get quite so near the entrance of the harbour
as to make sure what batteries or guns might he ptlaced to prevent our having any
communication with the castle. Falling little wind, it was live before I could form
my line, or distinguish any of the enemy's motions ; and could not judge at all of their
force, more than by numbers, which were seventeen, and thirteen appeared large.
They at first stood towards us in regular line; and tacked about seven; which I
judged was to endeavour to gain the wind of us in the night ; so that, being late,
I tacked in order to keep the weather-gage of them, as well as to make sure of the
land wind in the morning, being very hazj', and not above live leagues from Cape
Mola. We tacked off towards the enemy at eleven ; and at daylight had no sight of
them. But two tartans, with the French private signal, being close in with the rear
of our fleet, I sent the Princess Louisa to chace one, and made signal for the Rear-
Admiral, who was nearest the other, to send ships to chase her. The Princess Louisa,
Defiance, and Captain, became at a great distance ; but the Defiance took hers, which
had two captains, two lieutenants, and one hundred and two private soldiers, who were
sent out the day before with six hundred men on board tartans, to reinforce the
French fleet on our appearing off that place. The Phcenix, on Captain Hervey's offer,
prepared to serve as a fire-ship, but without damaging her as a frigate ; till the signal
was made to prime, when she was then to scuttle lier decks, everything else prepared,
as the time and place allowed of.
154 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [175C.
"Tlie enemy now Ijcgan to i»]jpear In mi tlie niast-liead. I called in the cruisers;
and, when tlicy had joine<l nic, I tacked tOwards the enemy, and formed the line ahead.
I found the Freuchjwere prejiaring theirs to leeward, having unsuccessfully endeavoured
to weather me. They were twelve large ships of the line, and live frigates.
"As soon as I judged the rear of our fleet the length of their van, we tacked
altogether, and immediately made the signal for the shijis that led to lead large, and
for the Dei'Tford to quit the line, that ours nught become equal to theirs. At two
I made the signal to engage : I found it was the surest method of ordering every shiji
to close down on the one that fell to their lot. And here I must express my great
satisfaction at the very gallant manner in which the Rear-Admiral set the van the
examjile, liy instant]\- hearing down on the shi]is he was to engage, with his second,
and who occasioned one of the Fiench shi]is to begin the engagement, which they did
by raking ours as they went down. The Iktrei'ID, uvfortunatdy, in the very begin-
ning, had her foretopniast shot away ; and as that hung on her foretopsail, and backed
it, he had no command of his ship, his fore-tack and all his braces being cut at the
same time ; so that he drove on the next ship to him, and obliged that and the ships
alifiad of nie to throw all back. This obliged me to do also for some minutes, to avoid
their falling on board me, though not before we had drove our adversar)' out of the
line, who ]iut before the wind, and had several shots fired at him by his own admiral.
This not only caused the enemy's centre to be unattacked, but the Rear-Admiral's
division rather imcovered for some little time. I sent and called to the ships ahead of
me to make sail, and go down on the enemy ; and ordered the Chesterfield to lay by
the Intrepid, and the Deptford to supply the Intrepid's place. I found the enemy
edged away constantly ; and as they went three feet to our one, they would never
permit our closing with them, but took advantage of destroying our rigging ; for
though I closed the Rear-Admiral fast, I found that I could not gain close to the enemy,
whose van was fairly drove from their line ; but their admiral was joining them, by
bearing away.
"By this time it was jiast six, and the enemy's van and ours were at too great a
distance to engage, I jierceived some of their ships stretching to the northward ; and
I imagined they were going to form a new line. I made the signal for the headmost
ships to tack, and those that led before with the larboard tacks to lead with the
starboard, that I might, by the first, keep (if possible) the wind of the enemy, and, by
the second, between the Rear-Admiral's division and the enemy, as he had suffered
most ; as also to cover the Intrepid, which I jjerceived to be in very bad condition,
and whose loss would give the balance very greatly against us, if they attacked us
next moniing as I exjiected. I brouglit to about eight that night to join the Intrepid,
and to refit our ships as fast as possible, and continued doing so all night. The next
morning we saw nothing of the enemy, though we were still lying to. Mahon was
N.X.W. about ten or eleven leagues. I sent cruisers to look out for the Intrepid and
Chesterfield, who joined me next day. And having, from a state and condition of the
squadron brought me in, found, that the Captain, Intrepid, and Defiance (which latter
has lost her captain), were much damaged in their masts, so thai they were in danger
of not being able to secure their masts properly at sea ; and also, ih'it the squadron in
general were very sickly, many killed and ivounded, and nowhere to put a third of
their number if 1 made an hospital of the forty-gun ship, which was not easy at sea ;
I thought it proper in this situation to call a council of war, before I went again to
look for the enemy. I desired the attendance of General Stuart, Lord Effingham, and
Lord Robert Bertie, and Colonel Cornwallis, that I might collect their opinions upon
the present situation of Minorca and Gibraltar, and make sure of protecting the latter,
since it was found impracticable either to succour or relieve the former with the
force ive had. So, thowjh we may Justly claim the victory, yet we are much inferior
to the weight of their ships, though the numbers are equal ; and they have the advantage
of sending to Miiiorca their wounded, and getting reinforcements of seamen from their
1756.] FALL OF PORT MAUON. 155
transports, and soldiers from their camp; all which uudoubl dlij has hcea d/>rie in tins
time that we have been lying to to rffit, and often in si(/ht of Minorca ; and their ships
have more than once appeared in a line from our mast-heads.
" I send thnr Lordships the resolutions of the council of war, in lohirh there was
not the least contention or doubt arose. J hope, indeed, v;e shall find stores to refit its
at Gibraltar ; and, if I have any reinforreinent, will not lose a moment of time to
seek the enemy again, and once more give them battle, though they have a great
advantage in being clean ships that go three feet to our one, and therefore have their
choice hoiu they will engage us, or if they ivill at all ; and will never let us close them,
as their sole view is the disabling our ships, in which they Imve but too well succeeded,
though we obliged them to bear up.
. "I do not send their Lordships the particulars of our losses and damages by tliis,
as it would take me much time ; and I am willing none should be lost in letting them
know an event of such consequence.
" I cannot help) urging their Lordships for a reinforcement, if none are yet sailed
on their knowledge of the enemy's strength in. th'se seas, and which, by very good intelli-
gence, will in a few days be strengthened by four more large ships from Toulon, almost
ready to sail, if not sailed, to join these.
" I dispatch this to Sir Benjamin Keene, by way of Barcelona ; and am making
the best of my way to cover Gibraltar, from which place I propose sending their
Lordships a more particular account. I remain, Sir, your most humble servant, —
"J. BVNR.
" Hon. John Clevlaxd, Esq."
The above dispatch appears to have arrived in England on
June 16th ; but it vi^as not pubHshed in the London- Gazette until
June 26th, and then only with the omission of those passages which
are now printed in italics. The omissions, it is clear, were some-
what unfair, and, being calculated to prejudice Byug, they show the
bias of the Ministry, which, previously inclined to underrate the
importance of Minorca, at length seemed disposed to attach the
utmost significance to it. The dispatch is, however, an unsatis-
factory one, even as it stands. It is too full of excuses, too
apologetic, to be the work of a strong and self-reliant man. It
smacks, indeed, more of a Persano than of a Nelson or a Saumarez.
To avoid a break in the narrative, it may here be said that the
town of Port Mahon defended itself gallantly, but had to capitu-
late, on .June '29th, on honoixrable terms. The garrison was sent to
England.
Commodore Broderick, with the reinforcement, had reached
Gibraltar on June 1.5th, and was there found by Byng on his arrival
there on June 19th. The Admiral at once began preparations to
return to Minorca ; but, while he was still engaged in these, on
July 3rd, the Antelope, 50, came in with Vice-Admiral Sir Edward
Hawke, Eear-Admiral Charles Saunders, and the order for the
supersession of the Commander-in-Chief and Eear-Admiral West.
156 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1757.
She had sailed from home ou June IGth. Captains Gardiner and
Everitt, Captain WilHam Gough (who had been a lieutenant of the
BainiUies, and who had since been appointed captain of the Experi-
ment), and Commander Chi-istopher Basset (who had also been a
lieutenant of the liamiUies and had been appointed after the action
to the command of the Fortune), were also recalled, besides other
officers, who were required as witnesses in England. The original
order to Hawke directed only the supersession of Byug ; but after
Hawke's departure from England and the receipt of Byng's dispatch
of May 25th, the Admiralty decided to go further and to make
prisoner of the late Commander-in-Chief. He sailed for England
in the Antelope, on July 9th, and, upon arriving at Spithead on
July •26th, he was put mider arrest. He was landed on August 19th
and sent to Greenwich. There he remained in confinement until
December 23rd, when he was removed to Portsmouth. His trial
began on board the St. George in Portsmouth Harbour on
December 27th, and continued until January 27th, 1757. On that
day sentence was pronounced, and the Admiral was transferred to
the Monarch, then in harbour.
The court-martial, summoned to try Byng, consisted of Vice-
Admiral Thomas Smith (4), who was president, Eear-Admirals
Erancis Holburne, Harry Norris and Thomas Broderick, and nine
captains. After hearing the evidence, the court agreed to thirty-
seven resolutions or conclusions, which embodied, among others,
the following : —
Tliat when the British tieet, on the starboard tack, was stretched abreast, or was
about abeam, of the enemy's line, Admiral Bj'ng should have caused his
ships to tack together, and should have immediately borne right down on
the enemy ; his van steering for the enemy's van, his rear for its rear, each
ship making for the one opposite to her in the enemy's line, under such sail
as would have enabled the worst sailer to preserve her station in the line of
battle.
That the Admiral retarded the rear division of the British fleet from closing with
and engaging the enemy, by shortening sail, in order that the Trident and
Princess Louisa might regain their stations ahead of the RamilUes ; whereas
he should have made signals to those ships to make more sail, and should
have made so much sail himself as would enable the CuJIoden, the worst
sailing ship in the Admiral's division, to keep her station with all her plain
sails set, in order to get down to the enemy with as much expedition as
possible, and thereby projjerly support the division of Rear- Admiral West.
That the Admiral did wrong in ordering the fire of the RamilUes to be continued
before he had placed her at proper distance from the enemy, inasmuch as he
thereby not only threw away his shot, but also occasioned a smoke, which
prevented his seeing the motions of the enemy and the positions of the ships
immediately ahead of the RamilUes.
1757.] BYNO'S COURT-MAUTIAL. 157
That after the ships whicli had i-cceived dainai^e in tlie action had been refitted as
circumstances would ])ermit, tlie Admiral ought to have returned with his
squadron off Port Mahon, and endeavoured to open communication witli the
castle, and to have used every means in his power for its relief, before
retiu-ning to (5ibraltar.
In short, the court considered that Byng had not done his
utmost to reheve St. Phihp's Castle. It also considered that
during the engagement he had not done his utmost to take, sink,
burn, and destroy the ships of the enemy, and to assist such of
his own ships as were engaged ; and it resolved that the Admiral
had fallen under the 12th Article of War ' ; and the court decided
that, as the 12th Article of War positively prescribed death, without
leaving any alternative to the discretion of the court under any
variation of circumstances, Admiral Byng should be shot to death,
at such time and on board such ship as the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty should direct.
" But," concludes the thirt^'-seveuth resokition, "as it appears by the evidence of
Lord Robert Bertie, Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, Captain Gardiner and other officers
of the ship, who were near the person of the Admiral, that they did not perceive any
backwardness in him during the action, or any marks of fear or confusion, either from
his countenance or behaviour, but that he seemed to give his orders coolly and dis-
tinctly, and did not seem wanting in jjersonal courage, and from other circumstances,
the court do not believe that his misconduct arose either from cowardice or disaffection ;
and do therefore unanimously think it their duty most earnestly to recommend him as
a proper object of mercy."
The court forwarded the sentence to the Admiralty, with an
accompanying letter signed by all the members. In this the
officers represented the distress of mind which had been occasioned
to them by being obliged to condemn to death, under the 12th
Article of War, a man who might have been guilty of an error of
judgment only ; and, for the sake of their consciences, as well
as for Byng's sake, they warmly pleaded for an exercise of
clemency.
In consequence of this letter, and of the recommendation to
^ " Every person in the fleet, who, through cowardice, negligence, or disaffection,
shall, in time of action, withdraw, or keep back, or not come into fight, or engagement,
or shall not do his utmost to take or destroy every ship which it shall be his duty to
engage ; and to assist all and every of his Majesty's ships, or those of his allies, which
it shall be his duty to assist and relieve ; every such person, so offending, and being
convicted thereof by the sentence of a court-martial, shall suffer death." — Act of
22 George IL, Art. 12.
This article superseded one in the Act of 13 Car. IL, which, after the word
"death," had the words, "or such other punishment as the circumstances of the offence
shall deserve, and the court-martial shall judge fit."
158 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1757.
mercy, the opinion of the twelve Judges was asked for as to the
legality of the sentence which had been pronounced. The decision
was given on February 14th, 1757, and was to the effect that the
sentence was legal. Some of the members of the court then made
an effort to save Byng by applying to Parliament to release them
frnui the oath of secrecy, by which they were bound not to reveal
the votes or opinions of individual members, upon the allegation
that they had something vital to disclose relative to the sentence.
Byng was respited, and a Bill for the desired purpose passed the
Commons, but was thrown out by the Lords, it not appearing to
that House that there was anything material to be divulged. The
fact is, that certain members simply desired to be able to make
public the fact that, had they realised that the result of their
sentence would be the infliction of the death penalty, their sentence
would have been other than it was. The severitj' of the punishment
caused Vice-Admiral the Hon. John Forbes, one of the Lords of
the Adnairalty, to refuse to sign the sentence, and it also induced
Eear-Admiral West, who had been offered a command, to decline
it, on the plea that although he could answer for his loyalty and
good intentions, he could not midertake to be held capitally
responsible on all occasions for the correctness of his judgment.
Byng, both dming his trial and after his sentence, behaved like
a brave man. It was at first ordered that he should be executed on
the forecastle of the Monarch. This ignomiuj' was, however, spared
him at the solicitation of his friends. On March 14th, 1757, the
day appointed for the carrying out of the sentence, the Marines of
the Monarch were drawn up under anus upon the poop, along
the gangways, in the waist, and on one side of the quarterdeck.
On the other side of the quarterdeck was spread some saw-dust,
on which was placed a cushion ; and in the middle of the quarter-
deck, upon the gratings, a platoon of nine Marines was drawTi up
in three lines of three. The front and middle lines had their
bayonets fixed, as was customary on such occasions. The captains
of all the ships in Portsmouth Harbour and at Spithead had been
ordered to attend with their boats ; but, to avoid crow^ding, thej^
were directed to lie abreast upon their oars, without coming on
board. A little before twelve o'clock, the Admiral retired to his
inner cabin for about three minutes, after which the doors of the
outer cabin were throwii open, and the Admiral walked from his
after cabin with a dignified pace and mimoved countenance. As
r.]
nYNG'S EXECUTION.
159
he passed through the fore cahin, he howed to liis acquaintances
there, and, saying to the Marshal oi' the Admiralty " Come along,
my friend," went out upon the quarterdeck. There, turning to
the Marshal, he politely bowed and gave him a paper containing
a sober vindication of his position, adding: " Eememher, sir, what
I have told you relative to this paper." He next went to the
cushion and knelt down. One of his friends, following him, offered
ADMIRAL THE HON. JOHN BYNG.
iFroni Ti. Somfou's fngravhuj ftj'tn' ilif puiiniit hi/ Uiidsuii.)
to tie the bandage over his eyes, but Byng declined the service and
blindfolded himself. The Marines, in the meantime, advanced two
paces and presented their muskets, waiting for the Admiral to give
them the signal to fire. He remained upon his knees for about
a minute, apparently praying, and then dropped a handkerchief,
the signal agreed upon. Six of the Marines fii-ed. One bullet
missed ; one passed through the heart ; and four others struck
different parts of the body. The Admiral sank to the deck, dead.
160 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1756.
A little later the corpse was put into a coffin ; and in the evening
it was sent on shore to the dockyard, whence it was forwarded to
the family burial place at Southill, in Bedfordshire. His monument
bears this inscription : " To the Perpetual Disgrace of Public
Justice, the Hon. John Byng, Esq., Admiral of the Blue, fell a
Martyr to Political Persecution, March J4th, in the year mdcclvii;
when Bravery and Loyalty were insufficient Securities for the Life
and Honour of a Naval Officer."
The tragedy, viewed from nearly every aspect, is to j^e most
heartily regi-etted. Byng was neither traitor nor coward ; but he
was not an original genius, and, having seen Mathews punished for
doing a certain thing, he believed that under no circumstances was
it his duty to do anything even remotely of the same kind. His
chief fault was that he was not independent enough, where a great
object was to be gained, to shake himself loose from formulae and
precedents, and to dash in when occasion allowed him. Yet, in
one way, the sentence may have been productive of good. It may
have taught the admirals who followed the unfortunate Byng, that
they must pay more attention to victory than to red tape, and
that not even the most honest devotion to conventional methods
is so great a merit in a naval, officer as success against the enemies
of his country.
Sir Edward Hawke, soon after his arrival at Gibraltar, sailed
with the fleet to Minorca, but found that the island had fallen, and
that the French army and fleet had returned to Toulon. The
enemy had no longer any squadron at sea in the Mediterranean,
and the Vice-Admiral therefore had to confine himself to protecting
British trade and preserving British prestige. This he did with
conspicuous energy and success. On December 3rd, 17.56, he set
out with part of his fleet for home, leaving Pear-Admiral Charles
Saunders in command.
It has been said that Vice-Admiral Charles Watson, Commander-
in-Chief in the East Indies, arrived off Fort St. David in the middle
of May, 1756. He had not been there long ere he received an
important piece of news, to the effect that six large French East
Indiamen, full of troops, were expected in India, where they were
to be fitted as men-of-war. Thereupon, in response to an m-gent
summons, he went to Madras, where he learnt that the Nawab of
Bengal, Surajah Dowleh, had seized Cassimbazar and Calcutta.
Almost at the same moment Watson received orders from the
1757.]
WATSON TAKES CALCUTTA.
KJl
Admiralty to return with his squadron' to England. He had,
however, sufficient strength of character to disregard orders which
he knew had been sent to him under misconception of the position
in India ; and he proceeded at once to the mouth of the Ganges,
with a detachment of troops under Lieut. -Colonel Clive. In spite of
great difficulties he assembled at Fulta, on December 15th, a force
consisting of the Kent, Tiger, Brklgeioater, SdlUhunj, and Kingfisher,
with some ships belonging to the East India Company. He there
found Governor Blake and other fugitives from Calcutta, and learnt
of the horrible fate of those Europeans who had been less fortunate,
and who had been confined in the infamous Black Hole. Watson
reinforced his command by the purchase of a craft, which he named
the Thunder, and fitted as a bomb under the command of Lieutenant
Thomas Warwick. The squadron sailed on December '27th ; and
on the 29th the force was landed, and Fort Bougee-Bougee was
attacked. This place was captured by an impromptu assault,
brought on by an incursion into the works of a drunken British
seaman named Strachau ; and on December 30th the white troops
were re-embarked, and the squadron proceeded up the river, the
sepoys of the Company's service marching parallel with it along
the shore.
On January 1st, when the ships entered the channel between
Fort Tanna and the battery opposite to it, the enemy abandoned
both. The Salisbury was left there to bring off the guns from the
works, and to demolish the defences, and at night the Vice-Admiral
manned and armed the boats of his squadron and sent them a few
' The Squadron uxder Vice-Admirai, AVatson in the East Indies, 175(j-17,')7.
Ships.
Kent .
Cumhe.rland .
Tiller .
Salisbury .
Brid'jeioater .
Triton ^
Kingfisher .
Thunder, bomb -
Blaze, fireship- ^
Guns.
70
66
60
50
24
24
14
ComujaDders.
/Vice-Adm. Charles Watson (B).
ICapt. Henry Sjieke.
fUear-Adm. Geoi-ge Pocock (1!).
(.Capt. John Harrison.
„ Thomas Latham.
„ William Martin (2).
„ Henry Smitli.
„ Edmund Townley.
Com. Richard Toby.
„ Tliomas Warwick.
Lieut. ?
1 Aniveil from Euglaml, aftpr tlie rest nf the s(iua<lruil had guue to Bjugat.
- Purchased aud anu'd by the Vice- Admiral iu India.
3 Could not make the Ganges, and had to b^ar away for Bombay.
VOL. III.
M
162 MAJOR OPKllATWNS, 1714-1762. [1757.
miles up the river, where they boarded and burnt some fireships,
which had been collected there. Early on the 2nd, Colonel Clive,
with the troops, landed and began the march towards Calcutta ; the
Kent, Tiger, Bridgeicater, and Kingjisher proceeding as the army
advanced. At 9.40 a.m. the enemy opened upon the Tiger from
their batteries below Calcutta, but abandoned them as the ships
drew near. At 10.20 the Tiger and Kent began a hot cannonade
VICE-ADMIRAL CHARLES W.\TSON'.
(Frum E. Fi:<her's ciigraviiifj after the poTtrnit bij Hudson.)
of Fort WiUiam, and after two hours drove the defenders out of it.
In this action the British lost only nine seamen and three soldiers
killed, and twenty-six seamen and five soldiers wounded. Calcutta
was at once occupied.
The Vice-Admiral later detached an expedition, the naval part
of which was under Captain Eichard King (1), who was serving as a
volunteer in the squadron, to seize the town of Hugh, thirty miles
above Calcutta. Another expedition, under Captain Speke, bm-nt
1757.] WATSON TAKES CIIANUERNAGORE. 103
the enemy's granaries at Gongee, and, assisted by the troops,
defeated a body of natives which had attacked them. This action
provoked Surajah Dowleli to send a large army against Calcutta.
Clive obtained from the Vice-Admiral the aid of a detachment of
seamen, under Commander Warwick, and tried to bar the way to
the city ; but, being misled by his guides in a fog, he had to retreat
upon Calcutta. In this affair Lieutenant Lutwidge of the Salisbury
was mortally wounded, and seventeen seamen were killed and
fifteen wounded. Chve, however, quickly regained his former
advanced position, and so disconcerted his opponent that the latter
sued for a peace, which was concluded on February 9th. The
British might undoubtedly have obtained more favourable terms
than they did, had they not been anxious to patch up all their
differences with the native princes, in order to be able to concentrate
the whole of their resources in opposition to the French in India.
These matters having been settled, the Vice-Admiral made
preparations for at once attacking Chandernagore ; but the French
made overtures for the neutrality of the place, and thus to some
extent delayed him. Failing in their efforts in this direction, the
French began to tamper with Surajah Dowleh. In the mean-
time, however, Watson and Clive invested Chandernagore. On
March 19th, the British boats destroyed some French fireships
which were collected near the town. On the '21st, Eear-Admiral
Pocock joined the flag ; but he had been obliged to leave his own
flagship at Ballasore, as she drew too much water to come up the
river ; and he arrived in a boat. On the '22nd he hoisted his flag in
the Tiger. On the 23rd there was a general bombardment of the
fort from land and water; and, after three hours" hot tiring, the
French capitulated. The Salisbiirij, owing to an accident, was
unable to get into action. The Kent lost 19 killed and -49 wounded ;
the Tiger, 13 killed and .50 wounded. Among those hurt was Eear-
Admiral Pocock.
The fugitives from Chandernagore were received and sheltered
by the Nawab, who acted throughout with great duplicity ; and, as
the British soon afterwards learnt of a plan of his own discontented
subjects to depose him, they determined to aid and abet it. It
cannot be pretended that the negotiations to this end were altogether
honourable to those Englishmen who were concerned in it ; and
Vice-Admiral AVatson declined to be a party to certain questionable
undertakings, which, in pursuance of the resolution, were entered
M 2
164 MAJOR OPEUATJONS, 1714-17C2. [1757.
into by Clive and the council ; but his name was, without his
privity, affixed to the treaty with the malcontents. Clive then
attacked the Nawab, and on June '23rd, 17.57, defeated him at
Plassej'. This victory eventually led to the fall and death of
Surajah Dowleh, and to the establishment in his place of Meer
Jaffier, a nominee of the British. The settlement was barely con-
cluded when, on August 16th, Vice-Admiral Watson died. His part
in the foundation of the British Empire in India has scarcely been
done justice to, and his loss, just then a serious one, would have
been much more severely felt than it was, had he not had as his
successor so capable an officer as Rear-Admiral Pocock.
Commodore James, of the East India Company's service, in
the Revenge, 22, had been stationed off Pondicherry to watch
the motions of the enemy, and had been joined there by H.M.S.
Triton, 24. But these vessels were driven off in September by
a strong French squadron ; and, since Pocock's ships were in a rather
bad condition, and some of them temporarily unfit for action, the
situation began to look threatening, especiall}' seeing that an
expected British reinforcement, under Commodore Charles Stevens,
had been detained at Bombay, and did not actuallj^ sail thence for
the coast of Coromandel until January 20th, 1758.
Indeed, the French were making great efforts to defend their
challenged possessions in India. They had already fitted out an
expedition, the naval command of which was given to the Comte
d'Ache, and the mihtary, to General Comte de Lally. The squadron
consisted of three king's ships, and one ship and a frigate belonging
to the French East India Company, with about 1200 troops on
board. D'Ache sailed on March 6th, 1757, but was driven back to
Brest by a stonn, and, while there, was deprived of two of the
king's ships, in order that they might be despatched to Canada.
Instead of them he received five more East Indiamen. He sailed
on May 4th, and on December 18th reached Isle de France, where
he found four additional ai-med East Indiamen. Choosing the best
vessels at his disposal, he put to sea with them on January 27th,
1758. The further movements of d'Ache and of Pocock will be
referred to later. Operations in other quarters during 1757 must
first be followed.
On the Leeward Islands' station. Commodore John Moore (1)
relieved Eear-Admiral Thomas Frankland and rendered valuable
service in protecting trade. On the Jamaica station, Eear-Admiral
1757.]
FUllliEiSTS ACTION WITH DE KEIiSAINT.
105
Thomas Cotes was in command, and was not less successful. In
the autumn, learning that the French were assemhling, at Cape
Fran9ois, a convoy for Europe, he sent the Augusta, Ediiihiiri/li
and Dreadnought to cruise off that place to intercept it. This
convoy was to be escorted by M. de Kersaint, with a small squadron,
which Cotes believed would be little, if at all, superior to that under
Captain Arthur Forrest of the Augusta. But de Kersaint was
reinforced at Cape Frangois, and had in consequence a considerably
more powerful command ^ than the British officer. On October '21st,'
de Kersaint issued forth, hoping by his very appearance in such
force to drive Forrest away. The latter, upon the French being
signalled, summoned his brother captains on board the Augusta,
and, when they met him on his quarterdeck, said, " Well, gentle-
men, you see they are come out to engage us." Upon which
Captain Suckling answered, " I think it would be a pity to dis-
appoint them." Captain Langdon was of the same opinion.
"Very well," replied Captain Forrest; "go on board your ships
again " ; and he at once made the signal to bear down and engage
the enem}\ The French had seven vessels to the British three.
Captain Suckling took the van. Captain Forrest the centre, and
Captain Langdon the rear. The action began at about 3.20 p.m.,
and continued very briskly for two hours and a half, when the
French commodore ordered one of his frigates to come and tow
him out of the line. Others of his squadron soon followed his
example ; and eventually the French made off. The British ships
were all much cut up aloft. The Augusta lost 9 killed and
29 wounded ; the Drcaduuuglit, 9 killed and 30 wounded; and the
Edinburgh, .5 killed and 30 wounded. The loss of the French is said
' The British and Frexch Squadroxs engaged on' OcTonEii '21st, 17-"i7.
Bkiti
SH.
Kken'ch.
Ships.
Guus.
Commauiiei's.
Ships. [Guns.
Com man lie IS.
Aujjitsta. . . .
JJiradnouf/ht .
Edinhiinjh . . .
60
(iO
61
Capt. Arthur Forrest.
,, Maurice Suckling.
,, \ViUiam Laugduu.
Tntrepide . . .
Sceptre . : . .
Opinidtre .
0'ree7tivick . . .
Outarde ....
Sauvage ....
Lirorv ....
74
"4
64
50
44
32
3 -J
M . de Kersaint.
- Oil the same day, rorty-eight years later, was fought the battle of Trafalgar.
Nelson, before goiug into action, recalled the fact that the day was the anniversary of
his uncle's gallant behaviour, and regarde.l it as of good omen.
166
MAJOR OPKRATIONS, 1714-1702.
[1757.
to have exceeded 500 in killed and wounded. Few pluckier or more
creditable actions have ever been fought ; and it is worth noting
that among the British captains, all of whom greatly distinguished
themselves, one, Maurice Suckling, was a maternal lincle of Lord
Nelson, and Nelson's earliest patron. Forrest had to bear up for
Jamaica, in order to get his ships refitted. De Kersaint, in the
meantime, picked up his convoy and sailed for France. But, at the
CAPTATS MAURICE SUCKLING, U.K., COXTROI.LEH OF THE N'AVY, 1775-78.
(By permission, j'nim tlic portrait bij Bcirdinll, in the jiossession a! Cnpt. Thomas Suckling, i?.jV.)
very end of his voyage, he met with a severe storm, in which
the Opinidtre, Greenwich, and Outarde drove ashore and were.
wrecked.
On the North American station Lord Loudoun, the new military
commander-in-chief, had formulated in the autumn of 1756, a plan
for the conquest of Cape Breton ; and, in the winter, the Ministry
at home approved his scheme. On January 3rd, 1757, he laid
a general embargo on all outward-bound ships in American colonial
1757.] PLANS OF LOUD LOUDOUN. 107
ports. His objects were, firstly, to prevent the communication of
intelligence to the enemy ; secondly, to obtain the necessary trans-
ports ; and thirdly, to secure additional seamen for his Majesty's
ships. The- measure, though perhaps it was wise, produced strong
dissatisfaction both in America and at home ; and, in spite of the
precaution, the French heard of the project. In the early spring,
therefore, they sent a fleet and strong reinforcements to Louisbourg.
Loudoun assembled at New York ninety transports ; and,
presently. Sir Charles Hardy (2), Governor of New York, received a
commission as Eear-Admiral, with orders to hoist his flag and co-
operate with the military commander-in-chief. He first hoisted his
flag in the Nightuif/ale, 20, but removed it later to the Sutherland, 50,
Captain Edward Falkingham (2). The army, consisting of 3500
men, was all embarked by the 25th ; but, just as the fleet was ready
to sail, news arrived that a French squadron, of five ships of the
hne and a frigate, was cruising off Halifax. This delayed the
departure of the expedition until the Kear-Admiral had sent two
sloops to reconnoitre. As they saw no enemy. Hardy sailed on
June 5th, and a few days afterwards disembarked his forces for
refreshment and exercise at Halifax, where were found three
infantry regiments and a company of artillery, bringing the total
force up to about 11,000 men.
Loudoun would scarcely have left New York with so feeble
a convoy' as that which was available under Hardy, had he not
had reason to expect to meet at Halifax Vice-Admiral Francis
Holburne, with a fleet from England, to support him. But, owing
to mismanagement at home, Holburne did not leave St. Helen's for
Ireland, where he was to pick up troops, until April 16th ; and
sailing from Cork on May 27th, he did not reach Halifax until
July 7th, when the season was almost too far advanced for the safe
commencement of an enterprise which could not but be met with
the most vigorous opposition. Moreover, the French had been
beforehand, and had despatched from Brest a fleet, which, under
M. de Beauffremont, went first to the West Indies, and, proceeding,
entered Louisbourg on June 5th, finding there four sail of the Hne
which a few days earlier had arrived from Toulon under M. du
Eevest. A further reinforcement from Brest, under M. Dubois
' Sutlierhinil, 50, Captain Edward Falkingham (2) ; Nir/htingale, 20, Captain
James Campbell (2) ; Kennin/jtoa, 20, Captain Dudley Digges ; Vulture, 16, Commander
Sampson Salt ; and Fernt, 14, Commander Arthur Upton.
168 MAJOR Ol'EBATIONS, 1714-1702. [1757.
de la Motte, sailed on May 3rd, and, evading the British blockade,
reached Louisbourg on June 29th, when the united French
squadrons included eighteen sail of the line and five frigates, a
force much superior to that which Holbume and Hardy were able
to dispose of. The town also contained 7000 regular troops.
Dubois de la Motte had been expressly ordered to protect Louis-
bourg, and on no account to hazard an engagement with the
British fleet unless he should be in such overwhelming force as to
place the question of his success beyond a doubt. It is right to
point this out in order to excuse him for having neither annihilated
Holburne, nor blockaded the British in Halifax.
Vice- Admiral Holbm-ne sent the Winchelsca, 20, Captain John
Kous, and other frigates, to look into Louisbom-g. Rous returned,
and, in consequence of his report, the army was re-embarked on
August 1st and 2nd, and a rendezvous was appointed in Gabarus
Bay, six miles west of Louisbourg. Ecus seems to have underrated
the strength of the French forces ; but tmer infoiination concerning
it was presently received from some papers which had been dis-
covered in a prize. This led to the abandonment of the project.
Some regiments remained in Halifax ; others, under convoy, went
to the Bay of Fundy, to Fort Cumberland, and to Annapolis Eoj'al ;
and the rest, with Loudoun, against whom there was a great outcry,
retm-ned to New York.
Holburne, however, was not satisfied, and resolved to reconnoitre
Louisbourg for himself. Leaving, therefore, a few vessels for the
defence of Hahfax, he sailed on August 16th, and arrived before the
place on August 20th. Near the harbour's mouth some of his ships
got close enough in to draw the fire from the island battery. The
Vice-Admiral was thus able to satisfy himself that the strength of
the enemy had not been exaggerated. Dubois de la Motte signalled
his fleet to unmoor, whereupon the British tacked, stood ofl', and at
nightfall bore away. On September 11th, Holbiime was again at
Halifax, where he found reinforcements of four sail of the line from
England, under Captain Francis Geary.
The original project could not then be persisted in, bi;t Holbume,
after w^atering and rewooding his fleet, which by that time consisted
of nineteen sail of the line, two fifty-gun ships, and several frigates,
sailed for Louisbourg with the intention of blockading the French,
until the approach of winter and shortness of supplies should obUge
them to come out and fight him. On September 2-4 th, he was only
1757.] STOliM OFF LOUlSBUUliO. ItlU
about sixty miles south of LouisLourcr, when a fresh easterly gale
sprang up. In the night it veered to the southward and blew an
awful hurricane until about 11 a.m. ou the 2.5th. Then, fortunately,
it again veered to the north, otherwise the fleet could scarcely have
been saved from destruction. The Tilbiirij, 60, Captain Henry
Barnsley,' who, with nearly all the crew, was lost, struck and went
to pieces. The Grafton,- 70, Captain Thomas Cornewall, bearing
the broad pennant of Commodore Charles Holmes, also struck, but
was got off. The Ferret, 14, Commander Arthur Upton, foundered
with all hands. All the other ships of the fleet were seriously
damaged, no fewer than twelve being dismasted either wholly or in
part. It was the fiercest hurricane ever experienced by anyone then
on the station ; and it naturally put an end to Holburne's plan. The
Vice-Admiral sent his most damaged ships direct to England, under
Sir Charles Hardy (2) and Commodore Charles Holmes, and went
with the rest to Halifax, whence, having refitted, he too sailed for
England, leaving a few ships under Captain Lord Colville, of the
Nurthumberland, 70, to winter at Halifax. Lord Colville had
orders to endeavour, when the season should permit, to prevent
supplies from getting into Louisbourg. The French force there,
however, put to sea at the end of October, and, after suffering from
very bad weather during the voyage, reached Brest at the end of
November.
The proceedings of M. de Kersaint on the Jamaica station have
already been described. Previous to going thither he had cruised
on the coast of Guinea ; and, in the absence of any sufficient British
squadron there to oppose him, had taken many prizes. He had also
attempted Cape Coast Castle, but had been beaten off by the resource
and courage of Mr. Bell, the Governor.
In the Mediterranean, Bear-Admiral Charles Saunders, who had
been left in command after the return to England of Sir Edward
Hawke, heard at the end of March that four sail of the hne — the
same which later reached Louisbourg — and one frigate, under
M. du Revest, had quitted Toulon. He therefore left Gibraltar on
April 2, 1757, to intercept them with the CuUudcn, 74, Benrick, G4,
Princess Louisa, 60, Guernsey, 50, and Portland, 50. On April 5th,
' In some Xavy Lists of tlie period tliis ollicer aiipears as Barnsby. He was a
captain of 1748.
- Slie lost her mainmast, foiotopniast, and rudiler ; luit tlie sliip was safely steered
to England by means of a jur\'-rudder devised by Commodore Holmes. (See plate.)
170
MAJOR OPERATION H, 17U-1762.
[1757
at 5 P.M., he sighted the enemy and, being to leeward, formed his
Hne. At sunset the French did the same, and began to fire at very
long range. The British chased, and gained so much on them that
the Gwernse!/ and Princess Louisa were able to engage; but in the
night the French got away. Vice-Admiral Henry Osborn arrived
with reinforcements in May, and assumed the command; but,
though the trade was well protected and many prizes were taken.
i
ADMIRAL SIR CHARLES SAUNDERS, K.B.
CFrom a portrait in the ' Xaval Chronicle' 1802.)
no further fleet operations of any importance took place on the
station during the j^ear.
It has been said that M. Dubois de la Motte escaped from Brest
in May 1757, with nine sail of the line and four frigates, and
reached Louisbourg. He was enabled to escape by the fact that
the blockading squadron before the place, iinder Vice-Admiral
Temple West, had been driven from its station by bad weather.
West was afterwards relieved by Eear-Admiral Thomas Broderick,
1757.] EXPEDITION AGAINST noCnEFORT. 171
who remained cruising till June, when Vice-Admiral the Hon.
Edward Boscawen took the command of the squadron for about a
month. Prizes were made, but there was no meeting between the
fleets of the two countries.
As the French still notoriously cherished the design of an in-
vasion of England, the Ministry determined if possible to be before-
hand and to deal a blow on the French coasts. A military officer,
who had made a short stay at Kochefort before the outbreak of the
war, gave information concerning the condition of the defences of
that port, which, though supposed to be weak, contained a most
valuable dockyard, arsenal, and foundry. The representations of
this officer. Captain Clarke by name, induced the authorities to
undertake an expedition against the town, and they were the more
readily inclined to adopt this course seeing that nearly the whole of
the French army was believed to be employed in Germany, and that
but few troops were supposed to be available on the Atlantic seaboard.
The scheme was kept secret ; but a large squadron was prepared
and entrusted to Admiral Sir Edward Hawke (Bamillies, 90),
Vice-Admiral Charles Knowles {Neptune, 90), and Eear-Admiral
Broderick {Princess Amelia, 80) ; and troops were collected and em-
barked under Lieut. -General Sir John Mordaunt and Major-Generals
Conway and Cornwallis. The instructions to Sir Edward Hawke
were " to attempt, as far as it shall be found practicable, a descent
on the coast of France, at or near Kochefort, in order to attack and,
by vigorous impression, force that place ; and to burn and destroy to
the utmost of his power all such docks, magazines, arsenals and
shipping as shall be found there."
The fleet consisted of sixteen sail of the line, besides numerous
frigates, small craft, and transports ; and it sailed on September 8th ;
but its destination was not known, nor even suspected, by any with
it, except the chiefs, until September 14th, when the alteration of
course revealed it.
On the 20th Sir Edward Hawke issued orders to Vice-Admiral
Knowles, directing him to attack Isle d'Aix ; and at noon the A^ice-
Admiral proceeded to execute these directions ; but, in doing so, he
chased a two-decked French ship, which escaped into the Garonne
and gave the alarm. Early on the SSrd the Vice-Admiral, with the
Neptune, 90, Captain James Galbraith ; Magnanime, 74, Captain
the Hon. Eichard Howe; Barfleur, 90, Captain Samuel Graves (1) ;
Turhaij, 74, Captain the Hon. Augustus Keppel ; Boijcd William, 84,
172 MAJOIt OrEllATIONS, 1714-17C2. [175P.
Captain Wittewronge Taylor, and two bombs, the Firedrake and
Infernal, attacked the works on Aix. The Matjnanime got into
action within forty yards of the fort, and, she being well seconded
by the Barflcur, in half an hour the position surrendered. It was
taken possession of, and the defences were later destroyed. In the
meantime vessels were sent to reconnoitre, and to sound for a
suitable place of disembarkation on the mainland ; but it was
discovered that a landing in any case would be difficult, and that,
if opposed, it could scarcely be effected. At a council of war, held
en the 25th in the Neptitne, it was therefore decided not to proceed ;
but at another council of war, on the 28th, this decision was re-
versed, and it was determined to attempt an attack, in spite of the
fact that the enemy, who had been very active, was then better than
ever prepared. Yet when, in the early morning of the 29th, all was
ready, the wind blew off shore, and the scheme had finally to be
abandoned. On October 1st the fleet sailed for England, and on the
6th arrived at Spithead. The collapse of the expedition, and the
waste of money, which its mismanagement by the Government had
entailed, caused grave public dissatisfaction.
Almost immediately afterwards a fleet of fifteen sail of the line
and several frigates, under Admiral Sir Edward Hawke and Vice-
Admiral the Hon. Edward Boscawen, was sent to sea with a view
to intercept the home-coming French squadron from Louisbourg.
It sailed from Spithead on October 22nd, but, when on its station,
was dispersed by a gale; and, before it could regain its assigned
position, M. Dubois de la Motte got into Brest unperceived, except
by the Vanguard, Captain Eobert Swanton, which sighted it on
November 23rd, and which was engaged by some of the enemy.
M. Dubois de la Motte finally called off his chasers for fear of
attracting the attention of the British fleet. Hawke and Boscawen,
therefore, returned to Spithead on December 15th.
The Earl of Loudoun was in 1758 succeeded a^ military com-
mander-in-chief in North America by Major-General Abercrombie ;
and it was determined to begin operations for the year with the
siege of Louisbourg. Admiral Boscawen, Eear-Admiral Sir Charles
Hardy (2), and Commodore Philip Durell (1), were nominated to the
command of the fleet which was designed for the service ; and, in
January, Hardy sailed in the Captain, 64, for Halifax, to assume
charge of the ships already there, and wdth them to blockade
Loiiisbourg as soon as the season should permit. Early in February,
1758.]
DISTRIBUTION OF THE NAVY.
173
DurcU followed him in the Diana, 3(5, to make the necesisary local
preparations; and on February 19th Boscavven himself sailed witli
the fleet. After Boscawen's departure, Sir Edward Hawke was
despatched to blockade the French Channel ports, while Commodore
Charles Holmes cruised off the north coast of Holland, and assisted
in obliging the French and their allies to evacuate Emden. At
the same time, troops were assembled in the Isle of Wight for an
ADMIKAL SIK GEORGE POCOC'K, K.B.
(From an enfirainttfj bi/ liidlcij, after tlw portrait >"! Uwlmn.)
intended iucm'sion upon the coast of France, and Admiral Lord
Anson assumed the command of the blockading fleet before Brest,
while a squadron for the descent upon the French coast was collected
under Commodore the Hon. Eichard Howe. It should be added
that reinforcements were sent to India, under Captain Kichard
Tiddeman ; that a small force under Captain Henry Marsh went to
the west coast of Africa; and that an expedition, ultimately en-
trusted to Commodore John Moore, sailed later for the West Indies.
174
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-17C2.
[1758.
Having thus summarised some of the chiel' naval movements of
1758, we may proceed to give accounts of the squadrons and their
principal doings.
In the East Indies Vice-Admiral Pocock was joined in Madras
Eoad, on March '24th, hy Commodore Charles Stevens, and, on
April 17th, sailed, with the object of getting to windward of Fort
St. David, to intercept the French squadron which was expected on
the coast. Comte d'Ach6 had reached Mauritius on December 17th,
17.57, and had there joined the small squadron under M. Bouvet,
with whom he sailed on January 27th, 1758, and made for the coast
of Coromandel ; but, owing to the monsoon, he did not anchor off
Fort St. David imtil April 28th. Having eleven vessels, the French
cut off the escape of H.M.S. Bridgewater, 24, Captain John Stanton,
and Triton, 24, Captain Thomas Manning, which were lying there,
and which, to save them frona capture, were run ashore and burnt.
D'Ache detached thence the Comte de Provence, 74, and the Dili-
gente, 24, to carry to Pondicherry M. de Lally, the new governor of
the French East India possessions. On the 29th, at 9 a.m., ere the
detachment had disappeared, Pocock sighted the French squadron
which then consisted of eight ^ ships fit for the line, whereas the
British consisted of only seven. ^ Pocock signalled for a general
chase ; upon which the French weighed and stood out to sea
E. by N., with the wind from the S.E. At 12.30 p.m. Pocock got
within three miles of the enemy, who waited for him in line of battle
ahead. He then hauled down the signal for a general chase and
' Xine were actually put into line by the French.
- British axd French Squadrons in the Action off Cuddalore
ON April 29th, IT-^s.
British.
Fkenoh.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Shijis.
Guns. 1 Commanders.
Tiger
60
Capt. Thomas Latham.
Bien Ainu- . . .
.is' ' Capt. de La P.allieie.
Salishiiry . . .
50
( „ John tftukley
I Somerset.
Vr7i(/eur ....
64 > „ Bouvet (2").
Conde ....
441 1 „ de Rosbau.
iCommfHl Charles Stevens,
^Capt. Richard Kemptn-
1 felt.
Due d'Orleans . .
561 „ de Surville (2).
Elizabeth . . .
64
'■ Zodiaque . . .
M, (Comte d'Ache.
(Capt. Gotho.
iVice-.\dmiral George
St. Louis . . .
501 ,, .loaunis.
Tarmoutk .
64
). Pocock.
Moras ....
441 1 ,, Bee de Lievre.
fCapt. John Harrison.
Sylphide. . . .
36 , „ Mahe.
Cumherland
!)6
,, William Brereton.
Dae de Bourgoyne.
60 1 „ d'Apret.
MuxaHle. . . .
50
,, George Legge.
Weymouth .
60
„ JJicholas Viuceut.
Comte de Provence.
74 ,. de La Chaise.
DiUgente . . .
24
Queenboroiiffh .
24
„ Hon. James Colville.
Protector, storcsbip
1 Umis actually m(.'uute l. Each of these ships could, aul later did, carry mure.
1758.] POCOCK AND TrACIIK OFF CUDDALOliE. 175
made that for line of battle aliead, with the ships at a distance of
half a cable apart. The Cumherland and Tiger, sailing badly, did
not get into their positions until '2.15, when Pocock bore down on
the Zodiaque, d'Ache's flagship, which occupied the centre of the
French line. The captains of the Newcastle and Weymouth un-
fortunately mistook the signal for the line, and did not close up to
the ships ahead of them ; and, when the Vice-Admiral signalled for
closer action, these ships did not obey. The enemy opened fire as
the British approached. The Cumberland was so long in getting up
that the Vice-Admiral, and the three ships ahead of him, had, for
some time, had to sustain the whole fire of the French. Yet, Pocock
did not return a shot until his ship had hauled up exactly abreast of
the Zodiaque, and then, at 3.55 p.m., he made the signal to engage.
Commodore Stevens, with the ships ahead of the Vice-Admiral,
behaved magnificently, but the three ships astern did not properly
support the van. This might have been serious, and even fatal, if
there had not been corresponding mistakes and derelictions of duty
on the French side. The captain of the Due de Bourgogne took up
a post behind the French line, and, in the most cowardly manner,
fired across it at the British ; and the Sijlphide, 36, a weak ship,
which seems to have improperly found a place in the line, was
driven out of it at the first broadside The Conde lost her rudder,
and was also obliged to fall out. In the van and centre, however, the
action was for the most part fought with the greatest determination
on both sides. In her somewhat belated attempts to get into action,
the Cumberland nearly fouled the Yarmouth, and forced her to back
her topsails, thus obliging the Neuxastle and the Wcgmouth'to back
theirs hkewise. But when the Cumherland had at length gained
her station, the Newcastle held back, in spite of signals from the
Vice-Admiral, and in spite of the WeijmoutJi's hailing her to close
up ; whereupon the Weymouth hai^led her wind and, passing to vdnd-
ward of the Neivcastle, got into line ahead of her and quickly obliged
the Moras to bear away. The Cumberland in the meanwhile en-
gaged the St. Louis, so materially relieving the Yarmouth.
In the height of the engagement explosions of powder on board
both the Zodiaque and the Bieii Aime caused some confusion.
D'Ache signalled for those of his ships which had withdrawn to
return to the action ; but they paid no attention. Still the fight was
hot, and the Tiger was very hard pressed until she was assisted
by the Salisbury and Eli-abetJi. As the battle neared its termiua-
176 MAJOR oi'EHatkjns, 1714-1762. [1758.
tion, the ship and frigate which had been detached by d'Ache to
I'ondicherry, and which M. de Lally had refused to allow to
return at once, although d'Ach^ had signalled for them, were coming
up ; but, the British rear then closing somewhat, and the fugitive
French vessels not rejoining, d'Ache at about 6 p.m. bore down to
his friends, and then, hauling his wind, made for Pondicherry. His
final movement, which seems to be thus rightly interpreted, appeared
to Pocock to have a different significance ; for he wrote : —
" At half-past four p.m. the rear of tlie French line had drawn pretty close up to
their flagship. Our three rear ships were signalled to engage closer. Soon after,
M. d'Ache broke the line and put before the wind. His second astern, who had kept
on the Yarmouth's quarter most part of the action, then carue up alongside, gave his
fire, and then bore away ; and a few minutes after the enemy's van bore away also."
From this, as Captain Mahan points out, it would appear that
the French deliberately, before leaving the scene of the action,
effected upon the principal English ship a movement of concentra-
tion, defiling past her.'
Pocock hauled down the signal to engage, and rehoisted that for
a general chase ; but such of his ships as had fought well were too
disabled to come up with the enemy, and, night approaching, he
stood to the southward with a view of keeping to the windward of
the enemy, and of being able to engage him in the morning, if the
French did not weather the British. With this object he ordered
the Queenhorough, 24, ahead to observe the enemy ; and he con-
tinued to endeavour to work up after the French until fi a.m. on
May 1st, when, as he lost ground and pursuit appeared to be useless,
he anchored three miles south of Sadras.
In this battle, which was fought about twenty-one miles from
Lampraavy, the British had lost '29 killed and 89 wounded. At
10 P.M. on the day of the action, the French anchored off Lam-
praavy. There, owing to the loss of her anchors and to damage to
her cables, the Bien Ainie drove ashore and was WTecked ; all her
crew, however, being saved. In the engagement the French had
suffered far more severely than the British, having lost 162 killed,
and 860 wounded ; for the ships had been full of troops and the
English fire had been directed, as usual, against the hulls rather
than against the rigging. D'Ache afterwards proceeded to Pondi-
cherry, where he lauded 1200 sick, and superseded M. d'Apret,
captain of the Due de Bourgogne, by M. Bouvet. It seems to have
1 ' Tnfl. of Sea Power,' iiOi^.
1758.] B'ACJJJ-J AT rONDlVlIEUliY. 177
been chiefly owing to the backwiU'dncss of the captains in the
British rear that the French were not completely defeated.
At about the time of the action, the French on land had taken
Cuddalore, the garrison of which was allowed to retire to Fort
St. David. That place was soon afterwards besieged by M. de Lally.
Pocock received some additional men from Madras, including eighty
lascars, and, having repaired the worst damages of his ships, tried in
vain to work up along the coast. He then stood to sea, and on
May 10th had stretched as far south as lat. 9° 30', whence he
endeavoured to fetch to the windward of Fort St. David ; but,
standing in, he met with a strong west wind, and, being unable to
get higher than Lampraavy, he anchored there on May '26th. On
the 30th he sighted Pondicherry, and saw the French squadron in
the road.
D'Ache, upon descrying the British, called a council of war,
which decided that the ships should remain moored close under the
batteries to await attack ; but M. de Lally, arriving from before
Fort St. David, insisted that the British should be met at sea, and
sent out to the fleet 400 lascars as a reinforcement. As de Lally
had the supreme command in India, d'Ache weighed with eight ships
of the line and a frigate ; yet, instead of bearing down on Pocock,
who could not work up to him, he kept his wind and plied for Fort
St. David, whither de Lally returned by land to prosecute the siege.
But no sooner had de Lally departed than the governor and council
of Pondicherry, who had full powers during de Lally's absence,
recalled d'Ache to protect their town. This order was most service-
able to the British ; for, soon after the return of the French squadron,
three valuable East India Company's ships, which must otherwise
have been taken, got safely into Madras.
Chiefly owing to the bad sailing of the Cumberland, Pocock failed
to get up with the French squadron. On the 6th he heard that
Fort St. George was likely to be invested ; and, realizing that should
this be so, his ships would be unable to re-water on the coast, he
made for Madras, where he brought his defaulting captains to court-
martial. Captain George Legge, of the Newcastle, was dismissed
the service ; Captain Nicholas Vincent, of the Weymouth, was dis-
missed his ship; and Captain William Brereton, of the Cumberland,
was sentenced to the loss of one year's seniority as a post-captain.
Fort St. David capitulated on June 2nd, and M. de Lally destroyed
the place. Had he then gone at once to Madras, he could have
VOL. III. N
178 MAJOn OVEllATIONIi, 1714-1762. [1758.
taken it easily ; but he delayed, and, in the interval, Fort-8t. George
was considerably strengthened. Instead of going to Madras, he
attacked Tanjore, in order to obtain payment of some money which
had been promised by the king to M. Dupleix in 1749. Before
Tanjore, his army, weakened by sickness and want of provisions,
was defeated ; and, being obliged to raise the siege and to retire,
closely pursued by his native opponents, he had some difficulty in
reaching Carical. On his retreat thither he learnt that d'Ache,
then off Pondicherry, had intimated his intention of proceeding to
Mauritius. He therefore sent to remonstrate with the French
commodore, and was thus able to induce him to postpone his
departure.
Vice-Admiral Pocock refitted, and, on July '25th, sailed with a
favourable wind southward along the shore to seek the enemy. On
the 26th he anchored off Lampraavy, where he took or bm-ut some
small craft of the enemy. On the evening of the 27th he got within
nine miles of Pondicherry, and saw the French fleet at anchor in
the road. On the 28th, at 10 a.m., the French got under sail and
stood to the southward with a land breeze ; on which Pocock
signalled for a general chase ; but the enemy kept to windward and
anchored early next morning off Porto Novo. When the land breeze
arose, the French weighed and stood to windward ; and at about
8 A.M. were out of sight. In the afternoon Pocock burnt the French
ship Bestitution, a British prize, off Porto Novo. At 10 a.m. on
August 1st he again sighted d'Ache, who was getting under sail off
Tranquebar, and who soon afterwards fonned his line of battle
ahead with starboard tacks on board, and seemed to edge down
towards the British. But when Pocock made sail and stood for the
French, they hauled on a wind. At about 1 p.m., however, they
formed line of battle abreast and bore down on Pocock under easy
sail. He, at 1.30, signalled for a line of battle ahead with the
starboard tacks on board, and stood to the eastward under topsails,
or with the maintopsails square so as to allow his ships to take
station, in waiting for the enemy. At 5 p.m. the French van was
abreast of the British centre at a distance of about two miles. The
enemy stood on till his van was abreast of the British van, and then
kept at about that distance until (5.30, when he hoisted his topsails,
set his courses, and stood to the south-east. Admiral Pocock
signalled to his van to fill and stand on, and made sail to the south-
ward, keeping his line until midnight, when he judged the French
1758.]
POCOCK AND D'AOr/Ji OFF NFGAI'ATJM.
179
to have tacked. He then signalled the fleet to wear, and stood after
the enemy to the westward. But, at daylight on the 2nd, the enemy
was not to be seen. In the evening, however, four sails were sighted
inshore to the north-west; and on the 3rd, at 5 a.m., the British
sighted the French fleet off Negapatam, about three miles to wind-
ward, formed in line of battle ahead, with the starboard tacks on
board.'
Pocock also formed his line of battle ahead on the starboard tack,
and stood towards the French ; and, seeing that the Comte cle
Provence, 74, led their van, he ordered the Elizabeth, 64, to take the
place of the Tiger, 60, an inferior ship, as the leader of his own line.
At 11 A.M., the wind dying awa}% the British were becalmed ; though
the enemy still had a light breeze from off the land, and, with it,
stood on, their line stretching from east to west. On that course the
French passed at right angles so close to the rear of the British that
they might almost have cut oft' the Cumherhttid and Newcastle, the
sternmost ships. At noon a sea breeze sprang up, and gave Pocock
the weather-gage. Both fleets thereupon formed line afresh ; and at
12.20 P.M. Pocock signalled to bear down and engage.
The Elizabeth and Comte cle Provence began the action ; l)ut, the
latter's mizen catching fire, she had to quit the line and cut away
the mast. The French charge Pocock with throwing inflammables
on board of them ; but the Vice- Admiral does not seem to have taken
any special measures for setting his opponents on fire, though
certainly in this battle they were unusually unfortunate in that
respect. The Elizabeth's next opponent was the Due de Bourgogne,
which, being hardly pressed, would have been assisted by the
' List of the British akd French Squadrons in the Action- off
Negapatam, on August 3Rn, 17.58.
Bkiti
SH.
Fkench.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
Ships.
Guus.
Commanders.
Tarvwuth .
Elisabeth . . .
Tiger
Weymouth .
Cumberland . .
Salisbury . . .
Newcastle. . . .
64
64
60
60
56
50
50
24
iVice-Adm. (leorge Po-
l cock.
iCapt. John Harrison.
K.:ommoci. Charles Stevens.
<Capt. llichard Kempeu-
1 felt.
„ Thomas Latham.
f ,, John Stukley
l Somerset.
,, William Martin (2).
„ Williaui Brereton.
,. Hon, Jamest'olville.
„ DigbyDent(3)
Zodiaque . .
Comte de Provence
St. Louis . .
Vengeur. . .
Due d'Orleans .
Due de Bourgogne
Condii . . .
Moras . . .
Diltgente . .
74
64
64
60
60
50
50
24
Comte d'Acbo.
Capt. de La Chaise.
„ de La Palliere.
„ de Surville (2).
„ Bouvet (2).
,, Bee de Lievi-e.
Queenhorouyh .
N 2
180
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1758.
Zodiaque, had not the latter had her wheel carried away by a shot
from the Yarmouth, her first antagonist. To repair it, she went
under the lee of the Due d'Orlcans; but, as soon as she returned to
the line, one of her lower-deck guns burst, and a fire broke out near
her powder room. In the consequent confusion, her new steering
gear gave way, so causing the ship to fall on board the Due
crOrlcaits ; and, while the two ships were entangled together, both
KEAK-AIlJIIKAL IlICHAIlIi KEMrEN'FELT.
{From a lithofirajihrii i'f/(jr<m/t<j hy liidhnj.)
were heavily cannonaded with impunity by the Yarmouth and Tiger.
By that time the Conde and Moras had been driven out of the line ;
and, at 2.8 p.m., the Zodiaque being free, M. d'Ache bore away. He
was followed in about a quarter of an hour by the rest of his ships.
Pocock signalled for closer action ; and the retiring enemj^ was
badly mauled as he went off under all possible sail. The signal for
a general chase followed ; whereupon the French cut away the boats
which most of them had towing astern ; and crowded to the N.N.W.
1758.] D'ACHE RETIRES TO MAURITIUS. 181
A running fight was maintained till about 3 p.m., when the French
were out of range. Pocock, however, pursued until dark, and, at
about 8 P.M., anchored three miles off Carical, while the Frencli
pursued their course to Pondicherry.
The fight, considering its indecisive character, was a very bloody
one, especially on the side of the French, who lost '250 killed and
000 wounded. The Zodiaquc alone lost 188 killed or dangerously
wounded. On the British side, however, only 31 were killed and
166 wounded. Both d'Ache and Pocock received slight injuries ;
and Commodore Stevens had a musket wound in his shoulder.
Aloft the British suffered more than the French ; and, had the
weather not been fine, many of them must have lost their masts.
D'Ache refitted at Pondicherry ; and, being apprehensive of an
attack there, anchored his ships close under the town and forts.
Feeling also that he could not, in his then state, again fight the
British, and that his remaining on the coast might lead to disaster,
he again announced his intention of proceeding to Mauritius. M. de
Lally and the French military and civil officers were astounded at
this new determination, and endeavoured to dissuade him ; but he
was supported by his captains, and, having landed 500 marines and
seamen to reinforce the army on shore, he sailed for his destination
on September 3rd. Pocock could not l)elieve that d'Ache had any
idea of withdrawing from the scene of operations, and sujDposed that
he would presently set out on a cruise. The Queenhorough, 24, was
therefore despatched to get news of the French ; but she failed to
obtain any. The British sailed from Madras on August '20th for
Bombay, calling at Trincomale for water. The Admiral ordei'ed the
Revenge, a Company's ship, to cruise off that port ; and she actually
sighted, and was chased by, d'Ache on his way to Mauritius ; but,
though the British put to sea, they could not come up with the
enemy. Pocock afterwards continued his voyage to Bombay.
In spite of the withdrawal of d'Ache, between whom and
M. de Lally the worst possible relations existed, the latter continued
his activity, and on December 14th laid siege to Madras. The town
was hard pressed, when, on February 16th, 1759, Captain Eichard
Kempenfelt, with two twenty-gun ships and six other vessels,
containing men and stores, arrived. Early on the 17th de Lally
raised the siege, retiring in such haste that he left behind him much
of his siege artillery, and large quantities of stores and ammunition.
It was a remarkable and dramatic instance of the influence of sea
182 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-176!^. [1758.
power upon history. Had d'Ache held the sea, and had he been in
a position to prevent the arrival of reinforcements and stores, the
place must have fallen. The raising of the siege of Madras may be
said to mark the beginning of the end of French dreams of empire
in India.
On the Leeward Islands' station, where Commodore John
Moore (1) commanded in 1758, no fleet action or engagement of
much moment happened during the year ; but there was great and
commendable activity ; and more than one of the transactions in
those seas will be found noticed in the next chapter.
On the Jamaica station, hkewise, there were very few events of
importance, though the enemy's trade suffered severely, thanks to
the excellent dispositions of Vice-Admiral Thomas Cotes and to the
vigilance of his cruisers.
It has been seen that in North America preparations had been
made for a new attack on Louisbourg. Eear-Admiral Sir Charles
Hardy (2) placed himself off that port as soon as the season permitted ;
but, owing to fog and gales, he was unable to prevent the entry into
the harbour of M. du Chaffault, who took out a strong squadron
from Brest. Du Chaffault, however, fearing to be blockaded, left
there six ships of the line and some frigates under M. de Beaussier
to assist in the defence, and himself went to Quebec. Hardy only
succeeded in intercepting the Foudroyant, 22, and a few other
French craft bound up the St. Lawrence. The Foudroijant pluckily
stood a short action with, the Captain, 64, ere she surrendered. She
had on board a large amount of very valuable stores.
Admiral the Hon. Edward Boscawen, who had been appointed
to the command of the expedition against Louisboui-g, sailed from
Portsmouth in February. At the verj^ commencement of his voyage
he lost the Invincible, 74, Captain John Bentley, which, missing
stays, ran on a shoal east of St. Helen's and became a total loss.
But the Dublin, 74, was as quickly as possible substituted for
her by the Admiralty ; and she carried out Major-General Jeffi-ey
Amherst, who was to command the mihtary forces. The Dublin
met Boscawen on May 28th, as he was coming out of Halifax with
his fleet ; but, being very sickty, she went on into port, while
Boscawen with his whole force, numbering in aU one hundred and
sixtj'-seven sail of various kinds, made for Gabarus Baj'. The fleet
was dispersed by bad weather, and the main part of it did not reach
the rendezvous until June 2nd. Among the celebrated men who
1758.] CAl'TUltE OF LOUISBOUBG. 183
shared in this expedition were George Brydges Eodncy, Edward
Hughes, later the opponent of Suffren, and James Wolfe, the hero
of Quebec.
The French were found to be well prepared, Louisbourg being
very thoroughly fortified, especially on the sea face. Between the
day of his arrival and January 8th, General Amherst several times
caused the troops to be put into the boats, ready for landing ; but
on each occasion he was compelled by the state of the surf to desist
and to re-embark them. In the interval the enemy was busy on
his defences, and never omitted to fire on the ships when they
ventured within range. On the 8th the army was again put into
the boats ; and it was decided to make three separate attacks.
Those on the centre and right were intended as feints or diversions,
• and were to be made in Freshwater Cove and on White Point
respectively. That on the left was to be the real attack. It was
made under Brigadier-General Wolfe, under cover of the Kenning-
ton, 28, Captain Dudley Digges, and Halifax, 12. The Diana, 36,
Captain Alexander Schomberg, Gramont, 18, Commander John
Stott, and Shannon, 36, Captain Charles Meadows,' covered the feint
in the centre ; and the Sutherland, 50, Captain John Eous, and
Squirrel, 20, Commander John Cleland (1), the feint on the right.
These ships, as soon as they had taken up their stations, began
a hot cannonade ; and, a quarter of an hour later, Wolfe's division
landed in the steadiest manner through the surf under a heavy fire.
Many men were unavoidably drowned through the oversetting of
boats, and much ammunition was wetted ; but the troops, fixing their
bayonets, drove the defenders from their position near the beach ;
and, before night, all the other troops had been landed. Almost
immediately afterwards the wind arose, and communication with the
fleet was cut off for several days. Siege operations were begun on
June 13th, the troops being at first much annoyed by the fire of
the French ships in the harbour. The Admiral landed his Marines
to assist. On the 28th the enemy sank the Apollon, 50, Fidele, 36,
Biche, 16, and Chevre, 16, in the mouth of the harbour to blockade
the entrance ; and on July Uth he made a vigorous but ineffectual
night sortie. On July 21st the Entreprenant, 74, one of the largest
French ships in the harbour, took fire, blew up and set in flames two
' Properly Medows, but the Navy List spelling is Meadows. This geutleman,
afterwards known as Charles I'ierrepont, became Viscount Newark and Earl Mauvers.
He resigned while yet a captain, and died in 1816.
184
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1711-1762.
[1758.
more ships of the hne, the CeUhre, 64, and the Cwpricieux, 64.
All three eventually become total losses. The fire from the two
remaining ships of the line being still troublesome, Boscawen, on
the night of the 25th, sent into the harbour in boats 600 seamen,
under Captains John Laforey and George Balfour ; and these, in
spite of a very fierce fire from the vessels and batteries, executed
their mission. Laforey took the Prudent, 74, which, being aground,
he burnt. Balfour carried the Bieiifaisant, 64, and towed her into
the north-east harbour. This decided the issue. Boscawen was
making preparations to send in six ships of the line, when the
governor proposed terms ; and, after a brief correspondence, the
place was surrendered on the '26th. About 3600 combatants
became prisoners of war ; and 216 guns, besides mortars, were
taken. With Louisbourg was siu-rendered, not only the island of
Cape Breton, but also that of St. John.^ Boscawen sent home
Captain the Hon. George Edgcumbe with the naval dispatches.
The colours which were captured were placed in St. Paul's
Cathedral.
Immediately after the fall of the place, Boscawen sent Bear-
Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (2) , with seven ships of the line, to destroy
the French settlements at Miramichi, Gaspee, etc., General Wolfe
' The island of St. John was renamed Prince Edward's Island in 1709, in lionour
of Prince Edward, Dnke of Kent, and father of H.Jl. Queen A'ictoria.
1758.] BOSCAWEN AND I)U CIIAFFAULT. 185
accompanying him. Some ships were also sent to the island of
St. John, with a garrison for it. General Amherst, who heard at
about that time of the repulse of Abercrombie at Ticonderoga,
embarked six battalions under convoy of the Captain, (54, for
Boston, and then marched for Lake George. Boscawen left Mr.
Durell, who in the meantime had been promoted to be a Kear-
Admiral, with a part of the squadron, to winter in America, and
himself sailed for England. On his passage, his squadron became
separated, so that when, on October 27th, as he was entering
the Soundings, he sighted the French squadron returning from
Quebec under M. du Chaffault, he had with him in company only the
Namur, 90, (flag). Captain Matthew Buckle (1), Boijal William, 84,
C0MMEM0R.4TIVE MEDAL OF THE TAPTURE OF LOUISBOURG, 17.58.
[From nn original liindhj lent bij n.S.H. CiipUiin Friiice Louis of Batteiiberg. Ji.X.)
Captain Thomas Evans, Somerset, 64, Captain Edward Hughes,
Bienfaisant, 64, Captain George Balfour, Boreas, 28, Captain the
Hon. Eobert Boyle Walsingham, Trent, 28, Captain John Lindsay,
Echo, 28, Captain John Laforey, with two fireships ; and the
Bienfaisant was useless, having but a few rounds of powder on
board. The French squadron consisted of the Tonnant, 80,
Intrepide, 74, Heros, 74, Protee, 64, and Belliqiteux, (54, besides a
frigate, and the Carnarvon, a captured British East Indiaman. The
enemy, being on the contrary tack, passed the British squadron, very
near, to leeward ; and, in passing, discharged his broadsides.
Some of the British ships returned the fire ; but, the wind blowing
hard, most of the vessels could not open their lower ports ; and
thus, in this partial action, very little damage was done. Boscawen,
in spite of the superiority of the French, changed his course and
186 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1702. [1758.
stood after them. The night was verj' stormy ; but, on the follow-
ing morning, the enemy was again discovered, though his force
then consisted of only four ships of the line and a frigate, one
ship of the line having evidently lost company in the darkness.
Boscawen also had lost sight of all his frigates. He nevertheless
renewed the chase ; yet, although there was at first no great
distance between the squadrons, the British did not gain ground.
The only prize made was the Carnarvon. The rest of the French
ships got away. One of them, the BelUqueux, was afterwards taken
off Ilfracombe by the Antelope, .50. Boscawen arrived at Spithead
on November 1st.
For their services in North America both Boscawen and Amherst
received the thanks of the House of Commons. The conquest
which had been effected, besides being very important in itself, had
involved a loss to the enemy of six ships of the hne and five frigates,^
and had deprived France of one of her best fisheries, and of a
valuable station for the privateers which long had preyed on the
coast commerce of the American colonies. It paved the way for
future British successes on the North American continent, and
sounded the death knell of the French dominion there. In fact,
just as the raising of the siege of Madras was the turning point of
the struggle in India, so the capture of Louisbourg was the turning
point of the struggle in North America ; and both results were
brought about by the force of sea power.
It has been said that in 1758 a small sqiiadron under Captain
Henry Marsh was despatched against the French settlements in
West Africa. It is curious to note that this belligerent expedition
was first suggested by a Quaker, Mr. Thomas Cumming, who had
been on the coast, and who knew some of the native princes. One
of these had promised his co-operation against Goree and Senegal,
and had undertaken, in case of the success of the adventure, to
grant exclusive trading privileges to British subjects. Cumming
represented that a force of a certain strength would be required for
the service ; but the administration unwisely cut down his estimates,
and repeatedly deferred action, until Mr. Samuel Touchet, an
influential London merchant, warmly seconded the project. The
force finally assigned for the service consisted of the Harwich, 50,
' In addition to the three frigates sunlc in the mouth of the harbour by the enemy,
the Diane (renamed Diana), 36, had been taken by Sir Charles Hardy (2), and tlie
Echo, 28, had been captured by the Juno and Scarborough.
1758.] CAPTURE OF SENEGAL. 187
Commodore Henry Marsh, the Nassau, 64, Captain James Sayer,
the Rijc, '20, Commander Daniel Uering, the Swan, 16, Commander
Jacob Lobb, and the two eight-gun busses, London and Portsmouth,
Commanders Archibald Millar and James Orrok, together with five
small hired vessels carrying from fonr to eight guns apiece. The
troops included 200 Marines under Major Mason, and a detachment
of artillery with ten guns and eight mortars. Mr. Gumming
accompanied the expedition, which sailed from Plymouth on
March 9, 1758.
From Tenerife, where the squadron called for wine and water,
Mr. Cumming, in the Sican, went on in advance to arrange for
assistance from the natives ; but, before he could conclude matters,
the squadron itself arrived on the coast. Marsh decided not to
wait for negotiations, but at once to proceed ; and on April 23rd,
he reached the mouth of the river Senegal, and sighted the
French flag flyiirg on Fort Louis in midstream, twelve miles
above the bar.
The enemy had armed a brig and six sloops, and had placed them
above the bar to defend the channel through it. These much
annoyed the British boats, which went in to sound. In the mean-
time troops were put into the small craft. On the 29th the Swan,
with the busses and armed vessels, weighed and made up the river
with a fair wind. The London, and some of the small craft, were
wrecked on the bar ; but no lives were lost ; and most of the rest of
the vessels got in safely, and made for the enemy's ships, which
promptly retired under the guns of the fort. On May 1st the work
surrendered ; but the actual handing over of the place was delayed,
owing to the action of the natives, w-ho, not thinking that their
interests had been sufficiently secured, blockaded the French. The
difficulty being got over, the fort was occupied. In it ninety-two
guns were found ; and, with it, sixteen craft of various sizes were
given up. The entire estimated value of the capture was about
.£200, 000. Podor, and other stations further up the river, were
included in the capitulation. For his services Mr. Cumming was
granted a pension during his lifetime. These possessions had long
supplied negro slaves to the French settlements in the West Indies ;
and for that reason their loss was soon severely felt.
Commodore Marsh, leaving a few small vessels on the spot,
sailed next to attack Goree, about ninety miles to the southward.
He arrived off the island on May 24th, and at once began a hot
188 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758.
cannonade, having anchored his ships with springs on their cahles.
But he had miscalcuhited the strength of the defence ; and in ahout
two hours and a half he had to signal his little squadron to cut, as
the rigging and spars, as well as the hulls, were badly mauled, and
about twenty men were killed, and forty wounded. This check was
owing purely to the inadequacy of the force employed ; and towards
the end of the year, the Government sent out a stronger squadron
to complete Commodore Marsh's work. In the meantime the
Nassau, SuKm and Portsmouth returned to England, with such
trade as was bound thither ; and, later, the Bye sailed with a convoy
for the Leeward Islands. Marsh himseK escorted the trade which
was bound for Jamaica.
The new expedition was entrusted to Commodore the Hon.
Augustus Keppel, who hoisted his broad pennant in the Torbay, 74,
Captain Thomas Owen, and who had under him the Nassau, 64,
Captain James Sayer, the Fougueux, Captain Joseph Knight, the
Dunkirk, (iO, Captain the Hon. Eobert Digby, the Lichfield, 50,
Captain Matthew Barton, the Prince Edward, 44, Captain William
Fortescue, the Experiment, 20, Captain John Carter Allen, the
Boman Emperor, 20, Commander William Newsom, the Saltash, 14,
Commander Walter Stirling, and the two bombs, Firedrake,
Commander James Orrok, and Furnace, Commander Jonathan
Faulknor (1). At Cork he picked up troops, under Lieut. -Colonel
Worge, who had been appointed governor of Senegal ; and, after
some delay, he finalh' sailed thence on November 11th, 1758.
In the early morning of November 29th, owing to an error in
reckoning caused by bad weather, the Lichfield ran ashore on the
coast of Marocco, and became a total loss.^ On the same occasion
a transport also went to pieces. On December 28th, after having
made a short stay at Santa Cruz, in the Canaries, the squadron
sighted Goree, and at 3 p.m. anchored in the road in eighteen
fathoms of water, the island bearing S.W. by S. distant about four
miles. The Saltash and the transports containing the troops were
sent into the bay between Point Goree and Point Barrabas ; and,
early on the 29th, the troops from them were disembarked in boats
in readiness to land on the island upon signal being made by the
Commodore. Most of the ships gradually took up their assigned
' There was uiifoi'tunatelj' some loss of life. The survivors were detained b}' the
Sultan of Marocco until ransomed, with other British subjects, for 170,000 doUars.
Captain Barton was tried for the loss of his ship, and honourably acquitted
1758.] CAPTURE OF OOREE. 189
positions on the west or leeward side of Goree, and moored bead
and stern under a heavy fire. At 9 a.m. the attack was begun by
the Prince Edward ; but the cannonade was not general until about
noon, some of the vessels experiencing difficulty in taking up their
stations. The bombardment was then rapidly effective ; for, after
a brief parley, followed by an almost equally short renewal of the
action, the enemy surrendered; whereupon Keppel landed his Marines
to take possession. About three hundred French, and many negroes,
became prisoners of war. The British loss was inconsiderable.
After escorting Colonel Worge to Senegal, and cruising for a short
time off the coast, the Commodore returned to England.
In the Mediterranean Admiral Henry Osl)orn and Eear-Admiral
Charles Saunders commanded. The French had on several occasions
discovered the wisdom and advantage of despatching in winter
their reinforcements of ships and troops for abroad, since they
found that the British blockading squadrons and squadrons of
observation were frequently prevented at that season by fogs or
bad weather from obtaining touch of the outward-bound detach-
ments. But one of their divisions which, under M. de La Clue,
left Toulon in December, 1757, for North America and the West
Indies, was forced by the vigilance of Admiral Osborn into Cartagena,
and was there blockaded. The French Government, in response
to M. de La Clue's representations, sent five ships of the line and
a frigate, under M. Duquesne, to endeavour to join him there, and
then to assist him in breaking the blockade. Two of the line-of-
battleships succeeded in getting in, but the rest of the force was
not so fortunate. On February 28th, off Cape de Gata, Osborn
at daybreak sighted four strange sail near his fleet, and ordered
them to be chased. The French ships separated, but each was
pursued. At 7 p.m. the Revenge, 64, Captain John Storr, brought
the Orphec, 64, to action; and, on the Benrick, 64, coming up,
the enemy struck. In the Bevenge, thirty-three were killed and fifty-
four wounded, among the latter being Captain Storr. The Orphee
was but six miles from Cartagena when she hauled down. Meanwhile
the Monmouth, 64, Captain Arthur Gardiner, the Siviftsure, 70,
Captain Thomas Stanhope, and the Hampton Court, 64, Captain the
Hon. Augustus John Hervey, chased the largest of the enemy, the
Foudroyant, 84, flag ship of Duquesne. The Monmouth, being
far ahead of her consorts, got up with and engaged the enemy
at 8 P.M. and fought her gallanth'. When Gardiner fell his place
190 MAJOlt OPKHATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1758.
was taken by Lieutenant Kobert Carkett,' till 12. 30 a.m., when
the Frenchman's guns were reduced to silence. Not until then
was the Swiftsure able to get up. Captain Stanhope hailed the
foe to know whether she had surrendered, but was answered with
a few guns and a volley of small arms, whereupon he poured in
a broadside and part of a second, and the enemy promptly sur-
rendered. She had 100 killed and 90 wounded, while the Monmouth
lost only 28 killed and 79 wounded. It was a magnificently con-
ducted action, and Lieutenant Carkett was deservedly rewarded
with the command of the prize. ^Vhen measured, at Gibraltar,
she was found to be 185 feet 3 inches in length from stem to
taffrail, and to have a length of keel of 1-5.5 feet. She was thus
about 12 feet longer than the large British first-rates of her day.
Moreover she caiTied 24 and 42-pormders, whereas the Monmouth
was armed only with 12 and 24-pounders.
As for the other French vessels, one, the Orlfiamme, 50, was
driven ashore by the Monarch, 74, Captain John Montagu, and
the Montagu, 64, Captain Joshua Eowley. The last, the Pleiade, 26,
escaped by superior sailing.
Eear-Admiral Saunders was relieved in the spring by Eear-
Admiral Thomas JBroderick (W.), who went out in the Prince
George, 80, Captain Joseph Peyton (1), which was unhappily burnt
by accident on April 13th with a loss of 485 lives. Osborn con-
tinued to blockade the French in Cartagena until he was obliged
to go to Gibraltar to refit, leaving only some frigates to look out
off the port. M. de La Clue then escaped and returned to Toulon.
A little later Osborn, being in bad health, had to resign his
command. He was succeeded by Eear-Admiral Broderick.
The part borne by H.M.S. Seahorse and Sto?nbolo, under
Commodore Charles Holmes, in obliging the French and Austrians
to evacuate Emden in March, 1758, scarcely merits detailed descrip-
tion here. Suffice it to say that the service was creditably performed.
Other events in waters near home must, however, be described at
some length.
Learning in the spring of the year that the French were fitting
out a considerable squadron to escort a convoy to America from
Isle d'Aix, the Admiralty ordered Admiral Sir Edward Hawke to
' Lieutenant, 1745. Captain, for this service, March 12th, 1758. Cominanded
Stirling Castle, 64, iu Byron's action, 1779, and in Rodney's action in the West Indies,
1780, and was lost in her in the hurricane of October lOtli, 1780.
1758.] HAWKi: OFF JSLK D'AIX. VM
endeavour to intercept it. He sailed from S[)itbead on Marcli 11th
with seven ships of the line and three frigates, and on the night
of April 3rd arrived off the island. At 3 o'clock next morning he
steered for Basque Koad, and at daylight sighted a number of
vessels, escorted by three frigates, some miles to windward. He
gave chase but they got into St. Martin, Ehe, except one brig,
which was driven ashore and burnt by the Hussar, 28, Captain
John Elliot. At about 4 p.m. Hawke discovered, lying off Aix,
the French men-of-war Florissant, 74, Sphinx, 64, Hardi, 64,
Dragon, 64, and Wanrick, (JO, l^esides six or seven frigates, and
about forty merchantman, which had on board 3000 troops. At
4.30 the Admiral signalled for a general chase, and at five the
enemy began to slip or cut in great confusion, and to run. At six
the British headmost ships were little more than a gunshot from the
rearmost of the French ; but, by that time, when many of the
merchantmen were already aground on the mud, the pursuers
were in very shoal water ; and, further pursuit being dangerous,
and night coming on, Hawke anchored abreast of the island. On
the morning of the 5th nearly all the French flotilla were seen
aground four or five miles away, several being on their broadsides.
When the flood made the Admiral sent in the Intrepid, 64, Captain
Edward Pratten, and the Medway, GO, Captain Charles Proby,
with his best pilots, as far as the water would serve ; and ordered
them to anchor there. They did so in about five fathoms, of which
three fathoms were due to the rise of the tide. The enemy was
very busy in lightening his ships, and in hauling and towing such of
them as coiild be moved towards the mouth of the Eiver Charente ;
and by evening some of the French men-of-war had been got thither.
The British frigates did what they could, by destroying the buoys
which they had laid down over their jettisoned guns and gear,
to prevent the ultimate salving of the merchaiat vessels. That day
150 Marines were put ashore on Isle d'Aix ; and, under Captain
Ewer, they destroyed the works there and safely re-embarked.
Hawke sailed on the 6th, having effectually prevented the despatch
of supplies to America, and, it may be, so facilitated the conquest
of Cape Breton and its dependencies.
A greater continental expedition, consisting of two squadrons
of men-of-war, and about 14,000 troops, under Lieut. -General the
Duke of Marlborough, was prepared somewhat later in the year.
One naval squadron, which was designed to directly co-operate
192 MAJOR Ol'EBATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758.
with the army, was entrusted to Commodore the Hon. Kichard
Howe. The other squadron, composed of upwards of twenty sail
of the Hne, was commanded by Admiral Lord Anson, having under
him Admiral Sir Edward Hawke. This force was intended to
cruise off Brest and to prevent any French squadron from inter-
fering with the operations of Howe and Marlborough. As on some
previous occasions, the main object of the projected demonstration
on the coast of France was to divert French attention, and, by
calling off troops from elsewhere, to assist the King of Prussia and
other British allies on shore ; but the precise destination of the
armament was kept very secret.
Howe's squadron consisted of one ship of the line, four .50's,
ten frigates, five sloops, two fireships, and two bombs, convoying
one hmadred transports, twenty tenders, ten storeships and ten
cutters ; together with a nmnber of flat-bottomed boats, which
were carried on board the ships, and which were to be used for
the landing of troops. On May 27th the whole armament was
assembled at Spithead. On June 1st Anson weighed and sailed
to the westward ; and Howe soon afterwards made sail and steered
straight across the Channel.
At 8 A.M. on June 2nd, after a stormy but not unfavourable
night, Howe sighted Cape La Hougue. The French were quickly
alarmed, and, from his course, probably formed a shrewd guess as
to his destination. The tides, and the frequent cahns which super-
vened, compelled the British to anchor repeatedlj-, but on June 5th
the entire force stood into Cancale Bay, six miles east of St. Malo.
At 11 A.M. the Duke of Marlborough went in shore in a cutter to
reconnoitre and was fired at. By 2 p.m. all the fleet was at anchor,
and the signal was made for the flat-bottomed boats to be hoisted
out. Howe shifted his broad pennant to the Success, 24, Captain
Paul Henry Ourry, and stood in with the Rose, 24, Captain Benjamin
Clive, Flainhorough, 28, Captain Edward Jekyll, and Diligence, 16,
Commander Joseph Eastwood, to silence the batteries, clear the
beach, and cover the landing. This he did, and then signalled for
part of the troops to disembark. The landing was effected in good
order and without loss, in spite of some musketry fire from the
enemy posted on a hill behind Cancale. These sharpshooters, how-
ever, soon fled as the troops advanced. More soldiers were after-
wards landed, and before dark a large force was ashore. It lay on its
arms for the night. The rest of the army, with the guns and stores.
1758.] EXPKDITWN To (JllEltUOUltG. Ui;j
was landed on the Gth ; and, at dawn on the 7th, the whole of
it except one brigade, that of Major-General the Hon. George
Boscawen, marched away in two columns. It is not intended
here to follow the military movements on shore : it is only necessary
to say that it was ultimately considered impracticable to attempt
St. Malo, and that, after doing a great deal of damage, the army
retm'ned and re-embarked on the lith and I'ith. The loss up to
that time had not been more than thirty killed and wounded.
. Owing to adverse winds, the fleet did not leave Cancale Bay till
June 21st ; and, after crossing and recrossing the Channel, it was
on the '26th close in with Le Havre. It was intended to effect a
landing near that town ; but the enemy was found to be well
prepared. On the '29th, therefore, the fleet bore away before
the wind for Cherboiu-g and anchored two miles from it. The
batteries on shore fired, doing, however, no harm. Preparations
were made for a descent ; but, a gale springing up and blowing on
shore, there was a very great surf, and, when the weather grew
worse, the fleet was in considerable danger. The crowded condition
of the ships had begun to breed sickness ; the horses on board were
almost starving for want of fodder ; and, as nothing was to be gained
by waiting, Howe weighed and re-anchored at Spithead on Jul_y 1st.
The army was immediately landed in the Isle of Wight to refresh
itself. In the course of this expedition the French frigate Giiirlande,
22, was taken by the Benoivn, 32, Captain George Mackenzie, assisted
at the last moment by the Rochester, .50, Captain Eobert Dufl".
Some of the troops in the Isle of Wight were sent to reinforce
the allied army in Germany ; and the remaining part of the military
force was then entrusted to Lieut. -General Thomas Bligh, an officer
who, though he had rendered good service, was then too old for
the command. The squadron, having refitted and been strengthened
by the arrival of the Moiitar/ii, 60, Captain Joshua Eowley, again
sailed on August 1st, when it had re-embarked the troops ; and on
August Gth it anchored in Cherbourg Eoad and was again fired at
from the shore. The defences had been improved since the previous
visit of the fleet, and many troops were in the town. Howe, who
had with him Prince Edward,^ second son of the Prince of Wales,
' H.K.H. Edward Augustus. Bom, 1739; went to sea, 1758; Captain, June 14th,
1759 ; created Duke of York and Albany, 1760 ; Rear- Admiral of the Blue, 1701 ;
second in command in the Channel, with Howe as his flag-captain ; Yice-Admiral
of the Blue, 1762; Commander-in-Chief in the Jlediterranean, 1763; died at Monaco,
September 14th, 1767; buried in Henry the Seventh's Chapel at AVestminster.
VOL. III. O
194 MAJOR OPERATIUNS, 1711-1762. [1758.
serving as a midshipman, accompanied General Bligh to reconnoitre ;
and arrangements were made for a landing. The fleet moved to
Marais Bay early on the 7th, leaving only a frigate and a bomb
before the town. Howe, whose broad pennant was then in the
Pall ax, 'Mi, Captain Archibald Cleveland, signalled to the frigates
and small craft to cover the disembarkation. These drove off the
enemy, and the troops were put ashore with little opposition. All
the infantry had been disembarked by the evening. On the 8th
the cavalry and artillery followed, and a march was begun on
Cherbourg, six miles to the eastward. The place was entered
without any fighting, the enemy retiring from the forts as well
as from the town at the approach of the British. By the 15th, the
pier, works, magazines, etc., had been destroyed, and the various
vessels in harbour had been sunk, burnt, or carried off. On the
16th the army re-embarked, having lost but twenty killed and
thirty wounded, although there had been frequent small skirmishes.
Cherbourg was not then an important naval station, and the
destruction of its harbour was a blow more mortifying than serious
to the French.
The fleet sailed on August 17th, and on the 19th anchored in
Portland Eoad. But the authorities were not satisfied with what
had been done, and a continuation of the operations was ordered.
The fieet, therefore, put to sea again on August 31st, and on
September 3rd anchored in the Bay of St. Lunaire, about six miles
west of St. Malo. On the following day the army landed and
encamped. On the 5th, Bligh detached a small force to burn some
shipping at St. Brieuc ; and, on the same day, the Commodore and
General reconnoitred the bank of the Eiver Eance to see if St. Malo
could be attacked on that side. As the w^est bank w^as found to be
well fortified and held, the design against the town was abandoned.
On the day following, at a council of war, the Commodore stated
that he did not consider it safe to re-enabark the troops in the Bay
of St. Lunaire, as the bottom was rocky and the weather threatened
to be not good ; and he expressed his desire to remove the fleet to
the Bay of St. Cas, and to embark the army there.
The troops therefore marched off on the 7th ; but, mifortunately,
they wasted their time and did not make the best of their w^ay.
They were much harassed by small parties of the enemy in woods
and hedges, and had frequent encounters with organised bodies of
soldiers, losing men continually. On the night of the 9th, the
1758.] THE DISASTER AT ST. CAS. 195
General, whose intelligence service seems to have been almost
non-existent, learnt, to his surprise, of the pn^senco, only three miles
from him, of a large force nndc^r the Due d'Aiguillon. The Bay
of St. Cas was then only four and a half miles off; and an officer
was sent in haste to Howe to inform him that the army would
proceed thither as quickly as possible. The Commodore, in the
early morning, made as good a disposition of his ships as time
permitted, in order to cover the re-embarkation. In the meanwhile,
the- retreat had begun, but it was 9 p.m. ere the heights above the
Bay were gained. The strange error was committed of re-embarking
all the guns and horses before the infantry. Nevertheless, by
11 A.M., two-thirds of the army were on board. At about that time
the enemy's cavalry and infantry appeared, and opened a battery of
guns on those who remained on the beach, doing great execution
there and in the boats. Gradually the French descended from the
hills ; and at last, after a desperate struggle, they seized the village
of St. Cas. There were then on shore only about seven hundred
British under Major-General Dury, whose dispositions and move-
ments were excessively rash. At length the French got close up to
the retiring British, whose ammunition was then exhausted ; and a
rout followed. Part plunged into the sea, part seized and held a rock
on the right of the Bay, whence many were taken off by the boats ;
but the majority had to surrender. The army lost, in killed,
wounded, or taken prisoners, eight hundred and twenty-two officers
and men. Of the naval officers who were superintending the
embarkation. Captains Joshua Rowley, Jervis Maplesden, and
William Paston, and Commander John Elphinstone (1), were taken.
The further naval loss, however, was but eight killed and seventeen
wounded.
The fleet which, under Lord Anson, was intended to cover the
operations under the Hon. Richard Howe and General Bligh, con-
sisted of twenty-two sail of the line and eight frigates. It blockaded
Brest and annoyed the enemy's trade, but returned to Plymouth on
July 19th, without having encountered the French. Sir Edward
Hawke being ill, his place was taken by Rear-Admiral Charles
Holmes. The fleet went back to its station on July '2'2nd, and
in August it was joined by a contingent under Vice-Admiral Charles
Saiinders. The three admirals continued to cruise until the middle
of September, b}^ which time the operations against the French
Channel ports had been concluded. Anson and Holmes returned
o 2
196 MAJOn OPERATIONS, 171!-17(i2. [1759.
to England, leaving Saunders to blockade Brest and to endeavour
to intercept the French squadron which was expected from Que))ec ;
but he did not fall in with it, and himself went Ijack into port in
the middle of December.
In 1759 the French made extraordinary efforts to retrieve their
position at sea, and once more resorted to the old expedient of
threatening an invasion, chiefly with a view to ci-ippling British
activity in distant parts of the world. But the situation of Great
Britain was then in every respect much stronger than in 1756,
when similar tactics had been tried ; and the scheme did not produce
the desired results. British troops were sent from England to the
Continent, to North America, and to the West Indies ; and a most
formidable expedition was organised against Canada ; while, on the
other hand, the French paid so much attention to menacing the
British in the home seas that they almost entirely overlooked
the business of protecting their own dominions abroad.
In the course of the year France assembled three expeditionary
forces : one at Vannes, in Bi-ittany, under the Due d'Aiguillon,
which was to be convoyed to Ireland by a fleet under M. de Conflans
and M. de La Clue ; one on the coast of Normandy, which was to be
despatched from Le Havre against England ; and the smallest of
the three, at Dunquerque, to be convoyed to Scotland or Ii'eland
by M. Thm-ot and six frigates and corvettes. To meet these and
other preparations the militia was embodied, and the following dis-
positions of ships were made. Commodore WiUiam Boys watched
Dmrquerque ; Admiral Thomas Smith (4) ^ and Commodore Sir Piercy
Brett (1) commanded a force in the Downs ; Eear- Admiral George
Brydges Eodney cruised in the Channel, and kept an e3'e on the
ports of Normandy ; and Sir Edward Hawke blockaded Brest.
Elsewhere, Boscawen commanded in the Mediterranean ; Bear-
Admiral Samuel Cornish went with reinforcements to the East
Indies ; the squadron on the Leeward Islands' station was
strengthened by a division under Captain Robert Hughes (2), and
by troops imder Major-General Hopsou ; and Vice- Admiral Charles
Saunders and Major-General Wolfe were despatched against the
' Thomas Smith was called b}' the seamen of his day " Tom o' Ten Thousand,"
because, while first lieutenant of the Gosport, in the absence of the captain, he compelled
a French frigate in Plymouth Sound to lower her topsails by way of salute. For this
act Lieutenant Smith was court-martialled and dismissed the service, but, on the
following day, both restored and posted. Captain, 1730; Eear- Admiral, 1747; Vice-
Admiral, 1748; president of the court-martial on Byng; Admiral, 1757; died, 1762.
1759.] POCOCK AND D'ACEE. J97
French iu Canada. The operations of this important and successful
year in the various parts of the world may now be followed in
greater detail.
In the East Indies, Vice-Admiral Pocock, who had refitted his
squadron at Bombay, sailed for the coast of Coromandel on
April 7th, endeavouring to get thither in advance of the French
fleet, wliich was expected back from Mauritius. He succeeded in
this object, and then cruised to intercept the enemy. On June 80t!i
he was joined by the Grafton, 68, and Stinderland, 60, with five
East Indiamen full of stores, of which he was greatly in need. On
August 3rd he sailed for FondicheiTy, and, during the rest of the
month, cruised off that port, but could learn nothing of the enemy,
and was at length obliged by lack of provisions and water to
proceed to Trincomale. He sailed again thence on September 1st,
having a few days earlier sent the East India Company's frigate,
Beoenge, to cruise off Ceylon and to keep a look-out for the French.
M. d'Ache had reached Mauritius in September, 1758, and had
there found a reinforcement of three sail of the line and several
French East India Company's ships. But provisions were so
scarce that he had to send one of the men-of-war and eight of the
Indiamen to South Africa to purchase supplies. These reached
Cape Town in January, 1759, and returned to Mauritius in April
and May. M. d'Ache was thus enabled to sail on July 17th for
Bourbon and Madagascar, to pick up further stores, and thence
for India. He reached Batticaloa in Ceylon on August 30th, and,
having there learnt something of the movements of the British
squadron, sighted it off Point Pedara ^ on September 2nd. His force
consisted of eleven sail of the line, besides two frigates ; that of
Vice-Admiral Pocock, of only nine sail of the line and one frigate.
On that same day, at about 10 a.m., the Revenge signalled to the
Vice-Admiral that she saw fifteen - sail in the south-east, standing
to the north-east. These were the enemy. Pocock signalled for
a general chase, and stood towards the French under all possible
sail ; but, the wind faihng, the British were unable to get up. In
spite of his great superiority, d'Ache apparently did all that lay in
his power to avoid an action, although Pocock was equally anxious
to provoke one. After much fruitless manoeuvring the French were
lost sight of, and Pocock then stood to the north for Pondicherry,
' Called also Point Palmyra. It is the X.E. jioiut of Ceylon.
- It does not appear that there were really more than thirteen.
198
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-17G2.
[1750.
where he expected to find his foe. He arrived off that place in the
early morning of the 8th, but saw no ships in the roadstead. At
1 P.M., nevertheless, he sighted the enemy's fleet to the south-
east. He was then standing to the northward with a sea breeze.
On the morning of the 9th, the French were again visible ; and
at 2 P.M., the wind springing up, the Vice- Admiral once more
signalled for a general chase. Two hours later the enemy appeared
to have formed a line of battle abi-east, and in that formation bore
down. But no action resulted.
At 6 A.M., however, on September 10th, the French bore S.E.
by S., distant eight or nine miles, sailing in hne of battle ahead on
the starboard tack. Pocock,^ in line of battle abreast, bore down
on them with the wind about X.W. by W. At 10 a.m. the enemy
wore, and formed a line of battle ahead on the larboard tack ; and
an hour afterwards Pocock did the same, the Elizabeth leading.
The action was begun on the British side by Eear-Admiral Stevens,
who, in the Grafton, attacked the Zodiaque. The tactics of the
day present no features of special interest ; and the action is
chiefly remarkable for the fury with which it was fought ; for the
fact that, owing to various defects, two of the British ships were
able to take only a very insignificant part in the engagement ; and
because, in the evening, the whole of the superior French squadron
bore away and stood to the S.S.E. under a crowd of sail. Most
of the British ships were far too damaged to be able to pursue ;
' Order of battle (on the starboard tack) of the British and French squadrons in the
East Indies in the action of September 10th, 175!i: —
Bkiii.sh.
FliEXCH.
Ships.
Guus.
Commanders.
Ships.
Guns,
Commandei-^.
KUzaheth . . .
64
Capt. Richard Tiddeman.
Actif ....
61
A'eitxastle .
50
„ Colin llichie.
Minotaure . . .
74
Tiger
60
„ William Breretoii.
Ouc d'Orliang . .
60
Capt. de Surrille (2).
[Reav-Admiral Charles
St. Loms . . .
60
Gm/ton ....
1 Stevens (R).
Vertgetir . . .
64
,, de La Palliere.
iCapt. Richard Ivempeu-
Lieut.-General Comte
( felt.
Zodiaqve . . .
74
■. d'Ache.
Capt. de La Chaise.
iVice-Admiral George
i Pocock CR).
(Capt. John Harrison.
Yarm(nith .
66
Comte de Provence.
74
Due de Bourgofjue.
60
., Bouvet(2).
Cumbeilaml i . .
5S
r „ John .Stukley
\ Somerset.
Illustre ....
Fortune ....
f4
64
Salisbun/ . . .
60
„ Digbv I >ent (3).
Ctntaurc
TO
., de Surrille (1).
Sunderland . . .
eo
f „ Hon. .Tames Col-
( ville.
Si/lphide.
;:(;
Weymouth . . .
60
1 „ Sir 'Hilliam Baird,
I Bart.
Itiligeutc . .
■J 4
Quft^nborougli .
■2.
„ R..I.ert Kiik.
1 Had been a 66-iiuu sbip, but \va^ reduced tu a 5^ to ease ber.
17;-)!).] D'AOnf: QUITS THE FIELD. 109
and, having ordered the llcrciKjc to oljserve the motions of the
French, Pocock lay to on the larljoard tack to enable his most
shattered vessels to repair damages. At dawn on September 11th
the French were seen in the S.S.E., about twelve miles away,
lying to on the larboard tack, the wind being about west. On
perceiving the British, they at once wore and brought to on the
other tack, and so continued until evening, when they were so far
off that they were almost out of sight. At that time, the wind
veering to the east, Pocock signalled his shijis to wear, and stood
. under easy sail to the south-west ; the Sunderland towing the New-
castle, the Weijmoutlt the Tiger, and the Eli.itiheth the Cumhcrland.
The loss sustained by the French in the engagement was, all
things considered, enormous, amounting, as it did, to nearly 1500
killed and wounded. Among the killed were the captains of the
Zodiaque and Centaure, and among the woiinded was d'Ache himself.
The French made for Pondicherry. The loss on the British side
was also very heavy, being 5G9 killed and wounded, including 184
who were either killed outright or died of their wounds. Among
the killed was Captain Colin Michie of the Neu-castle, and among
the wounded were Captain Somerset of the CumhcrhDid and Captain
Brereton of the Tiger.
On September l-')th the British anchored in the Eoad of
Negapatam ; and, having hastily completed their refitting, Pocock
sailed with his ships again on the '20th. On his way to Madras he
had to pass Pondicherry, where the French were lying ; and, un-
willing to pass it by night, or to do anything to prevent M. d'Ache
from fighting another action, he so arranged matters as to appear off
the town at daybreak on September 27th. There he lay with the
wind about W.S.W., with his maintopsails to the mast, and with
but just sufficient steerage way on his ships for the proper main-
tenance of the line. Thus the British drifted slowly to leeward, yet
not until Pocock had given d'Ache the fullest possible opportunity
to come out and light. But the latter had no such intention ; and,
after weighing and making a few meaningless demonstrations, he
returned to port and there announced his intention of sailing
immediately for Mauritius. He carried out this determination on
September 30th, in spite of the anxious remonstrances of the shore
authorities, and especially of M. de Lally. His principal motive for
thus acting seems to have been his knowledge that Pocock was
about to be reinforced by four ships of the line from England.
200 MAJOR OFEJtATIONS, 1714-1762. [1759.
Pocock, being short of water and stores, and with ships in
bad condition, returned to Madras, where he anchored on Sep-
tember 28th. Thence he sailed on October IGth for Bombay,
and on the 17th fell in with Eear- Admiral Samuel Cornish, with
three ships of the line, one .50-gun ship,' and three East Indiamen,
which last, and the troops which had been brought out as reinforce-
ments, were sent on to Madras escorted by the Queenhorough. They
reached that place on October 27th. Pocock proceeded to Bombay,
and, after making various dispositions, sailed on April 7th, 17G0, for
England with a very valuable convoy, arriving in the Downs on
September 22nd following. He left behind him Eear-Admirals
Stevens and Cornish.
Alluding to this last action, Mahan, after referring to the
numerical superiority of the French, says :
" The fruits of victory, liowever, were with tlie weaker fleet, for d'Ach^ returned to
Pondicherry and thence sailed on the 1st of the next month for the islands, leaving
India to its fate. From that time the result was certain. The English continued to
receive reinforcements from home, while the French did not ; the men opposed to Lally
were superior in ability; place after place fell, and in January, 1761, Pondicherry
itself surrendered, surrounded by land and cut off from the sea. This was the end of
French power in India ; for though Pondicherry and other possessions were restored at
the peace, the English tenure there was never again shaken, even under the attacks of
the skilful and bold Suffren, who twenty years later met difticulties as great as d' Ache's
with a vigour and conduct which the latter at a more hopeful moment failed to show." ''
Vice- Admiral Pocock was desen-edl}' made a K.B. for his ser^nces
and promoted to be Admiral of the Blue.
Such naval successes as the French won in the East after the
departure of Pocock were confined to the capture of the East India
Company's factory at Gombroon in the Persian Gulf, and the
reduction of certain British settlements in Sumatra. These successes
' Reinforcement which reached A'ice-Adniiral Pocock in the East Indies in
October, 175!:i :—
Sliip?.
GUD.>.
CMiiimaiiderb.
Lenox .....
74
1 Hear- Admiral Samuel Cornish (B.).
\C'aptain Robert Jocelyn.
Due iVAr/uitainf
64
Sir William Hewitt, Bart.
York .....
60
,, Vincent Pearce (2).
Fahiiouth ....
.",0
„ Richard Hughes (3).
■ hiti. of Sea Power," 310.
1759.]
FIASCO AT MARTINIQUE.
201
were merely raids, without iiilluence on tlio course of the war or on
the future of Franco-British commercial rivalry. The Dutch, seeking
to profit by the temporary difficulties of the British, attempted, witli
seveir East Indiamen and some troops from Batavia, to seize Chinsura
on the Ganges, but were checkmated by the energy of Colonel Clive,
Governor of Bengal, and by the gallantry of the masters of 'several
British East Indiamen, who, under AVilson of the Calcutta, took or
drove off the enemy on November '24th, 1759, after a sharp action.
The captured Dutch vessels were afterwards returned to their owners,
on security being given for the payment of £100,000 damages.
The British force on the Leeward Islands' station, under Commo-
dore John Moore, was strengthened by eight ships of the line under
Captain Eobert Hughes (2), and by troops under Major-General
Hopson, in order that the force might reduce some of the French
Caribbee Islands, which were supposed to be weakly garrisoned.^
The troops left England in November, 1758, under convoy of Captain
Hughes, and reached Carlisle Bay, Barbados, in January, 1759.
There Commodore Moore was met with. On the 13th of that mouth
the whole force sailed for Martinique, and on the afternoon of the
15th entered Fort Eoyal Bay. On the morning of the 16th the
Bristol, 50, Captain Leshe, and the Ripon, GO, Captain Jekyll,
silenced and occupied a fort on Negro Point. The Winchester, 50,
Captain Le Cras, Woolwich, 44, Captain Peter Parker (1), and
Boebuch, 44, Captain Thomas Lynn, cannonaded the batteries in the
Bay of Cas des Navires, where it was intended to disembark troops.
^ List of tlie British fleet on the Leeward Islands" station un<ler Connuodore .John
Moore in 175!) : —
^bips.
Cambridge .
St. George .
Norfolk .
Buclcinghavi
Burford
Berwick.
Lion .
Ripon
Panther
Winchester .
Brislot . .
90
74
70
70
64
60
CO
00
50
50
Commanders,
'Commodore Johu Moore.
.Capt. Thomas Burnett.
,, Clarke Caytou.
„ Eoljcrt Hughes (a).
„ l!ichardTyn-ell.i
„ James Gambier(l).
,, William Harmau.
,, William Tre-
lawney.
„ Edward Jekyll.
„ Molyneux bhuld-
ham.
,, Edward Le Cras.
,, Lachliii Leslie.-
Ship^
Woolwich .
Jtoebuck .
l.wllmo Castle .
Jienoum .
Amazon ■
line ....
Bouetta .
WeazH .
Antigua .
Spi/ ....
Kingfisher, bomh
Falcon, bomb .
fj'rcnadii, bomb
Infernal, liouib
44
44
40
32
26
20
14
14
13
10
Commandeif.
Capt. Peter Parker (1).3
Thomas Lvnu.
Edward Clark(l).<
George Mackenzie.
William Nortou.
Daniel Dering.
Richard King (1).
Com. John Boles.
AVeston Varlo.
"William Bayiie.
Sabine Deacou.
Mark Robiuson(l).
Samuel V vedale.
James Slackeuzie.
' Later, Capt. Lachliu Leslie. ~ Later, Capt. Peter Parker (1). a Later, Capt. Daniel Dering.
■• Brought out the second battalion of the P.oyal Highlanders from Scotland.
The above were eventually joined by the Lancaster, CG, Captain Eobert Mann (2),
the Emerald, 28, and the Griffon, 28.
202 MA.JOn UPERATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1759.
A lauding was effected at about 4 p.m. under Captains Molyneux
Shuldham, James Gambier (1), and Thomas Burnett; and, by the
following morning, nearly the whole army was ashoi'e. But against
4400 British, available for the service, there were at least 10,000
French, including their militia ; and, after some small operations
had been attempted. General Hopson, despairing of success, with-
drew his troops to the transports.
The expedition then proceeded to St. Pierre, the capital of the
island. But, on his arrival off that place on the 19th, the Commodore
did nothing except send in the liipon, 60, Captain Jekyll, to attack
some batteries, the reduction of which would not in the least have
influenced the general fate of the island. Jekyll was quite un-
supported; and, having fought from 2 till 4.30 p.m. with great
gallantry and silenced one battery, he was obliged to cut his cable
and tow off. The position of the liijjoii was for some time not
unlike that of the Formidable under Captain de St. Bon at the
attack on Lissa in 1866. She narrowly escaped grounding, and
could not entirely get clear till 6 p.m. Jekyll behaved magnificently.
It was then decided to abandon the attempt on Martinique, and
to attack Guadeloupe ; and on the morning of the 20th the squadron
sailed to the northward. By noon on the 22nd it was off Basse
Terre. After the town had been reconnoitred and a council of war
held, it was determined that on the morning of January 23rd the
citadel and various batteries of Basse Terre should be cannonaded
and, if possible, silenced, by the Lion, 60, Captain William
Trelawney, St. George, 90, Captain Clarke Gayton, Norfolk, 74, Cap-
tain Eobert Hughes (2), Canihridge, 80, Captain Thomas Burnett,
bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Moore, Panther, 60,
Captain Molyneux Shuldham, Burford, 70, Captain James Gam-
bier (1), Bericid,-, 64, Captain William Harman, and Bipon, 60,
Captain Edward Jekyll. The last named got aground, and was
again in the greatest danger, mitil relieved by the Bristol and
Boehucl'. At about 5 p.m. the enemy's fire was silenced. Neverthe-
less, the town w^as rather wantonly destroj^ed on the following day
by the fire of the tour bomb ketches. Indeed, Commodore Moore
exerted from the first much unnecessary force. He might have
landed his troops a little to the north of the town, and so captured
the place, which was open on the land side ; but he preferred the
useless and risky expedient of opposing his ships to forts. In the
action, however, only about thirt}' men were killed and about sixtj'
1759.] CAPTUliK OF GUADELOUPE. 203
wounded, among the latter being Captain Trelawney, of the Lioit.
Commodore Moore, of course, gained his object ; and on the 24th
the army was put ashore and Basse Terre and Fort Koyal were
occupied. The advantage was, unfortunately, not pressed ; and the
French governor retired to the mountainous interior of the island,
and was there able to make a most courageous stand for iipwards of
three months.
During the interval, the Commodore detached the Boehuck, 44,
Captain Lynn, the Winchester, 50, Captain Le Cras, the Berwick, 64,
Captain Harman, the BantJier, 60, Captain Shuldham, the Wool-
wich, 44, Captain Dering, and the Beiioivn, 32, Captain Mackenzie,
under Captain Harman ; and this force, on February 13th, made
itself master of Port Louis on the Grande Terre side of the island.
But the guerilla warfare and comparative inactivitj^ played havoc
with the troops. There were great numbers of sick ; and many of
them had to be sent to Antigua. On February 27th General Hopson
died, and was succeeded in the chief military command by Major-
General the Hon. John Barrington. This officer was beginning to
take somewhat more energetic measures than had previously been
displayed, when the army was partially deprived of the assistance
of the fleet in consequence of the arrival in the West Indies of
M. de Bompart, with five ships of the line and three large frigates,
containing troops intended for the relief of the French islands.
Commodore Moore felt it necessary to proceed to Prince Eupert's
Bay in the Island of Dominica, so that he might be in a position to
watch and promptly follow the motions of the enemy, who lay in
Great Bay, Fort Royal, Martinique. The operations on shore were
thereafter conducted chiefly by the army. The inevitable capitula-
tion was signed on May 1st, M. de Bompart not having interfered.
Nevertheless, after Guadeloupe had suiTendered, he made a brief
descent upon the island, and then, learning the truth, returned to
Martinique. Moore heard of this movement of the Freirch squadron,
and put to sea in search of the enemy ; but he failed to find him,
and once more anchored in Prince Eupert's Bay. After the capture
of Guadeloupe, General Barrington summoned, and received the
surrender of, Marie Galante, the Saintes, La Desirade and Petite
Terre. A little later Moore, reinforced by the Baisounable, 64, and
the Nassau, 64, proceeded to Basse Terre Eoad, and, on June 2.jth,
despatched part of the army to England under convoy of the
Boebuck.
204 MAJOR OFERATIONS, 1711-1762. [1759.
Their inferiority oi' force prevented the French from attempting
anything of importance against either the British fleet or the British
garrisons in the West Indies ; and, as no French fleet put to
sea, Moore had subsequently to confine himself to repressing the
enemy's privateers and to protecting British trade. On the Jamaica
station, where Vice-Admiral Cotes still commanded, the situation
was very similar ; and, though useful work was done by the cruisers,
no event of importance happened.
In North America the plans which had been formulated by the
Earl of Loudoun during his commandership-in-chief continued to
be carried out after his supersession ; and, in pursuance of these,
four considerable expeditions were entered upon in 1759, the object
of all being the ending of French rule in Canada. Three of these
expeditions, one against Fort Niagara, under Brigadier-General
Prideaux ; one against the French settlements on Lake Erie, under
Brigadier-General Stanwix ; and one under Major-General Amherst
against Crown Point and Ticonderoga, were mainly military. The
fourth, under Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders and Major-General
Wolfe, against Quebec, was fully as much naval as mihtary. All,
however, were parts of a single scheme, which was designed to
occupy the French in several quarters simultaneously, and so to
prevent them from concentrating their full strength at any one
point. The various expeditions were intended ultimately to assist
one another ; but that all the schemes did not accurateh" dovetail
as originallj- intended is only natural. That mistakes should be
committed and that there should be in some cases lack of fore-
sight and of due preparation, were matters of course. Yet, in
spite of local insuccesses, the great combined undertaking was
in its results triumphant, thanks largely' to Saunders and, above
all, to Wolfe.
Prideaux's force of about 5000 men started on May 20th from
Schenactady iip the Mohawk Kiver, and so, amid great difficulties,
to Oswego on Lake Ontario ; whence, leaving there a detachment,
it crossed the lake and reached Niagara on July 6th. In the
operations General Prideaux was killed by accident, and the com-
mand devolved upon the Colonial colonel. Sir WilHam Johnson,
Bart., who, after defeating a relieving force of the enemy, received
the surrender of the fort on July 25th. Johnson, being short of
ammunition and supplies, then returned to Oswego, where he
relinquished his command to Brigadier-General Gage, who built a
1750.] INVASION OF CANADA. 205
fort there, while Captain Joshua Loriiig, U.K., superintended the
construction of two large vessels for the navigation and command
of Lake Ontario and the Kiver St. Lawrence.
The expedition under General Stanwix was completely success-
ful, but it was so purely a military one that there is no need to
describe its operations here.
The expedition under General Amherst against Crown Point and
Ticonderoga was in many respects a large and powerful one ; yet it
should have included a great number of ship's carpenters, and
quantities of supplies for the creation of a naval force on Lake
Champlain. This provision was, however, overlooked. About
June 1st, the army was assembled at Fort Edward, and on
June 11th it marched to the banks of Lake George. Such boats
and radeaux as could be built were of an unsatisfactory nature ;
but at length a motley flotilla was collected, and the army embarked
and proceeded down the Lake. On June '22nd the troops were landed
near the Second Narrows and advanced against Ticonderoga, which
on the 25th was evacuated and blown up, the enemy retiring on
Crown Point. The boats and radeaux were then laboriously got
into Lake Champlain. On August 1st, Amherst learnt that Crown
Point had been abandoned ; and on the 4th he occupied it. He at
once set to work to endeavour to put a suitable naval force on Lake
Champlain, so that he might be able to press on and effect a
junction with the force under Wolfe. But, owing to the lack of
preparations, there were delays ; and, although the Freiich force on
the Lake was in part taken or destroyed, the approach of winter
obliged Amherst at the end of October to cut short his advance and
to return to Crown Point. Thus, both Prideaux and Amherst, who
were to have held forth helping hands to Wolfe, failed, perhaps
through no fault of their ovra. Only Stanwix, whose object was
rather diversion than actual and immediate co-operation, completel}'
gained his end. It is not the least of AVolfe's merits that, in spite
of the lack of expected help, but with the cordial co-operation of the
Navy, he brought to a triumphant conclusion the most important
and difficult expedition of the four.
Wolfe had with him ten battalions of infantry, three companies
of grenadiers and some companies of artillery and rangers, about
9200 men in all. The fleet, which was to convoy and support the
force, was under Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders and Bear-Admirals
Philip Durell (1) and Charles Holmes, and consisted of twenty sail of
20G
MAJOIi OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1759.
the line, two fifty-gun ships ami numerous frigates and small craft.'
Part of this fleet was already on the North American station under
Durell, and had wintered at Halifax. As soon as the season per-
mitted, Durell had entered the Kiver St. Lawrence, and on May 23rd
got lip as far as Isle Bic. Holmes went out from England to
Halifax early in the year 1759 to forward preparations ; and on
February 17th Saunders and Wolfe sailed from Spithead. The
main body of the expedition was gradually assembled at Louisbourg
in the island of Cape Breton ; and there it was joined by the troops
in ganison. On June 1st it began to leave the harbour ; and on the
23rd the fleet found Eear-Admiral Durell near Isle Coudres, and
obtained from him some French pilots whom he had secui'ed by a
ruse. Durell, reinforced, was left off Isle Coudres to bar the river,
and Saunders, hoisting his flag in the Stirling Castle, 64, Captain
Michael Everitt, proceeded, and on Jime "ifith anchored off Isle
d'Orleans, a few miles below Quebec.
The Marquis de Montcalm, who defended the city, had taken all
possible precautions, and had removed the buoys and marks. His
main army was about 14,000 strong, and lay at Beauport, to the
immediate north-east of Quebec. Detachments of it were posted
down the river at points whence it was expected that the advancing
' List nf the British tieet employed on the expedition to Quebec, 17."<;i : —
Ships.
Gims.
Commauders.
Ships.
Guns.
[ Commaudets.
iVice-AUmiml Charles
> Saunders (B).
leapt. Brwirick Hartwell.
i
Trent ....
28
Capt. John Lindsay.
yeptune . . .
90
1 Lizard ....
28
., James Jjoake.
Eclio
28
,, John I^forey.
(Eear-Admiral Philip
Lowestoft . . .
28
,, Joseph Deane.
Pi-i7icess Amtlia .
80
\ DureUCOCE).
Seahorse. . . .
24
„ James Smith.
ICapt. John Bray.
Scarborough . .
24
., John Stott.
|Eear-Admir.il Charles
JEurus
20
f „ John Elphinstone
Dublin ....
U
<^ Hi,lmes(W).
(Capt. William Goostrey.
Nightingale. . .
20
( „ James Campbell
t (2).
Hoijdl Williavi. .
SI
„ HnghPigot(lV
Terrible ....
74
„ Richard l'oUius(l).
Bimd
20
„ Robert Bond.
Shrewsbury . .
74
„ Hngh Palliser.
Squirrel ....
20
„ <ieorge Hamilton.
yorthuviberlan'i .
70
f „ Alex. Lord Col-
l Tille.
Foxvey ....
20
f „ George Anthony
I Tonm.
Vanguard . . .
70
„ Robert Swantoii. i
Scorpion. . . .
14
Com. John Cleland (1).
Devonshire . . .
66
,. William Gordon.
Porcuj/ine . . .
14
„ John Jervis.
Orfuril ....
66
„ Richard Sprj'.
Hunter ....
10
f ,, William Adams
I (2).
Somerset, . . .
64
„ Edward Hughes.
Mcide ....
64
„ Jame* Douglas (1).
Zephyr ....
10
f „ William Grecn-
1 wood.
lleAforA ....
64
,, Tholl.e Fowke.
Caiitain ....
64
„ John Amher.st.
Baltimore, bomb .
8
, Robert Carpenter.
Trident ....
64
,, Julian Legge.
Pelican, Iwinib . .
8
,, Edward iMountford.
Stirling Castle. .
64
„ Michael Everitt.
Jiacehorse, bomb .
8
,. Francis Richards.
I*nnce Fredericlc .
64
„ Robert Bonth.
Vesuvius, f.s. .
16
„ .lames Chads.
Medway ....
60
„ Charles Probv,
Cormorant, f.s.
16
,. I'atiick ^lonat.
Pembroke . . .
6U
„ John Wheelock.
Strombolo, f.s. . .
16
Lieut. Richard Smith.
Prince of Orange .
60
„ .^amuel Wallis.
Basra v-en, a.s. .
16
Com. Charles Doughis.
Centurion . . .
50
„ WiUiam Mantell.
Halifax, a.s. . .
12
Lieut.
Sutherland . . .
00
32
„ John Rous,
f „ Alexander Schom-
l berg.
Bodney, cotter . .
4
(Lieut. Hon. Philip Tufton
I Perceval.
Diana ....
Croivn, st.s. . .
18
Com. Joseph Mead.
Richmond . . .
32
f „ Thomas Hanker-
l son.
hesidf
s trans
^oi-ts, etc.
1759.] ATTACK ON QUKJiEC. 2U7
British could be annoyed. He luid also thrown up strong works on
the north side of the river, between the Kiver St. Charles and the
Falls of Montmorency, and had armed two hulks in the Eiver
St. Charles to defend the communications with the army and
Quebec. The Governor of the Province, Captain de Vaudreuil,
was, however, a naval officer, while the Marquis de Montcalm was
a soldier ; and there was not a good miderstanding between them.
Montcalm prudeirtly desired to make his preparations with a view
to . the necessity of a retreat ; but de Vaudreuil maintained that
such precautions were needless, and that if the whole French force
were concentrated on the north side of the river, the worst the
British could do would be to demolish some of the houses in
the city.
On June 27th, the British army landed on Isle d'Orleaus and the
French defences were reconnoitred. Towards night the ships were
disposed to the best advantage, and measures were taken to prevent
damage from the enemy's fireships, which were known to be in
readiness higher up. A certain number of Marines had been taken
from those ships which had been left at Isle Coudres under Durell,
and these were distributed throughout the fleet. At midnight on
June '28th, the French sent down seven fireships and two fire rafts ;
but they were grappled and towed clear by the activity and good
conduct of the seamen. Vice-Admiral Saunders then decided to
move some of his vessels into the open space of water immediately
below the town, known as the Basin of Quebec ; and, to afford them
some protection, he induced General Wolfe to order the occupation
of Point Levis by Brigadier-General Monckton. The enemy tried
to dislodge this force on July 1st by means of floating batteries, but
in vain. The batteries were driven back by the fire of the Trent, 28,
Captain John Lindsay. Ultimately some large ships were stationed
a httle higher up the river. Above these were frigates ; and again
above them armed boats rowed guard every night. The enemy
thereupon ordered such ships as he had up to Batiscan, sixty miles
above Quebec, but kept most of their crews in the city to assist in
working the guns. Batteries were erected on Point Levis to
bombard Quebec, and, the works on Isle d'Orleans having been com-
pleted, Wolfe, on July 9th, embarked his troops, and under convoy
of the Porcupine, 14, Commander John Jervis, and the Boscawen,
armed ship, 16, Commander Charles Douglas, effected a landing on
the north shore of the river below the falls of Montmorencv.
208 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1759.
On July IBtli the Sutherland, .50, Captain John Kous, the
Squirrel, 20, Captain George Hamilton, two armed sloops, and two
transports, passed the town without loss, and gained the upper river.
On July 31st, supported by the fire of the Centurion, 50, Captain
William Mantell, an attempt was made to land troops below the
enemy's entrenchments ; but the force had to be drawn off to the
beach. Some efforts were then made to destroy the French ships
above the town and to open communication with General Amherst,
who was supposed to be advancing from Crown Point. The Lowes-
toft, 28, Captain Joseph Deane, the Hunter, 10, Commander
William Adams (2), two armed sloops, and two storeships, passed
up to co-operate ; but it was found that the force could not be got
further than about thirtj' miles above Quebec.
On August 29th, the Seahorse, 24, Captain James Smith, two
more armed sloops, and two more storeships, were sent past the
town in preparation for a projected attack on Quebec from the west.
Eear-Admiral Holmes took command of the flotilla on the upper
river. On the night of September 4th, all the flat-bottomed boats
and many vessels passed the towTi ; and as manj- troops as could be
spared were sent up with them. On the evening of the 12th, all the
boats remaining below" the town were filled with Marines ; and on
the following morning at break of day they made a feint of landing
on the northern shore below the city, under cover of the fire of the
frigates and sloops. Troops had been alreadj- got into the boats on
the upper river, where Wolfe himself then was ; and in the starlight
they moved still further up, a French corps under M. de Bougain-
ville ^ marching parallel with them along the north bank. An hour
before daylight the boats turned and rowed down at gi^eat speed,
current and ebbing tide being both in their favour, and were followed
by the ships. The whole force quite outstripped the French, who
attempted to keep up with it. Just as day .was breaking the boats
arrived eastward of Sillery, a short distance above Cape Diamond,
those containing the light infantry falling a little lower down.
There the attacking force disembarked at the foot of a woody
precipice, scaled the height, and dispersed the guard on the summit ;
■^ Louis Aiitoine de Bougainville. Born, 1729 ; began life as a lawyer ; secretary
to the French embassy in London, 1755 ; had previously, in 1752, been elected a
Fellow of the Eoyal Society for a treatise on the integral calculus ; aide-de-camp to
Montcalm in Canada ; founded a French colony in the Falkland Islands, 1763 ; circum-
navigated the globe, 1766-68 ; commanded at sea during the war of American Revolu-
tion; vice-admiral, 1791; made a senator by Xapoleon; died, 1811.
1759.] CAPTURE OF QUKBEC. 209
and presently the whole army was pouring up the steep slopes, and
forming on the top, to await the approach of the main body of the
French, who, under Montcalm, were seen to be in motion.
The action began early. At 8 a.m. the sailors dragged up a gun,
which was most useful. By 10 the battle had become very general,
the enemy advancing with courage to within thirty yards, but then
wavering under the British fire, and being followed up with the
bayonet. It was at that time that AVolfe, at the head of the Louis-
bom-g Grenadiers, received a second wound, which proved mortal.
The Marquis de Montcalm was also fatally wounded. After some
further fighting, the French retreated to the city. General the
Hon. George Townshend, who succeeded to the command, fortified
the position which had been won. Additional ships were brought
up ; and batteries were being erected to bombard Quebec, when, on
the 17th, the enemy offered to surrender. The Vice-Admiral and
General, and the French commandant, signed the capitulation on the
morning of the 18th. Later in the day the upper town was taken
possession of by troops under Lieut. -Colonel Murray, and the lower
town by seamen, under Captain Hugh Palhser, E.N. The Vice-
Admiral's dispatches were sent to England by Captain James
Douglas (1), of the Alcide, who was knighted by the King, and
presented with ^500 wherewith to buy a sword. Throughout the
British dominions a public thanksgiving was ordered. Wolfe's
body was sent home in the Boyal William, 84, and a monument to
his memory was erected at the national expense in Westminster
Abbey.
Saunders sent back to England his larger ships under Holmes
and Durell, and followed in October, leaving Captain Lord Colville
in command, with his own ship (the Nortlmmherland, 70), the
Alcide, 64, the Trident, 64, the Pembroke, GO, the Prince of
Orange, 60, and several frigates, in North America. The Eace-
horse, bomb, Commander George Miller (1), and Porcupine, 14, Com-
mander John Macartney, were left to winter at Quebec.
After the British fleet had retired, the French ships at Batiscan
also fell down the river, waiting at Cape Eouge for a fair wind to
carry them past the batteries of Quebec. On November 2'2nd, three
of them, the merchantmen Soleil Boyal, 24, Senecterre, 24, and Due
de Fronsac, 24, drove ashore in a gale and were lost. On the 24th,
in the night and on the ebb, the rest came down with a favourable
breeze ; and, although the garrison was ready for them, and every
VOL. III. p
210 MAJOR OrEIiATIONS, 1714-17C2. [1759.
possible gun was fired at them, they all got past safely except one,
another merchantman, the Elisabeth, which took the ground on the
south side of the river. Her crew made preparations for blowing
her up, and then with the assistance of the crews of the merchant-
men Macliault, 24, and Chezine, 22, boarded and carried a British
schooner in which they escaped. On the following morning Com-
mander Miller, of the Racehorse, went on board the Elisabeth, and
ordering a light to be struck, inadvertentl}- blew up the ship and
destroyed most of his party. He and his lieutenant survived to
be removed, but were so fearfully injured that they died within a
few days.
The campaign was a most successful one, chiefly because the
French had made but faint efforts to divert British attention from
the main objects which were kept in view by Mr. Pitt. On the
other hand, the British would not allow their attention to be
diverted in the shghtest degree. Beatson rightly observes that : —
" liad M. de Boiupart, when he found he coidd not prevent the island of Guadeloupe
fi'oni falling into our hands, steered for Xew York with his squadron, he might have
made such an imjjression there as would have obliged General Amherst either to come
himself, or at least to make such a detachment from his army as would jierhaps have
disabled him from acting on the offensive for the remainder of the campaign. From
Xew York, M. de Borapart might have gone to Halifa.':, or St. .John's, Xewfoundland,
or both. An attack on either of these pJaces would have obliged Admiral Saunders to
make such a detachment from his fleet as might have greatly diminished our eflbrts
before Quebec, and, perhaps in the end, would have proved the ruin of the enterprise;
while before such detachment covdd have been able to overtake jNI. de Bompart, he
might have done his business, and sailed for Europe."
It was of course ine\'itable, when France was straining all her
resources in order to invade Great Britain and Ireland, and when
there were no considerable British forces in the Mediterranean, that
she should endeavoiu- to collect as large a naval force as possible at
Toulon, and then to send it round to join her main fleet at Brest.
Vice-Admiral Broderick commanded in the Mediterranean. Early
in the spring of 1759 his small squadron was reinforced by several
ships from England, and he received, and w^as able to cany out,
orders to watch Toulon. But Pitt was not content with merely
reinforcing the Mediterranean fleet. On April 14th, Admiral the
Hon. Edward Boscawen, with three more sail of the Une and some
frigates, left Spithead to take over for a time the chief command on
the station, and on April 27th he arrived at Gibraltar. There he
made arrangements as to the dispositions of criusers and convoys ;
1750.] BOSCAWEN AND BE LA CLUE. 211
and, sailing on May 3rd, joined Vice-Admiral Broderick off Cape
Sicie on May IGth, and assumed the command.
The French sqnadron prepared at Toulon was in charge of
M. de La Clue; and, when the British arrived oft" the port, it was
almost ready for sea. The French were carefully blockaded, or
rather, watched with a view to preventing them from leaving
without being detected and followed. On June 7th, before they
attempted to come out, Boscawen chased two French frigates, and
drove them into a fortified bay near Toulon, whither on the 8th, he
ordered the Gulloden, Conqueror and Jersei/, under the orders of
Captain Smith Callis, to proceed, and, if possible, destroy them.
The ships were gallantly taken in ; liut, when under the batteries,
they were becalmed ; and, after a sharp two hours' engagement, they
had to be recalled without having accomplished their object. The
Gulloden lost 16 killed and 26 wounded : the Conqueror, 2 killed and
■4 wounded : and the Jersey, 8 killed and 15 wounded ; and all the
vessels were badly damaged aloft.
The Admiral continued on his station until he was compelled, at
the beginning of July, to go to Gibraltar for provisions and repairs.
Preferring Salou ' for watering purposes, he put in there on the 8th,
remaining until the '24th ; and thus he only reached Gibraltar on
August 4th. Meanwhile he ordered the Lyme, 24, Captain James
Baker, to cruise off Malaga, and the Gibraltar, 24, Captain
William M'Cleverty, to cruise between Estepona and Ceuta to keep
watch for the enemy. On August 17th the latter descried the
French fleet, consisting of ten sail of the line, two fifty-gun ships
and three frigates, close in under the Barbary shore. Captain
M'Cleverty made at once for Gibraltar, and arrived off Europa Point
at 7.30 P.M., when he signalled the force and situation of the enemy
to the Admiral, who sent off an officer to the Gibraltar, ordering
her to keep sight of the foe and from time to time to signal to him
accordingly. The British squadron was not quite ready for sea, and
Boscawen's flag-ship, the Na)niir, in particular, had not so much as
a single sail bent. Still, a little before 10 p.m., the whole fleet, of
thirteen sail of the line and two fifty-gun ships besides frigates, was
out of the bay.
Owing to the haste in which they had gone out, and to the
Admiral, after leaving harbour, carrying a press of sail to the
westward, the ships were, on the following morning, in two well
' A few miles soutU-west of Tarragona. ■
p 2
-212
MAJOB OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1759.
defined divisions. The Warsjxite, Culloden, Swiftsure, Intrepid,
America, Portland, and Guernsey, whicli liad lain at anchor near the
Namur and had put to sea along with her, were still with her.
Vice-Admiral Broderick, in the Prince, with the rest of the
squadron, was many miles astern. At 7 a.m. on the 18th, ^ the
advanced division sighted the enemy to the westward. There were
then visible only seven sail, and it afterwards proved that the rest
had gone, without orders, into Cadiz during the night. De La Clue
first thought that the ships coming up behind him were his own
missing vessels ; but he was disabused when Boscawen signalled a
general chase to the N.W. At 9 a.m. the British Admiral ordered
his sternmost ships to make more sail. This soon had the effect of
bringing up the Vice-Admiral's division, which enjoyed a fine easterly
^ Bi'itisli and French fleets oft' Gibraltar in August, 1759: indicating, the order in
which the advanced British ships got into action on August 18th ; the loss suft'ered hy
each in the action ; and the fate of the French ships.
BltlTTSH.
Fkexch
Ships.
jUllS.
Commanders.
Killed.
Wounded.
Ships.
Guns.
Fate.
1
Ailmiral Hon. Edward
Ocian^. . .
80
[Bnmt.
G. Naviur . .
90
Boscawen (B). J-
13
44
RedvutabU .
74
;Capt. Watt hew Buckle( 1)
Centaure . .
74
Vice-Admiral Thomas
. Broderick (B).
Tt-nuraire . .
74
>Taken.
Prince - .
90
IfocUste. . .
64
Capt. Joseph Peytou(l).
Souverain . .
74
[Escaped, Ang.
j 18-19.
Newark. .
80
„ William Hol-l
[ bourne. /
5
Guerrier . .
Fantasque . .
74
64
5. WaTsplte .
'< 1
„ John Bentley.
U
40
Lion . . .
64
I. Culloden .
74 j
„ Smith Callis.
4
15
Triton . . .
64
Parted company,
Ang. 17-18;
and entered
Conqueror .
.7. Swiflmre .
70
„ William Lloyd (l).i
2
0
Fier. . . .
50
10
,, Tbom-is Stanhope.
5
32
orifiamme. .
50
JSdgar . .
61
f „ Francis William
1 Drake.
Chimere . .
26
Cadiz.
St. Albans .
64
,, Edward Vernon (2),
6
2
Mintrve . .
24
8. Jntrepul .
60
„ Edward Pratten.
6
10
Gracieuse . .
24
2. America .
60
,, .James Kirke.
3
16
Pr ince ss\
Louisa . i
60
„ Robert Hailand (2). 1
Jersey . .
60
„ John Barker (!■).
4. Guermey .
50
fl.ieut. Michael Kearnv)
I (acting). /
14
3. Portland .
SO
Capt. Jervis Slaplesdeu.
6
12
Avibuscade.
40
„ Eichard Gwynn.
liainbmv .
40
„ Christopher Basset.
Shann&n .
36
„ Charles Meadows.
Active . .
30
„ Herbert Sawyer(l)
Tltetis . .
32
„ John aioutray.
Lyme . .
24
,, James Baker.
Gibi-aXtar .
24
f „ -William ll'Cle-
l verty.
Glasgow ,
24
„ Andrew Wilkinson
Sheerness .
24
„ John Clark (1).
Tar tar' $]
Prize. .}
24
„ Thomas Baillie(l)
Favourite .
16
Com. Timothy Edwards.
Gramont .
16
„ Philip Affleck.
jKina, f.s. .
8
,, Richard Bi. kerton.
Salamanders
f.s. . .]
8
f ,, Hod. John Leve-
1 son Gower.
1 Excbauged ships.
2 Flag of M. de La Clue. Suffren. who w.is iu her, thus became fur the second tim-j a pnsuuer to the British.
1759.] THE ACTION OFF LAGOS. 213
breeze, while the enemy had barely enough wind to give them
steerage way. Thus the British gained on the chase till, at about
1.25 P.M., Boscawen signalled to engage.
At 1.30 P.M. the enemy began to fire at the headmost British
ships as they came up ; and since Admiral Boscawen perceived that
the French intended to make off as soon as the breeze should reach
them, he naturally desired that the most advanced ships of his fleet
should push on and attack the enemy's van, to stop their flight until
his remaining ships could get up. He therefore ordered the America
and Gnernseij to make more sail. At about 2.30 p.m. the GiiUocleii
began to fire on the Ceiitaure, the rear ship of the enemy ; and, very
soon afterwards, the America, Portland, Guernsey and Warspite got
into action. The wind had by that time dropped altogether, so far
as the ships which were in action were concerned. The British rear
division, however, still had a breeze, and was thus able to get up in
time to have a share in the victory.
Boscawen, himself, in the Namur, was in action with the stern-
most ships of the enemy at about 4 o'clock. The Swiftsure and
Intrepid were at that time to windward of him ; and, hailing the
former, he ordered her to push on for the enemy's van ship. By
about 4.30 p.m., the Namur was close alongside the Ocean; and,
when the two had been engaged for about half-an-hour, the Namur,
having lost her mizenmast and both topsail yards, was disabled, and
fell astern. De La Clue made every effort to take full advantage of
this misfortime to the British flagship. Each of his vessels, except
the Centaure, set all possible sail to get away; but the Centaure had
been engaged by every ship as she came up, and had stood the brunt
of the fight. At last, her fore and main topmasts had fallen ; and
she was so greatly damaged in every respect that she had no alter-
native but to strike.
The misfortune to the British flagship did not afl'ect the energy
and activity of the British Admiral, who ordered out his barge and
was rowed at once to the Newark, and there hoisted his flag. But,
by that time, the battle proper had almost ceased, and the pursuit
had begun. Boscawen continued it during the whole night. Though
there was a fine breeze, there was also a slight haze ; and, under
cover of this, two of the French ships, the Souverain and Guerrier,
altered their course in the darkness and so escaped. Thus, at day-
light on the 19th only four sail of the enemy were to be seen. The
British were about three miles astern of them, and about fifteen
214 MA.TOll OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1759.
miles from Lagos. Once more the wind had almost died away. At
about 9 o'clock the Oram ran amoDg the breakers, and the three
other ships anchored under the Portuguese batteries. Boscawen
thereupon sent the Intrepid and America to destroy the Ocean,
which, in taking the ground, had carried away all her masts.
Captain Pratten had anchored ; and he failed to carry out the order ;
but Captain Kirke, taking in the America very close, discharged a
few guns into the enemy at point-blank range, and obliged her to
strike. M. de La Clue, who had one leg broken and the other
injured, and who eventually died of his wounds at Lagos, had been
landed about half-an-hour previously. Captain Kirke took possession
of the French flagship ; and having removed such officers and men as
were found in her, he set her on fire, deeming it impossible to bring
her off. The Warnpite was ordered in against the Temeraire, 74,
and succeeded in bringing her out very httle damaged. Vice-Admiral
Broderick's division went against the remaining two ships, and,
after about half-an-hour"s action, captured the Mocleste, 64. The
Bedoutahle, 74, having been abandoned, and being found to be
bulged, was burnt. In this action the enemy's loss was very severe
in killed and wounded. In the Centaure alone, about 200 were
killed. The loss of the British, on the other hand, was very small,
amounting only to 56 killed and 196 wounded.^
"The Britii^b," says Beatson, "as well as the French Admiral, was not quite well
pleased with the behaviour of his captains, some of whom, he thought, did not make
sail enough to get up with the van of the enemy's fleet, which the Admiral wished they
should attack, in order to retard their flight until the rest of the squadron should be
able to join in the action. Others, through mismanagement, he thought, had allowed
their ships to fall to leeward, after they had engaged the enemy some time, and there-
fore could not properly get into action again. But great allowance ought to be made
for this, for just as the British ships came up with the enemy's rear, the wind died
away. They attacked the enemy on the lee side, in order that they might be able to
open their lower ports, some of the shi])S carrying them very low. Another reason why
some of the British ships fell so much to leeward was that the French Admiral, on
perceiving Admiral Boscawen in the Namur, and some ships along with him, pressing
forward to attack his van and centre, made his fleet lufl' up as much as they possibly
could, so as to form a sort of crescent ; by which position the whole of his shipis in
their van and centre were enabled by their fire, not only to assist the rear, but each
other, in their endeavours to repel the attack, which they looked for every moment
from the British Admiral. By this manauvre of M. de La Clue's, such of our ships as
first got up with the enemy's rear, and to leeward of their line, were thrown out of
action ; while, for want of sufficient breeze of wind, they could not get into it again.
The Portland, having lost her foretopmast, dropjied astern. The Tntrepid was to win<l-
ward of the Namur; she did not bear down close enough, but kept aloof, and fired at
the enemy across the other ships." -
' Boscawen's Disp. -See table p. 212, antea. ^ ' Nav. and Mil. Mems.,' ii. 318.
1759.] BLOCKADE OF CADIZ. 215
Boscawen, who said of the battle, " It is well but it might have
been a great deal better," presently rehoisted his flag in the Namur,
and despatched Captain Matthew Buckle, in the Gibraltar, to
England with dispatches. Buckle was graciously received by the
King, and presented with .i'.500 to buy a sword. The Admiral
himself, as soon as his fleet had repaired damages, returned, in
accordance with his instructions, to England, taking with him the
Namur, Wars2)ite, Swiftsure, Iiitrejnd, America and Portland, the
Salamander and ^tna fire-ships, and the prizes Temeraire and
Modeste. These were afterwards followed by the Edgar, Princess
Louisa, and the prize Ccntaiire. Vice-Admiral Broderick, who
remained in the Straits, blockaded Cadiz, in which still lay that part
of the Erench squadron which had taken refuge there.
Boscawen's rewards were a membership of the Privy Council
and a generalship in the Marines. Captains Bentley, of the War-
spite, and Stanhope, of the Swiftsure, were knighted for their share
in the action ; and the three prizes were purchased, and added to
the Navy under their Erench names.
Broderick blockaded Cadiz very closely ; but, on November 9th,
he was driven from his station by a storm, and was obliged to send
his flagship to Gibraltar to refit, and to hoist his flag on board the
Conqueror. The Newarh and Culloden had to cut away all their
masts, and run for port. Returning off Cadiz, Broderick contniued
the blockade as before ; but the enemy, though by that time sixperior
in strength, declined to come out and offer him battle. The Vice-
Admiral being a second time driven from his station by a storm, the
Erench at length ventured forth, and were happy enough to get
safely back to Toulon.
Eear-Admiral George Brydges Eodney was sent in the summer
with a light squadron,^ consisting of one ship of the line, four fifty-
gun ships, five frigates, a sloop and six bomb ketches, to endeavour
to destroy the flat-bottomed boats, and the supplies which had been
' Squadron under Eear- Admiral Rodney in the Channel, 17.5'.l: Achilles, 60, Hear-
Admiral George Brydges Dodney, Caiitaiu the Hon. Samuel Barrington ; Chatliam, 50,
Captain John Lockhart ; Deptford, 50, Captain John Holhvell ; Isis, 50, Captain
Edward Wheeler; Norwich, 50, Captain George Darb.v; Brilliant, 'i&, Ca.\^is.m Hj'de
Parlser (1) ; Juno, 36, Captain Henry John Philips ; Vestal, -32, Captain Samuel Hood (1) ;
Boreas, 28, Captain Hon. Robert Boyle ; Unicorn, 28, Captain Thomas Graves (2) ;
Wolf, 16, Commander Hugh Bromedge ; Furnace, bomb, Commander Jonathan
Faulknor (1) ; Firedrake, bomb, Commander James Orrok ; Basilisk, bomb, Com-
mander John C'larke(l); Mortar, bomb. Commander Joseph Hunt; Carcass, bomb.
Commander Charles luglis (1) ; and Blast, bomb, Conuuander Thomas Willis.
210 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1702. [1769.
collected a,t Le Havre for the projected invasion of England. Sailing
from St. Helen's on July 2nd, 1759, he anchored on the 3rd in the
Koad of Le Havre, and stationed his bombs in the channel leading
to Honiieur. These threw shells into the town, magazines, and
boats for fifty consecutive hours, and did immense damage, without
receiving any injury worth mentioning. Rodney, with some of his
frigates, remained off the port for the rest of the year, and captured
numerous prizes.
Admiral Sir Edward Hawke sailed in June, with a fleet of
twenty-five sail of the line and many frigates, to blockade or, more
strictly, to observe the enemy in Brest. He cruised some leagues at
sea, leaving an inshore squadron of his hghter ships, under Captain
the Hon. Augustus John Hervey, of the Monmouth, 64, close off the
port. He also detached Commodore John Eeynolds (1), in the
Firm, 50, with a small squadron, to watch the French transports
which had assembled in the river Morbihau in preparation for the
invasion of Ireland. ^Vhen at length the Firm became very foul and
had to go home to refit, she was relieved by the Rochester, Commo-
dore Eobert Duff. In the course of the blockade the Achilles, 60,
Captain the Hon. Samuel Barrington, also had to go home, having
run on a rock when in pursuit of some French vessels. It may be
mentioned that, during part of the summer. Prince Edward
Augustus, afterwards Duke of York, again served as a midshipman,
with Captain Lord Howe, in the Magnunime, 74.
Numerous brushes with the enemy relieved the tedium of the
blockade. On one occasion the French sent out four ships of the
line to attack the inshore squadron ; but Hervey, instead of retiring,
went to meet them ; and, the fleet making as if to support him, the
French withdrew. The intention had been that, if Hei-\-ey had
drawn off and left the coast clear, the four ships of the hne should
have gained the mouth of the Morbihan, crushed Duff, and then
escorted the French invasion of Ireland. Hervey and the inshore
squadron continued verj' active, and greatly annoyed the enemy,
until in October the Monmoutli, which had become very leaky, had
to return to England.
The approach of the season of bad weather seemed to afford the
French better opportunities for putting into execution their scheme
of invasion, it being impossible, in those days, for a blockading
squadron, no matter how strong or how ably commanded, to alwaj's
maintain its position dm-ing the autunni and winter. A \aolent gale
1759.] IIAWKE AND DE COyFlAyn. 217
of wind, in fact, forced Hawkc from his station on November '.)tii,
and obliged him to put into Torbay. This storm proved the salva-
tion of M. de Bompart, who, with his squadron, was returning from
the West Indies, and who must otherwise have been snapped up by
the British fleet. Most of the inen of his ships were turned over to
the fleet under M. de Conflans, who learnt by the arrival of M. de
Bompart that the British had Ijoen driven from off the port.
With the hope of being able to effect something against Commo-
dore Duff, de Conflans put to sea on November 14th. Hawke on the
same day got under way from Torbay, and on the 15th was in-
formed by Captain William M'Cleverty, of the Gihndtar (the same
who three months earlier had warned Boscawen of the approach of
M. de La Clue), that the Brest fleet had sailed, and that it had been
seen twenty-four leagues N.W. of Belle Isle, steering S.E. Hawke,
with strategical intuition, made for Quiberon Bay with all possible
sail, rightly judging that the French would take advantage of their
brief liberty in order to make for that neighbourhood, so as to free
the transports which were blockaded by Duft' in the Morbihan. But
he was unable to proceed with the speed he desired. Wind from
the S. by E. and S. drove him considerably to the westward and
delayed him. On the 19th, however, the wind became fair ; and, on
that day, Hawke ordered the frigates Muidstuiie and Govcntrij ahead
of the fleet, one on the starboard and the other on the larboard bow.
Early in the morning of the 20th he also ordered the Magnanime
ahead to make the land.
The contrary wind which had baffled Hawke also retarded
de Conflans, and was instrumental in saving Duff, who received his
first news that the Brest fleet had put to sea by Captain Gamaliel
Nightingale, of the Vengeance, on the morning of the 20th. Night-
ingale on entering the bay had fired guns to alarm the Commodore.
Duff realised at once the danger that was upon him, and immediately
made the signal for his ships to cut their cables. In a few minutes
they were all under way. He attempted to take them out to sea
round the north end of Belle Isle, but, the wind shifting, the
Belliqueux, 64, Captain Thomas Saumarez, was the onl}' one which
escaped by that passage. She was not able to rejoin until three
days after the battle. Duff then tried to escape by the south end of
the island ; and, in doing so, he was observed by de Conflans, who
made the signal to chase. The Chatham, 50, which sailed very badly,
was almost within gunshot of a French seventy -four, when a man
218
MAJOI; OPKUATIONH, 1714-17G2
[1759.
on the main-top-gallant yard of the Bochester hailed that he saw a
sail, and, presently, that he saw a fleet. The Commodore quickly
made out what the fleet was, and at once ordered his little squadron
to tack and chase the enemy. At first the French were puzzled by
this change of policy; but, as soon as de Conflans discovered the
cause, he recalled his chasers ; and Duff's squadron was thus enabled
in the course of the day to join Sir Edward Hawke.
At about 8.30 a.m. the Maidstone signalled that she had sighted
a fleet ; and at 9.45 the Mcujnanime announced that the strangers
were enemies. The French were at that time rehnquishing the chase
of the Commodore's squadron, and Belle Isle bore E. by N. j N.^
Hawke instantly made the signal for a line of battle abreast, in
order to draw up his ships ; and he followed it soon afterwards with
the signal for the seven ships which were nearest the enemy to
' List of the British and French fleets in the action in Quiberon Ba}', November
20th, 1759 :—
Buixisu.
French
Ships.
Guns.
Commauders.
Ships.
Guns.
Fate.
lioyal Gejrgi; . .
100
1 Admiral Sir E^lnard Hawke,
■ K.B.
Soleil lioyal
1
80 2
(Beached and burnt
I by the French.
(Capt. John Campbell (1).
Tonnant. . .
, 80 3
To the Charente.
iVke-Ailmiral sir Charles
Formidahh .
80 4
Taken.
Vnivn ....
90
\ Hardy (-2).
(Capt. John Evaus.
Orient . . .
Jntrepidc . .
80
74
|To the Charante.
Duke
90
,, Thomas Graves (2).
Glorieux
"4
,. Vilaine.
Namur ....
90
,, :\latthew Buckle(l).
Thesee . . .
"4
Foundered.
Mars
74
Commoil. Jauie.s Youiig (1).
Heros . . .
74
|Tak>'U, wrecked.
WarspiU . . .
74
Capt. Sir John Bentley, Kt.
I and burnt.
HoxuUs. . . .
74
,, William Fortescue.
Jiohuste , . .
"4
To the Vilaine.
Torhau ....
74
f „ Hon. Angustus Kep-
l pel.
yfagnifique . .
Jiiktt
-4
"0
,. Charente.
Wrecked.
Magwiniine
74
„ Viscount Howe.
Superbf. . . .
70
Foundered.
ITero
74
74
,, Henry .Speke.
f „ Hon. George EiJg-
[ cnmbe.
Dauphin lioyal
Dragon .
70
64
}To the Charente.
y'orthumberlantl
64
1
Sivi/tsure .
70
/ „ Sir Thumas Stanhope.
I Kt.
Sjikinx .
Solitaire . .
64
64
\ „ Vilaine.
Dorsetshire . . .
70
„ Peter Deuis.
Brillant, . .
64
„ Charente.
Burfurd . . .
70
,, James Cambier (1).
Eveill*- . . ,
64
„ Viliine.
Chichester . . .
70
„ AViUiamSaltreu W'illett.
Bizarre . . .
64
„ Charente.
Temple ....
70
f „ Hou.>Va.shiDgtuuShir-
l ley.
mjiexiblt . .
64
„ Vilaiu?.
Hevenge ....
64
„ John Storr.
Vestale. . . .
34
j
Essex ^ ....
Kingston
64
60
,, Lucius O'Brien.
„ Thomas Shirley.
Aigrette. . .
Calypso . . .
36
16
> ,, Vilaine.
Intrepid, . . .
60
,, Jervis jMapIesdeu.
Prince Noir
)
J.l<jjtlii{ta
60
,, Jo.shua Rowley.
Dttnhirk . . .
60
,, Hon. Roliert Digbv.
Defiance . . .
60
50
„ Patrick Bair.l.
„ Robert Duff.
Rochester . . .
Portland . . .
SO
„ :MaiTiot Arbutbnot.
falMund . . .
50
,, Francis Samuel Drake.
Chatham . . .
50
„ John Luckhart.
^
Minerva . . .
32
„ Al-'xaud r Arthur Hood.
Venus
36
,, Thumaj? Harrisuu (2).
Vengeance . . .
28
„ Gamaliel Nightingale.
Corentry
28
„ Francis Burslem.
Maidstone .
28
„ iJudtey Digge-s.
Sapphire . . .
32
,, Jchn Strachau.
1 Wrecked.
- Flag of M. de Confian>, \'iLe-Admiial.
Flag of the Prince de Bauffremout-Listenois, Chef d'Escadre.
Flag of M. St. Andre dn Verger, Chef d'Escadre.
1759.] THE BATTLE OF QUIDERON BAY. 219
chase, draw into line of battle ahead of him, and endeavour to arrest
the French until the remainder of the fleet could get up and bring
about a general engagement.
Upon realising that they were in the presence of the British, the
enemy fell into some confusion, but, in the course of a short time,
seemed to arrive at a determination to fight, and endeavoured to
form a line. While they were executing this manoeuvre, the British
approached very rapidly, the wind being then nearly west. De Con-
flans then suddenly altered his mind, and, instead of waiting to
engage, made off. He was near his own coasts, with the difficulties
and dangers of which he was fully acquainted and presumably knew
well how to avoid, while the British were on a lee shore, vdth which
they were unfamihar. The weather was tempestuous and was
rapidly growing worse ; and the November day would soon end.
De Conflans therefore endeavoured to keep his fleet together, and
steered right before the wind for the land, which was not more than
about twelve miles distant.^
The wind, as the short afternoon drew to its close, was variable
between N.W. and W.N.W., and blew in heavy squalls. Yet both
fleets crowded sail, the French to escape, and the British to overtake
them. At 2 p.m. the enemy began to fire at the leading ships of
the British fleet; and, half-an-hour later, when the Warspitc ix,i\A
Dorsetsliire were close up with the enemy's rear, Hawke made the
signal to engage. The British fleet was then to the soirth of
Belle Isle. A little later the Bevenge, Magnanimc, Torhay, Montagu,
Besolution, Swiftsure and Defiance got into action, and hotly
engaged the French rear. Yet this fact did not prevent the
French admiral, who was in the van, from leading round the
Cardinals. The Formidahle , carrying the flag of Eear-Admiral
du Verger, was attacked by the Besolution, and, in addition,
received a broadside or two from every other British ship that
passed her ; and, having been severely treated, she struck about
4 o'clock. The loss on board of her was terrible, M. du Verger
and upwards of two hmidred others being killed. The Formidable
was taken possession of by the Besolution. In the meantime, the
ships of the British rear were straiiaing to get into action. The
Thes4e, Captain de Iversaint ^ was hotly engaged by the Magnanime,
' For Quiberon Bay and its neigUbourhooil, see chart facinsj; p. 4:88, in A'ol. II.
- Guy Siinon de Caetnainpreu, Comte de Kersaint ; bora, 1709; entered the navy
as a seaman, 1722; lieutenant, 1742; captain, 174.5. In Benommee captured Prince
220 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1759.
but was relieved by the disablement of the British ship, which,
being fouled by one of her consorts, fell astern. Very soon after-
wards the ThesSe was tackled by the Torbay ; and, in the contest
which resulted, she capsized and foundered, chiefly owing to the
fact that her captain, from motives of self-pride, persisted in fighting
his lower deck guns, regardless of the stormy state of the weather.
All her crew of about eight hundred men, except twenty, were lost.
The Torbaij, owing to similar causes, was at one time in danger of a
like fate ; but Captain Keppel closed his ports in time, and saved
her. Another French ship, the Siq^erhe, foundered at about the
same time.
Owing to the gale, the lee shore, and the gathering darkness,
there was at that time great confusion ; and it is almost impossible
to tell exactly what happened. But it would appear that after
having engaged the Thesee, and having been fouled first by the
Warspite and then by the Montagu, Lord Howe, in the Magnanime,
observed the French Hems somewhat disabled to leeward, and,
bearing down and ranging alongside, quickly obliged her to strike.
The Heros anchored, but, owing to the weather, no boat could be
sent to take possession of her ; and, later, her captain ran her ashore
and lauded his crew. As night fell, the enemy's fleet divided ; part,
under M. de Beaufiremont, the vice-admiral, making to the south-
ward within the Four Bank, and probably designing to attract the
British into danger.
But Hawke would not be tempted to pursue them. Night was
come ; islands, rocks, and shoals were all around ; no pilots were on
board ; the charts were indifferent, and the weather was terrible.
Hawke, therefore, made the signal to anchor, and came to in fifteen
fathoms of water, the Isle de Dumet bearing E. by N. two or thi'ee
miles distant, the Cardinals W. ^ S., and the steeples of Le Croisic
S.E., as was discovered in the morning. Unfortunately, the signal
was not taken in, and, consequently, was not obeyed, b}^ many ships
of the British fleet. According to the code then in use, the signal to
anchor by night was made by firing two guns from the flagship,
of Orange. Commanded the Alcide in the East Indies. Some French accounts state
that the Thesee was sunk at Quiberon owing to being run do^vn by Hawke's flagship
while de Kersaint was going to the assistance of the Soleil Boyal ; but these are
clearly incorrect. The Coimfs son, who saw his father sink at Quiberon, was later a
distinguished naval officer, but, meddling with politics, was guillotined in 1793. He
was then a vice-admiral.
1759.] rilK DATTLE OF QUIBERON BAY. 221
without using lights or any other indications to distinguish the
j)articular purpose for which the guns were fired. At a moment
when there was still a certain amount of firing going on on all sides,
the discharge of two guns from the flagship could of course not be
recognised as a signal except by the few vessels which chanced to be
so near the Admiral as to be aware that he had anchored. The
others either stood out to sea or anchored, as prudence suggested.
Had the French only known the dangerous position in which the
unsatisfactory nature of the signal book had left their enemy during
that stormy night, they might, in the morning of the 21st, have
attacked the small body remaining at anchor near Hawke, and
perhaps have won a decided and complete victory by the mere
strength of superior forces.
The night was dark, and even more boisterous than the evening
had been ; but, though guns of distress were heard from all sides, it
was not possible to send assistance to anyone. On the morning of
the 21st the Besoliitioii was seen to be ashore, and the French Heros
was on the Four Bank. De Conflans's flagship, the Soleil lioyal, in
the obscurity overnight, had come to anchor in the very midst of the
British ; and, when at daylight she perceived her situation, she
slipped her cable and tried to get away, but presently went ashore
near the town of Le Croisic. No sooner was she observed to be in
motion than Hawke sigiralled the Essex to slip and pursue her ; but
in the ardour of the chase the Essex unfortunately got on the Four
Bank and was also wrecked. It was seen that, while the French
vice-admiral had gone to the southward with part of the fleet, the
remainder had stood to the N. and was engaged in the mouth of the
river Vilaine in getting out guns, stores, etc., and endeavouring to
find a haven up the river. On the 21st and 22nd, by taking ad-
vantage of the flood tide and of what vnnd there was under the land,
all of them got into the river, whence several of them could never be
brought out again. On the 22nd Hawke ordered the Soleil Boijal
and Heros to be set on fire. The French, however, anticipated him
by themselves burning the former.
On the British side the number of men killed in the action did
not exceed fifty, and only about two hundred and fifty were
wormded.^
As soon as it became known in England that the French had
sailed from Brest, the excitement was great, and every effort was
' Ha\vke"s Disp. of Xuvember 24 th.
99-7
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1711-1702.
[1759.
made to meet the situation. Eear- Admiral Geary was detached
with a reinforcement of ships ' for Hawke ; and other vessels capable
of putting to sea were ordered to be in readiness at a moment's
notice. Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders, returning from the con-
quest of Quebec, learnt in the chops of the Channel that the French
were out and that Hawke had gone in chase of them. Though he
had with him but three ships of the line,^ he realised so fully that no
addition of forces was to be despised, and he had so strong a sense
of his duty, that, on his own responsibility, he steered for Quiberon
Bay with all the sail he could set. But neither Geary nor Saunders
joined Hawke ere the battle. Geary anived several days too late,
COMMEMORATIVE MEDAL OF IIAWKE's VICTORY IN QUIBEROX BAY, 1759.
(From an oriijinal kindly lent by B.S.H. Captain Prince Louis of Battenberg, li.X.)
and Saunders, hearing of the issue of the action,^ altered his course
and steered again for England.
Hawke sent home his dispatches by Captain John Campbell (1),
who, as Captain Matthew Buckle had been, was graciously received
by the King, and presented with i^uOO to pm-chase a sword. Hawke
himself received the thanks of the House of Commons and a pension
of £2000 a year. Nor were other officers who had distinguished
themselves during the campaign forgotten. Boscawen, as has
already been mentioned, was made General of Marines ; Vice-
' Sandwich, 90, Rear-Admiral Francis Gear)', Captain Kichard Xorbury; Foud-
roijant, 84, Captain Richard Tyrrell; Bienfaisant, G4, Captain George Balfour;
AmerirM, 60, Captain .James Kirke; Anson, 60, Captain Matthew Whitwell; Firm, 60,
Captain John Reynolds (1); and Juno, 32, Captain Henry John Philips.
^ Somerset, 64, Vice- Admiral Charles Saunders, Captain Edward Hughes; Van-
(jmird, 70, Captain Robert Swanton ; and Devonshire, 66, Captain William Gordon.
^ Mahan calls this action "the Trafalgar" of the Seven Tears' War. Gueriu
exclaims : " C'etait La Hougue, moins la gloire et I'honneiir francais sauves."
175!).] PRECAUTIONS AGAINST Til HIST. 223
Admiral Saunders was made Lieut. -General of Marines, and Cap-
tains Sir Piercy Brett (1), Kt., the lion. Augustus Keppel, and Lord
Howe, were made Colonels of Marines.
On the 26th Hawke sent Commodore James Young (1), with a
squadron, to anchor in Quiberon Bay, and on the 27th detached
Captain the Hon. Augustus Keppel, with a squadron, to Basque
Boad, to attack such of the enemy as might be found there. But
before the latter reached his destination, M. de Beaufifremont had
lightened his ships and retired up the river Charente, whither the
British vessels were unable to follow him. Neither in the Charente
nor in the Vilaine could the fugitive ships be reached. Time, how-
ever, eifected what force could not ; for few of the vessels were ever
again fit for active service. Hawke was relieved by Boscawen, and
returned to England after an absence of ten months.
During the blockade it was notorious that no fleet employed
on similar service had ever before been so amply suppHed with
beer, provisions, and vegetables ; but, after the defeat of de Conflans,
in consequence chiefly of the adverse state of the weather, supplies
failed, and the men were obhged to be put upon short allowance.
This gave rise to the well-known satirical lines : —
" Ere Hawke did bang
Monsieur Conflans,
You sent us beef and beer.
Now Monsieur's beat.
We've naugbt to eat.
Since you have noiiglit to fear."
The small French expedition which had been assembled at
Dunquerque for a descent upon Scotland or Ireland, and which
was to be convoyed by Thurot, was blockaded throughout the
summer and early autumn of 1759 by a squadron ' under Commodore
AVilliam Boys, who, however, was driven from his station by a gale
in October. Thurot then shpped out and made to the northward,
Boys following as soon as possible, but not being able to overtake
the enemy, and ultimately having to content himself with cruising
' Squadron under Commodore William Boys, engaged in the bloL-kade of Dun-
querque, etc., 1759: Preston, 50, Commodore William Boys, Captain John Evans;
Antelope, 50, Captain James Webb; Pkvnix, U, Captain Christoi her Codrington
Bethell; Danae, -iO, Captain Heniy Martin (2) ; Liverpool, 32, Captain Richard Knight;
Stag, 32, Captain Henry Angell ; Argo, 28, Captain John Bladou Tinker ; Tweed, 28,
Captain William Paston; 7/«ssra»-, 28, Captain Robert Carkett ; Surprise, 2i, Captain
Charles Antrobus; Badger, li, Commander Basil Keith; Alderney, 12, Commander
John Peighin.
224 MAJOR OPEHAT/ONS, 171-1-1762. [1760.
off the coast of Scotland with the object of preventing any sudden
raid there. As Thurot's destination was unknown, and as there
were rumours that he contemplated a blow on some port on the
east coast of Enf^land, the squadron in the Downs/ under Com-
modoi-e Sir Piercy Brett (1), was ordered to Yarmouth. But
Thurot's operations in the British seas did not begin till the following
year, and an account of them may for the present be deferred.
During the year 17G0 the British squadrons on active service
were disposed as follows. Commodore Sir Piercy Brett commanded
in the Downs and North Sea ; Kear-Admiral George Brydges
Kodney cruised in the Channel and blockaded Le Havre ; Admirals
Sir Edward Hawke and the Hon. Edward Boscaweu reheved one
another in Quiberon Bay, and watched the French vessels in the
Vilaine and Charente, at Brest, Lorient, and Eochfort ; Commodore
Eobert Swanton was despatched with reinforcements to Commodore
Lord Colville in Korth America ; Captain the Hon. John Byron
was sent with a squadron to destroy the fortifications at Louis-
bourg ; Commodore Sir James Douglas (1) relieved Commodore John
Moore (1) on the Leeward Islands' station ; Eear-Admiral Charles
Hohnes reheved Vice-Admiral Thomas Cotes at Jamaica ; and
five additional ships were sent to the East Indies to reinforce Eear-
Admirals Charles Stevens and Samuel Cornish. In the Mediter-
ranean Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders succeeded to the command.
In the East Indies, Arcot and Carical, with many other places,
were taken from the French, the Marines serving in several
instances on shore, and the ships co-operating with the land forces
whenever possible. Pondicherry was besieged and blockaded, and
in October the boats of the fleet, under Commander William
Newsom, acting captain of the Southsea Castle, 40, and Lieu-
tenant Isaac Florimond Ourry, brilliantly cut out from under the
forts the Hermione, 36, and Baleine, 32, which were afterwards
purchased into the Eoyal Navy. The rainy season approaching,
Eear-Admiral Stevens left five ships of the line, under Captain
Eobert Haldane, of the America, 60, to continue the blockade,
and himself sailed on October 28rd for Trincomale. In the mean-
' Squadron under Commodore Sir Piercy Brett (1), Kt., in the Downs and Xorth
Sea, 1759: his, 50, Commodore Sir Piercy Brett, Kt., Captain Edward AVheeler;
Woolwich, 40, Captain Daniel Deriug; Aurora, 36, Captain Samuel Scott; Alarm, 32,
Captain John Eushworth ; Aquiion, 28, Captain Chaloner Ogle (2); Tactar, 28, Captain
John Knight (1) ; Sohhny, 24, Captain John Dah-ymple ; and Deal Castle, 24, Captain
George Tindall.
1760-yi.] REDUCTION OF rONDICHElUlY. 225
time the siege was actively carried on by Lieut. -Colonel Eyre
Coote.
On December 25th, Stevens returned with four of his ships of
the line, and resumed command off the port. On January 1st, 1761,
a violent hurricane burst upon the shipping. Stevens, whose flag
was in the Nur/o/k, 74, Captain Richard Kempenfelt, cut his cable,
and by gun-signals ordered his captains to do the same ; but, owing
to the violence of the gale and the amount of spray in the air, the
signals were neither heard nor seen. The Panther, 60, Captain
Philip Affleck, the America, 60, Captain Eobert Haldane, the
Medtvaij, 60, Captain John Bladon Tinker, and the Falmouth, -50,
Captain WiUiam Brereton, were dismasted, yet managed to ride
out the storm. A worse fate overtook the Neivcastle, 50, Captain
Digby Dent (3), the Queenhorough, 20, and the Protector, fireship, all
of which drove ashore and were wrecked about two miles from
Pondicherry, though they lost only seven of their crews. Other
vessels were even more unfortunate. The Due cVAquitainc, 64,
Captain Sir William Hewitt, Bart., the Sunderland, 60, Captain
the Hon. James Colville, and the Drake, storeship, foundered with
all hands, except seven Europeans and seven lascars. The total
sacrifice of life was about eleven hundred souls. Stevens, however,
resumed his position, and renewed the blockade on January 3rd,
and was next day joined by Eear-Admiral Cornish with additional
ships from Trincomale. Pondicherry was gradually reduced by
famine, until on January 15th it surrendered, and was occupied on
the 16th by the Navy and army. Thus ended the French power
on the coast of Coromandel.
On the Leeward Islands' and Jamaica stations the enemy was
in force too feeble to attempt anything of moment. Indeed, onlj'
one action that was fought in the West Indies in 1760 calls for
mention here. In the autumn Eear-Admiral Holmes learnt that
a French convoy, escorted by five frigates, was about to sail from
Cape Frantjois for Europe and he despatched the Hampshire, 50,
Captain Coningsby Norbury (2), the Boreas, 28, Captain Samuel
Uvedale, and the Lively, 20, Captain the Hon. Frederick Lewis
Maitland (1), to intercept them. On October 16th the French
put to sea, the escort consisting of the vessels mentioned in the
note.' Next morning at dawn the British ships sighted and
1 Sir'ene, 32; Due de C/ioiseuI, 32; Prhice Edirurd, 32; Fhtir de Lys, 32; and
Valeur, 20.
VOL. III. Q
226 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1760.
chased them, but closed veiy slowly until evening, when the breeze
freshened. At midnight the Boreas engaged the Sirine, but, being
disabled aloft, fell astern, and could not come up with her again till
2 P.M. on October 18th, off the east end of Cuba. A hot action
then began, and at 4.40 p.m. the Sirhie struck, having lost 80 killed
and woiinded. The Boreas had lost but one killed and one wounded.
In the meanwhile the Hampshire and Lively had been in chase of
the other frigates. Soon after daybreak on the 18th, the Lively,
by using her sweeps, got alongside of the Valeur, and, after an hour
and a half, forced her to surrender, she having lost 38 killed and
25 wounded, and the Lively but two wounded. Both the Sirene
and Valeur were added to the Navy under their own names. The
Hampshire at 3.30 p.m. got between the Due de Choiseul and the
Prince Edward, but the fonner, having the advantage of the wind,
got into Port au Paix. The latter ran ashore and struck, but was,
nevertheless, subsequently burnt by her crew. On the 19th the
Hampshire and Lively were about to attack the Fleur de Lys,
which lay in the bay to leeward of Port au Paix, w^hen the enemy
saved them the trouble by abandoning and burning the ship.
The conqiiest of Canada had not been completed when Quebec
fell, and the French still cherished hopes of ousting the British
and of regaining command of the countiy. On the other hand,
the British were determined to make good their possession. In
the winter of 17-59-60, a naval force consisting of the Onondaga, 18,
Mohawk, 16, and several row-galleys and gunboats, was estabhshed
on Lake Ontario, with a view to transporting an army down the
St. LawTence to Montreal. This airmy, of about 11,000 men
under General Amherst, consisted half of regulars and half of
provincial levies, besides Indians, commanded b}' Sir "William
Johnson, Bart. It was to be aided bj' another, of 5000 men,
under Colonel Haviland, advancing from Lake Champlain, and by
a third, under Brigadier-General Miu-raj-, advancing from Quebec
up the St. LawTence.
To help these various expeditions. Commodore Lord Colville ^
' Northumberland, 70, Commodore Lord Colville, Captain AVilliam Adams (2);
Alcide, 64, Captain Thomas Hankerson ; Trident, 64, Captain Julian Legge ; Pem-
hrol-e, 60, Captain John Wheelock; Prince of Orange, 60, Captain Samuel Wallis;
Richmond, 32, Captain Jolm Elphinstone (1) ; Eurus, 20, Captain Nathaniel Bateman ;
Porcupine, 16, Commander John Macartney ; and Racehorse, homb, ^vhich was already
at Quebec. The above wintered in America, and were joined at various times by the
Devonshire, 66, Captain George Darby; Norwich, 50, Captain William M'Cleverty;
Greyhound, 24, Captain Thomas Francis; and Lizard, 28, Captain James Doake.
17G0.] FBENCII ATTEMPTS AGAINST QUEBEC. 227
was directed to enter the St. Lawrence as soon as the season should
allow ; and a reinforcement ' under Commodore S wanton, consisting
of two sail of the line, three fifty-gun ships, and four frigates, sailed
from England early in the spring.
Knowing of some, at least, of those preparations, the French
made gallant attempts to seize Quebec before the river should be clear
of ice. They sent down the St. Lawrence an army of about 14,000
men mider M. de Levis. General Murray, underrating the force
of the enemy, marched out and attacked him, but was defeated at
Sillery on April •28th. Tf the French had at once followed up
their advantage, they could probably have taken the place, but
they let shp their chance. Murray was very active in the defence,
and sent the RaceJiorse down the river to look for the fleet and
hasten its arrival. On May 9th the Lowestoft, 28, Captain Joseph
Deane, anchored in the Basin, and brought news of the near
approach of Commodore Swanton, who, on the evening of the
15th, arrived in the Vanguard, 70, with the Diana, 36, Captain
Alexander Schomberg. On the 16th, in response to the expressed
wishes of General Murray, the Vanguard, Diana and Lowestoft
worked up towards the enemy's flotilla in the upper river, and soon
obliged it to retire with the loss of the Poinone, 36, which grounded
and was burnt near Cape Diamond, the Atalantc, 32, which grounded
and was burnt thirty miles higher up, and all the other craft except
a sloop. The active part of this work was done exclusively by the
Diana and Lowestoft, while the Vanguard, dropping down abreast
of Sillery, enfiladed the enemy's trenches there, and compelled their
abandonment. Indeed, this attack induced M. de Levis to raise
the siege on the night of the 16th, leaving behind him 44 guns,
10 mortars, and various stores. Unfortunately, the Lowestoft,
in returning, struck on a sunken rock and foundered, but without
loss of life. Lord Colville, with his squadron, reached Quebec on
the 18th.
All was then in readiness for the projected advance against
Montreal. General Murray's army was escorted up the river by
the Penzance, 40, Captain William Gough, the Diana, 32, Captain
Joseph Deane, the Porcupine, 16, Commander John Macartney,
' Vanguard, 70, Commodore Robert Swanton; Kingston, 60, Captain William
Parry (2); Rochester, 50, Captain Thomas Burnett; Falkland, 50, Captain Francis
Samuel Drake; Sutherland, 50, Captain Benjamin Clive; Penzance, 44, Captain William
Gough; Diana, 36, Captain Alexander Schomberg; Vengeance, 28, Captain Gamaliel
Nightingale; and Lowestoft, 28, Captain Joseph Deane.
Q 2
228 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1760.
the Gaspee, schooner, 8, and a flotilla of thirty-five small craft, it
having embarked in forty transports on June 13th. Progress vk'as on
several occasions challenged by French batteries ; but the various
difficulties were slowly overcome. Behind the main force followed
some troops from Louisbourg under Lord Kollo. In the interval,
General Amherst was advancing down the St. Lawrence under the
conduct of Captain Joshua Loring, K.N.' In the course of the
advance the Onondaga was taken by the enemy, and, though
retaken, had to be abandoned. Many boats and some small craft
were also lost by the way, owing to the gi'eat difficulties of naviga-
tion. On September 6th, however, the Commander-in-Chief's anny
landed on the upper end of the Island of Montreal, nine miles above
the city. The enemy fled, and Montreal was quickly invested.
As for Colonel Havilaud's force, it embarked at Crown Point
on August 11th, and, gradually driving the enemy before it, maae
its way, partly by water and partly by laud, to Isle Ste. Therese
near Montreal, appearing there within a few hours of the arrival
of Amherst and Murray in the same neighbourhood. The co-opera-
tion could not have l)een more exactly timed.
On September 7th a cessation of hostilities was agreed to ; and
on September 8th M. de Vaudreuil capitulated and Canada became
British. The final conquest had been prefaced bj' the captm-e or
destruction by Lord Colville of a large number of French privateers
on the St. Lawrence, and by the destruction by Commodore the
Hon. John Byron in Chaleur Bay, on July 8th, of the Macliaiilt, 32,
Bienfaisant, 22, Marquis de Marloze, 16, and several French small
craft which had taken refuge there in expectation of chance offering
them some opportunity for slipping up the river.
Captain Joseph Deane, R.N., and Major Barre carried home
the dispatches announcing the great success. Each was presented
with ;6500 whereveith to buy a sword. Byron, who had proceeded
on his own responsibility to Chaleur Bay on the service above noted,
and who had interrupted for the purpose the business of razing to
the ground the fortifications of Louisbom-g, subsequently retm-ned
and completed that work.
In the Mediterranean, whither A^ice-Admiral Charles Saunders
' .Joshua Loring came of a family which had been for some time settled in Korth
America. Lieutenant, 1745; Commander, 1756; Captain, 1757 ; chief director of the
Xaval Department in the Interior, and Commander-in-Chief of the Lake Flotilla, 1759-
1701': died, 1781.
1760.] GRUISK OF M. TIIUliOT. 229
went as Commander-in-Chief in April, ITCiO, little of importance
happened, owing to the overwhelming superiority of the British
naval forces. A French division slipped out of Toulon in June ;
but the greater part of it was driven by a squadron, under Captain
Hugh Palliser, of the Hlircivfihunj, 74, into a port in the island of
Candia, and was blockaded there until the British vessels had to
withdraw for supplies and repairs, whereupon the enemy got back
to Toulon.
.The fortunes of M. Thurot must now be followed. Evading
Commodore Boys, he left Dunquerque on October 15th, 1759. In
his little squadron of six frigates and corvettes, he had thirteen
hundred troops under Brigadier-General de Flobert.^ He first
went to Gothenburg in Sweden, partly to procure stores, and partly,
no doubt, to baffle pursuit or observation. There he remained for
nineteen days, going next to Bergen in Norway. On his way
thither, one of his ships, the Began, was so damaged in a gale as
to be obliged to return to France. The Fa a con also parted company
early in the voyage. Thurot quitted Bergen on December 5th, and
proceeded, by way of Stromo, in the Faroe Islands, reaching the
neighbom-hood of the Irish coast on January 25th, ]760. The
weather confounded an intended descent near Londonderry, and
scattered his squadron, so much so that the Amaranthc' never
rejoined, and returned in some distress to St. Malo. As the
ships were by that time all in a sorry plight, and more than one of
them was almost mutinous, the captains implored Thurot to abandon
the descent. But he refused, and put into Claigeann Bay, in the
island of Islay, on February 15th, to refresh.
Thurot left the island on February 19th, and next day anchored
in Belfast Loiigh, opposite Kilroot Point. The town of Carrick-
fergus was garrisoned by four newly-raised and weakly companies
of the 62nd Eegiment under Lieut. -Colonel Jennings. Thurot
landed about six hundred men on February 21st, and M. de Flobert,
after comparatively little fighting, obliged Colonel Jennings to
surrender the castle. The French requisitioned provisions from
^ De Flobei't, from the first, threw difficulties iu Thiirot's way, regarding him with
contempt and jealousy. 'I'liurot, as a seaman, jirohaljly had no high opinion of the
soldier ; for, as Laughton points out (' Studs, in Nay. Hist.,' 346), even until quite
recent times there was a saying on board ship, "a messmate before a shijiniate; a ship-
mate before a stranger; a stranger before a dog; but. — a dog before a soldier."
- It is tolerably certain, nevertheless, that the Amaranthe could have rejoined, h.ad
her captain desired to do so.
230
MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762.
[1760.
the town, and made several small prizes in the Lough, rifling
and afterwards bui-ning them ; but de Flobert resisted Thm-ot's
entreaties to advance and seize Belfast. The whole adventure
cost the French about thirty killed and sixty wounded. The mayor
and some gentlemen were carried on board as hostages, and at
midnight on February 27th, the enemy, having re-embarked, set
sail to return to France.
The Duke of Bedford, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, upon getting
news of the descent, sent expresses to all the principal ports to
inform the captains of any of H. M. ships that might be there of
what had happened. At Kingsale one of these expresses found
the frigates JSolus, Pallas, and Brilliant,^ which had been driven
from their station with Hawke's fleet on the coast of France.
These at once jmt to sea and went north. At Dublin, on the •26th,
the senior officer. Captain John Elhot, learnt that the enemy was
still at Carrickfergus. That same evening, he found himseK off the
mouth of Belfast Lough, but, the wind being contrar}-, he could
not get in. On the 28th, at 4 a.m., he caught sight of the French
as they rounded Copeland Island, and gave chase. " About nine,"
'continues Captain Elliot, in his dispatch of February 29th to the
Duke of Bedford, " I got alongside their commodore ; and, in a
few minutes, the action became general, and continued very briskly
for an horn- and a half, when they all three struck their colours."
The Marechal de Bdleisle alone fought well ; the Blonde and
Terpsichore stnick almost as soon as they were engaged. EUiot, •
with the prizes, subsequently put into Eamsay, Isle of Man, to
refit. All the vessels were greatly disabled aloft, and the Marechal
de Belleisle, which had suffered most of all, was with difficult}'
prevented from sinking.
' Squadron which, under M. Thurot, escajied from Dunquerque in 1759 ; and
squadron which, under Captain John Elliot, met and captured jiart of it on
February 28th. 17G0:—
FnENCir.
BnixrsH.
Ships.
GUDS.
.Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
! Losses.
Marechal de BeUtislc . .
Blonde
Terpsicfwrt
Bigon\
Amaranthe^
Faiicon '
44
36
24
36
Ig
I«
Molm ....
Pallas ....
Brilliant . . .
32
36
36
Capt. John Elliot.
,. Hicljael Clements.
., James Loggie.
KiUed.
4
I
Womided.
15
5
11
1 n.id jiartei compauy before the acttou.
1760] BOSGAWEN'S LAST SERVICE. 231
The gallant Thurot,' who fell on this occasion, was an opponent
who, in his method of carrying on the war, had never shut his eyes
to the principles of honour, generosity, and humanity, and who
was scarcely less lamented hy his British foes than by his own
countrymen. The three victorious captains were unanimously
voted the thanks of the Irish House of Commons, and the Blonde
and Terpsichore were purchased into the Eoyal Navy.
Admiral Boscawen, after the return of Sir Edward Hawke,
sailed to command the fleet in Quiberon Bay, with his flag in the
Boijal Wmiani, and with Eear-x\dmiral Francis Geary, in the
SandwicJi, as second in command. While he was going to his
station, the RamiUies, 90, Captain Wittewronge Taylor, of his
squadron, went ashore on Bolt Head in a gale and was lost, the
crew all perishing except one midshipman and twenty-five men.
Boscawen, who was obliged by the heavy weather to return, sub-
sequently shifted his flag to the Namtir, and proceeded. His
cruisers took several prizes ; but the enemy's fleet did not — indeed,
could not — come out. The blockade prevented the French from
sending supplies across the Atlantic, and from interfering with
British trade. In August, Sir Edward Hawke, in the lioijal
George, reheved Boscawen, who returned to England on Sep-
tember 1st. This was Boscawen's last service. He died at his
house, Hatchlands, near Guildford, on January 10th, 1761." Hawke
pursued his predecessor's policy, and was equally successful. Kear-
Admiral Eodney, cruising ofi' Le Havre, was not less energetic.
An expedition, to be commanded by Commodore the Hon.
Augustus Keppel, and to be directed either against Mauritius and
Bourbon or against the coast of France, was in preparation when,
on October '27th, George II. died. This important event led to so
much delay, that on December 13th orders were given for the
fleet to return from St. Helen's, where it lay ready for sea, to
Spithead, and for the troops on board to be disembarked. For
that season the enterprise was given up.
1 Fran9ois Thurot, born at Nuits, 1726. Son of a small innkeeper ; educated l.iy
the Jesuits at Dijon ; apprenticed to a druggist ; surgeon in a privateer, 1744 ; captured
by the British; escaped; devoted himself to privateering; lived for some time in
London ; given a commission in the French navy ; commanded the Friponne, and,
from 1757, the Marklud de Se/leide. His actions with the Southampton, the Seahorse,
etc., will be found noticed in the next chapter. He was one of the boldest of the French
corsairs.
" Boscawen was, however, buried in the church of St. Michael, Peukevel, Cornwall,
where there is a monument by Eijsbraak to his memory.
232 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 17U-1762. [ITOI.
By 1760 the enemy's navy had been so nearly annihilated that
but two or three of His Majesty's ships were taken by the French ;
and French trade had been so diminished that the British cruisers
made but comparatively few captures — only one hundred and ten
vessels in all. But the British mercantile losses by the ravages
of small privateers were enormous. As many as three hundred
and thirty trading vessels were taken. Few of them, however,
were of any considerable size ; and, in spite of the loss, British
trade flourished exceedingly. It was, no doubt, chiefly owing to its
healthy condition that the commercial marine experienced so many
losses.
In 1761 Vice-Admiral Francis Holburne commanded at Ports-
mouth ; Commodore Sir Piercy Brett (1) in the Downs ; Commodore
Kobert Swanton in the Channel ; Sir Edward Hawke and Sir
Charles Hardy (2) in Quiberon Bay till March, when Commodore
Keppel took charge of the squadron in the Bay of Biscay ; Vice-
Admiral Charles Saunders in the Mediterranean ; Commodore Lord
Colville in North America ; Eear-Admiral Charles Hohnes at
Jamaica; Commodore Sir James Douglas (1), and, at the end of the
year, Eear-Admiral Rodney, on the Leeward Islands' station ; and
Eear-Admiral Stevens in the East Indies, until his death, when
the command devolved on Eear-Admiral Cornish.
After the capture of Pondicherry, Mahe was reduced by the
troops under Major Hector Munro, supported by four sail of the
line under Eear-Admiral Cornish. The place siu-rendered on
February 10th. In May Eear-Admiral Charles Stevens fell a
victim to the unhealthiness of the climate. The French on the
station were by that time practically helpless, and Cornish soon
afterwards went to Bombay to refit. He then proceeded southward
to meet an expedition which he had reason to beheve was on its
way out, under Commodore Keppel, to attack Bourbon and
Mauritius ; but all idea of this expedition had, in the meantime,
been abandoned. The means taken, however, to apprise Cornish
of the change of plans were not efficacious ; and the Eear-Admiral
was actuallj' obliged, by scarcity of supplies, to go back to
Madras without hearing any news from home. Two of his ships,
however, the York, 60, Captain Henry Cowell, and the Chatham, .54,
Captain Thomas Ljiin, being imable to keep with the fleet, had
to bear up for the Cape of Good Hope. There they learned from
the Terpsicliore, 26, Captain Sir Thomas Adams, Bart., that Keppel
ITGL] . CAPTURE OF DOMIXICA. 233
was no longer to be expected ; and in due course they can-ied the
iutelhgence to the Eear-Admiral in India.
On the Leeward Islands' station, Commodore Sir James
Douglas (1), who was reinforced by four sail of the line and three
frigates/ with troops from North America under Lord Eollo,
attacked, and, on June 8th, captured, the Island of Dominica.
During the rest of the summer, operations were chiefly confined to
the protection of trade, and the repression of privateering. Towards
the end of the year, it having been determined to prosecute a more
active and offensive policy, and to largely increase the force among
the AVest India Islands, Eear-Admiral Eodney was appointed to
the command ; and on November 2'2nd he arrived at Carlisle Bay,
Barbados, where he was presentl_y joined by the Temeraire and
ActaoH, with troops from Belle Isle, and l)y a military force from
North America under Major-General Monckton.
On the Jamaica station there were several single-ship encounters,
but no occurrences of first-rate importance. Eear-Admiral Charles
Holmes, dying on November '21st, was .succeeded in the command
by the senior officer, Captain Arthur Forrest, of the Centaur,
pending the arrival of Sir James Douglas. In North America,
likewise, little of moment happened, the chief business of the fleet
being to convoy troops to the West Indies. Nor were there any
transactions on a large scale in the Mediterranean, although the
force there was, towards the end of the year, greatly strengthened
by the arrival of a detachment from home under Sir Piercy Brett (1).
The French scarcely ventured to put to sea ; and, when any of
their ships did issue from port, they were almost invariably
captm-ed.
Admiral Sir Edward Hawke and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles
Hardy (2) remained in the Bay of Biscay, watching the French ships
in the Vilaine and Charente ; and, to better effect their purpose,
stationed an inshore squadron, under Captain James Gambler (1),
quite close to the mouth of the Vilaine. Yet, in spite of this
precaution, on January 2nd, the night being dark and the breeze
fresh, several of the French vessels slipped out thence, and, though
chased by Gambler, escaped into Brest. After this evasion, the
' Stiiiimj Castle, 64, Captain Michael Everitt ; yonvich, 50, Captain William
M'Cleverty; Falkland, 50, Captain Francis Samuel Drake; Sutherland, 50, Captain
Julian Legge; Penzance, -l-i, Ca[itain .John Boyd (acting); Repulse, 32, Captain
John Carter Allen; and Lizard, 28, Captain James Doake.
234
MAJOR OFERATIONS, 1714:-1762.
[17G1.
blockading' force was needlessly large for the work remaining to
be done, and in March Hawke returned to England, leaving behind
him enough ships to observe the enemy's motions.
The expedition, which had been prepared during the previous
year, and had been destined at one time for Bourbon and Mauritius,
and later for the coast of France, was again brought forward in
1761, Commodore Hon. Augustus Keppel being appointed to
command the sea, and Major-General Studholm Hodgson^ the
laud forces. The squadron at first included ten sail of the line,
eight frigates, three sloops, three bombs, and two fireships, but
was eventually reinforced with five more sail of the line.^ The
army originally consisted of about seven thousand men,^ but about
three thousand more were subsequently sent to the scene of
operations.
The expedition* sailed from St. Helen's on March 29th, and
.sighted Belle Isle,^ which it was designed to attack, on April 6th.
That evening Keppel detached six frigates to cruise between the
island and the mainland, in order to sever communications. A
squadron under Captain Matthew Buckle (1), consisting of thirteen
' Later a field-marshal.
^ British squadron employed under Commodore the Hon. Augu.stus Keppel iu the
expedition against Belle Isle, 1761 : —
• Ships.
Guns.
CommaDders.
Ships.
Guns.
Commanders.
iCommod. Hou. August'is
Moitmouth t
64
Capt. .Tohn Storr.
Valiant ....
Y4
\
veppel.
Lynn
44
„ Walter Stirliug.
(Caut. Adam Duncau.
Launceston . .
44
.. Edmnnd Affleck.
Sandwich
90
, Kicbanl Norbury.
Soutltamptim .
36
,, Charles Antrobus.
Dragon ....
74
, Hon. Aug. John
Hervey.
, Blattbew Barton.
Melampe. . .
36
r ,, William Hothara
I (1).
„ Matthew iloore.
Tenu'rairt .
74
Adeenture . .
32
Torbay ....
74
, William Brett.
ActcEOn . . .
28
,„ Paul Henry Ourry.
Swi/tsurc . . .
70
{
, Sir Thomas Stan-
Flamhoroudh .
24
„ Samuel Thomp.sou.
hope, Kt.
Aldborougii
24
,. Mitchell Graham.
ITampton Court
64
, CdiT Scrope.
Escort . . .
14
Com. Charles EUys.
Hssi:x ....
Prince of Orantje .
64
60
{
, Alexander Schom-
My ... .
10
,, George Gayton.
berg.
, Samuel Wallis.
Druid . . .
8
f ., Hon. John Lut-
l treU.
Achilles ....
60
{
, Hon. Samuel Bar-
Firedrake. b.
8
,. James Orrok.
rioRton.
fv/ernal, b.
8
,, James Mackenzie.
Berol ....
74
, WiUbm Fort^scue.
Furnace^ b. . .
8
,, James Chaplen.
Buckingham i . .
70
, Peter I'arker (1).
Vesuvius^ f.s. .
16
„ Jaaies Chads.
Burforill . . .
Chichester l . . .
70
70
{
, .lames Gambier(l)-
, William Saltreu
Willett.
JEtna, f.s. . .
16
1 ,, Michael Henrv
{ Pascal.
I Fullowed the fleet as reinforcements.
' Its nominal force was 9000, but the regiments were incomplete. Hodgson to
Albemarle, March 28th, 1761.
* For Keppel's secret instructions, see ' Life,' by Hon. and Rev. T. Keppel, i. 302.
That biography, however, appears to contain numerous errors.
^ For Belle Isle and neighbourhood, see chart facing p. 488 of Vol. II.
1761.] THE EXPEDITION TO BELLE ISLE. 235
sail of the line and three frigates/ was presently sent to cruise
off Brest to prevent the possibility of interference from that quarter.
Early on April 7th the fleet passed the south end of the island close
in, so as to enable the Commodore and General to reconnoitre,
and at noon it anchored in the Koad of Palais. The Commodore
and General then reconnoitred more closely in a cutter, having
first ordered the boats to be hoisted out, and the troops to be
made ready to land. They found no place more suitable for a
disembarkation than a l)ay near Point de Locmaria, which they
had remarked in the morning. To distract the enemy, a feint of
landing was made near Sauzon by a detachment under Captain
Sir Thomas Stanhope ; and, on the morning of the 8th, the wind
being north-east, the real landing in force was made near Port
Andro, after the Prince of Orange, Dragon, and Achilles, with two
bombs, had silenced a four-gun battery at the entrance of the bay.
Commodore Keppel gave the signal for the disembarkation from the
Prince of Orange, to which he had shifted his broad pennant from
the Valiant. The boats were led by Captain Matthew Barton,
and, although the enemy offered a most vigorous resistance, the
landing was effected at three different places. But the troops found
it impossible to hold their ground or to mount the well-defended
slopes in front of them, and, after a hot contest, had to retreat with
very considerable loss. The retiring boats were covered by the fire
from the ships.
Bad weather for several days prevented any renewal of the
attempt ; but on the '2'2nd, while two feints were made elsewhere,
a new landing was prepared under Major-General John Craufurd
at Fort d'Arsic, under cover of the Sandwich, Dragon, Prince of
Orange, two bombs, and two armed transports ; Captain Barton,
as before, leading in the boats. The feints were ordered to be
made by Brigadier-General Hamilton Lambart, one near St. Foy
and the other at Sauzon. Lambart was directed, if he saw any
probability of success, to actuall)' land, and to endeavour to hold
' Namur, 90, Captain Matthew Buckle (1) ; Union, 90, Captain Thomas Evans ;
Royal William, 8-1, Captain Hugli Pigot (1) ; Princess Amelia, 80, Captain John
Montagu ; Hero, 74, Captain William Fortescue ; Fame, 74, Captain the Hon. John
Bj-ron ; Cornwall, 74, Captain Robert Man (2); 31ars, 74, Captain Richard Sprv ;
Bedford, 64, Captain Joseph Deane ; Prince Frederick, 64, Ca])tain Jervis MaiJesden;
Lion, 60, Captain Edward Le Cras ; Bipon, 60, Cajitain Edward Jekyll ; Unicorn, 28,
Captain Charles Douglas ; Tweed, 28, Captain William Paston ; Aquilon, 28, Captain
Chaloner Ogle (2).
2o(J Mjjuii opkhations, itu-ito:^. [itgi.
his own. This, in fact, he did under cover of the Swiftsure,
HamptoJi Court, Essex, and Lynn, and with the assistance of
Marines under Lieut. -Colonel Mackenzie and Captain Murray. As
he effected his object before the intended landing at d'Arsic had
begun, the division intended to attack that place rowed promptly
to Lambart's support, and enabled him to maintain his position
and to drive back the enemy. All the troops were disembarked
by ~) P.M., and the French retired before them to Palais. Batteries
were erected against the town on May 2nd, and in the preliminary
operations before the place, some Marines, under Captain David
Hepburn, greatly distinguished themselves. On May 13th several
advanced redoubts were carried, and the enemy was driven from
the town to the citadel, which, from the 16th onwards, was subjected
to a furious bombardment. On June 7th, a large breach had been
formed ; and preparations were being made for storming it, when
the Chevalier de St. Croix, the governor, offered to surrender.
Possession was taken on the 8th. The British in these operations
lost about three hundred and ten killed and five hundred wounded,
besides many men who died of disease. During the whole pro-
ceedings the most perfect harmony prevailed between the naval
and the military chiefs.^ The naval dispatches were sent home
by Caj)tain the Hon. Samuel Barrington, who, upon his arrival, was,
as was then usual in such cases, presented by the King with £500.
The island was held during the remainder of the war.
After the landing on Belle Isle, Keppel, who had been again
reinforced, despatched Sir Thomas Stanhope with a squadron - to
attack such French ships as might be lying in Basque Eoad, and
to destroy the works on Isle d'Aix. No ships were discovered, but
the destruction of the works was satisfactorily accomplished by
Captain Peter Parker (1) of the Buckingham, in company with the
MonDiuufh and Nassau, assisted later by the Actcson, Fhj and Blast,
' " I hear some scoundrels liave spread a report tliat the Commodore and I have
disagreed. I lielieve there never was more friendship and more harmony between two
persons since the creation of the world than has subsisted between us. . . . The two
services have acted as one corps ever since we left England." Hodgson to Albemarle,
June 8th, 1761.
^ Swiftsure, 70, Captain Sir Thomas Stanhope ; Sandwich, 90, Captain Richard
Norb\iry; Trident, G4, Captain Benjamin Clive; Buckinyliam, 64, Captain Peter
Parker (1) ; Monmouth, 64, Captain John Storr ; Nassau, 64, Captain Maurice Suckling ;
Prince of Oranrjc, 60, Captain Samuel Wallis ; Actieon, 28, Captain Paul Henry Ourry ;
Fly, 14, Commander George Gayton ; Blast, bomb, 8, Commander ; Furnace,
bomb, 8, Commander James Chaplen.
1761.]
QUEEN CHARLOTTE'S ESCOUT.
237
and by the boats of the squadrou. The French prames from the
mouth of the Charente endeavoured to interfere with the operations ;
but the work was completed with very Httle loss on June "ilst
and 2'2nd. Sir Thomas Stanhope continued on the station during
the rest of the year, his ships being occasionally relieved. In
December, the enemy made an ineffectual attempt to destroy them
by means of fireships. Soon afterwards Lord Howe succeeded
Stanhope in the command.
It may here be mentioned, although the matter has nothing to
SIK PETER PAKKER (1), BAUT., ADMIKAL OF THE FLEET.
{From an engraving by Rldleij after a portrait onir in llic possession of Mr. Valentine Green.)
do with the miUtary operations of the Navy, that, in August, Lord
Anson, as Admiral of the Fleet, hoisted his flag on board the EoyaJ
Charlotte {ex-Boyal Caroline), yacht, in order to escort to England
the Princess Charlotte of Mecklenburg-Strehtz, who had been
promised in marriage to George III., and who landed at Harwich
on September 6th. Anson's flag-captain on that occasion was
Captain Peter Denis, and the royal yacht was convoyed by the
238 MAJOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1702. [1701.
Nottinglidin, 60, Captain Samuel Marshall (1), the Winchester, .50,
Captain John Hale, the Minerva, 32, Captain Alexander Ai'thur
Hood, the Tartar, 28, Captain John Knight (1), the Hazard, 14,
Commander the Hon. Henry St. John (1), the Lynx, 14, Commander
the Hon. Keith Stewart (1), and a nmnber of small yachts.
Dux-ing the year there was a disposition, on the part of both
belligerents, to treat for peace ; but the negotiations broke down,
and the prospects of an amicable arrangement were seriously
diminished by the signature, on August 15th, 1761, of what is
known as the Family Compact, between the rulers of France and
Spain. As soon as news of this was received in England, Pitt
desired at once to declare war against Spain, which had for some
time previously behaved in a manner not altogether becoming a
neutral ; but, being overborne, he resigned. Had war been declared
when Pitt wished, the very rich home-coming Spanish treasure-
ships from America might have been seized. As soon as they were
safely in port, Spain took no more pains to disguise her hostiUty,
the consequence being that, by proclamation dated January 2nd,
1762, war was declared by Great Britain, and, by proclamation of
January 16th, by Spain. The Spanish court at once endeavoured
to coerce Portugal into joining Spain and France ; but Portugal was
loyal to her ancient ally, and manfully stood out, although war
was very quickly declared against her as a penalty for her non-
compliance. Substantial British miUtary support was promptly
given her, numerous British officers joined her army, and Com-
manders Joseph Norwood, Thomas Lee (1), and Michael Henry
Pascal ^ took service in her Kavy.
It was early resolved to deal with Spain in the most vigorous
and uncompromising manner. It has been stated that a large body
of troops had been ordered from North America to the AVest Indies
with a view to the reduction of the French Caribbee Islands. The
Ministry determined that these troops should be reinforced from
England, and that, after the newly conquered islands should have
been properly garrisoned, an expedition should proceed to the
attack of Havana. The conomand of the army assigned for this
ser\'ice was given to Lieut. -General the Earl of Albemarle. The
command of the squadron w^as given to Admiral Sir George
Pocock, K.B., with, as his second, Commodore the Hon. A. Keppel,
the Earl of Albemarle's brother.
' All these officers, upou their return to England after the peace, were posted.
1V61.] THE EXPEDITION AGAINST MANILLA. 239
Another movement induced by the rupture with Spain, was the
despatch of Commodore Sir Piercy Brett (1), with a strong reinforce-
ment, to Sir Charles Saunders, K.B.,^ in the Mediterranean. Sir
Edward Hawke, with Bear-Admiral the Duke of York, cruised off the
coasts of Spain and Portugal ; and later, the same squadron, under
command of Sir Charles Hai'dy ('2) and the Duke of York, left port a
second time on the same errand. While arrangements were thus
made to attack Spain in the West Indies, and, at the same moment,
to distract her attention at home, a small expedition, under command
of Brigadier-General Draper, was despatched from India against the
Philippine Islands.
On the death of Kear-Admiral Holmes, Sir James Douglas (1) was
appointed to the command at Jamaica ; Eear- Admiral Kodney still
commanded on the Leeward Islands' station ; and Commodore
Lord Colville remained in North America. Commodore Spry
cruised with a squadron of observation off Brest, until he was
reheved by Commodore Eobert Man (2) ; and Commodore Lord
Howe lay in Basque Eoad until he was relieved by Commodore
Peter Denis. Admiral Holburne commanded at Portsmouth ;
Commodore John Moore (1), in the Downs, and Commodore James
Y'oung (1), in the Channel.
Eear- Admiral Cornish continued to command in the East Indies ;
but, as the French had neither settlement nor trade there, he had
little to do against them. When, therefore, war broke out with
Spain, he was able to devote almost his undivided attention to the
new enemy. Colonel Draper, afterwards Sir William Draper, K.B.,
an officer who had distinguished himself at the siege of Madras in
17-59, had devoted part of a period of sick leave to inquiring into the
condition of the Spanish settlements in the Philippine Islands ; and
he had discovered that the defences had been much neglected, and
that the Spaniards there trusted rather to their remoteness than to
their strength for their protection." Upon the commencement of
hostilities. Colonel Draper laid his information before the Ministry,
and measures were taken accordingly. He was at once sent to
India in the Argo, 28, Captain Eichard Eing (1), with instructions for
fitting out an expedition against Manilla, and with an appointment
as commander-in-chief of the troops to be employed. The ex-
pedition ultimately consisted of the 79th Eegiment, a company of
' Vice-Admiral Sauuders was so installed, bj- proxy, ou May 26th, 1761.
- As they appear to have done again in 1898.
240
MAJOli OPEliATIONB, 1714-1762.
[1761.
Eoyal Artilleiy and miscellaneous bodies, which, with (530 seamen
and 270 INIarines from the fleet, brought the total of the available
field army up to about 2300 men, who were embarked in Eear-
Admiral Cornish's squadron and in two East Indiamen. The
preparations were begun and completed within three weeks. The
Seahorse, 20, Captain Charles Cathcart Grant, was sent in advance
to intercept any vessels that might be bound for Manilla. A
ADMIRAL SIK RICHARD KING (1), BART.
(From a lithograijh by Bidkij, after a miniature.)
di\asion of the fleet, under Commodore Eichard Tiddeman, sailed
on July 29th ; and the rest, with the exception of the Falmouth, 60,
which was left to convoy an ludiaman, followed under the Com-
mander-in-Chief on August 1st. On August 19th the fleet ^ reached
' Listof H.M. ships engaged in the expedition against Manilla : — Norfolk, 74, Rear-
Admiral Samuel Cornish (Yice- Admiral, October 21st, 1762), Captain Eichard Kempen-
felt ; Elizabeth, 64, Commodore Eichard Tiddeman, Captain Isaac Florimond Ourry :
Lenox, 74, Captain Eobert JoceljTi ; Orafton, 68, Captain Hyde Parker (1); Wey-
mouth, 60, Captain Richard Collins (2); America, 60, Captain Samuel Pitchford :
Panther, 60, Commander George Ourry (acting for Captain AVilliani JTewsom) :
17G1.] CAPTUllE OF MANILLA. 241
Malacca, and there watered and took on board various supplies.
On the '27th it sailed again ; and on September 23rd, to the great
surprise of the Spaniards, who had not heard of the outbreak of
war, it anchored off Manilla. On the 24th the town was sumnjoned,
but without result ; and, in the afternoon, under cover of the Argo,
Seahorse, and Seaford, some troops were landed, in spite of a heavy
surf which caused much loss of, and damage to, material. The
boats on this occasion were under the direction of Captains Hyde
Parker (1), Eichard Kempenfelt and William Brereton. There was
but shght opposition. The rest of the troops and the Marines were
disembarked on the 25th ; and on the 2Gth a brigade of seamen,
under Captains Collins, Pitchford and Ourry, reinforced them. On
the following days batteries were erected and opened ; and on the
29th the Elizabeth and Falmouth were ordered to co-operate as best
they could with the army, by enfilading the enemy's front. By
October .5th a practicable breach had been made in the works.
Early in the morning of that day this was stormed with success,
and the governor and officers were driven to the citadel, which they
presently surrendered at discretion. Not only Manilla, but with
it also Luzon, and all the Spanish islands, were handed over by the
terms of the capitulation. It was arranged that Manilla should be
ransomed for four millions of dollars to save it from pillage. Owing,
however, to the bad faith of the Spaniards, only half of this amount
was ever paid. The conquest, together with most of the prize
money, was handed over to the East India Company.
During the operations, Cornish obtained news that a galleon
from Acapulco was on her way to Manilla. Accordingly, on
October 4th, he despatched the FaiitJiey and Argo to intercept her.
These failed to do so ; but they succeeded in taking, on October 31st,
the Santisima Trinidad, which had left Manilla for Acapulco on
August 1st, having on board treasure worth about three million
dollars. In the meantime, the galleon from Acapulco had arrived
at Palapa, in Samar. It was agreed that, subject to certain
conditions, she was to be surrendered to the British ; but the
arrangement was never carried out, and it is probable that much of
her rich cargo eventually passed into the hands of private persons,
who had no right to it.
Fa! mouth, 50, Ca\ita\ri William Brereton; Ar(/o, 28, Captain Richard King(l); Sea-
horse, 20, Captain Charles Cathcart Grant; Heaford, 20, Captain John Peighin ; and
Southne'i Castle, store-ship.
VOL. III. E
242
MAJOR OPEItATJOXS, 1711-1702.
[1762.
The operations before Manilla were less costly than might have
Ijeeii expected. The army lost but 115 killed, drowned and
wounded, and the Navy but 35. The only naval officer who was
killed was Lieutenant Porter, of the Norfolk, but, unfortunately.
Commodore Tiddeman was accidentally drowned on the day of the
sun-ender. Captain llichard Kempenfelt was sent home with the
naval dispatches. As a reward for the sei'vice, Coi-nish was made
a baronet, and Draper a K.B., and each received the thanks of both
Houses. The colours taken at Manilla were hung in the chapel
of King's College, Cambridge, of which Draper had been a member.
The French empire in North America had ceased to exist ; and
its disappearance had rendered unnecessary the presence on the spot
of part of the large body of troops which had been concerned in the
conquest of Canada. As has already been mentioned, it had been
decided to employ some of them against the French islands in the
West Indies. Eear-Admiral Kodney had left England in October,
1761, and had arrived in CarHsle Bay, Barbados, on November 22nd.
He there found part of the squadron mider Commodore Sir James
Douglas (1), which he speedily detached to blockade Martinique.
Troops and transports were in the meantime assembled at Bar-
bados ; and an improvised force of armed hired sloops was sent to
cruise off St. Eustatia to prevent the Dutch from assisting the French
with supplies and provisions. At length, on January 5th, 1762, the
lieet,' having on board nearly 14,000 troops from England, Belle Isle,
' British fleet emjiloved in the expedition a;jainst Martinique, etc., 1762 : —
Ship^.
Cummauiiers.
Sbips.
rrmmauJers.
Marlborough
Dublin .
Foudroi/ant
Dragon ^ .
Trftneraire
Temple •
Vanguard
J/odeste .
Slirling Ca:
Devonshire .
Baisonnable
Alcide
Xottiitgham.
Eocfu^ster
:<utherland .
FdlkJaivl .
1 Kear- Admiral G . B.
\ Rodney (B).
((.'apt. John HoUwell.
iCommod. Sir James
^ i)oog]as(l).
leapt. Edward Gascoigue.
„ Robert Unff.
I ,, Hon. Aug. John
l Hervey.
,, JIatthew Barton.
,, Lucins O'Brien.
,, Robert S wanton.
f „ Hon. Robt. Boyle
( Walsingham.
„ Micliael Everitt.
,, George Darby.
i „ Molyueux .Shuld-
l ham.
„ Thomas Han kerson
„ Samuel Marshall (I).
t „ Thomas Burnett.
' „ .In ian Legge.
f „ "\VUliam M'Cle-
{ verty.
f ,, Francis Samuel
1 Krake.
S4
"4
64
64
60
50
50
Woolwich .
Penzance i .
Dover I .
Ecfio . . .
Stag . . .
liepulse , .
Actaon . .
Crescent
Lizard . .
Levant . .
Sightingale
Greyhound .
lioie . . .
Antigua.
Barbados
Ferret . .
Virgin .
Zephyr .
JBanlisk, bombi
Thunder, bomb
Grenada, bomb
lit/e- nai, bomb
44
44
40
Z-2.
32
32
28
28
28
20
20
20
10
16
12
12
8
Capt. M'illiam Bayne.
,, John Bovd.
„ Chaloner Ogle (3).
„ John Laforey.
„ Henry Angell.
,, John Carter Allen.
„ Paul Henry Ourry.
r „ Thomas Colling-
L wood.
,, James Doake.
,, William Tucker,
f „ James Campbell
I (2).
,, Joseph Mead.
„ Thomas Francis.
„ Francis Banks ( I ).
r „ John Neaie Pley-
i dell Ni.tt.
Com. Stair Douglas (1).
„ James Aims (1).
Capt.
Com. John Botterell.
„ Robert Brice.
Lieut. Rubert Ha.swell.
., James Hawker.
Com. James 3Iackeiizie.
1 I'ttaLbeil, uuiler C.ipt. the Hon. Augustus John Hervey, against St. Lucia.
y,zye<i^^i ^'^•r /^i^^nAof/y -^ - ^J^f^^■r^
1762.] CAFTIIHE OF MARTI MQUE. 243
North America and the West India Islands, under Major-General
the Hon. Eobert Monckton, sailed, and, on the 7th, joined Douglas
off Martinique. The coasts of the island had not been properly
reconnoitred, nor had the ships adequate charts on board. The
configuration of the island and the nature of its defences rendered
it desirable to land the troops as close as possible to the places at
which they were to be employed. But, at first, this fact was not
realised ; and Eodney, while detaching only a small S(|uadron to the
Great Bay of Fort Koyal, detached another to La Trinite to make
a feint, and himself anchored with the bulk of his force in St. Anne's
Baj'. A division, under Sir James Douglas, silenced the batteries
there, and landed the troops, losing, however, the HaisuiuKthle,
owing to the ignorance of her pilot. But it was soon found that
the march across to Fort Eoyal from St. Anne's Bay would be an
undertaking too difficult to be entered upon. The works which
had been erected at St. Anne's were therefore blown up, the
troops were re-embarked, and the whole force proceeded to Fort
Eoyal Bay.
The order of the attack having been arranged, the ships went to
their stations early on the morning of the 16th, opening fire upon
the batteries and silencing them by noon, soon after which the
troops were landed in three divisions in Cas des Navires Bay, under
conduct of Captains Molyneux Shuldham, Eobert Swanton and
the Hon. Augustus John Hervey. By sunset two-thirds of the
army were on shore ; and the rest, with 900 Marines, followed next
morning. The distance to Fort Eoyal was not great, only about
five or six miles ; but the country was terribly difficult, and the
defenders fought well from behind every rock and tree, as well as
within artificial works of all kinds. The necessary guns were,
however, dragged to the front, thanks mainly to the energy of the
seamen of the fleet ; and on January 24th, a preliminary attack was
made by a body of troops advancing along the coast parallel with a
detachment of a 1000 seamen in boats ; and the enemy was driven
back. On the 25th, the batteries began to bombard the citadel ;
and on the 27th the key to the whole position was taken. Yet
the citadel did not surrender until February 4th, and not until
February 16th was the whole island in possession of the British.
Captain Darby, of the Devonshire, and Major Gates, later a general
in the army of the revolting American Colonists, carried home the
dispatches announcing the capture of Fort Eoyal ; and each
R 2
244 MAJOR Ol'EBATIONS, 1714-1702. [1702.
received froiu the King the usual comphment of £500. The
British loss during the operations amounted to about 500 killed
and wounded.
Even before the conquest had been completed, Eodney detached
Captain Swantou to blockade Grenada ; and, when Martinique
had surrendered, Swanton was reinforced by vessels conveying
troops. These reached Grenada on March 3rd ; and on the fol-
lowing day the island was summoned ; but the governor refused to
comply. The inhabitants, however, ignored him, and capitulated
on the 4th ; and the governor himself was obliged to surrender at
discretion on the 5th, With Grenada fell the Grenadines. Swan-
ton, leaving a garrison, returned to Martinique.
On February 24th Captain the Hon. Augustus John Hervey had
been similarly detached against St. Lucia. But he could not satisfj'
himself as to the enemy's strength ; and, to discover it, he disguised
himself as a midshipman, and, in the capacity of an interpreter,
accompanied the officer whom he sent to summon the governor,
M. de Longueville. That gentleman refused to surrender; yet
Hervey learnt so much dm-ing his visit that, on the following day,
he made preparations for taking his ships into the harbour. Ko
sooner did the governor notice signs of their intention to approach
than he capitulated.
Hervey was next about to proceed to St. Vincent to assure the
Caribs that their neutrality would be maintained, and that the
French would be no longer suffered to interfere with them, when he
was recalled by Eodney, in consequence of news having been received
that a French squadron of seven sail of the line and four frigates,'
under M. de Blenac, with seven battalions of troops, had escaped
from Brest, owing to Commodore Spry having been driven from his
station off' that port ; and that it was on its w^-iy to relieve the
French West India Islands. Spry had detached the Aquilon, 28,
Captain Chaloner Ogle (2), with this intelligence to Eodney. But,
before the arrival of Spry's dispatch, the French squadron had been
sighted on March Sth, on the windward side of Martinique. It lay
to off the coast until the 10th, when it stood for Dominica.
Eodney summoned his detached division to a rendezvous off the
Salines, and, with Sir James Douglas (1), went in search of the enemy ;
but without result. AVhen he had collected his whole force and had
^ Due de Bovrgogne, 80; Df/enseur, 71; Hector, 71; Biadhne, 74; Protee, 64;
Drafjun,ii\; IiriU(mt,CA; Zephyr, 32; Di!i;/en>e, 3-2 ; Oinh,2f>; Ca'^Mo, 16.
1702] THE EXPEDITION J ''/.I /.V.s"/' I/AVAXA. 245
been assured that the French had gone to Cape Francois, he retiuiicil
to Martinique to water. He there found the Aquilon, from which
he learnt trustworthy details of M. de Blenac's strength. He
already knew, thanks to early information sent him by Commander
George Johnstone, commanding i\\o Ili)rnrt on the Lisbon station,
of the rupture with Spain ; and he was thus enabled to attack the
Spanish trade in the West Indies before the Spaniards themselves
knew that war had broken out. This important intelligence had
been brought to him by a small French privateer prize, which
Johnstone had entrusted to the Hornet's master, Mr., afterwards
Captain, John M'Laurin. At Martinique Eodney also heard that
a strong Spanish squadron had arrived at Havana and that Jamaica
was believed to be threatened. He therefore sent a frigate to warn
Captain Arthur Forrest, who, as senior officer, had succeeded Eear-
Admiral Holmes on the Jamaica station, and to desire him to join
the main fleet off Cape St. Nicolas, whither he himself intended to
proceed.
He was, however, not quite ready to sail when, oh March GGth,
the Eichmond, Captain John Elphinstone (1), arrived from England
with orders for him and General Moncktou to postpone further
operations pending the appearance of Admiral Sir George Pocock,
who had been commissioned to conduct a secret expedition on an
important scale. This did not prevent Eodney from sending Sir
James Douglas (1),^ with ten sail of the line, to the Jamaica station
with directions to bring Forrest's squadron thence as soon as
possible, and to join Pocock. He also sent Captain Swanton,
with a division, to cruise off the Spanish Main, and himself went
to St. Pierre, Martinique, sending a frigate to meet Pocock at Bar-
bados, where Sir George arrived on board the Naiiiiir on April '20th.
Pocock sailed again on the 24th, joined Eodney at Cas des Navires
on the 26th, and, with the greater part of the fleet, proceeded on
May 6th for Havana, leaving Eodney in charge of the Leeward
Islands.
On the Jamaica station Captain Forrest was, of course, super-
' J>«(6?i«, 74, Commodore Sir James Douglas (1), Captain Edward Gascoigne ; C'liJ-
loden, 74, Captain John Barker (1); Z)ra</o)i. , 74, Captain Hon. Aug. John Hervey ;
Temeraire, 74, Captain Matthew Barton ; Temple, 70, Captain Julian Legge ; Deuoii-
shire, 64, Captain Samuel Marshall (1) ; Alcide, 64, Captain Thomas Hankerson ; Sfirliiu/
Castle, 64, Captain James Campbell (2); Nottingham, 60, Captain Thomas Colling-
wood ; Sutherland, 50, Captain Michael Everitt ; Dover, 40, Captain Chaloner Ogle (■'>) ;
Tliuiidcr, bomb, Commander Robert Haswell ; and Grenada, bomb.
246
MA JO I! OPEIlAriONS, 1714-1762
[1762.
seded by the arrival of Sir James Douglas (1), who despatched a
squadron under Captain Hon. Augustus John Hervey ' to blockade
M. de Blenac at Cape Francois, until the whole Jamaica squadron
should be ready to join Pocock at Cape St. Nicolas.
The Havana expedition, when complete, included about 15, .500
men, the whole commanded by George, Earl of Albemarle. The
strength of the fleet will be found set forth in the note.^ After
leaving Martinique the expedition was joined in the Mona passage
on May 8th by Caj)tain Hon. Augustus John Hervey, and, having
arrived off Cape St. Nicolas on the 18th, was there reinforced on
the SSrd by Sir James Douglas from Jamaica.
It was open to Pocock either to sail by the south side of Cuba,
along the track of the galleons, round the west end of the island and
' Drarjon, li, Cajitain Hon. A. J. Hervey ; Temeraire, H. Captain Matthew Barton ;
Stirliiir/ Castle, 64, Captain James Campbell (2) ; Alcide, 64, Captain Thomas Hanker-
son ; Defiance, 60, Captain George Mackenzie ; Nottingham, 60, Captain Thomas
CoUiugwood ; Femhroke, 60, Captain John AVheelock ; Dover, 40, Cajitain Chaloner
Cgle (3) ; Trent, 28, Captain John Lindsay ; and Fort Mahon, 20, Captain Thomas
Lempriere.
- Fleet under Sir George Pocock at tlie reihictioii of Havana, and on the Jamaica
station, 1762: —
Ships.
Guus.
Commanders.
Ship?.
Guns.
Commanders.
f
(Imiral Sir George
Dover ....
40
Capl. Chaloner Ogle (3).
yamur ....
90
Pocock, K.B. CB).
Enterprise*.
40
John HouUon.
1
ICapt. John Harrison.
Richmond .
32
John Elphinstone
Ic
ommod. Hon. Angustus
co-
Valiant ....
74
Keppel.
Alarm ....
32
James Alms (I)
apt. Adam Duncan.
(acting).
Cambridge* . .
80
„ ■\Villiam Goustrey.
Echo
28
John l^ndrick.
Culloden. . . .
74
„ John Barker.
Lizard-. . . .
28
Francis Banks (1).
TetUfvaire . . .
74
„ MaUhew Barton.
Trent ....
i8
John Lindsav.
Dragon ....
{
,, Hi-n. Augustus
1 Cerberus > . . .
2S
Charles Webl>er.
|4
John Hervey.
Boreas ....
28
Samuel Uvedale.
Centaur'^ . . .
Dublin 3 . . . .
V4
It
„ Thomas Lempriere.
„ Edward Gascoigue.
Mercury
24
Samuel Granston
Gowlall.
Marlborough . .
vo
„ Thomas Burnett.
' Rose
20
John Neale Pley-
Temple ....
Orford ....
vo
„ Juliau Legge.
dell Nott.
66
„ Harriot Arbnthnot.
Port Mahon . .
20
Richard Bickerton.
Devonsfiire .
64
,, SamuelMarishail(l).
' Fowey ....
20
Joseph Mead.
Belleislc ....
64
., Joseph Knight.
Glasgoiv . . .
20
Richard Carteret.
Edgar ....
64
{
„ Francis ^Viliiam
I Bonetta ....
16
Com
l^ancelot Holmes.
Drake.
! Cygnet ....
16
Hon. Charles
Alcide'i ....
64
„ TliumasHankersou.
Napier (1).
Hampton Court
' Stirling Castle . .
64
64
{
,, Alexander Innes.
„ James Campbell
(•J).
i Merlin ....
Porcupine -
16
16
"William Francis
Bourke.
James Harmood.
Pembroke . . .
60
,. John Uheelock.
Barbados . . .
14
James Hawker.
llipon ....
60
„ Edward Jekyll.
Vijyer ....
1^
John Urry.
Nottingham
60
{
,, Thomas Oolling-
wood.
Pnrt Royal . . .
Fei-ret ....
14
14
Lieu
Stair Douglas (1).
t. Peter Clarke.
Defiance. . . .
60
,, George Mackenzie.
Lurcher, cutter
14
,,
^Valke^.
Jntrvpid- . . .
60
„ John Hate.
Thunder, bomb
8
Cum
Eobeit Haswell.
Centurion 3 4
50
,, James Galbraith.
tirenado. bomb
8
Deptford . . .
60
„ Dudley Digges.
Basilisk, bomb. .
8
Low field.
Sutherland^
50
„ ]\Iichael Everitt.
Hampshire . . .
50
,. Arthur Usher.
besides storeships,
bospits
Iship
s, and transpoits.
Pemaitcei . . .
40
„ Philip Buteler.
1 Joined after the siege had begun. - Escoited troops from North America.
3 Some time with the broad peunaiit of Comm-jdure Sir James Douglas.
* Escorted convoys from Jamaica to England.
1762.]
THE EXFEmriON AGAINST HAVANA.
247
so beat down to Havana, or to steer alonff the north side of Cuba
throni^h the Old Strait of Bahama. The former was the easier,
though the longer, course ; the latter was the shorter, though it was
somewhat difficult and even hazardous, the channel being narrow
and intricate. But the Admiral chose it, since time was precious,
and since it was important as early as possible to secure the only
passage by which the French could send supphes to Havana.
Pocock despatched Sir James Douglas in the Centurion to Jamaica
to bring stores thence, and to hasten forward such ships as were
still there ; and on the 27th, with his huge fleet of about two
hundi-ed sail, the Admiral bore away for the Old Strait of Bahama.
The precautions which he took are described in a letter which, on
June 14th, he addressed to the secretary of the Admiralty. He
placed boats on the most dangerous shoals on each hand to act as
marks ; and he records that he was greatly assisted in the navigation
by Anson's chart, which he found very correct. During the passage,
two Spanish vessels, the TJietis, 22, and Fenix, storeship, were
captured by the Alarm, Captain James Alms (1).
The Strait was passed on June 5th ; and on the morning of the
6th the fleet was brought to about fifteen miles east of Havana, so
that directions might be given to the captains as to the landing.
The conduct of this operation was eiitrusted to Commodore the
Hon. Augustus Keppel, who had under him six sail of the line and
some frigates. At 2 p.m. the Admiral bore away with thirteen sail
of the line, two frigates, the bombs, and thirty-six victuallers and
storeships, and ran down towards the harbour, in which he saw
twelve Spanish sail of the line ' and several merchantmen. On the
' Spanish laeii-of-wnr taken iir ilestroyed ilurini; the exiieilition agahist Ilavana,
1762:—
Ships.
Guus.
Commanders.
Fate.
■Tiifvc. . .
70
f Marques del Real Traspoilo.t
(.Dull J. Y. Mudariaga. ]
j
lie ill a
10
„ li. do Velasco.
Isurreudeied witli the city.
Sobnrano
TO
„ J. del Postigo.
1
«
Infante . .
70
,, V. de Rleilina.
]
a
ytptuno .
70
,, P. Berimidez.
Sunk at mouth uf" hailxmr.
>
JquilOii .
70
Marques Ciotizales.
Surrendered with the city.
Asia . . .
64
Don F. Garganta.
Sunk at movith of liarbunr.
America
60
„ J. Antonio.
Surrendered with the lity. Renamed J/oro.
<
Earcpji . .
Co)iqi(islador
00
60
,, J. Viucente.
„ P. Castejon.
Sun't at mouth of harbour.
1
San <ii:varit
San Antonio
60
60
I Not in Commission.
VSurrendered with the city.
Veni/ama .
26
Don D. Argote.
Taken by Lefiaiice at Mariel, May 28.
riicti^ . .
22
„ J. Porlier.
„ Alarm in the Stniit, June 3.
Marie . .
IS
,, D. HouecUea.
Defiance at Mariel. May 28.
Ft-nix, bt.s. .
Alarm in the Strait, May 28.
Two unfinished ships upon the stocks were destroyed.
248 MAJOli OrElSATIONS, 1714-17G2. [I7(i2.
following morning, the 7tb, he made a feint of landing the Marines
about four miles to the west of Havana, while the Earl of Albemarle,
with the whole army, landed without opposition between the rivers
Boca Nao and Coximar, six miles east of Moro Castle, under the
conduct of Captains Hervey, Barton, Drake, Arbuthnot, Jekyll, and
Wheelock, K.N. After it had landed, the enemy made some show
of fight, especially when the troops were about to cross the river
Coximar; but the foe was dispersed by the fire of the Mercurij,
Bone f fa, and Dragon. A detachment of seamen and 900 Marines
were landed to co-operate.
On July 1st, after some progress had l)een made with the siege,
the Cambridge, Dragon, and Marlboro iigJi, were ordered to cannonade
Moro ; and at about 8 a.m. they began a heavy fire, which was well
returned till 2 p.m. The vessels were all so much damaged that,
one after another, they had to be called off. The Cambridge lost
24 killed and 95 wounded; the Dragon, 10 killed and 37 w'ounded;
and the Marlborough, 2 killed and 8 wounded. Among the killed in
the Cambridge was Captain Goostrey, whose place was afterwards
taken by Captain Lindsay of the Trent. As this mode of procedure
was found to be too costly, the further bombardment of the defences
was left mainly to the shore batteries, which, aided by mines, made
a practicable breach in the Moro by July 30th. On that day the
castle was carried by storm. In the struggle the commandant, the
gallant Don Luis de Velasco, was mortallj' wounded. In honour of
his defence, there has ever since been a ship named the Velasco in
the Spanish navy. The vessels in the harbour took part in the
operations, but were of little avail.
Upon the fall of Moro the siege was pressed, and, on August 11th,
after a particularly heavy bombardment, flags of truce were hung
out on shore and in the Spanish flagship. A little later another flag
was sent to the British headquarters ; negotiations were entered
upon ; and, after some delay, the capitulation was signed on the
13th, and part of the works was taken possession of by the British
on the 14th.
The specie, stores, and vahiables found in the place were worth
about £3,000,000 sterling ; and with the city were also taken nine
sail of the line. Two others lying on the stocks had been burnt,
and three more, besides a large galleon, had been sunk in the mouth
of tlie harbour.^ On the other hand, the British killed, wounded,
' For tlie names and force of these, see note p. 247.
1762.] CArTURK OF IIAV.\yA. 249
and missing numbered no fewer than 1790 ; and many other Hves
were lost owing to the nnwholesomeness of the climate and the
hardships of the siege. The naval dispatches were sent home by
Captain the Hon. Augustus John Hervey, in the Draijnii, wliicJi on
her passage had the good fortune to capture a French sliip viihied
at £30,000.
During the siege several Spanish vessels were taken on the coast.
On July '2-ith the Chesterfield. 40, and four transports with reinforce-
ments of troops from North America, were lost at Cayo Confite,
but the people were saved. Lieutenant Walker, commanding the
Lurcher, cutter, going on June 13th up the Chorera Eiver out of
mere curiosity, had the misfortune to be killed. The prize money
divided amounted to about £736,000. Its division caused much
heart-burning, the shares of the Admiral and general being each
i'l'2-2,(597 lO.s. 6d. ; while the share of a captain E.N. was but
il600 10s. lOf?., of a petty officer only £17 5.s. Sd., and of a seaman
or Marine not more than £3 14s. djd. It was felt, and perhaps
with reason, that the administration permitted the commanding
officers to appropriate far too large a share of the spoils to them-
selves.
The fall of Havana, apart from its intrinsic significance, had
almost the importance of a great naval victory, owing to the large
number of Spanish sail of the line which shared the fate of the city.
The military conduct of the siege by the Earl of Albemarle has been
blamed, chiefly because, instead of attacking the city where it was
weak, he attacked Moro and Punta Fort, which were strong, but
which, nevertheless, must have quickly fallen had the city itself
been taken. But although there may be justice in this criticism, it
does not appear that anything can be urged against Pocock's conduct
of his part of the business ; unless indeed, it be admitted that he was
wrong to oppose his ships to the Moro on July 1st. For the rest,
the co-operation between the Navy and army was thoroughly loyal
and smooth ; and the behaviour of both was admirable.
Sir George Pocock delivered up the command of the fleet to the
Hon. Augustus Keppel, who by that time had been promoted to be a
Rear-Admiral of the Blue ; and, with the Namur, Cnlloden, Temple,
Devonshire, Marlborough, Infante, San Genaro, Asuncion,^ and
several other Spanish prizes and about fifty transports, sailed for
England on November 3rd. About six hundred miles west of Land's
' A prize nierchaiitiiiaii.
250 MAJOR OPEliATlONS, 1714-17G2. [1702.
End, the squadron was dispersed by a very violent gale from the
eastward. Twelve of the transports foundered, though their crews
were happily saved. The Temple came to a similar end. The
CuUoden and Devonshire would probably have fared likewise, had
they not thrown overboard many of their guns. Part of the fleet
made Kingsale. The other part, which kept the sea, suffered
terrible privations from famine, thirst and sickness. So anxious did
the Admiralty become, that it sent out several frigates to search for
Sir George ; who, however, safely reached Spithead on January 13th,
1763. The San Genaro, one of the ships which had put into
Kingsale, came to grief when at length she anchored in the Downs.
She was overtaken by another storm, and was cast away. The
Maiibovougli lost company with the Admiral early on the voyage ;
but she, too, met with very heavy weather, and, owing to leaks, was
obliged to put before the wind, throw her guns overboard, and keep
her crew at the pumps until November 29th, when her people were
taken off by the Antelope, .50, Captain Thomas Graves (2), which was
on her voyage home from Newfoundland. The Marlborough, after
having been abandoned, was destroyed. Eear-Admiral Keppel sent
home the rest of the Spanish prizes under Captain Arbuthnot of the
Orford, together with the Centaur, Dublin, Alcide, Hampton Court,
Edgar and some frigates ; and, after having acted with energy upon
the station until the peace, he remained to deliver up Havana on
July 7th, 1763, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty.
Some of his vessels then proceeded to Florida to take over that
province : and Keppel himself went to Jamaica, where he was
presently relieved by Eear-Admiral Sir William Bm-naby.
In the meantime, the French, taking advantage of the large
withdrawal of troops to the West Indies, of the defenceless condition
of Newfoundland, and of a fog in the Channel, despatched from
Brest, imder M. de Ternay, a squadron, which, with 1500 troops
under Comte d'Haussonville, evaded Sir Edward Hawke, crossed
the Atlantic, entered the harbour of St. John's on June 24th and
quickly took the town. On its way, this fleet fell in with three
combined convoys of great value, which it might easily have taken
had it not preferred the ulterior object of the expedition, and had it
not been deterred by the bold front offered to it by Captain Joshua
Rowley, of the Superb, 74, who had with him the Gosport, 44,
Captain John Jervis, and the Danae, 38, Captain Henry Martin (2).
The capture of this convoy would have done Great Britain far
ITGli.] BE-CAl'TUHE OF NEWFOUNDLAND. 251
more damage at that moment than the capture of Newfoundland.
Captain Thomas Graves (2), governor of the island, who lay at
Placentia in the Aiitclojje, 50, at once sent news of the French
descent to Commodore Lord Colville, at Halifax. Colville sailed to
the rehef of the island, and joined Graves ; and on August 25th,
M. de Ternay found himself blockaded in St. John's. On
September 11th, troops arrived from Louisbourg, and were landed ;
and the enemy was driven back ; but on the 16th, the Ijlockading
ships being driven from their station by a westerly gale, INI. de
Ternay slipped his cables and got away. A relieving squadron had
been sent from England in the meantime under Captain Hugh
Palliser, but de Ternay managed to avoid tliis force also. After his
departure, the condition of the French was, of course, hopeless ;
and on September 18th Comte d'Haussonville capitulated.
A little expedition of 1762 deserves some mention here in spite
of the fact that the Eoyal Navy had very little part in it, and that
it had no important results. It was an adventure which, in a
degree, recalls some of the exploits of the Elizabethan era, in that
it was a warlike undertaking by private persons, countenanced,
however, by the administration, and that it was aimed against the
Spanish power in America. A company of British noblemen and
merchants came to the conclusion that an attack upon the province
of Buenos Ayres might be both useful to the nation and lucrative
to the adventurers. They purchased from the Admiralty H.M. ships
Ki)iijsto)i, 50 (which they renamed Lord Clive), and Amhuscade, 28 ;
and they placed these under the orders of Mr. Macnamara, an
officer of the East India Company's marine. They further obtained
the co-operation of two Portuguese vessels, in which were embarked
five hundred soldiers. The little squadron, which also included
five store ships, sailed for Eio de Janeiro, where the final pre-
jparations were made, and, proceeding, entered the Eiver Plate on
November 2nd. Macnamara found that the Spaniards were better
situated for defence than he had expected. An attempt was made
on Nova Colonia, which had been captured by the Spaniards from
the Portuguese : but it was not successful. In a second attack, on
January 6th, 1763, the Lord Clive took fire and burnt to the water's
edge, her people, however, fighting her to the very last. Of her crew
of three hundred and fifty, two hundred and seventy-two, including
Macnamara, perished. The Amhuscade, though tembly mauled,
managed to get back to Eio. It should be added that the gallant
232 MAJOR OPEL'ATIOy.S, 1714-17GL'. [1762.
Spaniards treated with the greatest generosity those survivors of
the Lord CUve who fell into their hands, and, instead of regarding
them as enemies, treated them as guests whom misfortune had cast
upon their shores.
The year witnessed no events of great importance in the
Mediterranean ; where Sir Charles Saunders was strongly rein-
forced hy a squadron under Sir Piercy Brett (1). Some exceedingly
valuable prizes were made on the station ; but the fleets of the
belligerents did not meet. Sir Charles Saunders, and most of the
ships returned to England at the peace, leaving Kear-Admiral Sir
Piercy Brett to take possession of Minorca. Brett was subsequently
relieved by Commodore Thomas Harrison (2).
It has been already mentioned that M. de Blenac got out of
Brest, and sailed for Martinique duiing a temporarj' absence from
his station of Commodore Spry, owing to heavy weather. Spry
chased ; but, his provisions threatening to give out, he had to return
to England, having first sent the Aquilon to warn Rodney of what
had happened. During the year the other occurrences in waters
near home were mainly confined to the monotonous blockading of
the enemy's ports, and to the capture of their cruisers. Commodore
Lord Howe lay in Basque Koad, watching Eochefort and the mouth
of the Charente, until he was relieved by Commodore Peter Denis.
When M. de Ternay escaped from Brest, the fleet under Sir
Edward Hawke and the Duke of York went in pursuit, but missed
him. This fleet, then under Sir Charles Hardj' (2), cruised again in
September and October, and once more in November, but accom-
plished nothing. The cruisers of Commodore Robert Man (2), who
succeeded Spry off Brest ; of Commodore James Young (1), who
commanded in the Channel; and of Commodore John Moore (1),
who commanded in the Downs, made various prizes ; but the details
of these, and of other minor captures, will be fittingly given in the
next chapter. One episode, in which the force under Commodore
Moore was concerned, may, however, be noticed here.
The Dutch had for some time been supplying the enemies of
Great Britain with provisions and stores ; and the British cruisers,
in consequence, vigilantly searched their merchantmen. The States
General, resenting this, commissioned some men-of-war to protect
the illicit trade ; and, in September, a Dutch flotilla of four merchant-
men, convoyed by a 36-gun frigate, was fallen in with by the
Hunter, sloop; which, being refused permission to search, and being
1T(V.'.] THE WAIl AND TltADE. 253
too weak to enforce her demands, returned to Moore. He sent the
Diana, 32, Captain Wilham Adams (2), the Chester, 50, Captain
William Hay, the Hinifrr, 14, Commander James Ferguson, and
the Trial, 14, Commander James Cunningham, with orders to do
what was necessary. Adams found the Dutchmen, and demanded
to know what the convoy had on hoard. The Dutch captain again
refused to allow a search, and declared tliat lie would fight rather
than permit it ; whereupon Adams sent hoats to hoard each
merchantman. The Dutch fired a gun at the leading hoat, and
wounded a man in her. Adams retaliated hy firing a gun at the
frigate, which replied with a hroadside. This brought about an
action, which, in fifteen minutes, resulted in all the Dutch ships
submitting. They were taken into the Downs. The merchantmen,
being found to have on board stores for the French navy, were
detained ; but the frigate, which had lost four killed and five
wounded, was dismissed.
During this last year of the contest the enemy took but two
British men-of-war, a sloop and a bomb ketch. The hst of the
men-of-war taken by the British will be found in the appendix.
The French merchantmen and privateers taken numbered 120 ; and,
as in previons years, their value was greatly in excess of that of the
British privateers and merchantmen captured, though the number
of the latter was considerably greater. Towards the close of the
campaign the French had very few vessels at sea ; and their trade
was ruined. The Spanish power afloat was never great enough to
be a serious menace.
The first overtures for peace came from France to Great Britain
through the Sardinian envoy in London. In consequence of them,
the Duke of Bedford was sent to Paris, and the Due de Nivernois
came to England, with full powers ; and on November 3rd, 1702,
the preliminaries of peace, between Great Britain on the one side
and France and Spain on the other, were signed at Fontainebleau.
The terms were scarcely proportionate to the measure of the suc-
cesses which had been gained by Great Britain during the war. She
acquired Canada, St. John's, Cape Breton, and that part of what was
then called Louisiana, east of the Mississippi, except New Orleans,
together with the right of free navigation of the Mississippi. France
received permission, subject to certain conditions, to fish on the
banks of Newfoundland, and was given the islands of St. Pierre and
Miquelon as fish-curing stations. Spain relinquished her claim to
254 MAJOU (Jl'KllATIONS, 171 1-1762. [17G2.
fish on the liaiiks of Newfouudhuul ; and undertook to restore to
Portugal iiny places which she might have conquered from that
power, and to cede Florida to Great Britain. But Great Britain
was to restore Havana and its dependencies. Martinique, Guade-
loupe, and Marie Galante also, were to be given hack to France,
which, in addition, obtained St. Lucia, previously a neutral island.
Great Britain retained Grenada and the Grenadines, and received
the formerly neutral islands of Dominica, St. Vincent and Tobago.
She also had Minorca restored to her and kept Senegal ; but she
restored Belle Isle and Goree to France. The fortifications of
Dunquerque, should, it was agreed, be demolished. In Asia, Great
Britain had to restore the conquests made from France ; but France
was to erect no fortifications in her possessions within the province
of Bengal. Louisiana west of the Mississippi was ceded by France
to Spain.
The terms of the treaty, though honourable, could not be con-
sidered as particularly advantageous to Great Britain, seeing that
her maritime superiority in 176'2 was such that she might have
seized, and kept, almost what she would. The definitive treaty was
signed at Paris on February 10th, 17(53 ; and so ended the Seven
Years' "War.
Commenting upon the settlement, Mahan writes : —
" The nation at large and Pitt, the I'iwourite of the nation, were bitter!}' opposed to
the terms of the treaty. ' France,' said Pitt, ' is chiefly formidable to us as a maritime
and commercial power. What we gain in this respect is valuable to us above all
through the injury to her which results from it. You leave to France the possibility
of reviving her navy.' In truth, from the point of view of sea-power and of the
national jealousies which the spirit of that age sanctioned, these words, though
illiberal, were strictly justifiable. The restoration to France of her colonies in the
West hidies and her stations in India, together with the valuable right of fishery in
her former American possessions, put before her the possibility and inducement to
restore her shipping, her commerce, and her navy, and thus tended to recall her from
the path of continental ambition which liad been so fatal to her interests, and in the
same proportion favourable to the unprecedented growth of England's power upon the
ocean. The opposition, and indeed some of the ministry, also thought that so com-
manding and important a position as Havana was poorly paid for by the cession of the
then desolate and unproductive region called Florida. Puerto Rico was suggested,
Florida accepted. There were other minor points of difference, into which it is
unnecessary to enter. It can scarcely be denied that with the commanding military
control of the sea held by England, grasping as she now did so many important
positions, with her navy overwhelmingly superior in numbers, and her commercial
and internal condition very thriving, more rigorous terms might easily have been
exacted and would have been prudent. 'Ihe ministry defended their eagerness and
spirit of concession on the grotmd of the enormous growth of the debt, which then
amounted to £122,000,000, a sum from every point of view much greater then than
now; b\it while this draft upon the future was fully justified by the success of the
irryj.] THE END OF THE WAIl. 255
war, it also imperatively tlcimaiulcil that the utmost advantaj^es whieh the military
situation made obtainable, should be exacted. This the ministry failed to do. . .
Nevertheless, the gains of England were very great, not only in territorial increase,
nor yet in maritime preponderance, but in the prestige and po.sition achieved in the
eyes of the nations, now fully opened to her great resources and mighty power. To
these results, won by the sea, the issue of the continental war offered a singular and
suggestive contrast. France had already withdrawn, along with England, from all
share in that strife, and peace between the other i)arties to it was signed five days after
the Peace of Paris. The terms of the peace were simply the status quo ante, belbiin.
By the estimate of the King of Prussia, one hundred and eighty thousand of his
soldiers had fallen or died in this war, out of a kingdom of five million souls; while
the losses of Prussia, Austria, and France aggregated four hundred and sixty thousand
men. The result was sim]ily that things remained as they were."
( 25(i )
CHAPTEK XXVIII.
MILITAEY HISTOEY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1714-1762.
Minor Operations,
l. carr laughtox.
liicharil Lestock — "The Fifteen" — Moorish Pirates — Exploits of the Hind and the
liridi/ewater—Pimcy in the West — Edward Thatch, alias " Blaclibeard " —
Bartholomew Roberts — Chaloner Ogle ofl" Cape Lopez — Mighells at Vigo —
Smugglers and guarda-costas — The right of search — Salt gathering at the Tortugas
— Stuart and illicit trading — Fandino — Reprisals — The Shore/iam's prizes — The
Princesa taken — Pearce and Oglethoq^e at St. Augustine — Bamet and de Caylus
— Tlie West Indies — Loss of the Tijjur — Loss of the Tilbury — Callis at St. Tropez
— Martin at Ajaccio — Naval disasters — The Nortlntmhcrland taken — The hurricane
at Jamaica — Mostyn's fiasco — Capture of the Elephant — The Anglesey taken —
Lieut. Baker Phillips — The privateers — Successes of " The Royal Family " — The
Jersey and the St. Esprit — M. de Lage — The Nottingham, and the Mars — The
Alexander and the Solehay — The Portland and the Augnste — Fox and de La
Motte — Captures and losses — Commodore Pocock's successes — George Walker —
Ca])ture of the Magnanime — The Chesterfield — Piracy — The Blandford — Capture
of the Esperance — The Warwick taken — The Chausey Islands — Fortunatus
Wright — A repulse at Algeciras — Captain John Lockhart — " Error of .ludgment "
— Loss of the Greenwich and the Merlin — Destruction of the Aquilon and the
Alcion — Captures — Privateers — Thurot — Capture of the Emeraude — Disasters —
Burning of the Prince George — Capture of the Baisonnahle — Captain Brodrick
Hartwell — The Winchelsea taken — The Buckingham and the Florissant — The
Vestal and the Bellone — Capture of the Danae — The Achilles and the Comti de
St. Florentine — The Arethuse taken — Indecisive actions — Convoys — Adventures
of the Biademe — Sinking of the C'amherland — The Unicorn and the Vestale — The
Birhmond and the Felicite — The Minemt and the Warwick — The Bijio7i and the
Achille — Captures — Capture of the Achille and Bouffonne — The Bellona and the
Courageux — Last captures of the war.
F'
^OR several years after 1715, the
sending of a fleet to the Baltic
became, as has been already shown, a
species of annual exercise. All these
expeditions were barren of serious
fiphtint:, and there is little to be said of them here. In 1717,
1716.] THE NAVY ANT) THE PRETENDER. 257
however, when the fleet was iiudur 8ir George Byng, it was found
that, although the Swedish men-ol'-war still kept in port, consider-
able annoyance was occasioned to British trade by the niunerous
privateers. Against these Sir George detached various cruisers, of
which none was so successful as the Panther, 50, Captain Eichard
Lestock (2) . Many privateers were sent home ; but none of them
was of any great force, the average scarcely running to ten small
guns and sixty men per ship. The matter, indeed, is chiefly worth
noticing because it was in this way that Lestock, a man whose sub-
sequent behaviour rendered him notorious, began to come to the
front. His activity on these cruises attracted Byng's attention,
and gained him the name of a zealous officer. Sir George, in con-
sequence, chose him to command his flagship in the Mediterranean
campaign of the following year. The subsequent Baltic campaigns
were less active even than the campaign of 1717.
Nearer home, and on the Barbary coasts, meanwhile, the Navy
was finding work to do ; in the one case in connection with the
pro-Stuart rising, in the other, with the recrudescence of piracy.
The Pretender landed in December, 1715, and in the middle of
January, 1716, Sir John Jennings, Admiral of the White, was
appointed to the command of a squadron of ten ships wherewith
to cruise on the east coast and in the Firth of Forth. Other ships
cruised on the west coast, also for the suppression of the rebels,
while others again were kept in the Channel to restrain sympathetic
Frenchmen. A body of French officers, trying to escape from
Peterhead, was driven back ; but in spite of all precautions, the
Pretender himself contrived to get away safely. Some imputation
of negligence not unnaturally fell upon the Navy ; but the Govern-
ment was satisfied that reasonable diligence had been shown, and
published in the Gazette the following : —
"The Royal Anne, galley, Pearl, Port Malion, Deal Castle and Phoenix are
returned from cruising, it appears by the journal of Captain Stuart,' that he had early
intelligence of the Pretender having put to sea, in a clean-tallowed French snow, which
rowed out of the harbour and close in along shore a good way with her sails furled.
The Port Malion lay all that night within two leagues of the harbour's mouth, but
'twas so dark there was no seeing a sliip a quarter of a mile distant." -
Every precaution, indeed, seems to have been taken by the
refugees ; and it may be added that they appear to have been
' The Hon. Charles Stuart; born, 1681; Captain, 1704; Eear-Admiral, 1729;
Vice- Admiral, 1733 ; died, 174:0.
- Quoted in Lediard, 867.
VOL. III. S
258 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1716.
aware of the disposition of the various cruisers. Leaving Montrose,
the snow stretched across to the coast of Norway, whence she
coasted southward and made GraveHnes in safety. The Chevalier
de St. George testified his gratitude and appreciation by knighting
Mark Forrester, her master. In spite of their failure to intercept
this snow, the English ships did good, if unostentatious, work in
helping to stamp out the embers of the revolt, chiefly, of course,
by co-operating with the troops when they chanced to touch
the shore.
Piracy in the Mediterranean continued to demand considerable
attention, but was at length dealt with by the Admiralty on some-
thing like a rational system. In other words, there were ships
constantly cruising against the Barbary pirates ; and there was
thus avoided the great and often bootless expense incurred by the
fitting out of occasional expeditions on a large scale. The reign is
marked by no such fight as that of Captain Kempthorne of the
Mary Bose in 16G9 ; but cruisers detached, first by John Baker
and after him by Charles Cornwall, the officers in command on
the station, did efficient service. Of these the Hind, 20, Captain
Arthur Delgarno, in May, 1716, took one Sallee rover, and, in
October following, another, of 24 guns. This latter ship resisted
for two and a half hours before she struck, and then promptly sank,
taking down with her all but thirty-eight of her men. The Bridge-
water, also, in the same year, drove two Sallee ships, each of
16 guns, ashore near their own port. The Barbaiy pirates, how-
ever, though a real nuisance, were not the only one of the kind,
nor, indeed, were they so serious an obstacle to commerce as they
had been in the seventeenth century. This was, as has been
mentioned, partly due to the constant watch kept upon their move-
ments. A more fonnidable species of piracj-, the piracy of romance,
flourished on the Spanish Main, and spread thence over the high
seas. The doings of the notorious Kidd have been recorded ;
the history of William Dampier shows with what ease British
seamen drifted into this evil course of hfe ; and it will be easily
understood that the Sir Francis Verneys and the Wards of the
era preferred to join the successors of Sawkins, primarily to plunder
the Spaniard, rather than to turn renegade and prey on their owoi
countrymen in the Mediterranean. But though piracy in the
West was a growing source of anxiety, the bulk of its exponents
confined their attentions with some strictness to foreign flags, and
1718.] " BLAOKBEAnn;' TIIK PI RATE. 259
some of them, notably Sir Henry Morgan, compared not unfavour-
ably with the gentleman adventurers of the Elizabethan age. Kidd,
it has been shown, was a decided exception; Avery was another;
and so also was Edward Thatch, commonly called Teach, or, more
commonly still, from his appearance, " Blackbeard." ^ Born in
Bristol about 1675, he had, through the War of the Spanish
Succession, served in privateers, and he did not turn his hand
to piracy till the end of ITKi. It is notorious that the pirates
of fact enjoyed, to an even greater degree than their brethren of
fiction, the short life and merry one supposed to belong to men
of their calling ; and for his enjoyment of existence, as well as
for his egregious brutality. Thatch stands forth from among many
short-lived contemporaries. About the end of 1717, he took a
large Guineaman, which he named the Queen Anne's Bevenge, and
in which he went cruising, after having mounted her with forty
guns. One of the first incidents of his cruise was the falling in
with H.M.S. Scarborough, 20, which he beat off after a fight
lasting for some hours. The governor of Carolina entered into
a league with him, and he chose the coasts of that colony and
of Virginia as his scene of operations, and continued haunting their
creeks and preying on the merchants, whether at sea or ashore,
till they petitioned the governor of Virginia to rid them of the
pest. The governor took counsel with the captains of the Lyme, 20,
and Pearl, 40, and concerted a scheme by which Lieut. Eobert
Maynard,- of the Pearl, was to command two small sloops against
Blackbeard, who had got rid of his great ships, and was lurking
in a sloop in Ocracoke Inlet, one of the entrances to Pamlico
Sound. The sloops under Maynard's command mounted no heavy
guns, while the pirates were known to be well armed in that
respect; but, on the other hand, the sloops had sweeps, which
their enemy had not. Maynard rowed into the passage on
November 21st, 1718, and with great difficulty, after lightening
his vessel, got close to Thatch, who had run aground. Meanwhile,
the pirate sloop floated, and by a broadside of langiidge, did great
damage among Maynard's men, who were much exposed by the
lowness in the waist of their ship. Maynard thereupon kept his
men below as much as possible ; upon which Blackbeard, thinking
' In Jolmson's ' Lives of the most Notorious Pirates,' he appears as Teach. In
official papers he is Thatch.
- Died, a caijtain of 1740, iu 1750.
s 2
260 MINOR OPEHATIONS, 1714-17G2. [1718-22.
that there were few left to deal with, boarded at the head of fifteen
men. The rival commanders engaged hand to hand, and the fight
went stubbornly on, as usual in such cases, till the pirate's death.
Besides those killed, fifteen pirates were taken, and of them thirteen
were hanged.' That Thatch had so few men with him was owing
to his having marooned or otherwise got rid of the bulk of his
company shortly before in consequence of a dispute as to the
distribution of prize-money.
There was no lack of men to carry on the abominable work ;
but even of the best known of these desperadoes, such as Stede
Bonnet, Edward England, John Eackam, and Howel Davis, none
arrests the attention in such a degree as Bartholomew Roberts.'^
Eoberts was, in 1718, mate of a ship which was plundered by
pirates on the Guinea coast, and, joining his captors, was elected
to the command on the death of Howel Davis, their captain. He
cruised with considerable success from Brazil to Newformdland,
and, in 1721, crossed over to the African coast, where, amongst
other prizes, he took a large ship belonging to the Eoyal Africa
Company. To this ship he tm-ned over, named her the Boijal
Fortinw, mounted forty guns in her, and with a 32-gun ship, under
a man named Skyrm, and a 24, continued his cruise. His luck
continued good till on February 21st, 1722, when he and Sk3Tm
lay anchored under Cape Lopez, there came down on him
H-M.S. Swalloir, 60, Captain Chaloner Ogle (1), which, since the
preceding year, had been on that coast. Ogle knew with whom
he had to deal ; and when Skyrm, taking him for a merchantman,
slipped in chase, he bore awaj' out of earshot of the Royal Fortune.
He then tm'ned upon Skynn, and, after a shai"p encounter, took
him. Eeturning to Cape Lopez and hoisting the French flag, he
lured Eoberts into attacking him. Eoberts, overmatched and taken
by sui-prise, made a desperate fight, which did not cease till he
himself had been killed. Of 262 prisoners taken it is well to
' Of the two who escaped the gallows one was Israel Hands, the master, who at the
time of the action was ashoi-e recovering from a wovmd received from Thatch, who had
a trick of hlowing out his cabin lights and firing cross-handed imder the table.
Another practice of Blackbeard's was to light sulphur in the ship's hold, and to try
who could longest withstand the fumes. This was by way of enlivening a dull cruise.
- Eoberts is said to have been the original of Scott's Cleveland in ' The Pirate,' but
the career of the real does not agree with that of the ideal. The doings of Eoberts, as
chronicled in Charles Johnson's ' General History of the Most Notorious Pirates,' are,
so far as can be ascertained, substantially correct.
1719.] MIO HELLS AT VIGO. 261
notice that 5'2 were hanged, and that only 77 were acquitted on trial.
The captured ships were taken to England, where they were
bestowed on Ogle,' who also for this good piece of work received
the honour of knighthood.
In the latter end of July, 1719, preparations were making in
England for a secret expedition against Spain. About fifty trans-
ports were got together to convey a force of four thousand men
under Viscount Cobham ; and, meanwhile, a small squadron was
sent ahead under Commodore Sir Robert Johnson, in the Weymouth,
to co-operate with the French who were then engaged in the siege
of San Sebastian. In the beginning of August, some French troops
and two hundred seamen were landed by the squadron at Fort San
Antonio. Owing to the strength of the batteries at the entrance
to the harbour, the force was landed some distance to the westward,
advancing from which direction, it destroyed the fortifications and
spiked the guns in the harbour. On September 1.5th, Johnson,
in the Weymouth, having the Winchester and Dursley Galley in
company, heard that there were two Spanish men-of-war and a
large merchantman lying in Eivadeo. Accordingly the Weymouth
and Winchester appeared off the port on the following day ; boats
were sent in to take soundings; and the two ships anchored alongside
the enemy and abreast of a battery of eight guns. The battery
was taken, the men-of-war were destroyed, and the merchantman
was brought off. In the meantime, the main expedition had sailed
and was looking for Johnson off the Spanish coast, in hopes of
gaining information from him. This force was commanded by
Vice-Admiral James Mighells, who, detached by Berkeley in the
spring, had learnt of the dispersal of the Spanish fleet intended for
the invasion of Scotland. The object now before Mighells, and
the soldiers under Cobham whom he convoyed, was to proceed to
Vigo and retaliate for this intended insult. Sailing from St. Helen's
on September 21st, 1719, the expedition made Vigo on the '29th
without being joined by Johnson. The fleet at once entered the
harbour and landed the troops about three miles from the town.
On October 1st, the army occupied a strong position iinder the
walls ; whereupon the enemy spiked the guns in their batteries
and withdrew to the citadel. A bomb ketch was brought up on
the 3rd ; but as she could do little, owing to the greatness of the
range, some forty odd mortars were put ashore ; and on the 4th,
' Captains' Letters, O 2.
262 MlNOli OPEUATIONS, 1714-1762. [1720.
Fort Sail Sebastian, which had been occiapied, was armed with
heavy guns from the fleet. The citadel, upon that, surrendered,
its garrison of four hundred and sixty-nine officers and men
marching out on the 10th. The town, it was decided, could not
be held ; but a large quantity of guns, small arms, and ammunition,
which had been collected for the invasion of England, was taken
and brought home. Seven ships, also, were seized in the harbour,
of which three were fitting out for privateers. On the 14th, the
ships reduced Ponte Vedra, at the upper end of the harbour.
There, too, many gi;ns were found ; so that the total number
brought home was one hundred and ninety iron and thirty brass
heavy guns, with ten thousand stand of small arms, two thousand
barrels of powder, and other warlike stores. On November 11th,
Vice-Admiral Mighells put into Falmouth with the Enterprize,
Kingsale, and Biddeford, and with most of the transports. The
expedition had been prompt and successful : it had fully attained its
object ; and by sickness, desertion, and the sword it had lost no
more than three hundred men.
The difficulties experienced by British merchants in the Spanish
settlements of the west were a heritage of the days of Elizabeth, and
were by no means smoothed away by the many treaties which had
been entered into between the two nations.^ It is not possible here
to enter into an examination of these treaties ; let it suffice to say
that, by forbidding, save under the harshest restrictions, all traffic,
except, of course, that in negroes, which had been granted by the
Assiento, they put a premimn on smuggling. We know the tra-
ditional attitude of English and Spaniards to one another in the
New World, and we have noticed the growth of piracy, testifying to
the existence of a considerable proportion of unsettled spirits among
the British inhabitants of the American colonies. When we con-
sider both the evergreen national hatred, and the bitterness with
which the guarda costas must have regarded the enterprising and
unscrupulous smugglers, we cannot wonder at the tales of brutaht}'
on the part of the Spaniards ; but we must also be 'prepared to
believe that the Spaniards spoke the truth wWn they insisted that
the British traders of the islands were not always the lambs
they professed to be, and were, in many cases, but little removed
from pirates. There always has been ill-feeling about the right of
' The texts of these treaties will be found at length in Eousset de Missy, ' Eecueil
Historique ' ; and in Jean Dumont, ' Corps Universel Diplomatique,' vol. viii.
1728-33.] DIFFICULTIES WITH SPAIN. 2G3
search — probably there always will be — nor are we to believe that a
guarda costa, boarding a Jamaica smuggler in 1720, acted with such
civility as we expect from the Customs' House nowadays. On the
contrary, as he often had considerable difficulty in catching his
suspect, he was prone to try to catch him where he could, and to
scruple little whether he caught him in Spanish waters or on the
high seas. Such was the state of affairs, and it is clear that it was
bound, sooner or later, to lead to war. Before passing on to the
war itself, it will be interesting to examine in some detail one or two
of the incidents that thus led up to it.
In the latter part of 1728, a Spanish guarda costa sighted and
bore down on the Dursley Galley, 20, mistaking her for a merchant-
man, and with the intention of searching her. Naturally, the
Dwrsley Galley did not bring to, and the Spaniard opened fire, which
the British ship warmly returned. After a sliort fight, in which the
guarda costa lost five men killed and twenty wounded, the Spaniard
surrendered. That she was shortly afterwards released was due
simply to the fact that there was no reason for keeping her, and
Lediard ^ is undoubtedly wrong when he points to this as illustrative
of the difference between Spanish and English methods. As will
presently be shown, British ships that were detained were, at any
rate in most cases, legally detained as being smugglers. The next
incident to be mentioned was connected with the vexed question of
the gathering of salt at the Tortugas. It must be remembered that
the right to gather salt,^ like the right to cut logwood at Campeche,
was denied to the English by the Spaniards, although, in point of
fact, it had actually been acknowledged by the Convention of
Madrid. Early in 1733, a fleet of British ships under escort of the
Scarborough, 20, Captain Thomas Durell (1),^ was loading salt at
the Tortugas, when there came down on it two Spanish men-of-
war, one of sixty, and the other of seventy guns.* Four of the
merchantmen, viz., the Catherine, Two Sisters, Hopeivell, and Three
Brothers, were taken at the outset before the Scarborough could
cover her convoy ; but after that she managed to engage the atten-
tion of the Spaniards so well that the rest of the salt ships made
good their escape.
A point that is apt to be passed over in such an account as this is
that two Spanish ships of the line were quite equal to making miuce-
■ Lediard, 913. • " Captains' Letters, D 4.
- Kousset de Missy, i. 411. * Beatson, i. 22.
'264: MINOR OFEHATION.S, 17M-1T62. [1731.
meat of the Scarhoroii(/h first and of her convoy afterwards, had they
been so inchned. It would appear, then, that the Spaniards, whose
force seems to be exaggerated, and who were probably heavy coast-
guard cruisers, believed themselves to be engaging merely in the
reprisals customary in those parts, and that, when they found that
they had before them a King's ship, they refused to fight her for fear
of involving themselves in serious diplomatic entanglements.
Whether the guarda costas are to be regarded as privateers or
not, there is interest in a letter written from Jamaica by Commodore
Edward St. Loe, to Burchett, at the Admiralty, in May, 1728.'
Complaining that Spanish privateers infested the Jamaican coasts,
he said : —
" It's my opinion I could go in and destroy most of them had I but His Majesty's
jiermission. They, according to my notion, are no better than pirates, having no
commission for what they do, save from the governor of the place."
This is the opinion of a man qualified to judge. It may be
tempered by that of another naval officer who commanded on that
station, and who certainly held no brief for the Spaniards. This
was Kear-Admiral the Hon. Charles Stuart, who was sent out to
Jamaica in the Lion on December 9th, 1729, to take over the
command of the station in succession to St. Loe. Stuart seems to
have begun his commission with the prevailing belief that the fault
lay with the Spaniards, but his attitude changed somewhat as time
went on, and as his knowledge of the British merchants increased.
Writing on October 12th, 1731, to the Duke of Newcastle, he
admitted that the British carried on the trade at their own risk, and
that the ships were good prize if taken. This, he said, led them to
retaliate by robbing such Spaniards as they could ovei-power, and he
added : —
" I can assure you that the sloops that sail from this island manned and armed on
that illicit trade, have more than once bragged to me of having murdered seven or eight
Spaniards on their own shore. I can't help observing that I believe I am the first
military person who has stood up in the defence of peace and quietness, and for
delivering up vessels, against a parcel of men who call themselves merchants, but they
are no better than pedlars, and one of them formerly in jail for piracy."
His plea for peace and quietness maj' have been merely the outcome
of his knowledge that, as the British had by far the greater number
of ships in those seas, reprisals would be a losing game. That truth
was abundantly evidenced when war broke out ; for from September,
' Home Office Records, Admiralty, No. (56, quoted iu ' Eng. Hist, llev.,' iv. 741.
1731.] nniTisn and .spanish cruklties. 2(j5
1739, to November, 1741, the Spaniards took 331 British ships as
against only 231 of their own which they lost.'
On September 12th, 1731, Stuart wrote to the governoi- of
Havana a strong letter of complaint. It had been hoped that a
better condition of affairs was abovit to begin, as the King of Spain,
in response to pressure from England, had sent instructions to his
colonial governors to mitigate their harshness to British traders.
But this proclamation was bound to be without effect, for it ex-
empted from its protection all such ships as were engaged in the
illicit trade, while leaving it to the governors concerned to draw the
necessary distinction between legal and illegal traffic.- So it was
that Stuart never lacked cause of complaint, and, in the instance
cited,^ made mention "particularly of one Fandino, and others who
have committed the most cruel piratical outrages . . . particularly
about the 20th April last, sailed out of your harbour in one of those
guarda costas, and met a ship of this island,^ bomid for England . . ."
and so forth, giving the well-known traditional details of the no-
torious Jenkins case. He ended this letter with, " The king, my
master, having reason to believe that these repeated insiilts on his
subjects could never be continued but by the connivance of the
several Spanish governors in these parts, is determmed to endeavour
to put a stop to these piratical proceedings." But at the same time
he was much attacked by the merchants, who objected strongly to
his saying that they exaggerated their case, and who resented his
interference with their illicit trade, and his endeavours to repress
their cruelties.
Juan de Leon Fandino, probably more from the accident of his
having handled Jenkins than for any other reason, stands out from
among the guarda costa officers. On September 9th, 1731, he de-
tained and plundered the Prince WiUicun, William Joy, master, but
this ship was released a month later. Not so the Dolphin, Benjamin
Carkett, master, which was taken by Fandino in July, and sent into
Havana. She was adjudged legal prize, as the governor wrote to
Stuart ; but he added that he intended to chastise Spanish privateers,
' Lists in Gent. Miuj. 1741, pp. (!89-G'J8.
^ Beatson, i. 15.
^ This letter, taken fiom Home Office Records, Admiralty, No. 69, is priuted in
' Eng. Hist. Eev.,' vol. iv.
■* Jenkins's ship, the lUbecca, is not here mentioned bj' name, but is identified with
this vessel by a list of ships taken or plundered liy the Spaniards down to December,
1737. The Rebecca was taken on April 9th, which in the new style would be the L'Oth.
266 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1731-42.
who were now no longer necessary, and whose commissions he had
revoked. Stuart, however, must stop ships coming from Jamaica to
Cuba, where British and Dutch ships were then to be found all
through the year.
^Vhat ultimately became of Fandino falls into its place here,
though chronologically the story should be postponed. On June 4th,
1742, among the Bahamas, Captain Thomas Frankland, of the Hose,
fell in with, and chased, four ships, which showed British colours.
He chased under the same, and, overhauling them, fired a gun.'
The chase then hoisted the Spanish flag, and fought him furiously,
using all sorts of missiles, from broadsides of shot to poisoned arrows.
Frankland, however, held his fire for the fourth ship, a snow, which
seemed the strongest, giving the others only a few guns as they
chanced to bear. The first three sheered off badly hulled.
"I then endeavoured," says Frankland, "to laj' the snow aboard, which she
shunned with the utmost caution, maintaining a warm fire till I had torn her almost to
rags, the commander having determined rather to sink than strike, for reasons you'll
hereafter be sensible of: but in about four hours the people, in opposition to the captain,
hauled down the colours."
The prize mounted ten carriage guns, as many swivels, and had a
crew of over eighty men.
" The captain is Juan de Leon Fandino. ... He is the man that commanded the
guard of coast out of the Havana that took Jenkins when his ears were cut off. . . .
Not but such a desperado with his crew of Indians, Midattoes and Negroes could have
a cted as he did, for we were at least two hours within pistol shot of him keeping a
constant fire."
So much for a stor}^ which has long been accounted a myth, both
from its intrinsic improbability, and from the circumstance that
Jenkins, like other merchant skippers who gave evidence before the
House of Commons in 1738, was not on oath.-
In 1739, as has been seen, reprisals were ordered, and instructions
to that effect were sent out to Commodore Charles Brown at Jamaica,
whose broad pennant was then flying in the Hampton Court.^ The
bearer of this dispatch was the Hon. Edward Boscawen, of the
ShoreJiam, who joined Brown at Port Eo_yal on August 6th, and,
' Captains' Letters, F.
- Mr. Lecky's opinion of the truth of the story is given on ]-.age 51 of this volume;
and neither Stuart's nor Frankland's letter really goes far towards contradicting that
opinion. — W. L. C.
' The Hampton Courts log is of little value ; details of the cruise will be found in
the Commodore's log, bound up with his dispatches in Admirals' Dispatches 1738-
1742, Jamaica, in the Public Record Office.
1739.] WAh' WITH SPAIN. 267
after whose accession, the squadron consisted, hesides the two ships
named, of the FabnoutJi, Diamond, Torrington, Windsor and Drake.
Brown at once proceeded to carry out his orders, and on the following
day the Drake and the Hampton Court's barge brought in a schooner.
On the 14th the whole squadron left Port Eoyal, and proceeded
round Cuba on a cruise, during which, owing to the scarcity of
Spanish ships, they did no great amount of damage, but managed to
collect reliable information as to the strength and distribution of
Spanish men-of-war in those seas. On September 3rd, Captain
Charles Knowles, of the Diamond, was detached in pursuit of a
strange sail, and did not rejoin. The SJioreham was the most
successful ship of the squadron. In her, Boscawen reconnoitred
Havana, and, near that port, destroyed two sloops and took another,
while a little later, about September 15th, he landed at Porto Maria,
and burnt a large quantity of timber and other stores. He was there
attacked by two half galleys and a sloop, l)ut they kept in such shoal
water that the Shoreham, though hulled more than once, could not
get close enough to harm them. Meanwhile, a small fort between
Matanzas and Havana was destroyed. Brown, having stayed for
twelve days off Havana in hopes of falling in with a Spanish
squadron, learnt that none was expected, and, leaving the Windsor
and Falmouth to cruise there till the end of the month, proceeded
round the western end of the island, and, on October '28th, anchored
in Port Eoyal. There he found the Diamond, which had made two
captures — a ship and a brigantine, said to be worth .£30,000. These,
with two other small sloops taken, and a few large canoes, represent
the total damage done. In Port Eoyal lay Vernon's squadron, to
which Brown had by that time become attached.
Active warfare was at first entirely confined to the West Indies ;
and in European seas the first action of importance took place when
the Princesa, 64, six hundred men, of the Spanish Ferrol squadron,
fell in with the Lenox, Kent, and Or/ord, which had been detached
from Vice-Admiral John Balchen's squadron. These three ships,
with the St. Albans and liipon, had been cruising to intercept a
convoy of treasure ships under Pizarro, but saw nothing of them.
Pizarro, for his success on this service, was appointed immediately
to command the expedition which was sent out to round Cape Horn
and to act as a check on Anson. The Princesa was sighted at
9 A.M. on April 8th, 1740, and was at once chased by the three ships,
viz., Lcno.r, 70, Captain Covill Mayne, Kent, 70, Captain Thomas
268 MINOR OFERATIONH, 1714-1762. [1740.
Durell (1), and Orford, 70, Captain Lord Augustus Fitzroy (1).'
The chase was then under French colours ; but, when the Orford
drew up soon after half-past ten, she hoisted Spanish. About eleven
the Lenox also drew close up, and opened fire with her chase-guns,
being soon followed by the Orford. All three ships came into close
action and gave her many broadsides, for the most part within pistol
shot ; but she made a most stubborn defence, and, though she became
ungovernable, owing to the loss of her foretopmast, early in the en-
gagement, she proved capable of a gi'eat deal of passive resistance. In
explanation of this it was pointed out at the time that she was more
heavily armed than the British 70's. The Spanish establishment was,
24-prs. on the lower deck, 18-prs. on the upper deck, and 8-prs. on the
quarter deck and forecastle, as against 24, 12, and 6-prs. in the British
Navy ; but it is possible that the Princcsa may have had heavier guns
mounted. She was moreover of very stout scantling, and, having small
portholes, was, defensively at any rate, a most powerful ship. It has
also been suggested that, as a fresh breeze was blowing, the British
ships could not use their lower deck guns. This was not so. Covill
Mayne makes special mention of sending the enemy broadsides from
his lower, upper, and quarter-deck guns. The reports clash some-
what ; but, roughly, the middle part of the action seems to have
been fought with the Princesa out of hand, the Kent on her larboard
beam, and the Lenox or Orford on her starboard side, and the third
ship always under her stern, raking her fore and aft. In the after-
noon the Orford had her fore rigging so much disabled that she
dropped astern and had to lie to to knot and splice ; but meanwhile
the raking fire from the Lenox had carried away the Princesa's main
and mizen masts. The Orford, having repaired damages, drew up
again ; and thereupon the enemy struck her colours, having main-
tained an almost hopeless struggle with the utmost gallantry for
close on seven houi's. Not unnaturally Lord Augustus Fitzroy
claimed that she had struck to him, and sent the first boat on board,
following closely himself. To Covill Mayne's indignation he
received the sword of her commander, Don Pablo Agustin de
Aguirre, and took charge of her papers. There was some angry
protest, but the matter seems to have blown over. The prize, rated
as a 70, continued for some years as one of the best two-deckers in
the British Navy.
The next operation that falls within the scheme of this chapter
' Captains" Letters, vols, il i', and F 5.
1740.]
THE FLORIDA EXrKDlTJON.
269
was not so satisfactory to British pride. General Ogletliorpe,
commanding the troops on the North American station, conceived
the notion that it would be to His Majesty's service to take
St. Augustine, in Florida.^ Accordingly he consulted with the
General Assembly of Carolina, asking what troops could be spared
to him ; and he also gained the adherence to his plan of Captain
Vincent Pearce (1), of the Flainhowuf/li, the Commodore on the
station. The project was first suggested to Pearce in January, 1740 ;
but the general found some difficulty in putting it on a working
basis, and it was not till April that he renewed his request for the
co-operation of his ships. These were : —
Ships.
t_: uuft.
Cummauders.
Flamhorough
20
Captain
Vincent Pearce (1).
Bector
44
.,
Sir Yelverton Peyton, Bart.
Squirrel
20
„
Peter Warren.
Phoenix
20
Cliarles Fanshaw.
Tartar
22
the Hon. George Townslicud.
Speiice
6'
„
William Laws.
Wolf .
8
Commauder AVilliam Dandridge.
Eawk .
6^
and a sclioi-Hier.
8
i auil teu swivels.
' ami f'-'ur swivt-ls.
When Oglethorpe's request was finally made the squadron was
just on the point of starting on a cruise, and was therefore in
perfect readiness for immediate action. The Squirrel was sent off
St. Augustine pending the arrival of the rest of the force ; and
she was annoyed by six half-galleys that lay there, and which, during
calms and light winds, proved of considerable service to the
Spaniards. The Wolf was sent on to join Warren towards the
end of April, and on the 28th the Squirrel took a sloop belonging
to the king of Spain. This prize mounted eight 4-prs. and six
swivels, and had eight thoiisand pieces of eight on board. In May
the Hector and Spence joined the ships off the bar of St. Augustine,
Pearce meanwhile lying in St. John's Eiver co-operating with the
troops then on the advance from the northward. Two small forts,
St. Francis de Pupa and Fort Diego, were taken by Oglethoi-pe,
who then returned to the mouth of the St. John's Kiver, wheiace
on May 31st a general advance was made. On June 1st Pearce
proceeded off St. Augustine, and found the Spaniards getting away
their guns from a battery on the Island of St. Eustatia. He
' Captains" Letters, vol. P 8.
'270 MlNOn OPERATIONS, 17J 4-1762. [1740.
promptly sent in his boats, ordering the Wolf and Bpence to cover
the attack ; but the enemy gave no trouble, making off into the
harbour on the approach of the boats. On June 5th it was decided
at a council of war that the ships could remain on that coast
till July 5th ; on the 7th there was another skimiish with the
galleys ; and on the 13th the island was occupied by two hundred
seamen and as many soldiers. Two days later Colonel Palmer was
killed at Fort Moosa and his party driven back ; a serious reverse
which gave the enemy free communication to the landward.
Meanwhile guns were brought into position on the island, and
two small craft were fitted to serve against the galleys, there being
so little water on the bar that the ships could not get in. On
June '20th the governor was summoned to surrender, but promptly
refused. Deserters soon afterwards came into the British camp
with news that the galleys were very badly manned and could easily
be taken. As it had been discovered that the range was so great
that the guns on the island could have little effect, a council of war
was held with the view of seeing whether this information should
be acted upon. Pearce, however, was averse from taking the risk :
possibly he had doubts of the deserters ; and he persisted in his
refusal though the land officers offered to put one hundred soldiers
into the boats to take the places of those seamen who were absent
in the batteries ashore. On this Colonel Vanderdussen pointed out
how badly off the troops would be when the ships left the coast ;
for the galleys would cut their communications. Pearce found that
there was no port near where he could lay his ships up for the
hurricane season ; and, not being too well manned, he had to refuse
a request that he would leave two hmidred seamen to reinforce the
troops. It was by that time July ; and the moment had come
when, in accordance with the council of war of June 5th, the ships
were to leave the coast. Without any friction, therefore, between
Oglethorpe and Pearce, it was decided that nothing fm-ther could be
done,^ and on the 5th the whole force withdi-ew, the ships covering
it from any attempt on the part of the galleys.
In July, 1741, Captain Curtis Barnet, of the Dragon, 60, was
detached from Vice-Admiral Nicolas Haddock's squadron with the
two 44-gun ships, Feversham and Folkestone, and with orders to
cruise in the neighbourhood of the Strait of Gibraltar. Being off
' BovmJ up with Pearce's letters are his log for three months, the minutes of the
councils of war, and letters from Oglethorpe, Vanderdussen, Peyton and others.
1741.] BARNET AND BE CATLUS. 271
Cape Spartel on the "iStli of the month he chafed and came up with
three ships, which he had reason to beheve were two Spanish
register ships under convoy of a frigate. The Fevrrslnini had fallen
astern, and the other two ships did not come up with the strangers
till after dark. Barnet hailed to know what they were, and was
answered that they were Frenchmen from Martinique. He explained
that he was an English man-of-war, and that it was his duty to
satisfy himself that they were not Spaniards ; but, to his demand
that his boat should be allowed to board them, he received no
response save incivilities. Finding that he could do nothing by
talking, and being confirmed in his belief that the ships were really
Spanish, he opened fire, after due warning. The ships were, how-
ever, really French, being the Boree, 62, the Aquilon, 46, and the
Flore, 26,^ under the command of Captain de Caylus, in the first
named. A brisk action ensued, and the British ships, as the Fever-
sham was still far astern, being somewhat at a disadvantage, soon
found themselves obliged to lie to for half an hour to knot and splice.
In the morning, they and their consort again came up with the
Frenchman, and a boat was sent on board the Boree under a flag of
truce. The truth at once appeared ; but it also appeared that the
ships, being on their way from the West Indies, and knowing the
state of relations between the two countries, were under the convic-
tion that war had broken out. Barnet's lieutenant was requested to
swear before the French officers whether this were the case or not,
and was able to satisfy them that the two monarchies were still at
peace. It is hard to say that either Barnet or De Caylus was to
blame ; but the trouble might have been avoided had INI. de
Pardaillan, the captain of the Aquilon, been less suspicious of a
British ship ranging alongside cleared for action. The blame really
lay with the government which, though knowing that war was
inevitable, hesitated to declare it. As it was, the ships parted with
mutual apologies, and with a loss in killed of eleven men on the
British side, and of about thirty-five, among whom was M. de
Pardaillan, on board the French ships. All the vessels, moreover,
had their masts and rigging much cut.
Meanwhile, in the West Indies, several of the cruisers which
were detached by Vernon had better fortune than the main fleet.
Some fell in with register ships of considerable value, and others did
good service by capturing dispatch vessels. Of these latter the
' Fronde, i. 289. " Barnet's letter in Beatsou, iii. ol.
272 MINOR OPERATIONS, 17U-17G2. [1742.
Worcester, (iO, took a Spanish 24-gun ship bearing dispatches to the
viceroy of Mexico, and the Squirrel, 20, Captain Peter Warren,
captured a large privateer belonging to Santiago de Cuba. It is
said that the importance of this prize lay in information gained from
her papers that the French squadron, under M. d'Antin at Port
Louis, was intended to join with the Spaniards at Havana.' Be that
as it may, M. d'Antin's squadron was rendered ineffective by putrid
fever,^ and the breach with France was postponed. Captiires in the
West Indies, as in home waters, were frequent ; but so great was
the number of the enemy's privateers, and so large the number of
British merchantmen, that the balance was not in favour of Great
Britain ; and the London merchants, dissatisfied with the conduct
of the war, fell to petitioning Parhament for a redress of grievances.^
Early in the next year the Tiger, 50, Captain Edward
Herbert (1), was lost on a key near Tortuga. The crew got
safely ashore with a quantity of stores and provisions, and raised
on the island a fortification, in which they mounted twenty of the
ship's guns. It was well that they did so, for the Spaniards, hearing
of the misadventure, sent the Fuerte, 60, to capture them. She was,
however, lost in the attempt, and the Tiger's men, after two months
on the island, managed in their boats to take a sloop, in which thej'
reached Jamaica. Though several prizes of value were made during
the year, 1742, there was only one that calls for note. This was
the guarda costa already mentioned, commanded by Fandino, the
man who is alleged to have ill-treated Jenkins, and whose capture
has been described as a fitting conclusion to the Jenkins episode.*
The Spaniards at that time sent out a new governor to Cartagena,
and with him a reinforcement of over a thousand men. The troops
were in five ships of the Caracas company, of which two mounted
40, two 30, and the fifth 12 guns. The squadron was dispersed b}' a
hurricane, and two of the ships were lost, while the others, one of
the 40's and both the 30's, fell in on April 12th, 1742, with the
Elthain, 40, Captain Edward Smith, and the Lively, 20, Com-
mander Henry Stewart. After some hours' hard fighting, night
ended the engagement, and the Spaniards bore up for Puerto Bico.
As they had lost in killed and wounded some six hundred men,
' Beatson, i. 115.
^ Poissomiier Desperrieres, 'Maladie.5 des gens de Mer,' p. 2tl5,
» Beatson, i. 121-25. See also Gent. Marj. 17-11, pp. 689-698.
* See above, pp. 51 and 26G.
1743.] MATHEWS IN THE MEDITEItRANEAN. 273
including the new governor among the former, it' may be said that
the reinforcement had been practically annihilated.
On September 21st, 1742, the Navy sustained a heavy loss in the
destruction of the Tilbiiri/, (iO, Captain Peter Lawrence, by fire, off
Hispaniola. The cause of the accident was a drunken scuffle ; and
the whole of the story, down to the loss of one hundred men, corre-
sponds almost exactly with that of the destruction of the Paragon
during Penn's return from the West Indies in June, 1655.^
The destruction of five Spanish galleys at St. Tropez in June,
1742, was a spirited piece of service. Captain Eichard Norris, of
the Kingston, 60, had been detached, with the Oxford, 50, and Duke,
fireship, in company, to blockade them ; but as St. Tropez, being a
French port, was neutral, there would have been no attack had not the
galleys been so ill-advised as to fire upon the British. On June 13th,
therefore, Norris gave orders to Commander Smith Callis, of the
Duke, to go in and do his utmost to destroy the galleys at the mole.
Calhs went in on the 14th, and fired his ship with such good effect,
that the whole of the five were destroyed. So rapidly did he carry
oiit his orders that nothing was saved from the Duke, not even the
ship's or officers' papers.^ For his success, Callis was posted to the
Assistance.
Early in 1743, Vice- Admiral Thomas Mathews, hearing that the
Spanish ship San Isidoro, 70, was lying in the Bay of Ajaccio, sent
in the Ipsivich, 70, Captain William Martin (1), Revenge, 70, Captain
George Berkeley, and the Anne Galley, fireship, to bring her out.
Her captain refused to yield to the odds arrayed against him, and
opened fire, but finding it impossible to hold the ship, he ordered her
to be biu'nt. She blew up before all her people had been taken out
of her, and a considerable nmnber of men perished.
Apart from this piece of work, there was little done in the
Mediterranean, though the cruisers continued to send in prizes, and
to annoy the enemy's coast. In June, however, the enemy contrived
so far to avoid the blockading squadron as to carry fifteen shiploads
of warlike stores from Majorca to Genoa for the use of the army in
Italy. Mathews at once appeared off that port with six sail of the
line, and overawed the Genoese into sending the supplies back to
Corsica, there to lie till the conclusion of the war.
' Beatsou, i. 149.
2 See above. Vol. II. p. 208.
' Captains' Letters, C 14. Callis to Thomas Corbctt, August lltli, 1742.
VOL. III. T
274 MINOR UI'EHATIONS, 1714-1762. [1744.
The following year, 1744, was very far from being a fortunate
one for the British navy. The fiasco off Toulon was supplemented
by the capture of the Sea/ord, '20, Solebai/, 20, and Grampus, 14, by
de Kochambeau, by the throwing away of the Northumherland, 70,
and by the loss, through stress of weather, of the Victory, 100,'
Orford, 70, ColcheHter, 50, St. Albans, 50, Greenwich, 50, and other
ships of less value. Against this tale of disaster we could oppose
merely the capture of the Medee, 26, on April 27th, by the Dread-
nought, 50, Captain the Hon. Edward Boscawen,'-^ and Grampus, 14,
which formed part of the fleet of Vice- Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (1),
off the coast of Portugal.
Of these misfortunes that requiring most particular notice here is
the loss of the Northumberland. This ship, commanded by Captain
Thomas AVatson (1), was detached in chase of a strange sail on
May 8th by the Vice-Admiral, who was then homeward bound from
the Tagus. In view of the sequel, it is w'orth remembering that
Watson was a good and brave officer, favourably known in the
service for his work as Vernon's flag-captain at Puerto Bello and
Cartagena. But his skull had been fractured, and his mind im-
paired, so that "a small matter of liquor rendered him quite out of
order, which was his unhappy fate that day." ^ The weather grew
thick, the chase was lost sight of, and the signal was made for the
Northumberland' s recall ; but Watson held on. Soon three sail
were made out to leeward, and as he bore down on them under a
press of sail, it was seen that they were two two-decked ships and a
frigate. They were, in point of fact, the
>bii)&. 'ilm?^. (.'ummauders.
Content ... 64 Captain de Conflaus.
Mars .... 1)4 „ du Perrier.
Venus .... 26 „ d'Aclie.
The French ships lay to under topsails, while the Northumberland
bore down on them. Properly handled, the British ship would have
' See the previous chapter.
- Boscawen's nickcanie in tlie service dates from this time. The seamen transferred
tlie name of the ship to the man ; and lie went through life as " Old Dreadnought."
^ 'A true and authentic Narrative of the action between i[\e Northumherland and
tliree French men of war" .... By an Eye Witness. 8vo, 1745.
1744.] VAPTirni': OF Till': NOIlTlIUMBKItLANn. 275
had them at a disadvantai,'(!, for they were widely separated, and the
Content, a mile to windward of her consorts, made no attempt to
rejoin them. Watson, therefore, had the option of disa])ling her
before the others could interfere, or of following the counsel of his
master, Dixon, who advised him to stand close-hauled to the north-
ward ' under a press of sail, and so to lead the enemy across the
course of the British fleet. This advice was disregarded, and no
reasonable nor customary measures were taken to put the ship into a
fit state for action.
" We bore down so precipitately that our small .sails were not stowed, nor top-
gallant sails furled, before the enemy began to tire on us, and at tlie same time we had
the cabins to clear away ; the hammocks were not stowed as they should be ; in short
we had nothing in order."
Instead of engaging the weathermost ship, the Content, Watson ran
down to leeward without answering her fire, and so had to deal at
once with his three enemies. Even then, there was no real reason
why the ship should be taken, for the French gunnery was so
extremely bad that she was little hurt, and had but few men killed.
But Watson fell early in the action, none of the lieutenants were on
deck to take command, and the Master ordered the colours to be
struck, though there was fight enough left both in the ship and in
her crew. The Northuinheiiaud was taken into Brest, and till the
1st of June, 1794, for fifty years, the trophy name found a place on
French navy lists. When the officers returned to England from
their captivity, a court-martial was held. The first lieutenant,
Thomas Craven, was honourably acquitted, but Dixon, the master,
was condemned for surrendering the ship. The court took into
consideration the good advice which he had given his captain before
the action, and sentenced him only to be imprisoned for life in the
Marshalsea. The court foiind also " that Captain Watson had
behaved very rashly and inconsiderately, to which was owing chiefly
the loss of her " ; but death had settled his account. -
The hurricane that devastated Jamaica on October 20th was one
of the most violent upon record. Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle (1) was
at sea with a great part of the fleet, and so escaped its fury ; but
eight ships of the Eoyal Navy, besides a great number of merchant-
men, were either wrecked or driven ashore. The Greenwich, 50,
' The wind was westerly.
- Minutes of Court Martial held at Portsmouth on February 1st, 1744-5. R. 0.
vol. 27.
T 2
276 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1745.
Captain Edward Allen, was sunk, with the loss of her captain, a
heuteuant, and seventy men ; the Lark, hulk,' sank, and one hundred
and ten men with her; and the St. Albans, 50, Captain William
Knight, Bonetta, sloop, Commander WiUiam Lea, and Thunder,
bomb, were also total losses. The Prince of Orange, 60, Montagu,
60, and Experiment, 20, went ashore, but were got off again.^ The
histoiy of the year at sea was about as disheartening as possible ; and
1745 saw no marked improvement.
On Januaiy 6th, 1745, four sail of the line, the Hampton Court, 70,
Captain Savage Mostyn ; Captain, 70, Captain Thomas Griffin (1) ;
Sunderland, 60, Captain John Brett ; and Dreadnought, 60, Captain
Thorpe Fowke, cruising off Ushant, sighted and gave chase to three
French ships to the north-east. These were the Neptune, 74, and
Fleuron, 64, homeward bound from Martinique, with a vast quantity
of specie on board, worth four millions sterling, it is said, and in
company with the privateer Mars, George Walker, master, which
they had captm-ed two days before. As the captain of the Fleuron
told Walker, who was a prisoner on board his ship, the French
commodore had made a great mistake in interrupting his journey to
Brest for so trifling an object as the Mars. This was hardly compli-
mentaiy to Walker, who at that time, wath Fortunatus Wiight, did
as much to uphold British prestige at sea as any captains of the
Eoyal Kavj' ; but it was true, and, had the two French ships fallen,
they would richly have deserved their fate. As it was, thej' were not
captui'ed ; and the storj', as disclosed in the subsequent court-martial,^
and in an able comment thereon addressed to the House of Commons,*
is very unpleasant reading.
It is desirable here to enter into the matter in some detail,
for it shows the alanning state to which British naval prestige
had fallen, and it explains the necessity for the new Naval Discipline
Act of 1749.
The French ships, after their long passage, were both sicklj- and
foul, and the English, with a fresh southerlj- breeze, gi-aduall}- crept
up. The Captain, the leading ship, kept away after the Mars, and
took possession of her at dusk, lea^^ng the others to continue the
^ Formerly a 44-gun ship.
^ Beatson, i. 193.
' Minutes of the Court Martial, etc. 1745, 8to.
* ' An Enquiry into the Conduct of Captain Most}-n, being remarks on the Minutes
of the Court Martial, etc. Humbly addressed to the Hon. House of Commons by a
Sea Officer.' 1745, 8to.
1745.] BETIAVIOVR OF CAPTAIN MOSTYN. 277
chase. The Sunderland carried away her main topmast, and dropped
astern ; but at sunset the Hampton Court was close up with the
enemy. The DreadnougJit, sailing very badly, could not quite get
up, and Mostyn shortened sail to wait for her. All through the
night and during the next day, the position continued the same,
the Dreadnought sailing no faster than the chase and the Hampton
Court not engaging without her. At last, after ranging abreast of
the Neptune, but out of gunshot to windward, Mostyn decided that
nothing could be done, and left the French to carry their valuable
cargo into Brest. ^ Of course the two ships ought to have been
taken. Griffin, who was senior officer, had no business to bear
away after the Mars ; yet, apart from that, it was Mostyn's duty
to have engaged as soon as he came up, and to have detained the
enemy till the Dreadnought could get into action. Griffin, at the
court-martial, stated that when he bore away he believed the Mars
alone to be a ship of war and the other two to be merchantmen
under her convoy. He was accordingly acquitted ; but, as the
other three ships had no doubt whatever as to the nature of the
Neptune and Fleuron, and as the Captain was nearest to them, the
opinion of the service was unfavourable to the commanding officer
of the ship last named. As for Mostyn, the evidence went that, in
the fresh breeze that was blowing, the Hampton Court's lower deck
ports could not be opened, while both the enemy's ships could fight
all their guns, to leeward as well as to windward. It was further
stated that the Hampton Court lay along so much that shot from
her upper deck guns, at extreme elevation, would have struck the
water fifty yards from their muzzles. This, however, was mere
conjecture, and does not explain why not a shot was tried. It
might have been possible to knock away a spar, and to give the
Dreadnought a chance of coming into action. As to the French-
man's lower deck guns being run out to leeward, the writer of the
appeal to the House of Commons " points out that the witness who
swore to this fact proved too much. Those on board the Hampton
Court, in her position to windward, were not in a condition to see
whether the enemy's lee ports were open or not. There was no
cross-examination; and the Court decided that Mostyn "had done
his duty as an experienced good officer, and as a man of courage
' The Fleuron was, however, blown up in Brest harhmii- before her treasure could
be taken out of her.
^ Believed to be Vernuu.
278 MJKOTl OPKRATIONI^, 1714-1762. [1745.
and conduct." It is difficult to believe that this decision was come
to without bias. At any rate, it by no means satisfied public
opinion ; and, a year later, the Hampton Court, with Mostyn still in
command, went out of I'ortsmouth fiarbour to the cry of " All's
well ! there's no Frenchman in the way." '
On February '20th following, the Chester, .50, Captain Francis
Geary, and Smiderlcmd, 60, Captain John Brett, fell in in
the Soundings with the Elephant, 20, then on her way home
from the Mississippi, and having twenty-four thousand pieces
of eight on board. They chased, shot away her main topmast,
and captured her. This was but a mere flicker of success, closely
to be followed by another loss and Ijy another unsatisfactory
court-martial.
On March 28th, the Anyleseij, 44, Captain Jacob Elton, one of
the ships cruising to command the entrance of the Channel, put
out of Kingsale, whither she had been to land some sick, amongst
whom was her first lieutenant. On the following da}% a fresh
westerly breeze blowing, a large sail was sighted to windward.
Elton, making sure that she was his consort the Augusta, piped to
dinner, and paid no further heed. Meanwhile, the stranger came
down fast ; but it was not till she was close to the Anglesey that,
yawing slightly, she showed French ornamentation on her quarter.
Then all was hurry and confusion. Elton, to gain time, ordered the
foresail to be set ; but the only effect of this manoeuvre was to bury
the lee lower deck ports in the sea and almost to swamp the ship.
The enemy, which proved to be the Apollon, 50, belonging to the
French navy, but fitted out by private adventurers, ran close under
the stern of the Anglesey and rounded-to on her lee quarter, poui-ing
in a heavy fire. Elton and the Master fell at the first discharge,
and the command devolved on the second lieutenant. Baker Phillips.
The decks were not cleared ; the ship was half-full of water ; and
sixty men were dead or wounded. Phillips could not order the
helm to be put up without falling aboard a ship as full of men as
his was of water ; so, taking hasty comisel with Taafe, the third
lieutenant, he decided that no effective resistance could be offered,
and ordered the colours to be struck. It is difficult to see what else
Phillips could have done. William Hutchinson, " the Mariner," laid
down that a ship attacked as the Anglesey was ought to be box-
hauled, and to pass imder the enemy's stern raking him, as the
' Cluiruock, iv. 431.
1745.] CASE OF LIEUT. JSAKEIt I'TIILLII'S. 279
Serapis subsecjiunitl^y did in the course of her action with the
Bonhomme Uicliurd. Ikit in 1745 Phillips could not have had
the advantage of a study of Hutchinson's ' Treatise on Practical
Seamanship ' ; and, being a young man and inexperienced, he acted
as most other men in his position would have done. The ship
was lost by being engaged to leeward. The subsequent court-
martial ' —
" was vinanimoiisly of opinion tliat Ca])taiii I'liton, deceased, did not give timely
directions foi- getting his ship clear or in a projier jio-sture of defence, nor did he
afterwards behave like an ollicer or a seaman, which was the cause of the ship being
left to Lieutenant Phillips in such distress and confusion. And that Lieutenant Baker
Phillips, late second lieutenant of the said ship, by not endeavouring to the utmost
of his power after Captain Elton's death to put . the ship in order of fighting, not
encouraging the inferior officers and common men to fight courageously, and by
yielding to the enemy, falls under part of the tenth article. They do sentence him to
death, to be shot by a ])latoou of musqueteers on the forecastle, . . . but . . . having
regard to the distress and confusion the ship was in when he came to the command,
and being a young man and unexperienced, they beg leave to recommend him fur
mercy."
The recommendation was ignored, and the sentence was duly
carried into effect. It is difficult to say what was the reason of this,
and it has been suggested in explanation that there was a suspicion
that Phillips was in the pay of the Young Pretender. No hint of
this appears in the minutes of the court-martial ; but it must be
remem.bered that the terror of an invasion was at that time very
great, and that men may be swayed by motives which they do not
acknowledge even to themselves. Whether as a result of this court-
martial or not, it remains to be recorded that not a ship wavered in
her allegiance, though there were undoubted Jacobites in the fleet. -
The one action of the year that had a direct bearing on the result,
the engagement between the Lion and the French ship EUsaheth,
has already been described.^
A number of valuable prizes continued to be made, chiefly in the
West Indies. The greatest success fell to the privateers ; but in
December, 1744, the Bose, 20, Captain Thomas Frankland, had fallen
in with and taken the treasure-ship Concepcion, bound from Cartagena
to Havana. The prize mounted twenty guns and had a large crew ;
but her value lay in the enormously rich cargo which, after a stubborn
fight, became the property of the British. As she was not condemned
' 25th and 26th June, 17-15. P. K. O., vol 2H.
'^ Vide e.g., P. E. 0. Courts-martial, vol. 29. Lieutenant William .Tohnstun, fur
treason, July 15th, 1745.
' Supra, Chap. XW'IL, p. 110.
280 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-lTfi2. [1745.
by legal process, the exact value of her lading is unknown. It will
be enough, however, to say that it consisted chiefly of gold, silver,
and jewels, and that such additional finds as 20,000 and 30,000
pistoles, made after the ship had been cleared, were looked on by
comparison as trifles. The privateers which harmed the enemy
most at that time were the Prince Frederick, Duke, and Prince
George, fitted out by a London firm in the summer of 174-5, and
cruising under one James Talbot, master of the first-named,
as commodore.' The profit resulting from this single cruise,
£700,000, was so enormous as to tempt the merchants to repeat
their scheme ; and the ships were sent to sea again in the following
year under George Walker. Subsequently to his capture by the
Fleurun, Walker had commanded the privateer Boscarven, which,
as the French royal frigate Mklee, had been the first prize of the
war, and had been renamed in honour of her captor.
The French West India trade of 1745 went out under the convoy
of the Magnanime, 74, and other ships of war. Vice-Admiral Isaac
Townsend had, however, received news concerning the convoy, and,
on October 31st, intercepted it off Martinique. Townsend, in the
Lenox, together with the Dreadnought and Ipswich, engaged the
men-of-war, while the smaller ships were sent off in chase of
the flying merchantmen. Several of these latter were picked up
to leeward or were driven ashore, but the men-of-war escaped by
taking refuge under the batteries.'^
In the MediteiTanean, meanwhile, the only action of import-
ance was that between the Jersey, 60, Captain Charles Hardy (2),
detached from Captain Henry Osborn's squadron, and the St.
Esprit, 74. The action was very severe, lasting for two hours and
a half, at the end of which time both ships were crippled. The
St. Esprit returned to Cadiz with the loss of her foremast and
bowsprit, and with twenty men killed.
It has been said that the Apollon was a royal ship in pi-ivate
employ. This hiring out of the State's ships was by no means an
uncommon practice with the French ; and, on the break up of their
main fleet subsequent to the battle off Toulon, it was carried out
on a considerable scale. M. de Lage, a man w'hose chief merit lay
in his self-assertiveness, succeeded in obtaining from the Admiral
of France an acting commission as commodore, with authority to fit
' Beatson, i. 294 ; J. K. Laiightou : ' Studies in Naval History,' p. 237.
- Beats. .11, i. 2SG.
1715.] CRUISE OF M. DE l.AGE. 281
out a squadron at his own expense. The crews were to be raised
from the government Hsts of seamen and marines, hut were to be
paid by de Lage. But the men had a peculiar dishke to the
adventurer, and would not volunteer ; ajid it was with the greatest
difficulty that, after a hot press, two ships of the hne and two
frigates got to sea in April, 1745. These were the Fervie, 74,
Orlfiammc, 54, Diane, 30, and Volage, 30. Three times did
de Lage put to sea, and three times was he driven in by bad
weather. On each return to port numbers of men deserted, and
finally he had to pay off the Ferme. With the three ships that were
left, he put to sea for the last attempt at the end of March, 174G.
On the 29th he was sighted by Commodore the Hon. George
Townshend, who had with him at that time the Bedford, 70, and
Essex, 70, and two bombs, but who, contenting himself with a
distant view, chose to believe that the enemy was of superior force,
and declined to engage.^ De Lage stood over to the coast of Spain
where, on April 4th, oft' Cape St. Martin, the Volage, which had
chased out of sight of the squadron, was taken, after an obstinate
resistance, by Captain John Fawler, of the Stirling Castle, 70. On
the following morning her consorts hove in sight ; and Fawler,
believing himself to be in no fit condition to engage them, cut adrift
the prize, which he had taken in tow. She was therefore retaken,
and with her, a lieutenant and twenty-five men. Fawler was tried
by court-martial at Gibraltar on October (3th and 7th following ; and
the court, though it acquitted him for not engaging de Lage,
condemned him for not destroying the prize, which, as he had had
possession of her all night and had learnt from the prisoners that
her consorts were in the neighbourhood, he should and could
have done.
When de La Jonquiere, driven out of America by putrid fever and
small-pox, was on his way back to Europe, he had a narrow escape
from falling in with Anson, then in command in the Channel.
Indeed, so near were the fleets to one another that the French ship,
Mcrcure, 56, doing duty as a hospital, was taken, when but a httle
separated from the main body. Two other ships failed to reach
France ; the Ferine, 54, which had been sent to Quebec with
military stores, and which had fallen in with the British blockading
squadron, and the Mars, 64, which had been driven by stress of
weather to Martinique. Thence, after refitting, she had sailed for
' Court-martial on Townshend, February i)th, 17-16-47. P. K. O., vol. 30.
282 MINOR oriiltATlONS, 1714-1762. [1746.
home ; but she was seventy-five men short of her complement and
very sickly, so that, when she fell in, on October 11th, 1746, with
the Nottingham, 60, Captain Philip de Saumarez, cruising to the
south-west of Cape Clear, she was not in a condition to make effective
resistance. The fight was, nevertheless, maintained for two hours,
ere the Mars, reduced to a wreck, with twelve men killed and
forty wounded, as against three killed and sixteen wounded in the
Notfhif/ham, struck. But for the fineness of the weather it would
have been impossible to send her in. She was added to the Navy.
In 1746, the privateers on both sides continued to have a good
share in the hard knocks, and from time to time did excellent
service. There are two of their exploits which specially claim
mention. On April 10th the Alexander privateer, one hundred and
fortj' men, Phillips master, was cruising off lihe, when she saw
a frigate, with a store ship in company, standing into St. Martin.
This was the Solebaij, 20 guns and two hundred and thirty men,
which had been taken by de Rochambeau on the Portuguese coast
nearly two years before. Phillips boarded her athwart the bowsprit,
at the very entrance to the road, and carried her, killing fifteen of
her men. Phillips, like Walker, was kept out of the King's service,
which he was desirous of entering, by the stringency of the regula-
tions, and had to be content with an acknowledgment of five hundred
guineas and a gold medal. The second instance occurred on May 1st,
when, as has been briefly noted in the previous chapter, H.M.S.
Grei/JioiDtd, 20, with the sloops Baltimore and Terror, fell in off the
west coast of Scotland with two heavy French privateers of 32 and
34 guns respectively. The British were severely handled and beaten
off', and Commander the Hon. Richard Howe (afterwards Earl Howe),
then of the Baltimore, was badly wounded.
On February 9th, 1746, the Portland. 50, Captain Charles
Stevens, cruising in the Soundings, fell in with and engaged the
French Auguste, 50, four hundred and seventy men.
" After two-aud-a-half hours' close action," wrote Stevens, " she struck. Laving
tifty killed, ninety-four wounded, all her masts so shattered that they went by the
board, and so many shot in the hull, that, with the late hard easterly wind, I was
obliged to put away with her before it a hmidred leagues to the westward, and am now
towing her for Pljanouth." '
The Portland had five men killed and thirteen woimded, and lost
her main yard.'-* The Auguste was bought into the service, and,
' .J. K. Laughton : ' Studies in Naval History,' p. 255. '' Cliarnock, v. 229.
ITiTj CliUISK OF CAPTAIN TIfOMAS FOX. 283
as the PortlancTK Prize, cruised with success. On November 19th of
the same year, in company with the Winchehea, 20, the Portland
sighted the Snhtile, 2G. The Winchehea, in which Samuel (after-
wards Viscount) Hood was then a lieutenant, outsailed her consort,
and, after a very severe action, fought the chase to a standstill, so
that, on the Portland's coming up, the Frenchman struck im-
mediately.' The rest of the doings of single ships and light
squadi'ons in European waters during the year may be dismissed
with a mere reference to the destruction of the Ardent, 64, which was
chased ashore in Quiberon Bay in November by Lestock's squadron
when returning from its fruitless descent on Lorient.
Before Anson's victory of May 8rd, there was little done at sea
in 1747 ; and, after it, the enemy began to show great signs of that
exhaustion which, consequent on their second defeat in October, put
an end to the war. Anson's work was well supplemented when
Captain Thomas Fox, of the Kent, 74, having put to sea with
a small squadron in April, fell in, to the westward of the Bay of
Biscay, on June 20th, with the large fleet of French West Indiamen
which he had long been anxiously awaiting. The merchantmen were
under the convoy of M. Dubois de La Motte, whose force consisted
of three sail of the line and a frigate, a force inferior indeed to the
six ships " of Fox's squadron but not so far inferior as to justify the
flight which followed. M. de La Jonquiere, in his encounter with
Anson, had earned the gratitude of his country by deliberately giving
himself to be crushed that he might save his convoy ; de La Motte
shrank from the sacrifice, and took his men-of-war unscathed into
Brest, while, of the West Indiamen, about fifty, to the value of
upwards of a million, were picked up either by Fox himself or by
Eear-Admiral Sir Peter Warren's squadron to leeward.
On the following day the Etoile, 46, escorting five merchantmen,
was driven ashore at Cape Finisterre by Sir Peter Warren, and
was burnt. ^ A few days later, an attempt to execute a somewhat
similar exploit ended in disaster. The Maidstone, 60, Captain the
Hon. Augustus Keppel, which had been cruising in the Soundings
and in the Bay of Biscay, chased an enemy's ship inshore at Belle
' The Subtile was added to the Kuyal Navy as the Amazon.
" Kent, 74, Captain Thomas Fo.>l; Hampton Court, 70, Captain Savage MostjTi :
Eagle, 60, Captain George Brydges Rodney ; Lion, (50, Captain Artliur Scott :
Chester, 50, Captain Philip Durell (1) ; Hector, 44, Captain Thomas Stanhope : with
the fireships Pluto and Dolphin.
^ Troude, i. 318 ; Beatsou, i. 372 ; Cliarnock, iv. 1>S7.
284 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-17<J2. [1747.
Isle on June 27th. Venturing too close in, the Maidstone ran
aground and became a total wreck ; and Keppel and his men were
made prisoners of war.
Other captures of note made during the course of the summer
in European waters were those of the Bellone, Loup, and Tieuommee.
The Bellone, a 36-gun frigate bound from Nantes to the East
Indies, was taken by the Edinburgh, Eagle, and Nottingham, was
bought into the service as the Bellona, and was at once sent out
to cruise, with Captain the Hon. Samuel Barrington in command.
The Loup had been the British sloop Wolf, taken by the French
two years earlier. It is interesting to notice that she was captured
by the Amazon, 26, which, as has been mentioned, was originally the
French Subtile. The Wolf, in French hands, had been used as a
privateer, but resumed her duties as a 14-gun sloop in the British
Navy, curiously enough, under the orders of Commander George
Vachell, who had had her before her captm-e in 1745.^ The
Amazon, whose captain was Samuel Faulknor(2), son of that
Samuel Faulknor (1) who had perished with Balchen in the Victory
in 1744, continuing her cruise, fell in, on September 12th, with the
Renommec, 32. A severe but indecisive action followed, and left
both ships badly crippled. They parted company in the night,
but, next day, the Benommee, having the further misfortune to fall
in with the Dover, .50, Captain the Hon. Washington Shirley, was
taken, and, with her, M. de Confians, who was going out in her
to take over the government of San Domingo.
The French force under M. de I'Etenduere, which suffered
defeat on October 14th, 1747, at the hands of Hawke, had under
its convoy a large fleet of merchantmen for the West Indies.
Hawke, after the battle, was not in a fit state to pm'sue the convoy,
but, with admirable promptness, at once victualled the Weazel,
sloop, and despatched her to warn Captain George Pocock, who
had succeeded Captain the Hon. Edward Legge as commodore on
the West India station, of its approach. Thanks to this prompt-
ness, Pocock, though his squadron was scattered when the news
reached him, was able to capture many of the merchantmen. The
Captain took eight, the Dreadnought six, the Dragon five, the
Ludlow Castle another, and the privateers on the station ten more.
The twenty taken by Pocock were valued at ±'100,000.-
' He was lost with her uft' the Irish coast in .January, 1749.
- Beatson, i. 368 and -108.
1747.] THE ADVENTURES OF THE GLORlOtiO. 285
It still remains to describe the most noteworthy of the minor
actions of the year 1747.^ Mention has already been made of
George Walker, a man who would have done credit to any service,
and who was kept out of the Navy only by the regulations which
made it impossible to offer him therein any command which he
would be likely to accept. His fortune on two or three occasions
brought him into close contact with the Eoyal Navy, but never more
closely than in the present instance. Walker, it has been seen,
took over Talbot's squadron of privateers on the latter's retirement.
He enlarged it, and, like his predecessor, cruised with great success
against the enemy's commerce. On October 6th, 1747, the " Eoyal
Family," so called because all the ships composing it were named
after members of the reigning house, were standing out of Lagos
Bay when a large ship was sighted coming in towards Cape
St. Vincent. They immediately gave chase ; and the stranger bore
away to the westward, being, like the British ships, in some doubt
as to the enemy's force. She was, in fact, the Glorioso, a Spanish
74, which had previously landed at Ferrol about three millions of
treasure from the Spanish Main, and was then bound to Cadiz.
She was a fine powerful ship, though, as was general in that
service, she carried no heavier guns than '24-pounders. This was
not her first hostile meeting during the voyage, for on July 14th
she had fallen in at the Azores with the Lark, 40, Captain John
Crookshanks, and Warwick, 60, Captain Robert Erskine. The
Warivick had attacked but, left unsupported, had been beaten to
a standstill; and the Glorioso had made off. For this fiasco,
Crookshanks, who was the senior officer, was cashiered. A few
days later the Spaniard had met with the Oxford, 50, with the
Shorcham, 24, and Falcon, 14, in company ; but they had made
room for her as being of superior force.
.It was now for Walker to try his hand. He beheved that there
was treasure still on board ; but when, at about noon on the 6th,
he overhauled the chase, his frigate, the King George, 32, was alone.
It had fallen flat calm, and the rest of the "Eoyal Family" had
not been able to get up, so that the King George and the Glorioso
lay looking at one another, each uncertain as to what the other
was. In the evening a breeze arose, and the Glorioso headed in-
' J. K. Laughton : ' Studies in Kav.il History,' pp. 239 s<2q. P. E. 0. Courts-
martial, vol. 32, December 28th, 1747, on Smith Callis of the Oxford, and,
February 1st, 1748, on Crookshanks of the Lark.
286 MINOR orKliATlONS, 1711-1762. [1747.
shore, followed by the privateer which, on closing, hailed for
information. The Spaniard answered with a cross-question, and,
on finding that the ship alongside was British, poured in a broad-
side, which was returned at once ; and the ships ran slowly in to the
land, engaged yard-arm to yard-arm. There have been instances
enough of frigates attacking ships of the line ; the capture of the
Guillaume Tell in 1800 was directly due to the embarrassing atten-
tions of the Penelope ; and no small share of Edward Pellew's great
name is due to the manner in which, in the Indefatigable, 44, he
hung on to the Droits de I'Homme in a gale of wind on a lee shore,
till he left her a hopeless wreck. But this is the only instance in
which a frigate, in a smooth sea and fine weather, voluntarily
placed herself, yard-arm to yard-arm, with a ship of the line ; and
not the least wonder of it is that the frigate was only a privateer.
Fortunately for the King George, many of the enemy's shot either
went over her or took effect in her spars ; yet, in spite of that,
after some hours her position began to be critical. On one of her
consorts, the Prince Frederick, coming up, however, the Glorioso
took to fiight. On the morning of the 8th, the King George was
too disabled to pursue, and the Prince Frederick, with two other
ships of the squadron, was making sail after the chase when a large
vessel was seen coming up from the eastward. She was made out
to be British, and Walker at once sent to explain the situation to
her captain. She was the Russell, 80, Captain Matthew Buckle (1),
homeward bound from the Mediterranean, but with only half a crew
on board ; and, even of these, some were sick. As the Bussell crowded
sail in pursuit the chase was seen to be sharply engaged with some
vessel miknown which presently blew up. It was thought at first
that she was the Prince Frederick, but she was in reality the
Dartmouth, 50, Captain James Hamilton (2), which had been drawn
to the scene of action by the firing of the previous night. Out of
her crew of three hundred only fourteen, including a lieutenant,
were saved. Shortly afterwards the Russell in her turn came up,
and began a hot action which lasted for five hours, at the end of
which time the enemy's main-top mast went overboard and she
struck. So short-handed was the Russell that the number of the
prisoners was a serious embaiTassment, and many of them had to be
sent away in the privateers.
Towards the end of 1747 Captain Dubois de La Motte went
out to San Domingo with a convoy of merchantmen. His force
1748.] TIIE MAONANIME TAKEN. 287
consisted of the Mai/iianiiiw, ()4, and a new Etoile, 42. On
November 18th four British men-of-war were seen/ of which one
monnted (iO and another 50 ptuns. From these M. de La Motte
protected his convoy. There was some desultory firing, and the
merchantmen, with the exception of six, got safely away. No
sooner was the Magnanime back in France, than she was ordered
to the East Indies, bearing the broad pennant of Commodore the
Marquis d'Albert.^ On January 81st, 1748, she was sighted in the
north-west by the fleet then cruising under Hawke to the westward
of Ushant. The Magnanime had been partially dismasted in a gale
a few days previously, and was then on her way back to Brest
to refit. Directly she was sighted, the Nottingham, 60, Captain
Eobert Harland (2) , was detached in chase ; but, immediately
afterwards, it became apparent that the enemy was a ship of force,
and the Portland, 50, Captain Charles Stevens, was also ordered
to follow her. The Nottingham was engaged for nearly an hour
before Stevens could come up, and suffered somewhat severely,
losing in all sixteen men killed and eighteen wounded. The loss
of the Portland was only four men wounded, its smallness being due
to the disabled condition of the French ship, which allowed the
Portland to keep on her quarter and rake her at will. After
a stubborn resistance, lasting for six hours, the enemy struck,
having lost, out of a crew of six hundred and eighty-six men,
forty-five killed and one hundred and five wounded. The prize
was a very fine ship, and was added to the British Navy under
her old name. Her capture was the last one of importance in
the war.
The 10th of October, 1748, was marked by the mutiny of the
Chesterfield, 40, which was stationed on the coast of Africa. On
the date named, while the ship lay off Cape Coast Castle, and
the captain, O'Brien Dudley, and others were ashore, Lieutenant-
Samuel Couchman organised a rising, and, persuading the lieutenant
of Marines, the carpenter, and thirty men to join him, got possession
of the ship. The boatswain, Mr. Gastrien, was of those on board
the most zealous in his attempts first to dissuade, and afterwards to-
' This is on the authority of Troude, i. Hl'J. Beatsou makes no mention of it, and
as Troude gives no English names it i.s hard to say what the ships were.
^ Troude, i. 321. Tliere is some doubt as to the date of the capture of tlie
Magnanime, but as she had been in tlie AVest Indies in December, .January 31st, the-
latest date given, seems the most probable. Cf. Beatsou, i. 409.
288 MINOR OPERATION t>, 1714-1762. [1748-51.
overpower, the mutineers ; but had Couchman and his party been
men in any way equal to the risky part which they had set them-
selves to play, there can l;e no doubt that it would have gone very
hard indeed with the boatswain and the loyal party. The mutineers,
however, having first tried to reason a few more into joining them,
and having failed, left the well-disposed members of the crew to
roam about the ship and concert plans at their leisure. On the
12th, thei-efore, the boatswain took counsel with the gunner, who
was ill in his cabin, and, thus getting hold of twenty pistols, armed
a few resolute men and recovered the ship. A court-martial was
held on board the Invincible at Portsmouth on June 26th, 1749, to
inquire into alleged neglect of duty on the part of Captain O'Brien
Dudley, and to examine into the reasons for his being ashore with so
many of his officers to the detriment of the service. Captain Dudley
proved that there had been no cause to suspect latent mutiny, and
that he and his officers were ashore on duty. He and they were,
accordingly, acquitted of all blame. As for Couchman and John
Morgan, the lieutenant of Marines, they were tried on the 28th and
30th respectively, and both were condemned to be shot. On the
] 0th July six men were tried for the same offence, and of them two
were acquitted and the rest hanged.'
Till the outbreak of the next war the Navy had little to do, and,
as was usually the case in a time of comparative quiet, it tmiied its
attention to the Mediterranean pirates. A small squadron was sent
out, with Captain the Hon. Augustus Keppel in the Centurion, 50, as
Commodore. Keppel had a special mission to the Dey of Algier, to
treat with him, or, if necessary, to force him to restrain his piratical
cruisers ; and the story told - is that the Dey professed astonishment
that the King of England should have sent a beardless boy to treat
with him. Keppel, who was twenty-six, was, no doubt, nettled, and
is said to have answered : " Had my master supposed that wisdom
was measured by length of beard, he would have sent your Dey-
ship a he-goat." When the angry Dey threatened his visitor with
death, Keppel, pointing to his squadron, is said to have explained
that there were enough of his countrymen there to honour him with
a glorious funeral pyre. Whether there be truth in the story or not,
' P. R. 0^ Courts-martial, vol. 33. See also Beatson, iii. 89.
'^ A suspiciously similar story is told of the behaviour of the Bej- of Tripoli to
Shovell m 1675. There is no reference to the affair in the Hon. and Kev. Thomas
Keppel's 'Life' of his relative. — W. L. C.
1755.] THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR. 289
the fact stands that in June, 1751, the dilliculties were smoothed
over, and that Keppel returned to England in the following month
and paid off.
It was not until after some months of unofficial hostilities in
North America, and until after the receipt in England of Boscawen's
dispatch relative to the capture of the Alcide and Lij.s, that the
Seven Years' War was fairly set on foot.
Thus far the British had been the gainers in the struggle that
still awaited a formal initiation. They had taken two ships, and the}'
had lost but one, the Mars, 64, which had grounded while going into
harbour at Halifax on the return thither of Boscawen's squadron at
the end of June; and which it had been impossible to get off again.
Soon afterwards, on the night of August 18th, 1755, the Blandfurd,
20, Captain Kichard Watkins, when on her way to South Carolina,
fell in off Brest with a French squadron homeward bound from the
West Indies under M. du Guay. She did what she could to get
away, and, even when surrounded, attempted some resistance ; but
the British '20-gun frigate of that period was " a pigmy with a pop-
gun armament ; " and she was easily taken possession of and sent
into Nantes.^ The sequel is curious as testifying to a tardy zeal on
the part of the French to avert the consequences of their aggressions.
With a parade of regard for legality, the Blandford was restored by
the French Government ; but Great Britain was not thus readily
appeased, and she quickly retaliated by capturing the Espercmce,
commanded by Comte de Bouvet. That ship, nominally a 74, but
having only twenty-four guns mounted, was on her way home from
Louisbourg, when on November 13th, 1755, she fell in with Byng's
fleet, which had sailed from Spithead a month before. The Orford,
64, Captain Charles Stevens, was ordered to chase, and soon began
a close action, in which the Revenge, 64, Captain Frederick Corn-
wall, presently joined. The EsjuTancc, however, made a stout
resistance, and did not strike till the squadron began to draw up.
She was an old ship, and had been so severely handled that, con-
sidering the badness of the weather, it was judged useless to try to
keep her afloat. She had lost ninety killed and wounded out of a total
of three hundred. Her surviving people were, therefore, taken out
of her, and she was set on fire. This was on the 15th, when it was
first possible to send a boat on board her, although she had been
' V. Ti. O. Court-martial on "Watkins, October fitli, 1755. Vol. 36.
VOL. III. U
290 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1756.
making signals of distress ever since her capture on the 13th. Byng
wrote ^ concerning her : —
" She was iu the mo.st distressed coudilion 1 ever saw a ship, extremely leaky and
not able to carry any sail, having only her lower masts standing and foretopmast, and
not one yard across excejit the spritsail yard."
On March 11th, 1756, still prior to the declaration of war,
the Warwick, GO, was taken by the French near Martinique. Seeing
that, according to a French account,^ this ship was taken by a frigate,
it is interesting to turn to the stoi-y of the affair as given by her
commander. Captain Molyneux Shuldham, at the subsequent court-
martial.-* The Warwick had been detached on December 21st,
1755, by Commodore Thomas Frankland, to cruise in the neigh-
bourhood of Martinique ; and shortly after reaching her station
she began to be very sickly. As, however, the sickness began to
decrease, and as there was no information of any French ships of
force being in those waters, Shuldham resolved to continue his
cruise.
On March 11th, at daybreak, three sail were sighted, and, they
being obviously of superior force, and the private signal being
unanswered, the Warwick bore away under a press of sail. The
strangers were, in fact, the French 74-gun ship Prudent, and the
two frigates Atalante and Zephyr, then on their way out from
France under the command of Captain d'Aubigny of the Prudent.
The Warwick was one of the smallest of her class, was a dull sailer,
had less than three hundred men fit for service, and was so crank
that she could rarely use her lower deck guns. As there was a
heavy sea running, she was uiiable to use them on the occasion in
question ; and she had to rely almost entirely on the 9-pounders of
her upper deck and quarter-deck. The Atalante, 34, Captain du
Chaffault, was the first to come up with the chase, and, hanging on
her quarter, out of reach of her weather broadside, kept up a galling
fire. The wind shifted in a hard squall ; both ships were taken
aback ; and before the Waru-ick, whose rigging was much cut, could
pay off her head, the Prudent drew close up and opened fii-e. Shuld-
ham ordered the great guns to play upon the commodore only, and
the small-arm men to keep up their fire on the Atalante ; but it was
' Admirars Dispatches, Channel Fleet, vol. 2. Byng, Koveniber 19th, 1755.
■-' Troude, i. 338.
^ P. R. 0. Courts-martial, vol. 38, March 27th, 1758.
i7o6.] HOWE TO TJ/h' CUIAUSEY IHLANDS. 2iJl
still impossible to use the lowci' deck guns, the ship being half
swamjDed ; and after half an huuv more, being defenceless and un-
manageable, she struck her flag. Shuldham remained a prisoner of
war for two years, and on his release was adjudged by the court-
martial, held to inquire into the loss, to have done his duty.
An indecisive action was fought on May 17th, 1756, between the
Colchester, 50, and Lyme, 28, Captains Lucius O'Brien and Edward
Vernon (2), on the one hand, and the French ships Aqniloii, 50, and
FicUle,^ 26, on the other. The French ships were standing in for
Bochefort in charge of a convoy, when, qaite near the forts, they
were sighted by the British and chased. The convoy was ordered
to make the best of its way, and the men-of-war gave battle to
cover its retreat. The ships paired off, the Colchester engaging the
Aquilon, while the frigates fought it out together ; but so equal were
the forces on both sides, that, when they parted by mutual consent,
and with heavy loss, no definite result had been arrived at as the
outcome of seven hours' hard pounding.
A small expedition, planned and carried into effect during the
summer of 1756, deserves mention on account of the relief which
it afforded to British trade in the Channel. The enemy was busy
fortifying the Chausey Islands, which lie off" Granville, being influ-
enced thereto by the fact that the islands afforded a refuge to the
St. Malo privateers, and were also close to the Channel Islands, upon
which the French had designs. It was desirable that the fortifica-
tions should not be proceeded with, and Captain the Hon. Kichard
Howe, of the Dunkirk, 60, was sent with a small squadron, consisting
of a 20-gun frigate and some small craft, to put a stop to the work.
With Howe went three hundred men of the Jersey garrison ; but
there was no fighting, for the French commandant, after some
dispute about terms, was content to respect the force arrayed against
him, and to surrender on the conditions offered. The fortifications
were immediately destroyed. The conquest, small though it was,
would not have been so easily effected, had all the works been
completed, for the situation was strong ; and the approach to it was
difficult, and wholly exposed to the fire of the fort, which was
designed to mount thirty guns.^
' Troude, i. 3.39, calls her Ci/biJe, but tliere was no sliip of the name in the French
>favy List. O'Brien, in his report to Boscawen (Adiiiirars Dispatches, Channel Fleet
vol. 4), called her Lafiddelle.
2 Beatson, i. 520.
U 2
292 MINOR OPEltATIONS, 1714 -1702. [175C.
Consequent upon B^ait^'s action, there was a lull in the Medi-
terranean. The French had no fleet at sea there ; and Hawke's
command was for the most part uneventful. Its most interesting
episode was one which brought him into contact with Fortunatus
Wright,' the most notewoi'thy of all the British privateers who ever
plied in the Mediterranean. At the outbreak of the war Wright was
at Leghorn, where he had been building a small vessel in readiness
for emergencies. But Tuscan sympathies were so entirely French
that Wright, when on the point of sailing, found himself strictly
limited as to the force he might embark. However, he got outside
the port, took on board more guns and men from ships which had
sailed luider his convoy, and at once beat off a large French privateer
which was cruising in readiness to intercept him. Following this,
he put back to Leghorn to refit, but was at once ordered, or rather
forced, to bring his ship inside the mole, where she was detained on
a charge of having violated the neutrality of the port. A diplomatic
squabble began, and was continued until Captain Sir William
Burnaby appeared on the scene. Wright had contrived to let
Hawke know how matters stood ; and Hawke had immediatelj'
despatched Burnaby, in the Jersey, 60, together with the Iris, 50,
to set matters straight. The mission of Sir William was to convoj'
the trade from Leghorn, and to see the ,S7. George, Wright's ship, ,
safe out of that port. To the representations of the governor and
the Austrian or French sympathies of that officer, Burnaby had
nothing to say ; but he made it abundantly clear that he was
authorized, and in a position, to repel force b}' force, should anj-
resistance be offered ; and the Jersey, the Iris, the St. George, and
the merchantmen went out of Leghorn in peace.
Another somewhat invidious piece of service that fell to the lot
of Sir Edward Hawke was the cutting out, from' under the guns of
the Spanish port of Algeciras, of a British merchantman which had
been carried thither by a French privateer. The Spaniards were,
like the Tuscans, strongly French in their s3Tnpathies ; and, after
refusing to order the French ship and her prize out of their port,
they helped the privateer to pour a murderous fire into the attack-
ing boats. The boats lost one hmadi-ed and fifty men killed and
wounded, but the ship went back to Gibraltar with them, and the
memory of the affair stood over until 1762.
' Gomer Williams : ' Liverpool Privateer.s.' J. K. Laughton : ' Studies in Xavai
History."
1750-57.] LOCKIIAltT IN THE TAUTAll. 29o
The only other captures of loen-oi'-war made during 1756, were,
on the one hand those of the Arc en del, 50, and Chariot Royal, 36,
in July and March respectively, the vessels being at the time
engaged in carrying stores to Louisbourg, and on tlie other, that of
the small brig Adventure, mounting six 8-pounders. After a stout
resistance, she struck to the privateer Infernal of Havre. But
many privateers of force were taken ; and in that kind of service
Captain John Lockhart,' of the Tartar, made a great name both
for energy and for success. The Tartar was a frigate of 28 guns and
180 men, and Lockhart, who was appointed to her in March, 1756,
continued cruising in her for two years, during which time he took
many large privateers of equal or superior force. Among these were
the Cerf of 2'2 guns and '211 men, the Grand Gideon- of 26 guns and
190 men, and the Mo)it Ozier, of La Eochelle, of 20 guns and 170 men.
In engaging the last named, Lockhart was severely wounded, but
no sooner had he rejoined his ship, after an absence of two months,
than he took off Dunnose the Due d'Aiguillon of St. Malo, of
26 guns and 254 men. These are but some of the many large prizes
made by the Tartar.
In February, 1757, while Lockhart was ashore wounded, the
ship went out under the command of her first lieutenant, Thomas
Baillie (1), and took the Victoire, privateer, of Le Havre, of 26 guns
and 230 men, which was bought into the Eoyal Navy under the
name of the Tartar's l'ri.:e. The Grainont, 18, taken in the
following October, was bought in under her own name, as also was
the Melampc, the finest of all the Tartar's prizes. This ship was
taken, after a long chase and a stubborn action, early in November.
She was of 700 tons, mounted 36 guns, and had a crew of 320 men.-
Her capture proved to be the last of the achievements of Lockhart
while a frigate captain, for the Admiralty testified its appreciation of
his successful cruising by moving him into a fifty-gun ship, and so
limited his activity.
At the very end of 1756 there occurred an incident, which,
though of no great importance in itself, throws some light on the
interpretation of the Naval Discipline Act, and has in consequence
some bearing on the fate of Byng. It is an instance of what a
court-martial accepted as an " error of judgment," and as such is
recommended to the attention of those who have been led to believe
that it was merely for an " error of judgment " that Byng suffered. On
' Afterwanls Sir Juliii Lwkliart Russ, Bart. - Beatsou, ii. 77.
294 MINOn OPERATIONS, 1714-1762. [1757.
the morning of December 27th, Captain Thomas Graves (2)' in
the Sheerness, frigate, discovered a large ship making for Brest.
There v^^as some doubt as to what the stranger was; for it was
known that French ships of the line were in the neighbourhood, and
the vessel in question looked as if she might be one of them. The
weight of opinion on board the Sheerness was to the effect that the
enemy was a sixty-gun ship, and it was well seen that she was just
ending a long voyage and was very foul. The Frenchman tried to
get away before dawn, but, when she discovered the S^ieerness's force,
she shortened sail to wait for her. In point of fact, the enemy was
only an East Indiaman, and the court, satisfied on that point,
decided that Graves, who kept away, ought to have gone down and
discovered her force by engaging her. His holding aloof was not
attributed to negligence, disaffection, or cowardice. It was agreed,
however, that he had laid too great a stress on his orders, to carry
intelligence to Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Knowles ; that his fault
was an " error of judgment ; " and that his case fell under the thirtj'-
sixth article. He was, in consequence, publicly reprimanded bj' the
president of the court.
On March Kith, 1757, being then off Cape Cabron, San Domingo,
the Greenwich, 50, Captain Eobert Eoddam, saw to windward eight
large vessels. She made sail from them, and they gave chase ; and
eventually, on the 18th, the thi-ee leading ships came up with her
and opened fire. These w'ere the Diadhne, 74, Eveille, 64, and a
frigate. The GreenwicJi was quite hemmed in, and at length, seeing
that her position was hopeless, she struck.- The prize was fitted out
against us, and fought against Forrest on October 21st of the same
year, but, being sent back to France after the action, was lost near
Brest. Another vessel captui'ed from the Koyal Navy during the
year was the Merlin, 10, which struck to the French privateer
Machaidt, 30, on April 19th. Commander John Cleland (1), of the
Merlin, was endeavoiu-ing to rejoin a convoj- from which he had
been separated, when the privateer bore down upon him." It had
been, and was still blowing hard; and the Merlin, as was usual with
ships of her class, had her decks full of water, and had quite enough
to do to look after herself. The giins were all secured fore and aft ;
and, save with small arms, it was impossible to make anj- resistance.
' Afterwards Admiral Lord Graves.
- P. K. (). Courts-martial, vol. 37, .Tuly l-ltb, 1757.
" Ih., vol. 37, July 5tli, 1757.
lTr>7.] CAPTURE OF THE DUC D'AQUITAINE. 295
The prize did not remain long with the French, being retaken in the
autumn by the Lancaster and Dunkirk.
During the whole of the year 1757, though British squatlrons
were constantly cruising on the enemy's coast, there was no meeting
of fleets. The captures of armed ships by our cruisers were
nmnerous enough, but the vessels taken were, in almost every
instance, privateers. There were exceptions however. The Aquilmi
and Alcion were destroyed, and the Eincraiidc, Hcniiionc, liioi
Acquise and the French East India Company's ship Due d'Aqultainc,
manned and armed as a ship of war, were taken. The Aqullon, 60,
was met, on May 14th, by the Antelope, 50, Captain Alexander
Arthur Hood, which was cruising off Brest. After a short action
the Aquilon was run on the rocks of Audierne Bay, where she
became a total wreck. The Due d'Aquiiuine, for a Company's
ship, was most powerful, mounting as she did fifty 18-pounders on
two decks and having a crew of nearly five hundred men. On the
night of May 30th the Eagle, 60, Captain Hugh Palliser, and the
Medwaij, 60, Captain Charles Proby, sighted her in the Bay of
Biscay. She had landed her cargo at Lisbon, and was then on her
way round to Lorient. At daylight the Mcdwaij shortened sail to
clear ship, and the Eagle, passing ahead of her, engaged at close
range. The Medway was foul and could not get up at once, the
result being that, when she did reach the scene of action, she was
too late. The enemy had been beaten to a standstill, and had lost
her main and mizen masts together with fifty men killed ; and she
struck her flag as the Medwaij came up. Charnock ' says that she
had ninety-seven shot holes through both sides, which would seem
to imply that, in the thickness of her planking, she differed con-
siderably from a ship built exclusively for war purposes ; but the
Admiralty thought her stout enough, and ordered her to be bought
into the service. Another French man-of-war destroyed during the
year was the Nyinplic, 36, which was driven ashore at Majorca by
the Hampton Court.
In the account given of the captures of privateers during 1756 it
will have been noticed that the majority of the prizes were vessels
of considerable force. In fact, it may be said that the beginning
of the Seven Years' War saw a great increase in the size of the
average French privateer. During the remainder of the struggle,
this increase in size was maintained : for, as the French navy grew
' Biog. Nav., V. 487.
296 MINUH OPERATIONS, 1711-1702. [1757.
more and more exhaiisted, there was ever more and more work for
private venture, seeing that the growing British commerce proved
an ever more and more tempting bait. France, in short, sought
to use the authorised and officially encouraged privateer, instead
of the national vessel, as the cheapest weapon for a guerre de course.
This Cireat Britain never did. Her privateer was always a supple-
mentary, and often a much-suspected, cruiser. Of the privateers
taken during the year 1757, there were many representatives of the
large class. For instance, the Invincible of St. Malo, which fell
to the Unicorn, 26, Captain John Eawhng,' after a stubborn fight,
was a 24-gun frigate, and had been cruising with a consort mounting
eighteen guns. Again, the Comte de Gramont, not to be confounded
with the ship taken in the previous year, was a frigate of thirty-six
guns and three hundred and seventy men. She was taken by the
Lancaster, Captain the Hon. George Edgcumbe, and the Dunkirk,
Captain the Hon. Eichard Howe. If it be needful to multiply
instances of the strength of these privateers, mention may be made
of the TeUmaque, 26, taken by the Experiment, 24, Captain John
Strachan ; of the Vainqueur, 24, taken by the Ambuscade, 32,
Captain Eichard Gwynn ; and of another 26-gun ship, taken by the
Fortune, sloop, Commander William Hotham (1).
The most interesting of the French privateers at sea at that date
was Francois Thurot.^ Thurot was appointed to the command
of a regularly constituted squadron, and sailed from St. Malo on
July 16th, 1757, with two 36-gun frigates, the Marechal de BeUeisle
and ChanveUn, both with a main-deck armament of 12-prs., and
with two sloops. On July 25th he fell in, off Portland, with the
Soutiiampton, 32, Captain James Gilchrist, then on her way to
Plymouth with stores and money, and, after a brisk action, was
beaten off.
" As the action is one wliich Thurot's French biographer considers especially
glorious, it is well to point out that the French frigates were each of them more than
a nominal match for the Sotithamptoii. The point is that Thurot, with two frigates
against one, each larger, heavier, and with a more numerous crew, did not capture the
one ; and, with the best will in the world, it is difficult to see the great glory wliich,
from this non-capture, redoimds to the French Navy. It looks indeed as if M. Thurot
liad conceived his special work to be plundering comparatively helpless merchant-
ships, rather than fighting sturdily defended men-of-war ; and that, when he foimd the
Southampton no easy captiu'e, he stomached his loss — amounting, on board the
Belltisle alone, to fourteen killed, twent\'-six wounded — and hauled to the wind. That
' Captain Rawliug was mortally wounded, and died on ilay 18th, 1757.
- See ])p. 196, 223, 224, 229-231 antea.
1757.] CAPTUHE OF THE EMEKAVDE. 297
this is the correct view to take of Tliiii-ot's conduct seeins continued by the facts of
another action wliicli he fought oft' Flushing on 1st August, with the SfMhorse, a
24-gun frigate, carrying U-ixnuidcrs. After an engagement lasting three hu\n's and a
half, the Seahoise was almost dismantled and had eight men killed, and seventeen badly
wounded. She was of much smaller force tlian either the Belhisle or the Chauvelin,
and ought to have been captured. That she was not, was due not so much to her
material strength as to the moral weakness of her oiiponents." '
The Southampton was afterwards attached to the grand fleet
under Hawke's orders, and was sent to look into Brest. On
September 21st, Gilchrist saw a ship in chase of him, and promptly
made sail towards her. The wind fell light, and it was not till the
afternoon that the ships drew close together. The action which
then took place was very bloody. The enemy lost sixty men killed
and wounded, chiefly in an unavailing attempt to board, and the
loss in the Southampton was twenty killed and thirty wounded.
The Frenchman, having lost both her first and second captains,
hauled down her colours, and was found to be the royal frigate
Emevaude, 28. She was bought into the British Navy under
the name of the Emerald. On November 28rd a night action was
fought by the Hussar, 28, Captain John Elliot, and Dolphin, 24,
Captain Benjamin Marlow, with a French two-decked ship. Who
the stranger was did not appear at the time, but the frigates so
handled her that at the end of two hours she sank. None of her
crew could be picked up. It was learned afterwards that she was
the Alcion, 50.
It has already been stated that Hawke and Boscawen cruised
during the year to intercept M. Dubois de La Motte s squadron
on its way home from Louisbourg,- and that they failed to meet
with it. Two only of the French ships, the frigates Bien Acqitise, 3G,
and Hermione, 28, fell in with the British cruisers ; and they were
taken possession of without difficulty.
If 1758 was a year of great successes for the British Navy, it
was nevertheless not without its disasters. The earliest of these, the
loss of the Invincible, needs no further notice than it has already
received,^ but the burning of the Prince George, 90, in the Bay
of Biscay on April 13th, merits some detail of description.'' A letter
from the ship's chaplain gives a good account of the mishap, though
' J. K. Laughton : ' Studies in Xaval History,' pp. 333-35.
- See p. 172 aniea.
^ See p. 182 atitea.
* P. R. O. Minutes of Courts-martial, vol. 3S, Jfav 10th, 17.58.
298 MINOR OFKllATIONS, 1711-1762. [1758.
it does not suggest its cause. At half-past one in the afternoon
word was passed that the fore part of the ship was on fire. The
people assembled on the quarter deck ; it was ascertained that the fire
had begun in the boatswain's storeroom, buckets were passed, and
all possible measures were taken to get the flames under, but without
effect. A considerable sea was ruiuiing, and it was hoped that the
opening of the lower deck ports would be of avail ; but even this
was useless. Presently, although the magazine had been flooded,
it appeared that there was no possible chance of saving the ship.
The barge was, therefore, ordered to be got out, to put the Kear-
Admiral, Thomas Broderick, in a place of safety. But he, seeing
forty men in her, preferred to trust himself to the waves, and, after
swimming about for an hoi;r, was saved bj' a boat from one of the
convoy. The captain, Joseph Peyton (1), was also picked up, as
were most of the officers ; but, either by the over-setting of boats,
or in the flames, no fewer than four hundred and eighty-five men
perished as against two hundred and sixty who wei'e saved. The
merchantmen, it was complained, held aloof to windward ; and their
boats were busier in salving gear than in saving hves.
There were many prizes made during the year 1758, and, while as
before a large proportion were heavily armed privateers, man}' were
ships of war. On the North American station, the Boreas, Captain
the Hon. Robert Boj'le, took the Diane, 36 ; and in European waters
the Loire, 86, was taken by the iS7. Albans and Favourite, and the
Base, 86, was driven ashore at Malta by the Monrnouth and Lyme,
and was burnt where she lay. One of the most interestmg of the
actions was a brush between the Solebay, 28, Captain Robert Craig,
and Dolphin, 24, Captain Benjamin Marlow, and Thurot's ship,
the Marechal de Belleisle, the armament of which he had
increased to 44 gims by cutting a few extra ports on the lower
deck. The vessel was thus no longer a frigate proper ; on the other
hand she was not a two-decked ship at all comparable to the
English 44's. Perhaps the only other instance of a ship being
similarly anned is that of Paul Jones's Bonlwmme Bichard. In the
Belleisle's case, however, the change seems to have been beneficial,
and Thurot is credited with having made a number of prizes before
he was brought to action by the Dolphin and Solehatj on May 26th.
The Dolphin was first in action ; but, having the slings of her
main-yard shot away, she dropped astern ; and the Solebay came
up and in her turn occupied the Frenchman's attention while the
1758.] CAPTURE OF THE HAISONNAIJLE. 299
Dolphin was getting her main-yard ii]i. In due time the Dolphin
again got close ; bnt, about three and a haU' hours from the
beginning of the action, the BcUeisle wore and made sail away.
Both the British frigates wei'e nmch damaged aloft, and, prol)al)ly,
even if they had not been they would have stood no chance against
Thurot in sailing. The story of Thurot's final cruise has been
already told.'
On May '29th the liaisomiolilr, 64, then on her way to Louis-
bourg, was sighted by Captain Edward Pratten, who, in the
Intrepid, was cruising off the French coast with a small squadron.
He detached the Dorsetshire, 70, Captain Peter Denis, and the
Achilles, GO, Captain the Hon. Samuel Barrington, in chase. The
Dorsetshire had beaten the enemy to a standstill before the Achilles
came up, and had killed sixty-one Frenchmen and wounded one
hundred more, while she herself had lost but fifteen killed and
twenty wounded. The arrival of the Achilles settled the matter;
and the prize, being a fine ship, was bought into the Eoyal Navy.
In July the Shreivshury, 74, Captain Hugh Palliser, was detached
by Anson, together with the Unicorn, '20, and Lizard, 28, to cruise
as near Brest as possible and watch the French fleet in the road.
On September 12th the British vessels sighted a fleet of coasters,
which, under convoy of the Thetis and Cul[ipso frigates, were
working so close in shore that it was a matter of great difticultv
to cut them off. Captain Brodrick Hartwell, in the Lizard, managed,
nevertheless, to get between the frigates and part of the convoy,
the result being that the Calypso was driven ashore and destroyed
at the entrance to Audierne Bay, and that of the coasters many
were either taken or destroyed. On October 2nd the Lizard did a
further piece of service by capturing the Dnc d'Hanovrc, privateer,
14 ; and, a little later, the Torhaij, Captain the Hon. Augustus
Keppel, took the Bosfan, a privateer of twenty-six guns and three
hundred and twenty men. This prize was bought into the Eoyal
Navy under the name of the Crescen t. Beatson says ^ that the
French concealed ninety men in her hold in the hopes of recapturing
her from her prize crew, but that the people below betrayed them-
selves too soon and were overpowered.
In extra-European waters, the Winclielsea, 20, Captain John
Hale, while on her way home from Carolina, was taken on
October 11th by the Bizarre, 60. The Wi)ichclsea attacked in
' See pp. 22'J-2.31 antea. ' Beatsuu. ii. I'.il.
300 MINOR OFEIIATIONS, 1714-1762. [1758-59.
order to cover her convoy, and, till the Bizarre ran out her lower
deck guns, did not reahse the immense superiority of the enemy's
force. When she did so, she hauled her wind and tried to
get away ; hut, as she was under a jury mainmast, she stood no
chance of accomplishing her purpose, and, after a little firing,
hauled down her colours.
On the Jamaica station, in 1758, there was little for British
cruisers to do save to cut up the enemy's commerce, and to capture
his small privateers. The only action of any note was between the
Dread)iuii(j]it, 60, Captain Maurice Suckling, and the Assistance, 50,
Captain Robert Wellard, on the one hand, and the Palmier, 74,
which had previously taken the Sfurk, 10, on the other. On the
morning of September '2nd, the British ships came up with the
Frenchman off Port au Prince ; but, unfortunately, a calm prevented
the Assistance from seconding her consort ; arnd the Palmier, having
disabled the Dreadnought, made sail and escaped. On the Leeward
Islands' station much the same state of affairs prevailed ; but, on
November 8rd, Captain Richard Tyrrell, in the Buckingham, 70,'
cruising off St. Eustatia to intercept a French convoy from
Martinique, was sharply engaged with the Florissant, 74, which,
with two frigates," had charge of the merchantmen. The frigates
took some part in the action, but were soon beaten off; and the
ships of the line fought on from about three o'clock till dark. It
was claimed that the Florissant struck ; and it is possible that she
did so ; but the Bucldngham was much disabled,^ and the French-
man, taking advantage of the fact, made sail away from her.
The interest of 1759 was almost entirely confined to the actions
of the main fleets ; and, although it was the decisive year of the war,
there were few actions by detached cruisers. The first and most
stubborn of these was fought between the Vestal, 32, Captain
Samuel Hood (1), and the Bellone of equal force. The Vestal had
been cruising for a year, chieflj- in the Soundings, but, on
February 12th, had sailed with Rear-Admiral Holmes for North
America. On the 21st, being then in advance of the squadron,
she sighted a sail ahead. It was soon seen that the stranger was
an enemv ; and, sicrnallintr this fact to Holmes, Hood made sail
' The Wmzd, 14, being in company.
- Aigrette, 38, and AtaJunte, 28.
' She lost seven killed and fortv-six w.mnded. among the latter being Captain
Tvnell.
IT.V.i.] CAPTURE OF THE DANAl':. 'S\)\
in chase. The Eear-Admiral detached the Trent, 28, reputed to
be a fine sailer, to support the Vestal ; but it may here be said tliat
the Trnit lia.d no share at all in the engagement, she being still Inur
miles astern when the enemy struck. 'I'he action lasted from two
in the afternoon until six, when the Bellone had lost forty men
in killed alone, and was totally dismasted. The Vestal ' had only
her lower masts standing. She returned to Spithead with licr prize,
which was bought into the Navy and renamed Repulse.
On March 19th, the Isis, m, Captain Edward Wheeler, and
Mollis, 32, Captain John Elliot, cruising off Isle Dieu, fought an
engagement with four French frigates which were employed on
convoy service. Only two of the enemy were closely engaged,
and of these one, the Blonde, 32, escaped ; but the other, the
Mignonne, 20, lost fifty-five kiUed and wounded out of a crew of
one himdred and fifty, and was taken possession of. On the
27th, the Windsor, 60, Captain Samuel Faulknor (2), took, off
Lisbon, the French East Indiaman Due de CJiartres, mounting
twenty-four 12-prs., but pierced for sixty guns. There were four
East India ships in company, but the other three made oft".
On the following day there was fought a much more interesting
little action. The Soutliampton, 32, Captain James Gilchrist, and
Melampe, 24, Captain William Hotham (1), cruising in the North
Sea, fell in with and engaged two French frigates. The Melampe
fought them both for three-quarters of an hour before the
Southampton could come up ; and she suffered so much aloft that
she dropped astern. One of the French ships made sail away while
the Southampton was engaging the other, and while the Melampe
was refitting. When Hotham drew up again, the French ship
struck. She proved to be the Danae, 40 ; and she had lost her
captain, second captain, and about thirty men killed, besides a great
number wounded. She was added to the Royal Navy as the Danae.
Gilchrist was himself severely wounded by a grape shot, and lost
the use of an arm. He was given a pension of £300 a year for life,
and could not be employed again ; but, a generation later, the martial
ardour of his family again showed itself in the career of Thomas
Cochrane, tenth Earl of Dundonald, a son of Gilchrist's sister.
On April 4th, Captain the Hon. Samuel Barrington, in the
AchiUes, 60, took, to the westward of Cape Finisterre, the very large
privateer, Comtc de St. Florentine, also mounting sixty guns. This
' Which lost five killed aud twenty woundeil.
302 MINOR OPERATIONS, 17M-170L'. [1759-GO.
prize, too, was bought into the Navy, as also was the Arctliuse, 36,
which was taken by the Venus, 36, Captain Thomas Harrison (2),
on the coast of Brittany on May 18th.
When M. de La Chie's fleet had been shattered and dispersed,
the Souveraiii, 74, made for the Canaries, whence she returned to
Rochefort. On her way thither she fell in on October 10th with the
Hercules, 74, Captain Jervis Henry Porter, wliich engaged her in
a running fight till the British ship fell astern owing to the loss
of her maintopmast. Another French ship of the line, which was
met with and brought to action during the year 1759, was the
Pahnief, 74, which, having a frigate in company, fell in, when on
her way home from the West Indies, with the Thatnes, 32, and
Coventry, 28. The British frigates attacked her ; and as the sea
was rough and she could not use her lower deck guns, they had her
somewhat at a disadvantage. They shot away her foretopmast
and did her other considerable damage, and, but for the assistance
which her frigate was able to give her, would have stood some chance
of taking her.' As it was, they hung on to her in the hope of falling
in with some other British cruiser, keeping out of gun-shot by day,
and pouring in broadsides by night. They had not, however, the
fortune to meet with a friend ; and, after a long chase, they had the
mortification of seeing the Palmier run into Brest.
In March, 1760, the French fitted out the Malicieuse, 32, and
Opale, 32, in order to intercept the Portuguese trade, which, they had
heard, was to be convoyed by a single sloop. Near the Bayona
Islands ^ they fell in with the Penguin, 20, Captain W^illiam Harris,
which tried to get away, but which they overhauled and took.
They judged her not worth keeping, set fire to her, and continued
their cruise, till it was spoilt on April 4th by the Flamborough, 20,
Captain Archibald Kennedy,* and Bicldeford, 20, Captain Lancelot
Skynner (1), which, though not powerful enough to take them,
hung on to them in a most dogged manner and eventually put them
to flight.^ Meanwhile the convoy reached Lisbon in safety. Of
other little successes in European waters, perhaps not the least
complete was that of Captain the Hon. Augustus John Hervey
of the Dragon, 74, who, while attached to Boscawen's fleet, on
' Beatson, ii. 351.
- P. R. 0. Courts-martial, vol. 40.
' Later Earl of Cassilis.
* In this gallant action, Ijoth Captain Skynner and his lieutenant were mortally
wounded, the latter surviving, however, until April 1.0th.
17G0.] ADVENTURES OF TlIK DIADEME. 303
July l'2tli, ln'ing then close in shore off Isle Groix, was fired on
by a small fort. That evening he went ashore with his boats,
surprised the guard, dismounted the guns oi' the battery, tumbled
the pieces over the rocks, and eventually went off to his sbi[) with
the whole of the guard and with not a single man hurt.'
Of Boscawen's cruisers, the Cnitaur, 74, which had been taken
the year before in the action with M. de La Clue, fell in off Cape
Finisterre with the VaUlant, 64, and Ainctlujst, 32, homeward
bound from the West Indies. Deceived by her appearance they
let her come close up ; and it was not till they saw that she was
clearing for battle that they realised that she was no longer a
French ship. They made all possible sail, and got away by night
into Corunna. Another of Boscawen's cruisers, the Niger, 32,
Captain John Albert Bentinck, fell in with the Diadhne, 74,
escorting store-ships to Martinique. For some days the frigate
hung on to the Frenchman, both in the hope of cutting off some
of the convoy, and of meeting a ship of the line that could deal
with the seventy-four. In the course of her attempts on the
convoy, she ventured close enough to be severely mauled, and so
had to leave the enemy in order to make good her damages. A few
days afterwards, the DiaiUine was sighted and chased b_y the
Shrewsburij, 74, Pallas, 36, and Argo, 28. The Shrewsbiirij sailed
very badly, the Argo was busy with the convoy, and it was left
to the Pallas, Captain Michael Clements, to attack single handed.
She was but a frigate, and fought only in the hope of knocking
awaj' a spar or two and enabling the Shrewsbunj to come up.
Unfortunately she exposed herself to the enemy's l)roadside, and
very soon had to be content to leave the big ship alone. This
voyage of the Diademc bears a certain resemblance to the last cruise
of the Glorioso. She was annoyed by frigates all along her route,
and she ended with an affair with a heavy ship of the line. The
Glorioso, of course, had been harder put to it, and was ultimately
taken. The French ship was more fortunate. The Boijal
William, 80, which chased her at the conclusion of her voyage,
had not time to come up with her before she found safety in
Corunna.
The loss of the Cionberhmd, 56, Captain Kobert Kirk, which
sank at her anchors near Goa, on the night of November 2nd, 1760,
was adjudged to have " proceeded from her being entirely decayed,
' P. K. O. Adniirars Dispatches, Channel, vol. 4, July 27th, ITGO.
3U-4 MINOR OPERATIONS, 1T14-17G2. [ITCI.
and not in a condition to have proceeded to sea." ' There was
nothing extraordinary in the loss of the ship, save that it resulted
from the fact that she was one of the I'ather numerous vessels which
were at the time kept on service when they ought to have been
in the ship-breaker's yard. In many cases, no doubt, the fault laj'
with the Admiralty ; hut it must be borne in mind that ships were
not then built under cover, and that the decay of vessels built
in the open was often so irregular as to baffle calculation.
On January 8th, 1701, the Unicorn, 28, Captain Joseph Hunt,
cruising off Penmarck, fought a sharp action with, and captured,
the Vestale, 3'2, which later became the Flora in the British Navj'.
The captains of both ships were mortally wounded. On the
following day the Unicorn chased, but could not come up with,
the Aigrette, 32, and, on the 10th, saw her engage the Sealiorse, 20,
Captain James Smith, then carrying out astronomers to India
to observe the transit of Venus. Again she tried to come up,
but could not; and the Aigrette, having mauled the Seahorse'-
considerably, refused to be further detained and. forced to fight
at a disadvantage.
In January, the Felicife, 32, left Cherbourg for Martinique ;
but no sooner was she outside than she met the Richmond, 32,
Captain John Elphinstone (1). The ships sighted one another
in the evening, but the action did not begin till half-past ten the
next morning (January 24th), when they engaged broadside to
broadside, standing in for the land. Still close together, they both
ran ashore near Scheveningen, and continued serving their guns
in that position. Presently the EicJiinond floated, and was set
to leeward by the tide. The Frenchmen seized their opportunity
and escaped to the shore. They had lost very heavily, and their
captain had been killed ; but the casualties on board the Richmond
amounted only to three killed and thirteen wounded. Next day,
when the FeJicite was boarded, the dispatches which she had been
carrying to Martinique were found to be still in her. They were
taken out, and the ship was set on fire.
On the same day, but in the Mediterranean, the Warwick, the
ex-British 60-gun ship, with, however, only thirty-four guns mounted,
was attacked, while on her way to the East Indies, b}' Captain
' P. K. O. Courts-martial, vol. 41.
^ Which was, in consequence, obliged to return to port. When she sailed again she
was commanded by Charles Cathcart Grant, Captain James Smith having been
appointed to the Guernsey, 50.
17G1.] CAl'TUIiE OF THE WAltWIVK. 305
Alexander Arthur Hood in the Minerva, 32. The wind was fresh
from the east, and the sea was heavy. The enemy lost her mainmast
and foretopmast, but Hood waited for her to come up again, and
presently the ships fell foul of one another. The Minerva in turn
lost her foremast and bowsprit, and fell astern ; but she cleared
away the wreck very promptly, stood off to the Wanvlck and forced
her to strike. The loss was curiously even, fourteen killed and
thirty-two wouiaded in the Warwick as against fourteen killed and
thirty-four wounded in the Minerva. No sooner had the Warwick
struck, than the Minerva rolled away her remaining masts. The
capture of the Brune, 36, a week later, in the Soundings, by the
Venus and Juno, presented no unusual feature. She was added to
the Navy.
On March 9th, the Mipon, (50, Captain Edward Jekyll, one of
Commodore Buckle's squadron off Brest, chased a French sixty-four
and a frigate. They bore away from him, and during the night
he lost sight of them ; but, on the following day, with a fresh breeze
aft and a heavy sea, he overhauled a sixty-four, which proved to
be the Acliille. The ships engaged at half -past nine at night yard-
arm to yard-arm, running before the wind at a gi'eat rate ; and the
Bipon was half swamped by the water that came on board through
her lower-deck ports, which could only be opened from time to time.
To make matters worse, one of her lower-deck guns burst, killing
and wounding many men and throwing the whole deck into
confusion. After this all her mid-ship and forward ports on that
deck were kept shut, yet she managed to shoot away the enemy's
foreyard and foretopmast. The Bipon then came to the wind to
wait for the Frenchman, and the enemy ran down under the stern
of the British ship. Fortunately the Achilh was in such great
confusion that she missed the opportunity of raking the Bipon. As
soon as the Frenchman had passed to leeward, Jekyll gave orders
to wear ship and follow her, but his rigging was so much cut that
the manccuvre took a long time, and when it was complete the
enemy's lights were no longer visible.
There were other single-ship actions at about the same time.
On March 13th, 1761, the Vengeance, 26, Captain Gamaliel Nightin-
gale, took the Entreprenant, an armed ship of force equal if not
superior to her own. On March IGth, the Bedford, 64, took the
frigate Comete, 32, off Ushant ; and on April 3rd, the Hero and
Venus took the Bert in, an East India ship pierced for sixty-four
VOL. III. X
300 MlNUll Ol'KllATlO^ti, 1714-17G2. [ITUI.
guns, but then armed en flute and outward bound with soldiers on
board. On April 1st, the Oriflumme, 40, really a SO-gun ship,
was taken in the Mediterranean, after a short action, by the I.si.s, 50,
whose captain, Edward Wheeler, was killed in the fight. Another
easy capture was that of the Ute. Anne, a heavily-armed merchant-
man, which was taken on the Jamaica station by the Centaur, 74,
Captain Arthur Forrest, on June 5th. Hhe was pierced for sixty-
four guns, but had at the time only forty on board. When,
however, she was added to our Navy, her full number of guns
was mounted.
On July 14th, the Thunderer, 74, Captain Charles Proby, cruising
with the Modeste, 64, Captain the Hon. Kobert Boyle Walsingham,
Thetis, 32, Captain John Moutray, and Favourite, sloop. Commander
Philemon Pownall, for the purpose of intercepting the Achille, 64,
and Bouffonne, 32, which it was believed were ready to sail from
Cadiz, discovered that those ships had shpped out of port. The
squadron fell in with them, however, on the 16th, brought them
to action on the 17th, and in due course took them both,' the
Achille being carried by a boarding party from the TJtunderer, which
had had a great part of her poop blown up by the bursting of an
upper-deck gun. The Bouffonne struck to the Thetis. The Thunderer
lost seventeen killed, and one hundred and fourteen, including
Captain Proby, wounded, most of the casualties being due, however,
to the accident to the gun.
The most brilliant of the actions fought between cruising ships
in 1761 remains to be described. On August 13th, the Bellona, 74,
Captain Eobert Faulknor (2), and the Brilliant, 36, Captain James
Loggie, met the Courageux, 74, and the two 32-gun frigates, Mcdicieuse
and Hermione, off Vigo. The meeting took place in the evening;
but it was bright moonlight, and the ships kept sight of each other
till morning, when the enemy, who up to that time had been trying
to escape, decided to engage. On the 13th, it had been believed that
the British vessels were both ships of the line ; on the 14th, how-
ever, the French commodore fell into the opposite error of taking
the Bellona for a 50-gun ship. He signalled to the frigates to
engage the Brilliant, while he himself closed with the Bellona. The
Brilliant accepted her share with alacrity, and gave the frigates
so much to do that they were unable to interfere in the combat
between the seventy-fours. The duel between the Bellona and
' Troiide denies it, i. 4:27.
1761.] THE BELLONA AND THE COURAQEUX. 307
Courageux was fought out in ii fine l)reeze and a smooth sea. The
first broadside was fired i'roni the Frenchman when the ships were
within musket-shot ; and so good was the gunnery under the favour-
able conditions that prevailed, that, in nine minutes from the start,
the Bellona's mizen-mast went over the side and the rigging was
so much cut that the ship became immanageable. Faulknor was
afraid that the enemy might get away, and promptly called for
boarders ; but the Courageux sheered off, and the attempt had to
be abandoned. With great difficulty, Faulknor managed to wear
ship, a manoeuvre which brought him up on the Frenchman's
starboard quarter. A few broadsides fired from his new position
settled the fate of the day. The Courageux, much damaged, and
with about two hundred men killed and another hundred wounded,
struck, and was taken possession of. The frigates made sail away.
The total duration of the action was no more than forty minutes.
It was much the fashion to speak of the French as always firing
at the rigging, and as seizing the earliest opportunity to escape.
Certainly this is stated to have been the procedure in many
instances where the facts will not support such an assertion ; but
in this case something of the sort does seem to have happened,
owing partly no doubt to the enemy's having accepted battle
through a misunderstanding of the force he had before him. It
is not easy to suggest any other explanation for the condition of
the BeUona, and for the Courageux, which lost more than three
hundred men, having killed and wounded only four-and-thirty.
The new year, 1762, opened with affairs in a peculiar condition.
Great Britain was paramount at sea, whereas France was exhausted.
There was, indeed, nothing new in this ; it had been the prevailing
state of things since the action in Quiberon Bay. What was strange
was that France, having received a new ally in virtue of the
Family Compact, gained no real accession of force, although the
Spaniards entered upon the war with a considerable number of
ships. Why this happened was because, as has been already
noticed, the French ports were so closely watched that nothing
could get out withovit running the risk of immediate capture, and
because the Spaniards concentrated all their naval forces for the
protection of their colonies and lost them, en masse, in distant seas.
The result, as far as Spain was concerned, was, that she was
hopelessly beaten without anything worthy the name of a naval
battle having taken place in European waters. The French, too,
X -2
308 MINOli OPERATIONS, 1714-17G2. [17C2-
were so utterly exhausted that there was not onlj' no fleet action
fought but also not even a ship of the line to be taken.
Short accounts of a few frigate actions will, therefore, finish the
story. Captain Thomas Harrison (2), in the Venus, 36, had a large
share of good fortune. On January 6th, he took, after a short action,
the Boulogne, 20, on her homeward journey from the Isle of France,
with a valuable cargo on board, and, amongst other passengers, the
Comte d'Estaing. On March 17th, he took a 14-gun privateer out
of San Sebastian ; on May 6th, he captured another privateer of the
same force out of Bayonne; and on June 4th, a large Spanish
privateer of sixteen guns, twenty swivels, from Bilbao, struck to him.
These were by no means all the privateers he took, either Spanish
or French, but the cases supply typical instances of the force of
the ships he had to deal with. Another somewhat notable capture
of a privateer was made on the night of March 7th. The
Milford, 28, Captain Eobert Mann, fell in with the Gloire, a French
letter of marque, mounting sixteen 6-prs., besides swivels, and bound
to San Domingo, and took her after a sharp action. The Milford
lost only four killed and thirteen wounded, but among the former
were Captain Eobert Mann,^ and his first lieutenant. The richest
capture of the war was made by the Active, Captain Herbert
Sawyer (1), and the Favourite, sloop, Commander Philemon
Pownall, two of Sir Piercy Brett's cruisers, which, on May 21st,
intercepted the register-ship Hermiune, bound from Lima for Cadiz.
The summons to surrender was the first intimation to the Spaniards
that war had broken out ; there was no resistance whatsoever ; and
in this easy manner did treasure to the value of about half a million
pass into British hands. On the Jamaica station, the Fotvey, 24,
(9-prs.), Captain Joseph Mead, fell in, off Cape Tiberon, with the
Spanish royal frigate Ventiira, 26 (12-prs.), and fought her for an
hour and a half, when the ships separated, much damaged. On the
following morning the action was resumed with vigour, and
continued till the Ventura struck. The Foweij lost ten killed
and twenty-four wounded, and the Ventura, forty in killed alone.
On August 18th, the BocUester, cruising in the Channel, in
company with the Maidstone and Benommee, took the Guirlande, 26,
a French frigate ; and on September 1st, the Lion, 60, one of a small
' Commamler, 1756 ; Captam, 1757. His name is ver}' consistently spelt Mann in the
Navy Lists of the period, whereas that of his contemporary Robert Man (2), presently
to be mentioned, who died an Admiral in 1783, is spelt with one n only.— W. L. C.
1702.]
CONCLUSION OF THE SEVEN YEABS' WAll.
:!U!)
squadron detached, vinder Coiuiiiodore Robert Man (2), by Havvkc
to cruise off Brest, took the ZepJujr, 32, which had, however, only
twenty-six guns mounted, and which was then carrying troops and
stores to Newfoundland. The last capture made from the French
during the war was that of the Oiseau, 26, which struck to the
Briine, 32, Captain George Anthony Tonyn, in the Mediterranean,
on October 23rd.
( '^10 )
APPENDIX TO CHAPTERS XXYII. AND XXVIII.
LOSSES OF THE BELLIGEBENT rOWEliS.
L. CaRK LATfiHTOX.
NoTK.— These lisfc*, like tunse ou p. 535 et seq. of Vol. II., are teutati^-c ; but they are not bo meagre as the lists given by
the best-known historians of the period, et;., Charaock, Itealsfiu, and 'lYoude, Those authorities have beeu
largely clieck&l by reference to Captains' Letters, :\Iuster itooks. Minutes of Courts- Martial, and other papers
I f like nature , but it is an almost impossible tii-k to eusure lompleteuess.
(',.) LOSSES OF H.M. SHIPS FKuM 17U TO 17(;:!.
IJIC Nov. 10
171V
1V19 I -Tau.
j l-'eb.
Mar.
1720 i No%'. 24
IV21
Dec. 1
1723 April 1.T
1724
1729
IT.'iii
1740
1741
Nov.
Dec.
Jan.
JIar.
Apr.
Hay
Aug.
Oct.
Jau. 12
.Tune 14
Aug. 15
Sept. 21
1743
1744 I .Ian.
, I Feb. 11
May 8
Summer
Oct.
8Iiips.
CommauJer.
[* Lost bis life ou tbe
ocrasiou.]
Aiiijuate 00 Cipt. Robert Joliuson. ^V recked in tbe Baltic.
Hazardous ... . . Lost at sea.
Sorlimjs . 12 Lost.
('rown .... r)0 ,, Jobn Iloberts. ' Lost at entrance <»f Tagus.
Jiur/ord . . . 70 ., Cbarles Vanbrugh. Lost iu the ilediteiTanean.
lilandfwd 'Capt. Erasmus I'liillips. KoundereJ iu the Hay.
Jfe"cV 50 ,. Hon. George Cnnton.{J^J;^J^''™"'"'>F'™"-
Milfo »-(i . . 20 Lost,
Hoijal Anvc . .10 ' Lost.
Uind .. 'Cnpt. John Furzer. Wrecked off Guerusey.
Greiihound .... 'jo Taken by guarda costas : restored.
/i&lfm-d . . . '.»)> Sunk.
Cruiser (pnzi) . . la Lost.
//«j/a.E jlnwe, galley. . , .. *Capt. Francis Willis. ' Foundered off tlie Lizard.
Princess Louisa. . ' 40 Lost (ex-Lt(//»'>-,s(i„i).
Triumpfi (prize). . . | 18 , Foundered off Sambala Keys.
Ottei- 8 Com. John Gage. \V recked iu the Sjuth Seas.
Wolf f 14 Wrecked on coast of Floriila.
Ualicia (prize) ... To Capt. Daniel Hoare. Burnt as useless at Cartagena.
Wager 28 „ David Cheaii. Wrecked in the South Seas.
-4nna(piuk). . . . | j J Ilrokeu up at Juan Fernandez.
rryal (_brig-sloop) . . 14 Com. Charles Saunders. ."^cuttled by order.
Tiger 50 Capt. Edw. Herbert (1). Wreckeil on a key near Tortuga.
/VH/ce (f.K.) .... s Com. Smith Callis. Expended at St. Tropez.
Gloucester .... 5t) Capt. iMattheiv ilichell. Burnt l;y order iu the .South Seas.
Tiihmy 60 i ,, Peter Lawrence. Accidentally burnt in W. Indies.
Drake'. +14 I-^st iu ibe Channel (?).
Grampus +14 Lost.
Saltash +14 Com. Peter Toms. ! Lost iu the W. Indies.
Lone 44 Capt. Ashby Uttiug. Lost in America.
Astrina, s.s Com. Pi'-bert Swanton. Accidentally bmut at Piscataqua.
, Or/ord 7o Capt Periy Mavue. Wrecked in Gulf of ilex ico.
I Anyie Galley, t.s. ■ ■ \ 8 *Com. Mackie. Expended off Toulon.
\ iVoi-thumbertawl , . \ 10 *Capt. Thomas Watsou (1). Taken by the French.
Solebay ! 20 .. 'Jhomas Burv (1). Taken bv the French ; retaki n.
\Tr-IZs: : : : : ?2 Com.iSSLsd). JTakenbytherrencb.
i«^'°'V/ 100 {:^;.lS^;^:;r(l).}L»'"-ten,anne..
j St. Albans .... 50 *C-pt. William Knigtit. \
I Greenwich .... 50 *Capt. Edward Allen. I
j /ionetta 14 *Com. William Lea. /Wrecked in a hurricane at Jamaicj
I Thunder, homh . . . i 3 Com. Thomas Gregory (2). |
j Lark (hulkj . . . . I . . }
\ Colchester . . . . j 50 ("apt. Sir \Vm. Hewett. Bt- AVrecked on the Kentish Knock.
I Hornet 14 Taken by the French ; reuiken.
t These sloops are usually spoken of as carrying 14 guns. Sometimes, b'>wever. they are credited with 20, sometimes
with only 8. The explanation seems tu be tha' tbev often carried s guns and 12 swivels or patercroes ; thus the 14 wonld
be arriveil at by rating a swivel conventionally as half a gun. But in reality their ai-mament was rather haphazai-d.
LOSSES OF Il.M. SHIPS FROM 1714 TO 170:
311
I
""
Coiimianiier.
Ye»r. Date. Sbips.
Gnus.
[* Lost his lilc on the
Fate.
ocL'a»iou.]
n44
Swallow
16
Wn-cke.l.
Salisbury. . .
50
'laken by the Kreucli ; retaken. i
1Y45 Feb.
16 1 Weymouth . .
to
Capt. Warwick Calmady.
W reiked in Lcewanl Islaud>.
1 Mav.
28 1 Anglesey . . .
4-1
* „ .Tacnh Ktt^m.
Taken by Apnllm, 50.
June
Mandford . .
20
„ Kdwuni \)<Ai\.
Taken by French in W. Indie-*.'
Nov.
14
Fox ....
20
* ,, Kdmunii Heavor.
I'oinidcred ofl" Dunbar ; all Io>t.
Lyme ....
20
Foundered in the AtUutlc,
Mercury, , ,
14
Taken by the French.
Wolf ....
14
Cum. GeorgL' \'ucliC'll.
'I'uken by the Frencli ; retaken.
J-Ume ....
1.4
Foundered.
Sapphire's Prize
14
Wr.-ckc<i.
Hazard . . .
12
Taken by the rebels; retaken.
Mediator .
10
iSunk.
Mast, bomb . .
Achilles . . .
IXakfu by two Spaniards ueav Jamaica.
Oct.
19
Falcon
8
50
Capt. William Li.le.
'I'akon by the Frencii.
'I'akpu by XL de Conflans; retaken 17^7.
It46
Severn. . . .
Dec.
Hornet . . .
U
'laken by tiie French.
Albany
14
Com. Stephen Culby.
Taken by the French.
Saltash . . .
14
Wrecked in the Channel.
i
Lightning, bomb
8
„ William Martin (2).
Capsized near Lt-ghoni ; 45 drowned.
IjOuisboury, f.s. .
8
Taken by the hrencli.
114?
July
7 Maidstone . .
50
Capt. Hon. AugustnsKeppet
Wrecked ou Belle Me.
Sept.
WTiitehaven, armed
sp.
14
Com. Can- Scrope.
Burnt by accident on'ln>*li coast.
Oct.
8 DartmotUh . .
50
*Capt. James Hamilton (2).
Blown up in action witli (ilon'oso.
1V48
Fowey.
20
14
,, Francis William Drake
Wrrcked in G. <.f Florida.
.lavage
Wrecked on the Lizard.
1749
Jau.
Wolf ....
1 1<
*Com. George Vachell.
jR.-Acl. Hon. Edward Hos-
{ caweu.
tCapt. Samuel Marshall (1).
Wrecked off Ireland.
1
April
12 1 Xamur . . .
i '<
UV recked in E. Indies ; 600 lost.
(
^^
Apollo, bosp. sh.
18
V\ recked iu E. Indies.
13 Pembrole . .
60
* ,, Thomas Fiucher.
Wrecked in E. Indies; XW lost.
1?55
June
Aug.
13
.Vars ....
r.4
,. Julm Amherst.
„ Kiclmrd Watkins.
Wrecked at Halila.K.
Blandford . .
20
Taken ofT Brest ; restr.red.
1756
Mav.
1 1 1 Warwiclc .
fiO
,, Molyueux Shuldham.
Taken at Martinique.
Adventure . .
6
Lieut. James Orrok.
Takeu by privateer Ivftrnal.
Oswego
sloup
sloop
(Surrendered at Oswegti.
I
Ontario . . .
1757 Mav.
18 Greenwich . .
50
Capt. Ilobert Roddam.
Taken iu W. Indies.
April
Sept.
19
24
19
Merlin
10
60
10
74
Com. John Clelaud (1).
*Capt. Heuvy Barusley.
*Com. Arthur Uptou.
C;ipt. John Bentley.
Taken off Brest ; retaken.
Tilbury .
jLost in a hurricane off Louisbourg.
Lost near St. Helen's.
Ferret
1768 Feij.
Invincible . .
April
13 Prince George .
90
fR.-Ad. Thomas Broderick.
tCapt. Joseph I'eytou (1).
[Burnt at sea; 485 lost.
2S
Triton ....
24
„ John Stautcm.
„ Thomas Manning.
(Destroyed iu the E. Indies.
Jiridgewater. .
24
^^
29 London (buss) .
^\'^ecked iu R. Senegal.
AUE.
stork ....
10
,, William Tucker.
Taken iu W. Indies.
Oct.
11 Winchelsea . .
211
,. John Hale.
Takeu by French ; retaken.
Nov.
29 ' Lichfield . . .
50
„ :Mat.thew Baitou.
AVrecked ou African coast; 130 lost.
1759
May
Tartar's Prize .
24
,, 'Ibomas Baillie(l).
Sprang a plank in JMediterrauean.
Nov.
20 Pcsotution
74
,, Hi ury Sjieke.
hVrecked on Four Bank iu Quibcrun Bay.
21 ICssex ....
64
,. Lucius O'Brien.
.Mermaid .
I 20
■' 12
,, James Hackm >u.
\Vrecked among the Bahamas.
Hawke . . .
Taken off C. Clear; retaken 1761.
Falcon (bomb") .
8
Com. i\[ark Rubinson (l").
Wrecked on the Saiutcs, Guadeloui)e.
nco
Feb.
15 natnillics. . .
j 90
*Capt. Wittewron^^e Taylor.
Wrecked on Bolt Head.
Mar.
May
28
17
Penguin .
1 20
j 28
1 12
,, William Harris.
„ Jop.ei)li Deane.
Com. Edward St. Loe (2).
Taken and burnt.
Lowestoft ,
Wrecked iu the St. Lawrence.
Virgin . . .
Taken by French; retaken, Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
4
2
Harwich .
50
20
56
Capt. \Viinam Marsh.
„ Thomas Tiiylor (I).
,, Robert Kirk.
Wrecked on the Isle of Pines.
Griffin . . .
AVrecked near Barbuda.
Cumberland . .
Foundered near Goa.
Liime ....
28
,, Sir Edward Vernon (2)
A\ recked iu j^orth Sea.
Eurus.
20
70
,, Johu Elphinstone ^\)
A\' recked in St. Lawrence.
Conaueror . .
^Vrecked ou St. Nicholas Island.
jVeura^tle. . .
50
„ Digby Deut (3).
(Lost iu a hmTicane off Poudiiherry ;
Qucenborough .
20
C crews saved.
1761
.Tau.
, Protector, f.s. .
\Duc d'Aquitaine
8
64
* „ Sir William Hewitt. Bt.
(Lost in a hurricane off Pondichcrry ;
Isunderland . .
60
* „ Hon. James Colvilje.
I" crews lost.
\Duke (store-ship)
10
Mar.
Pheasant (cutter)
10
f*Com. Bartholomew (?) Nel-
1. sou.
JFouudered iu the Channel.
April
Dec.
4
30
.'^peedieell .
10
20
Lieut, .lames Allen.
*(.apt. Thomas Gordon (2).
Taken at Vigo by Achilla.
Middefm-d . .
Wre>-ketl ne.tr Flamborough Head.
1762 Feb.
Raismnablc . .
64
,, ]\[olyneux Shuldham.
Lost ar Martinique.
Etrreuve .
14
Com. Peter Blake.
Lost iu returning from South Carolina.
Savage . . .
9
Lost iu Torbay.
:J12
APPENDIX.
Year. Date.
Sliips.
Commaniler.
C* Lo-this Ufeou the
occasion.]
May
July 2*
Nov. 29
Dec. 18
Jau.
Hussar .
Chesterfield .
Marlborough.
Temple . .
Southtea Castle
Hum her .
Gramont .
^orjiion .
Peretp'ine
.'^an f'tnaro .
Basilisk (bomb)
•:8
•to
70
70
40
40
IS
16
16
60
Capt. Robert Carkett. f^oi-t m the W. Indie!^.
T»t in Old Strait of Baliama.
„ 'ihomas Bnruett. iFouotir-nd on passage borne from
,, Thomas ("olingwcxKl. j Havana.
,, William Newsoiii,
,, Richiird Ouslow.
Com. Patrick Mouat.
*Com. Edward KuowJes.
Lo^t at .Manilla.
Lost on Hazclxm/ Sauds.
Taken at St.. J oliu'tj, Newfoundland.
Lost in Iri^h Sea.
FouD' ered on way to W. Indies.
Wrecked in the Downs.
Tjkou by AudarJeuT:. privateer.
(6.) LOSSES OF THE FRENCH NAVY, 1744-48, 1755-62.
Note. — Frenth East Indiamen. if .serving with, or in lieu of ships of, the Fr^^uch Navy, are, in a few instances,
included bvlow.
.-bip<.
ViiW.
1744
1745
ir4S
1755
175ti
1757
Apr.
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
May 19
Feb.
Apr.
Aug.
9
4
4
4
Oct. 1 1
., 14
Nov. 19
May 3
3
M 3
-t 3
» 3
June 21
Sept. 13
Oct. 14
.. ^ +
>» 14
» 1-1
,. 14
Jan. 31
June 8
Nov. 13
I Mar.
July 12
May 14
., 30
Sept. 21
Nov. 23
Medee ....
Fleuron .
Elephant .
Pantliere . . ,
Vigilante.
Avguste .
Volage
Mercure (i u flr'ite)
\ Ferme ....
I Mars ....
( Due d' Orleans* .
I Subtile
Ardent
Casaubon.
Parfait . . .
Fmbuscade . .
Fine ....
Flore ....
Maligr.e (sb op) .
Invincible
Serieux .
Hiamant . . .
Jason ....
Gloire.
Htibis (fiiite) . .
Etoile. _. . .
JitTuymmie . .
Monarque . .
Terrible . . .
Neptune .
Fitifiueux
Trident . . .
.'■'everne
Castor.
26
64
20
26
t>4
50
32
5(i
&4
t)4
30
2*3
64
GO
:A
40
30
1 ellone ....
Lys
Magnanime .
Lys (en fli'.te;
Alcidi^
Esptrance (en flute)
chariot Boyal .
Arc en Citl .
Aqziilon ....
Due d'Aquitaine
Eineraude
Ale ion ....
Bien Acquire. .
Hermione . . .
Merlin ....
74
64
52
40
26
74
70
50
23
36
26
74
64
64
74
36
50
50
50
2S
50
36
2<
10
Renamed Intrepid.
Renamed Isis.
Taken by Ih-eadnought and Grampus.
Accidentally burnt at Brest.
Taken by Chester and Sunderland.
Taken by V.-Adm. Martin in the Channel.
Taken by Commodore \Varreu at Louislxmrg.
Taken by Portland. l;enam&i Portland's Prize.
'i'aken ; retaken nest day.
Taken by Xamur.
Taken by Pembroke.
Taken by yottivgham.
Wrecked in E. Indies.
Taken by Portland. Renamed Amazon.
Captured and burnt.
JAccidentally burnt at Chebucto.
Taken by Defiance.
V\ recked at .\Iontrose.
Taken by Greyhound, privateer.
Taken.
Taken by Anson.
Taken by Anson.
Taken by Anson.
Taken by Anson.
Taken by Anson.
I Taken by Anson.
I DestroyftJ by Warren.
Taken by M i-er.
Taken by Hawke.
Taken by Hawke.
T;fken by Hawke.
Taken by Hawke.
Taken by Ha" ke.
Taken by Ilau ke.
Taken by Hawke.
Taken.
Taken.
Taken by Xottingham and Portland.
JTaken off Louisboorg.
Taken and burnt.
Taken by Lichfield and yorwich.
Taken by Torbay.
Destroyed by Antelope.
Taken by Lcglf. and Methcay.
Taken by Southampton .
Sniik by ffussar and Dolphin.
Taken.
Taken.
Retaken by Lancaster and Dunkii k.
* ReaUy a ?hip cf the East India Company, but was serving with the fleet.
Loaasa of the fuencu navy, 17-14-1702.
313
Year.
1757
1758
Feb. 28
„ 23
„ 28
Apr. 7
„ 3J
May 29
June 2s<
„ 29
"I
July
Sept.
oJt.
Dec.
Aug.
Feb. 21
Mar. 19
,, 27
„ 2S
May 18
Aug. Z
„ ? 16
Nov. 20-
22
.May 16{
July s)
Sept.
Oct. 18.
„ 19
.. I
Jau. s
„ 2*j
,. 30
Mar. 16
Apr. 1
3
July lij
Aug. 13
Aug. 18
Stpt. 1
Oct. 15
ships.
Mymphe
£scarboucle . . . .
A ^loop
Fundi uyant . . . .
Ori/lammc
(jvplue
Galatee
Jiicn Aimi; . . . .
Diane
liaisonnabJe . . . .
Echo
JpoUon
Chcvrc ....".
niche ... . .
Fidele
O'uirlande
Entreprenant .
Cehbre j
Frudent
JiienJ'aisant . . . .
Hhinacerm . . . .
Calypso
Due d' Banovrc ,
Bellitititux . . . .
Opinidtre . . . .
Outarde
Greenwich . . . .
Robnsie (eu flr'ite) .
Loire
Kote
A. ships buililing . . .
L'ellune
Mignonne . . . .
Dice de Chartres.
Danat-
Ari-thuse
Jierfceley
Hermione
Ocean
KedoutahU . . . .
Ttmtraire . . . .
Centauje
Mhdeste
Soleil Royal .
Formii^ahlc . . . .
Heros
Thesie . . . .
Svperle
Juste
Ivjltxiblc
J'omone
Atalante . . . . .
Marhault
Bieii/aim>it .
Jfarijuis de J.arloze
Vierye (ex Virgin) .
Sirene, . . . .
Prince Edouard
Valciir . . . . .
Flcur-de-Lys
Hermione
Baleine
Epreuve
Vestale
Fi'licite ....
Warwick (eu flute 34) .
lirwne
ComMe . .- .
(irijiamme (en flute") .
Btrlin (eu fliite ".Js)
Faisan
Ste. Anne (Jin flute 40) .
Bo'iffonne . . . .
A'h'ille
Couixti.eux . , . .
Anemone
Sardoine
Liopard
Guirlande . . . .
Ziphyr .
Crnzon (schoonpv) .
3G
16
*-0
f-0
58
30
16
36
•24
"4
t4
64
74
64
36
14
64
fc4
41
r,o
74
44
36
32
20
bO
46
36
20
26
80
74
74
74
64
80
HO
74
74
70
VU
64
36
32
32
60
32
32
f>\i
64
16
64
32
02
74
14
14
GO
Fate.
Destroyed at Majarcu.
'J'uken by l»is.
TaUeu by I'ha'nix, privateer.
■JakL-n by MonmuiUh.
Destroyed by Monarch and Montiuju.
'I akcn by hevengi'. and lierwick.
'I'akt n by E.sex and I'luto.
Wrecked in K. Indies.
Taken by Boreas.
Taken by Doryctshire and Achilles.
Taken by Juno.
I
'^Sunk by French at Louisbuurg,
Taken by Rochester and Renown.
iBunit by accident at Louisbourg.
ICut out by boats at Louislx»urg.
Taken and burnt by Isis.
Driven asliure an<i destroyed in Audierne Bay.
Tbktu by Lizard off" Brest.
Taken by Antekpe off"llfraconilje.
>Wrecked near Brest.
Taken by Alcide and Actcuon.
Taken by St. Alhans in Mediterranean.
Destmyed at Malta by Monmouth.
Burned at ht. ^?ervand.
Taken by IVi/ttL
'Jakeu by .Fuluy and Isis.
TaKeu by Wiiidsur.
Taken by Southampdon and Mtlampe.
Taken by Chatham, \tnus and Tltames.
Taken by Cret^ceiit.
Taken by Cotes at Jamaica.
I Taken by BoscaA\en.
Destroyed by Bi scaweu.
Burnt by Hawke.
Taken by Hawke.
'Jakeu and burnt l)y Hawke.
Sunlv by Hawkr.
Sunk by Hawke.
Wrecked at month of Loire.
Wrecked in Vilaine.
[Destroyed at Quebec by Swautou.
iDes^troyed at Chulenr Fay by liyron.
Retaken by Temple and Gi ujin
'Jaken by Bortas.
Destroyed by Holmes,
'laktiu by Lively.
Destroyed by Hulme-*.
jCut out at Poudicherry.
Taken by yiger.
Takeu by Unicorn.
Taken iiud destroyed by Lichmond.
Takeu by Jlinereo.
Taken by Venus and Jnnu.
Tak< u by Bedford.
Taken by Isis.
Taken by Hero and Venus.
'I'al-en by Albany.
j 1 akcn by a dniiral Holmes's sijujdron on
( Jam dca station.
Taken by Thetis and Modeste.
Taken by Thunderer.
Taken by Bellona.
JTaken by Mars and Oxford in Bay of Biscay.
Burnt at Quebec with plague on board.
Takeu.
I'aken by Lion.
Taken by Venus.
314
APrKSDlX.
1762 Oct. 23
Ships,
Oiseau
Opalc .
Ecureuil .
Dragon .
Jution .
Hermioni:
Xt-nobie .
Mutine
Miverre ■
Aigle .
Guiis.
10
64
Aii
32
26
24
24
50
Fate.
TakL'ii by Itranc.
'lakeii by Phovir.
Takeu by Fnvie mid />/'«n.
Lost at Cape Fran 90 is.
LoBt ofTMabou.
Lost Cdniing out of Dunqiipniiic.
fjost off IVjitlaud.
' Lost on the I)ogger«bauk.
Lost near Villa Kranca.
1 I^st iu ^!t^ait of IJelle Inle.
(c.) LOJSSKS OF THE SPANISH XAVV, 171l^-lH, i7;j;)-4y, 1762.
X^,i 1;. — It is possible that a few of the smiiU craft meutiuued Diay have belonged to the Caraccas Compau}*.
Ills Aug. 11
Aug. IH
Aug. 11-
Aug.
? 1T4-2
? 174_'
.Jau. '-'(>
1727 Mar. 11
1 7:19 Dec. 6
Xov. 23 [
1740 Apr. s
„ 2S
Oct. 23
1741 Feb.
Mar. ? 6
Aug.
1 74 J Feb.
Real San Felijx 74
Brincipcdc Asturias . . 70
San Co.rlo!( 6U
Santa Isabtht . 60
Santa Jiosa . . 60
Volante ... ... 44
Juno ..... 3ii
Jieal . - . . . 6u
San Isidoro 46
Sorpresa .... 36
AgnHa .... 24
A 4th rate ^4
Esperan^a . 46
A 4th rate 44
A*. Juan Afenor .... 20
Jfaiuione . . . . 4-i
Conde de 7'oidouse . . . 3o
San Ftr7iando ■ tJii
Tigre ... ... 2ii
2 bombs l u
1 bomb H>
1 fireship
4 storeships
1 settee
Sonta Jiosalia . - 64
San Pedro .... 60
A frigate ....
X S. del Homi'io 46
2 storeships . .
AstrfEO . 20
Triutifo . 2)*
Princesa 64
1 sloop* . . J*
2 storeships
Guipmcoa 74
Hermione. •'"4
1 patacbe 20
Galicia . . 7U
San Carlos 7u
Africa . . HO
Conquistador 60
San Felipe '"^o
Drar/6n .60
1 fi-igate* ... . . 24
Fiierte .... 60
San Juan \
Santa Teresa I
S'ledad > galleys.
San Felipe I
.■?. Genaro I
Invencibile ... . 70
X Juan fiautista (35 nien)t .
San Joaquin (110 meu)t . i
San Josi' (Z2 mGu)i . . . |
-Taken by Byng in the battle off Cape I'as=aro.
> Taken by Walton's divi;>ion.
Hurut after capture.
liunit by Mari.
burnt.
Taken.
iiuiiit at Me.ssiiia.
Taken at Messina.
tiuuk at Messina.
Taken.
liurnt by Mari.
Taken by WaitonV division.
Burnt by Mari.
Taken.
Bmut.
Driven ashore.
Lost iu Ray of Tarauto.
I'aken by Itoyal Oak.
Taken by Royal Oak.
Taken by Skecrness.
[Taken at Puerto Bello.
Taken by Kent, Lenox aud Orford.
Taken near St. Augustiui^ by Siiairrd.
Taken liy Inanvmd.
Lust off .Saut.i ^lartha.
Foundered at sea.
Broken up ;it St. Catherine's.
Taken at Cartagena ; afterwards burnt.
Scuttled at Carta{;eua ity Spaniards.
Scuttled at Cartagena by Spaniards.
Scuttled at Cartagena by Spaniards.
Bumt at Cartiigena by Spaniards.
I BuiTit at Cartagena by Spaniards.
'Taken by \VorcKsU:r.
I Wre^^ked while trying to take- the ship's company
\ of the Tiger.
.Burnt at St. Trope-/,
Burnt at Havana.
VTaken or destroyed.
* These may perhaps be identified with some of the ships on which head-money was paid in 1746, and
which are eiven at the end of the losses for 1742.
t The'only record of these ships is that they were men-of-war taken or destroyed, but not at Puei-to Bellu or
Cartagen-i. Head-money was boint; paitl t\ir them iu 1746, at the same time as for the Princesa and other ships
taken bi^fore 1742 ; hence it may be iuferre.l tliat tbeiv loss was prior to the earlier date. See note * above.
LOSSES OF THE SPANISH NAVY, 1718-1702.
315
Year.
Date. 1 Ships.
GunH.
Fate.
1743
June 20 N. S. dc Calxuhniffa* .
56
'J'aken by f'enlnriw.
S. Isiiluro ....
70
liurnl at Ajacciu.
\1U
Feb. 11
Poder . .
60
Talccn by lifrwich- ; jiClerwards burnt.
Conde dt chincan .
24
Taken by liijion in \\ . Im
ies.
1145
Conceiicion (treasure ship)
.
Taken by liin^e.
1746
Fot-te de JVnvIz ^f)
32
Taken.
1747
Oct. 9
(ilori'isv . . ■. .
74
Taken Ity liu&sell.
1748
Oct. 1
Co»f]Uiiftaihir
64
Taken by Knowles in \V.
ndifs.
3
Africa
70
linrjit by Kniiwlrs in W. I
nlics.
1762
May 28
Unix, f.s
18
Taken by Alarm.
» 38
Venganza ....
24
'I'aken I)y Defiantr.
„ 28
Marte , .
18
'Jaken by Defiance.
June 3
Thetis
Neptuno
Asia
Emopa
22
70
84
60
Taken I)y Alarm.
Isunk at the entraicc tf ita
\ana.
/ Tiffre
70
Beina
70
."^jberano
70
In/ante
70
Atlg. 13 1 Aquildn
70
Surrciuicreil with l[a\ana
America
60
Cftnqiiistndor . .
60
yau Genaro ....
60
Sa» An tan it 1
60
Aujr. li ships (building') .
..
Destroyed at HavaUii.
Oct. 31 .^'antisimu Trinidad
22
Taken at JIanilla.
' Veyitifra
26
'Jaken l)y the Fmreji.
^■^>t J iiuiii-(if-\var.
^
( ':^1<5 )
CHAPTEE XXIX.
voyages and discoveries, 1714-1762.
Sir Clements Makkham, K.C.B.
Clipperton and Shelvocke to the Pacific — Voyages to Hudson's Bay -Expeditions of
Bailow, Vaughan, Scroggs, and Middleton — The search for a North- West Passage
— Hcm-y Ellis's Voyage — Coats's book on Hudson's Bay — Anson's Voyage — The
value of naval Exploration.
TN 1718 there was war between the German
-*- Emperor and Spain ; and some London
adventurers obtained a commission from the
■government at Vienna to cruise against the
Spaniards in the Pacific. The commission
was received from the authorities at Ostend ;
and the ships, fitted out in the Thames, were named the Prince
Eugene and the Sfarlicinherg. A retired naval lieutenant named
Shelvocke was to have had the former, a ship with thirty-six guns
and a complement of one hundred and eighty men ; while the Starhem-
berg, mounting twenty-four guns, was to have been entrusted to
John Clipperton, the man who had deserted Captain Dampier. But
the owners were displeased with Shelvocke for his extravagance
when he went to Ostend for the commissions, so they disrated
him, giving Clipperton the chief command in the Prince Eugene,
and transferring Shelvocke to the Sfarhembcrg. Meanwhile war
broke out with Spain, so the names of the ships were changed to
Success and Speedwell, the Ostend commissions were retvirned with
thanks, and the expedition sailed under British colours. Shelvocke
for the time stifled his resentment at having been superseded ; and
the ships sailed from Plymouth on February 13th, 1719. Soon
afterwards a gale of wind gave Shelvocke an opportunity of parting
company with his superior officer, with all the wine and brandy on
board his ship. His chief mate was Simon Hatley, who had been
with Woodes Rogers, and William Betagh was his " captain of
1719-22.] VOYAGKS OF CLIPrERTON AND SlllCLVOCKE. 317
marines." Willi IkjIIi these oi'ticers Slielvoclic, who was a free
drinker, had constant quarrels. In rounding Cape Horn the ship
was driven down to 61" 30' S., where tlie cold was intense. " We
had continued squalls of sleet, snow, and rain," says Shelvocke ;
and the only sea hird was a disconsolate hlack albatross. Simon
Hatley thought it was a bird, of ill-omen which brought the snow
and mist ; and he shot the albatross. He believed that this act
would bring a fair wind : but, on the contrary, it continued foul
and tempestuous for another month. Shelvocke touched at the
island of Chiloe, plundered and burnt the town of Payta, on
the Peruvian coast, and arrived at Juan Fernandez on May
4th, 1720. There the Speedwell parted her cable, was driven on
shore, and became a total wreck. The crew worked hard at a
new vessel, of 20 tons, which was launched on the 5th of October
and named the Recovery. Shelvocke embarked with forty-six men,
leaving eleven Enghshmen on the island. He shaped a course
to the Peruvian coast and captured a fine vessel of 200 tons at
Pisco, leaving his own little craft for the Spanish crew. Sailing
northward, they encountered the Success off Quibo, but they parted
company almost immediately. The two vessels met again three times
on the coast of Mexico, but without exchanging a word. Shelvocke
named his prize the Hajrpij Bet urn. Clipperton sailed for China in
May, 1721, and sold the Success at Macao on account of the owners,
returning home with his crew in June, 1722. Shelvocke captured
a rich prize called the Concepcion, with 108,636 dollars on board, and
then steered for Cahfornia, anchoring in Puerto Seguro, near Cape
San Lucas, for which port he gives some sailing directions. Having
left California for China in August, 1721, Shelvocke states that on
the 21st he sighted an island one hundred and ten leagues from
Cape San Lucas, at a distance of two leagues. This he judged to be
seven or eight leagues in circumference. It was named Shelvocke
Island. Burney thinks that it is the Boca Part Ida seen by Villa-
lobos, and afterwards by Sx^ilbergen in about 20" N. When the
present writer was serving as a midshipman on board the flagship of
Sir George Francis Seymour in the Pacific, the Collingivood sailed
over the position of Shelvocke Island on the old chart ; and we had
orders to enter the visibility of distant objects in the log at each bell,
so as to judge the space our eyes covered on either side of our track.
But no Shelvocke's Island was ever seen. That worthy made the
best of his way across the Pacific to China, where he sold his
318 VOYAGES AND DISCOVEIiTES, 17M-1T(;2. [ITI'J.
ship. He reached England in July, 17'22, and was prosecuted for
piracy and other luisdemcaaours ; but the evidence was insufficient.
Shelvocke published his account of the voyage in 1726, and two years
afterwards his " captain of marines," William Betagh, published a
refutation of Shelvocke's statements. The unfortunate Enghsh-
men who were left by Shelvocke at Juan Fernandez were captured
l)y a certain Captain Salavarria, who was given the command of a
ship fitted out by two wealthy Lima merchants in consequence of
the arrival of Clipperton and Shelvocke on the coast. Their fate is
unknown.
The British vessels which cruised in the Pacific Ocean during
the forty years from 1680 to 1720 were all employed either for
piratical or for warlike purposes. Yet they are properly noticed in
a chapter on discovery and exploration, because they made the west
coast of South America and the Pacific Ocean known to English
seamen, and familiarised them with the navigation. Surveys were
executed, especially of the Galapagos and Bashee Islands, and some
few discoveries were made. Above all, they kept alive that spirit of
juaritime enterprise which has ever been the mainstay of our Navy.
The Arctic voyages to Hudson's Bay were of practical importance,
for they led to the formation of a company to trade for furs and skins,
with a charter, granted in 1669, which conferred rights and privileges
over all the lands in that direction. In the previous year one
GiUam, in the Nonsuch, had been sent on a voyage of discovery, and
had reached a latitude of 75' up Davis Strait, then passing through
Hudson's Strait, and wintering in the southern extreme of Hudson's
Bay. Gillam had there formed a settlement called Fort Charles.
The French were at Fort Bourbon, on the western side of the bay,
from 1697 to 1714 ; but after the peace of Utrecht they departed and
their settlement became Fort York on the Hayes Eiver. The
Company's most northern fort was on the Churchill Kiver. Ships
were sent out every year, returning with valuable cargoes of furs
and skins ; but a strict monopoly was maintained, and discovery
was discouraged. Nevertheless, it could not be altogether sup-
pressed, especially as a general belief prevailed that the north-west
passage was to be discovered by following up the opening named
Sir Thomas Koe's Welcome by Button.
In 1719 two vessels named the Albaiii/ and Discovcrij sailed from
the Thames, under masters Barlow and Vaughan, to discover a
passage, but they never returned. A man named Scroggs, in a ship
1719-1745.] MIDDLETON AND THE NORTH-WEST PASSAGE. 319
called the Wlialebone, was sent from Fort Churchill in search of them
in 17'2'2. He went np the " Welcome " as far as 04'' 15', heard news
from tlie Eskimos of a very rich copper mine, and named a ])()iiit of
land after his ship — AVhalebone Point. Then followed an expedition,
the despatch of which was due to the representations of Mr. Arthur
Dobbs, who had studied the subject with great care. He spoke to
Sir Kobert Walpole, and eventually he induced Admiral Sir Charles
Wager, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to supply two vessels for
the discovery of the north-west passage, the Furnace, sloop, and
Discovery, pink. Christopher Middleton, who had commanded ships
of the Hudson's Bay Company, was induced l)y Mr. Dobbs to take
command, and he had good officers under him, but a rascally crew,
consisting of the sweepings of the jails. There were not three
seamen amongst them.
Middleton did his work well. Starting from England late in
the season of 1741, it was necessary to winter at the Churchill
Eiver. In 1742 Middleton left Churchill on the 1st of July,
and proceeded up Sir Thomas Eoe's Welcome. He reached a
headland in 65" 10' N., which he named Cape Dobbs, and on the
northern side of which there was a wide opening. But, after a
careful examination, Middleton came to the conclusion that it was
merely an estuary, and gave it the name of the Wager Eiver, after
the First Lord of the Admiralty. Pressing onwards he came to
another headland, which he named Cape Hope, anticipating that
the passage was on the other side of it. But there was again
disappointment. Eepulse Bay showed no opening. The Frozen
Strait then turns south-east. As there was much scurvy on board
the ship, Middleton resolved to return. In the circumstances he
had done excellently, but Mr. Dobbs was so bitterly disappointed
that he made a violent and unjustifiable attack on the commander
of the expedition. The Admiralty called upon Middleton for a
detailed reply to the accusations against him ; and he made it to
the satisfaction of their lordships.
In 1745 an Act was passed for giving " a pul)lic reward of
±'20,000 to such person or persons as shall discover a north-west
passage through Hudson's Strait to the western and southern
ocean of America." Subscribers came forward to fit out an
expedition. A sum of .ilO,000 was raised, and a North-West
Committee was formed, and purchased the Dobbs, galley, of
100 tons, and the CaUofniia of KiO tons. They were well equipped.
320 VOYAGIiS AND DISCOVERIES, 17U-17G2. [1740.
William Moor commanding tho Dobbs and Francis White the
California. Mr. Henry Ellis, an able and experienced seaman, also
went out as the Committee's agent, with instructions to make charts,
to record bearings, distances, soundings, and vai-iations, to collect
specimens, and to keep a journal. The expedition left Gravesend
on May 20th, 1746, was off Cape Digges on August 2nd, and
wintered at York Factory. On June 24th, 1747, it left its
winter quarters, entered the Welcome, and sent northward a boat,
which rounded Cape Dobbs. The conclusion of Ellis was in
agreement with that of Middleton, that the W'ager Eiver was not
a strait ; but that the passage would probably be found through
Frozen Strait. Ellis returned home in October ; and this con-
cluded the attempts to find a passage by Hudson's Bay during
the eighteenth century. But William Coats, a master in the
Hudson's Bay Company's service, who had made many voyages,
acquired an intimate knowledge of the great inland sea, and wrote
in 1750 " The Geogi'aphy of Hudson's Bay," a very useful treatise,
which was first printed for the Hakluyt Society in 18-52.
The expedition of Commodore George Anson was despatched
for belligerent purposes when the war with Spain broke out in
1739. It is, however, properly looked upon as a voyage of discovery,
so far as the Navy is concerned, because Anson's was the first naval
expedition which ever crossed the Pacific Ocean. Anson received
his orders in June, 1740 ; but the ships were manned with great
difficulty, and at last the complement was made up by five hundred
superannuated invalids, out-pensioners of Chelsea Hospital, who
all died during the voyage. The Commodore was on board the
Centurion, 60 ; and the other vessels were the Gloucester, 50, Captain
Eichard Norris ; the Severn, 50, Captain the Hon. Edward Legge ; the
Pearl, 40, Captain Matthew Michell; the Wager, 28, Captain Dandy
Kidd ; the Tnjal, slooj). Commander the Honourable George
Murray; and two store ships, the Anna and Industry. Anson's
expedition finally sailed from St. Helen's on September 18th, 1740.
At Madeira the captain of the Gloucester was invalided, and was
succeeded by Captain Michell, whose place in the Pearl was given
to Captain Kidd ; and Lieutenant David Cheap, of the Centurion,
received command of the Tryal. At Port St. Julian, the captain
of the Pearl having died, the Honoirrable Captain Murray succeeded
him, and Captain Cheap was given the Wager, and Lieutenant
Charles Saunders, the Tryal. Eunning through the Strait of Le
1741.] ANHOJ^'H VOYAGE. 321
Maire in March, 1741, the squadron encountered a succession oi'
furious gales off the Horn, and the Pearl and Severn returned
home. The scurvy broke out in a most malignant form, so that
the Centurion alone buried forty-three men, the mortahty in the
other ships being equally serious. Driven down to (JO" .5' 8., the
remaining ships were dispersed.
The Centurion did not reach Juan l*'ernandez until June
10th, 1741, having one hundred and tliirty men in the sick-list,
and having buried two hundred during the voyage. She was
anchored in Cumberland Bay ; and the Trijal arrived on the
same afternoon. On the 21st, the Gloucester came in sight, having
lost two-thirds of her crew from scurvy. The sick were landed
and placed in tents, twelve dying while they were being cari'ied
from the ship to the shore. The fresh vegetables of the island,
and the healthier surroundings, soon began to restore the survivors.
A prize named the Monte Carmelo was captured, and equipped as a
cruiser; and, in September, the Centurion, Trijal, and prize, the last
commanded by Lieutenant Philip de Saumarez, sailed for the South
American coast. The Gloucester, not being ready, was to join them
at Payta. Soon afterwards another fine prize was captured; and,
the Trijal having become unseaworthy, her crew was turned over
to the new vessel, which was armed and received the name of the
TrijaVs Prize. After cruising along the coasts of Chile and Peru,
and capturing some other prizes. Commodore Anson anchored
on November 18th in Payta Bay and surprised the town. The
plunder amounted in value to ^632, 000, besides stores of wine and
brandy, fresh provisions, and live stock. The town was set on
fire, and six vessels in the bay were sunk. Two days after leaving
Payta the Gloucester joined, with prizes containing specie and plate
worth i;18,000 ; and in December the squadron arrived safely off' the
island of Qui bo.
Meanwhile misfortune had attended the voyage of the remaining
vessel. The Wager, commanded by Captain David Cheap, had parted
company with the Commodore in a gale off' Cape Horn on April 23rd,
1741. Out of one hundred and thirty men on board, only thirteen
officers and men were fit for duty. The rest were down with scurvy,
and the captain had dislocated his shoulder. Being off the southern
coast of Chile, on May 1.5th, the ship struck on a rock ; and
she was wrecked within musket-shot of the land. Captain Cheap
was navigating by Narbrough's chart, which had been supplemented
VOL. III. Y
322 VOYAGES AND DISCOVERIES, 17U-1762. [1741-42.
from faulty Spanish surveys. In reality this part of the coast of
Patagonia was unknown. The Wager was deeply emhayed in the
G\\\i of Penas, and was' lost off the south coast of the peninsula
of Tres Montes. Masts were cut away, boats were got out, and
the sick were landed. The land was precipitous, but well wooded.
The men declared that as soon as the ship was lost their pay ceased,
and tliat they were no longer amenable to naval disciphne. A few,
however, remained loyal, provisions were landed, and a guard was
placed over them. The captain shot a midshipman named Cozens,
who was in open mutiny ; but this increased the discontent, and an
insubordinate feeling was aroused. The long boat was lengthened
and rigged as a schooner. The mutineers insisted upon being
taken back to England by Magellan's Strait ; and, when Captain
Cheap refused, they surprised him at night, tied his hands, and
deposed him, as they said, for having killed Cozens. They then
prepared to depart in the long boat, barge, and cutter, altogether
eighty-one men, leaving the Captain behind. Lieutenant Hamilton,
of the Marines, and the surgeon, with seven men, remained faithful,
the mutineers leaving the yawl and some provisions for them.
Soon after the departure of the boats the barge returned with
two midshipmen, the Honourable John Byron and Alexander
Campbell, and eight more men, who were also true to the Captain.
On December 15th, the forlorn party embarked in the barge
and yawl. After enduring fearful hardships and sufferings, they
were obhged to give up the voyage, and, in February, 1742, they
returned to the place where the Wager was wrecked, which had
been called " Cheap's Bay." At last some natives arrived in two
canoes, and undertook to pilot the fourteen survivors in the barge
to the Island of Chiloe. They started ; but, soon afterwards, the
men deserted with the barge and were never heard of again, leaving
behind Captain Cheap, Lieutenant Hamilton, the sm-geon, and
the two midshipmen. The surgeon died, and the rest were taken
by the natives in canoes. After the most terrible privations they
reached Chiloe, and were kindly received by the Spanish governor,
who sent them as prisoners of war to Valparaiso. They were
eventually embarked on board a French ship, arrived in France,
and were released in April, 1746. Campbell and Byron both
wrote narratives of their wonderful adventures. The mutineers
made their way through Magellan's Strait to the Portuguese settle-
ment of Kio Grande, whence they got passages to Lisbon.
1742-43.] ANSON'S VOYAGE. 323
The Commodore had, of course, given the Wager up as lost.
Leaving Quibo, he cruised off Acapulco to intercept the return
galleon from that port to Manilla. The squadron consisted of
the Centurion, Gloucester, and three armed prizes. Anson released
all his prisoners, giving them the prizes, and made sail for China,
with the Gloucester in company, on May 5th, 1742. In August
it was found necessary to abandon the Gloucester, owing to her
leaky condition. She was set on fire, and her officers and crew were
taken on board the Centurion, During the voyage the scurvy
broke out afresh, and for a long time several men died every day.
On August '27th, the Centurion anchored in Tinian Eoad,' in
one of the Ladrone Islands, after an unusually prolonged voyage.
The sick were landed to the number of oiie hundred and twenty-
eight, and placed in a large thatched building on shore. Live-stock
and vegetables were obtained in abundance. About thirty of the
sick died, but the rest rapidly recovered, and were soon convalescent.
The ship was repaired, and on October 21st Commodore Anson
sailed for China, anchoring off Macao in November. There the
Centurion wintered ; and on April 29th, 1743, Anson put to sea,
announcing to his people that he intended to make another attempt to
intercept the Manilla galleon. Although officers and men had been
so long away, and had gone through such fearful sufferings, they all
cheerfully concurred. On May 5th, they sighted the Bashee Islands
of Dampier, and for a month Anson cruised off the island of Samar
without sighting any vessel. At length, on June 20th, a midshipman
named Charles Proby ^ shouted from his station at the top-masthead,
" A sail to windward ! " She was soon seen from the deck,
coming down before the wind towards the Centurion. It was the
long-sought galleon, N. S. de Cavadonga. Both ships cleared for
the action, which lasted an hour and twenty minutes, at the end of
which the Spaniard struck her colours. Anson lost onl}' two men
killed and seventeen wounded ; but the loss of the Spaniards was
sixty-seven killed and eighty-four wounded. The cargo of the galleon
included $1,313,843, besides 35,682 ounces of silver, and merchandise.
The prize was commissioned and entrusted to the command of
Lieutenant Philip de Saumarez. Next day they again made the
Bashee Islands, and on July 10th they entered the river of Canton.
In December the prize was sold at Macao, and the Centurion
' Brotlier of the first Lord Carysfort. Afterw.irds Commissioner at Cliathani
Doclvyard.
Y 2
324 VOYAGES AND DISCOVERIES, 1711-1762.
was homeward bound on December 15th, 1743. She anchored at
Spithead, after an absence of nearlj' four years, on June 1.5th, 1744.
Commodore George Anson's expedition is correctly looked upon
as an exploring expedition, although with warlike objects. It
was the first pm-ely naval exploring expedition of modern times ;
and it is memorable for having been — quite as much, if not
more, than those which succeeded it — a most successful nursery of
valuable naval officers. Many of the best men in the Navy, during
the Seven Years' War, had learnt their first lessons, and gained
invaluable experience, during their hard service in Anson's exploring
squadron. There were Piercy Brett (1),^ and John Campbell,-
who was Lord Hawke's flag-captain at the battle of Quiberon
Bay ; there were Charles Saunders,'' Charles Proby, de Keppel,*
Philip de Saumarez,^ Peter Denis, '^ the Hon. John Byron,' and
Hyde Parker (1). No doubt, the voyage of Anson, remarkable
as it was for its early misfortunes, for the thrilling stories of
suffering and shipwreck connected with it, and yet notable for the
way in which the patience and resolution of its commander were
rewarded with final success, was the incentive for the despatch of
the expeditions which, in due time, followed in its wake. It is still
more noteworthy that Anson's expedition was, perhaps, the best
example of a naval exploring voyage, forming a splendid and
prolific niu'sery for training the best and most valuable class of
naval officers.
' Lieutenant in tlie Cmtnrion. ^ A petty officer in the Centurion.
' First lieutenant of tlie Ccv(<j()'jOH. ■* Midsliipnian in tlie C«/^«nora.
^ Third lieutenant of the Centurion. '' Lieutenant in tlie Centurion.
' Midshipman in the Wager.
( 325 )
CHAPTER XXX.
THE CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792.
Ailuiinistration of the Navy — First Lords — Secretaries of the Admiralty — Navy Board
ofticials, etc. — Naval Bxiieuditure — Seamen and Marines- Strength of the Fleet —
Rigging of a First-Rate — New classes of men-of-war — The carronade — Establish-
ments of guns — Gun-locks — Typical ships of the period — Condition of the
Dockyards — Ships in ordinary — Coppering — Pumpis — Distillatit)n of water —
Sanitation — Lighting and buoying — Lightning conductors — The longitude —
Harrison's time-keepers — The Nautical Almanac — Desertion — Discontent —
Mutiny — Bounties to seamen — Officers' halfpay — Officers in peace-time — Prize-
money — The Marine Society — The Hibernian Maiine Society — The Marine School
at Hull — Dockyard artificers — The King and the Navy — Promotion to the flag —
Superannuation — Naval uniform — Naval law — Coffin's case — The right of search
—The right of the flag — International courtesies.
"VrO changes of great importance were
made in the administrative machinery
of the Navy during the compara-
tively short period which is covered by
the present chapter. Even the lessons
Signature of Eichaed, ,. ,, ,^j ,. . ■ -^ -, ,
Bahl Howe, Admiral of the War of American independence
OF THE Fleet. produced few reforms, save in the manage-
ment of the Dockyards. The succession of the more important
administrative officers was as follows : —
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY.
George Grenville.
John, Earl of Egmont.
.John, Earl of Sandwich.
John, Earl of Egmont.
Sir Charles Saiuideis, K.B., Vice-Admiral.
Sir Edward Hawke, K.B., Admiral.
John, Earl of Sandwich.
Hon. Augustus Keppel, Admiral.
Richard, Viscount Howe, Admiral.
Augustus, Viscount Keppel, Admiral.
Richard, Viscount Howe, Admiral.
John, Earl of Chatliam.
Apr.
10, 17G;i.
Apr.
23, 1763.
Sept.
10, 1763.
Sept.
Ifi, 1766.
Dec.
176G.
Jan.
12, 1771.
Mar.
30, 1782.
Jan.
30, 1783.
Apr.
10, 1783.
Dec.
31, 1783.
July
1788.
326 CIVIL lUSTOIiY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1763-92.
SECRETARY OF THE ADMIRAL'I'Y.
Jolm Clevland.
1763. riiilip Stephens (later, Sir P. Stephens, Bart.).
178.'). (As Assistant) John Ibbetson.
Apr.
July
Apr.
Dec.
I'reasureu of the Navy.
William Wildman, Vis-
cdunt Barringtoii.
Iiichard, Viscuunt Howe,
(Captain, R.X.
Sir Gilbert Elliot, Bart.,
later Lord Minto.
AVelbore I':ilis.
Isaac Banc''.
Henry Duudas.
Charles Townsend.
Henry Dundas."
Kili;",.
1G70.
1777.
1782.
1782.
5, 1783.
30, 1783.
Aug.
1770.
Apr.
1775.
July
1778.
Mar.
Controller of the Navy.
Greor>;e Cockburne, Cap-
tain, R.X.
Hugh Palliser, Captain,
R.N.
Maurice Suckling, Cap-
tain, R.N.
Sir Charles Middleton,
Captain and Rear-
Admiral.^
1790. Sir Henry Martin (2),
Bart., Captain, R.N.
SuRyEYOK OF THE NaYY.
(Thomas Slade.
I William Bateley.
-_,,_ fSir Thomas Slade, Kt.
Ijohn Williams.
1771. Sir John Williams, Kt.
Mar.
1778
Sir John AVilliams, Kt.
rSir Jol
lEdwan
July
d Hunt.
,_.,- fEdward Hunt.
1 ( 8o. \
IJohn Henslo\v.
Clerk of the Act.s.
Edward Mason.
1773. George Marsh.
Controller of the Treasurer's
Accounts.
Timothy Brett.
1782. George Rogers.
June
Oct.
Oct.
July
Aus;.
Controller- of the ^'lcTUALLIN«
Accounts.
Robert Osborne.
1771. Charles Proby, Captain,
R.N.
1771. Thomas Hanway, Ca]>-
taiu, R.N.
George Marsh.
James Gam bier (1), Cap-
tain, R.N.
AVilliam Palmer.
17:
17;
17
Jan
Controller of the Storekeeper's
Accounts.
Hon. William Batemau,
Captain, R.N.
1783. William Campbell.
1790. William BeUinghara.
Jan.
Oct.
Extra Commissioners.
Sir Richard Temple.
Sir John Bentley, Kt.,
Captain, R.N. (till
1763).
1778. Edward Le Cras, Cap-
tain, R.N. (tUI 1783).
1782. Samuel Wallis, Captam,
R.N. (till 1783).
1787. Samuel Wallis, Captain,
R.N. (again).
Commissioners at H.M. Dockyards, etc.
Chatham.
Thomas Hanway, Cap-
tain, R.N.
Charles Proby, Captain,
R.N.
Oct.
1771.
Portsmuuth.
Richard Hughes (2), Cap-
tain, R.N. (Bart. 1773).
Aug. 1773. James Gambler (1), Ca]>-
tain, R.N.
Jan. 1778. Sir Samuel Hood, Bart.,
Captain, R.N.'
Created Viscount Melville, 1802. - Created Lord Barham, 1803.
^ Created Lord Hood, 1782.
1763-92.]
Oct.
EXPENDITUIil': ON TUK NAVY.
327
Miir.
1780. tJouiy Martin (2), Captain,
K.N. (later a Baronet). j ,,1^.
1791. Sir Charles Saxton, Kt.,
Captain, U.N. (a Bart. j^^. |,
17114).
Apr.
Fhjiiioiith.
Frederick liogers, Cap-
tain, R.N. (a Baronet,
1773).
1775. Paul Henry Ourry, Cap-
tain, R.N.
1783. Edward Le Cras, Cap-
tain, R.N.
178-1. John Laforey, Captain,
R.N.
1789. Robert Pausliawe (1),
Captain, R.N.
GihmUar and Minorca.
Charles Colby, Captain,
R.N. (retired, 1763).
Oct.
Sept.
Apr.
Halifax, Nova Hculia.
1775. Marriot Arbuthnot, Caii-
tain, R.N.
1778. Mr Richard Hughes (2),
Bart., (Japtain, R.N.
1780. Sir Andrew Snape Ha-
mond, Bart., Captain,
R.N.
1784. Henry Duncan (1), Ca)i-
tain, 1!.N.
Lccivard Islands.
177'.i. John Laforey, Captain,
R.N. (till 1783).
1784. John Muutray, Captain,
R.N. (till 1785).
Jamaica.
1782. Robert Alexander Lam-
bert, Captain, R.N.
(till 1784).
The " extra " and " ordinary " expenditure, as voted by Par-
liament from year to year, and the number of seamen and Marines
authorised, are shown below in a table which is a continuation of
the one on p. 5 of the present volume : —
No. of Sea-
1
No. of Sea-
Year.
" E.\tra.''
'•Ordiuary."
men and
Marines. 1
Year.
"Exira."
"Ordinary."
meu aud
MaiiiU'S-i
S,
£
£
£
1763
100,000
380,661
30,000
1778
488,695
389,200
60,000
1764
200,000
398,568
16,000
1779
579,187
369,882
70,000
1765
200,000
407,734
16,000
1780
697,903
385,381
85,000
1760
277,300
412,983
16,000
1781
670,016
286,261
90,000
1767
328,144
409,177
16,000
1782
1)53,519
409,766
100,000
1768
274,954
416,403
16,000
1783
311,843 2
451,989
110,000
1769
282,413
410,255
16,000
1784
1,100,000
701,869
26,000
1770
283,687
406,380
16,000
1785
940,000
675,. 307
18,000
1771
423,747
378,752
40,000
1786
800,000
692,326
18,000
1772
375,939
394,725
25,000
1787
6.50,000
700,000
18,000
1773
421,554
424,019
20,000
1788
600,000
700,000
18,000
1774
420,729
444,188
20,000 '
1789
575,570
713,000
20,000
1775 1
297,379
444,680
18,000
1790
490,360
703,276
20,000
1776 I
339,151
426,904
28,000
1791
506,010
689,395
24,000
1777
465,500
400,805
45,000
1792
350,000'
672,482
16,000
1 The cost of these was in addition to the sums specified in the " Extra " and " Ordinary " columns.
2 This was £1,000,000 short of the estimated expense: but it was considered that the deficiency wnuM In-
balanced by the number (if men to be discharged owing to the peace.
3 For work in the Royal Yards only. No money was voted for work in private yards, the estimate for which,
with fittings and stores for the ships, was £81,8*20.
The fluctuations in the streno^th of the fleet are indicated in the
328 CIVIL ni.srOIiY of the royal navy, 176.3-1792. [1763-92.
appended table, which, thoiif^'h it goes into less detail, and omits to
notice vessels possessed of no distinct fighting value, is, in effect, a
continuation of the table on p. 7.
Abstract or the Fighting Ships ov tiik Hoyai. Navy at Fouu Different
Dates, 17G2-1792.
(Prom Derrick, pp. 148-197, with corrections.)
Total of the Line : — .
Fourth
56
,^
52
1
1
.,
50
24
12
20
16
Fifth
44
21
4
28
21
)»
40
..
2
1
»»
;w
2
,.
7
i
"
36
4
3
17
14
JJ
34
1
32
32
35
o'J
47
1*
30
24
**2
1
1
__
I
i
Sixtli
30
1
^j
28
•>'>
24
33
28
))
26
. ,
1
},
24
21
1
U
6
ti
22 and 20
13
i:^
14
"
Sloops
18 to 8
57
:^8
85
42
Bombs
14
o
^
4
o
Fireships
11
1
17
9
Gener;
\.h Total .
365
270
468
330*
1 It baving been suggested, iii the course of the progress of this work, that some description of the rigging o
a mau-of-uar iu the heroic age of the British Xavy would be useful to the reader, a plate, showing the rigging,
etc., of a first-rate in 1775 is here inserted. Esplaiiatory references to it will be found on the page opposite.
~ Besides 7 prizes which, though taken, had not then been purchased for the Navy.
3 Besides 4 prizes which, though taken, had not then beeu pmxhased for the Navy.
* Including 47 needing repair.
5 Besides 18 building or ordered.
The 50-gun ship had ceased about the year 1756 to rank as of
the hue. Another class of ship ranking between the ship of the line
( 329 )
REFERENCES TO THE J'LATE,
SJiowing till' Ri</(jiu</, etc., of a Fiml-rnfe of 1775.
1 liOWSl'WT.
6K
( 'rosstrees.
130 Backstays.
■1 Yaid and sail.
69
Cap.
131 Stay.
■i fiamuH'tiing.
132 Stay sail an^i haliards
4 Horse.
70 FORE TOPllALLAXT-
1.33 Lifts.
5 Bobstay.
MA.ST.
131 Braces and pendants.
H Sprltsail sheeti.
71
Shronds aud lanyards.
135 Bowlines and bridles.
7 Pemlaiits.
72
Yard and sail.
136 Clewlines.
H Braces and pemiaiits.
73
Backstays.
137 Flagstaff.
9 Haliarls.
74
Stay.
138 Truck.
10 Lifts.
75
Lifts.
139 Flagst.tff stay.
1 1 Clewlines.
76
Clewlines.
140 Royal Standard.
12 Spritsail horses.
77
Braces aud jiendants.
!.■) Buntlines.
7.S
Bowlines aud bridles.
14 Standing lifts.
79
Flag staff.
141 MIZEN MAsr.
15 Spritsail tup.
so
Truck.
142 Sbnmds and lanyards.
16 Flying .jil>boom.
SI
Flag staff stay.
143 Pendants and burtons
17 Flying .jib stay and sails.
S2
Flag of Lonl High Ad-
144 Y'ard aud sail.
IS Haliards.
miral.
145 Crowfwt.
l!l .Sheets.
146 Sheet.
20 Horses.
S3 JIAIX MAST.
147 Pendant Hues.
S4
Shrouds.
148 Peakbrails.
21 SPRITSAIL I-OP.MASi'.
S5
Lanyards.
149 Staysail.
22 Shrouds.
S6
Runner and tackle.
150 Stay.
23 Yard and sail.
.h7
Pendant of the goraet.
151 Derrick aud span.
24 Sheets.
ss
Guy of diito.
152 lop.
25 Lifts.
S9
Fall of ditto.
153 Crossjack yard.
21 Braces and pendants.
90
Stay.
154 Crossjack lifts.
27 Cap.
91
Preventer stay.
155 Crossjack braces.
2S Jack staff.
92
Stay tackle.
156 Crossjack slings.
29 Truck.
93
Woolding of the mast.
30 Jack flag.
94
.leers.
95
Y'ard tackles.
157 MIZEN TOPMA.ST.
31 FORE MA.ST.
96
Lifts.
l.^M .Shrouds and lanyards.
32 Runner and tackle.
97
Biaces and pendants.
159 Y'ard aiul sail.
33 Shrouds.
98
Horses.
160 Backstays.
34 Lanyards.
99
Sheets.
161 stay.
35 Stay ami lanyard.
100
Tacks.
162 Haliards.
36 I'reventer stay aud lanyard.
101
Bowlines aud bridles.
163 Lifts.
37 Wooldings of the mast.
102
Crowfoot.
164 Braces and pendants.
:iH Yard and sail.
103
Top-rope.
165 Bowlines an<l bridles.
39 Horses.
lot
Top.
166 Sheets.
40 Top.
105
Butitliues.
167 Clewluies.
41 Crowfoot.
106
Leechiiues.
168 Staysail.
42 Jeers.
107
Y'ard and sail.
169 Crosstrees.
43 Yard tackles.
170 Cap.
44 Lifts.
lOS MAIN TOPMAST.
171 Flagstaff.
45 Braces and pendants.
109
Shrouds and lanyards.
172 Flagstaff stay.
40 Sheets.
110
Y'arii aud sail.
173 Truck.
47 Fore tacks.
HI
F'nttock shrouds.
174 Union Flag.
4« Bowlines and bridles.
112
Backstays.
175 Ensign staff.
49 Fore buntlines.
113
Stay.
176 Track.
50 Fore leecblines.
114
.Staysail and .stay aud
177 Eusign.
51 Fore top-rope.
haliard.
1 7S Poop ladder.
52 Futtock shrouds.
115
Runners.
179 Bower cable.
116
Haliariis.
53 FORE TOPllAST.
117
Lifts.
54 Shrouds and lanyards.
lis
Clewlines.
55 Y'ard and sail.
119
Braces auii pendants.
56 Stay and sail.
120
Horses.
Hl'LL.
57 Runner.
121
Sheets.
5.S Backstays.
122
Bowlines and bridles.
.■V Cat head.
59 Haliards.
123 Buntlines.
11 Fore channels.
60 Lifts.
124
Reef-tackles.
C Main channels.
61 Braces and pendants.
125
Crosstrees.
I) Mizeu channels.
62 Horses.
126
Cap.
E Entering port.
63 Clewlines.
K Hawse holes.
64 Bowlines and bridles.
127 MAIN T0PGALLAN1--
i; Poop lanterns.
65 Reef-tackles.
MAST.
H Chesstree.
66 Sheets.
12S
Shrouds aud lanyards.
1 Head.
67 Buntlines.
129
Y'ard aud sail.
Iv Stern.
330 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY. 1763-1792. [1703-92.
and the frigate proper was the two-decked 44-giiii class. When
these vessels had nearly all died out, a new class, the 88-gun frigate,
appeared in 1780. Of this class the Minerva, launched on June 3rd,
1780, was the first. She originally carried, on her main deck,
twenty-eight 18-pounders, and on her quarterdeck and forecastle ten
9-pounders, eight 18-pGunder carronades and fourteen swivels ; but
slight modifications were afterwards made and the swivels were
omitted. In 1780, also, the 36-guii frigate was revived, with, how-
ever, 18 and 9-pduuders in \\e\\ of the 12 and 6-pounders of the older
ships of the same class. In 1775 a new so-called 24-gun class was
introduced, carrying twenty-two 9-pounders on the main deck and
four 3-pounders, later two 6-pounders, on the quarterdeck. Thence-
forward there were no proper frigates of less than 24 guns, though
post ships of 22 and even 20 guns continued to be commissioned.
These corresponded roughly with the vessels which, in the French
navy, were called corvettes. Below them came the sloops, which,
with bombs, fireships, armed ships and store ships, were commanded
by Masters and Commanders.' Below these again came cutters,
schooners, brigs, armed vessels, armed transports, armed store-ships
and surveying sloops, which were commanded by Lieutenants. AH
yachts were commanded by Post Captains, and the larger of them
were sometimes entrusted to Captains of long standing who, in
consideration of the honour, either temporarily or pennanentlj'
surrendered their right to promotion to flag-rank, when it fell to
them in the ordinary course of senioritj'.-
The introduction of the carronade was bj' far the most important
development of naval ordnance during the period under review.
" So long," says Mr. William James, " as that species of ordnance, called gun by the
English and canon by the French, continued in exclusive possession of the decks of a
fighting ship, no difference existed between the number of carriage pieces she actually
mounted and the number which stood as a sign of her class in the published lists. In
process of time, however, the nominal, or rated, and the real force of a ship lost their
synonymous signification, and that in a manner, and to an extent, too important, in
every point of view, to be slightly passed over.
" In the early part of 1779, a piece of carriage ordnance, the invention, by all
accounts, of the late scientific General Robert Melville, was cast, for the first time, at
the ironworks of the Carron Company, situated on tlie banks of tlie river Carron, in
' The " Master-and-Commander " was equivalent to the modem Commander, and
is, in fact, usually called Commander in these pages, for the sake of brevity.
^ E.g., Captain Sir Alexander Schomberg, Kt., who, posted in 1757, would, in the
ordinary course, have obtained his flag in 1787, but who, accepting in 1771 the
command of the Irish Viceroy's yacht, retained it until his death in 1804.
1779.J
INTIIODUCTION OF THE CAliltUNADK.
331
Scotland. Althoiigli shorter than the navy 4-poundei-, and lightei', by a ti-ifle, tlian tho
navy 12-pounder, this gun equalled, in its cylinder, the 8-incli howitzer. Its
destructive effects, when tried against timber, induced its ingenious inventor to give it
tlie name of smasher.
" As the smasher was calculated chielly, if not wholly, for a ship-gun, the Carron
Company made early application to have it employed in the British Navy, but, owing
to some not well-explaiued cause, were unsuccessful. Upon the supposition that the
size and weight of tlie smasher, particularly of its shot, would operate against its
general employment as a sea-service gun, the proprietors of the foundry ordered the
casting of several smaller pieces, corresponding in their calibre with the 24, 18, and
12-pounder guns in use, or rather, being of a trifle less bore, on account of the reduced
windage very judiciously adopted in carronades, and which might he extended to long
guns with considerable advantage. These new pieces became readily disiioscd of among
the captains and others, employed in fitting out private armed ships to cruise against
America, and were introduced, about the same time, on l)oard a few frigates and smaller
vessels belonging to the Royal Navy.
" The new gun had now taken the name of carrmiadf, and its several varieties
became distinguished, like those of the old gun, by the weight of their respective shot.
This occasiontd the smasher to be called, irrevocably, a 68-pounder, whereas, repeated
experiments had shown that a hollow, or cored shot, weighing 50 or even 40 lbs.,
would range further in the first graze, or that at which the shot first strikes the
surface of the water, and the only range worth attending to in naval gunnery. The
lioUow shot would, also, owing to its diminished velocity in passing through a ship's
side, and the consequent enlargement of the hole and increased splintering of the
timbers, produce more destructive efl'ects than the shot in its solid form, one of the
principal objections against which, was, and still continues to be, its being so cumbrous
to iiaudle.
" Before lialf the expiration of the year in which tlie first cairouade had been cast,
a scale was drawn up by the Navy Board and sanctioned by the Lords of the Ad-
miralty,' for arming the different rates in the service with the 18 and 12-]KHmder
' Carronades assigned to each class of ship in the Koj'al Navy, by Admiralty C)rder
of Jvdy 13th, ITT'.I :—
Eate.
Class of
Ship.
Quarterdeck.
Forecastle.
Poop.
Actual uumber
of carriage guns
Guus.
No.
Prs.
No. Prs.
No.
lis.
mounted.
First
100
2
12
8
12
110
Second
98
4
12
6
12
108
}j
90
4
12
6
12
100
Third
74
2
12
6
12
82
)>
64
2
12
6
12
72
Fourth
50
2
24
2
24
6
12
60
Fifth
44
8
18
2
18
54
J)
38
6
18
4
18
48
»J
36
4
18
4
18
44
■ J>
32
6
18
2
18
40
Sixth
28
4
18
2
18
34
))
24
6
12
4
12
34
))
20
6
12
2
12
28
Sloops '
18
6
12
2
12
26
„
16
6
12
2
12
24
V
11
r, il:
2 12
*■>>>
1 Ship-rig
geii.
332 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL SAVY, 176:}-171t2. [1770.
calibres. In cousequence of the lii'st, necuiid, ami third-rate ships having their quarter-
decks as fully supplied with guns as there was room for ports on each side, no
additional pieces could be placed there ; but it was found that the forecastle would
geuerally admit the opening of a pair of extra ports, and that the poop, which for
nearly a century past had served chiefly as a roof to the captain's cabin, would if
timbered up on each side, afford space for tliree pairs of ports, making, in the whole, eight
additional ports for the reception of carronades. The .50-gun ship was found to have
room for a pair of additional ports on her quarterdeck, besides a pair on her forecastle,
and three pairs on her poop, when the latter was barricaded, making altogether ten
ports. The 44-gun ship had no poop, and no armament on the quarterdeck. By
furnishing the latter with a barricade, and cutting through it four pairs of ports,
besides an extra pair on the forecastle, this ship might mount the same additional
number of pieces as the 50. The three remaining classes of the fifth, and the first two
classes of the sixth rate, would also admit of additional ports being cut through the
sides of their forecastles and quarterdecks. The third class of the sixth rate, and the
quarterdecked ship-sloop class,-being, in respect to their quarterdecks and forecastles,
in a similar state to the 44, would require to be similarly built up before they could
mount the eight carronades assigned to them.'
" Several captains complained of the carronade ; some, of its upsetting after being
heated by successive discharges ; others, that, owing to its shortness, its fire scarcely
passed clear of the ship's side, and that its range was too confined to be useful. The
captains of some of the 32-gun frigates, in particular, represented that one pair of their
quarterdeck carronades was so much in the way of the rigging as to endanger the
lanyards of the shrouds, and begged to have their established number reduced from six
to four. As the principal objection to carronades appeared to have arisen from defects
in the manner of mounting them, some additional instructions on that head were
prepared and forwarded by Mr. Gascoigne, the chief proprietor of the Carron foundry.
Some alterations were also made in the piece itself.^ Still the Board of Ordnance, in
repeated conferences with the Navy Board, maintained the superiority of the old gun,
resting their arguments'chiefly on the comparative length of its range ; while the Navy
Board urged that a vessel, able to carry 4-pounderB of the common construction,
might, with equal ease, bear 18-pounders of the new; that its shot was far more
formidable and destructive; and that its range was quite sufficient for the purpose
required. . . .
"According to an official list, dated on the Oth of Januarj', 1781, there were then
429 ships in the Navy mounting carronades, among which the 32-pounder carronade
appears, and was the first of that calibre which had been used. The total of the
carronades employed was 604, namely, eight 32-pouuders, four 24-poimders, three
hundred and six 18-pounders, and two hundred and eighty-six 12-pounders. In
December of this year, a recommendation to use 68-pounder carronades on the fore-
castle of large ships, and 42 and 32-pounders on the same deck of some of the smaller
rates, induced the Navy Board to order the old Sainhow, 44, to be fitted, by way of
experiment, wholly with carronades of the largest description. Sir John Dalrymple
proposed the casting of some that should carry a ball of 100 or 130 lbs. weight;
but the Board resolved to confine themselves to the heaviest of the pieces already cast,
the 68-poimder.
" The necessary carronades were ordered from the foimdry, and some of the
foremen belonging to the works attended to see them properly fitted. It was not,
however, until February or March, 1782, that the Sainhow could be completed in her
' Establishment of 1762.
^ E.g., increasing its length by two calibres.
1782.]
CARliONADK V. LONO GUN.
333
eqiiipiueiit. AVliat additional force she acquired- by this clianjie in her .iiiiiaiiieiit the
following table will show : — ■
Old Armameut.
Nc« .\l
niiiiKMit.
I .Ollg
Guns.
Broadside weight
of metal.
Carronades.
No. 1 Prs.
HroailslcU- wpi^rlit
No.
Pr.s.
of mHal.
First deck
Second deck .
Quarterdeck
Forecastle .
20
99
2
18
12
'6
I,1)S.
:!1H
20
22
4
2
68
42
32
32
Lbs.
44
48
'■In the beginning of April, the Bainlxjw, thus armed, and cuinmauded liy
Captain . . . Henry TroUope, who, with Captain Keith Elphinstone (the late Adniii-al
Lord Keith) and the late Rear-Admiral Macbride, was among the earliest patrons of the
carronade, sailed on a cruise. All the well-known skill and enterprise of her captain
failed, however, to bring him within gunshot of a foe worth contending with until the
4th of the succeeding September, when, being off Isle de Bas, he came suddenly u]}on
a large French frigate. Owing to the latter's peculiar bearing, one of the Bainhours
forecastle 32-pounders was first discharged at her. Several of the shot fell on boai'd,
and discovered their size. The French captain, rationally concluding that, if such
large shot came from the forecastle of the enemy's ship, much larger ones would follow
from her lower batteries, fired his broadside ' povir I'lioniieur du pavilion,' and sur-
rendered to the Raiyibow. . . .
'■ In the course of 1782, a few of the larger sorts of the carronade were mounted on
board some of the receiving ships in order that the seamen of such vessels as were in port
refitting might be exercised at handling and firing this, to them, novel piece of oi'dnance.
As one proof of many that carronades were gaining ground in the Navy, the captams of
the few 38 and 36-gun frigates in commission applied for and obtained 24-pounder
carronades, in lieu of the 18s with which their ships had been established. The
termination of the war in January, 1783, put a stop to any further experiments with
the carronade ; but its merits were now too generally acknowledged to admit a doubt of
its becoming a permanent favourite : in the British Navy, at least, where a short range
is ever the chosen distance."
It does not, however, appear that foreign powers adopted the
carronade until after 1783.^
The estabhshment of long guns underwent various modifications,
the most important of which may be shown thus : —
' Nor is it quite certain that the innovation was altogether beneficial. Mr. Henry
Carey Baird, of Philadelphia, has laid before the author reasons for attributing some at
least of the British failures during the War k{ 1812-1.") to an excessive confidence in
the value of the carronade.
334 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1763-92.
Establishment of Guns (other tlian Carronadcs in 1792, and half-pouiider Swivels
in 1762) CARRIED by some of the priscipal classes of ships of the Royal
Navy in 1762 and 1792 respectively : —
Luwer Deek. Middle Deck. Upper Declt.
Quarter-
deck.
Forecastle.
Classes of Ships.
Date.
No.
Pis. S
,. Ip
rs. No. j Pre.
No. Pre.
No.
Pre.
100 gnus (large) .
1762
30
42 28
24 30
12
10
6
2
6
100 „ „ . .
1792
30
32 or 42 ' 28
24 30
18
10
12
2
12
100 „ (smaller) .
1762
28
42 28
24 28
12
12
6
4
6
100 „
1792
28
32 or 42 28
24 28
12
12
12
4
12
90 „ . . . .
1762
26
32 26 18 26
12
10
6
2
6
90 „ . . . .
1792
26
32 26 1 1
8 26
12
10
12
2
12
80 „ (8-decker).
1762
26
32 26 ]
8 24
9
4
6
..
..
80 „ (2-decker) .
1792
30
32
. 32
24
14
12
4
12
74 „ (larger)
1762
28
32
. 30
24
12
9
4
9
74 „ „
1792
28
32
. 30
24
14
9
2
9
74 ., (smaller) .
1762
28
32
. 28
18
14
9
4
9
'■1 „
1792
28
32
. 30
18
12
9
4
9
64 „ . .
1762
26
24
. 1 26
18
10
9
2
9
64 „ . .
1792
26
24
. 26
18
10
9
2
9
50 „ .
1762
22
24
. 22
12
4
6
2
6
50 „ . .
1792
22
24
. 22
12
4
6
2
6
44 „ . .
1762
20
18
. j 22
9
, ,
, ,
2
6
44 „ . .
1792
20
18
. ' 22
12
, ,
2
6
.36 „ . .
1762
. 26
12
8
'e
2
6
36 „ . .
1792
. 26
18
8
9
2
12
32 „ . .
1762
. 26
12
4
6
2
6
32 „ . .
1792
. 26
18
4
6
2
6
28 „ . .
1762
. 24
9
4
3
28 „ . .
1792
. 24
9
4
6
24 „ . .
1762
2
9
. 20
9
2
3
24 „ . .
1792
22
9
9
6
20 „ . .
1762
. 20 9
..
20 „ . .
1792
. 20 9
..
..
14-gun sloops
1762
. .
. 14 1 6
..
14-gun ,,
1792
14 ' 6
1
Gun-locks and tin tiring-tubes had been used in a few ships
during the latter part of the Seven Years' War; but, the general
feeling of the service being against them, the old match was
reverted to until after 1780, when the flint lock, with an improved
tube, became common, though the match-tub was retained for use
in case of breakdown.
As in Chap. XXVI., particulars of some typical ships of war of
the period imder review are given : —
1763-92.]
SOME TYriCAL MES-OF-WAR.
335
Tyimcal liiUTisH Ships oi-* W.vii, ITiJlJ-D^, incluihng imrir Phizes and
IJRlTISH-liUII.T \'ksSKLS ;~
Ship.
Gun
])eck.
Keel.
Beam.
Depth.
Where, and liy whom [Iiiilt.
Victory .100
viUe de Paris
Queen Clutrlotte .
Harjieur . . .
(iibraltar (ex Finix
C(Esar ....
liamiliies .
/iamiUiea .
/{runswick
Auyiista .
Froti'e ....
Prince WilUavi .
Argonaut .
Warwick .
Roebuck . . .
Pnncess Caroline.
Pradente .
Minerva .
fft-b<^ ....
oiseatt ....
Thalia ....
Jfelampus .
Glory ....
Iris (later Hancock)
Clinton (ex Hspei'ance)
Heroine
Castor .
Hussar
Sartine.
Virginia .
Hose . .
Amphitritti
Squirrel .
Ariadne .
Charleston
Boston") .
Cygnet .
Zebra .
Brisk .
SwiJ't . .
Serpent.
Cliilders, brig
Ferret, cutter
Cockatrice, cutter
Alecto, firesbip
jEtna, buuib .
Augusta, yacht
(ex
1765
•1782 185
1789 190
1768 177
'1780 178
1793 181
1763 168
1785 170
1790 176
1763 1159
•1780 164
«1780 153
*1782 ,163
1705 1 151
1771 1140
•1781 129
*1779 136
1780 141
1782 1 150
'1779 146
1782 137
1786 141
1763 ,125
'1777 1 137
•1780 1 134
1783 1130
1786 126
1763 114
*1778 U32
*I778 132
1785 120
1776 114
1785 119
1776 !108
*1780 114
1776 110
1780 98
1774 |101
1763 ' 91
Ft. in.
136 0 151 3S
0
5
7^153
0 156
8 144
10} 144
0 [148
6 '13.S
0 140
2il45
0 130
1 140
1 113
3 117
0 103
1 '116
0 113
Hi 107
0 104
1778
1763
1731
1781 103
1776 I 91
reblt. 1
1770 r"
Ft.
52
53
52
Oi 50
6 I 53
311 61
2 I 46
U «
3 I 43
6i 44
OJ 44
44
45
40
37
33
37
38
39
34
3i| 38
OJ 33
4 i 35
6 34
0 I 35
■ OJI 36
0 I 35
33
35
34
33
32
32
30
90 9i 28
2+
130
3i
0
136
0
0
122
9
0
116
4J
1
107
5
I)
UH
11
0
117
3J
1+
125
*+
3
126
9»
4
1U2
8+
6
118
0
6
108
0
6
99
6
3
94
3+
U
99
0
0
89
8
3
94
3i
2.1
27
3i 26
9i 27
8 25
0 ! 20
25
29
27
Ft.
23 l\ 10 11
(■Chatham, E. Alleu, after Sir
I T. SlaUe.
•Taken from the Freucli.
(.'liatham.
Chatham, J. Harris.
*Taken from the Sp.mianls.
Plymoutli.
(Jhatbain, E. Allen.
Thames, liaudall & Co.
Deptford, M. Ware.
Thames. Wells & Co.
*Taken from the French.
*Taken from the Spaniards.
*Taken from the French.
Portsmouth, .J. Bucknall.
Chatham.
*Takeu from the Dutch.
l*Taken from the French.
Woolwich, J. .Tenner,
l*Taken from the French.
i*Taken from tlie French.
j Bursledou, H. Parsous.
Tiristol.
; Hull, J. Hodfison.
l*Tuken from the Americans.
*Taken from the French.
I Bucklershard.
' Harwich.
\ Thames, R. Inwood.
i*Taken from the French.
;*Taken from the Americans.
I Sandgate.
j Deptford, ,\. Hayes.
1 Liverpool.
I Chatham, J. Powuall.
0
385
4
320
Gravesenri, C'leverlv
10
337
.Saudgate.
3i
271
Thames, H. Bird.
0
321
Plymouth.
0
202
Thames.
10
83
Chatham, E. .VIU n.
9
181
Dover.
0
423
Dover.
1
303
Thames.
184 Deptforrt.
Diiring the peace which preceded the war with the American
Colonies, the condition of the dockyards, and of the ships in ordinary,
was much neglected; and when, in 1771, the First Lord of the
Admiralty had occasion to demand of the Surveyor of the Navy a
return of the number of vessels fit for service, he received a reply
which, he presently found, conveyed an entirely misleading impres-
sion. The store of oak timber was also discovered to be at a
dangerously low ebb. Upon this, it was ordered in Council that for
the future His Majesty's Navy and Awards throughout the kingdom
should be inspected by the Board of Admiralty every two years. A
33G CIVIL HISTOBY OF THE liOYAL NAVY, 17fi3-17&2. [1763-92.
little later, in 1775, the practice of paying by piece-work was intro-
duced in the dockyards. After the war, the Admiralty, on Julj' lOtb,
1783, appointed twenty-four Masters ^ from the half-pay list to
superintend the ships in ordinary; eight at Portsmouth, six at
Plymouth, eight at Chatham and Sheerness, and two at Woolwich.
To each Master a division of ships was entrusted ; and to every ship
was assigned a proportion of men, besides warrant officers and
servants, as follows : ships of 100 guns and upwards, 36 men ; ships
of 90 or 98 guns, 32 men ; ships of 70 or 74 guns, 26 men ; ships of
64 guns, 20 men ; ships of 50 guns, 14 men ; ships of 44 guns,
12 men ; ships of 28 or 38 guns, 10 men ; ships of 24 guns, 8 men ;
sloops, 6 men ; and cutters, 4 men.
Ships fit for service were ordered to have their lower masts in ;
their bowsprits, lower yards, topmasts and topsail yards on board ;
and a roof over their upper decks to protect them from the weather.
In 1784, revised rules were issued for the appropriation and laying
aside of gear and stores for ships under construction, with a view to
ensuring that the former should be ready as soon as the latter;
and l)etter arrangements were made for the accumulation of reserve
and spare stores at the dockyards and the naval stations abroad.
It has been mentioned in a previous chapter that the first
British man-of-war to be coppered was the Alarm, 32. This was
in 1761. A second ship was not similarly treated till 1764, when
the Dolphin, 24, was coppered. Then followed the Jason, 32, and
in 1776, the Daphne, 20. Between that time and 1784 or 1785
nearly every vessel in the Navy was dealt with in the same way. It
was still asserted that the ships in ordinary deteriorated very rapidly
in consequence of the action set up between the copper on their
bottoms and the iron on their bolts. An inquiry into the matter
was instituted in 1786 ; but it did not result in the condemnation of
the practice of laying up ships with their copper on. An improved
method of copper fastening had been, however, introduced a little
before that time ; - and this, doubtless, had the eflect of diminishing,
if not of altogether preventing, the galvanic action which had been
complained of.
About the year 1764 some improvements in ships' pumps were
' The Master, it need scarcely be explained, was then only a warrant oificer,
although he was nearly equivalent to the Navigating Lieutenant of a later date.
He was totally distinct from the commissioned Master-and-Commander, — the Com-
mander of to-day.
- In November, 1783.
lTG3-!lli.] J-UOVJSIUN OF FllE.^II WA'IF.I:. 337
introduced by a Mr. Coles ; and in that year tlie Adniii'alty ordered
a GO-gnn ship to be experimentally fitted with pumps of Mr. Coles's
pattern. In the following year a similar puinp was fitted on board
the Seaford, 20, at Portsmouth ; and it was then found that,
whereas the old pump required seven men to pump out a ton of
water in 7(3 seconds, the new pump, with but four men, would pump
out a ton of water in 43^ seconds; and that, whereas two men could
not move the old pump at all, two men could with the new pump
pump out a ton of water in 55 seconds. It was also found that,
when choked with single ballast, the new pump could be cleared in
four minutes, while the old could not be cleared at all so long as
water remained in the ship's hold. Experiments continued ; and it
would appear that, for some years, Coles's pump was largely used in
the Navy ; but it was from time to time improved, notably in 1787,
and, in 1791, by a Mr. Hill, a carpenter K.N., who was also the
inventor of a machine for drawing bolts out of ships" sides, and of
an apparatus for stopping shot-holes below the water-line.
The distillation of fresh water from salt was not usually practised
on shipboard during the period ; but it was carried out occasionally.
In 1772 the Admiralty directed all ships of war to be fitted with a
still and other necessary apparatus. The process appears to have
been the invention of one Dr. Lynn ; but a Frenchman, M. de
St. Poissonniere, devised a somewhat similar process at about the
same time. It was, however, impossible in those days to distil
sufficient water for the whole ordinary consumption of a ship's crew.
At best only relatively small quantities could be prepared; and,
looking to the invai'iable foulness of shore water after it has been for
some time in a ship's casks or tanks, it is astonishing that it was
ever possible for even the most careful captains to keep their crews
in fair health during long voyages. Yet some at least of them
certainly managed to do so. In the course of Cook's second voyage,
with the Resolution and Adventure, between April, 1772, and Jul}',
1774, only four men, exclusive of a boat's crew who were murdered
in New Zealand by the natives, died ; and of these but one died of
sickness. In Cook's last voyage the Besolution lost but five by
sickness, three of these having been in ill-health when they left
England ; and the Adventure lost not so much as a single man in
the four years and two months during which she was absent froin
home.
Progress, but not very rapid progress, was made between 1763
VOL. III. z
338 CIVIL histohy of the royal navy, noa-no'J. [no.-j-oa.
and 1792 iu lighting and buoying the coasts of the United Kingdom.
The Smalls Eock light was first shown from a wooden structure
which was built by Mr. Henry Whiteside in 1778, and which was
not removed until 1861. The Needles' and St. Catherine's light-
houses were estabhshed in 1780. The Longships' lighthouse, off
Land's End, was begun in September, 1791. A 21-inch aperture
facet reflector, used at Liverpool in 1763 ; a facet parabolic reflector,
used in the Scots lighthouses about the year 1787 ; and a plano-
convex lens, used at Portland iu 1789, were shown at the Eoyal
Naval Exhibition, 1891.
Lightning conductors were, at Anson's instance, supplied to
ships soon after that officer's death in 1762 ; but they were not
permanently fitted, and were merely directed to be set up when a
storm threatened. In consequence, they were often not used at all,
and many accidents resulted.
Eilorts to arrive at some satisfactory method of discovering the
longitude at sea continued to be made. In 1764, Mr. William
Harrison, with one of his timekeepers, was received on board the
Tartar, 28, Captain John Lindsay. She sailed from Spithead on
March 28th, and arrived at Madeira on April 19th. Captain
Lindsay made Porto Santo exactly as he had been led to believe
that he would make it by Mr. Harrison, who had taken two alti-
tudes of the sun on the 18th. The ship proceeded ; and on May 12th,
Harrison was able accurately to discover her distance from Barbados,
which was sighted on the 13th. Harrison returned to England in a
merchantman, arriving in London ou July I8th. The timekeeper
was then only fifteen seconds slow, allowing for the variations of the
thermometer, as chronicled in the inventor's journal. In 176-5 the
Board of Longitude approved a scheme of marine tables, designed
by Mr. Witchell, for finding the longitude at sea by the limar
method ; and it awarded the inventor £1000 to enable him to carry
out his plans. In consequence, with Mr. Isaac L^yons, junior,
Mr. Wales, of Greenwich, and Mr. Mapson, Mr. Witchell became
responsible, under the direction of the Astronomer Eoyal, Neville
Maskelyne, for the compilation of a naiitical ephemeris for the use
of navigators and astronomers. This was the origin of the ' Nautical
Almanac,' a publication which has since remained at the head of all
works of the kind.
In the course of the war which ended in 1763 the number of
seamen and Marines employed in the Navy was 184,893. Of these
1763-92.] MORTALITY AND DESERTION. 339
only 1512 were returned as having been killtul in action or by
accident : yet, at the conclusion of the war, no more than 49,678
remained on the books of the Navy Office. The number, therefore,
of those who had died by sickness or were missing reached the
extraordinarily large total of 188,708. These figures incline one to
believe that there must have been an enormous amount of desertion.
Another return, issued m 1780, shows the number of men raised
for H.M. Navy between September 29th, 1774, and September 29th,
1780, and the number killed in action, and who died or deserted,
between January 1st, 1776, and September 29th, 1780. This casts
much light upon the discontent which in those days must have
prevailed upon the lower deck of the Navy. The number of men
raised in the six years was 175,990. Of these, in the four years
covered by the second part of the return, only 1243 had been killed,
and no more than 18,541 had perished from sickness or disease ; but
as many as 42,069 had run. The discontent thus indicated did not
lead during the period, as it did later, to any general outbreak, but it
produced several isolated disturbances. For instance, at the peace
in 1783, when the Channel fleet was ordered into port to be reduced
and paid off, the men in many ships became riotous and even
mutinous, owing to their intolerance of delay in liberating them.
On that occasion the discontent in the Raisonnable, 64, was quashed
by the captain, Lord Hervey, who, having appealed in vain to his
crew to behave themselves, went forward armed, with his officers,
and, having seized the ringleaders, soon compelled the rest to obey.
When the ship arrived at Sheerness several men were tried by
court-martial, and four of them were condemned to death. Three
of them were executed on August 11th, on board the Carnafic,
Scipio, and Dictator respectively. The foiu'th, who was to have
suffered on board the TJietis, was reprieved immediately before the
moment fixed for his execution. The mutiny of the Bounty is
described elsewhere. There were also mutinous outbreaks in the
Narcissus, 20, Captain Edward Edwards, in 1782, and, at different
times, in other vessels.
During this period it was on several occasions found necessary
to offer government bounties to seamen ; and, as often, special
bounties were also offered to them by corporations and cities.
In 1770, at the time of the Falkland Islands' scare, the King,
by proclamation, offered a bounty of 30*'. to every able seaman ; and
the following cities offered additional bounties : i.e., London, 40s. to
z 2
340 CIVIL niiSTuny of the IWYAL navy, 176;i-17'.)2. [1763-02.
every al^le seaman ; Bristol, 20.s. to every able seaman ; Montrose
and Edinburgh, each 2 guineas to every able, and 1 guinea to every
ordinary seaman ; Aberdeen, 1 guinea to every able, and 15,s. to
every ordinary seaman; and Lynn, 1 guinea to every able seaman.
In 1773, again, the King offered to every able seaman £3, to everj'
ordinary seaman i'2, and to every landsman Ml. In 1779 the East
India Company, besides building at its own expense three 74-gun
ships, the Ganges, Carnatic, and Bombay Castle, provided the
necessary bounty for the raising of fiOOO seamen. In 1791 bounties
vt'ere offered on the same scale as in 1778.
The position of the seamen of the Navy was but little improved,
and the failure of the authorities to care sufficiently for the lower
deck led a little later to mutinies which, at one time, threatened to
be extremel}^ serious. The status of many of the officers was,
however, from time to time considerablj- bettered. For example,
in 1773, in consequence of a petition presented to Parliament by
Lord Howe, Captains were granted an addition of 2.s. a day to their
half-pay, so that, thereafter, the first thirty Captains on the list
received 10?., the next 8s., and the rest 6s. per day. In the same
year the number of Sm'geons entitled to half-pay was increased from
fifty to a hundred, half to receive 2.?. 6d. and half 2s. The number
of Masters entitled to half-pay was increased to the same extent, the
half-pay being the same as in the case of the Surgeons. In 1779 the
twenty senior Masters, if qualified for first or second-rate ships, were
given half-pay at the rate of 3-5. 6d. a day, and the next seventy-five
at the rate of 3,s. a day. In 1781, the list of Surgeons entitled to
half-pay was increased to one hundred and twenty-five, they being
Surgeons of not less than five years' actual service. The first fifty
•on the list received 2s. 6(7., and the next seventy-five 2s. a day.
But the attractions of the Navy in peace time were never great
enough to induce anything like the whole body of officers to rest
content with their position, which was indeed then a very imsatis-
factory one. In 1771, Admiral Sir Charles Knowles solicited and
obtained the King's permission to enter the Russian navy, in which
he remained until 1774, when, upon his return to England, he was
reinstated in his rank. Diiring the next peace many officers of
inferior position also lent their services to Bussia ; and in the battles
of 1788-90, between the Eussians and the Swedes, British captains,
some of whom had been only heutenants or masters in their own
service, commanded ships on both sides. Indeed, Admiral Samuel
1781.] TlIK STATUS OF CAPTAIN OF THE FLEET. 341
Grieg,' who was at one time coiiiniander-in-chief of the liussian
fleet, was a Scot. Among the captains, Trevenen,'-' Denisoii, and
Marshall, who were Idlled, and l*llphinstone,^ Miller, and Aiken,
deserve to be remembered. Sir William Sidney Smith, then a
captain, R.N., served as a volunteer with the Swedes. In wartime,
adventures and the prospect of prize-money seem to have satisfied
British naval officers as a body : and there was very little agitation
in favour of increased pay, although the pay, all things considered,
was miserably small. But in peace, many officers either found work
for their swords in the service of foreign states, or accepted employ-
ment in command of merchant vessels."
It may be mentioned in connection with the subject of prize-
money that in 1781 an old dispute between Vice-Admiral John
Campbell, who had been Keppel's Captain of the Fleet in 1778, and
Sir Hugh Palliser, who had been Keppel's third in command, was
decided. Campbell claimed a flag-officer's share of the prize-money
arising from captures made by the fleet : PalHser resisted the claim ;
and the matter was referred to arbitration. The arbitrator decided
against Campbell, and, incidentally, against Kempenfelt, upon whose
behalf there was a similar claim ; and this in spite of the fact that
as early as 1672 an order of the Duke of York had directed that the
First Captain to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet should rank as
a flag-officer. But, although the decision was thus adverse, the King,
on January 9th, 1782, by proclamation, ordered that for the future
the First Captain to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet or to any
flag-oliicer commanding twenty ships in the line of battle, whether
British only, or British and their allies, should rank as a flag-officer,
and should be entitled to share prize-money on the same scale as
the junior flag-officer in the fleet. It was at the same time ordered
that the Physician of the Fleet should share prize-money on the
same scale as the lieutenants. A seaman's share of prize-money
' Samuel Grieg, boru, 173G; served with tlie British fleet at Quiberou, 1759; joined
the Russian navy, 1764. Mainly responsible for the victory off Tchesme, July, 1770.
Coniinanded in the action off Gogland. Died, 1788. A Russian man-of-war still bears
his name.
^ Had been a midshipman aTid lieutenant in the Hesohifion in Cook's last voyage.
Mortally wounded at Wyborg, 17o;i.
' Samuel Williams Elphinstone, second son of Captain John Elphinstone (1), R.N.,
who entered tlie Russian service in 17(il», and became an admiral. He returned to
active service in the British Xavy in 1775, and died in 1785. Captain S. W. Elphin-
stone married a daughter of Admiral Crvise, a Scotsman in the Russian service.
■* Among those who connnanded merchant sliips was Sir Home Riggs Popham.
312 CIVIL niSTOEY OF THE BOYAL NAVY, 1763-17i>2. [],763-<J2.
was of course always very small ; but a slight concession to the
lower deck was made in 1771, when an Act of Parliament authorised
Greenwich Hospital, in certain specified cases, to refund unclaimed
shares of prize-money or bounty-money within a limited time after
payment of such into the funds of the hospital.
Indirectly, something more was done for the seamen by the
action of the Marine Society, which, in 1763, immediately after the
peace, resolved to receive, and make provision for, all boys under
sixteen years of age, who had been, or might be, discharged from
the service, by putting them as apprentices into the mercantile
marine, on their presenting certificates of good behaviour from their
former officers, or by apprenticing them into some trade. Thus 295
boys were at once benefited. Again, in 1775 the Hibernian Marine
Society in Dublin was incorporated under letters patent, for the
maintenance, education, and apprenticing of orphans and children
of decayed mariners ; and in 1787 a Marine School at Hull was
opened by the Corporation of Trinity House, for the education and
clothing of boys intended for the sea service.
A little more was done for the artificers in the Dockyards. In
1764 one man out of every fifty of those who had served with good
character for thirty years, was made entitled to a pension of £20 per
year. In 1771 this privilege was extended to one in forty, instead
of one in fifty ; and the men, for pension purposes, were divided into
three classes, i.e., joiners, shipwrights,' blockmakers, plmnbers,
braziers, blacksmiths, and armourers, £20 a year ; house carpenters,
sailmakers, smiths, and brickla_yers, £15 ; pitch-heaters, bricklayers'
labourers, riggers, and riggers' labourers, £10 a year. When the
King was at Portsmouth in 1773 he, moreover, ordered £1500 to
' Xumber of shipwrights borne in H.il. Dockj'ariU on January l-tth of eacli year,
170.3-17'JL' :—
Year.
Xu.
Year.
No.
Year.
Ku.
1763
2941
1773
3195
1783
3260 j
1764
2723
1774
3260
1784
3141 !
1765
3060
1775
3236
1785
3130
1766
3143
1776
3145
1786
3125
1767
3155
1777
3140
1787
3082
1768
3003
1778
3126
1788
3059
17C9
2974
1779
3246
1789
3023
1770
2928
1780
3260
1790
2965
1771
S383
1781
3290
1791
3082 1
1772
3202
1782
3248
1792
3060 1
1763-92.] NAVAL HhTlf-nVX. 343
be distributed among the artificers, workmen, and labourers of the
Dockyard, Victualhng Office, and Gunwharf.
The King's visit on that occasion took pkxce in order that His
Majesty might review the fleet then lying at Spithead. On June
2'2nd, the King went on board the Barfleur, flagship of Vice-Admiral
Thomas Pye, dined there, and, in the evening, knighted the Vice-
Admiral, Eear-Admiral Eichard Spry, Captain Joseph Knight, senior
captain in the fleet. Captain Edward Vernon (2), of the Barfieur, and
Captain Kichard Bickerton, of the Augusta, yacht. He also con-
ferred baronetcies on Captain Hugh Palliser, Controller of the
Navy, and Captain Richard Hughes (2), Commissioner of the Dock-
yard. He directed the promotion of such commanders of sloops,
first lieutenants of flagships, and lieutenants commanding cutters,
as were present, as well as of the lieutenant of the Augusta, yacht,
and of two midshipmen from each of certain ships. He further
gave £350 to the crews of the Barjicur, of the Augusta, yacht, and
of the royal barge.
This was not the only time when George III. visited his Navy
in the earlier part of his reign. In 1781 he reviewed Vice-Admiral
Sir Hyde Parker's fleet at the Nore, after its return from the battle
of the Doggersbank, and went on board the Fortitude. In 1789,
the King and Queen, with some of the princes, review"ed such
ships as were in Portland Road ; and, during their residence at
Weymouth, they went for several short sea cruises in the South-
ampton, 32, Captain Andrew Snape Hamond, and the Magnifi-
cent, 7-4, Captain Richard Onslow. Later in the same summer
they proceeded to Plymouth and visited the Impregnable, 90,
Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton. Indeed, King George III.
always took a great personal interest in the Navy, in which served
two of his brothers ' and one of his sons.-
The subject of promotion to the flag, which had for some tune
previously been a little unsystematic, attracted much attention in
1787. Early in the eighteenth century it had been the custom
for the Crown to promote to the flag by selection, tempered
by seniority. In the middle of the century, seniority gradually
strengthened its claim ; and soon after the conclusion of the
American War, when a captain, upon reaching the top of the
captains' list, instead of being given a flag was put upon the list
' Edward Augustus, Duke of York, and Heury Fredei'ick, Duke of Cumberland.
^ William Henry, Duke of Clarence, afterwards William IV.
344 CIVIL HISTORY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1763-1792. [1787.
of Superannuated Eear-Admirals, or was altogether passed over, he
thought himself aggrieved. Things came to a crisis in 1787. On
March .5th of that year, Sir Matthew White Eidley moved in the
House of Commons an address to the King on behalf of Captain
David Brodie,' who had been several times passed over. The
motion, being strongly opposed by the Ministry, was defeated by
a majority of seventeen in a house of one hundred and eighty-
three. But the subject was not left there. On February '20th,
1788, Lord Eawdon took up the matter in the House of Lords.
It should be explained that by an Order in Council, dated in
1718 and addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, it
was directed that their Lordships, in the advancement of officers to
the rank of rear-admiral, should promote according to the seniority
of the captains on the list, regard only being had to the officers
being qualified for the rank to which they were otherwise eligible
for promotion. By a subsequent order of 1747, the Lords of the
Admiralty were authorised to superannuate such captains of long
and meritorious service as, in their Lordships' opinion, should be
disqualified by age or infirmity from serving as flag-officers, and that
such officers should have the title of Superannuated Eear-Admirals.
In the vulgar speech of the day these were usually called " Yellow
Admirals." In a promotion made by the Board of Admii-alty on
September '24th, 1787, sixteen captains had been advanced to the
flag, while upwards of forty had been passed over. The gi'eater
number of these last had been offered transfer to the superannuated
list ; but, believing themselves fully competent to serve as active
flag-officers ; and believing, also, that their past services fully entitled
them to promotion on the active hst, they refused the retirement
that was offered them, and sought to be reinstated in the Hne
of active promotion. The policy which had been pursued by the
Admiralty occasioned great dissatisfaction amongst naval officers,
who discovered with misgiving that their expectations of rank, as
a reward for long and meritorious serAnce, might be altogether
dependent upon the caprice of a First Lord of the Admiralty. It
was for this reason that Lord Eawdon brought the case before
the House of Lords.
He moved " that a humble address be presented to His Majesty,
' A captain of March 9th, 1748, wlio, iu the ordinary course, would have become
a Rear- Admiral in 1778 or 1779 : yet, though he had lobt an arm in action, he was
neither promoted nor superannuated. He appears to have died in 1788.
1787.] rnOMOTION TO FLAC-ltANK. 345
praying that he will be graciously pleased to take into his royal
consideration the services of such captains of His Majesty's Navy
as were passed over in the last promotion of admirals." Lord
Howe, as First Lord, rose at once to oppose the motion, and to justify
his own action. He pointed out that there were several I'easons,
which might reasonably excuse an official in his position for passing
over a number of captains. Those who were likely to be entrusted
with the care of our fleets ought to be men sound in mind and
body, and capable of enduring the hard service which would lie
before them in war time. It did not necessarily follow that an
officer, who had served ably and meritoriously in a subordinate
position, was fit to be entrusted with the care of a fleet. A sergeant
of grenadiers, though an able and excellent soldier, might not be
quahfied to command a Ijody of troops on a forlorn hope. The
First Lord was responsible for the good conduct and well-being
of the service ; and, having such responsibility, he was necessarily
justified in exercising his judgment and discretion in the appoint-
ment of officers by whom the fleet was to be led. At the same
time he could not, in any public assembly, state the particular
reasons which had influenced his judgment in coming to a con-
clusion on each case. He could only say that he had acted with
the strictest impartiality. Had the officers who had been passed
over been advanced, as was suggested, and had they been called
into active service, as would probably have been the case, they
must have gone on being promoted from time to time, subject only
to the contingency of death ; and they might thus have stood in
the way of many officers from whose services the country would
have derived the highest degree of advantage. Finally, he pointed
out that the principles which had governed the late promotion were
not without precedent.'
The Earl of Sandwich also opposed the motion. It had been
found, he said, at different periods extremely inconvenient and
detrimental to the service that promotions to the flag should be
governed merely by seniority. In the year 1747 a promotion had
been necessary ; and those then on the Board of Admiralty had
been aware that there were then on the list of captains several
officers who were in an eminent degree qualified for the connnand
of fleets ; but they had not, at first, known how to get at them
without loading the public with unjustifiable expense. They had
' lustancing a iiroiiiution made in 1770, when Lord Hawke had been First Lord.
346 CIVIL inSTOin' of the royal navy, 17(53-1711:^. [1787.
therefore planned the superannuation list, the object of which was
to provide an income for such captains as the Board of Admiraltj',
not meaning to call them out for further service, omitted to appoint
to the flag in the rota of seniority. At the time of instituting the
establishment the object was to make eight flag-officers only ; and, in
order to do that, nineteen captains were passed over. Yet the
matter had not been taken notice of in the House of Commons,
nor had there been any complaint of injustice or partiality. Those
captains who had been put upon the superannuation list were not
in any wise disgraced nor even stigmatised ; they merely entered
what was an honourable retirement from service.
Lord Eawdon's motion was negatived without a division. But
on April 12th the subject was again brought forward in the House
of Commons by Mr. Bastard, who particularly devoted himself to
the cases of Captains Balfour ' and Thompson,- who, although
they had received the thanks of the House for their behaviour
on April 12th, 1782, had, when they reached the top of the
captains' list, been passed over. Naval opinion in the House was
divided. Captain Sir George Collier and Captain John Macbride
contending that such a principle as had been followed by Lord
Howe in 1787 must inevitably lead to the ruin of the service, and
Captain Lord Mulgrave and Vice-Admiral Lord Hood being of
opinion that any interference on the part of the House might
eventuallj' prove more detrimental than advantageous to the Navy.
At the same time it seemed to be admitted on all sides that several
officers who had been passed over did not appear to be in any
respect disqualified for the rank to which, in the ordinary course
of advancement, they were entitled. Finding, however, that the
wording of his motion did not meet with favour, Mr. Bastard
withdrew it, promising to bring forward the subject later in some
other shape.
Accordingly, on April 18th he moved " that the House resolve
itself into a committee of the whole House to inquire into the
conduct of the Board of Admiralty touching the late promotion
to the flag." In support of his motion Mr. Bastard cited the
cases not only of Captains Balfour and Thompson, but also those
' George Balfour, Captain, July 26tli, 1758 ; superaund. Eear-Admiral, 1787 ; died,
June 28tb, 1794.
^ Samuel Thompson, Captain, November 4tli, 17G0 ; superannd. Kear-Admiral,
1788 ; died, August 13th, 1813.
^iS^itti^u'-^Uii-ul^.
za/p/a/n . t^Ax
O
//^.
Vj/ia^n- _^.*.v ,.yM\^y^-^€<>n^ ,
,-«5«««: i^*W;<**^^e*t- JZ . _^^«.a^^-
1787.] SENIORITY V. SELECTION. 'Ml
of Captains Sanuu^l LTvodalo, 'i'hoinas Shirley, Jnlm V>v;i\, and
John Laforey, most of whom had served with distinction in war;
and he pointed out that, although it might be alleged that Captain
Bray had not been promoted because, during the last war, he
had been employed on shore in tlu; impress service, and that
Captain Laforey ^ had been set aside l)ecause he had previously
accepted the post of Commissioner of the Navy at Antigua, and,
later, at Plymouth, Sir Charles Middleton, even while actually
serving in a civil capacity,'' had been promoted, apparently, as
a matter of course. Both Pitt and Fox took part in the debate.
The latter, who supported the motion, urged that the rank of
flag-officer ought to be considered from two points of view. The
principal view was undoubtedly prospective, and looked to future
service ; and, from that point of view, selection was proper and
justifiable. But the rank might also be looked upon as an honour
and reward for past services ; and, from that point of view, the
promotion of 1787 could not be defended for a moment, and was
most scandalously partial and unjust. And, he said, as proof that
the Admiralty, at least in some cases, considered promotion as a
reward for past services, he might cite the advancement of Sir
John Lindsay, who, though an officer of first-rate reputation, was
well known to be in so bad a state of health that there was no
hope of his ever being able to resume an active career.^ Upon
the question being put, the House divided, and the motion was
lost by sixteen votes in a House of two hundred and eighty-
four.
The smallness of the majority encouraged Mr. Bastard to make
a third attempt; and on April 29th he moved "that it is highly
injurious to the service, and unjust, to set aside from promotion
to the flag meritorious ofticers of approved services, who are not
prechided by the orders of His Majesty in Council." On that
occasion the motion was defeated by a majority of fifty-one in a
House of three hundred and eighty-nine.
The institution of a naval uniform for certain officers has been
noticed in a previous chapter. As early as 1767, within twentj'
' Laforey was eventually promoted, his commission as a flag-officer being ante-dated
so as not to deprive him of any seniority.
^ i.e., as Controller. Sir Charles was afterwards created Lord Barham.
^ In point of fact, he died on June 4th, 1788, having been promoted only on
September 24th, 1787.
3-18 CIVJL III^TOllY OF THE liOYAL NAVY, 17G:i-17'J2. [1763-92.
years of that institution, alterations were made by an Admiralty
order of July I8th of that year, worded as follows : —
It is His Majesty's pleasure tliat tlie embroidered unilbnu clothing of Hag ofticers,
and the full dress uniibrm of Captains, Coininanders, and Lieutenants of His Majesty's
fleet, bn discontinued, andithat the frock uniform clothing of the said officers be likewise
altered and worn as follows: The Admiral's frock to have narrow lappels down to the
waist ; small boot cuffs ; a single lace instead of treble lace down to the skirts — a plaiu
niusquetairc lace; but in all other respects the same as now worn. The Captains' and
Commanders' frocks to liave narrow lappels down to the waist, and in all other respects
as they are now wm-n. 'I'lie Lieutenants' frocks to have narrow la])pels down to the
waist, flash cuffs like the commanders', witliout lace, instead of roll cufts, and in all
other respects as now worn.
Another modification was made in January, 1768, when the
King signified his pleasure that the lappels and cuffs of the military
uniform frocks appointed to be worn by the Lieutenants should be
thenceforth of white, instead of blue cloth, and the waistcoat, etc.,
of plain white cloth, with gilt buttons of the pattern previously
worn, without any lace. In 1774 another alteration was made in
the uniform of Captains and Commanders ; and it was directed that
the uniforms so altered should be considered as full dress, and
that a blue frock with embroidered button-holes, conformable to
a pattern lodged at the Navy Office, might be worn upon common
occasions. The altered uniform was thus described : —
The lace on the coat to returu round the pockets and sleeves; the lappels and
cufl's to be two incheii and a half broad ; the lace ujwn the upper part of the lap])els to
run even with the bottom lace of the collar; the buttons to be flat, wiih an anchor
and cable engraved tliereon, according to the pattern lodged at the Navy Office ; the
waistcoat to be plain instead of laced ; the breeches to be of the same colour as the
waistcoat, instead of blue, and both to have buttons of the same pattern as those on
the coat. The undress uniform was to have blue frock lappels, and collar and cuffs of
the same ; but the collar was to button on to the lappels and lap over behind ; the
lining to be of white shalloon ; the buttons to be the same as on the dress coat, and the
buttonholes to be gold embroidered according to the following scheme : for Captains
who had taken post three years or upwards, twelve holes in the lappels, by threes,
three on the flaps, and three on the sleeves ; for Post Captains of less than three years'
standing, twelve holes in the lappels, by twos, four holes on the flaps, and three on the
sleeves ; and for Commanders, twelve holes in the lappels disposed regularly, with three
holes on the flaps and three on the sleeves ; and waistcoat and breeches to be the same
as for the dress uniform.
In 1783 there was another alteration, the uniforms then being —
For Admirals, blue cloth coat, with white cuti[s, white waistcoat and breeches. The
coat and waistcoat to be embroidered with gold, in pattern and description the same as
that worn by generals in the army, with three rows of embroidery on the cuffs. For
Vice- Admirals the same, but with embroidery the same as worn by lieutenant-generals
in the army, and with two rows of embroidery on the cufl's. For Rear- Admirals the
1703-92.] NAVAL UMFUUMH. 349
fiaiiie, but with embroidery similai' to tliat worn by iiiajur-geiierals in tlie aniiy, ami
with one row of embroidery on the cufts. Tlic buttons were to remain as before.
The above were the full di-ess uiiiloiius. The miilfess luiiloniis
were —
For Admirals, a lilue cloth frock with blue culfs and blue la|.]>cls; emljroidered
buttonholes, lilve those i)reviously in use, from the top to the bottom of the lappels,
and three lioles on the cuffs; ibr Vice- Admirals, the same, with buttonholes arranged
three and three; for Hear-Admirals, the sanu", with Imttdnlmles arranged two .and two.
All to wear plain white waistcoat and bi'eeches.
On November 17th, 1787, more extensive chan<;;es were made,
in accordance with the following instructions : —
Admirals' frocks ; blue cloth, with bhie lappels and culfs; g(jld-lace holes, three,
pointing at the end, with the same distinction in the disposition for the difterent ranks
as before; stand-up collar, with one hole on each side; three holes in the tiaps, three
on the outside cuffs, and three behind; white liiung, and new anchor buttons with
laurel.
Post Captains of three years' standing ; full dress : blue cloth coat with white lapjiels
and cuffs, laced with gold lace; the pockets double laced; round culfs with two laces;
three buttons to the pockets and cuffs ; blue stand-up collar, double laced ; white
lining; new buttons with anchoi- in an nval; white cloth waistcoat, and breeches
plain. Frocks: blue cloth coat witli l)lu<' la])pels and round cufts; fall-down collar;
gold laced holes square at both ends, regular in the lappels ; two to the pockets and two
to the cufts; none behind; white lining; buttons the same as in full dress; white cloth
waistcoat, and breeches plain.
Post Captains of under three years' standing ; full dress : blue coat with white
lappels and cuHs, laced with gold lace; pockets with one lace; round cuffs with one
lace ; three buttons to the pockets and cuff's ; blue stand-up collar double laced ; white
lining; buttons as before-mentioned; white cloth waistcoat, and breeches plain.
Frocks: blue cloth coat ; blue lappels ; blue round cufts; fall-down collar ; gold laced
lioles square at both ends; nine holes in the lappel by threes, tw^o to the pockets, and
two to the cuffs ; none behind; white lining ; buttons the same as in full dress ; white
cloth waistcoat, and breeches plain.
Masters and Commanders ; full dress : blue cloth coat with lilue lappels and round
cufts, laced with gold lace; the pockets once laced, with one lace on the cuffs ; three
buttons [o each ; stand-up collar, double laced ; white lining ; buttons as before ;
white cloth waistcoat, and breeches plain. Pi-ocks : blue coat, with blue lajipels ;
round cufts and fall-dow'n collar ; gold laced holes, square at each end ; ten holes in
the lappels by two and two; two to the pockets, and two to the cuffs; none behind:
white lining ; buttons as before; wliite cloth waistcoat, and breeches plain.
Lieutenants; full dress: blue cloth coat, with white lappels; blue round cuff's:
holes regidar in the lappels; three buttons to the pockets, and three to the cufl's;
stand-vq) collar ; white lining; buttons as for the Captains ; white cloth waistcoat, and
breeches plain. Undress : blue cloth coat, edged with white cloth ; blue lappels, and
blue round cuff's; three btittons to the pockets and cuft's ; stand-up collar; buttons as
above ; white cloth waistcoat, and breeches plain.
Warrant officers: blue cloth coat, with blue lappels and round cuft's; fall-down
•collar ; three buttons to the pockets and cuft's ; white lining, but not edged with white ;
buttons with an anchor, like the buttons previously worn by Captains : white cloth
waistcoat and breeches.
359 CIVJL mSTOBY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1703-1792. [1781-88.
Masters' Mates : blue cloth eoat, edged witli wliite ; no iappeLs ; blue i-oiiiid cufi's,
with three buttons ; three to the pockets ; t'all-down collar ; white lining ; buttons as
lor the warrant officers ; white cloth waistcoat and breeches.
Midshipmen: blue cloth coat; no iappels ; blue round cuffs, with three buttons,
and three to the pockets; stand-up collar, with small white turn back as before; white
lining, but not edged ; buttons as for the warrant officers; while cloth waistcoat and
breeches.
The expedition of Commodore Johnstone in 1781 led up to
some interesting problems in naval law. Johnstone caused Captain
Evelyn Sutton, of the Isis, to be tried by court-martial on a charge
of misconduct during the action in Porto Praya Bay. Sutton, being
honourably acquitted, brought a civil action for damages against
Johnstone in the Court of Exchequer, and obtained a verdict for
£.5000. A new trial was demanded and Sutton thereupon secured
a verdict for £(5000. Johnstone procured a reversal of the judgment
on a writ of error ; and Sutton ultimately took the case to the
House of Lords, which, in May, 1787, afdrmed the reversal of
the judgment. Lord Howe declaring that to establish the verdict
would be to subvert the good order and discipline of the Navy.
Sutton in consequence lost his case.
Another problem, arising out of the captures made by Johnstone
in Saldanha Bay, was detennined in June, 1786, when, on an appeal
from the Court of Admiralty to the Lords of the Council, it was
decided that, since the destination of Johnstone's force had been
the Cape of Good Hope, and, seeing that a considerable land force,
under General Meadows, had been on board and had shared in the
action, the capture did not come under the provisions of the Prize
Act. The whole of the property was claimed by, and would go
to, the Crown ; and the captors must relinquish aU hope of prize-
money in respect of it, and look merely to the royal bounty for any
compensation which they might eventually obtain.
Yet another interesting and rather celebrated point in naval
law was threshed out in 1788. In May of that year Captain Isaac
Coffin, of the Tliishe, had been tried by court-martial at Halifax, N.S.,
on a charge of making false musters, in that he had kept on his
ship's books one of his own nephews and two sons of Lord Dor-
chester, who had, it appeared, not been actually on board, conform-
ably with the rules of the Navy. The charge had been proved ;
but as it had seemed to the court that it had been brought forward
mainly in consequence of private pique and resentment, and that
the accused officer had not intended to defraud His Majesty, Coffin
1788.] ADMIRALTY REVISION OF SENTENCES. 351
had been sentenced only to be dismissed from the command of tlie
Thisbe. When the ofiicer arrived in Eiif^dand, Earl Howe, who
was then First Lord of the Admiralty, so stron<^ly disapproved of
the sentence, which he believed to be not in accordance with the
spirit of the 31st Article of War, that he induced the Board to
strike Coffin's name off the list of post captains. The Article in
question declared, "Every officer, or other person in the fleet,
who shall knowingly make or sign a false muster, or muster-book,
etc., upon proof of any such offence being made before a court-
martial, shall be cashiered and rendered incapable of further employ-
msnt in his Majesty's naval service." Coffin laid his case before
the King, who, with the assent of the Privy Council, directed the
twelve judges to give their opinion as to whether the Admiralty
had the power to set aside the judgment of the court-martial. The
judges decided that the Admiralty's sentence was not legal, and that
the punishment directed to be inflicted by the Act of 22 George II.,
cap. 33, upon persons convicted of the offence set forth in the 31st
Article of War established by the said Act, could not be inflicted,
nor judgment thereon be pronounced or supplied, by any other
authority than that of the court-martial which tried the ofl'ender.
Coffin was thereupon reinstated in his rank, and after having served
as Commissioner in Corsica, at Sheerness, etc., died an Admiral and
a Baronet in 1839, in his eighty-first year.
Questions concerning the right of search and the honour of the
flag cropped up as in previous periods. In 1780, a squadron
which, under Captain Charles Feilding (1), had been despatched
for the purpose, intercepted, west of the Isle of Wight, a Dutch
convoy escorted by two sail of the line and two frigates, under Kear-
Admiral Count Lodewijk van Bylandt. Feilding demanded to
examine the merchantmen, which were suspected of having on board
naval stores for France. Van Bylandt resisted, and fired at some
boats which had been sent to board the convoy. Feilding thereupon
fired a shot ahead of the Dutch rear-admiral, who replied by dis-
charging a broadside at the Nainur, and, when it was returned,
struck. Seven of the merchantmen were detained.
In 1791, Commodore the Hon. William Cornwallis, having
received intelligence that some neutral ships under French colours
were expected on the Malabar coast, with supplies for Tippoo Sultan,
found two of them in Mahe Eoad. They refused to be examined,
pleading in particular that they were then in their own port ; but
352 CIVIL TllSTOltY OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 1703-1792. [1763-92.
Commander Edward James Foote, of the Afalaiita, 14, sent a party,
which liroke open the hatchways. The examination, however, seems
to have been considered by the Commodore to be inconclusive ; and,
a httle later, when the two French vessels sailed in company with
the French frigate Besolu, 32, they were followed by the Phcpnix, 3(5,
and Persevercaice, 3(5. The former got up with the French frigate
off Mangalore, and was hailed to know what she wanted. Captain
Sir Richard John Strachan replied that he had orders to board the
merchantmen. While his boats were occupied on that service
they were fired at by the Besolu, which presently also discharged
a broadside at the PJianix. An action resulted ; and in twenty-
five minutes the Frenchman strack, having lost 25 killed and
40 wounded. The Phanix lost only 6 killed and 11 wounded. A
renewed examination of the merchantmen showed that they had no
contraband of war on board ; and they were suffered to proceed on
their voyage.
A noteworthy case of the insistance of the right of the flag
happened in 1769, when a Fiench frigate anchored in the Downs
and neglected to pay the usual comphment. Captain John Hollwell
sent a Heutenant to demand the salute. The French captain refused
compliance, whereupon Hollwell ordered the Hawke, 10, to fire two
shots over her. This induced her to concede the point without
further dispute.
Though the British Navy was thus jealous of its privileges, the
relations between it and other countries upon the high seas were in
some respects courteous and pleasant. In 1779, the French court
chivalrously issued orders that the British circumnavigators, James
Cook and Charles Clark, were on no account to be molested,
although a state of war existed at the time. In 1785, when La
Perouse ^ set out from Brest on his great voyage of discovery, the
Admiralty and Royal Society furnished him with copies of all such
observations and charts as could be of use to him, and gave him also
Cook's timekeeper and azimuth compass.
' Jean Francois de Galaup, Comte de La Perouse. Born, 17-11. Attacked British
settlements in Hudson's Bay, 1782. Perished off Vanicoro Island, 1788. His fate was
not ascertained until 1827, by Dumont d'Urville.
CHAPTER XXXI.
MAJOR OPERATIONS OF THE ROYAL NAVY, 17G2-1783.»
Decisive Influence of Control ol' the Water in the American Revolution — The Lake
Campaign of 1776 — Attack upon Charleston, S. C. — Combined Military and Xaval
Operations about New York and Philadelphia, 1776-1778 — Howe and d'Estaing,
1778 — Battle of Ushant, July, 1778 — Barrington at St. Lucia, December, 1778
— Byron off Grenada, July, 1779 — Franco-Spanish Fleet in tbe Channel, 1779 —
Rodney and Langara, January, 1780 — Rodney at Gibraltar, and in the West
Indies, 1780 — Combined Naval and Military Operations in Southern States,
1779-1781 — Arbuthnot anddes Touches off the Chesapeake, March, 1781 — Hood
and de Grasse off Martinique, April, 1781 — Graves and de Grasse off the Chesa-
peake, September, 1781, and Capitulation of Yorktovvn — Relief of Gibraltar, and
Allied Fleet in the Channel, 1781 — Hyde Parker's Action with tbe Dutch Fleet,
August, 1781 — Kempenfelt and de Guichen, December, 1781 — Hood and de
Grasse at St. Kitts, January, 1782 — Rodney's Victory over de Grasse, April,
1782 — Howe's Relief of Gibraltar, October, 1782 — Military and Naval Operations
in India, 1778-1783 — Saffron's Campaign in India, and Actions with Johnstone
and Hughes, 1781-1783.
A^
COMMEMORATIVE MEDAL OF KEPPEL 5 ACTION OFF
USHANT, 177y.
{From an oritjinal lent bij Capt. H. S, H. Prince Louis
of Baltenberg, E. N.)
T the time when hostilities
began between Great
Britain and her American
Colonies, the fact was realised
generally, being evident to
reason and taught by experi-
ence, that control of the \^"ater.
both ocean and inland, wonld
have a preponderant effect
npon the contest. It was clear to reason, for there was a long
seaboard with numerous interior navigable watercourses, and at the
same time scanty and indifferent communications by land. Critical
portions of the territory involved were yet an unimproved wilderness.
Experience, the rude but efficient schoolmaster of that large portion
of mankind which gains knowledge only by hard knocks, had con-
tirmed through the preceding French wars the inferences of the
thoughtful. Therefore, conscious of the great superiority of tlie
* Copijright, 1S98, By A. T. Maitan.
VOL. Ill — 23
;354 MAJOR Ol'KliATIONS. 1702-178:5. [177.').
liiitisli Navy, which, liowevt-r, liad not then atfciiiied the uuehiil-
lenged supremacy oi a hitcr ilaj-, the Ameiican leaders early sougiit
the alliance of the Bourbon kingdoms, the liereditaiy enemies of
Great Britain. There alone could be found the counterpoise to a
power which, if unchecked, must ultimately prevail.
Nearly three 3-ears elapsed before the Colonists accomplished this
object, by giving a demoustration of their strength in the enforced
surrender of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. This event has merited
the epithet " decisive," because, and only because, it decided the in-
tervention of France. It may be affirmed, with little hesitation, that
it was at once the result of naval force, and the cause that naval
force, entering further into the contest, transformed it from a local
til a universal war, and assured the independence of the Colonies.
That the Americans were strong enough to impose the capitula-
tion of Saratoga, was due to the invaluable year of dela}-, secured
to them by their little navy on Lake Champlain, created by the
indomitable energy, and handled with tlie indomitable courage, of
the traitor, Benedict Arnold. That the war spread from America
to Europe, from the English Channel to the 15altic, from the Bay
of Biscay to the Mediterranean, from the West Indies to the Missis-
sippi, and ultimately involved the w'aters of the remote peninsula of
Hindostan, is traceable, through Saratoga, to the rude flotilla w^hieh
in 1776 anticipated its enemy in the possession of Lake Champlain.
The events which thus culminated merit therefore a clearer under-
standing, and a fuller treatment, than their intrinsic importance and
pettjr scale would justify otherwise.
In 1775, only fifteen years had elapsed since the exjiulsion of the
French from the North American continent. The concentration of
their power, during its continuance, in the valley of the St. Law-
rence, had given direction to the local conflict, and had impressed
upon men's minds the importance of Lake Champlain, of its tribu-
tarj- Lake George, and of the Hudson lliver, as forming a consecu-
tive, though not continuous, water line of communications from the
St. Lawrence to New York. The strength of Canada against attack
b\- land lay in its remoteness, in the wilderness to be traversed be-
fore it was reached, and in the strength of the line of the St. Law-
rence, with the fortified posts of Montreal and Quebec on its northern
bank. The wilderness, it is true, interposed its passive resistance to
attacks from Canada, as well as to attacks upon it : but when it had
been traversed, there were to the southward no such strong natural
1775.]
THE MILITARY ai.VDlTluN.S OF THE NORTU.
355
positions confronting tho assail-
ant. Attacks from the south
fell upon the front, or at best
upon the flank, of the line of
the St. Lawrence. Attacks from
Canada took New York and its
dependencies in the rear.
These elements of natural
strength, in the military con-
ditions of the North, were im-
pressed upon the minds of the
Americans by the prolonged re-
sistance of Canada to the greatly
superior numbers of the British
Colonists in the previous wars.
Regarded, therefore, as a base
for attacks, of a kind with which
they were painfully familiar, but
to be undergone now under
disadvantages of numbers and
power never before experienced,
it was desirable to gain posses-
sion of the St. Lawrence and its
posts before they were strengtli-
ened and garrisoned. At this
outset of hostilities, the Ameri-
can insurgents, knowing clearly
their own minds, possessed the
advantage of the initiative over
the British government, which
still hesitated to use against
those whom it styled rebels the
preventive measures it would
have taken at once against a
recognised enemy.
Laider these circumstances,
in May, 1775, a body of two hun-
dred and seventy Americans, led
by Ethan Allen and Benedict
Arnold, seized the posts of Ti-
356 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17(iJ-1783. [1775.
conderoga and Crown Point, which were inadequately garrisoned.
These are on the upper waters of Lake Chanijilain, where it is le^ss
tiiau a tliird of a mile wide; Ticonderoga being on a peninsula
formed by the lake and the inlet from Lake George, Crown Point
on a promontory twelve miles lower down. They were recognised
positions of importance, and advanced posts of the British in pre-
vious Mars. A schooner being fouiul there, Arnold, who had been
a seaman, embarked in her and hurried to the foot of the lake.
The wind failed him when still thirty miles from St. John's, another
fortified post on the lower narrows, where the lake gradually tapers
down to the Kichelieu River, its outlet to the St. Lawrence. Unable
to advance otherwise, Ariu)ld took to his boats with thirty men, pulled
tliroughout the night, and at six o'clock on the following morning
surprised the post, in which were only a sergeant and a dozen men.
He reaped the rewards of celerity. The prisoners informed him that
a considerable body of troops was expected from Canada, on its way
to Ticonderoga ; and this force m fact reached St. John's on the
next day. When it arrived, Arnold was gone, having carried off a.
sloop which he found there and destroyed everj^thing else that could
float. By such trifling means two active officers had secured the
temporary control of the lake and of its southern approaches. There
being no roads, the British, debarred from the water line, were unable
to advance. Sir Guy Carleton, Governor and Commander-in-Chief in
Canada, strengthened the works at St. John's, and built a schooner;
but his force was inadequate to meet that of the Americans.
The seizure of the two posts, being an act of offensive war, was
not at once pleasing to the American Congress, which still clung
to the hope of reconciliation ; but events were marching rapidly,
and ere summer was over the invasion of Canada was ordered. On
Septemljer 4th, General Montgomery, appointed to that enterprise,
embarked at Crown Point with two thousand men, and soon after-
wards appeared before St. John's, wliich, after prolonged operations,
capitulated on the 3rd of November. On the 13th Montgcmer}- en-
tered Montreal, and thence pressed down the St. Lawrence to Pointe
aux Trembles, twenty miles above Quebec. There he joined Arnold,
who in the month of October had crossed the northern wilderness,
between the head waters of the Kennebec River and the St. Law-
rence. On the way he had endured immense privations, losing five
hundred men of the twelve hundred with whom he started ; and
upon arriving opposite Quebec, on the 10th of November, three
1770.] THE BLOCKADE OF QUEBEC. 357
days had been unavoidably spent in collecting boats to pass the
river. Crossing on the night oi' the 13tli, this adventurous soldier
and his little command climbed the Heights of Abraham by the
same path that had served Wolfe so well sixteen years before.
With characteristic audacity \w summoned the place. The demand
of course was refused ; but that t'arleton did not fall at once upon
tlie little band of seven hundred that bearded him shows l)y how
feeble a tenure Great Britain tlien held Canada. Immediately after
the junction Montgomery advanced on Quebec, where he appeared
on the 5th of December. Winter having already begun, and neither
his numbers nor his equipments being adequate to regular siege
operations, he very properly decided to try the desperate chance of
an assault upon the strongest fortress in America. This was made
on the nigkt of December 31st, 1775. Whatever possibility of suc-
cess there ma}- have been, vanished with the death of Montgomery,
who fell at the head of his men.
The American army retired three miles up the river, went into
winter-quarters, and established a land blockade of Quebec, which
was cut off from the sea by the ice. " For five months," wrote
Carleton to the Secretary for War, on the 14th of May, 1776, " this
town has been closely invested by the rebels." From this unpleasant
position it was relieved on the 6th of May, when signals were ex-
changed between it and the Surprise, the advance ship of a squadron
under Captain Charles Douglas,^ which had sailed from England on
the 11th of March. Arriving off the mouth of the St. Lawrence,
on the morning of April 12th, Douglas found ice extending nearly
twenty miles to sea, and packed too closely to admit of working
through it by dexterous steering. The urgency of the case not ad-
mitting delay, he ran his ship, the Tsis, 50, with a sjDeed of five knots,
against a large piece of ice about ten or twelve feet thick, to test the
effect. The ice, probably softened b}' salt water and salt air, went
to pieces. " Encouraged by this experiment," continues Douglas,
somewhat magniticently, "we thought it an enterprise worthy an
English ship of the line in our King and country's sacred cause, and
an effort due to tlie gallant defenders of Quebec, to make the attempt
of pressing her by force of sail, through the thick, broad, and closely
connected fields of ice, to which we saw no bounds towards the west-
ern part of our horizon. Before night (when blowing a snow-storm,
1 Father of tlie late Sir Howard Douglas. He died a Rear-Admiial and
Baronet in 1789.
358 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-1783. [1776.
we Liought-to, or rather stoj)ped), we had penetrated about eiglit
leagues into it, describing our path all the way with bits of the
sheathing of tin; sliip's bottom, and sometimes pieces of the cutwater,
but none of tlie oak plank ; and it was pleasant enough at times,
when we stuck fast, to see Lord Petersham exercising his troops on
the crusted surface of that fluid through which the ship had so
recently sailed." It took nine days of this work to reach Anticosti
Island, after whicli the ice seems to have given no more trouble ;
but further delay was occasioned by fogs, calms, and head winds.
Upon the arrival of the ships of war the Americans at once
retreated. During the winter, tliough reinforcements must have
been received from time to time, they had wasted from exposure,
and from small-pox, which ravaged the camp. On the 1st of May
ihe returns showed nineteen hundred men present, of whom only a
thousand were fit for duty. There were then on hand liut thiee
days' provisions, and none other neai-er than St. John's. The in-
habitants would of course render no further assistance to the Araeri-
(;aus after the ships arrived. The Navy had again decided the fate
of Canada, and was soon also to determine that of Lake Champlain.
When two hundred troops had landed from the ships, Caileton
marched out, " to see," he said, " what these mighty boasters were
about." The sneer was unworthy a man of his generous character,
for the boasters had endured much for faint chances of success ; and
the smallness of the reinforcement which encouraged him to act
shows either an extreme prudence on his part, or the narrow margin
by «liich Quebec escaped. He found the enemy busy with prepara-
tions for retreat, and upon his appearance they abandoned their
camp. Their forces on the two sides of tlie river being now sepa-
rated by the enemy's shipping, the Americans retired first to Sorel,
where the Richelieu entei"s the St. Lawrence, and thence continued
to fall back by gradual stages. It was not until June loth that
Arnold quitted Montreal ; and at the end of June the united force
was still on the Canadian side of the present border line. On the 3rd
of July it reached Cro^\ai Point, in a pitiable state from small-pox
and destitution.
Both parties began at once to prepare for a contest upon Lake
Champlain. The Americans, small as their flotilla was, still kept the
superiority obtained for them Ity Arnold's promptitude a year before.
On the 25th of June the American General Schuyler, commanding
the Northern Department, wrote : " We have happily such a naval
177G.] TIIK LAKE C.IMI'.llf/.V. .'jr.9
superiority on Lake Chaniplain, that I have a conlideiit hope llie
enemy will not appear upon it this campaign, especially as our force
is increasing by the addition of gondolas, two neaily linisiied. Anmlil,
however," — whose technical knowledge caused him to be intrusted
with the naval preparations, — " says that 300 carpenters should lie
employed and a large number of gondolas, row-galleys, etc., be built,
twenty or thirty at least. There is great diriiculty in getting the
carpenters needed." Arnold's ideas were indeed ou a scale wortliy
of the momentous issues at stake. " To augment our navy on the
lake appears to me of the utmost importance. There is water be-
tween Crown Point and Pointe au Fer for vessels of the largest size.
I am of opinion that row-galleys are the best construction and chea}i-
est for this lake. Perhaps it may be well to have one frigate of -3(1
guns. She may carry 18-pounders on the Lake, and be superior to
any vessel that can be built or floated from St. -John's."
Unfortunately for the Americans, their resources in men and
means were far inferior to those of their opponents, who were able
eventually to carry out, though on a somewhat smaller scale, Arnold's
idea of a sailing ship, strictly so called, of force as yet unknown in
inland waters. Such a ship, aided as she was by two consorts of
somewhat similar character, dominated the Lake as soon as she was
afloat, reversing all the conditions. To place and equip her, however,
required time, invaluable time, during which Arnold's two schooners
exercised control. "If we could have begun our ex})edition foui-
weeks earlier," wrote Baron Riedesel, the commander of the (ieruian
contingent with Carleton, after examining the American position at,
Ticonderoga, " I am satisfied that everything \\ould have been ended
this year (1776); but, not having shelter nor other necessary things,
we were unable to remain at the other [southern] end of Chaniplain."
So delay favours the defence, and changes issues. What would have
been the effect upon the American cause if, simultaneously with the
loss of New York, August 20th-September 1.5th, had come the news
that Ticonderoga, wliose repute iov strength stood high, had also
fallen ? Nor was this all ; for in that event, the plan which was
wrecked in 1777 by Sir William Howe's ill-conceived expedition to
the Chesapeake, woiild doubtless have been carried out in 1776. In
a contemporar}' English paper occurs the following significant item :
" London, September 26th, 1776. Advices have been received here
from Canada, dated August 12th, that General Burgoyne's army has
found it impracticable to get across the lakes this season. The naval
360 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [177«.
force of the Provincials is too great for them to contend with at
present. They must build larger vessels for this purpose, and these
cannot be ready before next summer. The design vms^ IJiat tiie two
armies commanded by Generals Howe and Bui-goyne should co-
operate ; that they should both be on the Hudson River at the same
time ; that they should join about Albany, and thereby cut off all
communication between tiie northern and southern Colonies." ^
As Arnold's more amljitious scheme could not be realised, he had
to content himself with gondolas and galleys, for the force he was
to command as well as to build. The precise difference between the
two kinds of I'owing vessels thus distinguished by name, the writer
has not been able to ascertain. The gondola was a flat-bottomed boat,
and inferior in nautical qualities • — speed, handiness, and seaworthi-
ness — • to the galleys, which probably were keeled. The latter cer-
tainly carried sails, and may have been capable of beating to windward.
Arnold preferred them, and stopped the building of gondolas. " The
galleys,"' he wrote, " are quick moving, which will give us a great
advantage in the open lake." The complements of the galleys were
eighty men, of the gondolas forty-five ; from \\'hich, and from their
batteries, it may be inferred that the latter were between one third
and one half the size of the former. The armaments of the two were
alike in character, but those of the gondolas much lighter. American
accounts agree with Captain Douglas's report of one galley captured
by the British. In the Ijows, an 18 and a 12-pounder ; in the stern,
2 nines ; in broadside, from 4 to 6 sixes. There is in this a some-
what droll reminder of the disputed merits of bow, stern, and
broadside fire, in a modern iron-clad; and the practical conclusion
is much the same. The gondolas had one 12-pounder and 2 sixes.
All the vessels of both parties carried a numljer of swivel guns.
Amid the many difficulties which lack of resources imposed upon
all American undertakings, Arnold succeeded in getting afloat with
thi'ee schooners, a sloop, and five gondolas, on the 20th of August.
He cruised at the upper end of Chanq)lain till the 1st of September,
when he moved rapidly north, and on the 3rd anchored in tlie lower
narrows, twenty-five miles above St. John's, stretching his line from
shore to shore. Scouts had kept him informed of the f)rogress of
the British naval preparations, so that he knew that there was no
innnediate danger ; while an advanced position, maintained with a
bold front, would certainly prevent reconnoissances by water, and
•^ Author's italics. ^ Remembrancer, iv. 291.
1770.] THE LAKE CAMPAIGN. 361
possibly might impose somowliaL u[K)ii the enemy. The latter, iiow-
€ver, erected batteries on each side of the anchorage, compelling
Arnold to fall back to tlie broader Lake. He tlieii liul sdimdirigs
taken about Valcour Island, and between it and the western shore ;
that being the position in which he intended to make a stand. He
retired thither on the 23rd of September.
The British on their side had contended with no less obstacles
than their adversaries, though of a somewhat different chai'acter.
To get carpenters and materials to build, and seamen to man, were
the chief difficulties of the Americans, the necessities of the sea-
board conceding but partially the demands made upon it ; but their
vessels were built upon the shores of the Lake, and launched into
navigable waters. A large fleet of transports and ships of war in
the St. Lawi-ence supplied the British witli adequate resources, which
were utilised judiciously and energetically by Captain Douglas ; but
to get these to the Lake was a long and arduous task. A great
part of the Richelieu River was shoal, and obstructed by rapids.
The point where Lake navigation began was at St. John's, to which
the nearest approach, b}' a hundred-ton schooner, from the St. Law-
rence, was Chambly, ten miles below. Flat-boats and long-boats
could be dragged up stream, but vessels of any size had to he trans-
ported by land ; and the engineers found the roadbed too soft in
places to bear the weight of a hundred tons. Under Douglas's direc-
tions, the planking and frames of two schooners were taken down
at Chambly, and carried round by road to St. .John's, where they
were again put together. At Quebec he found buikling a new hull,
(jf one hundred and eighty tons. This he took apart nearly to the
keel, shipping the frames in thirty long-boats, which the transport
captains consented to surrender, together with their cai'penters, for
service on the Lake. Drafts from the ships of war, and volunteers
from the transports, furnished a body of seven hundred seamen for
the same employment, — a force to which the Americans could op-
pose nothing equal, commanded as it was by regular naval officers.
Tiie largest vessel was ship-rigged, and had a battery of eighteen
12-pounders ; she was called the Inflexible, and was commanded by
Lieutenant John Schanck. The two schooners, Marin, Lieutenant
Starke, and Carlcton, Lieutenant James Richard Dacres, carried re-
spectively fourteen and twelve 6-pounders. Tiiese were the backbone
of the British flotilla. There were also a radeau, the Thunderer, and
a large gondola, the Loyal Convert, hoth iieavily armed; but, being
362 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17C2-178:J. [1770.
equally heavy of movement, they do not ai)peai' to have 2)layed any im-
portant part. Besides these, when the expedition started, there were
twenty gunboats, each carrying one fieldpiece, from twenty-fours to
il-pounders ; or, in some cases, howitzers.'
" By all these means," wrote Douglas on Jidy 21st, "our acquir-
ing an absolute dominion over Lake Chaniplain is not doubted of."
The expectation was perfectly sound. With a working breeze, the
Inflexible alone could sweep the Lake clear of all tliat floated on it.
Hut the element of time I'cmained. From the day of this wr-iting
till that on wliich he saw the Inflexible leave St. John's, October
4th, was over ten weeks ; and it was not until the 9th that Carleton
was read}' to advance with the squadron. By that time the Ameri-
can troops at the head of the Lake had increased to eight or ten
thousand. The British land force is reported ^ as thirteen thousand,
of which six thousand were in garrison at St. John's and else-
where.
Arnold's last reinforcements reached him at ^''alcour on the Gth
of October. On that day, and in tlie action of the 11th, he had with
him all the American vessels on the Lake, except one schooner and
one galle}'. His force, thus, was two schoonere and a sloop, broad-
side vessels, besides four gallej-s and eight gondolas, whicli may be
assumed reasonably to have depended on tlieir bow guns ; there, at
least, was their heaviest fire. Thus reckoned, his flotilla, disposed to
the best advantage, could l)ring into action at one time, 2 eighteens,
18 twelves, 1 nine, 2 sixes, 12 fours, and 2 2-pounders, independent
of swivels : total, 32 guns, out of eighty-four that were mounted in
lifteen vessels. To this the British had to oj^pose, in three broadside
\-essels, 9 twelves and 13 sixes, and in twenty gunboats, 20 other
brass guns, " from twenty-fours to nines, some with howitzei-s ; " *
total, 42 guns. In this statement the radeau and gondola have not
been included, because of their immanageableness. Included as
broadside vessels, they would raise the British armament — by 3
twenty-fours, 3 twelves, 4 nines, and a howitzer — to a total of .53
guns. Actuall}", thej- could be brought into action only under ex-
ceptional cii'cumstances, and are more properly omitted.
1 The radeau had six 24-iiouiKlei"S, six 12's, and two howitzers; the gondola,
seven 9-poimders. The particulars of armament are from Douglas's letters.
- By American reports. Beatson gives the force sent out, in the spring of 1776,
as 13,357. (' Mil. and Kav. Memoirs,' vi. 44.)
^ Douglas's letters.
177(i.J THE L.IKi: CAM I'. lies. 363
These minutise are necessary for llu; [jropcr appreciaticui ol" wlial.
Captain Douglas justly called ''a nionunildMs cvcut." It was a strife
of pigmies for the prize of a continent, ami (he headers are entiUrd
to full credit both for their antecedent energy and for llirii- dispo-
sitions in the contest ; not least the unhappy man who, liaving done
so much to save his country, afterwards l^lasted liis name by a ti'ca-
son unsurpassed in modern war. Energy and audacity liad so fai-
preserved the Lake to the Americans; Arnold drtermincd to have
one more try of the chances. H(i did nol know tin; full force of
the enemy, but he expected that " it would he \ery formidable, if
not eijual to ours." ' The season, howcvcu', was so near its end that
a severe check would equal a defeat, and woidd postpone C'arleton's
further advance to the next spring. licisidcs, what was the worth of
such a force as the American, such a flotilla, under the guns of Ticon-
deroga, the Lake being lost? It was eminently a case for taking
chances, even if the detachment should be sacrificed, as it was.
Arnold's original purpose had been to fight under way ; and it
was from this point of view that he valued the galleys, because of
their mobility. It is uncertain wIumi he first learned of the rig and
battery of the Infleo:ille ; '^ but a good look-out was kept, and the
British squadron was sighted from Valcour when it quitted the nar-
rows. It may have been seen even earlier; for Carleton had l)een
informed, erroneously, that the Anierieans were near Grand Island,
which led him to incline to that side, and so t)pen out Valcour
sooner. The British anchored for the ingiit of October 10th, be-
tween Grand and Long- Islands. Getting under way next morning,
they stood up the Lake with a strong north-east wind, keef)ing along
Grand Island, upon which their attention douljtless was fastened by
the intelligence which they had received : ))nt it was a singular negli-
gence thus to run to leeward with a fair wind, without thorough
scouting on both hands. The consequence was that the American
flotilla was not discovered until Valcour Island, which is from one
hundred and twenty to one hundred and eighty feet high through-
out its two miles of length, was so far passed that the attack had
to be made from the south, — from K-eward.
^ Douglas thought that the appearance ul' the Injicxihle was a complete surprise;
Ijut Aiuold had been informed that a tliird vessel, larger than the schooners, was
being set up. With a man of his character, it is impossible to be sure, from his
letters to his sujierior, how much he knew, ur what he withheld.
2 Now calh-d North Hero.
36 J- MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-1783. [1770.
AVheii the British were first made out, Arnold's second in com-
mand, Waterbiny, urged tliat in view of tlie enemy's superiority tlie
flotilla should get under way at once, and fight them " on a retreat
in the main Lake ; " the harbor being disadvantageous " to fight a
number so much superior, and the enemy being able to surround us
on every side, we lying between an island and the main." With
sounder judgment, Arnold decided to hold on. A retreat before
square-rigged sailing vessels having a fair wind, by a heterogeneous
force like his own, of unequal speeds and batteries, could result
only in disaster. Concerted fire and successful escape were alike
improbable ; and besides, escape, if feasible, was but throwing up the
game. Better trust to a steady, well-ordered position, developing
the utmost fire. If the enemy discovered him, and came in by the
northern entrance, there was a five-foot knoll in mid-channel which
might fetch the Ijiggest of them up ; if, as proved to be the case,
the island should be passed, and the attack should be made from
leeward, it probably would be partial and in disorder, as also hap-
pened. The correctness of Arnold's decision not to chance a retreat
was shown in the retreat of two days later.
Valcour is on the west side of the Lake, about three quarters
of a mile from the main ; but a peninsula projecting from the island
at mid-length narrows this interval to a half-mile. From the ac-
counts, it is clear that the American flotilla lay south of this penin-
sula. Arnold had, therefore, a reasonable hope that it might be
passed undetected. Writing to Gates, the commander-in-chief at
Ticonderoga, he said : " There is a good harbor, and if the enemy
venture up the Lake it will be impossible for them to take advan-
tage of our situation. If we succeed in our attack upon them, it
will be impossible for any to escape. If we are worsted, oui- retreat
is open and free. In case of wind, which generally blofls fresh at
this season, our craft ^^ill make good weather, while theirs cannot
keep the Lake." It is appareut from this, written three weeks be-
fore the battle, that he then was not expecting a force materially
different from liis own. Later, he describes his jiosition as being
" in a small bay on the west side of the island, as near together as
possible, and in such a form that few vessels can attack us at the
same time, and those will be exposed to the fire of the whole
fleet." Though he unfortunately gives no details, he evidently had
sound tactical ideas. The formation of the anchored vessels is de-
scribed by the British officers as a half-moon.
177G.] TIIK LAKE CAMPAIGN. 365
When tlie Britisli discovered the enemy, they li;uUed uji for
them. Arnold ordered one of liis scliooners, tlie lti)ij(d S((V(((j<\ and
the fonr galleys, to get undin- way; the two other seliooners and
the eight gondolas remaining at their anchors. The Royal iiava(jt\
dropping to leeward, — by bad management, Arnold says, — came,
apparently nnsupported, under the distant fin; of the Inflexible, as
she drew under the lee of Valcour at 11 a.m., followed by the
Carleton, and at greater distance by the Maria and the gunboats.
Three shots from the ship's 12-pounders struck the Royal Savage,
which then ran ashore on the southern point of the island. The
Inflexible, followed closely by the Carleton, continued on, but firetl-
only occasionally ; showing that Arnold was kee[(ing his galleys in
hand, at long bowls, — as small vessels with one eighteen should be
kept, when confronted with a broadside of nine guns. Between
the island and the main the north-east wind doubtless drew more
northerly, adverse to the ships" approach ; but, a flaw off the cliffs
taking the fore and aft sails of the Carleton, she fetched " nearly into
the middle of the rebel half-moon, where Lieutenant J. R. Dacres in-
trepidly anchored with a spring on her cable." The Maria, on board
which was Carleton, together with Commander Thomas Pringle,
commanding the llotilla, was to leeward when the chase began, and
could not get into close action that day. By this time, seventeen
of the twenty gunboats had come up, and, after silencing the Royal
Savage, pulled up to within point-blank range of the American flotilla.
" The cannonade was tremendous," wrote Baron Riedesel. Lieutenant
Edward Longcroft, of the radeau Thunderer, not being able to get his
raft into action, went with a boat's ci'ew on board the Royal Savage,
and for a time turned her guns upon her former friends ; but the fu-e
of the latter forced him again to abandon her; and it seemed so likely
that she might be retaken that she was set on fire by Lieutenant
Starke of the Maria, when already " two rebel boats were very near
her. She soon after blew up." The American guns converging on
the Carleton in her central position, she suffered severely. Her com-
mander. Lieutenant Dacres, was knocked senseless ; another officer
lost an arm; only Mr. Edward Pellew, afterwards Lord Exmouth,
remained fit for duty. The spring being shot away, she swung bows
on to the enemy, and her fire was thus silenced. Captain Pringle
signalled to her to withdraw ; but she was unable to obey. To pay
her head off the right way, Pellew himself had to get out on the
bowsprit under a heavy fii'e of musketry, to bear the jib over to
;3G6 M.IJOll OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [177G.
windward; l)ut to wAw siiil seems to have been impossililc. Two
artillery boats wmv scut to her assistanee, "which towed her off
tiirough a very liiick lire, until out of farther reach, niueli to the
lionour of Mr. .Joiiii Cuiling and Mr. Patrick Carnegy, mastei-'s mate
and midshipman of tlie Tsis, who conducted them ; and of Mi'.
Ivlward rdlcw, mate of llie Blonde, wlio threw the tow-rope from
the Carlctoiis bowsprit." ' 'I'liis service on board the Carldun started
Pellew on his road to fortune ; but, singularly enough, the lii;utenaney
j)romised Ihm in consequence, by both the First Lord and Lord Howe,
was delayed by tlu; fact that he stayed at the front, instead of going
to the rear, wiiere he would have been " within their jurisdiction." ^
The Carleion had two feet of water in the hold, and had lost eight
killed and six wounded, — about half her crew, — when she anchored
out of lire. In tiiis small l)ut stirring business, the Americans, in
addition to the Royal Savar/c, had lost one gondola. Besides the
injuries to tlie Carleton, a British artilleiy boat, commanded by a
German lieutenant, was sunk. Towards evening the Inflexible got
within point-l)hink shot of the Americans, "when five broadsides,"
wrote Douglas, " silenced their whole line." One fresh ship, with
scantling for sea-going, and a concentrated battery, has an unques-
tioned advantage over a dozen light-built craft, carrying one or two
guns each, and a heady several hours engaged.
At nightfall the Inflexible dropped out of range, and the British
squadron anchored in line of battle across the southern end of the
passage between the island and the main ; some vessels were ex-
tended also to the eastward, into the open Lake. "The best part
of my intelligence," wrote Burgoyne next day from St. Jolin's, to
Douglas at Quebec, " is that our wliole fleet was formed in line
above the enemy, and consequently they must have surrendered this
morning, or given us battle on our own terms. The Indians and
light troops are abreast with the fleet; they cannot, therefore, escape
by land." Tlu? British squadron sharing this confidence, a proper
look-out was not kept. The American leader immediately held a
conference with his officers, and decided to attempt a retreat, "which
was done with such secrecy," wi-ites Waterhurj-, "that we went
through them entirely undiscovered." The movement began at
7 P.M., a galley leading, the gondolas and schooners following, and
Arnold and his second bringing up the rear in the two heaviest gal-
leys. This (hdicate operation was favoured by a heavy fog, which
1 Duiij^his's letter. - Sandwich to Pt-llew.
1770.] THE LAKE C.lMl'.lliiN. 367
(lid not (-Irar till iiuxt iiioi'iiing ;il cij^iit. As the Aiiun'icaii.s stole
I)y, tliey eoiild not see any of the lioslile ships. IJy daylight they
were out of sight of the British. Kiedesel, speaking of this event,
says, " 'J'he sliips anchored, secure of the enemy, who stole off
during the night, and sailing round the left wing, aided by a
favourable wind, escaped under darkness.'" The astonishnuait next
morning, he continues, was great, as was Carleton's rage. The hit-
ter started to pursue in such a hurry that he forgot to leave oider.s
for the troops which had been landed; but, failing to discover the
fugitives, he returned and remained at Valeour till nightfall, when
scouts brought word that tlie enemy were at Schuyler's Island, eight
miles above.
The retreat of the Americans had been embarrassed by tiieir
injuries, and by the wind coming out ahead. They were obliged to
anclior on the 12tli to repair damages, both hulls and sails having
suffered severely. Arnold took the precaution to write to Crown
Point for bateaux, to tow in case of a southerly wind ; but time was
not allowed for these to arrive. Two gondolas had to be sunk on
account of their injuries, making three of that class so far lost. The
retreat was resumed at 2 p.m., but the breeze was fresh from the
southward, and the gondolas made very little way. At evening the
British chased again. That night the wind moderated, and at day-
break the American flotilla was twenty-eight miles from Crown
Point, — fourteen from Valeour, — having still five miles' start.
Later, however, by Arnold's report, " the wind again breezed up to
the southward, so that we gained very little either by beating or row-
ing. At the same time the enemy took a fresli breeze from north-
east, and, bj' the time we had reached Split Rock, were alongside of
us." The galleys of Arnold and Waterbury, the Congress and the
Washington, had throughout kept in the rear, and now received the
l)rnnt of the attack, made by the Inflexible and the two schooners,
which had entirely distanced their sluggish consorts. This fight was
in the upper narrows, where the Lake is from one to three miles
wide ; and it lasted, by Arnold's report, for five glasses (two hours
and a half),^ the Americans continually retreating, until about ten
miles from Crown Point. There, the WasMnrjton having struck
some time before, and final escape being impossible, Arnold ran his
own galley and four gondolas ashore in a small creek on the east
side; pulling to windward, vath the cool judgment that had marked
1 Beatson, ' Niw. and Mil. Mpinoirs,' ."^ays two Iioiun.
368 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1770.
all Lis i-oiiduct, so that the enemy coulil not follow him — except in
.small boats with whii'li he could deal. There he set his vessels on
fire, and stood by them until assured tliat they would blow up with
their flags flying. He then retreated to Crown Point through the
woods, " despite tlic savages ; " a phrase which concludes this singu-
lar aquatic contest with a quaint touch of local colour.
In three days of fighting and retreating the Americans had lost
one schooner, two galleys, and seven gondolas, — in all, ten ves.sels
out of fifteen. The killed and wounded amounted to over eight}',
twenty odd of whom were in Arnold's galley. The original force,
numbering seven hundred, had been decimated. Considering its raw
material aud the recency of its organisation, words can scarcely exag-
gerate the heroism of the resistance, which undoubtedly depended
chiefly upon the personal military qualities of the leader. The Brit-
ish loss in killed and wounded did not exceed forty.
The little American navy on Champlain was wiped out; but
never had any force, big or small, lived to better purpose or died
more gloriously ; for it had saved the Lake for that j-ear. Whatever
deductions may be made for blunders, and for circumstances of every
character, which made the British campaign of 1777 abortive and
disastrous, and so led directly to the American alliance with France
in 1778, the delay, with all that it involved, was obtained Ijy the
Lake campaign of 1776. On October 15th, two days after Arnold's
final defeat, Caiieton dated a letter to Douglas from before Crown
Point, whence the American gan-ison was withdrawn. A week later
Riedesel arrived, and wrote that, " were our whole army here it
would be an easy matter to cMve the enemy from their entrench-
ments," at Ticonderoga, and — as has been quoted already — four
weeks sooner would have insured its fall. It is but a coincidence
that just four weeks had been required to set up the Inflexible at St.
John's ; but it typifies the whole story. Save for Arnold's flotilla,
the two British schooners would have settled the business. " Upon
the whole. Sir," wrote Douglas in his final letter from Quebec before
sailing for England, " I scruple not to say, that had not General Car-
leton authorised me to take the extraordinary measure of sending up
the Inflexible from Quebec, things could not this year have been
brought to so glorious a conclusion on Lake Champlain." Douglas
further showed the importance attached to this success by men of
that day, by sending a special message to the British ambassador at
Madrid, " presuming that the early knowledge of this great event
1770.] THE LAKE CAMPAIO.X. 369
in tlie southern parte of iMirope may bt; of lulvantage to His j\Iajes-
ty's service." That the opinion of the govc:riuiu;ut was similar may
be inferred from the numerous rewards bestowed. Carleton was
made a Knight of the Bath, and Doughxs a baronet.
In no case where the British and the Americans have met u[>on
the water, has a serious charge of [lersonal miscoudnct Itccu proved
against any individual ; and the galhxntry shown upon occasion by
both sides upon Lake Clmmplain in 1776, is evident from the fore-
going narrative. With regard to the dii'ection of movements, — the
skill of the two leaders, — the same equal credit cannot be assigned.
It was a very serious blunder, on October 11th, to run to leeward,
passing a concealed enemy, undetected, upon waters so perfectly well
known as those of Champlain were ; it having been the scene of fre-
quent Britisli operations in previous wars. Owing to this, " the
Maria, because of her distant situation (from which the Inflexible
and Carleton had chased by signal) when the rebels were first dis-
covered, and baffling winds, could not get into close action." ^ For
the same reason the Inflerihlc could not support the Ckirlcton. The
Americans, in the aggregate distinctly inferior, were thus permitted
a concentration of superior force upon part of their enemies. It is
needless to enlarge upon the mortifying incident of Arnold's escape
that evening. To liken small things to great, — always profitable
in military analysis, — it resembled Hood's slipping away from de
Grasse at St. Kitts.
In conduct and courage, Arnold's behaviour was excellent through-
out. Without enlarging upon the energy which created tlie flotilla,
and the breadth of view which suggested preparations that he could
not enforce, admiration is due to his recognition of the fact — im-
plicit in deed, if unexpressed in word — that the one use of the
navy was to contest the control of the water ; to impose delay, even
if it could not secure ultimate victory. No words could say more
clearly than do his actions that, under the existing conditions, the
navy was useless, except as it contributed to that end ; valueless, if
buried in jiort. Upon this rests the merit of his bold advance into
the lower narrows ; upon this his choice of the strong defensive
position of Valcour ; upon this his refusal to retreat, as ui-ged by
Waterburv, when the full force of the enemy was disclosed, — a
^ Douglas's letters. The sentence is awkward, but carefully compared with the
copy in the autlior's hands. Douglas says, of the details he gives, that " they have
been collected with the most scrupulous circumspection."
vol. in — 24
370 M.lJnii OPERATIONS. 17G2-178:!. [I'TC
decision justified, or rather, illustrated, by the advantages whieii the
accidents of the day threw into his hands. His personal gallantry
was conspicuous there as at all times of jiis life. " His countrymen,"
said a generous enemy of that day, " chiefly gloried in the dangerous
attention which he paid to a nice point of honour, in keejiing his flag
fljdng, and not quitting his galle\' till she was in flames, lest the
enemy should liave boarded, and stiuck it.'' It is not the least of
the injuries done to his nation in after years, that he should have
silenced this boast and effaced this glorious record by so black an
infamy.
Witli the destruction of the flotilla ends the naval story of the
Lakes during the War of the American Revolution. Satisfied that
it was too late to proceed against Ticonderoga that year, Carleton
withdrew to St. John's and went into winter-quarters. The follow-
ing year the enterprise was resumed under General Burgoyne ; but
Sir William Howe, instead of co-operating by an advance up the
Hudson, which was the plan of 1776, carried his army to Chesapeake
Bay, to act thence against Philadelphia. Burgoyne took Ticonde-
roga and forced his way as far as Saratoga, sixty miles from Ticon-
deroga and thirty from Albany, where Howe should have met him.
There he was brought to a stand by the army which tiie Americams
had collected, found himself unable to advance or to retreat, and was
forced to lay down his arms on October 17th, 1777. The garrisons left
by him at Ticonderoga and Crown Point retired to Canada, and the
posts were re-occupied by tlie Americans. No further contest took
place on the Lake, though the British vessels remained in control of
it, and showed themselves from time to time up to 1781. With the
outbreak of war between Great Britain and France, in 1778, the scene
of interest shifted to salt water, and there remained till the end.
The opening conflict between Great Britain and her North Ameri-
can Colonies teaches clearly the necessity, too rarely recognised in
practice, that when a state has decided to use force, the force pro-
vided should be adequate from the first. It is better to be much too
strong than a little too weak. Seeing the evident temper of the
Massachusetts Colonists, force would be needed to execute the Boston
Port Bill and its companion measures of 1774 ; for the Port Bill
especially, naval force. The supplies for 1775 granted only 18,000
seamen, — 2,000 less than for the previous year. For 1776, 28,000
seamen were voted, and the total appropriations rose from £5,556,000
177(i.] THE EVACUATION OF BOSTON. 371
to £10,154,000; but it was tluiii too late, liostoii was evacuated Ijy
the British army, 8,000 strong, on tiie 17th of March, 1770 ; but
already, for more than half a year, the spreading spirit of revolt in
the thirteen Colonies had been encouraged by the sight of the British
army cooped up in the town, suffering from want of necessaries, wliile
tlie colonial army blockading it was al)le to maintain its position,
because ships laden with stores for the one were captured, and the
cargoes diverted to the use of the other. To secure free and ample
communications for one's self, and to interrupt those of the opjronent,
are among the first requirements of war. To carry out tlie measures
of the British government a naval force was needed, wliicli should not
only protect the approach of its own transports to Boston Bay, but
should prevent access to all coast ports whence supplies could be
carried to the blockading army. So far from tiiis, tlie squadron was
not equal, in either number or quality, to the work to be done aljout
Boston ; and it was not until October, 1775, that the Admiral was
authorised to capture colonial merchant vessels, which therefore went
and came unmolested, outside of Boston, carrying often provisions
which found their way to Washington's army.
After evacuating Boston, General Howe retired to Halifax, tiiere
to await the coming of reinforcements, both military and naval, and
of his brother Vice-Admiral Lord Howe, appointed to command the
North American Station. General Howe was commander-in-cliief of
the forces throughout the territory extending from Nova Scotia to
West Florida ; from Halifax to Pensacola. The first o[)eration of
the campaign was to be the reduction of New York.
The British government, however, had several objects in view,
and permitted itself to be distracted from tlie single-minded prosecu-
tion of one great undertaking to other subsidiary, and not always
concentric, operations. Whether the control of the line of the Hud-
son and Lake Champlain ought to have been sought through opera-
tions beginning at both ends, is open to argument ; the facts that the
Americans were back in Crown Point in tlie beginning of July, and
that Carleton's 13,000 men got no farther than St. John's that year,
suggest that the greater part of the latter force would have been
better employed in New York and New Jersey than about Cliam-
plain. However that may be, the diversion of a tiiird body, respect-
able in point of numbers, to the Carolinas, is scarcely to be defended
on military grounds. The government was induced to it hy the
expectation of local support from royalists. That there were con-
?,T2 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-1783. [1776.
sidenible numbers of llie.se in both Colouies i.s certain ; but wliile
military operations must take account of political conditions, the
latter should not be allowed to overbalance elementary principles
of the militaiy art. It is said that General Howe disapproved of
this ex-centric movement.
The force destined for the Southern coasts assembled at Cork
towards tlie end of 1775, and sailed thence in January, 1776. The
troops were commauded by Lord Cornwallis, the squadron by Nel-
son's early patron. Commodore Sir Peter Parker, whose broad pen-
nant was hoisted on board the Bristol, 50, Captain John Morris.
After a l)oisterous passage, the expedition arrived in May off Cape
Fear in Nortli Carolina, where it was joined Ijy 2,000 men under Sir
Henry Clinton, Cornwallis's senior, whom Howe had detached to the
southward in January, by the government's orders. Upon his appear-
ance, the royalists in North Carolina had risen, headed by the hus-
band of Flora Macdonald, whose name thirt}- years befoie had been
associated romantically with the escape of the young Pretender, but
who had afterwards emigrated to America. The rising, however,
had been put down, and Clinton had not thought it expedient to try
a serious invasion, in face of the large force assembled to resist him.
Upon Parker's coming, it was decided to make an attempt upon
Charleston, South Carolina. The fleet therefore sailed from Cape
Fear on the 1st of June, and on the 4th anchored off Charleston Bar.
Charleston Harbour ojiens Ijetween two of the Sea-Islands which
fringe the coasts of South Carolina and Georgia. On the north is
Sullivan's Island, on the south James Island. The bar of the main
entrance was not abreast the mouth of the port, but some distance
south of it. Inside the bar, the channel turned to the northward,
and thence led near Sullivan's Island, the southern end of which
was therefore chosen as the site of the ri;de fort hastily thrown up
to meet this attack, and afterwards called Fort Moultrie, from the
name of the commander. From these conditions, a southerly wind
was needed to bring ships into action. After sounding and buo3-ing
the liar, the transpoi-ts and frigates crossed on the 7tli and anchored
inside ; but as it was necessary to remove some of the BristoVs guns,
she could not follow until the 10th. On the 9th Clinton had landed
in pei'son with five hundred men, and by the loth all the troops had
disembarked upon Long Island, next north of Sullivan's. It was
understood that the inlet between the two was fordable, allowing the
troops to co-operate with the naval attack, by diversion or otherwise ;
1T70.] Tin-: ATTACK WON ClIARUiSTON, S. C. 373
but this proved to be ca inistiike. The passage was seven feet deep
at low water, and thei'e were no means for crossing ; consequently a
small American detachment in the scrub wood of the island was suf-
ficient to cheek any movement in that quarter. The fighting there-
fore was confined to the cannonading of the fort by the ships.
Circumstances not fully explained caused the attack to be fixed
for the 23rd ; an inopportune delay, during whicii the Americans
were strengthening their still very imperfect defences. On the 23rd
the wind \\-as unfavourable. On the 25th the Experiment, 50, Cap-
tain Alexander Scott, arrived, crossed the bar, and, after taking in
her guns again, was ready to join in the assault. On the 27th, at
10 A.M., the ships got under way with a south-east breeze, but this
shifted soon afterwards to north-west, and they had to anchor again,
about a mile nearer to Sullivan's Island. On the following day the
wind served, and the attack was made.
In plan. Fort Moultrie was square, with a bastion at eacli angle.
In construction, the sides were palmetto logs, dovetailed and bolted
together, laid in parallel rows, sixteen feet apart, and the interspace
filled with sand. At the time of the engagement, the south and west
fronts were finished ; the other fronts were only seven feet high, but
surmounted by thick planks, to be tenable against escalade. Thii-t}'-
one guns were in place, eighteen and nine pounders, of wliich twenty-
one were oji the south face, commanding the channel. WitMn was
a traverse running east and west, protecting the gunners from shots
from the rear ; but there was no such cover against enfilading fire,
in case an enemy's ship passed the fort and anchored above it. " The
general o[)inion before the action,"' JNIoultrie says, " and especially
among sailors, was that two frigates would be sufficient to knock the
town about our ears, notwithstanding our batteries." Parker may
have shared this impression, and it may account for his leisure-
liness. When the action began, the garrison had but twenty-eight
rounds for twenty-six cannon, but this deficiency was unknown to
the British.
Parker's plan was that the two 50's, Bristol and Experiment, and
two 28-gun frigates, the Active, Captain William Williams, and the
Solchay, Captain Thomas Symonds, accompanied by a bomb-vessel, the
Thunder, 8, Captain .lames Reid, should engage the main front;
while two frigates of the same class, the Ada'on, Captain Christopher
Atkins, and the Syren, Captain Christopher Furneaux, with a 20-gun
corvette, the Sphinx, Captain Anthony Hunt, should pass the fort.
374 MAJOR OrEIiATlUSS. 1TU-J-I78:j. [1770.
anchoring to the westward, iip-channel, to protect the heavy vessels
against tire-shijjs, as well as to eniilade the main batterj-. The order
to weigh was given at 10.30 a.m., when the flood-tide had fairly
made; and at 11.15 the Active, Bristol, and Experiment, anchored in
line ahead, in the order named, the Active to the eastward. The
Solehay lay outside the others, abreast the interval between the 50's.
The ships seem to have taken their places skilfully and without con-
fusion, and their fire, which opened at once, was rapid, well-sustained,
and well-dii'ected ; but their disposition suffered under the radical
defect that, whether from actual lack of water, or only from fear of
grounding, they were too far from the works to use grape effectively.
The sides of ships being much weaker than those of shore works,
while their guns were much more numerous, the secret of success
was to get near enough to beat down the hostile fire by a multitude
of projectiles. The boml>vessel Thunder anchored ahead, and out-
side, of the Active, south-east by south from the east bastion of the
engaged front. Her shells, though well aimed, were ineffective.
" Most of them fell within the fort," Moultrie rej^orted, " but we had
a morass in the middle, which swallowed them instantly, and those
that fell in the sand were immediately buried." During the action,
the mortar bed broke, disabling the piece.
Owing to the scarcity of powder, the garrison had positive orders
not to engage at ranges exceeding four hundred yards. Four or five
shots were thrown at the Active, while still under sail, but with this
exception the fort kept silence until the ships anchored, at a distance
estimated by the Americans to be 350 yards. The word was then
passed along the platform, " jNIind the Commodore ; mind the two
50-gun ships," — an order which was strictly obeyed, as the losses
sliow. The protection of the work proved to be almost perfect, — a
fact which doubtless contributed to the coolness and precision of fire
vitally essential with such deficient resources. The texture of the
palmetto wood suffered the balls to sink smoothly into it without
splintering, so that the facing of the work held well. At times,
when three or four broadsides struck together, the merlons shook so
that Moultrie feared they would come bodily in : but they withstood,
and the small loss inflicted was chiefly through the embrasures. The
flagstaff was shot away, falling outside into the ditch, but a young
sergeant, named Jasper, distinguished himself by jumping after it,
fetching back and rehoisting the colours under a heavy fire.
In the squadron an equal gallantry was shown under circum-
177(i.]
FORT MOlLTlllE.
375
376 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17(J2-17«;J. [1770.
stances which made severe demands upon endurance. Whatever
Parkers estimate of the worth of the defences, no trace of vain-con-
fidence appears in his dispositions, whieli were thorough and careful,
as the execution of the main attack was skilful and vigorous. But
the ships' companies had expected an easy victoiy, and they found
themselves confronted with a resistance and a punishment as severe
as were endured by the leaders at Trafalgar, and far more prolonged.
Such conditions impose upon men's tenacity the additional test of
surprise and discomfiture. The Exiicrimcnt, though very small for
a sliip of the line, lost 23 killed and 56 wounded, out of a total prob-
ably not nuicli exceeding 300, while the Bristol, having the spring
shot away, swung with her head to the southward and her stern to
the fort, undergoing for a long time a raking fire to which she could
make little reply. Three several attempts to replace the spring
were made by i\Ir. .Tames Saumarez, — afterwards the distinguished
admiral, then a midshipman, — before the ship was relieved from this
grave disadvantage. Her loss was 40 killed and 71 wounded ; not a
man escaping of those stationed on the quarter-deck at the beginning
of the action. Among the injured was the Commodore himself,
whose cool heroism must liave been singularly conspicuoxis, from the
notice it attracted in a ser\ice wliere such bearing was not rare. At
one time wlien the quarter-deck was cleared and he stood alone upon
the poop-ladder, Saumarez suggested to him to come down ; but he
replied, smiling, " You want to get rid of me, do you ? " and refused
to move. The captain of the ship, John ilorris, was mortally
wounded. "With commendable modesty Parker only reported him-
self as slightly bruised ; but deserters stated that for some days he
needed the assistance of two men to walk, and that his ti'ousers had
been torn off him b\' shot or splinters. The loss in the other ships
was onl}- one killed. 14 wounded. The Americans had 37 killed and
wounded.
The three vessels assigned to enfilade the main front of the fort
did not get into position. They ran on the middle ground, owing,
Parker reported, to the ignorance of the pilots. Two had fouled
each other before striking. Having taken the bottom on a rising
tide, two floated in a few hours, and retreated ; but the third, the
Actccon, 28, sticking fast, was set on fire and abandoned by her offi-
cers. Before she blew up. the Americans boarded her, securing her
colours, bell, and some other trophies. " Had these ships effected
their purpose," ^Moultrie reported, " they would have driven us from
our guns."
1770.]
NUllTIl AMERICA AND TIJE U'EUT IS DIES.
•ill
PART OF NORTH AMERICA AND THE NORTH ATLANTU' AND THE WEST INDIES.
378 M./JOR OPERATIONS. 1702-178:!. [1776
The main division held its ground until long after nightfall,
firing much of tlie time, but stopping at intervals. After two hours
it liad been noted tiiat tlu; fort replied veiy slowly, which was attrilj-
uted to its being overborne, instead of to the real cause, the neces-
sity for sparing annnunition. For the same reason it was entirely
silent from 3.30 p.m. to 6, when fire was resumed from only two or
three guns, whence Parker surmised tliat the rest had Ijeen di:>
mounted. The Americans were restrained throughout the engage-
ment by the fear of exhausting entirely their scanty store.
" About 9 P.M.," Parker rei^orted, " being very dark, great part
of our amnninition exjiended, the people fatigued, the tide of eljl)
almost done, no prospect from the eastward (that is, from the army),
and no possibilitj- of our being of any fiu'ther service, I ordered the
ships to withdraw to their former moorings." Besides the casualties
among the crew, and severe damage to the hull, the Bristol's, main-
mast, with nine cannon-balls in it, had to be shortened, while the
mizzen-mast was condemned. The loss of the frigates was imma-
terial, owing to tlie garrison's neglecting them.
The fight in Charleston Harbour, the first serious contest in
which ships took part in this war, resemljles generically the battle of
Bunker's Hill, with wliich the regular land warfare had opened a
year before. Both illustrate the difficult}- and danger of a front
attack, without cover, upon a fortified position, and the advantage
conferred even upon untrained men, if naturally cool, resolute, and
intelligent, not onl}- by the protection of a work, but also, it may be
urged, by the recognition of a tangible line up to wliicli to hold, and
to abandon which means defeat, dishonour, and disaster. It is much
for untried men to recognise in their surroundings something which
gives the unity of a common purpose, and thus the coherence which
discipline imparts. Althougli there was in Parker's dispositions
nothing open to serious criticism, — nothing that can be ascribed to
undervaluing his opponent, — and although, also, he had good reason
to expect from the army active co-operation which he did not get, it
is probable that he was very much surprised, not only at the tenacity
of the Americans' resistance, but at the efficacy of their fire. He
felt, doubtless, tlie traditional and natural distrust — and, for the
most part, the justified distrust — with which experience and prac-
tice regard inexperience. Some seamen of American birth, who had
been serving in the Bristol, deserted after the fight. Her crew,
they reported, said, " We were told the Yankees would not stand
17Tti.J THE OCCUPATION OF NEir yoUK IJAIllinUR. 379
two fires, but we never saw butter fellows;" and when the lire of
the fort slackened and some cried, " They have done fighting," others
replied, " By (xod, we are glad oi it, for \\v never had such a dnili-
bino- in our lives." "All the common men of the fleet spoke loudly
in praise of the garrison," — a note (jf admiration so frequent in
generous enemies that we may be assured that it was echoed on the
quarter-deck also. They could afford it well, for beyouil the natural
mortification of defeat, there was no stain ujron their own record, no
flinching under the severity of their losses, although a number of
their own men were comparatively raw, volunteers from the trans-
ports, whose crews had come forward almost as one man when they
knew that the complements of the ships were short through sickness.
Burke, a friend to both sides, was justified in saying that " never did
British valour shine more conspicuously, nor did our ships in an
engagement of the same nature experience so serious an encounter."
There were several death-vacancies for lieutenants ; and, as the Ijattlc
of Lake Champlain gave Pellew his first conunission, so did that of
Charleston Harbour give his to Saumarez, who was made lieutenant
of the Bristol by Parker. Two years later, when the ship had gone
to Jamaica, he was followed on her (j^uarter-deck Ijy Nelson and Col-
lingwood, who also received promotion in her from the same hand.
The attack on Fort Moultrie was not resumed. After necessary
repairs, the ships of war with the troops went to New York, where
they arrived on the 4th of August, and took part in the operations
for the reduction of that place under the direction of the two Howes.
The occupation of New York Harbour, and the capture of the
city were the most conspicuous British successes of the summer and
fall of 1776. While Parker and Clinton were meeting with defeat
at Charleston, and Arnold was hurrying the preparation of his ilotilla
on Champlain, the two brothers. General Howe and the Admiral,
were arriving in New York l^ay, invested not only Avith the powers
proper to the commanders of great fleets and armies, but also with
authority as peace commissioners, to negotiate an amicable an-ange-
ment with the revolted Colonies.
General Howe had awaited for some time at Halifax the arrival
of the expected reinforcements, but wearying at last he sailed thence
on the 10th of June, 177ti, with the army then in hand. On the
25th he himself reached Sandy Hook, the entrance to New York
Bay, having preceded the transports in a frigate. On the 29th, the
380 MAJOR OPEIUTIONS. 1702-1783. [1770.
day after Parker's repulse at Fort Moultrie, the troops arrived ; and
on July 3rd, the date on which the Americans, retreating from Can-
ada, reached Crown Point, the British landed on Staten Island, which
is on the west side of tlie lower Bay. On the 12th of July the Eagle,
64, came in, carrying the flag of Admiral Lord Howe. This officer
was much esteemed by the Americans for his own personal qualities,
and for liis attitude towards them in the present dispute, as well as
for the memory of his brother, who had endeared himself greatly to
them in the campaign of 1758, when he had fallen near Lake Cham-
plain ; but the decisive step of declaring their independence had
been taken already, on July 4tli. eight days before the Admiral's
arrival. A month was spent in fruitless attemj^ts to negotiate with
the new government, witliout recognising an}^ official character in its
representatives. During that time, however, while abstaining from
decisive operations, cruisere were kept at sea to intercept American
traders, and the Admiral, immediately upon arriving, sent four ves-
sels of war twenty-five miles up the Hudson River, as far as TaiTy-
town. This squadron was commanded by Hyde Parker, afterwards,
in 1801, Nelson's commander-in-chief at Copenhagen. The service
was performed under a tremendous cannonade from all the batteries
on l)0th shores, from the lower Bay to far above the city, Init the ships
could not be stopped. Towards tlie middle of August it was evident
tiiat the Americans would not accept any terms in the power of the
Howes to offer, and it became necessary to attempt coercion by arms.
In the reduction of New York in 1776, the part plaj-ed by the
British Navy, owing to the nature of the campaign in general and of
the enemy's force in particular, was of that inconspicuous character
which obscures the fact that without the Navy the operations could
not have been undertaken at all, and that the Navy played to them
the iiart of the base of operations and line of communications. Like
the foundations of a building, these lie outside the range of super-
ficial attention, and therefore are less generally appreciated than the
brilliant fighting that goes on at the front, to the maintenance of
which they are indispensable. Consequently, whatever of interest
may attach to any, or to all, of the minor affairs, which in the aggre-
gate constitute the action of the naval force in such circumstances,
the historian of the major operations is confined perforce to indi-
cating the broad general effect of na^'al power upon the issue. This
■will be done best by tracing in outline the scene of action, the com-
bined movements, and the Navv's influence in both.
1776.]
NEIV YORK UAiauJUli AND NEWIlBUUlillOOJj.
381
382 MAJOR OPKRATIONS. 1762-1783. [1776.
The harbour of New York divides into two parts — the upper
and lower Bays — connected by a passage called the Narrows, between
Long and Staten Islands, upon the latter ol' whicli tlie British troops
were encamped. Long Island, which forms the eastern shore of the
Narrows, extends to the east-north-east a hundred and ten miles,
enclosinsr between itself and the continent a broad slieet of water
called Long Island Sound, that reaches nearly to Narragansett Baj'.
The latter, being a fine anchorage, entered also into the present plan
of operations, as an essential feature in a coastwise maritime cam-
paign. Long Island Sound and the upper Bay of New York are
connected b}' a passage, known as the East River, eight or ten miles
in length, and at tiiat time nearly a mile wide ^ abreast the city of
New York. At the point where the East River joins New York Bay,
the Hudson River, an estuary there nearly two miles wide, also enters
from the north, — a circumstance which lias procured for it the alter-
native name of the North River. Near their confluence, and half a
mile below the town, is Governor's Island, centrally situated to com-
mand tlie entrances to both. Between the East and North rivers,
with their general directions from north and eas1>north-east, is em-
liraced a long strip of land gradually narrowing to the southward.
The end of this peninsula, as it would otherwise be, is converted
into an island, of a mean length of about eight miles, by the Harlem
River, — a narrow and partially navigable stream connecting the East
and North rivers. To the southern extreme of this island, called
Manhattan, the city of New Y'ork was then confined.
As both the East and North rivers were navigable for large
ships, the former throughout, the latter for over a hundred miles
above its mouth, it was evident that control of the water must
j)lay a large part in warlike operations throughout the district
described. With the limited force at Washington's disposal, he had
been unable to push the defences of the city as far to the front as
was desirable. The lower Bay was held by the British Navj-, and
Staten Island had been abandoned, necessarily, without resistance,
thus surrendering the strong defensive position of the Narrows.
The lines were contracted thus to the immediate neighboiu-hood of
New York itself. Small detached works skirted the shores of ilan-
hattan Island, and a line of redoubts extended across it, following
the course of a small stream wliicli tlien partly divided it, a mile
from tlie southern end. Governor's Island was also occupied as an
' At the present diiy reiluctJ by reclaimed land.
1770.] rilE UP /■RATIONS AHOf'T NFAF YORK. 383
outpost. Of more iulnnsii; struiigUi, but not ;it lirst coucurucd,
strong works had been thrown up on either side of the Nortli Iliver,
upon commanding heights eight miles iiljove New Yorlc, to dispute
tlie iiassage of ships.
The crucial weakness in tliis sclumie of defence was that tiie
shore of Long Island opjiositc the city was much higher than tliat
of Manhattan. If this lieight were seized, the city, and all Ix'low it,
became untenable. Here, therefore, was the key of the position and
the chief station for the American troops. For its protection a hue
of works was thrown up, the flanks of which rested upon Wallaljout
Bay and Gowanus Cove, two indentations in tlie shores of Long
Island. These Washington manned with 9,000 of the 18,000 men
under his command. By tlie arrival of three divisions of Hessian
troops, Howe's army now numbered over 34,000 men, to whieli
Clinton brought 3,000 more from before Charleston.'
On the 22nd of August the British crossed from Staten Island to
Gravesend Bay, on the Long Island shore of the Narrows. The
Navy covered the landing, and the transportation of tlie troops was
under the charge of C'cnunodore William Hotliam, wlio, nineteen
years later, was Nelson's commander-in-chief in the jMediterranean.
By noon 15,000 men and forty field-guns Jiad Ijeen carried over and
placed on shore. The force of the Americans permitted little oppo-
sition to the British advance ; but General Howe was cautious and
easy-going, and it was not till the 27th that the army, now increased
to 25,000, was fairly in front of the American lines, having killed,
wounded, and taken about 1,500 men. Hoping that Howe would be
tempted to storm the position, Washington replaced these with 2,000
{bawn from his meagre numbers ; but his opponent held back his
troops, who were eager for the assault. The Americans now stood
with their backs to a swift river, nearly a mile wide, witli only a
feeble line of works interposing between them and an enemy more
than double their number.
On the morning of the 27th, Sir Peter Parker, with a 64, two
50's, and two frigates, attempted to work up to New York, witli a
view of supporting the left flank of the army ; but the wind came
out from the north, and, the ebb-tide making, the ships got no nearer
than three miles from the city. Fortunately for the Americans, they
either could not or would not go farther on the following two days.
^ Beatson's 'Military and Naval Memoirs,' vi. 44, give 34,(il4 as tlie strength of
Howe's armv. Clinton's division is not included in this. \'i. 45.
384 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 176-2-17s:5. IMIfi.
After (lurk of the 28th, Howe broke ground for regular approaches.
Washington, seeing this, and knowing that there could be but one
result to a siege under his condition of inferiority, resolved to with-
draw. During the night of the 29tli ten thousand men silently
quitted their positions, embarked, and crossed to Manhattan Island,
carrjing with them all their belongings, arms, and ammunition. The
enemy's trenches were but six hundred yards distant, yet no suspicion
was aroused, nor did a single deserter give treacherous warning.
Tlie night was clear and moonlit, although a heavy fog towards day-
break jDrolonged the period of secrecy which shrouded the retreat.
When the fog rose, the last detachment was discovered crossing, but
a few ineffectual cannon shot at it were the only harassment experi-
enced in the course of this rapid and dexterous retirement. The
garrison of Governor's Island was withdrawn at the same time.
The unmolested use of the water, and the nautical skill of the
fishermen who composed one of the American regiments, were essen-
tial to this escape ; for admirable as the movement Avas in conception
and execution, no word less strong than escape applies to it. By it
Washington rescued over half his army from sure destruction, and,
not improbably, the cause of liis people from immediate collapse.
An opportunity thus seized implies necessarily an opportunity lost on
the other side. For that failure both army and Navy nmst bear their
share of the blame. It is obvious that when an enemy is cornered,
his line of retreat should be watched. This was tlie business of both
coramanders-in-cluef, the execution of it being primarily the duty of
the Navy, as retreat from the American position could be only by
water. It was a simple question of look-out, of detection, of molesta-
tion by that means ; not of arresting the retreat. To the latter, sail-
ing ships were inadequate, for tliey could not have remained at anchor
under the gmis of Manhattan Island, either by day or niglit ; but a
few boats with muffled oars could have watched, could have given the
alarm, precipitating a British attack, and such a movement inter-
rupted in mid-course brings irretrievable disaster.
Wasliington now withcbew the bulk of his army to the line of
the Harlem. On liis right, south of that river and commanchnsr the
Hudson, was a fort called by liis name ; ojiposite to it on the Jersey
shore was Fort Lee. A garrison of four- thousand men occupied
New York. After amusing himself with some further peace nego-
tiations, Howe determined to possess the city. As a diversion from
tlie main effort, and to cover the crossing of the troops, two detach-
J77G.] FORT irjSIIfNOTON JiVACUATED. 385
ments of ships were ordered to ];)ass tlie Latteries on the Hudson and
East rivers. This was (hint; on tlie l^Uh and the lotli of September,
the North River division commanded by Captain Francis Banks, tlie
East River by Captain Il3-de Parker. The hitter suffered severely,
especially in spars and rigging ;i but the success of both, following
upon that of Hyde Parker a few weeks earlier, in liis expedition to
Tarrytowu, confirmed Washington in the opinion which he expressed
five years later to de Grasse, that batteries alone could not stop ships
having a fair wind. This is now a commonplace of naval warfare.
On the 15th Howe's army crossed under cover of Parker's shi])s,
Hotham again superintending the boat work. The garrison of New
York slipped along the west shore of the island and joined the main
body on the Hailem ; favoured again, apparently, in this ilank move-
ment a juile from the enemy's front, by Howe's inertness, and fond-
ness for a good meal, to which a shrewd American woman invited
him at the critical moment.
Despite these various losses of position, important as they were,
the American army continued to elude the British general, who
apparently did not hold very strongly the opinion that the most
decisive factor in war is the enemy's organised force. As control of
the valley of the Hudson, in connection with Lake Champlain, was,
very properly, the chief object of the British government, Howe's
next aim was to loosen Washington's grip on the peninsula north of
the Harlem. The position seeming to him too strong for a front
attack, he decided to strike for its left flank and rear by way of Long
Island Sound. In this, which involved the passage of the tortuous
and dangerous channel called Hell Gate, with its swift conflicting
currents, the Navy again bore an essential part. The movement
began on October 12th, the day after Arnold was defeated at ^'al-
cour. So far as its leading object Avent it was successful, Washington
feeling obliged to let go the line of tlie Harlem, and change front to
the left. As the result of the various movements and encounters of
the two armies, he fell back across the Hudson into New Jersey,
ordering the evacuation of Fort Washington, and deciding to rest his
control of the Hudson Valley upon West Point, fifty miles above
New York, a position of peculiar natural strength, on the west bank
of the river. To these decisions he was compelled by his inferiority
in numbers, and also by the very isolated and hazardous situation
in which he was operating, between two navigable waters, abso
1 Admiral James's Journal, p. 30. (Kavy Records Society.)
VOL. III. — 25
336 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17iii.'-1783. [ITTG.
lutely coiitioUed by tlie enemy's shipping, 'i'liis coiickLsion was.
further forced upon liim by another successful passage before the
guns of Forts Washington and Lee by Hyde Parker, witli three
ships, tlie riuenix, 44, Ilocbuck, 44, and Tartar, 28, on the 9th of
October. On tliis occasion the vessels, two of wliicli were frigates
of the heaviest class, suffered very severely, losing nine killed and
eighteen \vounded; but the menace to the communications of tlie
Americans, wliose supplies came mostly from the west of the Hud-
son, could not be disregarded.
It was early in November that Washington crossed into New
Jersey with five thousand men ; and soon afterwards he directed the
remainder of his force to follow. At that moment the blunder of
one subordinate, and the tlisobedience of another, brought upon 1dm
two serious IjIows. Fort Washington not lieing evacuated when
ordered, Howe carried it by storm, capturing not only it but its
garrison of 2,700 men, a very heavy loss to the Americans. On the
other hand, tlie most explicit orders failed to bring the officer left
in command on the east of the Hudson to rejoin the commander-
in-chief. This criminal perverseness left Washington with only 6,000
men in New Jersey, 7,000 being in New York. Under these condi-
tions nothing remained but to put the Delaware also between himself
and the enemy. He therefore retreated rapidl}' through New Jersey,
and on the 8tli of December crossed into Pennsylvania with an army
reduced to 3,000 by expiry of enlistments. 'Jlae detachment beyond
the Hudson, diminishing daily by the same cause, gradually worked
its way to liini, its commander luckily being captured on the road.
At the time it joined, a few battalions also arrived from Ticonderoga,
released by Carleton's retirement to the foot of Champlain. Wash-
ington's force on the west bank of the Delaware was thus increased
to 6,000 men.
In this series of operations, extending from August 22nd to De-
cember 14th, when Howe went into winter-quarters in New Jersey,
the British had met with no serious mishaps, beyond the inevitable
losses midergone by the assailants of well-chosen positions. Never-
theless, having in view the superiorit}- of numbers, of equipment, and
of discipline, and the command of the water, the mere existence of
the enemy's army as an organised body, its mere escape, deprives the
campaign of the claim to be considered successful. The red ribbon
of the Bath probably never was earned more cheaply than by Sir
William Howe that year. Had he displayed anything like the energy
1770.] TUE EVACUATION UE lUIODK ISLAND. 387
ui' liis two elder brotliLTS, ^\'a^^llill;^■tol), wiUi all, iiis vigilaiicu, linuness,,
and enterprise, could .scareely have brought oil' the force, vastly
diminished but still a living organism, aroiuid which American resist-
ance again crystallised and hardened. As it was, Avilliiu a montli lie
took tlie offensive, and recovered a great part of New Jersey.
Whatever verdict may Ijc [lassed upon the merit of tiie military
conduct of affairs, there is no doubt of the value, or of the unflag-
ging energy, of the naval support given, (ieneral Ilowe alludes to it
frequently, both in general and specifically ; while the Admiral sums
up liis always guarded and often cuiuljrous expressions of opinion in
these words: "It is incumbent upon me to represent to your Lord-
ships, and I cannot too pointedly express, the unabating perseverance
and alacrity with which the several classes of officers and seamen
have supi)orted a long attendance and unusxaal degree of fatigue^
consequent of these different movenientj of the army."
The final achievement of the campaign, and a very important
one, Avas the occupation of Rhode Island and Narragansett Bay by a
combined expedition, which left New Yorlv on the 1st of Decembei-,
and on the 8th landed at Newport without opposition. The naval
force, consisting of five 50-gun ships, — the Chatham (broad pennant).
Captain Tobj' Caulfield ; Preston (Commodore W. Ilotham), Captain
Samuel Uppleby ; Co/^m/'/o/i, Captain Richard Brathwaite; Eaimcn,
Captain Francis Banks ; and Experiment, Captain James Wallace,
and eight smaller vessels, — was commanded by Sir Peter Parker ; th^
troops, seven thousand in number, by Lieutenant-General Sir Henry
Clinton. The innnediate effect was to close a haven of privateers,
which centred in great nuuabers around an anchorage that flanked
the route of all vessels bound from Europe to New York. The pos-
session of the bay facilitated tlie control of the neighbouring waters
by British ships of war, besides giving them a base, central for coast-
wise operations, and independent of tidal considerations for entrance
or exit. The position was abandoned somewhat precipitately three
years later, and Rodney then deplored its loss in the following
terms : " The evacuating Rhode Island was the most fatal measure
that could possibly have been adopted. It gave up the best and
noblest harbour in America, capable of containing the whole Navy of
Britain, and where they could in all seasons lie in perfect security;
and from whence squadrons, in forty -eight hours, could blockade the
three capital cities of America ; namely, Boston, New York, and
Philadelphia."
388 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1777.
At the end of 1776 began the series of British reverses which
characterised the year 1777, and made it the decisive period of the
war, because of the effect tliiis prodnced upon general public opinion
abroad, and especially \\[)on the goverinnents of France and Spain.
On the 20t]i of December, Howe, announcing to the Ministiy that
he had gone into winter-quarters, wrote : " The chain, 1 own, is
rather too extensive, but I w^as induced to occupy Burlington to
cover the county of Monmoutli ; and trusting to the loyalty of the
inhabitants, and the strength of the corps placed in the advanced
posts, I conclude the troops will be in perfect security." Of this
unwairanted security Washington took prompt advantage. On
Christmas night a sudden descent, in a Ijlinding snow-storm, upon
a British outpost at Trenton, swept off a thousand prisonere ; and
although for the moment the American leader again retired behind
the Delaware, it was but to resume the oifensive four days later.
C'ornwallis, who was in New York on the point of sailing for Eng-
land, hurried back to the front, but in vain. A series of quick and
well-directed movements recovered the State of New Jersey ; and by
the 5th of January the American headquarters, and main body of the
army, were established at IMorristown in the .Jersey hills, the left
resting upon the Hudson, thus recovering touch with the strategic
centre of interest. This menacing position of the Americans, upon
llie flank of the line of communications from New York to the Dela-
ware, compelled Howe to contract abruptly the lines he had extended
so lightly; and the campaign he was forced thus reluctantly to reopen
closed under a gloom of retreat and disaster, which profoundly and
justly impressed not only the opinion of the public, but that of mili-
tary critics as well. " Of all the great conquests which his ^Majesty's
troops had made in the Jersies," wTites Beatson, " Brunswick and
Amboy were the only two places of any note which they retained ;
sxnd however brilliant their successes had been in the beginning of
the camj^aign, they reaped little advantage from them when the
winter advanced, and the contiguity of so vigilant an enemy forced
them to perform the severest duty." With deliberate or unconscious
liumour he then immediately concludes the chronicle of the year
with this announcement : " His Majesty was so well pleased with
the abilities and activit}- which General Howe had displayed this
campaign, that on the 25tli of October he conferred upon him the
Most Honourable Order of the Bath."
1777.] BURGOYNE REACHES FORT EDWARD. 389'
The leading- pui-pose of the British goveriuucnt in tlic campaign
of 1777 was the same as that with which it had begun in 177G, — the
control of the line of tlie Hudson and Lake Cliamplain, to lie mastered
by two expeditions, one starting from each end, and both working
towards a common centre at Albany, near the Iiead of navigation of
the River. Preliminary difficulties had been cleared away in tlie
previous year, by the destruction of the American lh)tilla on llie Lake,
and by the reduction of New York. To both these objects tlie Navy
had contributed conspicuously. It remained to complete the work
by resuming the advance from the two bases of operations secured.
In 1777 the fortifications on the Hudson were inadequate to stop the
progress of a combined naval and military expedition, as was shown
in the course of the campaign.
The northern enterprise was intrusted to General Burgoj-ne. Tlie
impossibility of creating a naval force able to contend with tliat put
ailoat by Carleton had prevented the Americans from further building.
Burgoyne therefore crossed the Lake witliout opposition to Ticon-
deroga, before which he appeared on the 2nd of July. A position
commanding the works was discovered, and tliis the Americans luul
neglected to occupy. It being seized, and a battery established, the
fort had to be evacuated. The retreat being made by water, the British
Lake Navy, under Captain Skeffington Lutwidge, with whom Nelson
had served a few years before in the Arctic seas, had a consjncuous
part in the pursuit; severing the boom l)lockading the river, and join-
ing impetuously in an attack upon the floating material, tlie flat-boat
transports, and the few relics of Arnold's flotilla ^\•hich had escaped
the destruction of the previous year. This afJair took place on the
6th of July. From that time forward the progress of the army was
mainly by land. The Navy, however, found occupation upon Lake
George, where Burgoyne established a d^pot of supplies, although he
did not utilise its waterway for the march of the army. A party of
seamen under Edward Pellew, still a midshipman, accompanied the
advance, and shared the misfortunes of the expedition. It is told
that Burgoyne used afterwards to chaff the young naval officer with
being the cause of their disaster, because he and his men, by rebuild-
ing a bridge at a critical moment, had made it possible to cross the
Hudson. Impeded in its progress by immense difficulties, both
natural and imposed by the enemy, the army took twenty days to
make twenty miles. On the 30th of July it readied Fort Edward,
forty miles from Albany, and there was compelled to stay till the
middle of September.
593 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1702-178:3. [1777.
Owing to neglect at the War Oflice, the peremptory ordei.s to Sir
William Howe, to move up tliu Hudson and make a junction with
Burgoyne, were not sent foi'ward. Consequently, Howe, acting upon
the discretionary powers whicli he possessed already, and swayed
by political reasons into which it is not necessary to enter, detennined
to renew his attempt n^jon Philadelphia. A tentative advanc: into
New Jersey, and tlie consequent manoeuvres of Washington, satisfied
him that tlie enterprise by this route was too hazardous. He therefore
embarked 14,000 men, leaving 8,000 with Sir Henry Clinton to hold
New York and make diversions in favour of Burgoyne ; and on the
23rd of July sailed from Sandy Hook, escorted by five 64-gun ships,
a 50, and ten smaller vessels, under Lord Howe's immediate command.
Tlie entire expedition numbered about 280 sail. Elaborate pains were
taken to deceive Washington as to the destination of the armament ;
but little was needed to prevent a competent soldier from supposing
a design so contrary to sound military jirinciple, having regard to
Burgoyne's movements and to the well-understood general purpose
of the British ministry. "Howe 's in a manner abandoning Burgoyne
is so unaccountable a matter," wrote the American general, '• that
till I am fully assured of it, I cannot help casting my eyes continually
behind me." He susjjected an intention to return upon New York.
On the 31st of July, just as Burgo3-ne reached Fort Edward, where
he stuck fast for six \veeks, Hope's armament M'as off the Capes of
the Delaware. The prevailing summer wind on the American coast
is south-south-west, fair for ascending the river ; but information was
received that the enemy had obstructed the channel, which, for some
distance below Philadelphia, lends itself to such defences. Therefore,
although the free navigation of the river, to the sea, was essential to
maintaining a position at Philadelphia, — for trial had shown that the
whole army could not assure communications by land with New York,
the other sea l)ase, — Howe decided to prosecute his enterprise hy way
of the Chesapeake, the ascent of which, under all the conditions, could
not be seriously impeded. A fortnight more was consumed in contend-
ing against the south-west w-inds and calms, before the fleet anchored
on the 1.5th of August within tlie Capes of the Chesapeake ; and yet
another week passed before the head of the Bay was reached. On the
25th the troops landed. Washington, though so long in doubt, was
on hand to dispute tlie road, but in inferior force ; and Howe had no
great difficulty in fighting his way to Philadelphia, which was occupied
on the 26tli of September. A week earlier Burgoyne had reached
1777.] IDiU'K ADVANCES TOJVARDS I'lIILAIiELI'IIIA. 391
Stillwater, (Hi tlic west bank (jT IIri lliiilson, the ntnuist jioiut of lii.s
progress, w here lie was still twent}' miles from Albaii}-. 'J'hree ■weeks
later, surrounded by overwlieliiiiug numbers, be was forced to cajjitu-
late at Sai-atoga, whither be bad retreated.
Lord Howe held on at the bead of the Chesapeake until satisfied
that bis In-otber no longer needed liiin. On the 14tb of Septendirr he
■started down the Bay with the scjuadron and convoy, sending ahead to
the Delaware a small division, under Captain Andrew Snape Ilamond,
to aid the army, if necessary. The winds holding southerly, ten days
were required to get to sea ; and outside further delay was causeil by
very heavy weather. The Admiral there quitted the convoy and
hastened u}) river. On the Gtb of October he was off Chester, ten
miles belo\v Philadelphia. Hamond bad alreadj' been at work for a
week, clearing away obstructions, of which there were two lines, both
■commanded by batteries on the farther, or Jersey, shore of the Dela-
ware. The lower battery had been carried l)y trooj^s ; and when
Howe arrived, Hamond, though meeting lively opposition from the
American galleys and tire-rafts, bad freed the channel for large ships
to approach the upper obstructions. These were defended not only
by a work at Red Bank on the Jersey shore, but also, on the other
•side of the stream, by a fort called Fort Mifflin, on ]\Iud Island.'
As the channel at this point, for a distance of half a mile, was only
two hundred j^ards wide, and troops could not reach the island,
the position was very strong, and it detained the British for six
weeks. Fort Mifflin was supported by two floating batteries and a
number of galleys. The latter not only fought, offensively and
defensively, but maintained the supplies and ammunition of the
garrison.
On the 22nd of October, a concerted attack, b\- the army on the
works at Red Bank, and by the Navy on Fort Mifthn, resulted dis-
astrously. The former was repulsed with considerable loss, the
officer commanding being killed. The squadron, consisting of a
64, the Augusta, Captain Francis Reynokis, hiter Earl of Ducie,
three frigates, and a sloop, the Merlin, 16, Commander Samuel
Reeve, went into action with ^fud Island at the same time; but,
the channel having shifted, owing possibly to the obstructions, the
Augusta and the sloop grounded, and could not be floated that
day. On the 23rd the Americans concentrated upon the two their
batteries, galleys, and fire -rafts ; but, in the midst of the preparations
- Sometimes called Fort Island ; it was just below the mouth of the Schuylkill.
392 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1777.
for ligliteuiu^r liur, the AvjusUt took fire and blew up. Tho Merlin
was then set on lire and abandoned.
So long as this obstacle remained, all supplies for the army had to
be carried by boats to the shore, and transported considerable dis-
tances by land. As direct attacks had proved unavailing, more
deliberate measures were adopted. Tiie army built batteries, and the
Navy sent ashore guns to mount in them ; but the decisive blow to
Mud Island was given by a small armed ship, the Vi(jilant, 20,
Lieutenant Hugh Cloberry Christian, Avhich was successfully
piloted through a channel on the west side of the river, and
reached the rear of the work, towing with her a floating battery
with tlu-ee 24-pounders. This was on the 15th of November. That
same night the Americans abandoned Fort Miftlin. Their loss,
Beatson says, amounted to near 400 killed and wounded ; that of
the British to 43. If this be correct, it should have established
the invincibility of men who under such prodigious disparity of
suffering could maintain their position so tenaciously. After the
loss of Mud Island, Red Bank could not be held to advantage,
and it was evacuated on the 21st, when an attack Avas imminent.
The American vessels retreated up the river; but they were cor-
nered, and of course ultimately were destroj'ed. The obstructions
were thus removed, and the British communications by the line
of the Delaware were established.
While these things were passing, Howe's triumph was marred
by the news of Burgoyne's surrender on the 17th of October.
For this he could not but feel that the home government must
consider him largely responsiijle ; for in the Chesapeake, too late
to retrieve his false step, he had received a letter from the Minister,
saying that, whatever else he undertook, support to Burgo3'ne was
the great object to be kept in view.
Diuing the operations round Philadelphia, Sir Henry Clinton
in New York had done enough to show what strong probabilities
of success would have attended an advance up the Hudson, by the
20,000 men whom Howe could have taken with him. Starting
on the 3rd of October with 3,000 troops, accompanied by a small
naval division of frigates, Clinton in a week had reached West
Point, fifty miles up the river. The American fortifications along
the way were captured, defences levelled, stores and shipping burned ;
while an insignificant detachment, with the light vessels, went
fifty miles further u^^, and there destroyed more military stores
1777.1 NEir rURK AXI) I'lll L.lDKI.fll I J. 393
without eufouutering any resistance worth meatiouing. C'ertainlv'>
had Howe taken the same line of operations, lie would have had
to reckon with Washington's trn thousand men wlii(;h confronted
him on the march to riuladelphia ; hut his flank would have been
covered, up to Albany, by a navigable stream, on either side of
which he could operate by that flying bridge which the presence
and control of the Navy continually constituted. Save the fortili-
cations, which Clinton easily carried, there was no threat to his com-
munications or to his Hank, such as the hill country of New Jersey
had offered and ^Vashington had skilfully utilised.
The campaign of 1777 thus ended for the British with a conspicu-
ous disaster, and with an apparent success which was as disastrous
as a failure. At its close they held Narragansett Bay, the city and
hai'bour of New York, and the city of I'hiladelphia. The first was
an admirable naval base, especially for sailing ships, for the reasons
given by Rodney. The second was then, as it is now, the greatest
military position on the Atlantic coast of the United States ; and
although the two could not connnunicate by land, they did support
each other as naval stations in a war essentially dependent ujion
maritime power. Philadelphia served no purpose but to divide and
distract British enterprise. Al)solutely dependent for maintenance
upon tlie sea, the forces in it and in New York could not co-operate ;
they could not even unite except by sea. When Clinton relieved
Howe as commander-in-chief, though less than a hundred miles away
by land, he had to take a voyage of over two hundred miles, half of
it up a difficult river, to reach his station ; and troops were trans-
ferred b}- the same tedious process. In consequence of these condi-
tions, the place had to be abandoned the instant that war with
France made control of the sea even doubtful. The British held
it for less than nine months.
During 1777 a number of raids were made by combined Britisli
land and sea forces, for the purpose of destroying American ddpots
and other resources. Taken together, such operations are subsidiary
to, and aid, the great object of interrupting or harassing the commu-
nications of an enemy. In so far, they have a standing place among
the major operations of war ; but taken singly the}' cannot be so
reckoned, and the fact, therefore, is simply noted, without going into
details. It may be remarked, however, that in them, although the
scale was smaller, the Navy played the same part that it no^v does in
the many expeditions and small wars undertaken by Great Britain in
:394 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1702-1733. [1778.
various parts of the world ; tlic same that it (hd in tlie Peninsular
War. The land force depended upon the water, and tlie water was
controlled by the Navy.
The events of 1777 satisfied the French government that the
Americans liad strength and skill suiiicient seriously to embarrass
Great Britain, and that the moment, therefore, was opportune for
taking steps whiidi scarcely could fail to cause war. ( )n the 6th of
February, 1778, France concluded with the United States an open
treaty of amity and commerce ; and at the same time a second secret
treaty, acknowledging the independence of the late Colonies, and
contracting with them a defensive alliance. On the 13tli of March,
the Frencli Ambassador in London communicated the open treat}' to
the British government, with the remark that " the United States
were in full possession of the independence ijroclaimecl by their
declaration of July 4th, 1776." Great Britain at once recalled her
Ambassador, and both countries prepared for war, although no decla-
ration was issued. On the 13th of Ajjril, a French fleet of twelve
ships of the line and live frigates, under the command of the Count
d'Estaing,^ sailed from Toulon for the American coast. It was
destined to Delaware Bay, hoping to intercept Howe's squadron.
D'Estaing was directed to l)egin hostilities when forty leagues west
of Giln-altar.
The British ministry was not insensible of the danger', the im-
minence of which had been felt during the previous year ; but it
iiad not got ready betimes, owing possibly to confident exjoectations
of success from the campaign of 1777. Tlie ships, in point of num-
bers and equipment, were not as far forward as the Admiralty had
represented ; and difficulty, amounting for the moment to impos-
sibility, was experienced in manning tliem. The vessels of the
Channel fleet had to be robbed of both crews and stores to compose
a proper reinforcement for America. ^Moreover, the destination of
the Toulon squadron was unknown, the Fi'ench government having
given out that it was Ijound to Brest, where over twenty other ships
of the line were in an advanced state of preparation. Not until tlie
5th of June, when d'Estaing was already eight weeks out, was cer-
tain news brought by a frigate, which had watched his fleet after it
» Charles H., Comte d'Estaing. Born, 1T29. Served in India under Lally Tollen-
<lal, 1758. After having been taken prisoner at Madras in 1759, exchanged into the
navy. Commanded in North America, 1778-80. Guillotined, 1794.
1:78.] isYuns's fleet. 395
liacl passed Gibraltar, and which liad accompanied it into tlie Athmtic
ninety leagues west of the Straits. The reinforcement for America
was then permitted to depart. On the iHli of June, tliirteen sliii)s of
the line sailed for New York under tlie connnaiid of \"ice-Adiuiral
the Hon. John Bjron.^
These delays occasioned a singular and striking illustration of
the ill effects ui)on commerce of inadequate j)reparation for manning
the fleet. A considerable number of ^V'est India sliijis, with stores
absolutely necessary for the preservation of the islands, waited at
Portsmouth for convoy for upwards of three months, while the
whole fleet, of eighty sail, was detained for five weeks after it had
ajsembled; "and, although tlie wind came fair on the 19th of May,
it did not sail till the 26th, owing to the convoying ships, the Boijne
and the Buhjj, not being ready." Forty-five owners and master.^
signed a letter to the Admiralty, stating these facts. " Tlie convoy,"
they said, "was appointed to sail April 10th." jNIany ships had
been ready as early as February. "Is not this shameful usage, my
Lords, thus to deceive the public in general ? There are two hun-
dred ships loaded with ]:)rovisions, etc., waiting at Spithead these
tliree months. The average expense of each ship amounts to £150
monthly, so that the expense of the whole West India fleet since
February amounts to £90,000."
The West Indies before the war had depended chiefly upon tlieir
fellow Colonies on the American continent for provision-;, as well as
' List of tbe fleet sent to North America under Vice- Admiral Byron: —
Princess Ro,jal 90 -^ ^^'ce- Admiral the Hon. .1. Byron (B.).
l Captain William Blair.
Royal Oak 74 5 Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker (B.).
i. Captain Henry Francis Evans.
T ■ ■! 1 ►- , ^ Commodore John Evans.
Invianbk ' ^ -! ^ . , t,
( Captain Anthony Parrey.
Bedford 74 Captain Edmund Aflleck.
Albion 74 Captain George Bowyer.
Conqueror 74 Captain Thomas Graves.
CoriiKall 74 Captain Timothy Edwards.
Cnlloden 74 Captain George Balfour.
Fame 74 Captain Stephen Colby.
Grafton 74 Captain Thomas Wilkinson.
Russell 74 Captain Francis Samuel Drake.
Sultan 74 Captain John Wheelock.
Monmouth 64 Captain Thomas Collingwood.
Guadalonpe 23 Captain Hugh Robinson.
Beatson, vi. 106 (corrected). W. L. C.
396
MAJOn nPERATlUSS. 17G2-17^.3.
[1778.
for other pi'iuie necessaries. Not only were these cut off as an inci-
dent of the war, entaihng great embarrassment and suffering, wliicli
elicited vehement appeals from the planter community to the home
government, but the American privateers preyed heavily upon the
commerce of the islands, whose industries were thus smitten root
and branch, imjiort and export. In ITTti, salt food for whites and
negroes had risen from 50 to 100 per cent, and corn, the chief sup-
port of the slaves, — the labouring class, — by 400 per cent. At the
same time sugar had fallen from 25 to 40 per cent in price, rum over
37 per cent. The words "starvation" and '• famine " were freely
used in these representations, which were repeated in 1778. Insur-
ance rose to 23 per cent ; and this, with actual losses by capture,^
and by cessation of American trade, with conse(]^uent fall of prices,
was estimated to give a total loss of £QQ upon every £100 earned
before the war. Yet, with all this, tlie outward West India fleet
in 1778 waited six weelcs, April lOth-^NIay 2Gth, for convoy. Imme-
diately after it got away, a rigorous embargo was laid upon all ship-
ping in British ports, that their crews might be impressed to man the
Channel fleet. ]\Iarket-boats, even, were not allowed to pass be-
tween Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight.
Three days after Byron had sailed, Admiral the Hon. Augustus
Keppel also put to sea with twent^'-one ships of the line, to cruise
off Brest. His instructions were to prevent the junction of the
^ The Secretary of Lloyd's, fur tbe purposes of this work, has been so good as to
caiTse to be specially compiled a summary of the losses and captures during the period
1775-1783. This, so far as it deals with merchantmen and privateers, gives the fol-
lowing results.
BKITiSH
Vessels.
Exemy's
Vessels.
Merchantmen.
Privateers.
Merchantmen.
Privateers.
Taken.»
Re-taken or
Ransomed.
Taken.*
Re-taken or
Ransomed.
T.aken.*
Re-taken or
Ransomed.
Taken.*
Re-taken or
Ransomed.
177.T . .
1776 . .
229
51
—
19
6
—
1777. .
331
52
—
—
51
1
18
—
177S . .
359
87
5
—
232
5
16
—
1779 . .
487
106
29
5
238
5
31
—
1780 . .
581
260
15
2
203
3
34
1
17S1 . .
587
211
38
6
277
10
40
—
1782 . .
415
99
1
—
104
1
68
—
17S3 . .
98
13
1
1
11
•1
3
—
lucluding those re-takeu or ransomed.
W. L. C.
177b.] BYRON AlUllVK^ AT HALIFAX. :yj7
Toulou and Invest divisions, attacking either that ho might meet.
On tlio 17th oi' June, two Freiiuli frigates were sighted. Jn order
tliat they might not report Iiis force or liis movements, the British
Admiral sent two of his own frigates, with the request that they
Avould spealv him. One, tlie Belle Poulc, St!, refused ; and an engage-
ment followed between her and the British sliip, tlie Arcthusa, 32,
Captain Samuel ^larshall.^ Altliough both Keppel's and d'Estaing's
orders prescribed acts of liostility, no formal war yet existed. The
King of France subsequently declared tliat this occurrence fixed
the date of the war's beginning.
Byron had a very tempestuous passage, with adverse winds, by
wliich his vessels were scattered and damaged. On the 18th of
August, sixty-seven days from Plymouth, the flagsliip arrived off the
south coast of Long Island, ninety miles east of New York, without
one of the fleet in company. There twelve sliips were seen at anchor
to leeward (north), nine or ten miles distant, having jury masts, and
showing otlrer signs of disability. The British vessel approached
near enougli to recognise them as Frencli. Tliey were d'Estaing"s
squadron, crippled by a xevy lieavy gale, in v,-liicli Howe's force had
also suffered, though to a less extent. As he was alone, and ignorant
of existing conditions, Byron thouglit it inexpedient to continue on
for either New Yoi'k or Narragansett Bay. Tlie wind being soutli-
erly, lie steered for Halifax, which lie reached August 26th. Some
of his ships also entered there. A very few had already succeeded
in joining Howe in New York, being fortunate enough to escape the
enemy.
So far as help from England \\-ent, Lord Howe would have been
crushed long before this. He owed his safety partly to his own celer-
ity, partly to the delays of his opponent. Pearly in ^lay he received
advices from home, wlrich convinced him, that a sudden and rapid
abandonment of Philadelphia and of Delaware Bay might become
necessary. He therefore concentrated his ships of the line from New
York and Narragansett at the mouth of the Bay, while the transports
embarked all stores, except those needed for a fortnight's supply of
the army in a liostile country. The threatening contingency of a
superior enemy's appearing off the coast might, and did, make it
imperative not to risk the troops at sea, but to choose instead the
alternative of a ninety-mile march through New Jersey, which a year
before had been rejected as too hazardous for an even larger force.
* For an account of the single-slii[i actions of the war, see Chap. XXXII.
3C8 MAJDU (JI'KHATIOXS. 1762-178'!. [1778.
'J'lius prepared, no time was lost when the evacuation became neces-
sary. Sir William Howe, who had been relieved on the 24th of Mav
by Sir Heniy Clinton, escaped the humiliation of giving up his
dearly bought conquest. On the 18tli of June the British troops,
12,000 iu number, were ferried across the Delaware, under the super-
vision of tlie Navy, and began their hazardous march to New York.
The next day the transports began to move down the river ; but,
owing to the difticult navigation, head winds, and calms, they did not
get to sea until the 28tli of June. On the 8tli of July, ten days too
late, d'Estaing anchored in the moiitli of the Delaware. "Had a
passage of even ordinary length taken place," wrote Washington,
" Lord Howe with the British ships of war and all the transports in
the river Delaware must inevitably have fallen ; and Sir Henry
Clinton must have had better luck than is commonly dis[)ensed to
men of his profession under such circumstances, if he and his troops
had not shared at least the fate of Burgoyne."
Had Howe's fleet been intercepted, there would have been no
naval defence for New Yoik ; the French fleet would, have sur-
mounted the difficulties of the harbour bar at its ease ; and Clinton,
caught between it and the American army, must have surrendered.
Howe's arrival obviated this immediate danger; but much still
needed to be done, or the end would be postponed only, not averted.
A fair wind carried the fleet and the whole convoy from the Dela-
Mare to Sandy Hook in forty-eight houi-s. On the morning of the
29th, as Howe was api)roaching his port, he spoke a packet from
England, which not only brought definite news of d'Estaing's sailing,
but also reported that she herself had fallen in with him to the south-
ward, not very far from the American coast, and had been chased by
his ships. His appearance off New York, therefore, was imminent.
Howe's measures were prompt and thorough, as became his great
reputation. To watch for d'Estaing's approach, a body of cruisers
was despatched, numerous enough for some to bring frequent word
of his movements, while others kept touch witli him. The ships at
New York were ordered down to Sandy Hook, where the defence of
the entrance was to be made. Clinton, who had been hard pressed
by Washington tlu'oughout his march, arrived on the 30th of June —
the day after Howe himself — on the heights of Navesink, on the sea-
coast, just south of Sandy Hook. During the previous winter the
sea had made a breach between the heights and the Hook, convert-
ing the latter into an island. Across this inlet the Navy tlu-ew a
1778.] Jj'JiST.nxa ()I<'1<' S.LXJiV IlUUK. 399
bridge of boats, by wliiuh the army mi tin; otli of July [lassuil to tlic
Hook, and thence was conveyed to the city.
On tho same day tlie French fleet was siylitcd off the coast of
Virginia l)y a cruiser, wliicli reached Ilowc (in tiie 7lh ; and two days
later another brought word that the enemy had anchored on the 8th
off the Delaware. There d'Estaing again tarried for two dajs, which
were diligently improved by the British Admiral, w ho at the same
time sent off despatches to warn Byron, of whose coming he now had
heard. Despite all his energy, his prejjarations still were far from
complete, when on the morning of the 11th a tliird vessel arrived,
announcing that the French were approaching. That evening tliey
anchored outside, four miles south of Sandy Hook. Howe, who
during all those days was indefatigable, not only in planning but also
in personal supervision of details, hastened at once to place his ves-
sels according to the disposition which he had determined, and which
he had carefully explained to his captains, thus insuring an intel-
ligent co-operation on their part.
The narrow arm of land called Sandy Hook projects in a nor-
therly direction frum the New Jersey coast, and covers the lower bay
of New York on the south side. The main shii)-chaiinel, then as
now, ran nearly east and west, at right angles to the Hook and close
to its northern end. Beyond the channel, to the north, there was no
solid ground for fortifieation within the cannon range of that day.
Therefore sueh guns as could be mounted on shore, live in niunbei-,
were placed in battery at the end of the Hook. These formed the
right flank of the defence, which was continued thence to the west-
ward by a line of seven ships, skirting the southern edge of the
channel. As the approach of the French, if they attacked, must lie
with an easterly wind and a rising tide, the sliips were placed with
that expectation ; and in such wise that, riding with their heads to
the eastward, each successive one, from van to rear, lay a little out-
side— north — of her next ahead. The oljject of this indented for-
mation was that each ship might bring her broadside to l>ear east, and
yet fire clear of those to the east of her. In order to effect this con-
centration of all the batteries in an easterly direction, which would
rake tlie a[)proach of the enemy, a spring was run from the outer, or
port quarter of every ship, except the leader. ^ These springs were
1 The leader, the Leviathan, CoinnumJer Joseph Tathwell, was excepted, evidently
because she la}- under the Hook, and her guns could not bear down channel. Slie
was not a fighting ship of the siiuadron, but an armed storeship, although originally-
400 MAJOn OPERATIONS. 17G2-1783. [1778.
not taken to tlio Ijow caljle or anchor, as was often done, but to
anchors of their own, placed broad off the port bow.s. If, tlien, the
enemy attacked, the ships, by siini)ly keeping fast tlie springs and
veering the cables, would swing with their broadsides to tiie east. If
the enemy, wliicli liad no bow lire, survived liis punishment, and suc-
ceeded in advancing abreast the line, it was necessary only to keep
fast the cables and let go the springs ; the sliips would s^^'ing head
again to tlie east, and the l:)roadsides would once more bear across
the channel, instead of along it. These careful arrangeiiients Avere
subject, of course, to the mischance of shot ci;tting away caljles or
springs; but this was more than offset bj- the jjrobable injury to
the enemy's spars and rigging, before he could use his batteries at all.
Such was tlie main defence arranged by Howe ; with which Xew
York stood or fell. In the line were five sixty-fours, one fifty, and
an armed storeship. An advanced line, of one fifty with two smaller
vessels, was placed just iiaside the bar — two or three miles outside
the Hook — to rake the enemy as he crossed, retiring as he ap-
proaclied ; and four galleys, forming a second line, were also stationed
for the same puipose, across the channel, abreast of the Hook. The
retreat of these was secure into the shoal water, where they could not
l)e followed. One sixty-four and some frigates were held as a reserve,
inside the main line, to act as occasion might require. The total
available force was, six sixty-fours,^ tlu'ee fifties, and six frigates. D'Es-
taing's fleet, in detail, consisted of one ninety-gun slfip, one eighty,
six seventy-fours, tliree sixty-fours, and one fift)-. Great as was this
discrepancy between the opponents, it was counterbalanced largely
b}- Howe's skilful dispositions, which his enemy could not circum-
a. ship of war, and therefore Ijy lier tliickness of side better fitted for defence than an
crdinarj' merchant vessel. Placing her seems to have been an afterthought, to close
the gap in the line, and prevent even tlie possibility of the enemy's ships turning in
there and doubling on the van. Thus Howe avoided the fatal oversight made by
Brueys twenty years later, in Aboukir Bay.
^ These were ; —
r Vice- Admiral Lord Howe (R-)-
Eagle 64 -; Captain Henry Duncan (1st).
(Captain Roger Curtis (2ik1).
Trident 64
Somerset
64
Nonsiu-h
64
Ardent
64
St. Albans
64
S Commodore .John Elliot.
c Captain Anthony James Pye Molloy.
Captain George Ourry.
Captain Walter Griffith.
Captain George Keppel.
Captain Richard Onslow.
W. L. C.
1778.] IWH'E AND D'KHTJING. 401
vent. If the latter once got aloiigside, there was little hope for the
British ; but it was impossible to evade the primary necessity of
undergoing a raking fire, without reply, from tlie extreme range of
tlieir caiuioii up to the iiioment iif closing. The stake, iiowever, was
great, and the apparent ocUls stirred to the bottom the lighting blood
of the British seamen. The ships of war being short-handed, llowe
called for volunteers from the transports. Such nmnbers came forward
that the agents of the vessels scarcely could keep a watch on board ;
and many whose names were not on tlie lists concealed themselves in
the boats which carried their companions to the fighting ships. The
masters and mates of merchantmen in the harbour in like manner
offered their services, taking their stations at tlie guns. Others
cruised olf the coast in small boats, to warn oif approaching vessels ;
many of which nevertheless fell into the enemy's hands.
Meanwhile d'Estaing was in communication with Washington,
one of whose aides-de-camp visited liis flagship. ^V number of New
York pilots also were sent. When these learned tlie draught of the
heavier French ships, they declared that it was impossible to take
them in ; that there was on the bar (inly twenty-tliree feet at high-
water. Had that been really the case, Howe would not have needed
to make the preparations for defence that were visible to thousands
of eyes on sea and on shore ; but d'Estaing, though personally brave
as a lion, was timid in his profession, which he had entered very late
and without serving in the lower grades. The assurances of the
l)ilots were accepted after an examination by a lieutenant of the
ilagship, who conld find nothing deeper than twenty-two feet.' For-
tune's favours are thrown away, as though in mockery, on the incom-
petent or the irresolute. On the 22nd of -fuly a fresh north-east
wind concurred with a spring tide to give the highest possible water
on tiie bar.
" At eight o'clock," wrote an eye-witness in the British fleet, "d'Estaing with
all his squadron appeared under way. He kept working to windward, as if to gain
a proper position for crossing the bar by the time the tide should serve. The wind
could not be more favourable for such a design ; it blew from the exact point from
which he could attack us to the greatest advantage. The spring tides \\ere at the
highest, and that afternoon thirty feet on the bar. We consequently expected tlie
hottest day that had ever been fought between the two nations. On our side ail
was at stake. Had tlie men-of-war been defeated, the fleet of transports and
' A letter to the Admiralty, dated October 8th, 1779, from Yice-Adniiral Marriot
Arbuthnot, then commander-in-chief at New York, states that " at spring tides there
is generally thirty feet of water on the bar at bigli water."
VOL. HI — 26
402 MAJOR OPERATIOXS. 17(;2-17s;3. [1778.
victuallers must have been destroyed, and the army, of course, have fallen with us.
D'Estaing, however, had not sijirit equal to the risk ; at three o'clock we saw hira
bear off to the southward, and in a few hours he was out of sight."
Four (lays later, Howe, reporting these occurrence.s, wrote : "The
weather having Ijucii favourable the last three days for forcing en-
trance to this port, I conclude the French coinniander has desisted."
It is clear that the experienced British admiral did not recognise the
impossibility of success for the enemy.
After the demonstration of the 22nd, d'Estaing stood to the
southward, with the wind at east. The British advice-boats brought
back word that they had kept company witli him as far south as the
Capes of the Delaware, and there had left him ninety miles from
land. When their departure freed him from obsen^ation, he turned,
and made for Narragansett Bay, an attack on which, in support of an
American land force, had been concerted between him and Wasliing-
ton. On the 2itth he anchored three miles south of Rhode Island,
and there awaited a suitable moment for forcing the entrance.
Narragansett Bay contains several islands. The two largest,
near the sea. are Rhode Island and Conanicut, the latter being the
more westerly. Tlieir general direction, as that of the Bay itself,
is north and south ; and by them the entrance is divided into three
passages. Of these, the eastern, called Seakonnet, is not navigable
above Rhode Island. The central, which is the main chamiel, is
joined liy the western above Conanicut, and thus the two lead to the
upper r>a\-. The town of Newport is on the west side of Rhode
Island, four miles from the main entrance.
On the 80th of July, the day after the French fleet had arrived,
two of its ships of the line, under command of the afterwards cele-
brated Suffren, went up the western channel, anchoring Vtithin it
near the south end of Conanicut. One of them, as she passed, was
hulled twice by the British batteries. At the same time, two frig-
ates and a corvette entered Seakonnet ; whereupon the British
abandoned and burned a sloop of war, the Xingfisher, 16, and some
galleys there stationed. The British general. Sir Robert Pigot, now
withdrew his detachments from Conanicut, disabling the guns, and
concentrated the bulk of his force in the southern part of Rhode
Island and about Newport. Goat Island, which covers the inner
harbour of the town, was still occupied, the main channel being
commanded by its batteries, as well as by those to the north and
south of it urion Rhode Island. On the 5th of August, Suffren's
1778.J mnVE JND irKSrjING. 403
two ships got under way, sailed tliroiigli tlie western passage, and
anchored in the main elianne!, north of Conanieut; their former
positions being talcen by two otlier ships of the line.' The senior
British naval officer. Captain Jolm Brisbane, seeing retreat cut off
in both directions, now destroyed those ships of war ^ which could
not enter the inner harbour, sinking two between Goat and Rhode
Islands, to prevent any enemy passing there. Five transports also
were sunk north of Goat Island, between it and Coaster's Harbour,
to protect the inside anchorage in that direction. These preliminary
operations thus cost the British five frigates and two sloojjs, besides
some galleys. Guns and ammunition taken from them went to
increase the defences ; and their ol'lieers and crews, over a thousand
in number, served in the fortifications.
On the 8th of August the eight remaining B^rench sliips of the
line ran the batteries on Rhode and Goat Islands, anchoring above
the latter, between it and Conanicut, and were rejoined there by
the four previously detached to the western passage. Ten thousand
American troops having by this time crossed from the mainland to
the northern part of Rhode Island, d'Estaing immediately landed
four thousand soldiers and seamen from the fleet upon Conanicut,
for a preliminary organisation ; after which they also were to pass to
Rhode Island and join in the operations. For the moment, there-
fore, the British garrison, numbering probably six thousand men,*
was hemmed in by vastly superior forces, by land and by water.
Its embarrassment, however, did not last long. On the following
morning Lord Howe appeared, and anchored off Point Judith, seven
miles from the entrance to the Bay, and twelve from the position
then occupied by the French fleet. He brought a stronger force
than he had been able to gather for the defence of New York, having
now one seventy-four, seven sixty-fours, and five fifties, besides
several smaller vessels ; but he still was greatly inferior to his
opponent, l)y any rational mode of naval reckoning.
Howe's energies in New York had not been confined to prepara-
tions for resisting the entrance of the enemy, nor did they cease
with the latter's departure. When he first arrived there from Phila-
1 These four ships were among the smallest of the fleet, being one T4, two 64's,
and a 50. D'Estaing very properly reserved his heaviest ships to force the main
channel.
- Flora, 32 ; Juno, 32 ; Larlc, 32 ; Orpheus, 32 ; Falcon, 16.
* I have not been able to find an exact statement of the number ; Beatsou give*
eight regiments, with a reinforcement of Ave battalions.
404 MAJOR OPEliATIOXS. 176-2-178.3. [1778.
delphia, he had hastened to get his sliips ready for sea, a pre-
i)('Cii[)ation whicli somewhat, but not unduly, dehiyed their takiiig
their positions at Sandy Hook. Two, for instance, had been at tlie
watering-place when the approach of the French was signalled.
Owing to this diligence, no time was lost by his fault when the new
destination of the enemy was made known to him, on the 28th or
29th of July, 1)\' the arrival of the Jirnsonnuhlc, <i4,' Captain Tliomas
Fitzherbert, from Halifax. This ship narrowly escaped the French
fleet, having passed it on the evening of the 27th, steering for Rhode
Island. The Benowiu 50, Captain George Dawson (Act'g), whicli on
the 26th had reached New York from the West Indicjs, had a
similar close shave, having passed unnoticed through the rear of the
enemy the night before. Besides these two, Howe was joined also
by the Centurion, 50, Captain Richard Brathwaite, from Halifax,
and by the Cormvall, 74, Captain Timothy Edwards ; the latter,
which crossed the bar on the oOth. being the first of BjTon's fleet to
reach New York. The three others belonged to Howe's own
squadron. For the two Halifax ships which helped to make this
most welcome reinforcement, the Admiral was indebted to the dili-
gence of the officer there commanding, who hurried them a\\ay as
soon as he learned of d'Estaing's appearance on the coast. The
opportuneness of their arrival attracted notice. " Had they appeared
a few days sooner," sa^-s a contemporary narrative, " either they
must have been prevented from forming a junction with our squad-
ron, and forced again to sea, or we should have had the mortifica-
tion to see them increase the triumph of our enemy."
On the 1st of August, forty-eight hours after the Cornvmll had
come in from a stormy jiassage of fifty-two days, the squadron was
ready for sea, and Howe attempted to sail ; but the wind hauled foul
immediately after the signal to weigh had been made. It did not
become fair at the hour of high water, when alone heavy ships could
cross the bar, until the morning of tlie 6th. " Rhode Island was of
such importance," says the narrator already quoted, " and the fate of
so large a portio)h of the British army as formed the garrison was of
such ivfinite consequence to the general cause, that it was imagined the
Admiral would not lose a moment in making some attempt for their
relief." He liad learned of the detachments made from the French
fleet, and hoped that some advantage might be taken of this division.
- It may be interesting to recall tbat tliis was tlie ship on the books of which
Nelson's name first was borne in the navy, in 1771.
177a.] JIUH'E AM) jyESTAING. 405
111 slicirt, he went, as was propur and inciuuhciit on liiiii in .such
critical circumstances, to take a great risk, in Lope of a I'avonralile
chance offering. On the 9th, as before stated, he anchored off Point
Judith, and opened communications with tlie garrison, from whicli
he learned the events that had so far occurred, and also that the
enemy was well provided with craft of all kinds to make a descent
upon any part of the Island.
As de Grasse at Yorktown, when rumour announced tlic ap-
proach of a British fleet, was deten-ed only by the most urgent appeals
of Washington from abandoning his control of the Chesapeake,
essential to the capture of Cornwallis, so now d'Estaing, in Narra-
gansett Bay, was unwilling to keei) ^^^^ place, in face of Howe's
greatly inferior squadron.^ The influence exerted upon these two
admirals by the mere approach of a hostile fleet, when decisive
advantages depended upon their holding their ground, may be
cited plausibly in support of the most extreme view of the effect of
a " fleet in being ; " but the instances also, when the conditions are
analysed, will suggest the question : Is such effect always legitimate,
inherent in the existence of the fleet itself, or does it not depend
often upon the characteristics of the man affected? The contem-
porary British narrative of these events in Narragansett Bay, after
reciting the various obstacles and the inferiority of the British
squadron, says : " The most skilful officers were therefore of opinion
that the Vice-Admiral could not risk an attack ; and it appears by
his Lordship's public letter that this was also his own opinion :
under such circumstances, he judged it was impracticable to afford
the General any essential relief." In both tliese instances, the
admirals concerned were impelled to sacrifice the almost certain
capture, not of a mere position, but of a decisive part of the enemy's
organised forces, by tlie mere contingency of action, the moral effect,
of a fleet greatly inferior to their own, and which in neither case
wouid have attacked, as things stood. What does this prove ?
Immediately upon Howe's appearance, the French seamen who
had landed the day before on Conanicut were recalled to their ships.
The next morning, at 7 a.m., the wind came out strong at north-
east, which is exceptional at that season. D'Estaing at once put to
sea, cutting the cables in his haste. In two houi's he was outside,
1 Truude attributes d'Estaing's sortie to a sense of the insecurity of his position;
Lapevi-ouse Bonfils, to a desire for contest. Clievalier dwells upon the exposure
of the situation.
40f)
MAJOR OPEliATIOXS. 17Gl'-17s:5.
[1778.
steering for the enemy. Howe, of course, retired at once ; Iiis
inferiority ^ did not permit an engagement except on iiis own terms.
To insure tliese, he needed tlie weather-gage, the offensive position
of that day, which he expected, by keeping soutli, to gain, when the
usual wind fnnn that quarter shouhl set in. Tlie French Admiral
had the same object, hoping to crush his agile opponent ; and, as the
sea breeze did not make tliat day, he succeeded in keeping the
advantage with which lie had started, despite Howe's skill. At
nightfall, and during the night, both fleets steered to the southward,
' Howe's fleet consisted of : —
S nil's.
Eagle . . . .
Trident. . . .
Prestun .
Cornwall . .
Nonsuch .
Eaisonnahlc
Somerset . ■ ■
St. Albans . .
Ardent . . .
Centurion . .
Experiment .
Isis . . . .
lienown .
Phcenix .
Roebuck . . .
Venus
Richmond . .
Pearl . . . .
Apollo
Sphinx . .
Nautilus
Vigilant (a. s.)
Strombolo (f. s.)
Sulphur (f. s.) .
Volcano (f. s.) .
Thunder (bmb.)
Carcass (bmb.) .
Philadelphia * .
Hussar * . .
Ferret * . . .
Cornwallis *
Guns.
64
64
50
74
64
64
64
64
64
50
50
50
50
44
44
36
32
32
32
20
16
20
Mi:n.
522
367
600
500
500
500
500
500
350
350
350
350
280
28 0
240
220
220
220
160
125
1.50
45
45
45
80
80
CuMM.VNnEKS.
( Vice-Adni. Lord Howe (H.).
% Cajit. Hfiiiy Duncan (1st).
' Capt. lioger Curtis (2nd).
j Com. Jobn Elliot.
I Capt. Anthony James I'ye MoUoy.
( Com. William Hotliam.
( Cajit. Samuel Uppleby
Capt. Timothy Edwards.
Capt. Walter Griffith.
Capt. Thomas Fitzherbert.
Capt. George Ourry.
Capt. Richard Onslow.
Capt. George Keppel.
Capt. Richard Brathwaite.
Capt. Sir James Wallace.
Capt. John Rayuer.
Capt. George Dawson (Act'g).
Capt. Hyde Parker (2).
Capt. Andrew Snape Hamond.
Capt. William Peere Williams.
Capt. John Lewis Gidoin.
Capt. John Linzee.
Capt. Philemon Pownall.
Capt. Alexander Gra;me.
Com. John Bechei'.
Com. Hugh Cloberry Christian.
Com. Peter Apliu.
Com. James Watt.
Com. AVilliam Henry King O'Hara.
Com. James Gambler (2).
Lieut. Edward Edwards. (Act'g).
Lieut. Paterson.
Lieut. Sir James Barclay, Bart.
Lieut. Edward (?) O'Bryen.
Lient. Spry.
Galleys.
^■■^if^y,uu^fi. ..Ji^A^" ^^ma^zd^^^ .z-n^ ^i^^f^.^/^O'iv^J^f^.^^./z^^^.
1778.] HOirh: AND UEi^TMNa. 407
on tlie port tack, with llic \\hv\ viirial)lc! at east. At daybreak of
the 11th they oeeupied nearly the same relative positions, — the
French north-east to north from the Britisli, but somewhat more
distant than tlic nio-ht liefore, liaving ap[)arentl_y kept cUxser to the
wiu(h wliich ijy this had .steaiUed at eastrnorth-east. (See Plan : aa,
aa.)
Howe now shifted liis flag from the Eaf/lc, til, to tlie Apallo, 32,
and placed liinisclf between the two fleets, the In-tter to deciiU; the
movements of his own. Finding it impossible to gain the weather-
gage, and unwilling, probably, to be drawn too far from Rhode
Island, he formed his line on the other tack, heads to the northward.
r=
.-■r" h
A
""--.X '. ■■■>
-•?'•;. .,^'
.-'! \ ■^■■<
.iV-:^ ■"••-
,■•' • •■-> ^. o
,•',' N •■■-^ \ a
! \ '-.^ \
\ . ^ ' "
y, V > f' \ ^
\ a -^P"'" ^-
\ ) ."
\ ■■■' ^
\ . .'■ ^
/^
\ 11/^
/f{ '-~.js''°b ^
^
>,1 ■■•.Ji- ^
, f{ \. ^^ Manoeuvres of Howe and DEstainc
P\ • .,'2^ //'" ^"/c /77S.
■ .,.ij 2> ^-^ f^£.\c*^. ^ 3-/r^r/^M
1^ —
II
MAKCEUVr.ES OF HOWE AND h'esTAIN'O.
The French continued on the ^lort tack, under short canvas, heading
to the southward and eastward, so that their bearing changed from
east-north-east — directly to windward — at 6 a.ji., to soutli-south-east
at 4 P.JI., which would be nearly astern of the British. (See Plan :
bb, bl).) At this time their van was estiniateil l)y Howe to be two
or three miles from the British rear, and, according to his reading of
408 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1778.
tlieir mannenvres, d'Estaing Legan to form his line for the same tack
as the British, with a view of "engaging the Britisli squadron to
leeward," whereby he would obtain over it the advantage of using
the lower-deck guns, the wind and sea having become much heavier.
As the French admiral, in this new disposition, had put his heaviest
ships in the van, and his line was uearl}' in tlie wake of the Britisli,
Howe inferred an attack upon his rear. (See Plan: l)b.) He tliere-
fore ordered his heaviest ship, the Cornwall, 74, to go there from the
centre, exchanging places with the Centurion, 50, and at the same
time signalled the fleet to close to the centre, — a detail worth remem-
bering in view of Rodney's frustrated manoeuvre of April ITth, 1780.
It now remained simply to await firmly the moment when the
French should have covered the intervening ground, and brought
to action so much of his rear as d'Estaing saw fit to engage ; the
conditions of the sea favouring the speed of the bulkier ships that
composed the hostile fleet. The latter, however, soon abandoned
the attempt, and " bore away to the southward, apparently from the
state of the weather, which, by the wind freshening much, wdth
frequent rain, was now lendered verj- unfavourable for engaging."
It may be added that the hour was very late for beginning an
action. At sundown the British were under close-reefed topsails,
and the sea such that Howe was unable to return to the Eagle.
The wind now increased to afreat violence, and a severe storm
raoed on the coast until the evenincr of the 13th. tin-owing the two
fleets into confusion, scattering the ships, and causing numerous
disasters. The Apollo lost her foremast, and sprung the mainmast,
on the night of the 12th. The next day only two sliips of the line and
three smaller vessels were in sight of the Admiral. The latter,
when the weather moderated, went on board the Phcenix, 44, and
thence to the Centurion, 50, with which he " proceeded to the south-
ward, and on the 15th discovered ten sail of the French squad-
ron, some at anchor in the sea, about twenty-five leagues east from
Cape ]\Iay." ^ Leaving there the Centurion, to direct to New York
any of Byron's ships that might come on the coast, he departed
thither himself also, and on the evening of the 17th rejoined the
squadron off Sandy Hook, the appointed rendezvous. Many injuries
had lieen received by the various ships, but they were mostly of a
minor character; and on the 22nd the fleet again put to sea in
search of the enemy.
' At the mouth of Delaware Bay.
177.S.J IlOiri: AM) JJ'ESTAIXG. 409
The French had suffered imu'h more severely. The flagsliip
Luii/jtmloc, 90, had carried away her bowsprit, all her lower masts
followed it overboard, and her tiller also was broken, rendering the
rudiler unserviceable. The Marscillais, 74, lost her fcircniast and
bowsprit. In the dispersal of tlie two fleets that followed the gale,
each of these crippled vessels, on the evening of the 13tli, encoun-
tered singly a British 50-gun ship ; the Laiujxhedoo being attacked by
the Renown^ Captain George Dawson (Act'g), and the Marseillaishy
the Preston, Comraodoi'e W. Hotham, C\i|)tain Sanniel Uppleby,
The conditions in each instance were distinctly favourable to the
smaller combatant; l)ut botli unfortunately withdrew at nightfall,
making the mistake of postponing to tlie morrow a chance which
they had no certainty would exist after to-day. When morning
dawned, other French ships appeared, and the opportunity passed away.
The Isis, 50, Captain John Rayner, also was chased and overtaken
l)y the Cesar, 74. In the action which ensued, the French ship's
wheel was shot away, and she retired ; — • two other British vessels,
one of the line, being in sight. The latter are not mentioned in tlie
British accounts, and both sides claimed the advantage in this drawn
action. The French captain lost an arm.
^Vfter making temporary re[iairs, at the anchorage where Howe
saw them on the 15th of August, the French fleet had proceeded
again towards Newport. It was in the course of this passage that
they were seen by Byron's flagship ^ on the 18th, to the southward
of Long Island. The Experiment, 50, Captain Sir James Wallace,
which Howe had sent to reconnoitre Narragansett Bay, was chased
])y them into Long Island Sound, and only reached New York by
the East River ; being the first ship of the line or 50-gun ship that
ever passed through Hell Gate. On the 20th d'Estaing communi-
cated with General Sullivan, the connnander of the American land
forces on Rhode Island ; but it was only to tell him that iji his own
opinion, and in that of a council of war, the condition of the squad-
ron necessitated going to Boston to retit. Whatever may be thouglit
of the propriety of this decision, its seriousness can be best under-
stood from the report sent by Pigot to Howe. " The rebels had
advanced their batteries Avithin fifteen hundred yards of the British
works. He was under no apprehensions from any of their attempts
in front ; but, should the French fleet come in, it would make an
alarming change. Troops might Ije landed and advanced in his
1 Ante, p. 397.
410 MAJOR UPK RATION a. 17U2-1783. [1778.
rear ; and In tliat case he could not answer for the consequences."
Disregarding Sullivan's entreaties tiiat lie would remain, d'Kstaing
sailed next day for Boston, and readied it on August 28th. On tlie
3ist the indefatigable Howe came in sight; but the French liad
worked actively in the three days. Forty-nine guns, 18 and 24-
poundere, with six mortars, were already in position covering the
anchorage; and "the French squadron, far from fearing an attack,
.desired it eagerly." ^ The withdrawal of the fleet was followed by
that of the American troops before Newport.
Howe had quitted New York the instant he heard of d'Estaing's
reappearance off Rhode Island. He took with him tlie same number
of vessels as before, — thirteen of the line, — the Monmouth, 64,
Captain Thomas CoUingwood, of Byron's squadron, having arrived
and taken the place of the Isis, crippled in her late action. Before
reaching Newport, he learned that the French had started for Boston.
He hoped that they would find it necessary to go outside George's
Bank, and that he might intercept them by following the shorter
road inside. In this he was disappointed, as has been seen, and the
enem3'-'s position was now too strong for attack. The French retreat
to Boston closed the naval campaign of 1778 in North American
waters.
The inability or unwillingness of d'Estaing to renew the enter-
prise against Rhode Island accords the indisputable triumph in tliis
campaign to Howe, — an honor he must share, and doubtless gladly
would liave shared, with his supporters in general. That the British
fleet, for the most part two years from home, in a country without
dockyards, should have been able to take the sea within ten days
after the gale, while their opponents, just from France, }et with three
months' sea practice, were so damaged that they had to abandon the
field and all the splendid prospects of Rhode Island, — as they already
had allowed to slip the chance at New York, — shows a decisive
superiority in the officers and crews of the former. The incontest-
able merits of the rank and file, however, must not be permitted to
divert attention from the great qualities of the leader, but for
which the best luaterial would have been unavailing. The condi-
tions were such as to elicit to the utmost Howe's strongest qualities,
— firmness, endurance, uninterrupted persistence rather than celerity,
great professional skill, ripened by constant reflection and ready at
an instant's call. Not brilliant, perhai)S, but absolutely clear, and
^ Chevalier : ' Marine Fran^aise,' 1778.
1778.] HOIVK AXD D-KHTAING. 411
with mind replete with expeLlients to meet every probable con-
tingency, Plowe exhibited an equable, nnflagging energy, which was
his greatest characteristic, and which eminently fitted him for the
task of checkmating an enemy's every move — for a purely (hd'ensive
campaign. He was always on hand and always ready; for he never
wearied, and he knew his business. To great combinations he was
perhaps unequal. At all events, such are not associated with his
name. Tlie distant scene he did not see; but step by step he saw
his way with al)solute precision, and foUowed it with unhesitating
resolution. With a force inferior throughout, to have saved, in one
campaign, the British fleet. New York, and Rhode Island, with the
entire Britisli army, wliich was divided Ijctween those two stations
and dependent upon the sea, is an achievement unsurpassed in the
annals of naval defensive warfare.
Howe's squadron had been constituted in 177G with reference to
the colonial struggle only, and to shallow M'ater, and tlierefore was
composed, veiy properly, of cruisers, and of ships of the line of the
smaller classes ; there being several fifties, and nothing larger than
a sixty-four. When war with France threatened, the Ministry, ha\-
ing long warning, committed an uni)ardonable fault in allowing such
a force to be confronted by one so superior as that Avhich sailed from
Toulon, in April, 1778. This should have been stopped on its wa_y,
or, failing that, its arrival in America should have been preceded
by a British reinforcement. As it was, the government was saveil
from a tremendous disaster only by the efficiency of its Admiral. ,Vs
is not too uncommon, gratitude was swamped by the instinct of self-
preservation from the national wrath, excited by this, and b}- other
simultaneous evidences of neglect. An attempt was made to dis-
parage Howe's conduct, and to prove that his force was even supe-
rior to that of the French, by adding together the guns in all Ins
ships, disregarding their classes, or by combining groups of his small
vessels against d'Estaing's larger units. The instrument of the
attack was a naval officer, of some rank but slender professional
credit, who at this most opportune moment underwent a political
conversion, which earned him emplo3-ment on the one hand, and the
charge of apostasy on the other. For this kind of professional arith-
metic, Howe felt and expressed just and utter contempt. Two and
two make foiu- in a primer, but in the field they may make three, or
they may make five. Not to speak of the greater defensive power
of heavy ships, nor of the concentration <if their fire, the unity of
412 MAJUli Ul'KRATIOXS. 1702-178:5. [1778.
direction mider one captain possesses here also that importance
which lias caused unity of command and of effort to be recognised
as the prime element in military efficiency, from the greatest things
to the smallest. Taken together, the three elements — greater defen-
sive power, concentration of fire, and unity of direction — constitute
a decisive and permanent argument in favour of big ships, in Howe's
days as in our own. Doubtless, now, as then, there is a limit ; most
arguments can Ije flushed to an absurdum, intellectual or practical.
To draw a line is always hard ; but, if we cannot tell just where the
line has been passed, we can recognise that one ship is much too big,
while another certainly is not ; and between the two we can make
an approximation to an exact result.
( )n his return to New York on September 11th, Howe found there
Rear- Admiral Hyde Parker i with six ships of the line of Byron's
squadron. Considering his task now accomijlished, Howe decided
to return to England, in virtue of a [)ermission granted some time
before at his own re(]^uest. The dixt}- against the Americans, lately
liis fellow-countrymen, had been always distasteful to him, although
he did not absolutely refuse to undertake it, as did Admiral Keppel.
The entrance of France into the quarrel, and the coming of d'Estaing,
refreshed the spirits of the veteran, who moreover scorned to
abandon his command in the face of such odds. Now, with the
British positions secure, and superiority' of force insured for the time
being, he gladly turned over his charge and sailed for home, burn-
ing against the Admiralty with a wrath common to most of the
distinguished seamen of tiiat war. He was not employed afloat again
until a change of Ministry took place, in 1782.
During the same two months that saw the contest between
d'Estaing and Howe in America, the onl}' encounter between nearly
equal fleets in 1778 took place in European waters. Admiral the
Hon. Augustus Keppel, having returned to Spithead after the affair
between the Belle Puule and the Arcthusa, again put to sea on the
9th of .Tulv, with a force now increased to thirty ships of the line.
He had been mortified by the necessity of avoichng action, and of
even retiring into port, with the inadequate numbers before under
1 Later Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde P.irker, Bart., who perished in the Cato in 1VS3.
He was father of that Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, who, in ISOl, was Nelson's com-
niander-in-chief at Copenhagen, and who in 1778 commanded the Phanix, 44, in
Howe's fleet.
1778.] TIIIC IIATTLE OF USII.IXT. 413
his comniaiul, ami liis iiiiml was lixed now to compel an engagement,
if he met the Frencli.
Tlie Brest fleet also put to sea, the clay before Keppel, nmk'r the
command of Admiral tlie Comte d'Orvilliers. It contained thirty-
two ships of the line. Of these, three — a sixty-four, a sixty, and a
fifty — were not considered fit for the line of battle, which was tints
reduced to twenty-nine sail, carrying 2,098 guns. To these the
British opposed an aggregate of 2,278 ; but comparison by tins means
only is very rough. Not only the sizes of the guns, btit the classes
and weight of the vessels need to he considered. In the particular
instance the matter is of little im[)ortance ; the action being inde-
cisive, and credit depending upon maiucuvres rather than upon
fighting.
The French admiral was iuimpered l)y vacillating instructions,
reflections of the unstable impulses which swayed the Ministry.
Whatever his personal wishes, he felt that he mtist avoid action,
unless under very favourable circumstances. At the moment of
sailing he wrote : " Since you leave me free to continue my cruise, I
will not bring the fleet back to Brest, unless by positive orders, until
I have fulfilled the month at sea mentioned in my instrttctions, and
known to all the captains. Till then I will not fly before Admiral
Keppel, whatever his strength ; only, if I know him to be too
superior, I will avoid a disproportionate action as well as I can; but
if the enemy really seeks to force it, it will be very hard to -^ihtin."
These words explain his conduct throughout the next few days.
On the afternoon of Jtily 23rd the two fleets sighted each other,
about a hundred miles west of Ushant, the French being then to
leeward. Towards sunset, the latter were standing south-west, \'\ ith
the wind at west-north-west, and bore north-east from the Britisli,
who were lying-to, heads to the northward. The latter remaining
nearly motionless throughout the night, and the wind shifting,
d'Orvilliers availed himself of the conditions to press to windward,
and in the morning was found to bear north-west from his opponent.^
Their relative positions satisfied for tlie moment both admirals;
for Keppel found himself interpose<l between Brest and tlie French,
while d'Orvilliers, though surrendering the advantage of open
retreat to his port, had made it possilile, by getting the weather-gage,
to fulfil his promise to keep the sea and yet to avoid action. Two of
' Testimony of Captains Himd, Eoliinson, and Macbride, and of Ecar-Ailniiral
Campbell, captain of tlie fleet to Kep]iel.
414 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 170J-17);:5. [1778.
las ships, however, the Due dc Bounjoijnc, 80, and a seveiitj-fuur,
were still to leeward, not oid}- of their own maiu body, but also of
the British. Kepjjcl seat chasers after tiieai, for tiie expressed pur-
pose of coaipelliag d'Orvilliers to action ia their support,^ and it was
belieA'ed by the iiritish tluit they were forced to return to Brest, to
avoid being cut off. They certainl}' quitted their fleet, which was
thus reduced to twenty-seven effective sail. From tliis time until
.July 27th the wind continued to the westward, and the wariness of
the French admiral l)al'lled all Kcppel's efforts to get within lange.
The latter, having no doubts as to what was expected of hiu!, pur-
sued vigorousl}-, watching his chance.
On the morning of the 27th the two fleets were from six to ten
miles apart, wind west>south-west, botii on the port tack, steering
north-west, the French dead to windward. Tlie latter were in line
ahead, the British in bow-and-quarter line ; that is, nearly abreast
cacli other, but so ranged that, if they went about together, they
should have been in line ahead. Both fleets were in-egularly formed,
the British especially so ; for Keppel rightly considered that he
would not accomplish his purpose, if he were pedantic concerning
the order of his going. He had therefoi-e signalled a '• General
Chase," which, by loermitting much individual freedom of movement,
facilitated the progress of the whole. At daylight, tlie division com-
manded by Sir Hugh Palliser — the right wing, as then heading —
had dropped astern ; and at 5.30 A. Ji. the signal was made to seven
of its fastest sailers to chase to windward, the object being so to
place them, relatively to the main body, as to support the latter, if
an opportunity for action should offer.
At 9 A. M. the French admiral, wishing to approach the enemy
and to see more clearly, ordered his fleet to wear in succession, — to
countermarch. As the van ships went round under this signal, they
had to steer off the wind, parallel to their former line, on which
those following them .still were, until they reached the rear ship,
wlien they could again haul to the wind. Tliis caused a loss of
ground to leeward, l^ut not more than d'Orvilliers could afford, as
things stood. Just after he had fairly committed himself to the
manojuvre, the wind hauled to the southward two points,^ which
favoured the British, allowing them to head more nearly towards tlie
enemy. Keppel tlierefore continued on the port tack, luitil all the
Freneli were on the starboard, and at 10.1.5, being nearly in their
' See notu un preceding pixgR. - Twenty-two clegrees.
TIIK BATTLK OF U SUA XT.
415
List of till; Uiitisli :inil Fieiii-li Fleets ill tile action oil' Usliaut, July 27tli, 1778, cliielly
from Beatsoti, vi. 129-132, and Guei'iii, v. 24, 25 ; corrected from the Navy List, the Gazelle
dc France, the dispatches of d'Orvilliers to Sartiiie (Arch, de la Marine), and the Proceedings
of the C. M., 7 Jan. to 11 Feb., 1779, and April 12 to May 5, 1779.
- W. L. C.
SHU'S.
■A
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
o_
COMMANDERS.
Monarch.
74
Capt. Joshua Rowley.
t Lieut.-Gen. Coiute Duchaf-
I lector.
74
Capt. Sir Johu Hamilton, Bart.
Couronnc.
80
J fault.
Cnifiiiir.
74
Capt. Phillips Cosby.
\ Capt. Baron de Kermadec.
Exeter.
04
Capt. John Neale Pleydell Nott.
Due de Bourgognc.
80
Vicomte de Rochechouart (chef
Duke.
1)0
Capt. William Brereton.
d'esc).
i
( Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Har-
Glnrieux.
74
Capt. de Beaunes {chef d'esc).
>
Queen.
90
j land (R.).
Palmier.
74
Capt. de Reals.
' Capt. Isaac Prescott.
Bien-Aime.
74
Capt. d'Aubenton.
Shrewsburi/.
74
Capt. Sir Johu Lockhart Ross,
Dauphin lioyal.
70
Capt. de Nieuil.
Bart.
Vcvgeur.
04
Capt. d'Amblimont.
Cumberland.
74
Capt. Joseph Peyton (1).
A tciandre.
(U
Capt. de Tr»';migon (1).
Bei'wick.
74
Capt. the Hon. Keith Stewart.
Indien.
i;4
Capt. de la Grandiere.
Stirling Castle.
64
Capt. Sir Cliarles Douglas, Bart.
Saint Michel.
Amphion.
00
5<l
Capt. Mithon de Geuouilli.
Capt. de Trobriand.
Courogeux.
74
Capt. Lord Mulgrave.
Lieut.-Gen. Comte d'Orvil-
Thunderer.
74
Capt. the Hon. Robert Boyle
Walsingham.
Bretagne.
no
liers.
Capt. Duplessis Perseault.
Sandivich.
90 |Capt. Richard Edwards (2).
Ville de Paris.
lOO
Comte de Guichen (chef d'esc).
Valiant.
74 jCapt. the Hon. Johu Leveaou
L'Oru'/it.
74
Capt. Hector (chef d'esc).
Gower.
Fcndant.
74
Capt. de Vaudreuil.
Bien/am:nl.
C4 Capt. John Macbride.
Magnijique.
74
Capt. de Brach.
w"
Adm. the Hon. A. Keppel (B).
Act)/.
74
Capt. Thomas d'Orves.
«
Rear-Adniii'al John Campbell
Pefiechi.
G4
Capt. Cillart de Suville.
w
Victory.
100,- (1st Capt.).
Elellle.
04 'Capt. de Bot-Dern.
o
Capt. Jonathan Faulkuor (1)
'^ (2nd).
Artesien.
04
Oapt. des Touches.
Actionnaire.
64
Capt. de Proissi.
Foiidraijanf.
SO
Capt. John Jervis.
Princit (leorfje.
90 Capt. Sir John Lindsay, K. B.
Vigilant.
04 Capt. Robert Kingsmill.
Ten-ible.
74 .Capt. Sir Richard Bickerton,
Bart.
Ve7igeance.
74 Capt. Michael Clements.
Worcester.
1)4 Capt. Mark Robinson (1).
Lieut-Genl. Due de Chartres.
Elizabeth.
74
Capt. the Hon. Fredk. Lewis
Maitland.
Saint Esprit.
SO
Capt. La Motte-Picquet (1st).
Capt. de Mouperoux.
Robust.
74
Capt. Alexander Arthur Hood.
llobuste.
74
Capt. de Grasse-Tilli (chef d'esc)
I Vice-Admiral Sir Hugh Palli-
Coitquerant.
74
Capt. de Mouteil (chef d'esc).
.
Formidable.
90
J ser(B).
(Capt. John Bazely (1).
Intrepide.
74
Capt. de Beaumier.
<
Zodiaque.
74
Capt. de la Porte- Vezhis.
^
Ocean.
90 (Capt. John Laforey.
Diademe.
74
Capt. de la Cardomiie.
America.
04
Capt. Lord Longford.
Solitaire.
04
Capt. de Bricqueville.
Defiance.
04
Capt. Samuel Granston Goodall.
Poland.
04 Capt. de I'Archantel.
Egviont.
74
Capt. John Carter Allen.
Sphinx.
04 iCapt. de Soulanges.
Jiamillies.
74
Capt. Robert Digby.
Triton.
04 |Capt. de Ligondea.
Fier.
50
Capt. de Turpin.
ArctJiusa
32
Capt. Sanmel Marshall.
Sensible.
32
Proserpine.
28
Capt. Evelyn Sutton.
Andromaque.
32
Milford.
28
Capt. Sir William Buruaby, Bt.
Sincere.
32
Capt. de la Clocheterie.
Fox.
28
Capt. the Hon. Thos. Windsor.
.Tiinon.
32
i
Andromeda.
28
Capt. Henry Bryne.
Iphigenie.
32
Capt. Comte de Kersaint (2).
\A
Lively.
20
Capt. Robert Biggs.
Xi/mphe.
32
i
Pluto {i. s.).
S
Com. James Bradby (1).
Siirveillante.
10
H
Vulcan {I. s.)
8
Com. Lloyd.
Perle.
IG
2
Alert (cutter).
12
Com. William George Fairfax.
Ecareuil.
14
HlrondeUe.
Serin
Curieuse.
Lunette.
Favorite.
16
14
10
4
10
Capt. de la Perouse.
416 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [I77fi.
wake, he ordered his own ships to tack together. ^Vt this moiiieiit a
tliick rain-stjuall came up, concealing the fleets one from another for
three quarters of an hour. With the squall the wind sliifted back,
favouring the British on this tack, as it had on the otlier, and en-
abling them to lay up for the enem3^'s rear. When the weather cleared,
at 11, the French were seen to have gone about again, and were still
in the conuision of a partly executed manujuvre. Tiieir admiral had
doubtless recognised, from the change of wind, and from the direction
of the enemy Avhen last visible, that an encounter could not be
avoided. If he continued on the starboard tack, the van of the
]iursuing enemy, whose resolve to force battle could not be niisun-
dorstood, would overtake his rear ships, engaging as many of them
as he might choose. By resuming the port tack, the heads of the
columns would meet, and the fleets pass in opposite directions, on
equal terms as regarded position. TJierefore lie had ordered Ids
ships to go about, all at the same time ; thus forming column again
rapidly, but reversing the order so that the rear became the van.
Keppel so far had made no signal for the line of battle, nor did
he no^^^ Recognising from the four days' chase that his enem}- was
avoiding action, he judged correctly that he should force it, even at
some risk. It was not the time for a drill-master, nor a parade.
Besides, thanks to the morning signal for the leewardly ships to
chase, these, forming the rear of the disorderly column in -n-hich he
was advancing, Avere now well to windward, able therefore to sujj-
port tlieir comrades, if needful, as well as to attack the enemy. In
short, practically the whole force was coming into action, although
much less regularly than might have been desired. What was to
follow was a rough-and-ready fight, but it was all that could be had,
and better tlian nothing. Keppel therefore simi)ly made the signal
for battle, and that jast as the firing began. The collision was so
sudden that tlie ships at first had not their colours flying.
The French also, although their manunivres had been more
methodical, were in some confusion. It is not given to a body of
thirty ships, of varying qualities, to attain perfection of movement
in a fortnight of sea practice. The change of wind had precipitated
fin action, which one admiral had been seeking, and the other shun-
ning; but each had to meet it with such shift as he could. The
British being close-hauled, the French, advancing on a parallel line,
were four [loints ^ off tlie wind. Most of their ships, therefore, could
1 Foitv-five decrrees.
1778.J THK IIATTLE OF UHIIANT. 417
have gone clear to wiiulwaid of tlieir opponents, Ijut lliu fact that
the latter could reacli .some of tlie leaders compelled the others to
support them. As d'Orvilliers liad said, it was liard to avoid an
enemy resolute to iiglit. Tiie leading tin'ee French vessels' hauled
their wind, in obedience to the aihuiral's signal U) form tlie line of
battle, which means a close-hauled line. The effect of this was to
draw them gradually away from tlu^ IJiitish, and, if imitated hy llieir
followers, to render the affair a mere touch at a single point — inde-
cisive. The fourth French ship began the action, opening fire soon
after eleven. The vessels of the opposing fleets surged by under
short canvas, firing as opportunity offered, but necessarily nnich
handicapped by smoke, wliieh prevented the clear sight of an enemy,
and caused anxiety lest an unseen friend might receive a Ijroadside.
" The distance between the Formidable, 90, and the Egvioni, 74, was
so short," testified Captain .Tohn Laforey, whose three-decker, tlie
Ocean, 90, was abreast and outside this intei'val, " that it was with
difficulty I could keep l)etwixt them to engage, without firing upon
them, and I was once very near on board the Ecjmontr The Formid-
able, Palliser's flagship), kept her mizzen topsail aback mucli of the
time, to deaden her way, to make room for the Ocean, and to allow
the ships beliind her to close. " At a quarter past one," testified
Captain Maitland of the Elizabeth, 74, " we were very close behind
the Formidable, and a midshipman upon the poop called out tliat there
was a ship coming on board on the weather bow. I put the helm
up, . . . and found, when the smoke cleared away, I was shot up
under the Formidable's lee. She was then engaged with the two
last ships in the French fleet, and, as I could not fire at them without
firing through the Formidable, I was obliged to shoot on." ^ Captain
Bazely, of the Fonnidable, says of the same incident, " Tiie Formid-
able did at the time of action l)ear up to one of the enemy's ships, to
avoid being aboard of her, whose jib boom nearly toitched the main
topsail weather leech of the Formidable. I thought we could not
avoid being on board."
Contrary to tlie usual result, the loss of the rear division, in
killed and wounded, was heaviest, nearl}' equalling the aggregate of
' Cliev.iher say.^i, p. 89, " The EiiLjlisb passed out of r.ange " of these ships. As
these ships had the wind, they had the choice of range, barring signals from their
own admiral. In truth, they were obeying his order.
^ This evidence of the captains of the Ocean and the Elhahcfh contradicts Palliser's
charge that his ship was not adecjuately supported.
418
MAJOR OrERATIONS. 17(i2-17.s3.
[1778.
the other two.' Tliis was due to the morning signal to chase to
windward, which brought these ships closer than their leaders. As
soon as the Britisli van, ten ships, had jjassed the French rear, its
commander, Vice-A(hniial Sir Robeit Harland, anticipating Keppel's
wisiies, signalled it to go aljout and follow the enemy (Fig. 1, V).
As the French coluuni was running free, these ships, when about,
fetched to windward of its wake. As the Victor)/ drew out of the
fire, at 1 P.M., Kepi;)el made a similar signal, and attempted to wear,
ADMIRAL AUGVSXrs, VISCOt'XT KEITEL.
(From Rid/ei/\'! engTciving, after the portrait by G. Eomnei/.)
the injuries to his rigging not permitting tacking ; but caution was
needed in manoeuvring across the bows of the following ships, and it
was not till 2 p.m., that the Victory was about on the other tack,
heading after the French. At this time, 2 p.jr., just before or just
after wearing, the signal for battle was hauled down, and that for
1 It was actually quite equal, but this was due to an accidental explosion on
board the Fortn/ilnhle.
1778.]
TllK UATTLK OF UHIIANT.
411)
the line of battle was hoisted. The ol)ject of the latter was to
re-form the order, and the lirst was discontinued, partly because no
longer needed, chiefly tiiat it might not seem to contradict tiie urgent
call for a re-formation.'
At this time six or seven of Ilarland's division were on the
weather bow of the Victory, to windward (westward), but a little
ahead, and standing like her after the French ; all on the port tack
(Fig. 1). None of the centre division succeeded in joining tlie flag-
ship at once (Fig. 1, C). At 2.30 Palliser's ship, the Furmidahk,
BaTTi_E or UsHANT
2 7 '■ Jul V /77a B JO P M
r,c I.
>><^-wcv c> w€^'>"^c.f» 6t/cce3S'<r'v
^rf-em w-^t /fcT-iOA^
B'^^r.S^ » ^O**,,^
a roJ9 ^l/fSV/T
V ^^.fL -/Va J /^ ^CS*
^ ^/vO O/v/Siort
fy^,^ .^ ^c^.o^ )
C A'eff'ci. '9 ^iMCiM
T^ACM Ot.'0^£ ^/VD
R Pa,. t.. setts {
, 'J'^M
#
* ■*..
-.\ ■ :.
-*• 1
■-.... <?
^
R
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f ^
O 0
OO Of
o p
BATTLE OF USHANT.
on the starboard tack passed her to leeward, the last of the fleet
apparently out of action (Fig. 1, R). A half -hour after this the
Victory had been joined by three of the centre, which were following
her in close order, the van remaining in the same relative position.
Astern of these two groups were a number of other ships in various
degrees of confusion, — some going about, some trying to come up,
1 Naval officers will observe the strong analogy to the speculative naval tactics of
to-day, — a charge through (or b)'), ami a re-l'ormatiou afterwards.
420 MAJOR Ol'EltATW^S. 17G2-1783. [1778.
others coiupletely disiililed. Especially, there was in the soutii-south-
east, therefore well to leeward, a cluster of four or five British vessels,
evidently temporarily incapable of iiiaua-uvring.
This was the situation which met the eye of the French admiral,
scanning the field as the smoke drove away. The disorder of the
British, which originated in the general chase, had increased through
the hurry of the manoeuvres succeeding the squall, and culminated
in the conditions just described. It was an inevitable result of a
military exigency confronted b}- a fleet only recently equipped.
The French, starting from a better formation, had come out in I^etter
shape. But, after all, it seems difficult wholly to remedy the dis-
advantage of a policy essentially defensive ; and d'Orvilliers' next
order, though well conceived, was resultless. At 1 p.m. ^ he sig-
nalled his fleet to wear in succession, and form the line of battle on
the starboard tack (Fig. 1, F). This signal was not seen by the
leading ship, which should have Ix'gun the movement. The junior
French admiral, in the fourth ship from the van, at length went
about, and spoke the Bretagne, to know what was the commander-
in-chief's desire. D'Orvilliers explained tliat he wished to pass along
the enemy's fleet from end to end, tu leeivard, because in its dis-
ordered sbite there was a fair promise of advantage, and by going
to leeward — presenting his weather side to the enemy — he could
use the weather lower-deck guns, whereas, in the then state of the
sea, the lee ports could not be opened. Thus explained, the move-
ment was execirted, but the favourable moment had passed. It was
not till 2.30 that the manoeuvre was evident to the British.
As soon as Keppel recognised his opponent's intention, he wore
the Victory again, a few minutes after 3 p.m., and stootl slowly
down, on the starboanl tack off the wind, towards his cripjiled ships,
in the south-south-east, keeping aloft the signal for the line of battle,
which commanded every manageable ship to get to her station (Fig.
2, C). As this deliberate movement was away from the eneni}-, Palli-
ser tried afterwards to fix upon it the stigma of flight, — a preposter-
ous extravagancy. Harland put his division about at once and joined
the Admiral. On this tack his stati(in was ahead of the Victory, but
in conset^uence of a message from Keppel he fell in behind her, to
cover the rear until Palliser's division could repair damage and take
their places. At 4 v.M. Harland's division was in the line. Palli-
ser's ships, as the}' completed refitting, ranged themselves in rear
' Clieviilier. Proljably later by tlie otlier times used in this account.
1778.]
TllK /JATVLK OF USIIANT.
421
of the Formidahle, their captains coti.sidering, as they testified, tliat
tliey took station from theii' divisional commander, and not from
the sliip of the commander-iu-cliicf. 'I'here was formed thus, on the
weather quarter of tlie Victuri/, and a mile (jr two distant, a separate
line of ships, constituting on tiiis tack the proper rear of tlie fleet,
and dependent for initiative on Palliser's flagship (Fig. 2, R). At
5 P.M. Keppel sent word by a frigate to Palliser to liasten into
the line, as he was only waiting for him to renew tlie action, the
Battle: of Ushamx
Fig II
0 '
f *
V
0
•O O *3<I3 o
BATTLE OF USIIANT.
French now having completed their manoeuvre. They had not at-
tacked, as they might have done, but had drawn up under the lee
of the British, their van abreast the hitter's centre. At the same
time Harland Avas directed to move to his proper position in the van,
which he at once did (Fig. 2, V). Palliser made no movement, and
Keppel with extraordinary — if not culpable — forbearance, refrained
from summoning tlie rear ships into line by their individual pennants.
This he at last did about 7 P3I., signalling specifically to each of the
vessels then grouped with Palliser (except the Formidahle), to leave
422 MAJOR orKRATlONS. 17U2-1783. [1778.
the latter and take their posts in the line. This was accordingly
done, but it was thought then to be too late to renew the action.
At daylight the next morning, only three French ships were in sight
f i-oni the decks ; but the main body could be seen in tlie south-east
from some of the mastheads, and was thought to be from fifteen to
twenty miles distant.
Though absolutely indecisive, this was a pretty smart skirmish ;
the British loss being 133 killed and 373 wounded, that of the
French 161 killed and 513 wounded. The general result would
appear to indicate that the French, in accordance with their usual
policy, had fired to crijiple their enemy's spars and rigging, the
motive-power. This would be consistent with d'Orvilliers' avowed
purpose of avoiding action except under favourable circumstances.
As the smoke thickened and confusion increased, the fleets had got
closer together, and, whatever the intention, many shot found their
way to the British hulls. Nevertheless, as the returns show, the
French hit were to the British nearly as 7 to 5. On the other hand,
it is certain that the manoeuvring power of the French after the
action was greater than that of the British.
Both sides claimed the advantage. This was simply a point ot
honour, or of credit, for material advantage accrued to neither.
Keppel had succeeded in forcing d'Orvilliers to action against his
will ; d'Orvilliers, by a well-judged evolution, had retained a superi-
ority of mano3uvring power after the engagement. Had his next
signal been promptly obeyed, he might have passed again by the
British fleet, in fairly good order, before it re-formed, and concen-
trated his fire on the more leewardly of its vessels. Even mider the
delay, it was distinctly in his power to renew the fight ; and that
he did not do so forfeits all claim to victor^'. Not to speak of
the better condition of the French ships, Keppel, by running off
the wind, had given his opponent full opportunity to reach his fleet
and to attack. Instead of so doing, d'Orvilliers drew up under the
British lee, out of range, and offered battle ; a gallant defiance, but
to a crippled foe.
Time was thus given to the British to refit their sliips sufficiently
to Ijear down again. This the French admiral should not have per-
mitted. He should have attacked promptly, or else have retreated ;
to windward, or to leeward, as seemed most expedient. Under the
conditions, it was not good generalship to give the enemy time, and
to await his pleasure. Keppel, on the other hand, being granted
1778.] I'JLLlSKli'S CIIAliGES .IH.liyST KEl'PEL. 423
tliis chance, should liavi^ it'iiewed the figlit ; and here arose the con-
troversy whicli set all ICnqlaiid hy the; cars, and may be said to have
immortalised this otlicrwisc trivial incident. Palliser's division was
to windward from -t to 7 p.m., while the signals were flying to form
line of Ijattle, and to bear down in the Admiral's wake ; and Keppel
alleged that, had these been obeyed by 6 P.Jr.. he wonld have re-
newed the battle, havin;^' still over two hours of daylight. It lias
been stated already that, besi(k's tlie signals, a frigate brought Talli-
ser word that the Admiral was waiting only for him.
The inunediate dispute is of slight present interest, except as an
historical link in the fighting development of the British Navy; and
only this historical significance justifies more than a passing mention.
In 1778 men's minds were still full of Byng's execution in 1757, and
of the iMathews and Lestock affair in 1744, which had materially in-
fluenced Bj-ng's action off ^Minorca. Keppel repeatedly spoke of him-
self as on trial for his life ; and he had been a member of Byng's
court-martial. The gist of the charges against him, preferred by
Palliser, was that he attacked in the first instance without properly
forming his line, for which Mathews had been cashiered ; and, sec-
ondly, that by not renewing the action after the first pass-by, and by
wearing away from the French fleet, he had not done his utmost to
>' take, sink, burn, and destroy " — the latter, the charge on which
Byng was shot. Keppel. besides his justifying reasons for his course
in general, alleged and proved his full intention to attack again, had
not Palliser failed to come into line, a delinquency the same as that
of Lestock, which caused Mathews's ruin.
In other words, men's minds were breaking away from, but had
not thrown off completely, the tyranny of the Order of Battle, — one
of the worst of tyrannies, because founded on truth. Absolute error,
like a whole lie, is open to speedy detection ; half-truths are trouble-
some. The Order of Battle was an admirable servant and a most
objectionable despot. Mathews, in despair over a recalcitrant second,
cast off the yoke, engaged with part of his force, was ill supported,
and cashiered ; Lestock escaping. Byng, considering this, and being
a pedant by nature, woidd not lireak his line ; the enemy slipped
away, Minorca surrendered, and he was shot. In Keppel's court-
martial, twenty-eight out of the thirty captains who had been in
the line were summoned as witnesses. Most oi them swore that if
Keppel had chased in line of liattle that day, there could have been
no action, and the majority of them cordially approved; but there
424 MAJOR OPKHATIONS. 1762-1783. [1778.
was evidently an undercurrent still of dissent, and especially in the
rear shiixs, where tliere had been some of the straggling inevitable in
sueli movements, and whose commanders therefore had uncomfortable
experience of the lack of mutual support, whieli the line of battle was
meant to insure.
Another indication of still surviving pedantry was the obligation
felt in the rear ships to take post behind their own admiral, and to
remain there when the signals for the line of battle, and to bear down
in tlie admiral's wake, were flying. Thus Palliser's own inaction, to
whatever cause due, paralysed the six or eight sail with him ; but it
appears to the writer that Kepi^el was seriously remiss in not sum-
moning those ships by their own pennants, as soon as he began to
distrust the purposes of the Vice-Admiral, instead of delaying doing
so till 7 P.M., as he did. It is a cbrious picture presented to us by
the evidence. The Commander-in-Cliief, with his staff and the cap-
tain of the ship, fretting and fuming on the Victon/s quarter-deck ;
the signals flying whicli have been mentioned ; Harland"s tlivisiou
getting into line ahead ; and four points on the weather quarter, only
two miles distant, so that " everv gun and port could be counted," a
group of seven or eight sail, among them the flag of the third in com-
mand, apparently indifferent spectators. The Formidable' s only sign
of disability was the foretopsail unbent for four hours, — a delay which,
being unexplained, rather increased than relieved suspicion, rife then
throughout the Navy. Palliser was a Tory, and had left the Board
of Admiralty to take his connnand. Keppel was so strong a Whig
that he would not serve against the Americans ; and he evidently
feared that he was to be betrayed to his ruin.
Palliser's defence rested upon three principal points : (1), that the
signal for the line of battle was not seen on board the Formidable ;
(2), that the signal to get into the Admiral's wake was repeated by
himself ; (3), that his foremast was wounded, and, moreover, found to
be in such bad condition that he feared to cany sail on it. As re-
gards the first, the signal was seen on board the Ocean, next astern
of and "not far from" ^ the Formidable ; for the second, the Admiral
should have been informed of a disabilitj' by which a single ship was
neutralising a division. The fi'igate tliat brought Keppel's message
could have carried back this. Thirdly, the most damaging feature to
Palliser's case was that he asserted that, after coming out from under
fire, he wore at once towartls the enenn- ; afterwards he wore back
1 Evidence of Captain John Laforey. of the Ocean.
1778.] KErriCL ACQUITTED. 425
agiiiii. A ship that thus wore twice before tliree o'clock, might Jiave
(lisphiyed zeal and efliciency enough to run two miles, off the win<l,'
at five, to support a figlit. Delilterate treachery is impossible. To tlie
writer the Vice-Admiral's beliaviour seems that of a man in a sulk,
who will do only that which he can find no excuses for neglecting.
In such cases of sailing close, men generally slip over the line into
grievous wrong.
Kcppel was cleared of all the charges preferred against him ; tlie
accuser liad not thought best to embody among them the delay to
recall the ships which lie himself was detaining. Against Palliser
no specific charge was preferred, but the Admiralty directed a gen-
eral inquiry into his course on the 27th of July. The court found
his conduct " in many instances highly exemplary and meritorious,"
— he had fought well, — " but reprehensible in not having acquainted
the Counnander-in-C'hief of his distress, which he might have done
either by the Fo.r, or otiier means which he had in liis power."
Public opinion running strongly for Keppel, his acquittal was cele-
brated with bonfires and illuminations in London ; the mob got
drunk, smashed the windows of Palliser's friends, wrecked Palliser's
own house, and came near to killing Palliser himself. The Admiralty,
in 1780, made him Governor of Greenwich Hospital.
On the 28th of July, the British and French being no longer in
sight of each other, Keppel, considering his fleet too injured aloft to
cruise near the French coast, kept away for Plymouth, where he
arrived on the 31st. Before putting to sea ag;:in, he provided against
a recurrence of the misdemeanour of the 27th by a general order, that
" in future the Line is always to be taken from the Centre." Had
this been in force before, Palliser's captains woidd have taken station
by tlie Commander-in-Chief, and the FuruiiduhJe would have been left
to windward by lierself. At the same time Howe was closing his
scjuadron upon the centre in America ; and Rodney, two years later,
expeiienced the ill-effects of distance taken from the next ahead, when
tlie leading ship of a fleet disregarded an order.
Although privately censuring Palliser's conduct, the Commander-
in-Cliief made no official complaint, and it was not until the matter got
into tlie papers, througli the talk of the fleet, that the difficulty began
which resulted in the trial of both officers, early in the following year.
1 " 1 do not recollect how many points I went from the wind ; 1 must have bore
down a pretty large course." Testimony of Captain J. Laforej^, of the Ocean, on this
point.
426 MAJOR urEliATIOXS. 1702-178:3. [1778.
After this, Keppel, being di.ssatisfied with the Admiralty's treiitineut,
intimated his wisli to give \i[) the command. The order to strike his
flag was dated Marcli 18tli, 1779. He was not employed afloat again,
l)ut npon tlie eliange of administration in 1782 he became First Lord
of the Admiralty, and so remained, with a Ijrief intermission, until
December, 1783.
It is perhaps necessary to mention that both British and French
asserted, and assert to tliis day, that the other fjarty abandoned the
field.' The point is too trivial, in the author's opinion, to warrant
further discussion of an episode whose historical interest is very
slight, though its professional lessons are valuable. The British case
has the advantage — through the courts-martial — of the sworn testi-
mony of twenty to thirty captains, who agreed that the Britisli kept
on the same tack under short sail throughout the night, and that
in the morning only tlu'ee French ships were visible. As far as
known to the author, the French contention rests only on the usual
reports.
Conditions of weather exerted great influence upon the time and
jilace of hostilities during the maritime war of 1778, the opening
scenes of which, in Europe and in North America, have just been
narrated. In Eurojiean seas it was realised that naval enterprises by
fleets, requiring evolutions by masses of large vessels, were possible
only in summer. Winter gales scattered ships and impeded ma-
noeuvres. The same consideration prevailed to limit activity in Xorth
American -waters to the summer ; and complementary to this was the
fact that in the West Indies hurricanes of excessive violence occurred
from July to October. Tlie practice therefore was to transfer effort
from one quarter to the other in the Western Hemisphere, according
to the season.
In the recent treaty wdth the United States, the King of France
had formally renounced aU claim to acquire for himself any part of
the American continent then in possession of Great Britain. On the
other hand, he had reserved the express right to conquer any of her
islands south of Bermuda. The West Indies were then, in tlie ^'alue
of their products, the richest commercial region on the globe ; and
' " Durin<^ the night (of the 27th) Admiral Keppel kept away (fit route) for
Portsmouth." Chevalier, ' Marine Fran^aise,' p. 90. Paris, 1877. Oddly enough, he
adds that " on the evening of tlie 28th the French squadron, carried eastward uy the
currents, sighted Ushant."
1778.]
LUMIMC.L SEIZED Bl THE FRENCH.
All
France wished not only to increase her already large possessions
there, but also to establish more solidly her political and military
tenure.
In SeiDtember, 1778, the British Island of Dominica was seized l)y
an expedition from the adjacent Frencli colony of Martinic^ue. Tiic
affair was a surprise, and possesses no special military interest; Iml
it is instructive to observe tliat (ireat Britain was unprci>arcd, in the
West Indies as elsewhere, when the war began. A change had been
ADMir.AL THE HON. SAJU'EL BARRINGTON
(From the lillwfiraph by RhUctj, after ffie portrait tty J. ,S". Copley^ R. A,)
made shortly before in tlie command of the Leeward Islands Station,
as it was called, which extended from Antigua southward over the
Lesser Antilles with headquarters at Barljados. Rear-Admiral the
Hon. Samuel Barrington, the new-comer, leaving home before \vav
had been declared, had orders not to quit Barbados till further
instructions should arrive. Tliese liad not reached him when he
learned of the loss of Dominica. The Fi'encli had received their
428 MAJOR Dl'EliATIONS. 1762-178:5. [1778.
orders on tin; 17th of August. The blow was intrinsically somewhat
serious, so far as the mere ca^jture of a position can be, for tlie forti-
fications were strong, though tiiey had been inadequately garrisoned.
It is a mistalvc to l)uild works and not man them, for their fall trans-
fers to the enemy strength whicli he otherwise would need time to
create. To the French the conquest was useful beyond its commer-
cial value, because it closed a gap in their possessions. They now
lield Inur consecutive islands, from Udrth to south, Guadeloupe,
Dominica, Martinique, and St. Lucia.
Harrington had two ships of the line, his flagship, the Fnnce of
Wales, 74, Captain Benjamin Hill, and the Boijnc, 70, Captain Herbert
Sawyer, which, had he been cruising, would prolialjly have deterred
the French. Upon receiving the news, he put to sea, going as far as
Antigua ; but he did not ventm-e to stay away because his expected
instructions had not come yet, and, like Keppel, he feared an ungener-
ous construction of Ids actions. He remained in Barbados, patiently
watching for an opportunity to act.
The departure of Howe and the appi'oach of winter determined
the transference of British troops and ships to the Leeward Islands.
Reinforcements had given tlie British fleet a numerical superiority,
which for the time imposed a check upon d'Estaing; but B3-ron,
I)roverbially unlucky in weather, was driven crippled to Ne\vport,
leaving the French free to quit Boston. The difficulty of provision-
ing so large a force as twelve ships of the line at first threatened to
prevent the movement, supplies being then extremely scarce in the
port ; but at the critical moment American privateers brought in large
numbers oi prizes, laden with provisions from Europe for the British
army. Thus d'Estaing was enabled to sail for Martinique on the 4th
of Xovember. On the same day there left New York for Barbados
a British squadron, ' — 2 sixty-fours, 3 fifties, and tlu-ee smaller craft,
— under the command of Commodore William Hotham. convojdng
f>,000 troops for service in the "West Indies.
Ciiniinoddre William Hotiiam.
Cajitain Samuel Uppleby.
Caiitaiii Eicliaid Onslow.
Captain Walter Griffith.
Captain .John Eayner.
Captain Eichard Bratliwaite.
Captain James Ferguson.
Captain Alexander Graeme.
Coutmander Edward Edwards.
Beatson. vi. lU). — W. L. C
Preston
50
St. Albans
G4
Nonsuch
64
Isiit
50
Centurion
50
Venus
36
Pearl
32
Cairass (bomb)
8
j:
1778.] BJRRINGTUN AT ST. LUCIA. 429
Being bound for nearly the same puint, the two liostile Ijodies
steered parallel courses, liacli ignorant of the other's nearness. In
the latitude of Ilerniuila Imtli suffered from a \'iiilcnt gale, Init tlie
French most; the flagship) Ldiujualoc losing her main and nuzzen
toi)masts. On the 25th of November one ^ of I lotham's convoy fell
into the hands of d'Estaing, who then first learned of the British
sailing. Doubtful whether llieir destination was Barbados or
Antigua, — their two chief stations, — he decided for the latter.
Arriving off it on the 6th of December, he cruised for forty-eight
hours, and then bore away for Fort Royal, Martinique, the princii)al
French ddpot in the West Indies, where he anchored on the 9th. On
the 10th Hotham joined Barrington at Barbados.
Barrington knew already what he wanted to do, and therefore
lost not a moment in deliberation. The troops were kept on board,
Hotham's convoy arrangements being left as they were ; and on the
morning of December l'2th the entire force sailed again, the main
change being in the chief command, and in the addition of Barrington's
two ships of the line. In the afternoon of the 13th the slnpping
anchored in the Grand Cul de Sac, an inlet on the west side of St.
Lucia, which is seventy miles east-north-east from Barbados. Part
of the troops landed at once, and seized the batteries and heights
on the north side of the bay. The remainder were put on shore tiie
next morning. The French forces were inadequate to defend their
works; but it is to be observed that they were driven with iniremit-
ting energy, and that to this promptness the British owed their
ability to hold the position.
Three miles north of the Cul de Sac is a bay then called the
Car^nage ; now Port Castries. At its northern extremity is a pre-
cipitous promontory. La Vigie, then fortified, upon the tenure of
which depended not only control of that anchorage, but also access
to the rear of the works which eonnnaaded the Cul de Sac. If
those works fell, the squadron must abandon its position and put to
sea, where d'Estaing's fleet would be in waiting. On the other hand,
if the squadron were crushed at its anchors, the troops were isolated
and must ultimately capitulate. Therefore La Vigie and the squad-
ron \\-ere the two keys to the situation, and the loss of either would
be decisive.
By the evening of the 14th the British held the shore line fiuin
La Vigie to the southern point of the Cul de Sac, as well as Moriie
■ The Frf-ncL accounts sav three.
430
MAJDii OI'EltATlOXS. 1702-17«3.
[1778.
Furliiiic (Foil C'luuiutlcJ, tlit- capital ol the i.slaud. The i'eeljle
French garrison retired to the interior, leaving its guns uiispiked,
and its annnunition and stoi'e.s untouched. — amillicr instance of the
danger of woiks turning to one's own ilisad\antage. It was Bur-
lington's purpose now to remove the transports to the Cardnage, as
a more commodious harhour, probably also better defended ; but he
was prevented by the arrival of d'Estuiug that afternoon. "Justus
all the important stations were secured, the French coloui-s struck,
THE NOr.THEny PART OF THE IST.A>T) OF ST. LVCIA.
and General Grant's lieadquarters established at the Governor's
house, the Ariadne frigate came in sight with the signal abroad for
the approach of an enemy." ^ The French fleet was seen soon after-
wards from the heights above the squadron.
The British had gained much so far by celerity, but they still
spared no time to take breath. The night was passed by the soldiers
in strengthening their positions, and by the Rear-Adniiral in rectify-
ing his order to meet the expected attack. The transports, between
• Bfiitson : ' Military and Xaval Memoirs,' iv. 390.
177S.] D'ESTATNa AUItlVES AT ST. LUCIA. 431
fifty aiitl sixty in numbur, \v'ere warped in.side tlic ships of war, and
the latter were most carefully disposed across the nioiitli of the bay.
At the northern (windward) et\d was placed the Isis, 50, Ca^itain
John Rayner, well under the [mint to prevent anything from passing-
round her ; but for further security she was supported by three
frigates ; the Venus, 36, Captain William Peere Williams, the Ariadne,
20, Captain Thomas Pringie, and the Aurora, 28, Captain James
Cunnning, anchored abreast of the interval between her and the shore.
From the Isis the line extended to the southward, inclining sliglitly
outward ; the Priiirc of Wales, 74, Harrington's flagship, taking the
southern flank, as the most exposed position. Between her and tlie
Isis were five other ships, — the Boi/nc, 70, Nonsuch, 64, St. Albans, 64,
Preston, 50, and Centitrivn, 50. Tlie works left by the French at the
north and south points of the bay may have been used to support
the flanks, but Barrington in his report does not say so.
D'Estaing had twelve ships of the line, and was aljle to land, two
days after this, 7,000 troops. With such a superiority it is evident
that, had he arrived twentj-'four hours sooner, the British would
have been stopped in the midst of their operation. To gain time,
Barrington had sought to prevent intelligence reaching Fort Royal,
less than fifty miles distant, by sending cruisers in advance of liis
squadron, to cover the approaches to St. Lucia ; but, despite his care,
d'Estaing had the news on the 14th. He sailed at once, and, as has
been said, was off St. Lucia that evening. At daybreak of the 15th
he stood in for the Cardnage; but when he came within range,
a lively cannonade told him that the enemy were already in posses-
sion. He decided therefore to attack the squadi'on, and at 11.30
the French passed along it from north to south, fii-ing, but without
effect. A second attempt was made in the afternoon, directed upon
the lee flank, but it was equally unavailing. The British liad three
men killed; the French loss is not given, but is said to have been
slight. It is stated that the sea breeze did not penetrate far enough
into the bay, that day, to admit closing. This frequently happens,
but it does not alter tlie fai't that the scjuadron was the pro})er point
of attack, and that, especially in the winter season, an opportunity
to close must offer soon. D'Estaing, governed probably by the sol-
dierly bias he more than once betrayed, decided now to assault the
works on shore. Anchoring in a small bay north of the Car^nage,
he landed seven thousand men, and on the 18th attempted to storm
the British lines at La Vigie. The neck of land connecting the
432 MA.JOl:. OI'KRATIONS. 17(J-J-17S:i. [1778,1779.
promontory with tlic island is very fiat, and tlic French therefore
laboured under great disadvantage from the commanding j)osition of
their enemy. It was a repetition of Bunker Hill, and of many other
ill-judged and preeipitat« attacks. After tiu'ee gallant but ineffectual
charges, led by d'Estaing in person, the assailants retired, with the
loss of 41 officere and 800 rank and fih;, killed and wounded.
D'Estaing re-embarked his men, and stood ready again to attack
Barrington, a frigate being stationed off the Cul de Sac, to give
notice when the wind should serve. On the 24th she signalled, and
the fleet weighed ; but Barrington, who had taken a veiy great I'isk
for an adeiiuate object, ran no unnecessary risks through presump-
tion. He liad employed his respite to warp the ships of war farther
in, where the breeze readied less certainly, and where narrower
waters gave better support to the flanks. He had strengthened the
latter also by new works, in which hi' had placed heavy guns
from the ships, manned by seamen. For these or other reasons
d'Estaing did not attack. On the 29th he quitted the island, and
on the 30th the French governor, the Chev. de Micoud, formally
cajiitulated.
This achievement of Barrington, and of Major-General James
Grant, who was associated with him, was greeted at the time with an
applause which will be echoed by the militar}- judgment of a later
age. There is a particular pleasure in finding the willingness to
incur a great clanger, conjoined with a care that chances nothing
against which the utmost diligence and skill can provide. The
celerity, forethought, wariness, and daring of the Hon. Samuel
Barrington have inscribed upon the records of the British Navy a
success whose distinction should be measured, not by the greatness
of the scale, but by the perfection of the workmanship, and by the
energy of the execution in the face of great odds.
St. Lucia remained in the hantls of the British throughout the
war. It was an important acquisition, because at its north-west
extremity was a good and defen.sible anchorage, Gi-os Ilet Bay, only
thirty miles from Fort Roj-al. In it the British fleet could lie,
when desirable to close-watch the enemy, yet not be worried for its
safety when away ; for it was but an outpost, not a base of opera-
tions, as Fort Royal was. It was thus used continually, and from
it Rodney issued for his great victory in April, 1782.
During the first six months of 1779 no important incident
occurred in the West Indies. On the Gtli of Januarv, Vice-Admiral
177!».] irEHTAINd TAKES ST. VISCKNT. 433
tlie Hon. John Byron, witli ten ships of the line from Narragansett
Bay, reached St. Lucia, and relieved Barrington of the chief com-
mand. Both the British and the French fleets were reinforced in
the course of the spring, but the relative strength remained rurally
as before, until the 27th of June, when the arrival of a division
from Brest made the French numbers somewhat superior.
VICE-ADMIRAL SIR HYDE PARKER \\), liART.
{From a lithograph by H, R. Cook^ after the portrait hij J, Xorthcote, /?. A.)
Shortly before this, Byron liad been constrained l)v one of the
commercial exigencies that constantly emlmrrassed the military
action of the British admirals. A large convoy of trading sliips,
bound to England, was collecting at St. Kitts, and he thought
necessary to accompany it part of the homeward way, until well
clear of the enemy's West India cruisers. For tliis purpose he left
St. Lucia early in June. As soon as the coast was clear, d'Estaing,
informed of his object, sent a small combined expedition against
St. Vincent, which was surrendered on the 18th of the month. On
the 30th the French admiral liimsclf quitteil Fort Royal with his
vol.. Til. — 2*^
434
MAJOR Ul'KUATlUMi. 1702-178:).
[1779.
whole fleet, — twenty-five ships of the line and several frigates, —
directing his course for the British Island of Grenada, before which
he ancliored on the 2nd of July. AVitli connnendable promptitude,
lie landed his troops that evening, and on the 4th the island capitu-
lated. Except as rejjresented by one small armed sloop, the York,
12, Lieutenant Daniel Dobrde, which was biken, the British Navy
had no part in this transaction. Thirty richly laden merchant ships
were captured in the port.
At daybreak of July 6th, Bj-ron appeared with twenty-one sail of
the line, one frigate,^ and a convoy of twenty-eight vessels, carrying
troops and equipments, lie had returned to St. Lucia on the 1st,
and there had heard of the loss of St. Viucent, with a rumour that
the French had gone against Grenada. He consequently liad put
to sea on the 3rd, with the force mentioned.
^ List of the British Fleet in the action otT Grenada, July 6th, 1779.
Beatson, vi. 160 (corrected). — W. L. C.
From
COMMANDERS.
LOSSES.
SHIPS.
1
3
1
Suffolk ....
74
617
\ Kuar-Adm. Joshua Rowley. )
\ Capt. Hugh Cloberry Christian. )
7
25
Boyne ....
70
520
C'ajit. Herbert Sawyer.
12
30
Enyal Oak . . .
74
600
Cajit. Thomas Fltzherbert.
4
12
Prince of Wales .
74
600
I Viec-Adniiral the Hon. Samuel Barrington. )
( Cipt. Benjamin Hill. )
26
46
Magnificent . .
74
600
Capt. John Klphinstone.
8
11
Trident ....
64
500
Capt. Anthony James Pye MoUoy.
2
6
Medway . . .
60
420
Capt. AVilUam Affleck.
—
4
Fame ....
74
600
Capt. John Butchart.
4
9
Nonsuch . . .
64
500
Capt. AValter Grittith.
—
— .
Sidfan ....
74
600
Capt. Alan Gardner.
16
39
Princess Puoyal
90
770
A'ice-Adm. the Hon. John Byron. /
Capt. William Blaiv. i
3
6
Albion ....
74
600
Capt. George Bowyer.
—
2
Stirling Castle
64
500
Capt. Robert Carkett.
2
6
Elizabeth . . .
74
600
Capt. AVilliam Truscott.
1
2
Varmouth . . .
64
500
Capt. Nathaniel Bateman.
—
—
Lion
64
500
Capt. the Hon 'Williara Cornwallis.
21
30
Vigilant . . .
64
500
Capt. Sir Digby Dent, Kt.
—
—
Conqueror . . .
74
617
( Rear-Adm. Hyde P.arker (1). )
( Capt. HaiTy Harniood. i
—
—
Cornieall . . .
74
600
Capt. Timothy Eilwards.
16
27
Monmouth . . .
64
500
Capt. Robert Fanshawe.
25
28
Grafton ....
74
600
Capt. Thomas Collingwood.
35
63
Ariadne . . .
20
160
Capt. Thnnins Pringle.
—
—
177!).] BYRON OFF GRENADA. 435
The British approach was i-eported to d'Estaing during tlie niglit
of the 5th. Most of liis fleet was then lying at anclior off George-
town, at tlio siiutli-wfst of tlie ishxnd ; some vessels, wliiclt had Ijeen
under vny on look-out duly, had fallen to leeward.^ At 4 A.Ji. tlie
French began to lift their anchors, with orders to form line of battle
on the starboard tack, in order of speed; that is, as rapidly as
possible without regard to usual stations. When daylight had fully
made, the British fleet was seen standing down from the northward,
close inshore, on the port tack, with the wind free at north-east by
east. It was not in order, as is evident from the fact that the ships
nearest the enemy, and therefore first to close, ought to have been
in the rear on the then tack. For this condition there is no evident
excuse ; for a fleet having a convoy necessarily proceeds so slowly
that the war-ships can keep reasonable order for mutual support.
jMoreover, irregularities that are permissible in case of emergency,
or when no enemj' can be encountered suddenly, cease to be so
when the probability of an imminent meeting exists. The woi'st
results of the day are to be attributed to this fault. Being short of
frigates, Byron assigned three ships of the line (a), under Rear-
Admiral Rowley, to the convoy, which of course was on the off hand
from the enemy, and somewhat in the rear. It was understood,
however, that these would be called into the line, if needful.
When the French were first perceived by Byron, their line was
forming; the long thin column lengthening- out gradiially to the
north-north-west, from the confused cluster '^ still to be seen at the
anchorage (A). Hoping to profit by their disorder, he signalled "a
general chase in that quarter,^ as well as for Rear-Admiral Rowley
to leave the convoy; and as not more than fourteen or fifteen of
the enemy's ships appeared to be in line, the signal was made for
the ships to engage, and form as tJtei/ could get w^:i." * It is clear
from this not onl}^ that the ships Avere not in order, but also that
1 To the westward. These ishimls lie in the tr.iile-wi)iJs, which are constant in
general direction from north-east.
^ Admiral Keppel, in his evidence before the Palliser Court, gave an interesting
description of a similar scene, altliough the present writer is persuaded that he was
narrating things as they seemed, ratlier than — as at Grenada — as they were. " The
French were forming their line exactly in the manner M. Conflans did when
attacked by Admiral Hawke." (Keppel had been in that action.) "It is a manner
peculiar to themselves, and to those who do not understand it, it appears like con-
fusion ; they draw out ship by ship from a cluster."
" That is, towards the ships at anchor, — the enemy's rear as matters then were.
* Byron's Report. The italics are the author's.
436
MAJUll UPERATIONS. 17G2-17S3.
[1779.
tliey were to form under fire. Three sliii)s, the Sultan, 74, the
Prince of Wales, 74, and tlie Boyne, 70, in the order named, — the
second carrying the flag of Barrington, now a Vice-Admiral, — were
well ahead of the fleet (b). The direction prescribed for the attack,
that of the clustered sliips in the French rear, carried the liritish
=i
Bvron's Action off Creimada
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BTIION S ACTION OFF GRENADA.
down on a south-south-west, or south by west, com-se ; and as the
enemy's van and centre were drawing out to the north-north-west,
the two lines at that time resembled the legs of a " Y," the point of
which was the anchorage off Georgeto\vn. Barrington's three
ships therefore neared the French order gradually, and had to
receive its fire for some time before they could reply, unless, b}'
hauling to the wind, they diverged fi'om the set course. This, and
their isolation, made their loss very heavy. When they reached the
rear of the French, the latter's column was tolerably formed, and
Barrington's sliips wore in succession, — just as Harland's had
done in Keppel's action, — to follow on the other tack. In doing
this, the Sultan kept away under the stern of the enemy's rearmost
177:).] THE ACTION OFF GRENADA. 437
ship, to rake her; to avoid whicli the latter bore up. The Sultan
thus lost time and ground, and Barrington took the lead, standing
along tlie Fieneh line, from rear to van, and to windward.
Meanwhile, the forming of tiie enumy had revealed to Byron for
the first time, and to his dismay, that he had been deceived in tliink-
ing the French force inferior to his own. "However, the general
chase was continued, and the signal made for close engagement." ^
The remainder of the ships stood down on the port tack, as the first
three had done, and wore in the wake of the latter, whom they fol-
lowed; but before reaching the point of wearing, three ships (c),
"the Grafton, 74, the Cornwall, 74, and the Lion, 64, happening to he
to leeward,'^ sustained the fire of the enemy's whole line, as it passed
on the starboard tack." It seems clear that, having had the wind,
during the night and now, and being in search of an enemy, it should
not have " happened " that any ships should have been so far to lee-
ward as to be unsupported. Captain Thomas White, R.N., writing
as an advocate of Byron, says,^ " while the van was wearing . . . the
sternmost ships were coming up under Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker.
. . . Among these ships, the Cormvall and Lion, from being nearer
the enemy than those about them (for tlie rear division had not then
formed into line), drew upon themselves almost the whole of the
enemy's fire." No words can show more clearly the disastrous, pre-
cipitate disorder in which this attack Avas conducted. The Grafton,
White says, was similarly situated. In consequence, these three were
so crippled, besides a tremendous loss in men, that they dropped far
to leeward and astern on the other tack.
When the British ships in general had got round, and were in
line ahead on the starboard tack, — the same as the French, — ran-
ging from rear to van of the enemy (B), Byron signalled for the eight
leading ships to close together, for mutual support, and to engage
close. This, which should have been done — not with finikin preci-
sion, but with military adequacy — before engaging, was less easy
now, in the din of battle and with crippled ships. A quick-eyed
subordinate, however, did something to remedy the error of his chief.
Rear-Admiral Rowley had been left considerably astern, having to
make up the distance between the convoy and the fleet. As he fol-
lowed the latter, he saw Barrington's three ships unduly separated,
and doubtless visibl}' much mauled. Instead, therefore, of blindly
' Byron's Report. Author's italics.
2 ' Naval Researches.' London, 1830. p. 22.
438 MAJOR OPI'J RATIONS. 1762-1783. [1779.
following Ills leader, he cut slraiglit across (a a') to the head of the
column to support the van, — an act almost absolutely identical witli
that which won Nelson renown at Cape St. Vincent. In this he was
followed by the Moavioath, 64, the luilliancy of whose bearing was so
conspicuous to the two fleets that it is said the French officers after
the battle toasted " the little black ship." Slie and the Suffolk, 74,
Rowley's tlagship, also suffcrctl severely in tliis gallant feat.
It was imperative with Byron now to keep his van well up witli
the enemy, lest he should uncover the convoy, liniad on the weather
bow of the two fleets. " They seemed much inclined to cut off the
convoy, and had it mucli in their power by means of their large
frigates, independent of sMps of the line." ^ On the other hand, the
Cornwall, Grafton, and Lion, though they got their heads round, could
not keep up with the fleet (c'), and were dropping also to leeward —
towards the enemy. At noon, or soon after, d'Estaing bore up with
the body of his force to join some of his vessels that had fallen to
leeward. Byron very properly — under his conditions of inferioritj'
— kept his wind ; and the separation of the two fleets, thus produced,
caused tiring to cease at 1 p.m.
The enemies were now ranged on parallel lines, some distance
apart ; still on the starboard tack, heading north-north-west. Between
tlie two, but far astern, the Cormijall, Grafton, Lion, and a fourth
British ship, the Favic, were toiling along, greatly crippled. At 3 p.m.,
the French, now in good order, tacked together, which caused them
to head towards these disabled vessels. Byron at once imitated the
movement, and the eyes of all in the two fleets anxiously watched
tlie result. Captain Cornwallis of the Lion, measuring the situation
accurately, saw tluit, if he continued ahead, he would be in the mitlst
of the French by the time he got abreast them. Having only his
foremast standing, he put liis helm up, and stood broad off before
the wind (c"), across the enemy's bows, for Jamaica. He was not
pursued. The other three, unable to tack and afraid to wear, which
would put them also in the enemy's power, stood on, passed to wind-
ward of the latter, receiving several broadsides, and so escaped to the
northward. Tlie Monmouth was equally maltreated ; in fact, she had
not been able to tack to the southward with tlie fleet. Continuing
north (a'), she was now much separated. D'Estaing afterwards re-
formed liis fleet on its leewardmost ship (BC).
Byron's action off Grenada was the most disastrous, viewed as an
1 Byron's Report.
1771).] /ll'JiON'.S DLS.liSrER. 430
isolated event, that tin; British Navy had encountered since lieachy
Head, in IGOO. That the Cornivull, Grafton, and Lion were not caj)-
tured was due simply to the strained and cautious inaptitude of the
French admiral. This IJyron virtually admitted. " To my great
surprise no ship of the enemy was detached after the Zion. Tlie
Grafton and Cprntvall might liavc beim weathered by the French, if
they had kept their wind, . . . l)ut they persevered so strictly in de-
clining every chance of close action that they contented themselves
with firing upon these ships when i)assing barely within gunshot,
and suffered them to rejoin the squadron, witliout one effort to cut
them off." Suffren,! who led the Frencli on tlie starboard tack, and
whose ship, the Fantasquc, 64, lost 22 killed and 43 wounded, wrote :
"Had our admiraFs seamanship equalled his courage, we would not
have allowed four dismasted ships to escape.'' That the Monmouth
and i?'ame could also liave been secured is extremely probable ; and
had Byron, in order to save them, borne down to renew the action,
the disaster might have become a catastrophe.
That nothing resulted to the French from their great advantage is
a matter for French naval history, not for British. It is otherwise as
regards the causes of sucli a grave calamity, when twenty ships met
twenty-four,^ — a sensible but not overwhelming superiority. These
facts have been shown sulKciently. Byron's disaster was due to attack-
ing with needless precipitation, and in needless disorder. He had the
weather-gage, it was early morning, and the east wind, already a
working breeze, must freshen as the day advanced. The French were
tied to their new conquest, which they could not abandon without
humiliation, not to speak of their troo})S ashore; but even had tliey
wished to retreat, they could not have done so before a general chase,
unless prepared to sacrifice their slower ships. If twenty-foiu- ships
could reconcile themselves to running from twenty, it was scarcely
possible but that the fastest of these would overtake the slowest of
those. There were time for fighting, an (Opportunity for forcing action
1 Pierre A. de Suffren de Saint Tropez, a Bailli of the Order of KnigUts of Malta.
Born ll'lG. Present at two naval actions before he was twenty. Participatecl in
1750 iu the attack on Port Mahon, and in 1759 in the action off Lagos. Chef
d'escadre in 1779. Dispatched to the East Indies. Fought a British squadron in
the Bay of Praya, and a succession of brilliant actions with Sir Edward Hughe.s.
Vice-Admiral, 1783. Killed in a duel, 1788. One of the greatest of French naval
officers.— W. L. 0.
'^ Troude says that one French seventy-four, liaving touched in leaving port, wa*
440 MAJUli Ul'ERATIONS. 1702-1783. [1779.
which couhl iiol ha evaded, and time also for the British to form in
reasoiial)le order.
It is important to consider tliis, Ijecause, while Keppel must he
api^roved for attacking in partial disorder, Byron must be blamed for
attacking in utter disorder. Keppel had to snatch ojiportunity from
an unwilling foe. Having himself the lee-gage, he could not 2»ick and
choose, nor yet manoeuvre; yet he Ijrought his fleet into action, giving
mutual supp(U't throughout nearl}-, if not quite, the whole line. What
Byron did has been set forth : the sting is that his bungling tactics can
find no extenuation in any urgency of the case.
The loss of the two fleets, as given by the authorities of either
nation, were: 15ritish, 1S3 killed, 34G wounded ; French, 190 killed,
759 wounded. Of the British total, 12G killed and 235 wounded, or
two thirds, fell to the two groups of three ships each, which by the
Vice-Admiral's mismanagement were successively exposed to be cut
up in detail by the concentrated fire of the enemy. The British loss
in spars and sails — in motive-power — also exceeded greatly that of
the French.
After the action d'Estaing returned quietly to Grenada. Byron
went to St. Kitts to refit ; but repairs were most difficult, owing to the
•dearth of stores in which the Admiralty had left the West Indies.
With all the skill of the seamen of that day in making good damages,
the sliips remained long unserviceable, causing great apprehension for
the other islands. This state of things d'Estaing left unimproved,
as he had his advantage in the battle. He did, indeed, parade his
superior force before Byron's fleet as it lay at anchor ; but, beyond
the humiliation naturally felt by a Navy which prided itself on ruling
the sea, no further injury was done.
In August Byron sailed for England. A^ice-Admiral Barrington
had already gone home, wounded. The station therefore was left in
connnand of Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker (1), and so remained until
the following March, when Admiral Sir George Brydges Rodney,
K. B., arrived as Commander-in-Chief on the Leeward Islands Station.
The North American Station was given to Vice-Admiral Marriot
Arbuthnot, who had under him a half-dozen ships of the line, with
headquarters at New York. His command was generally indepen-
•dent of Rodney's, but the latter had no hesitation in going to New
York on emergency and taking charge there ; in doing which he had
the a2)i)roval of the Admiralty.
The a]ii)roach of winter in 1778 had determined the cessation of
177!).]
THE junnsii at savannah.
441
operations, both naval and niilitaiy, in the northern part of the Ameri-
can continent, and had led to the transfer of 5,000 troops to the West
Indies, already noted. At the same time, an unjustifiable extension
of British effort, having regard to llie disposable means, was undei'taken
in the Southern States of Georgia and South Carolina. On the 27th
of November a small detachment of troops under Lieutenant-Colonel
Archibald Campbell, sailed from Sandy Hook, convoyed by a division
ADMIRAL MAKRIOT AIIBUTIIXOT.
{From a lUhograph hij II, R. Cookj after the portrait by Hising.'}
of frigates commanded by Captain Hyde Parker (2),i in the Phosnix,
44. It entered tlie Sa^'a,nnah River four weeks later, and soon after-
wards occupied the city of the same name. Simultaneously with this,
by Clinton's orders. General Prevost moved from Florida, then a
British colony, with all the men he could spare from the defence of
St. Augustine. Upon his arrival in Savannah, he took command of
the whole force thus assemljled.
1 Sir Hyde Parker, Kt. Born, 1739. Captain, 1763. Rear- Admiral, 1793. Vice-
Admiral, 1794. Admiral. 1799. Died, 1807. Nelson's chief ut Copenhagen, in 1801.
442 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1779.
These operations, wliich during 1779 extended as far as the
neighbourhood of Chark;ston, depended upon the control of the
water, and are a conspicuous examjjle of misapplication of power to
the point of ultimate self-destruction. They were in 1778-79 essen-
tially of a minor character, especially the maritime jiai't, and will
therefore be dismissed with the remark that the Navy, by small ves-
sels, accompanied every movement in a country cut up in all direc-
tions by water-courses, large and small. " The defence of this
province," wrote Parker, '• must greatly depend on the naval force
upon the different inland creeks. I am therefore forming some gal-
leys covered from musketiy, which I believe will have a good effect."
These were precursors of the " tin-elads " of the American Civil War,
a century later. Not even an armoured ship is a new thing under
the sun.
In the Southern States, from Georgia to Virginia, the part of the
Navy from first to last was subsidiary, though important. It is there-
fore unnecessary to go into details, but most necessary to note that
here, by misdirection of effort and abuse of means, was initiated the
fatal movement which henceforth divided the small British army in
North America into two sections, wholly out of mutual support.
Here was reproduced on a larger, and therefore more fatal, scale,
Howe's error of 1777. This led directly, by the inevitable logic of
a false position, to Cornwallis"s march tlirough North Carolina
into Virginia, to Yorktown in 1781, and to the signal demonstra-
tion of sea jDower off Chesapeake Bay, Avhich accomplished with a
crash the independence of the United States. No hostile strategist
could have severed the British army more hopelessly than did
the British government; no fate could have been more inexorable
than was its own perverse will. The personal alienation and
official quarrel lietween Sir Henry Clinton and Lord Cornwallis,
their divided counsels and divergent action, Avere but the natural
result, and the reflection, of a situation essentially self-contradictory
and exasperating.
As the hurricane season of 1779 advanced, d'Estaing, who had
orders to bring back to France the ships of the line with which he
had sailed from Toulon in 1778, resolved to go first upon the Ameri-
can coast, off Sovith Carolina or Georgia. Arriving with his whole
fleet at the mouth of the Savannah, August 31st, he decided to
attempt to wrest the city of Savannah from the British. This would
have been of real service to the latter, had it nipped in the bud
1779.] SPAIN DECLARES ll'JI! AdAlNST ENGLAND. 443
their ex-centric uiulcrtaking ; but, after three weeks of opened trenches,
an assault upon the place failed. D'Estaiiig tlicn sailed for Europe
with the ships designated to accompany him, the others returning to
the West Indies in two squadrons, under De (Jrasse and La Motte-
Picquet. Tliough fruitless in its main iil)ject, tliis enterprise of
d'Estaing had the imjiortant indirect effect of causing the British to
abandon Narragansett Bay. Upon the news of his appearance, Sir
Henry Clinton had felt that, with his greatly diminished army, he
could not hold both Rhode Island and New York. He therefore
ordered the evacuation of the former, tluis surrendering, to use again
Rodney's words, " the best and noblest harbour in America." The
following summer it was occupied in force by the Frencli.
D'Estaing was succeeded in the chief connnand, in the West
Indies and North America, by Rear-Admiral de Guichen,i who ar-
rived on the station in March, 1780, almost at the same moment as
Rodney.
In June, 1779, the maritime situation of Great Britain had Ije-
come much more serious by Spain's declaring war. At the same
moment that d'Estaing with twenty-five ships of the line had con-
fronted Byron's twenty-one, the Channel fleet of forty sail had seen
gathering against it a host of sixty-six. Of this great numljcr thirty-
six were Spanish.
The open declaration of Spain had Ijcen preceded by a secret alli-
ance with France, signed on the 12th of April. Fearing that the
British government would take betimes the reasonable and proper
step of blockading the Brest fleet of thirty with the Channel forty,
thus assuming a ceiitral position with reference to its enemies and
anticipating the policy of Lord St. Vincent, the Fi'ench INIinistry
hurried its ships to sea on the, 4th of June; Admiral d'Orvilliers,
Keppel's opponent, still in command. His orders were to cruise off
the island of Cizarga, where the Spanianls were to join. On the
lltli he was at his station, but not till tlie '23rd of July did the bulk
of the Spanish force appear. During this time, the French, insuffi-
ciently equipped from the first, owing to the haste of their departure,
were consuming provisions and water, not to speak of wasting pleas-
ant summer weather. Their ships also were ravaged by an epidemic
1 Louis Urbain de Boucnic, Conile ilu Guichen. Born, 1712. Entered the navy,
1730. Commanded the Illustre with success in North America in 1756. Second in
command in the action off Ushant in 1778. Thrice fought Rodney in the West Indies
in 1780. Fought Kempenfelt off the Azores in 1781. Died, 1790. — W. L. C.
444
MAJOR Ul'KllATlONS. 17GL'-1783.
[1779.
fever. Upon tlie junutiou, d'Orvilliers found that the Spaniards had
not been furnislicd with the Frencli system of signals, althougli by
the treaty the French adnurul was to be in chief command. The
rectification of tliis oversiglit caused furtlier delay, l)ut on the 11th
of August the combined fleet sighted Ushant, and on the 14th was
off tlie Lizard. On the 16th it ajipearcd before Plymouth, ar.d there
on the 17th captured the Ardent, G4, Captain Pliilip Boteler.
ADMIKAL ..1. L :.LES IIAr.DY (2), KT.
(From the lilhograjih by U. E. Cook, after titeporlrail by G. Eomney.)
Tliirty-five ships of the Channel fleet had gone to sea on the
16th of June, and were now cruising outside, under the command
of Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (2).^ His station was from ten to
1 Admiral Sir Charles Hardy (2), Kt. Son of Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Hardy
(1), wlio died in 1744. Born about 1716. Entered the Xavy, 1731. Lieutenant,
1737. Commander, 1741. Captain, 1741. Knighted, and Governor of New York,
17.55. Eear-Admiral, 1756. Employed under Boscawen and Hawke. Vice-Admiral,
1762. Admiial, 1770. Governor of Greenwich Hospital, 1771. Commander-in-
Chief in the Clianuel, 1770. Died, 1780. —AV. L. C.
1779.] FRANGU-Hl'ANlSn FLEET IN THE CHANNEL. 445
twenty leagues sovxth-wcst of Scilly ; conscqtxeutly ho had not been
seen by the enemy, who from Ushaiit liad stood up the (Iliannel.
The allies, however, now nearly double tlie numlK-rs of tlie IJritisli,
were between them and tlieir ])orts, — a serious situation doubtless,
but by no means desperate ; not so dangerous for sailing ships as it
jjrobably will be for steamers to have an enemy between them and
their coal.
The alarm in England was very great, and especially in the south.
On the 9th of July a royal proclamation had commanded all horses
and cattle to be driven from the coasts, in case of invasion. I5ooms
had been placed across the entrance to Plymouth Ilarljour, and orders
were sent from the Admiralty to sink vessels across the harljour's
mouth. Many who had the means withdrew into the interior, which
increased the panic. Great mcreliant fleets were then on the sea,
homeward bound. If d'Orvilliers were gone to cruise in the ap-
proaches to the Channel, instead of to the Spanish coast, these might
be taken ; and for some time his whereabouts were unknown. As it
was, the Jamaica convoy, over two hundred sail, got in a few days
before the allies appeared, and the Leeward Islands fleet had similar
good fortune. Eight homeward bound East Indiamen were less
luckjr, but, being warned of their danger, took refuge in the Shannon,
and there remained till the trouble blew over. On the other hand,
the stock market stood flrm. Nevertheless, it was justly felt that
such a state of things as a vastly superior hostile fleet in the Channel
should not have been. " What a humiliating state is our country
reduced to!" wrote Jervis, who was with the fleet, to his sister; but
he added that he laughed at the idea of invasion.
The French had placed a force of flfty thousand men at Le Havre
and St. j\Ialo, and collected four hundred vessels for their transport.
Their plans were not certainly known, but enough had transpired to
cause reasonable anxiety ; and the crisis, on its face, was very serious.
Not their own preparations, but the ineflicicncy of tlieir enemies, in
counsel and in preparation, saved the British Islands from invasiou.
What the results of this would have been is another question, — a
question of land warfare. The original scheme of the Frencli Jlin-
istry was to seize the Isle of Wight, securing Spithead as an anchor-
age for the fleet, and. to prosecute their enterprise from tins near and
reasonably secure base. Eeferring to this first project, d'Orvilliei-s
wrote : " We will seek the enemy at St. Helen's, and then, if I find
that roadstead unoccupied, or make myself master of it, I will send
446 MA J nil Ol-KHATIONS. 1702-1783. [1779.
word to Marshal De Vaiix, at Le Havre, and inform him of the
measures I will lake to insure his passage, which [measures] will
depend upon the position of the English main fleet [d(;pendront
des forces supijrieures des Anglais]. That is to say, I myself will
lead the combined fleet on that side, to contain the enemj', and
I will send, on the other side, a light squadron, with a sufficient
number of ships of the line and frigates ; or I will propose to M. de
Cordova to take this latter station, in order that the passage of the
army may be free and sure. I assume that then, either by the
engagement I shall have fought with the enemy, or hy their retreat
into their ports, I shall be certain of their situation and of the success
of the operation." ^ It will be observed that d'Orvilliers, accounted
then aud now one of the best officers of his day in the French navy,
takes here into full account the British " fleet in being." ^ The main
body of the allies, fifty shi[)S, was to hold this in check, while a
smaller force — Cordova had command of a special "squadron of
observation," of sixteen ships of the line ■ — was to convoj' the
crossing.
These projects all fell to pieces before a strong east wind, and a
change of mind in the French government. On the 16th of August,
before Plymouth, d'Orvilliers was notified that not the Isle of
Wight, but the coast of Cornwall, near Falmouth, was to be the scene
of landing. The effect of this was to deprive the huge fleet of any
anchorage, — a resource necessary even to steamers, and far more
to sailing vessels aiming to remain in a position. As a jioiut to
begin shore operations, too, as well as to sustain them, such a remote
corner of the countay to be invaded was absurd. D'Orvilliers duly
represented all this, but could not stay where he was long enough to
get a reply. An easterly gale came on, which blew hard for several
days and drove the allies out of the Channel. On the 25th of August
word Mas received that the British fleet was near Scilly. A council
of war was then held, which decided that, in view of the terrible
increase of disease in the shipping, and of the shortness of provisions,
it was expedient not to re-enter the Channel, but to seek the enemy,
and bring him to battle. This was done. On the 29th Hardy was
sighted, being then on his return up Channel. With the disparity
of force he could not but avoid action, aud the allies were unable to
' Chevalier, ' Marine Frangaise,' 1778. p. 165. Author's italics.
- But it was not niercl_T a " fleet in being." It was aLso, in all senses, a " potential
fleet." — W.L. C.
1779.] THE OBJECTS OF THE IIAK, 447
compel it. On the 3rd of September lie reached Spithead. D'Or-
villiers soon afterwards received orders to return to Brest, and on
tlie 14th the combined fleet anchoi'cd tliere.
The criticism to be passed on the conduct of this summer cam-
paign by the Britisli Ministry is twofold. In the first place, it was
not ready, according to the reasonable standard of the day, which
recognised in the probable co-operation of the two Bom-bon king-
doms, France and Spain, the measure of the minimum naval force
permissible to Great Britain. Secondly, the entrance of Spain into the
war had been foreseen months before. For the inferior force, therefore,
it was essential to prevent a junction, — to take an interior position.
The Channel fleet ought to have been off Brest before the French
sailed. After they were gone, there was still fair ground for the
contention of the Opposition, that they should have been followed,
and attacked, off the coast of Spain. During the six weeks they
waited there, they were inferior to Hardy's force. Allowance here
must be made, however, for the inability of a representative govern-
ment to disregard popular ovitcry, and uncover the main approach to
its own ports. This, indeed, does but magnify tlie error made in not
watcliing Brest betimes, for a fleet before Brest covered also the
Channel.
With regard to the objects of the war in which they had become
partners, the views of France and Spain accorded in but one point, —
the desirability of hijuring Great Britain. Each had its own special
aim for its own advantage. This necessarily introduced divergence
of effort; but France, having first embarked in the contest and then
sought the aid of an ally, the particular objects of the latter naturally
obtained from the beginning a certain precedence. Until near the
close of tlie war, it may be said that the chief ambitions of France
were in the West Indies ; those of Spain, in Europe, — to regain
Minorca and Gibraltar.
In this way Gibraltar became a leading factor in the contest, and
affected, directly or indirectly, the major operations throughout the
world, by the amount of force absorbed in attacking and preserving
it. After the futile effort in the Channel, in 1779, Spain recalled
her vessels from Brest. " The project of a descent upon England
■was abandoned provisionallj-. To blockade Gibraltar, to have in
America and Asia force sufficient to hold the British in check,
and to take the offensive in the West Indies, — such," wrote the
French government to its ambassador in Madrid, " was the plan of
448 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1780.
campaif^n adopted for 1780." Immediately upon the declai-ation of
war, intercourse between Gibraltar and the Spanish mainland was
stopped ; and soon afteiwards a blockade l)y sea was instituted,
fifteen cruisers being stationed at the entrance of the Bay, where
they seized and sent into Spanish ports all vessels, neutral or British,
bound to the Rock. This blockade was effectively supported from
Cadiz, but a Spanish force of some ships of the line and many small
vessels also maintained it more directly from Algeciras, on the opposite
side of the Bay of Gibraltar. The British Mediterranean squadron,
then consisting only of one 60-gun ship, three frigates, and a sloop,
was wholly unable to afford relief. At the close of the year 1779,
flour was fourteen guineas the barrel, and other provisions in propor-
tion. It became therefore imminently necessary to throw in supplies
of all kinds, as well as to reinforce the garrison. To this service
Rodney was assigned ; and with it he began the brilliant career, the
chief scene of which was to be in the West Indies.
Rodney was appointed to command the Leeward Islands Station
on the 1st of October, 1779. He was to be accompanied there imme-
diately by only four or five ships of the line ; l)ut advantage was
taken of his sailing, to place under the charge of an officer of his
approved reputation a great force, composed of his small division
and a large fraction of the Channel fleet, to convoy supplies and
reinforcements to Gibraltar and Minorca. On the 29th of December
the whole body, after man}' delays in getting down Channel, put to
sea from Plymouth : twenty-two ships of the line, fourteen frigates
and smaller vessels, besides a huge collection of storeships, victuallers,
ordnance vessels, troop-ships, and merchantmen, — the " trade " for
the West Indies and Portugal.
On the 7tli of January, a hundred leagues west of Cape Finisterre,
the West India ships parted, under convoy of a ship of the line and
three frigates. At daylight on the 8th, twenty-two sail were seen to
the north-east, the squadron apparently having passed them in the
night. Chase was at once given, and the whole were taken in a few
hours. Seven ^ were ships of war, chiefly frigates ; the remainder
merchant vessels, laden with naval stoi'es and pi'ovisions for the
Spanish fleet at Cadiz. The i)rovision ships, twelve in number, were
diverted at once to the relief of Gibraltar, under charge of the Span-
1 Cfuipuscoana, 64 (added to the Royal Navy as Prince Williani) ; San Carlos,
32; San Rafael, 30; San Bruno, 26; Saiita Teresa, 24; SanFcrmin, 16; SanVincente,
14. Steel's ' Navy List': Beatson, vi. 233. — W. L. C.
1760.] RODNEY AT ailUlALTAU. 449
isli sixty-four, which had bccu one of their convoy before capture,
and had now received a British crew. Continuing on, intelligence
was received from time to time by passing vessels that a Spanish
squadron was cruising off Cape St. Vincent. Thus forewarned, orders
were given to all captains to be [irepared for battle as the Cape was
neared. On tlie 16th it was passed, and at 1 P.M. sails in the south-
east were signalled. These were a Spanish squadron of eleven ships
of the line, and two 26-gun frigates. Rodney at once bore down for
them under a press of canvas, making signal for the line abreast.
Seeing, Iiowever, that the enemy was trying to form line of battle
on the starboard tack, which with a westerly wind was with heads to
the soutliward, towards Cadiz, a hundrcnl miles to the south-east, he
changed the orders to a " General Chase," the ships to engage as
they came up ; " to leeward," so as to get between the enemy and
his post, and " in rotation," by which probably was meant that the
leading British vessel shovild attack tlie sternmost of the SjDaniards,
and that her followers should pass her to leeward, successivel}^ en-
gaging from the enemy's rear towards tlie van.
At 4 P.M. the signal for battle was made, and a few minutes
later the four headmost of the pursuers got into action. At 4.40
one of the Spanish ships, the Santo Domingo, 70, blew vip with all on
board, and at (3 anotlier struck. By this hour, it being .January,
darkness had set in. A night action therefore followed, which
lasted until 2 a.m., when the headmost of tlie enemy surrendered,
and all firing ceased. Of the eleven hostile ships of the line, only
four escaped. Besides the one blown up, six were taken. These
were the Fcnix, 80, flag of the Spanish Admiral, Don Juan de Lan-
gara, the Monarca, 70, the Princesa, 70, the Diligcntc, 70, the San
Julian, 70, and the San Eugenia, 70. The two latter drove ashore
and were lost.' The remaining four were brought into Gibraltar,
and were ultimately added to the Navy. All retained their old
names, save the Fcnix, which was re-named Gibraltar. " The
weather during the night," by Rodney's report, " was at times very
tempestuous, with a great sea. It continued veiy bad weather the
next day, when the Royal George, 100, Prince George, 90, Sandwich,
90 (Rodney's flagship), and several other ships were in great danger,
and under the necessity of making sail to avoid the shoals of San
Lucar, nor did they get into deep water till the next morning."
^ Rodney's Report. Chevalier saj'.s that one of them was retaken bj' her crew
and carried into Cadiz.
VOL. III. — 29
450 MAJUli OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1780.
It was ill tliis danger from a lee shore, which was deliberately
thougli promptly incurred, that the distinction of this action of
Rodney's consists. The enemy's squadron, being only eleven ships
of the line, was but half the force of the British, and it was taken
by surprise ; whicli, to be sure, is no excuse for a Ijod}' of war-ships
in war-time, ('auglit unawares, the Spaniards took to flight too
late. It was Rodney's merit, and no slight one under the conditions
of weather and navigation, that they were not permitted to retrieve
their mistake. His action left nothing to be desired in resolution
or readiness. It is true that Rodney discussed the matter with his
flag-captain, Walter Young, and that rumour attributed the merit
of the decision to the latter; but this sort of detraction is of too
common occurrence to affect opinion. Sir Gilbert Blane, Physician
to the Fleet, gives the following account : " When it was close
upon sunset, it became a question whether tlie chase should be con-
tinued. After some discussion between the Admiral and Captain,
at which I was present, the Admiral being confined with the gout,
it was decided to persist in the same course, with the signal to
engage to leeward." Rodney at that time was nearly sixty-two,
and a constant martyr to gout in both feet and hands.
The two successes by the way imparted a slightly triumphal
character to the welcome of the Admiral by the garrison, then sorelj^
in need of some good news. The arrival of much-needed supplies
from home was itself a matter of rejoicing ; but it was moi'e inspirit-
ing still to see following in the train of the friendly fleet five hostile
ships of the line, one of them bearing the flag of a Commander-in-
Chief, and to hear that, besides these, three more had been sunk or
destroyed. The exultation in England was even greater, and es-
pecially at the Admiralty, which was labouring under the just
indignation of the people for the unpreparedness of the Navy.
'• You have taken more liue-of-battle ships," wrote the First Lord
to Rodney, " than had been captured in any one action in either of
the two last preceding wars."
It should be remembered, too, as an element in the triumph, that
this advantage over an exposed detachment had been snatched, as
it were, in the teeth of a main fleet superior to Rodney's own ; for
twenty Spanish and four French ships of the line, under Admiral de
Cordova, were lying then in Cadiz Bay. During the eighteen days
when the British remained in and near the Straits, no attempt was
made by Cord(j\-a to take revenge for the disaster, or to reap the
17S0.] RODNEY SAILS FUR THE WEST INDIES. 451
benefit of superior force. The inaction was cine, probably, to the
poor condition of the Spanisli shi[)s in point of elliciency and ecjuip-
ment, and largely to their having uneoppered bottoms. This ele-
ment of inferiority in the S[>anish navy should be kept in mind as
a factor in the general war, although Spanish fleets did not come
mucli into battle. A French Commodore, then with tlie Spanish
fleet in Ferrol, wrote as follows: " Their ships all sail so badl}- that
they can neither overtake an enemy nor escape from one. The
Glorieux is a bad sailer in tiie French navy, but better than the
best among the Spaniards.'" He adds: "The vessels of Langara's
squadron were surprised at immense distances one from the other.
Thus they always sail, and their negligence and security on this
point are incredible."
On approaching Gibraltar, the continuance of Ijad weather, and
the strong easterly current of the Straits, set many of Rodney's
ships and convoy to leeward, to the back of the Rock, and it was
not till the 26th that the flagship herself ancliored. The storeships
for Minorca Avere sent on at once, under charge of three coppered
ships of the line. The practice of coppering, though then fully
adoj^ted, had not yet extended to all vessels. As an element of
speed, it was an important factor on an occasion like this, when
time pressed to get to the West Indies ; as it also was in an engage-
ment. The action on the IGth liad been opened by the coppered
ships of the line, which first overtook the retreating enemy and
brought his rear to battle. In the French navy at the time, Suffren
was urging the adoption upon an apparently reluctant ilinister.
It would seem to have been more general among the British, going
far to compensate for the otherwise inferior qualities of their ships.
"The Spanish men-of-war we have taken," wrote Rodney to liis
wife concerning these prizes, " are much superior to ours." It may
be remembered that Nelson, thirteen years later, said the same.
■"I perceive you cry out loudly for coppered ships," wrote the First
Lord to Rodney after this action ; " and I am therefore determined
to stop your mouth. You shall have copper enough."
Upon the return of the ships from ^Minorca, Rodney put to sea
again on the l-3th of February, for the West Indies. The detach-
ment from the Channel fleet accompanied him three days' sail on his
way, and then parted for England with the prizes. On this return
voyage it fell in \\\i\\ fifteen French supply vessels, convoyed by two
sixtv-fours, l:)0und for the He de France, in the Indian Ocean. One
452 MA.TOI! OI'KBATIONS. 1702-1783. [irsii.
of the ships of war, the ProUc, and three of the storeships were taken.
Though trivial, tlic incident illustrates the effect of operations in
Europe upon war in India. It may be mentioned here as indicative
of the o()vernnu>nt's dilemmas, that Rodney was censured for hav-
ing left one ship of the; line at the Rock. " It has given us the
trouble and risk of sending a frigate on purpose to order her home
immediately ; and if you will look into your original instructions, 30U
will find that there was no point more strongly guarded against than
that of your leaving any line-of-battle ship behind 3'ou." These
words clearly show the exigency and peril of the general situation,
owing to the inadequate development of the naval force as compared
with its foes. Such isolated ships ran the gauntlet of the fleets flank-
ing their routes in Cadiz, Ferrol, and Brest.
When Rodney arrived at St. Lucia with his four ships of the line,
on the 27th of March, he found there a force of sixteen others, com-
posed in aliout equal proportions of ships that had left England with
Byron in the summer of 1778, and of a reinforcement brought by
Rear-Adrairal Rowley in the spring of 1779.
During the temporary command of Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker,
a smart affair had taken place between a detachment of the squadron
and one from the French division, under La Motte-Picquet, then
lying in Fort Royal.
On the 18th of December, 1779, between 8 and 9 a.m., the British
look-out ship, the Preston, .50, between Martinique and St. Lucia,
made signal for a fleet to windward, which proved to be a body of
French supply ships, twenty-six in number, under convoy of a frigate.
Both the British and the French squadrons were in disarra}-, sails
unbent, ships on the heel or i)artiallj^ disarmed, crews ashore for
wood and water. In both, signals flew at once for certain ships to
get under way, and in both the orders were executed with a rapidity
gratifying to the two commanders, avIio also went out in person.
The British, however, were outside firet, with five sail of the line
and a 50-gun ship. Nine of the merchant vessels were captured
by them, and four forced ashore. The French Rear-Admiral had
by this time got out of Fort Roj-al witli three shij)s of the line, — the
Annibal, 74, Vengcur, 64, and ReflecM, 64, — and, being to windward,
covered the entrance of the remainder of the convoy. As the two
hostile divisions were now near each other, with a fine working
breeze, the British tried to beat up to the enemy ; the Conqueror, 74,
Captain Walter Griffith, being ahead and to windward of her consorts.
1780.] RODNEY AND BE GUICllEN. 453
Coming within range at 5, firing began between her and the French
flagship, A/iJiibfd, 74, and subse([ucntly between her and all the three
vessels of the enemy. Towards sunset, the Albion, 74, had got close
up with the Conqueror, and the oilier ships were within distant range;
" but as they had worked not only well within tlie dangers of the
shoals of the bay (Fort Royal), but within reach of the Ijatteries, I
called them off by night signal at a quarter before seven." ^ In this
chivalrous skirmish, — for it was little more, although the injury
to the French in the loss of the convoy was notable, — Parker was
equally delighted with his own squadi'on and with his enemy. " The
steadiness and coolness with which on every tack the Conqueror
received the fire of these three ships, and returned her own, work-
ing his ship with as much exactness as if he had been turning into
Spithead, and on every board gaining on the enemy, gave me infi-
nite pleasure. It was with inexpressible concern," he added, " that
I heard that Captain Walter Griffith, of the Conqueror, was killed by
the last broadside." ^ Having occasion, a few days later, to exchange
a flag of truce with the French liear-Admiral, he wrote to him :
" The conduct of your Excellency in the affair of the IStli uf this
month fully justifies the reputation which you enjoy among us, and
I assure you that I could not M'itness without envy the skill you
showed on that occasion. Our enmit}- is transient, depending upon
our masters ; but your merit has stamped upon my heart the greatest
admiration for yourself." Tliis was the officer who was commonly
known in his time as " Vinegar " Parker ; but these letters show
that the epithet fitted the rind rather than the kernel.
Shortly after de Guichen took command, he arranged with the
Marquis de Bouill^, Governor of Martinique, to make a combined
attack upon some one of the British West India Islands. For this
purpose 3,000 troops were embarked in the fleet, which sailed on the
night of the 13tli of April, 1780, intending first to accompany a
convoy for Santo Domingo, until it was safely out of reach of the
British. Rodney, who was informed at once of the French departure,
put to sea in cliase with all his ships, twenty of the line, two of which
were of 90 guns, and on the 16th came in sight of the enemy to lee-
ward of jMartinique, beating up against the north-east trade- wintls,
and intending to pass through the channel between that island and
Dominica. " A general chase to the north-west followed, and at five
1 Parker's Report.
454
MAJOR OrKIlATIUXS. 1702-1783.
[1780.
in the evening we plainly discovered that they consisted of twenty-
three sail of the line, and one lifty-gun ship." ^
As it fell dark Rodney formed his line of hattle,^ standing still
to the north-west, therefore on the starboard tack ; and he was atten-
tive to keep to windward of the enemy, whom his frigates watched
diUgently diuing the night. " Their manceuvres," he wrote, " indi-
cated a wish to avoid battle," and he therefore was careful to coun-
1 Rodney's Report. The Frencli authorities give their line of battle as twenty-
two sliips of the line. There was no 9()-gun ship among tlieni — no three-decker j
but there were two of 80 gun.s, of which also the British had none.
^ British line of battle on April 17th, 1780. The Stirling Castle to lead with
the starboard, and the Maynificent with the larboard tacks on board. From Beatson,
vi., 217, 218, with additions and corrections. — W. L. C.
SHIPS.
i
S
COMMANDERS.
5
u
3
s
o
Stirling Castle . .
64
500
Capt. Robert Carkelt.
4
34
Ajax
74
600
Capt. Samuel Uveilale.
4
13
y.
Elizabeth ....
74
600
Capt. Hon. Fredk. Lewis Jlaitland.
9
15
>
Princess Royal . .
90
770
I Rear-Adniiral Hyde Parker (R). ]
\ Capt. Harry Harmood. )
5
14
Albion
74
600
C.npt. George Bowyer.
3
2
Terrible ....
74
600
Capt. John Douglas.
—
—
TrUent ....
64
oOO
Capt. Anthony James Pye Molloy.
14
26
Greyhound, 2S .
Capt. AVilliara Dickson.
—
—
Grafton ....
74
600
\ Commod. Thomas Collingwood. (
1 Capt. Thomas Xewnham. )
2
30
Yarmouth . . .
64
500
Capt. Nathaniel Batemau.
5
15
Cornwall ....
74
600
Capt. Timothy Edwards.
21
49
Sandivich ....
90
752
j Adin. Sir George Brydges Rodney (W). )
( Capt. Walter Young. S
IS
51
Suffolk ....
74
600
Capt. Abraham Crespin.
—
12
O
Boyne
70
520
Capt. Charles Cotton.
2
—
V^igilant ....
64
500
Capt. Sir George Home, Bart.
—
2
Vemcs, 36 . .
Capt. John Fergusson.
—
—
Pcfjasus, 28 . .
Capt. John Bazely (1).
—
—
Deal Castle, 24
Capt. WilUam Fooks.
—
—
Vengeance ....
74
617
( Commod. "William Hotliani. )
' Capt. John Holloway. )
4
6
Ucdicay ....
60
420
Capt. William Affleck.
2
3
Montagu ....
74
600
Capt. John Houltoii.
9
26
<
m
K
Conqueror ....
74
617
( Rear-Admiral Joshua Rowley (R). )
' Capt. Thomas AVatson. )
13
38
Intrepid ....
64
500
Capt. the Hon. Henry St. John.
7
10
Magnificent . . .
74
600
Capt. John Elphinstone.
1
10
Andromeda, 28
Capt. Henry Bryne.
—
—
Centurion,* .50
Capt. Richard Brathwiute.
—
—
* To assist the Rear in case of need.
1780.] RODNEY AND J)E CUICHEN. 455
teract them. At daylight of the ITtli, they were seen forming line
of battle, on the ])ort tack, four or live leagues to leewanl, — that is,
to the westwai'd. The wind lieing east, or east l)y nortli. llic i""ien(di
would be heading south-south-east (Fig. 1, aa). The British order
now was rectified by signal from the iiregularities of darkness,
the ships being directed to keep two cables' ^ lengtiis apart, and
steeling as before to the northwa^rd and westward (a). At 7 A.M.,
« RODNEV AND DE:CuiCHe.N4
c
o /^ ■■•
-.■^--r-. \ \ \ : \ ■ : : I , ■■ ■ .■-■^■<==-^ - *
EOBXF.Y AND DE GriCIlF.X.
considering this line too extended, the Admiral closed tlie intervals
to one cable. The two fleets thus were passing on nearly parallel
lines, but in opposite directions, which tended to bring the whole
force of Rodney, whose line was better and more compact than the
enemy's, abreast the latter's rear, upon wliich he intended to concen-
trate. At 8 A.M. he made general signal that this was his purpose ;
anol at 8.30, to execute it, he signalled for the ships to form line
abreast, bearing from each other sovrth by east and north by west,
and stood down at once upon the enemy (Fig. 1. bb). The object
^ A cable was then assumed to have a length of 1-i) fathoms, — 720 feet.
456 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-1783. [1780.
of the British being evident, cle Guichen made las Heet wear together
to the starboard tacic (Ijb). The Freneli rear tlius beeanie the van,
and tlieir former van, wliicli was stretched too far for prompt assist-
ance to the tlireatened rear, now headed to support it.
Rodney, baullced in his fost spring, liauled at once to the wind
on tlie port taclv (I^'ig. 1, cc), again contrary to tire French, standing
tlnis onee more ah)ng tlieir line, for their new rear. The intervals
were opened out again to two cables. The fleets thus M'ere passing
once more on parallel lines, each having reversed its oi'der ; but the
British still retained the advantage, on whatever course, that they
were much more comj)act than the French, whose line, by Rodney's
estimate, extended four leagues in length. ^ Tlie wariness of the two
combatants, both trained in the school of the eighteenth century, with
its reverence for the line of battle, will appear to the cai'eful reader.
Rodney, although struggling through this clu-ysalis stage to the later
vigour, and seriously bent on a deadly blow, still was constrained
by the tracUtious of watchful fencing. Nor was liis caution extrava-
gant; conditions did not justify yet the apparent recklessness of
Nelson's tactics. " The different movements of the enemy," he wrote,
" obliged me to be very attentive, and watch every opportunity that
offered of attacking them to advantage."
The two fleets continued to stand on opposite parallel courses —
the French north by west, the British south by east — until the flag-
ship Saiidiuich, 90, was abreast the Conronne, 80, the flagship of de
Guichen. Then, at 10.10 a.:m., the signal was made to wear together,
forming on the same tack as the enemy. There being some delay in
execution, this had to be repeated, and further enforced by the pen-
nant of the StirUiU) Castle, which, as the rear ship, should begin the
evolution. At half-past ten, apparently, the fleet was about (Fig. 2,
aa), for an order was then given for rectifying the line, still at two
cables. At 11 A.>r. the Atbnii'al made the signal to jjrepare for
battle, "to convince the whole fleet I was determined to bring the
enemy to an engagement," ^ and to this succeeded shortly- the order
to alter the course to port (bb), towards the enemy.^ Why he
thouglit that any of the fleet should have required such assurance
1 A properly formed line of twenty ships, at two cables' interval, would be about
five miles long. Rodney seems to have been satisfied that this was about the con-
dition of his fleet at this moment.
^ Rodney's Report.
" Testimony of the signal officer at the court-martial on Captain Bateman.
1780.] RODNEY ANT) T)E GUICHEN. 4o7
cannot certainly be said. Possibly, altliougli he had so recently
joined, he had already detectt.'d the ill-will, or the slackness, of which
lie afterwards complained ; possilily he feared that tlie wariness of
his tactics might lead men to believe that he did not mean to exceed
the lukewarm and indecisive action of da3'S scarce yet passed away,
which had led Suffren to stigmatise tactics as a mere veil, behind
wliich timidity thinks to hide its naketbaess.
Rod n El V
AM O
De: C
UICH E.
/}"-
^f>ft 11,
'7'eo
Fic.,1
ScCOivo ^^^(X U VttC ^f^O
TO /O PM ^,
'. k i i
1*
':■ ^ \ )JJ^'
.W-'A--
■=?
'■•*'' o---
^^^<^ "=
nODNEY AXD DE GUICHEN.
At 11.50 A.M. the decisive signal was made "for every ship to
bear down, and steer for her op[)Osite in the enemy's line, agreeable
to the 21st article of the Additional Fighting Instructions." Five
minutes later, when the ships, presumably, had altered their course
for the enemy, the signal for liattle was made, followed by the mes-
sage that the Admiral's intention was to engage closely ; he expect-
ing, naturally, that every ship would follow the example he purposed
to set. The captain of the leading ship, upon whose action depended ■
that of those near her, unfortunately understood the Admiral's signal
to mean tliat he was to attack the enem3-'s leader, not the ship oppo-
458 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1780.
site to him at the moment of hearing away. Tiiis ship, therefore,
(hverged markedly from the Admiral's course, drawing after him
man}' of the van. A few minutes Ijefore 1 l'..M., one of the headmost
ships began to engage at hjng range ; but it was not till some time
after 1 p.m. that the Sandwich, having received several broadsides,
came into close action with the second vessel astern from tlie French
Admiral, the Actionnairc, 64. The latter Avas soon beat out of the
line by the superiority of the Sandwich's battery, and the same lot
befell the ship astern of her, — probably the /yi^M'^^ifZc, 74, — which
came itp to close the gap. Towartls 2.80 r.M., the Sandwich, either
by her own efforts to close, or by her immediate opponents' keei^ing
away, was found to be to leeward of the enemy's line, the Couronne
being on her weather bow. The fact was jiointed out by Rodney to
the captain of the ship, Walter Young, who was then in the lee
gangway. Yoimg, going over to look for himself, saw tliat it was
so, and that the Yarmouth, 64, had hauled off to windward, where
she lay with her main and mizzen topsails aback. Signals were then
made to her, and to the Cornwall, 74, to come to closer engagement,
they both being on the weather bow of the flagshii).
De Guichen, recognising this state of affairs, then or a little later,
attributed it to the deliberate purpose of the British Admiral to
break his line. It does not appear that Rodney so intended. His
tactical idea was to concentrate his whole fleet on the French rear
ami centre, btit there is no indication that he now aimed at breaking
the line. De Guichen so construing it, however, gave the signal to
Avear together. The effect of this, in any event, would have been
to carry his fleet somewhat to leeward ; but with ships more or less
crippled, taking therefore greater room to manoeuvre, and with the
exigency of re-forming the line upon them, the tendency was exag-
gerated. The movement which the French called wearing together
was therefore differently interpreted by Rodney. " The action in
the centre continued till 4.15 p. M., when M. de Guichen, in the
Couronne, the Triom])hai]t, and the Fcmlant, after engaging the
Sandwich for an hour and a half, bore away. The superiority of fire
from the Sandwich, and the gallant behavioiu' of the officers and
men, enabled her to sustain so unequal a combat ; though before
attacked by them, she had beat three ships out of their line of
battle, had entirely broke it, and was to leeward of the French
Admiral." Possibly the French accounts, if they were not so very
meagre, might dispute this prowess of the flagship : T)ut there can he
17S0.] RODS El' CENSUliES FAHKEli A.\JJ RUIfLEY. 459
no doubt that Kodney had set an example, which, had it been foUowed
by all, would have uiailo this engagement memorable, if not decisive.
He reported that the captains, with very few exceptions, liad not
placed their ships properly (cc). Tlie Sandwich had eighty sliot in
her hull, had lost her foremast and mainyard, and had fired 3,288
rounds, an average of 73 to each gun of tlie broadside engaged.
Thi-ee of her hits being below the water line, she was kept afloat with
difficulty during the next twenty-four liours. With tlic wearing of
the French tlie battle ceased.
In the advantage offered liy tlie (^uMuy, wliose order was too greatly
extended, and in his own plan of attack, Rodney always considered
this action of April ITtli, 1780, to have been the great opportunity of
his life ; and his wratli was bitter against those by whose misconduct
he conceived it had been frustrated. " Tlie French admiral, wlio
appeared to me to be a brave and gallant ofticer, had the honour to be
nobly supported during the whole action. It is with concern inex-
pressible, mixed with indignation, that the duty I owe ray sovereign
and my country obliges me t( > acquaint your Lordships tliat during the
action between the French fleet, on the 17th inst., and his Majesty's,
the British flag was not properly supported." Divided as the Navy
then was into factions, with their hands at each other's throats or at
tlie throat of the Admiralty, the latter thought it more discreet to
suppress this paragraph, allowing to appear only the negative stigma
of the encomium upon the French officers, unaccompanied by any on
his own. Rodney, however, did not conceal his feelings in public or
private letters ; and the censure found its way to the ears of those
concerned. Subsequently, three niontlis after the action, in a public
letter, he bore testimony to the excellent conduct of five captains,
Walter Young of the flagship, George Bowyer of the Albion, John
Douglas of tlie Terrible, John Houlton of the Montagxt, and A. J. P.
Molloyi of the Trident. " To them I have given certificates, under
my hand," " free and unsolicited." Beyond these, " no considera-
tion in life would induce " him to go ; and the two junior flag-officers
were implicitly condemned in the words, " to inattention to signals,
bo til in the van and rear divisions, is to be attributed the loss of that
glorious opportunity (perhaps never to be recovered) of terminating
the naval contest in these seas." These junior admirals were Hyde
1 Siiisularly enoiigli, this officer was afterwards eonvt-niartialleJ for misliehaviour,
on the 1st of June, 1794, of precisely the same character as that from all share in
which Rodnev now cleared him.
4G0 MAJOR UVEltATWyS. 1702-1783. [1780.
Parker and Rowley ; tliu latter the same who had behaved, not only
so gallantly, but with such unusual initiative, in liyron's engagemejit.
A singular incident in this case led liini to a like independence of
action, which displeased Rodney. The Montarju, of his division, when
closing the French line, wore against the helm, and could onl}- be
brouglit into action on the wrong (port) tack. Immediately upon
tliis, part of the Flench rear also wore, and Rowley followed them of
his own motion. Being called to account by Rodney, he stated the
facts, justifying the act by the order that "the greatest impression
was to be made on the enemy's rear." Both parties soon wore back.
Hyde Parker went home in a rage a few Aveeks later. The certifi-
cates of Bowyer and Douglas, certainly, and probably of MoUoy, all
of his division, bore the stinging words that these officers " meant
well, and would have done their duty had they been permitted." It
is stated that tlieir ships, which were the rear of the van, were going
down to engage close, following Rodney's example, when Parker
made them a signal to keep the line. If this be so, as Parker's
corn-age was beyond all doubt, it was simply a recurrence of the old
superstition of the line, aggravated b}' a niisundeistauding of Rodney's
later signals. These must be discussed, for the whole incident is part
of the history of the British Navy, far more important than many an
indecisive though bhjody encounter.
One of the captains more expressly blamed, Carkett of the Stir-
ling Castle, wrote to Rocbiey that he understood that his name had
been mentioned, unfavourably of course, in the public letter. Rod-
ney's reply makes perfectly apparent the point at issue, his own plan,
the ideas running in his head as lie made his successive signals, the
misconceptions of the juniors, and the consequent fiasco. It must be
said, however, that, granting the facts as they seem certainly to have
occurred, no misunderstanding, no technical verbal allegation, can
justify a military stujpidity so great as that of which he complained.
There are occasions in which not only is literal disobedience permis-
sible, but literal obedience, flj^ng in the face of the evident conditions,
becomes a crime.
At 6.45 in the morning, Rodney had made a general signal of his
purpose to attack the enemy's rear. This, having been understood
and answered, was hauled down ; all junioi-s had been acquainted
with a general purpose, to which the subsequent manoeuvres were to
lead. How he meant to carry out his intention was evidenced by
the consecutive course of action while on that tack, — the starboard -,
1780.] KOnyEY'S LETTEIl TO CARKETT. 461
when the time came, the fleet bore up together, in hue abreast, .stand-
ing for the French rear. This attempt, being balked then bj de
Guichen's wearing, was renewed two h(jurs later; only in place of
the signal to form line abreast, was made one to alter the course to
port, — towards the enemy. As this followed immediately upon that
to prepare for battle, it indicates, almost beyond question, that Rodney
wished, for reasons of the moment, to run down at th-st in a slanting
direction, — not in line abreast, as before, — ships taking course and
interval from the flagsliip. Later again, at 11.50, the signal was
made, "agreeable to the 21st Article of the Additional Fighting
Instructions, for every ship to steer for her opposite in tiie enemy's
line; " and here the trouble began. Rodney meant the ship o[)posite
when the signal was hauled down. He had steered slanting, till he
had gained as nearly as possible the position he wanted, probably till
within long range ; then it was desirable to cover the remaining
ground as rapidly and oi'derly as possible, for which purpose the ship
then abreast gave each of his fleet its convenient point of direction.
He conceived that his signalled purpose to attack the enemy's rear,
never having been altered, remained imperative ; and further, that
the signal for two cables' length interval should govern all shij)S, and
would tie them to him, and to his movements, in the centre. Carkett
construed " opposite " to mean opposite in numerical order, British
van ship against French van sliip, wherever the latter was. Rodney
states — in his letter to Carkett — that the French van was then two
leagues away. " You led to the van ship, notwithstanding you had
answered my signals signifying that it was my intention to attack the
enem3-'s rear ; which signal I liad never altered. . . . Your leading in
the manner you did, induced otliers to follow so bad an exam[)le ; and
thereby, foi-getting that the signal for the line was only at two cables'
langth distance from each other, the van division was led by you to
more than two leagues' distance from the centre chvision, which was
thereby not properly supported." ^
1 The words in Rodney's public letter, .suppressed at the time by the Admiralty,
agree with these, but are even more e.xplicit. " I cannot conclude this letter with-
out acquainting their Lordships that had Captain Carkett, who led the van, properly
obe3-ed my signal for attacking the enemy, and agreeable to the 21st Article of the
Additional Fighting Instructions, bore down instantly to the ship at that time
abreast of him, instead of leading as he did to the van ship, the action bad com-
menced much sooner, and the fleet engaged in a more compact manner. . . ." This
clearly implies that the Additional Fighting Instructions prescribed the direction
whicli Rodney expected Carkett to take. If these Additional Instructions are to be
found, their testimony would be interesting.
462 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1780.
C'aikett was the oldest captain in the fleet, his post eoiuniission
being dated xVIarch 12th, 1758. How far he may have been excus-
able in construing as he did Fighting Instructions, which originated
in the inane conception that the supreme duty of a Commander-in-
C^hief was to oppose ship to ship, and that a fleet action was only an
agglomeration of naval duels, is not very material, though histori-
cally interesting. There certainly v/as that in the past histoiy of
the British Navy whicii extenuated the offence of a man who must
have then been well on in middle life. But since the Fighting
Instructions had been first issued, there had been the courts-martial,
also instructive, on Mathews, Lestock, Byng, Keppel, and Palliser,
all of which turned more or less on the ct^nstraint of the line of
battle, and the duty of supporting ships engaged, — above all, an
engaged Commander-in-Chief. Rodney perhaps underestimated the
weight of the Fighting Instructions upon a dull man ; but he was
justified in claiming that his pi-evious signals, and the prescription of
distance, created at the least a conflict of orders, a doubt, to which
there should have been but one solution, namely : to support the ships
engaged, and to close down upon the enemy, as near as possible to
the Commander-in-Chief. And in moments of actual perplexit}' such
wiU always be the truth. It is like marching towards the sound of
■gims, or, to use Nelson's words, " In case signals cannot be understood,
no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of
an enemy." Tlie " In Case," however, needs also to be kept in mind ;
and that it was Nelson who said it. Utterances of to-daj-, like
utterances of all time, show how few are the men who can hold both
sides of a truth firmly, without exaggeration or defect. Judicial
impartialitj' can be had, and i)ositive convictions too; but their
combination is rare. A two-sided man is apt also to be double-
minded.
The loss of men in this sharp encounter was : British, killed, 120,
wounded, 3.54 ; ^ French, killed, 222, M-ounded, 537.- This gives
three French hit for every two British, from which, and from the
much greater damage received aloft by the latter, it may be inferred
that both followed their usual custom of aiming, the British at
' Among the killed was Captain the Hon. Henry St. John, of the Intrepid.
Amonj,' the wouncled were Captains John Houlton, of the Montagu, and Thomas
Newnhain, of the Grafton. — W. L. C.
- Lapeyrouse Bonfils, ' Histoire de la Marine Fran^aise,' iii. 132. Chevalier gives
jnuch smaller numljcrs, hut the former has particularised the ships.
1781).] RODNEY RETURNS TO ST. LUCIA. 463
the hull, the French ;il Liie spars. 'J'o the latter conduced also the
lee-gage, which the French had. The British, as the attacking Jjarty,
suffered likewise a raking lire as they Ijore down.
Rodney repaired damages at sea, and pursued, taking care to
keep between Martinique and the French. The latter going into
Guadeloupe, he reconnoitred them there under the batteries, and
tlien took his station off Fort Jioyal. "The only chance of bringing
them to action," he wrote to the Admiralty on the 2Gth of April,
" was to be off that port before them, where the fleet now is, in
daily expectation of their arrival." Tiie French represent that he
avoided them, but as they assert that they came out liest on tlie
17th, and yet admit that he appeared off Guadeloupe, the claim is
not tenable. Rodney here showed thorough tenacity of purpose.
De Guiehen's orders were " to keep the sea, so far as the force
maintained by England in the Windward Islands would permit,
without too far compromising the fleet intrusted to him." ^ With
such instructions, he naturally and consistently shrunk from decisive
engagement. After landing his \\-ounded and refitting in Guade-
loupe, he again put to sea, with the intention of proceeding to St.
Lucia, resuming against that island the project which both he and
De Bouillc continuously entertained. The latter and his troops
remained Avith the fleet.
Rodney meantime had felt compelled to return momentarily to
St. Lucia. " The fleet continued before Fort Royal till the c(.)ndi-
tion of man}- of the ships under my command, and the lee currents,^
rendered it necessary to anchor in Ghoque Bay, St. Lucie, in order
to put the wounded and sick men on shore, and to water and relit
the fleet, frigates having been detached both to leeward and to
windward of every island, in order to gain intelligence of the motions
of the enemy, and timely notice of their approach towards Martinique,
the only place they could refit at in these seas." In this last clause
is seen the strategic idea of the British Admii-al : the French nnist
come back to Martinique.
From the vigilance of his frigates it resulted, that when the
look-outs of de Guichen, who passed to windward of Martinique on
the 7tli of May, came in sight of Gros Ilet on the 9th, it was simply
to find the British getting under way to meet the enemy. During
the five following days both fleets were engaged in constant uiove-
1 Cbevalier, 'Marine Fran^aise,' 1778, ji. 185.
- A lee current is uue that sets with the wind, in this case the trade-wind.
4(;4 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1702-17tJ3. [1780.
ments, upon the character of which the writers of each nation put
(liiiurent constructions. IJotli are agreed, however, that the French
were to windward throughout, except for a brief hour on the 15th,
when a fleeting change of wind gave the British that advantage,
only to lose it soon again. Tlicj- at once used it to force action.
As the windward position carries the power to attack, and as the
Frencli were twenty-three to tlie Jiritisli twent}-, it is probably not a
strained inference to say that the latter Avere chasing to windward,
and the former avoicUng action, in favour, perhaps, of that ulterior
motive, the conquest of St. Lucia, for which they had sailed. Rod-
ney states in his letter that, when tlie two fleets parted on the 20th
of May, they were forty leagues to windward of Martinique, in
sight of which they had been on the 10th.
Diuing these days de Guichen, whose fleet sailed the better,
according to Rodney, and certainly sufficiently Mell to preserve the
advantage of the wind, bore do\\Ti more than once, generally in the
afternoon, when the breeze is steadiest, to within distant range of
the British. Upon this movement, the French base the statement
that tlie British Admiral was avoiding an encounter; it is equally
open to the intei-pretation that he would not tlu'ow awa)- ammunition
imtil sure of effective distance. Both admirals showed much slcill
and mastery of their profession, great wariness also, and quickness
of eye ; but it is wholly untenable to claim that a fleet ha\dng the
weather-gage for five days, in the trade-winds, was \mable to bring
its enemy to action, especially when it is admitted that the latter
struclc the instant the wind permitted liim to close.
On the afternoon of May 15th, about the usual hour, Rodney
" made a great deal of sail upon the wind." The Frencli, inferring
tliat he was trying to get off, which he meant tliem to do, appi'oached
somewhat closer than on the prevdous days. Their van ship had
come witliin long range, abreast the centre of the British, wlio were
on the port tack standing to the soutli-south-east, with tlie wind at
east (a, a). Here the breeze suddenly hauled to south-south-east.
The heads of all the ships in both fleets were thus knocked off to
south-west, on the port tack, but the shift left the British rear, wliich
on that tack led the fleet, to windward of the French van. Rodney's
signal flew at once, to tack in succession and keep the wind of the
enemy ; the latter, unfailing to yield the advantage, wore all together,
hauling to the wind on tlie starboard tack, and, to use Rodney's
words, " fled witli a crowd of sail " (a', a').
17b(!.]
MAXCEUVRES OF THE FLEETS.
465
The British fleet tacking in succession after their leaders, the
immediate result was tluit both were now stiinding on the starboard
tack, — to the eastwaril, — the British having a slight advantage of
the wind, but well abaft the beam of the French (b, b). The result,
liad the wind held, would have been a trial of speed and weatherli-
ness. "His Majesty's fleet," wrote Rodney, " l>y this luano'uvre had
gained the wind, and would have forced the enemy to battle, had it
not at once changed six points when near the enemy, and enabled
^zr
RoDNtY AND DE Gu
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P' . ; ; • 1 1 '■ ■ iLuic/ s&c
1 ' ■' ; ' 1 1 • i '
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• 1 1 W^ 1 J ■ ■ ! wind /l
1 ' W ' ' ' I ' ' ' ' 'W '
' W '•'''' 11 'i ■' ■
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I CH E M
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i -'.
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W W,;->-'iA
ll —
RODNEY AND DE GUICHEN.
them to recover that advantage." When the wind thus shifted again,
de Guichen tacked his ships together and stood across the bows of
the advancing British (c, c). The leader of the latter struck the
enemy's line behind the centre, and ran along to leeward, the British
van exchanging a close cannonade with the enemy's rear. Such an
engagement, two lines passing on opposite tacks, is usually indeci-
sive, even when the entire fleets are engaged, as at Ushant: liut
where, as in this case, the engagement is but partial, the result is
naturally less. The enemv's van and centre, having passed the head
VOL. III. — .30
466 M.lJiili (jI'E1;AT/<).\S. 17G2-17S3. [17«0.
of the Jiritish, diverged at that puiiit fiirtlier and farther from the
track of the oii-comirig sliips, which, from the centre rearwards, did
Jiot fire. •' As the enemy were under a press of sail, none l;ut the
van of our fleet coulil come in for any part of the action without
wasting his Majesty's powder and sliot, the enemy wantonl}- expend-
ing theirs at such a distance as to have no effect." Here again the
P'rencli were evidently taking the chance of disabling the distant
enemy in his spars. Tlie British loss in the action of May 15th w'as
21 killed and lUU wcmnded.
The fleets continued their respective movements, each acting as
before, until the 19th,' when another encounter took place, of exactly
tlie same character as the last, although without the same prelimi-
nary manteuvring. The British on that occasion lost 47 killed and
11-3 wounded. The result was equally indecisive, tactically consid-
ered ; but both by tliis time had exhausted their staying powers.
The French, having been absent from IMartinique since the 13th of
April, Jiad now but six days' provisions.^ Rodney found the Con-
queror, Cornicall, and Botjnc so shattered that he sent them before
the wind to St. Lucia, while he himself with the rest of the fleet
stood for Barbados, where he arrived on the 22nd. The French
anchored on the same day at Fort Royal. "The English," sajs
Chevalier, "stood on upon the starboard tack, to the southward,
after the action of the 19th, and the next day were not to be seen."
" The enemy," reported Rodney, " stood to the northward with all
the sail they could possibly press, and were out of sight the 21st
inst. The condition of his Majesty's ships was such as not to allow
a longer pursuit."
By their dexterity and vigilance each of the two admirals had
thwarted the other's aims. Rodney, by a pronounced, if cautious,
offensive effort, had absolutely prevented the "ulterior object" of the
French, which he clearly understood to be St. Lucia. De Guichen
had been successful in avoiding decisive action, and he had momen-
tarily so crippled a few of the Biitish ships that the fleet must await
their repairs before again taking the sea. Tlie tactical gain was his,
the strategic victory rested with his opponent ; but that liis ships also
had been much maltreated is shown by the fact that half a dozen
1 Pievinus to which date the Triumph, 74, Captain Philip Affleck, and the Pres-
ton, 50, Captain 'Williani Truscott, had joined Rodney. In the action of the 19th,
•Captain Thomas Watson, of the Conqueror, was mortally wounded. — AV. L. C.
' Chevalier, p. 01.
17.SI).] SUSPICIOUS FEELING IN THE NAVY. 407
coukl not put to sea three weeks later. The French admiral broke
down under the strain, to whieh was added the grief of losing a son,
killed in the recent engagements. He asked for his recall. "■ The
command of so large a fleet," he wrote, "is infinitely Ijeyond my
capacity in all respects. ^ly health cannot endure such continual
fatigue and anxiety." Certainly this seems a tacit testimony to
Kodney's skill, persistence, and offensive purpose. The latter wTote
to his wife: "For fourteen days and nights the fleets were so near
each other that neither officers nor men could be said to sleep. Noth-
ing but the goodness of the weather and climate would have enabled
us to endure so continual a fatigue. Had it been in Europe, half the
people must have siuik under it. For my part, it did nie good.''
Rodney stated also in his liome letters tliat tlie action of his sul>
ordinates in the last affairs had been efficient; but he gave them
little credit for it. " As I had given pul)lic notice to all my captains,
etc., that I expected implicit obedience to every signal made, under
the certain penalty of being instantly superseded, it had an admi-
rable effect, as they were all convinced, after tlieir late gross behaviour,
that they had nothing to expect at my hands l)ut instant punishment
to those who neglected their duty. My eye on them had more dread
than the enemy's fire, and they knew it would be fatal. No i-egard
was paid to rank : admirals as well as captains, if out of their sta-
tion, were instantly reprimanded by signals, or messages sent by
frigates ; and, in spite of themselves, I taught them to be, what they
had never been before, — officers.'''' It will be noticed that these
words convey an implication of cowardice as well as of disaffection,
and liint not obscurely at Byng's fate. Rodney told his officers also
that he would shift his flag into a frigate, if necessary, to watch them
better. It is by no means necessary to accept these gross aspersions
i\s significant of anything ^\'orse than the suspiciousness prevalent
throughout the Navy, traceable ultimately to a corrupt administra-
tion of the Admiralty. The latter, like the government df 1756,
was open to censure through political maladministration , every one
feared that blame would be shifted on to liim, as it had been on to
Byng, — who deserved it; and not only so. but that blame would be
pushed on to ruin, as in his case. Tlie Navy was honeycombed with
distrust, falling little short of panic. In this state of apprehension
and doubt, the tradition of the line of battle, resting upon men who
•ilid not stop to study facts or analyse impressions, and who had seen
•officers censured, cashiered, and sliot. for errors of judgment or of
4G8 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1702-178:j. [1780.
action, naturally jiroduced hesitations and misunderstandings. An
order of battle is a good tiling, necessary to insure mutual support
and to develoj) a 2)lan. The error of the eentur}-, not then exploded,
was to observe it in the letter rather than in the spirit ; to regard the
order as an end rather than a means ; and to seek in it not merely
efficiency, which admits bi-oad construction in positions, but precise-
ness, which is as narrowing as a brace of liandcuffs. Rodney himself,^
Tory though he was, i'oimd fault with the administration. With all
his severity and hauteur, he did not lose sight of justice, as is shown
by a sentence in his letter to Carkett. " Could I have imagined your
conduct and inattention to signals had proceeded from anything but
error in judgment, I had certainly superseded j'ou, but God forbid 1
should do so for error in judgment only," — again an allusion, not
ol)Scure, to Byng's fate.
In Barbados, Rodney received certain information that a Span-
ish squaib'on of twelve ships of the line, with a large convoy of
10,000 troops, had sailed from Cadiz on April 28tli for the West
Indies. The vessel bringing the news had fallen in with them on
the way. Rodney s[)read a line of frigates " to windward, from Bar-
bados to Barbuda," to obtain timely warning, and with the fleet put
to sea on the 7th of June, to cruise to the eastward of IMartinique to
intercept the enemy. The latter had been discovered on the 5th by a
frigate, fiftj- leagues east of the island, steering for it ; but the Spanish
admiral, seeing that he would be reported, changed Ids course, and
passed north of Guadeloupe. On the 9th lie was joined in that neigh-
bourhood by de Guichen, who was able to bring with him only fifteen
sail. — a fact which shows that he had suffered in the late brushes quite
as severely as Rodney, who had with liim seventeen of liis twenty.
Having evaded the British, the allies anchoi^ed at Fort RoyaU
but the Spanish admiral absolutely refused to join in any undertak-
ing against the enemy's fleet or possessions. Not only so, but he
insisted on being accompanied to leeward. The Spanish squadron
was ravaged by an epidemic, due to unsanitary conditions of the
ships and the uncleanliness of the crews, and the disease was com-
municated to their allies. De Guichen had already orders to leave
the Windward Islands when winter approached. He decided now
to anticipate that time, and on the 5th of July sailed from Fort
Royal with tlie Spaniards. Having accompanied the latter to the
east end of Cul)a, he went to Cap Francois, in Haiti, then a princi-
pal French station. The Spaniards continued on to Havana.
17S0.] DE GUICIIEN SAILS FOR EUROPE. 4(»9
At Cap FraiK'ois, de Guichen found urgent entreaties from the
French Jlinister to the United States, and from Lafayette, to carry
liis fleet to the continent, where the clear-siglited genius of A\'iish-
ington had recognised already that tlie issue of the contest depended
ui^on the navies. Tlie French admiral declined to comply, as con-
trary to his instructions, and on the IGth of August sailed for Europe,
with nineteen sail of the line, leaving ten at Cap Frant^ois. Sealed
orders, opened at sea, directed him to proceed to Cadiz, where he
anchored on the 24th of October. His arrival raised the allied force
there assemljled to fifty-one sail of the line, besides the ninety-
five sugar and coffee ships wliieli lie had convoyed from Haiti.
It is significant of the weakness of Great Britain then in the
iMediterranean, that these extremely A'alnable merchant ships were
sent on to Toulon, only five ships of the line accompanying them
past Gibraltar. The French government liad feared to trust them
to Brest, even with de Guichen's nineteen sail.
The allied operations in the Windward Islands for the season
of 1780 had thus ended in nothing, notwithstanding an incontest-
able inferiority of the British to the French alone, of which Rodney
strongly complained. It was, however, contrary to the intentions
of the Admiralty that things so happened. Orders had been sent to
Vice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, at New York, to detach ships
to Rodney ; but the vessel cariying them was driven by weather
to the Bahamas, and her captain neglected to notify Arbuthnot
of his whereabouts, or of his dispatches. A detachment of five
ships of the line under Commodore the Hon. Robert Boyle Walsing-
ham was detained three months in England, wind-l)ound. The}'
consequently did not join till July 12th. The dispositions at once
made by Rodney afford a very good illustration of the kind of duties
that a British Admiral had then to discharge. He detailed five
ships of the line to remain with Hotham at St. Lucia, for the protec-
tion of the Windward Islands. On the 17th, taking with him a large
merchant convo}', he put to sea with the fleet for St. Kitts. where
the Leeward Islands " trade " was collecting for England. On the
way he received precise information as to the route and force of the
Franco-Spanish fleet under de Gtiichen, of the sickness on board
it, and of the dissension between the allies. From St. Kitts the
July " trade " was sent home with two ships of the line. Three
■others, he wrote to the Admiralty, would accompany the September
fleet, "and the remainder of the ships on this station, which are in
470 MAJiiIl UPKHATIoXS. 1702-17S3. [1780.
want of great repair aiitl are not copper-bottomed, shall proceed with
them, or with the convoy which their Lordships have been pleased
to order shall sail from iieiiLc in October next." If these arrived
before winter, he argued, they would be available by spring as a
reinforcement for the Channel fleet, and would enable the Admii'alty
to send him an equivalent number for the winter work on his
station.
As de Guichen had taken from ^lartinique to Cap Francois the
whole French homeward merchant fleet, and as the height of the
hurricane season was near, Rodney reasoned that but a small French
force would remain in Haiti, and consequently^ that Jamaica would
not require all the British fleet to save it from any possil^le attack.
He therefore sent tliither ten sail of the line, notifying Vice-Admiral
Sir Peter Parker that they were not merely to defend the island,
but to enable him to send home its great trade in reasonable
security.
These tilings being done by July 31st, considering that the allies
had practically abandoned all enterprises in the West Indies for
that year, and that a hurricane might at any moment overtake tlie
fleet at its anchors, possibly making for it a lee shore, Rodney went
to sea, to cruise off Barbuda. His mind, however, was inclined
already to go to the continent, whither he reasoned, correctly but
mistakenly, that the greater part of de Guichen's fleet would go,
as it should. His purpose was confirmed by information from an
American vessel that a French squadron of seven ships of the line,
convo^-ing G,000 troops, had anelioiefl in Narragansett Baj^ on the
12th of July. He started at once for the coast of South Carolina,
wiiere he communicated with the army in Charleston, and thence,
'■ sweeping the southern coast of America," anchored with fourteen
ships of the line at Sandy Hook, on the 14th of September, unex-
pected and unwelcome to friends and foes alike.
Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot, being junior to Rodney, showed plainly
and -with insubordination his wrath at this intrusion into his com-
mand, which superseded his authority and divided the prize-money of
a lucrative station. This, however, was a detail. To Washington,
Rodney's coming was a death-blow to the hopes raised b}- the arrival
of the Frencli division at Newport, which he had expected to see
reinforced by de Guichen. Actual^, the dejiarture of the latter
made immaterial Rodney's appearance on the scene : but this Wash-
ington did not know then. As it was, Rodney's force joined to
1780.] RfJDyEV SAILS FUli THE IfEST ISLilES. 471
Arbutlinot's constituted a fleet of over twenty sail of the line, Ijefore
which, vigorously used, there can be little doubt that the French
squadron in Newjiort must liave fallen. ]»ut liodney, thougli lie
had shown great energy in tlie West Indies, and unusual resolution
in quitting liis own station for a more remote service, was sixty-two,
and suffered from gout. " The sudden cliange of climate makes it
necessary for me to go on shore for some short time," he wrote ; and
althoucrh he added that his illness was " not of such a nature as shall
cause one moment's delay in his Majesty's service," he probably lost
a chance at Rhode Island. He did not overlook the matter, it is
true, but he decided u[)on tlie information of Arbuthnot and Sir
Henry Clinton, and did not inspect the ground himself. Nothing
of consequence came of his visit; and on the 16th of November
he sailed again for the West Indies, taking with him only nine
sail of the line.
The arrival of de Ternay's seven ships at Newport was more
than offset Iw a British reinforcement of six ships of the line under
Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves (1),^ which entered New York on July
13tl-,^ — only one day later. Arbutlinot's force was thus raised to ten
of the line, one of which was of 98 guns. After Rodney had come
and gone, the French division was watched by cruisers, resting upon
Gardiner's Bay, — a commodious anchorage at the east end of Long
Island, between thirty and fortj' miles from Rhode Island. When a
movement of the enemy was apprehended, the squadron assembled
there, but nothing of consequence occurred during the remainder of
the year.
The 3"ear 1780 had been one of great discouragement to the
Americans, but the injury, except as the lapse of time taxed their
staying power, was more superficial than real. The successes of the
British in the Southern States, though iindeniable, and seemingly
substantial, were involving them ever uku'c deeply in a ruinously
ex-centric movement. They need here only to be summarised, as
steps in the process leading to the catastrojihe of Yorktown, — a dis-
aster wdiich, as Washington said, exemplified naval rather than
military power.
The failure of d'Estaing's attack upon Savannah in the autumn
of 1779 had left that place in the possession of the British as a base
1 Thomas, Lord Graves. Born, 1725. Commainler, 1754. Captain, 1755. Eear-
Adiuiral, 1119. Vice-Admiral, 1787. Admiral, 1794. Raised to an Irisli ]ieerage
for bis sliare in the victory of the Glorious First of June. Died, 1P02. — W. L. C.
472 MAJOR OPERATIOXS. 1762-1783. [1780.
for further advances in South Carolina and Georgia ; lasting success
in which was expected from the numbers of royalists in those States.
When the departure of the French fleet was ascertained, Sir IJeury
Clinton put to sea from New York in December, 1779, for the Savan-
nah River, escorted by Vice-Admiral Arbuthnot. The details of the
operations, which were leisurely and methodical, will not be given
here ; for, although the Navy took an active jDart in tliem, they
scarcely can be considered of major importance. On the 12th of
May, 1780, the city of Cliarleston capitulated, between six and seven
thousand prisoners being taken. Clinton then retm-ned to New
York, leaving Lord Cornwallis in command in the south. The
latter proposed to remain quiet during the hot months ; but the
activity of the American partisan troops prevented this, and in July
the approach of a small, but relatively formidable force, under Gen-
eral Gates, compelled him to take the field. On the 16th of August
the two little armies met at Camden, and the Americans, who were
much the more numerous, Ijut largely irregulars, were routed deci-
sively. This news reached General Washington in the north nearly
at the same moment that the treason of Benedict Arnold became
known. Although the objects of his treachery were frustrated, the
sorrowful Avords, "Whom now can we trust? " show the deep gloom
which for the moment shadowed the constant mind of the American
Commander-in-Chief. It was just at this period, too, that Rodney
arrived.
Cornwallis, not content with his late success, decided to j^usli on
into North Carolina. Thus doing, he separated himself from his
naval base in Charleston, comnuuiicatiou with which l>y land he had
not force to maintain, and could only recover effective touch with
the sea in Chesapeake Bay. This conclusion was not apparent from
the first. In Nortli Carolina, the British general, who had exjjected
substantial support by the inhabitants, failed to secure it, and found
himself instead in a very difficult and wild couiatiy, confronted by
General Greene, the second in ability of all the American leadere.
Harassed and baffled, he was compelled to order supplies to be sent by
sea to Wilmington, North Carolina, an out-of-the-way and inferior
port, to which he turned aside, arriving exhausted on the 7th of April,
1781. The question as to his future course remained to be settled.
To return to Charleston by sea was in his power, but to do so would
be an open confession of failure, — that he could not retm-n through
the country by which he had come. To supjjort him in his distress
1780.] THE ACTION UFF MONTE CIIIIISTI. 473
by a diversion, Sir Henry Clinton had sent two successive detach-
ments to ravage tlie valley of the James River in Virginia. These
Avere still there, under tliu command of General Phillips ; and t'orn-
wallis, in the circumstances, could see many reasons that tliither was
the very scene to carry the British operations. On the 25th of Ajjril,
1781, he left Wilmington, and a month later joined the division at
Petersljui'g, Virginia, then connnanded by Benedict Arnold ; Philli])s
having died. There, in touch now with his fate, we must leave him
for the moment.
To complete the naval transactions of 1780, it is uecessarj- to
mention briefly two incidents, trivial in themselves, but signiiicant,
not only as associated with the greater movements of tlie campaign,
hut as indicative of the naval pohcy of the states which were at
war. The two, though not otherwise connected, have a certain
unity of interest, in that the same British officer commanded on both
occasions.
It will be remembered that in Byron's action off Grenada, in
July, 1779, the 64-gun ship Lion received such injuries that her com-
mander. Captain the Hon. William Cornwallis, had been compelled
to run down before the trade-winds to Jamaica, in order to save lier
from capture. Since that time she had remained there, as one of the
squadron of Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Parker. In March, 1780, still
connnanded hy Captain Cornwallis, she was making an ordinary
service cruise off the north side of Haiti, having in company the
Bristol, 50, Captain Toby Caulfield, and the Janus, 4-1, Captain
Bonovier Glover. On the 20th of March, off Monte Christi, a num-
ber of sail were sighted to the eastward, which proved to be a French
convoy, on its way from Martinique to Cap Frangois, protected by
La Motte-Picquet's squadron of 2 seventy-fours, 1 sixt}-four, 1 fifty,
and a frigate. The French merchant ships were ordered to crowd
sail for their port, while the men-of-war chased to the north-west.
La Motte-Picquet's flagship, the Annihal, 74, got within range at
5 P.M., when a distant cannonade began, which lasted till past mid-
night, and was resumed on the following morning. From it the
Janus was the chief sufferer, losing her mizzen topmast and fore-
topgallant mast. It falling nearly calm, the Bristol and Lion got out
their boats and towed to her support. The two other French ships
of the line got up during the forenoon of the 21st, so that the action
that afternoon, though desultorj^, might be called general.
The two opposing commodores differ in tlieir expressed opinions
474 MAJOll (iPKUATIOXS. 170^-1783. [1780.
as to the i^ower of the Fiencli to make the affair more decisive.
Some of La Motte-Picquet's language seems to show that he felt the
responsibility of his position. "Tlic Janus, being smaller and more
easily worked, lay upon our i[uarter and under our stern, where she
did considerable damage. A little breeze springing up eualjled us
(the Anmhal) to stand towards our own ships, which did everything
possible to come up and cover us, without which we should have
been surrounded^ It is easy to see in such an expression the reflection
of the commands of the French Cabinet, to economise the ships. This
was still more evident in La JNIotte-Picquet's action next day. On
the morning of the 22nd, " at daylight we were within one and a half
cannon-shot, breeze fresh at east-north-east, and I expected to overtake
the British squadron in an hour, when we perceived four ships in
chase of us. At 6.30 a.ji. three were seen to be men-of-war. This
superiority of force compelled me to desist, and to make signal to
haul our wind for Cap Francois." These three new-comers were
the Huh//, 04, and two frigates, the Pomona, 28, and Niger, 32. The
comparison of forces, therefore, would Ije : French, 2 seventy-fours,
1 sixt}-four, 1 fifty, and 1 frigate, opposed to, British, 2 sixty-fours,
1 fift}-, and 3 frigates. La Motte-Picquet evidently did not wait
to ascertain the size of the approaching ships. His courage was
beyond all dispute, and, as Hyde Parker had said, he was among the
most distinguished of French officers ; but, like his comrades, he was
dominated by the faulty theory of his government.
The captain of the Janus died a natural death during the encoun-
ter. It may be interesting to note that the sliip was given to Nelson,
who was recalled for that purpose from the San Juan expedition.
Ilis liealth, however, prevented this command from being more than
nominal, and not long afterwards he returned to England with Corn-
wallis, in the Lion.
Three months later, Cornwallis was sent by Parker to accompan}^
a body of merchant ships for England as far as the neighbourhood of
Bermuda. This duty being fulfilled, he was returning towards his
station, having with him 2 seventy-fom-s, 2 sixty-fours, and 1 fift_y,i
when, on the morning of Jime 20, a number of sail were seen from
Captain the Hun. William Cornwallis.
Captain Alan Gardner.
Captain Sir John Hamilton, Bart.
Captain John Cowling.
Captain Toby Canltield.
Captain John Brown.
^ Lion
64
Sultan
74
Hector
74
Euhj
64
Bristol
50
Niger
32
1780.]
COliMfJlLlS AMj Dli TER.Wiy.
-175
north-east to east; the squadron then steering east, witli the wiiiil at
south-south-east. The strangers were a hody of Frencli transports,
carrying the 6,000 troo[)S destined for Rhode Island, and convoyed
hy a division of seven shi[is of Uic line — 1 eighty, 2 seventy-fours,
and 4 sixty -fours — under tlie eonnnand of Commodore de Ternay.
Two of the ships of war were with the convoy, the remainder very
properly to windward. Tlie latter tiieivfore stood on, across the Ijows
of the British, to rejoin their consorts (aa), and tlien all hauled their
CORNWAULIS AND DE TebNAY
<?(? ^^ i/t//vc . //'SO
jy.c'.d', /?i/a-y .
c
o
o
o
Ojb
.^£5-
Pn
'=^^
-ip~P
~vtr> o cr> o ci> c:> C5y
^
CnUN'WALLIS AND DE TEKNAY.
wind to the south-west, standing in colunui towards the enemy.
Cornwallis on his part hatl Icept on to reconnoitre the force opposed
to him (a) ; but one of his ships, the Ruly^ 64, was so far to leeward
that the enemy, by keeping near the wind, could pass between lier and
him (b, b, b'). She therefore went about and steered south-west, on
the port tack, close to the wind . The French, who were already head-
ing the same way, were thus brought on her weather quarter in chase.
Cornwallis tlien wore his division, formed line of Ijattle on the same
tack as the others, and edged down towards tlic Fiiibij (c). If the
47U
MAJOR Ol'KUATIONS. 1702-1783.
[1780.
French now kept their wind, either the Ruhy (c') must be cut off, or
Cornwallis, to save her, must light the large odds against him. I)e
Ternay, however, did not keep his wind (c). "The enem)%" Avrote
Cornwallis, " kept edging off and forming line, though within gun-
shot. At 5.30 P.Ji., seeing we had pushed the French ships to lee-
ward sufficiently to enalile the liuhj, on our lee bow, to join us, I
made the signal to tack." As the British squatli'on went about to
ADMIllAL THE HON. Sill WILLIAM CORNWALLLS, G. C. B.
i,Fmn Ihe litliogniph by Ridlry, a/lcr the. portrait by D. Gardner, painlfd in 1775, when Comtvallis ^^■as a
Post-Cnplain, at. 31.)
■stand east again, the French, heading west-south-west, hoisted their
colours and opened fire in passing. The Eultj kept on till she
fetched the wake of the British column, when she too tacked. The
French then tacked also, in succession, and the two columns stood on
for awhile in pai'allel lines, exchanging shots at long range, the British
to -windward. Cornwallis very j-jroperl}' declined fm-ther engagement
with so superior a force. He had already done much in saving a ship
■so greatly exposed.
1780.] CAPTURE OF A HhTJ'lSII (JONVOY. AIT
The account above followed is that of the Jiritish comniaiuler, but
it does not differ in essentials from tiie French, whose captains were
greatly incensed at tlie cautious action tif Uiuir chief. A Frencli com-
missaire in the squadron, who afterwards published his joimial, tells
that de Ternay a few days later asked the cajitain of one of the shi[)S
what English admiral he thought they had engaged, and received the
reply, "We have lost our opportunity of fimling out." He gives also
many details of the talk that went on in the ships, which need not be
repeated. Chevalier points out correctly, however, that de Ternay
had to consider that an equal or even a superior force might be en-
countered as Narragansett Bay was approached, and that lie should
not risk crippling his squadron for such a contingency. The charge
of 6,000 troops, under the then conditions, was no light responsibility,
and at the least must silence off-hand criticism now. Comment upon
his action does not belong to British naval history, to which the firm-
ness and seamanship of Captain Cornwallis added a lasting glory.
It may be noted that fifteen years later, in the French Revolution,,
the same officer, then a Vice-Admiral, again distinguished himself by
his bearing in face of great odds, bringing five ships safe off, out of
the jaws of a dozen. It illustrates how luck seems in many cases to
characterise a man's personality, much as temperament does. Corn-
wallis, familiarly known as " Billy Blue " to the seamen of his day,
never won a victory, nor had a chance of winning one ; but in com-
mand both of ships and of divisions, he repeatedly distinguished him-
self by successfully facing odds which he could not overcome.
The year was uneventful also in European waters, after Rodnej-'s
relief of Gibraltar in January. The detachment of the Channel
Fleet which accompanied him on that mission returned safelj' to
England. The " Grand Fleet," as it still was styled occasionally,
cruised at sea from June 8th to August 18th, an imposing force of
thirty-one ships of the line, eleven of them three-deckers of 00 guns
and upwards. Admiral Francis Geary w^as then Commander-in-Chief,
but, his liealth failing, and Barrington refusing to take the position,
through professed distrust of himself and actual distrust of the
Admiralty, Vice-Admiral George Darby succeeded to it, and lield it
during the year 1781.
The most notable maritime event in 1780 in Europe was the cap-
ture on August 9th of a large British convoj-, two or three hundred
miles west of Cape -St. Vincent, Ijy the allied fleets from Cadiz. As
out of sixty-three sail only eight escaped, and as of those taken six-
478 MAJOR OPEIUTIONS. 17G-2-1783. [17S0.
teen were carrying troops and suiiplies necessary for the West India
garrisons, sucli a disaster claims mention among the greater opera-
tions of war, the success of whicli it could not fail to influence.
Captain John Moutray, the officer commanding the convoy, was
brought to trial and dismissed his ship ; but there were not wanting
those who charged the misadventure to the Admiralty, and saw in
the captain a victim. It was the greatest single blow that British
commerce had received in war during the memory of men then
living, and "a general inclination prevailed to lay the blame upon
some individual, who might be punished according to tlie magnitude
of the object, ratlier than in proportion to his demerit." ^
During the year 1780 was formed the League of the Baltic
Powers, known historicall}- as the Armed Neutrality, to exact from
Great Britain the concession of certain points thought essential to
neutral interests. The accession of Holland to this combination,
together with other motives of dissatisfaction, caused Great Britain
to declare war against the United Provinces on the 20th of Decem-
ber. Orders were at once sent to the East and West Indies to seize
Dutch possessions and ships, but these did not issue in action until
the following year.
Towards the end of 17!S0 the French Government, dissatisfied
with tlie lack of results from the immense combined force assembled
in Cadiz during the summer months, decided to recall its ships, and
to refit them during the \vinter for the more extensive and aggressive
movements planned for the campaign of 1781. D'Estaing was sent
from France for the purpose ; and under his command thirty-eight
ships of the line, in which were included those brought by de Guichen
from the West Indies, sailed on the 7th of November for Brest.
Extraordinary as it may seem, this fleet did not reach its port until
the 3rd of January, 1781.
Rodney, returning to the West Indies from New York, reached
Barbados on December 6th, 1780. There he seems first to have
learned of the disastrous effects of the great October hurricanes of
that year. Not only had several ships — among them two of the
line — been wrecked, with the loss of almost all on board, but the
greater part of the survivors had been dismasted, wholly or in part,
as well as injured in the hull. There were in the West Indies no
docking facilities ; under-water damage could be repaired only by
careening or heaving-down. Furthermore, as Barbados, St. Lucia, and
I Beatsnn. 'Military and Xaval Memoirs.'
17NI.]
IKioil .llllUrES AT ST. LUCIA.
47!)
Jamaica, all had been .s\v('i)t, llu'ii' sup[)lii'.s were mainly destroyed.'
Antigua, it is true, had eseajied, the hurrieaue passiiiLf south of St.
Kittsjbut Rodney wrote home that no stores for relittiutf were
ohtaiualjle in the Caribbee Islanfls. He was lioping then that Sir
Peter Parker might supply his iiclmIs in part; for wlieii writing from
St. Lucia on December 10th, two months after the storm, he still was
ignorant that the Jamaica Station had suffered to the full as severely
as the eastern islands. The fact shows not merely the ordinary slow-
ness of communications in those days, but also the paralysis that fell
upon all movements in conseipience of that great disaster. ''The
most beautiful island in the world," he said of Barbados, '■ has the
appearance of a countr}' laid waste by fire and sword."
Hearing that the fortifications at St. Vincent had been almost
destroyed by the hurricane, Kodney, in comliination with General
Vaughan, commanding the troops on the station, made an attempt to
reconquer the island, landing there on December 15th; but the intel-
ligence i^roved erroneous, and the fleet returned to St. Lucia. "I have
only nine sail of the line now with me capable of going to sea," wrote
the Admiral on the 22nd, " and not one of thein has spare rigging or
.sails." In the course of January he was joined l)y a division of eight
.ships of the line from England, under the command of Kear-.Vdmiral
Sir Samuel Hood. These, with four others refitted during that
month, not improbablj- from stores brought in Hood's convoy of
over a hundred sail, raised the disposable force to twenty-one ships
of the line : 2 nineties, 1 eighty, 15 seventy-fours, and 3 sixty-fours.
^ List of H. it. sliips lost in the hurricane in the West Indies in October, 1780,
with the names of their commanders, such of the latter as perished being indicated
with an asterisk (*). Chiefly from .Steel's ' Navy List.' — W. L. C.
SUH'S.
Guns.
Thunderer
74
Stirling Cnstle
64
Pluenix
44
Blanche
42
Laurel
28
Andromeda
28
Deal Castle
24
Scarborough
20
Beaver's Prize
16
Barbados
14
Chameleon
14
Endeavour
14
Victor
10
COMMANDEIIS.
( Com. the Hon. K. B. Walsingliani.*
I Capt. Kobert Boyle Nicholas.*
Capt. Robert Carkett.*
Capt. Sir Hyde Parker (2).
Capt. Saiiniel Uppleby.*
Capt. Tliom.is Lloyd.*
Capt. Henry Bryne.*
Capt. James Hawkins (afterwards Whitshcd).
Capt. Samuel Hood Walker.*
Com. .lolin Auriol Druniniond.*
Com. Kalph Jlilbanke.
t^om. James Johnstone.*
Lii-ut. Francis Wooldridge.
Lii-ut.
480
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
L1781.
On the 27th of January, an express arrived from Enghind, direct-
ing the seizure of tiie Dutch possessions in the Caribbean, and
specifying, as first to be attacked, St. Eustatius and St. Martin, two
small islands lying within fifty miles north of the British St. Kitts.
St. Eustatius, a rocky patch six miles in length by three in breadth,
had been conspicuous, since the war began, as a great trade centre,
where supplies of all kinds were gathered under the protection of its
neutral flag, to be distributed afterwards in the belligerent islands
and the North American continent. The British, owing to their
extensive commerce and maritime aptitudes, derived from such an
intermediary much less benefit than their enemies ; and the island
had been jealously regarded by Rodney for some time. He asserted
that when de Guichen's fleet could not regain Fort Royal, because of
its injuries received in the action of April 17th, it was refitted to meet
him by mechanics and materials sent from St. Eustatius. On the other
hand, when cordage was to be bought for the British vessels after the
hurricanes of 1780, the merchants of the island, he said, alleged that
there was none there ; although, when he took the island soon after-
wards, many hundred tons were found that had been long in stock.
Rodney and Vaughan moved promptly. Tlu'ee days after their
orders arrived, they sailed for St. Eustatius. There being in Fort
Royal four French ships of the line, six British were left to check
COJIJIEMOr.ATIVE MEDAL (IF THE CAPTUKE OF ST. EUSTATIUS BY liODXEY, 1781.
{From an nriginnl lent by Capt. H. S. H. Prince Louu 0/ Battenher(j^ H. X.)
them, and on the 3rd of February the fleet reached its destination. A
peremptory summons fi-om the commander of a dozen ships of the
line secured immediate submission. Over a hundred and fifty mer-
chant ships were taken ; and a convoy of thirty sail, which had left
the island two days before, was pursued and brought back. The
mercliandisu found was valued at over £3,000,000. The neiglilwur-
ino- islands of St. Martin and Saba were seized also at this time.
1781.] RODNEY AT ST. EUSTATIUS. 481
i!,odnL'3"'.s imag-imition, as is shown in his letters, was g-rcatly im-
pressed by the magnitude of the prize and hy the defenceless condi-
tion of Iiis capture. He alleged these as the motives for staying in
person at St. Eustatius, to settle the complicated tangle of neutral
and belligerent rights in the propei'ty involved, and to provide against
the enemy's again possessing himself of a place now so equipped for
transactions harmful to Great Britain. The storehouses and con-
veniences provided for the particular traffic, if not properly guarded,
were like fortifications insufficiently garrisoned. If they passed into
the hands of the enemy, the}' liecame sources of injury-. Tlu; illieit
traffic could start again at once in full force, with means which elsc-
wliere would have first to ])e created. There were a mile and a half
of storehouses in the lower town, he said, and at the least he nuist
leave these roofless, if not wholly demolished.
For such reasons he remained at St. Eustatius throughout Feb-
ruary, ]\Iareh, and April. The amount of money involved, and the
arbitrary methods pursued by him and by Vauglian, gave rise to
much scandal, which was not diminished by the King's relinquishing
all the booty to the captors, nor by the latters' professed disinterest-
edness. Men thought they did protest too much. Meanwhile, other
matters arose to claim attention. A week after the capture, a vessel
arrived from the Bay of Biscay announcing that eight or ten French
sail of the line, with a large convoy, had been seen on the 31st of
December steering for the West Indies. Rodney at once detached
Sir Samuel Hood with eleven ships of the line, directing him to
take also tinder his command the six left before Fort Royal, and to
cruise with them to windward of Martinique, to intercept the force
reported. Hood sailed February 12th. The particular intelligence
proved afterwards to be false, but Hood was continued on tliis duty.
A month later he "was ordered to move from tlie windward to tlie lee-
ward side of the island, and to blockade Fort Royal closely. Against
this change he remonstrated, and the event showed him to be right ;
but Rodney insisted, saying that from his experience he knew that a
fleet could remain off Fort Royal for months without dropping to lee-
ward, and that there ships detached to St. Lucia, for water and
refreshments, could rejoin before an enemy's fleet, discovered to
windward, could come up. Hood thought the Admiral's object was
merely to shelter his own doings at St. Eustatius ; and he considered
the blockade of Fort Royal to be futile, if no descent upon the island
were intended. '■ It would doubtless have been fortunate for the
VOL. 111. — 01
482 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1V81.
jDublic," he remarked afterwards, " had Sir George been with his
fleet, as I am confident lie woukl liave been to windward instead of
to leeward, when de Grasse made las approach."
The preparations of the French in Brest were completed towards the
end of March, and on the 22nd of that month Rear-Admu'al de Grasse
sailed, having a large convoy under the protection of twenty-six ships
of the line. A week later six of the latter parted company, five under
Suffren for the East Indies, and one for North America. The remain-
ing twenty continued their course for Martinique, which was sighted
on the 28th of April. Before sunset. Hood's squadron also was dis-
covered to leeward of the island, as ordered by Rodney to cruise, and
off the southern point, — Pointe des Salines. De Grasse then hove-to
for the night, but sent an officer ashore both to give and to obtain intel-
ligence, and to reach an understanding for concerted action next day.
The French fleet consisted of one shijJ of 110 guns, 3 eighties, 15
seventy-foui's, and 1 sixty-four, in all 20 of the line, besides tlu-ee
armed en flute, wluch need not be taken into account, although they
served to cover the convoy. Besides these there were the four in
Fort Royal, 1 seventy-four and 3 sixty-fours, whose junction with the
approaching enemy it was one of Hood's objects to prevent. The force
of the British was 1 ninety. 1 eighty, 12 seventy-fours, 1 seventy, and
2 sixty-fours : total, 17.^ Thus both in numbers and in rates of ships
^ List of the fleet imder Rear-Admiral Sir S. Hood, Bart., on April 29th, 1781.
Chiefly from Beatson, vi. 264, and Steel's ' Navy List.' This includes the 64-gun
.ship, wl)ich joined from St. Lucia at 9.20 a.m. — W. L. C.
Captain AVilHam Bayue.
Captain James Brine.
Captain Charles Thompson.
Captain Sir Kiclianl Bickerton, Bart.
Captain Fiancis Reynolds (later F. R. Moreton).
j Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, Bart. (B).
Captain John Knight (2).
Captain James Ferguson.
Captain Sir Thomas Rich, Bart.
Captain John Symons.
Captain Lord Robert Manners.
Captain John Houlton.
j Rear-Admiral Francis Samuel Drake (B).
( Captain Charles KnatchbuU.
Captain John jSTeale Pleydell Xott.
Captain Andrew Sutherland.
Captain Stair Douglas (1).
Captain John Lewis Gidoin.
Captain Anthony James Pye Jlolloy.
Captain Mark Robinson (1).
Lizard, 28, as repeater. PocaJwutas, 14, as repeater.
A/frcd
74
BclUqucilx
64
Alcidr.
74
Invincible
74
Monarch
74
Barfleur
90
Terrible
74
Princcsa,
70
Ajax
74
Resolution
74
Montagu
74
Gibraltar
80
Centaur
74
Eussell
74
Prince Williarii
64
Torhay
74
Intrepid
64
Shrewsbury
74
1781.]
HOOD AM) 1)E cn.iSSE.
483
Hood was inferior to the main body alone of tlie French ; but he liad
the advantage of sliips all coppered, owing to Rodney's insistence
witii the Admiralty. lie also had no convoy to worry him; but he
was to leeward.
Early in the morning of the 29th, de Grasse advanced to round
the southern point of the island, which was the usual course for sail-
ing ships. Hood was too far to leeward to intercept tliis movement,
CHART OF PART OF THF, WINDWARD ISLANDS.
for which he was blamed by Rodney, who claimed that the night had
not been properly utilised by beating to windward of Pointe des
Salines.i Hood, on the other hand, said in a private letter : " I never
once lost sight of getting to windward, but it was totally impossible.
. . . Had I fortunately been there, I must have brought the enemy
to close action upon more equal terms, or the}' must have given up
1 Rodney .said that Hood " lay -to " for the nif;ht. This is antecedently incredible
of an officer of Hood's character, and is expressly contradicted Ijj' Captain Sutherland
of the Russrll. " At 6 p.m. (of the 28th) oui' fleet tacked to the north, and kejit mov-
ing across the bay (Fort Royal) for the right (sir), in line of battle." Ekins, ' Xa-\-al
Battles,' p. 13(5. The word " right " is evidently a misprint for " niglit." Rodney's
criticisms seem to the author captious throughout.
484 M A.J on OPERATIONS. 1702-178:5. [1781.
their transports, trade, etc." Hood's subsequent career places it be-
yond doubt tliat bad he been to windward there would have been a
severe action, whatever the result ; but it is not possible to decide
positively between liis statement and Rodney's, as to where the fault
of being to leeward lay. The writer believes that Ilood would have
been to windward, if in any way possible. It must be added that the
British had no word that so great a force was coming. On this point
Hood and Rodney are agreed.
Under the conditions, the French j^assed without difficulty round
Pointe des Salines, the transports hugging the coast, and the ships of
war being outside and to leeward of them. Thus they headed up to
the northward for Fort Roj'al Baj^ (Cvil de Sac Royal), Hood standing
to the southward until after 10, and being joined at 9.20 by a sixty-
four- (which is counted in the list above) from St. Lucia, making his
force eighteen. At 10.35 the British tacked together to the north-
ward. The two fleets were now steering the same way, the French
van abreast of the British centre. At 11 the French opened their fire,
to which no reply was made then. At 11.20, the Britisli van being
close in with the shore to the northward of the Baj-, Hood tacked
again together, and the enemy, seeing his convoy secure, wore, also
together, wliich brought the two lines nearer, heading south. At this
time the four French ships in the Baj-got under waj- and easil}- joined
the rear of their fleet, it having the weather-gage. The French were
thus 24 to 18. As their shot were passing over the British, the latter
now began to reph'. At noon Hood, finding that he could not close
the enemy, shortened sail to topsails and hove-to, hoping by this defi-
ance to bring them down to him. At 12.30 the French admiral was
abreast of the British flagship, and the action became general, but at
too long range. " Never, I believe." wrote Hood, " was more powder
and shot tlu'own aM-ay in one day before." The Frencli continuing
to stand on, Hood filled his sails again at 1 p.:m., as their van had
stretched beyond his.
As the leading ships, heading south, opened the channel between
St. Lucia and Martinique, they got the breeze fresher, which caused
them to draw away from the centre. Hood, therefore, at 1.34 made
the signal for a close order, and immecUately afterwards ceased fii-ing,
finding not one in ten of the enemy's shot to reach. The engage-
ment, however, continued somewhat longer between the southern
ships, where, by the account of Captain Sutherland, who was in that
part of the line, four of the British were attacked very smartly by
17.S1.]
MAIiriSiqUE.
485
0* 5'
§1
486 MAJOR OFEUATIONS. 1702-1783. [1781.
eight of the French. The Centaur, Russell, Intrepid, and Bhrewsbury
appear to have been the ships that suffered most heavily, either in
liull, spars, or crews. Tliey \vere all in the van on the southern tack.
The Eussdl, having several shot between wind and water, was with
difficulty kept afloat, the water rising over the platform of tlie maga-
zine. Hood sent her off at nightfall to St. Eustatius, where she
arrived on the 4th of May, bringing Rodney the first news of the
action, and of the numbers of the French reinforcement. During the
30th Hood held his ground, still endeavouring to get to windward
of the enem}' ; but failing in that attempt, and finding two of his
squadron much disabled, he decided at sunset to bear away to the
nortln\ard, because to the southward the westerly currents set so
strong that the crij^pled ships could not regain St. Lucia. On the
11th of May, between St. Kitts and Antigua, he joined Rodney, who,
after hurried repairs to the Russell, had left St. Eustatius on the 5th,
with that ship, the Sandu-ich, and the Trhmiph.
It is somewhat difficult to criticise positively the conduct of Hood
and of de Grasse in this affair. It is clear that Hood on the first day
seriously sought action, though his force was but tliree-fourths that
of Ills foe. He tried fii"st to take the offensive, and, failing that, to
induce his enemy to attack frankl}- and decisively. Troude is doubt-
less correct in sa^-ing that it was optional with de Grasse to bring on
a general engagement ; and the writer finds himself in agreement also
with another French authority. Captain Chevalier, that " Coimt de
Grasse seems to have been too much preoccupied with the safetj' of
his convoy on tlie 29th, Admiral Hood having shown liimself much
less circumspect on that day than he was on the next. Notmthstand-
ing our numerical superiority, Count de Grasse kept near the land
until all the convoy were safe." He represents Hood as fencing
cautiousl}- on the following day, keeping on the field, but avoiding a
decisive encounter. This differs somewhat from the version of Hood
himself, who mentions signalling a general chase to windward at 12.30
P. M. of the 30th. The two statements are not irreconcilable. Hood,
having coppered ships, had the speed of the French, whose vessels,
being partly coppered and partly not, sailed unevenly. The British
commander consequent!}' could afford to take risks, and he therefore
played with the enemy, watching for a chance. Hood was an officer
of exceptional capacity, much in advance of his time. He thoroughly
understood a watching game, and that an opportunity might offer to
seize an advantage over part of the enemy, if the eagerness of pursuit.
1781.] lUiAKI': AM) DK dllASSE. 487
or any mishap, caused the French to separate. P^rora any dilemma
that ensued, the reserve of sjieed gave him a power of witlicb-awal, in
relying upon which he was right. 'J'he j)rescnt writer adopts here also
Chevalier's conclusion : " Admiral Hood evidently had the very great
advantage over his enemy of commanding a squach-on of coppered
ships. Nevertheless, homage is due to his skill and to the confidence
shown by him in his captains. If some of his ships had dropped
behind through injuries received, he would have had to sacrifice them,
or to light a superior force." This means that Hood, for an adequate
gain ran a great risk ; that he thoroughly understood both the advan-
tages and the disadvantages of his situation ; and that he acted not
only -wdth great skill, but warily and boldly, — a rare combination.
The British loss in this affair was 31 • killed, including Captain Nott,
of the Centaur, and 162 wounded. The French loss is given by Cheva-
lier as 18 killed and 56 wounded; by Beatson, as 119 killed and 150
wounded.
Rodney, having collected his fleet, proceeded south, and on the 18th
of j\Iay put into Barbados for water. Much anxiety had been felt at
first for St. Lucia, which Hood's retreat had uncovered. As was
feared, the French had attacked it at once, their fleet, with the excep-
tion of one or two ships, going there, and 1,200 troops landing at Gros
Het Bay; but the batteries on Pigeon Island, which llodney had
erected and manned, kept them at arms' length. The works elsewhere
being found too strong, the attempt was abandoned.
At the same time, two ships of the line and 1,.300 troops had sailed
from Martinique against Tobago. When de Grasse returned from the
failure at St. Lucia, he learned that the British were at sea, apparently
bound for Barbados. Alarmed for his detachment before Tobago, he
again sailed with the fleet for that island on the 25th of IMa}', accom-
panied by 3,000 more troops. Rodney learned at Barbados of the
attempt on Tobago, and on the 29th dispatched a squadron of six sail
of the line, under Rear-Admiral Francis Samuel Drake, to support
the defence. On the following day he heard that the French main
fleet had been seen to windward of St. Lucia, steering south, evi-
dently for Tobago. On the 30th also Drake and de Grasse encountered
one another off the latter island, the French being to leeward, nearest
the land. Drake necessarily retired, and on the morning of .June 3rd
was again off Barbados, whereupon Rodney at once sailed for Tobago
with the whole fleet. On the 4th the island was sighted, and next
morning information was received that it had capitulated on the 2nd.
488 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17(!-2-17S;}. [1781.
The two fleets returning north were in i)resence of one another on
the 0th ; but no engagement took place, iiodney, who was to wind-
ward, having twenty sail to twenty-three,^ was unwilling to attack
unless he could get a clear sea. The strength of the cun-ents, he
said, would throw his fleet too far to leeward, in case of rc\ erse, into
the foul ground between St. Vincent and Grenada, thus exposing
Barbados, which had not recovered sufliciently from the hurricane
to stand alone. He put into Barbados, and de Grasse went to Mar-
tinique to i^repare tlie expedition to tlie American continent, ^\•llich
resulted in the surrender of Cornwallis. On the 5th of July he sailed
from Fort Eoyal, taking with him the " trade " for France, and on
the 2()th anchored with it at Cap Francois, where he found a division
of four ships of the line which had licen left the 3'ear before by
de Guichen. There also was a frigate, which had left Boston on
the 20th of June, and bj- wliicli he received dispatches from Wash-
ington, and from Rochambeau, the general commanding the French
troops in America. These acquainted him with the state of affairs
on the continent, and requested that the fleet sliould come to either
the Chesapeake or New York, to strike a decisive blow at the British
power in one quarter or the other.
It is expedient here to resume the thread of events on the con-
tinent.
It has been said that, to support the operations of Cornwallis in
the Carolinas, Clinton had begun a series of diversions in the valley
of the James River. The first detachment so sent, under General
Leslie, had been transferred speedil}" to South Carolina, to meet the
exigencies of Cornwallis's campaign. The second, of l.GOO troops
under Benedict Arnold, left New York at the end of December, and
began its work on the banks of the James at the endof January, 1781.
It advanced to Richmond, nearh- a hundred miles from the sea, wast-
ing tlie country round about, and finding no opposition adequate to
check its freedom of movement. Returning down stream, on the
20th it occupied Portsmouth, south of the James River, near the sea,
and valuable as a naval station.
Wasliington urged Commodore des Touches, who by de Ternay's
death had been left in command of the French squadi-on at Xewport,
to interrupt these proceedings, by dispatching a strong detachment
to Chesapeake Bay ; and he asked Rochamljeau also to let some troops
1 One French ship had left the fleet, Jisaljleil.
1781.] ARnUTIIXOT JXI) DES TOrC/fKS. 489
accompany the naval division, to support the scanty force which lie
himself could spare to Virginia. It happened, liowevcr, tliat a gale
of wind just then had inflicted severe injury upon Arbuthnot's squad-
ion, three of which had gone to sea from Gaixliner's Bay upon a report
that three French ships of the line had left Newport to meet an ex-
pected convoy. One seventy-four, the Bedford, was Avholly dismasted ;.
another, the Cullodcn, Captain George Balfour, drove ashore on Long
Island, and was wi'eckedi The French ships had returned to port the
day before the gale, but the incident indisposed des Touclies to risk
his vessels at sea at that time. He sent only a sixty-four, with two
frigates. These left Newport on February 9th, and entered the
Cliesajjeake, but were unable to reach the British vessels, which, being
smaller, withdrew up the Elizabeth River. Arbuthnot, hearing of this
expedition, sent orders to some frigates off Charleston to go to the
scene. The French division, when leaving the Bay, met one of these,
the Romidus, 44, Captain George Gay ton, off the Capes, captured her, and
returned to Newport on February 25th. On the 8th of March, Arnold
reported to Clinton that the Chesapeake was clear of French ^•essels.
On the same day Arbuthnot also was writing to Clinton, from
Gardinei-'s Bay, that the Fiencli were evidently preparing to quit
Newport. His utmost diligence had failed as 3'et to repair entirely
the damage done his squadron by the storm, but on the 9t]i it was
ready for sea. On the evening of the 8th the French had sailed.
On the 10th .Vrbuthnot knew it, and, having taken the precaution to
move down to the entrance of the bay, he was able to follow at once.
On the 13th he spoke a vessel which had seen the enemy and gave
liim their course. Favoured by a strong north-west wind, and his
ships being coppered, he outstripped the French, only three of which
had copper on them. At 6 A.M. of the 16th the latter were reported
by a frigate to be astern — to the north-east — about a league distant,
a thick haze preventing the British from seeing them even at tliat dis-
tance (A A).' Cape Heniy, the southern point of the entrance to the
Chesapeake, then bore south-west by west, distant forty miles. The
wind as stated bj- Arbuthnot was west ; by the French, south-west.
The British admiral at once went about, steering in the direction
reported, and the o[iposing squadrons soon sighted one another.
The British l)eing between them and tlieir port, the French hauled
to the wind, which sliifted between 8 and 9 to north by west, putting
them to windward. Some preliminary manceirvres then followed, both
' Reference is to Mabau's " Inthience of Sea Power Upon Histor}-," Plate XII.
490 MA.IOli OPEHATIONS. 17G2-178;i. [17SI,
parties seeking the weather-gage. The weather remained thick and
squall}', often intercepting the view ; and the wind continued to shift
until towards noon, when it settled at north-east. The better sailing,
or the better seamanship, of the British had enabled them to gain so
far upon their opponents tliat at 1 p.m. they were laying nearly up in
their wake, on the port tack, overhauling them ; both squadrons in
line of liattle, heading east-south-east, the French bearing from their
pursuers east by south, — one point on the weather bow (B B).^ The
wind was rising with squalls, so that the ships lay over well to theii'
canvas, and the sea was getting big.
As the enemy now was threatening his lear, and had the speed to
overtake, des Touches felt it necessary to resort to tJie usual parry to
such a thrust, by wearing his squadron and passing on the other tack.
This could be done together, reversing the order, or in succession ;
depending much upon the distance of the enemy. Having room
enough, des Touches chose the latter, but, as fighting was inevitable,
he decided also to utilise the manoeuvre by surrendering the weather-
gage, and passing to leeward. The advantage of this course was that,
with the existing sea and wind, and the inclination of the ships, the
party that had the opponent on his weather side could open the lower-
deck ports and use those guns. There was thus a great increase of
battery power, for the lower guns were the heaviest. Des Touches
accordingly put his helm up, his line passing in succession to the
southward (c), across the head of the advancing British column, and
then hauling up so as to rim parallel to the latter, to leeward, with
the wind four points free.
Arbuthnot accepted the position offered, stood on as he was until
nearly abreast of the French, and at 2 p.m. made the signal to wear.
It does not appear certainly how this was executed ; but from the
expression in the official report, "the van of the squadron wore in
the line,"' and from the fact that the ships which led in the attack
were those which were leading on the port tack, — the tack before
the signal was made, — -it seems likely that the movement was made
in succession (a). The whole squadron then stood down, but with
the customary result. The ships in the van and centre were all
engaged by 2.30, so Arbutlmot states ; but the brunt of the action
had already fallen upon the three leading vessels, which got the first
raking lire, and, as is also usual, came to closer action than those
which followed them (C). They therefore not only lost most heavily
1 Reference is to Mahan's " Influence of Sea Power Upon History," Plate XII.
1781.]
ARBUTirXOT AXn 7)ES TOUCHED.
491
in men, but also were so damaged aloft as to be crippk-d. Tho British
Vice-Admiral, keeping the signal for the line flying, and not hoisting
that for close action, ajjpears to liave caused a movement of indecision
in the squadron, — an evidence again of tlie hold which the line then
still had upon men's minds. Of this des Tuuclies cleverly availed
himself, by ordering his ships to wear in succession. The French
column filed by the tlnee disaljled Hritish vessels (d), gave them their
broadsides one by one, and then hauled oif to the eastward, quitting
Arbuxhnot and Desto(jcme:s
Ar.IiUTHXOT AND DKS TOl'CIl ES.
the field (D). Arbuthnot made signal to wear in pursuit, but the
Rohu&t and Prudent^ two of the van ships, were now wholly un-
manageable from the concentration of fire upon them caused by des
Touches's last movement; and the maintopsail yard of the Zo«f/o?i,
the only British three-decker, had lieen shot away. The chase there-
fore was abandoned, and tlie squadron put into Chesapeake Bay, for
which the wind was fair (D). The French returned to Newport. The
respective losses in men were : British, 30 killed, 73 wounded ; French,
72 killed, 112 wounded.
492
MAJOR Dl'EUATlONS. 17C:>-17S:i.
[1781.
Both sides had eight ships, besides smaller craft, in thLs encounter.
From the table ^ given Ijelow it is evident that the advantage in force
was distinctly with the British. For this reason, probablj-, the action
was considered particularly discreditable by contemporaries, and the
more so because several vessels did not engage closely, — a fault laid to
the Vice-Admiral's failure to make the signal for close action, hauling
down that for the line. Tliis criticism is interesting, for it indicates
how men's minds were changing ; ami it shows also that Arbuthnot
had not changed, but still lived in the middle of the centur}-. Tlie
French commodore disi^layed very considerable tactical skill ; his
squadron was handled neatly, quickly, and with jjrecision. With
inferior fijrce he carried off a decided advantage by sheer intelligence
and good management. Unluckily, he failed in resolution to pursue
his advantage. Had he persisted, he doubtless could have controlled
the Chesapeake.
His neglect to do so was justified by Commodore de Barras, Avho
on the 10th of May arrived in Newport from France to command the
squadron. This oilficer, after pointing out the indisputable tactical
success, continued thus : —
"As to the advantage which the English olitained, in fulfilling their object,
that is a necessary consequence of their superiority, and, still more, of their pui-ely
defensive attitude. It is a principle in war that one should risk much to defend one's
own positions, and very little to attack those of the enemy. M. des Touches, whose
object was purely offensive, could and shoidd, when the enemy opposed to him
1 List of the British and French squadrons in tlie action of March 16th, 1781.
The British list gives Arbuthnot's line of battle ; the America to lead with the star-
board, and the Robust witli the larboard tacks on board. Beatson, vi. 273 (corrected).
— W. L. C.
SHIPS.
z
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
r.
COMMANDERS.
America . .
04
Capt. Samuel Thompson.
*ypptune . . . .
74
1 M. des Touches.
Bedford . .
74
Capt. Ednuiud Affleck.
1 Capt. de Midine.
Adamant. .
50
Capt. Gideon Johnstone.
*Duc fie Bourgogne .
84
Capt. Baron de Durf ort.
London , •
9S
j Rear-Adni. Thomas Graves (2), (R).
1 Capt. David Graves.
Conquerant . . .
74
Capt. de la Grandiere.
Provence . . . .
C4
Capt. Lambart.
lioyal Oalc .
74
j Vice-Adm. Marriot Arbutlmot.
Ardent
G4
Capt. de Marigny.
1 Capt. William Swiney.
Jaxon
G4
Capt. de la Clocheterie.
Prudent . .
64
Capt. Thomas Burnett.
*ExeUle
G4
Capt. de Tilly.
Europe . .
C4
Capt. Smith Child.
'fRonudun . . . .
44
Capt. de Villebrune.
Robust . .
74
Capt. PhilUps Cosby.
Frigates : —
Frigates : —
Giimlnhqie .
2S
Capt. Hugh Robinson.
Bermicne . . . .
36
Capt. de la Touche.
Pearl . . .
32
Capt. George Montagu.
Genlille . . . .
32
Iris . . .
32
Capt. George Dawson.
Ftintiisqne (enflGte)
64
Capt. de Vaudor^.
Meitea . .
2S
Capt. Henry Duncan (1).
* These ships were coppered,
t Late Briti.sh. Though only a 44-guu ship, she was a two-decker.
17S1.] CORSir.lLLlS ANU CLISTON. 493
superior forces, renounce a project wliich cuukl no longer succeed, unless, contrary
to all probability, it ended not only in beating, but also in destroying entirely, that
superior squadron."
This exaltation of the defensive above the offensive, this despair-
ing view of probabilities, this aversion from risks, go far to explain
the French want of success in this war. No matter how badly tlio
enemy was thrashed, unless lie were entirely destroyed, he was still a
fleet "in being," a paralysing factor.
The retreat of des Touches and the coming of Arbuthnot restored
to the British the command of Chesapeake Bay. Clinton, as soon as
he knew that the two squadrons had sailed, had sent off a reinforce-
ment of 2,000 troops for Arnold, under General Phillips. Tliese
arrived on INIarch 26th in Lynnhaven Bay, and thence proceeded at
once to Portsmouth, Virginia. It is unnecessary to speak of the
various operations of this land force. On the 9th of Ma}-, in conse-
quence of letters received from Cornwallis, it moved to Petersburg.
There on the 13tli Phillips died, the command reverting momentarily
to Arnold. On the 20th Cornwallis joined, and Arnold soon after
returned to New York.
Cornwallis now had with him about 7,000 troops, including the
garrison at Portsmouth ; but a serious ' difference of opinion existed
between him and Clinton, the Commander-in-Chief. The latter had
begun the conquest of South Carolina, and he did not welcome tlie
conclusion of his lieutenant that the conquest could not be main-
tained, away from the seaboard, unless \^irginia also were subdued ;
for from the latter, a rich and populous region, men and supplies
supported the American cause in the south. Cornwallis had tested
the asserted strength of the Royalists in the Carolinas, and had found
it wanting. Offensive operations in Virginia were what he wished ;
but Clinton did not approve this project, nor feel that he could spare
troops enough for the purpose. Between October, 1780, and June,
1781, he said, 7,724 effectives had been sent from New York to
the Chesapeake ; and he could not understand the failure to cut off
the greatly inferior force of the enemy in Virginia. This at least did
not indicate probable success for a renewed offensive. The garrison
of New York was now short of 11,000, and could not be diminished
further, as he was threatened with a siege. In sliort, the Britisli
position in America had become essentially false, by the concurring
effect of insufficient force and ex-centric — double — operations. Sent
to conquer, their numbers now were so divided that they could barely
494 MAJun OPERATWIS'S. 1762-1783. [17«1.
maintain the defensive. Comwallis therefore was ordered to occupy
a defensive position, wliich should control an anchorage for ships of
the line, and to strengthen Iiiniself in it. After some discussion,
which revealed further disagreement, he placed himself at Yorktown,
on the peninsula formed by the James and York rivers. Portsmouth
was evacuated, the garrison reaching Yorktown on the 22nd of August.
Cornwallis's force was then 7,000 troops ; and there were with him
besides about a thousand seamen, belonging to some half-dozen small
vessels, which liad been shut up in the York by the coming of the
French fleet.
On the 2ud of July Arbuthnot sailed for England, leaving the
command at New York to Rear-Admiral Thomas Graves (2). The
latter on tlie same day wi'ote to Rodney, by the \mg Active, that inter-
cepted dispatches of the enemy had revealed that a large division
from the West Indies was to arrive on the American coast during
the summer, to co-operate with the force already in Xewport. Rodney,
on the other hand, dispatched to New York on the 7th the Swallovj
sloop, 16, with word that, if he sent reinforcements from the AVest
Indies, they would be ordered to make the Capes of the Chesapeake, and
to coast tlience to New York. He asked, therefore, that cruisers with
information miglit be stationed along that route. Two days later,
having then certain news that de Grasse had sailed for Cap Frangois,
he sent the intelligence to Viee-Admiral Sir Peter Parker at Jamaica,
and gave Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood preparatory orders to com-
mand a reinforcement destined for the continent. This, however, was
limited in numbers to fifteen sail of the line, Rodney being misled by
his intelligence, which gave fourteen ships as the size of the French
division having the same destination, and whicli reported that de Grasse
himself would convoy the trade from Cap Francois to France. On the
24th instructions were issued for Hood to proceed on this duty. He
was first to convoy the Jamaica trade as far as the passage between Cuba
and Haiti, and thence to make the utmost speed to the Chesapeake.
A false report, of French ships reaching Martinique from Europe,
slightly delayed this movement. The convoy was dispatched to
Jamaica with two ships of the line, wliich .Sir Peter Parker was
directed to send at once to America, and requested to reinforce
Avitli othius from his own squadron. Hood was detained until the
re[)ort could be verified. On the 1st of August Rodney sailed for
England on leave of absence. On the 10th Hood left Antigua
with fourteen ships of tlie line, direct for the Capes. He had
1781.] DE GRASSE AT CAP FRANqOIS. 495
already received, on thu ;.ii-d, (iraves's letter by the Active^ which
he sent back on t!ie (ith with his answer and with a notification
of his speedy departure.
The Swalloiv and the Active should have reached Graves before
Hood; but neither got to him at all. The Swallow, Comman-
der Thomas Wells, arrived safely in New York on the 27th of
July; but Graves had sailed witli all iiis squadron on the 21st, for
Boston 15ay, ho[)ing there to intercept an expected convoy from
France, concerning which a special caution had been sent him l)y the
Admiralty. The sloop was at once sent on by the senior naval
officer, but was attacked by hostile vessels, forced ashore on
Long Island, and lost. The Active was ca})tured before she reached
New York. Graves, in happy ignorance of the momentous crisis
approaching, continued cruising until the 16th of August, when
he returned to Sandy Hook. There he found the duplicates of
the Siualloivs letters, but they only notified him of the course a
reinforcement would take, not that Hood had started. On August
25th the latter, being then off the Chesapeake, sent duplicates of
the Active s dispatches, but these preceded l)y little his o\\"n airival
on the 28th. That evening news was received in New York that
de Barras had sailed from Newport on the 25th, with his whole
division. Hood anchored outside the Hook, wheie Gra^•es, who
was the senior officer, undertook to join liini at once. On the -Slst
five sail of the line and a fifty-gun ship, all that could be got
ready in time, crossed the bar, and the entire body of nineteen
ships of the line started at once for the Chesapeake, whither it
was now understood that both the French fleet and the united
armies of Washington and Rochambeau were hurrying.
Count de Grasse upon his arrival at Cap FrauQois had fomid
that many things must be done before he could sail for tlie con-
tinent. Measures needed to be taken for the security of Ha'iti:
and a large sum of money, with a considerable reinforcement of
troops, was required to insure the success of the projected operation,
for which but a short time was allowed, as it was now August and
he must be again in the West Indies in October. It was not the
least among the fortunate concurrences for the American cause at
that moment, that de Grasse, whose military capacity was not con-
spicuous, showed then a remarkable energy, politic tact, and breadth
of view. He decided to take with him every ship he could command,
postjioning the sailing of the convoys ; and bv dexterous arrangement
49(J MAJOR Ol'EltA'riONS. 1762-1783. [1781.
with the Spaniards he contrived to .secure botli tlie funds required
and an efficient corps of 3,300 French troops, without stripping
Haiti too closely. On the 5th of August he left Cap Fran9ois, vni\\
twenty-eight .ships of the line, taking the route tlu-ough the Old
Bahama Channel,^ and anchored in Lynnhaven Bay, just within the
entrance of the Chesapeake, on the 30th, the day before Graves sailed
from New York for the same place. Tiie troops were landed instautl}'
on the south side of the James River, and soon reached La Fayette,
who commanded the forces so far opposed to Cornwallis, which were
tlius raised to 8,000 men. At the same time Washington, having
thrown Clinton off his guard, Avas crossing the Delaware on his waj-
south, with 6,000 regular troops, 2,000 American and 4,000 French,
to join La Fayette. French cruisers took jjosition ii>the James River,
to prevent Cornwallis from crossing, and escaping to the southward
into Carolina. Others were sent to close the mouth of the York.
By these detachments the main fleet was reduced to twenty-four sail
of the line.
On the 5th of September, at 8 a.ji., the French look-out frigate,
cruising outside Cape Henry, made the signal for a fleet steering for
the Bay. It was hoped at first that this was de Barras's squadron
from XcAvport, known to be on its wa}-, but it was soon evident from
the numbers that it must be an enemy. The forces now about to Ije
op})osed, nineteen British sail of the line to twenty-four French, were
constituted as follows: Bi-itish, 2 ninety-eights (three-deckers); 12
seventy-fours, 1 seventy, 4 sixty-fours, besides frigates ; ^ French, 1
one hundred and four (thi-ee-decker),^ 3 eighties, 17 seventy-foiu-s,
3 sixty-fours.
The mouth of the Chesapeake is about ten miles wide, from CajDe
Charles on the north to Cape Heurj^ on the south. The main chan-
nel is Ijetween the latter and a shoal, thi-ee miles to the uorth\A-ard.
called the Middle Ground. The British fleet, when the French were
first seen from it, was steering south-west for the entrance, under
foresails and topgallant sails, and it so continued, forming line as it
approached. The wind was north-north-east. At noon the ebVtide
made, and the French began to get under way, but many of their
ships had to make several tacks to clear Cape Henrj^ Their line was
1 Along the north coast of Cuba, between it and the Bahama Banks.
- See note on opposite page.
' The Ville de Paris, to which TrouJe attributes 104 guns. She was considered
the biggest and finest ship of her day.
1781.]
GRAVES OFF THE CUESAFEAKE.
497
consequently late in forming, and was Ly no means regular or closetl
as they got outside.
At 1 P.M. Graves made the signal to form on an east and west line,
which would be the elosehauled line heading out to sea, on the other
tack from that on which his fleet still was. At 2 p.m. the French van,
three miles distant by estimate, bore south from the London, Graves's
flagship, and was therefore abreast of the centre of the British line.
As the British van came near the Middle Ground, at 2.13 p.m., the
ships wore together. This put them on the same tack as the French,
Hood's division, which had been leading, being now the rear in the
reversed order ; and the fleet brought-to, in order to allow the centre
Note. — British line of battle in the action of Sept. 5, 1781 . Mainly from Beatson,
vi. 284 ; corrected by Steel's ' Navy List ' of the period, and from MS. notes by Henry
Wise Harvey in Ed's, edition of Schomberg, iv. 377, 378. The Alfred was to lead
with the starboard, and the Shrcu-shurij with the larlioanl tacks on board. — W. L. C.
SHIPS.
GUNS.
COMMANDERS.
Alfred
74
Capt. William B.iyne.
BelUqueux
64
Capt. James Brine.
Invincible
74
Capt. Charles Saxton.
Earfleur ......
98
j Kear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood (B).
1 Capt. Ale.xander Hood.
Monarch
74
Capt. Francis Reynolds (later Lord Ducie).
Centaur
74
Capt. John Nicholson Iiiglefield.
Santa Margaritla, 36 .
Capt. Elliot Salter.
Richmond, 32 . . .
Capt. Charles Hudson.
America
64
Capt. Samuel Thompson.
Resolution
74
Capt. Lord Robert Manners.
Bedford
74
Capt. Thomas Graves (3).
London
98
I Rear-Admiral Tliomas Graves (2), (R).
( Capt. David Graves.
Royal Oak
74
Capt. John Plummer Ardesoif.
Montagu
74
Capt. George Bowen (1).
Europe
64
Capt. Smith Child.
Solchay, 28 ... .
Capt. Charles Holmes Everitt (later Calmady).
Nymphc, 36 ... .
Capt. John Ford.
Adamant, 50 . . .
Capt. Gideon Johnstone.
Terrible
74
Capt. Hon. William Clement Finch.
Ajax
74
Capt. Nicholas Charrington.
Princesa
70
\ Rear- Admiral Francis Samuel Drahc (B).
\ Capt. Cliarles Knatchbull.
Alcide
74
Capt. Charles Thompson.
Intrepid
64
Capt. Anthony James Pye Molloy.
Shrewsbury
74
Capt. Mark Roljinson (1).
Salamander (f. s. ) . .
Commander Edward Bovvater.
Sihyl, 28
Capt. Lord Charles Fitzgerald (?).
Fnrtiinee, 40. . . .
Capt. Hugh Cloberry Cln-istian.
498
MAJOR UPKUATluyS. 1762-1783.
[1781.
of the enemy to come abreast of the centre of the British (a a). The
two lines now were nearly parallel, but the British, being five ships
fewer, naturally did not extend so far as the rear of the French, which
in fact was not yet clear of the Cape. At 2.30 Graves made the
signal for the van ship (the Shrewsbury'), to lead more to starboard —
towards the enemy. As each sliip in succession would take her course
to follow the leadei-, the effect of this was to put the British on a line
Craves and de Cra s s e
J'" vS^r^T-. /P'8/
• •.»• •••••L »•.•.•••*•»
o.r=>^>- c>£>^>c>C>- ■ .
oCi
GRAVES AND DE GRASSE.
inclined to that of the enemy, the van nearest, and as the signal was
renewed three quarters of an hour later, — at 3.17, — this angle became
still more marked (bb).^ This was the original and enduring cause
of a lamentable failure, by which seven of the rear slrips, in an inferior
force undertaking to attack, never came into battle at all. At 3.34
the van was ordered again to keep still more towards the enemy.
At 8.46 the signal was made for ships to close to one cable, fol-
lowed almost immediately by that to bear down and engage the
1 This reproduced the Ijluiider of Byng, between whose action and the one now
under discussion tliere is a marked resemblance.
1781.] HiJOD'S CRITICISMS. 499
enemy, — the signal for the line .still flying. Graves's flagship, which
was hove-to, filled and Ijore down. Under the conditions, tiie van
ships of course got first under fire, and the action gradually extended
from them to the twelfth in the order, two ships astern of the London.
According to the log of the latter, at 4.11 tlie signal for the line
ahead was hauled down, tliat it miglit not interfere with tliat for close
action, but at 4.22 it was rehoisted, " tlie ships not being sufficiently
extended." The meaning of this expression may be inferred from
Beatson's accoimt : —
" The London, by taking the lead, had advanced farther towards tiie enemy
tlian .some of the ships stationed immediately aliead of her in the line of battle ;
and upon luffing up, to bring her broadside to bear, they having done the same
thing, her second ahead was brought nearly upon her weather beam. The other
ships ahead of her were likewise too much crowded together."
As the ship on the London s weather beam could not fire upon the
enemy unless she drew ahead, this condition probaljly accounts for
the flagship being again hove-to, while tu-ing, as Ilood says that she
was. Reader's will remember a similar incident occurring with Byng"s
flagship. The signal for the line was hauled down again at 4.27, by
the London's log, that for close action Ijeing up, and repeated at 5.20,
when Hood at last bore down with his division, but the French ship.;
bearing up also, he did not near them. Firing ceased shortly after
sunset. The loss of the British was 90 killed, 246 wounded ; that of
the French is given only in roimd numbers, as about 200 killed and
wounded.
Hood's statement introduces certain important qualifications into
the above account : —
" Our centre began to engage at the same time as the van, at four, but at a
most improper distance, and our rear, being barely within random shot, did not fire
while the signal for the line was flying. The London had the signal for close action
flying, as well as the signal for the line ahead at half a cable was under her topsails,
with the main topsail to the mast,^ though the enemy's ships were pushing on."
As showing the improper distance at which the London brought-to
to fire, he says : —
" The second ship astern of her (of the London) received but trifling damage,
and the third astern of her received no damage at all, which most clearly proves
[at] how much too great a distance was the centre division engaged."
The day after the action Hood made a memorandum of his criti-
cisms upon it, wliich has been published. The gist of this is as
^ /. c, she had stopped.
500 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1702-1783. [1781.
follows. As the French stood out, their line was not regular or con-
nected. The van was much separated from the centre and rear, and
it appeals also, from the French narratives, that it was to windward
of the rest of the fleet. From tliese causes it was mucli exposed to
be attacked unsupported. There was, by Hood's estimate, " a full
hour and a half to have engaged it before any of the rear could have
come up." The line of battle on the port tack, with the then wind,
was east and west, and Graves had first ranged liis fleet on it, as the
French were doing ,• but afterwards, owing to his method of approach,
by the van bearing down and the other ships following in its wake, the
two lines, instead of being parallel, formed an angle, the British
centre and rear l^eing much more distant from the enem}- than the
van was. This alone would cause the ships to come into battle suc-
cessively instead of together, a fault of itself ; but the Commander-
in-Chief, according to Hood, committed the further mistake that he
kept the signal for the line of battle flying until 5.30 p.m., near to
sunset. The line of battle at any moment lan, of course, from the
van ship through that of the Commander-in-Chief ; those two points
determined it for all in the rear, where Hood was. Hence the latter's
criticism, which is marked by much acerl)ity towards his superior, but
does not betray any consciousness that he himself needed any justifica-
tion for his division not having taken part.
" Hud the centre gone to the support of the van, and the signal for the line
been hauled down, or the Commander-in-Chief had set the example of close action,
even with the signal for the line flying, the van of the enemy must have been cut
to pieces, and the rear division of the British fleet would have been opposed to
those ships tlie centre division fired at, and at tlie proper distance for engaging, or
the Rear- Admiral who commanded it ' would have a great deal to answer for." ^
So much for the tactical failure of that day. The question remained
what next was to be done. Graves contemplated renewing the
action, but early in the night was informed that several of the van
1 Hood himself.
- Concernin;.,' the crucial fact of the signal for the line of battle being kept flying
continuously until 5.30 P.M., upon which there is a direct contradiction between Hood
and the log of the London, it is necessary to give the statement of Captain Thomas
AVhite, who was present in the action in one of the rear ships. " If the London's log,
or the log of any other individual ship in the fleet, confirm this statement," (that
Hood was dilatory in obeying the order for close action), " I shall be induced to fancy
that what I that day saw and heard was a mere chimera of the brain, and that what
I believed to be the signal for the line was not a union jack, but an ignis fatuus con-
jured up to mock me." "White and Hood also agree that the signal for the line was
rehoisted at 6.30. (White : ' Naval Researches,' London, 1830.)
1781.] ORAVES RETU/tNS TO NEW YORK. 601
ships were too crippled to peiinit this. He held liis ground, how-
ever, in sight of the French, until dark on the 9th, when they were
seen for the last time. They were then under a cloud of sail, and
on tlie morning of the lOtli hud disappeared. From tlieir actions
during this interval, Hood had inferred that de Grasse meant to get
back into the Chesapeake without further fighting; and lie implies
that he advised Graves to anticipate the enemy in so doing. Though
some ships were crippled aloft, the British batteries were practically
intact, nor had men enough been disabled to prevent any gun in
the fleet from being fought. Could but a single working day
be gained in taking up an anchorage, a defensive order could be
assumed, practically impregnable to the enemy, covering Cornwallis,
and not impossibly intercepting the French ships left in the Bay. In
the case of many men such comment might be dismissed as the idle
talk of tlie captious fault-finder, always to the fore in life ; but in the
case of Hood it must be received witli deference, for, but a few
months later, when confronted with greater odds, he liimself did the
very thing he here recommended, for an object less vital than the
relief of Cornwallis. llaving regard to the character of de Grasse, it
is reasonable to believe that, if he liad found the British fleet thus
drawn up at anchor in Chesapeake Bay, as he found Hood at St.
Kitts in the following January, he would have waited off the
entrance for de Barras, and then have gone to sea, leaving Washington
and Rochambeau to look at Cornwallis slipping out of their grasp.
On the 10th of September Graves decided to burn the Terrible, 74,
whicii had been kept afloat with difticulty since the action. This
done, the fleet stood towards the Chesapeake, a frigate going ahead
to reconnoitre. On the 13th, at G a.m., Graves wrote to Hood that
the look-outs reported the French at anclior above the Horse Shoe
(^shoal) in the Chesapeake, and desired his opinion what to do with
the fleet. To this Hood sent the comforting reply that it was no
more than what he had expected, as the press of sail the (French)
fleet carried on the 9th, and on the night of the 8th, made it very
clear to him what de Grasse's intentions were. He "would be very
glad to send an opinion, Init he really knows not what to say in the
truly lamentable state [to which] we have brought ourselves."' On
the 10th de Barras had reached the Bay, where he was joined b}- de
Grasse on the 11th, so that there were then present thirty-six Frencli
ships of the line. Graves, therefore, returned to New York, reach-
1 ' Letters of Lord HuoJ." N. R. S., p. 35.
502 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1781.
ing Sandy Hook on tte 19th. On the 14th Washington had arrived
before Yorktown, where he took the chief command; and the armies
closed in upon Cornwallis by land as the French fleets had done
already by water. On the 19th of October the British force was
compelled to surrender, 7,247 troops and 840 seamen laying down
their arms. During the siege the latter had served in the w'orks,
the batteries of which were largely composed of ships' guns.
After Graves's return to New York, Rear-Admiral the Hon. Robert
Digby arrived from England on the 24th of September, to take com-
mand of the station in Arlnithnot's place. He brought with him
three ships of the line ; and the two which Sir Peter Parker had been
ordered by Rodney to send on at once had also reached the port. It
was decided by the land and sea officers concerned to attempt the
relief of Cornwallis, and that it was expedient for Graves to remain
in command until after this expedition. He could not start, how-
ever, until the 18th of October, by which time CornwaUis's fate was
decided. Graves then departed for Jamaica to supersede Sir Peter
Parker. On the 11th of November Hood sailed from Sandy Hook
with eighteen ships of the line, and on the 5th of December anchored
at Barbados. On the 5th of November de Grasse also quitted the
continent with his whole fleet, and returned to the West Indies.
In Europe, during the year 1781, the two leading questions which
dominated the action of the belligerents were the protection, or
destruction, of commerce, and the attack and defence of Gibraltar.
The British Channel Fleet was much inferior to the aggregate sea
forces of France and Spain in the waters of Europe ; and the Dutch
navy also was uoav hostile. The French goverumeut represented to
its allies that by concentrating their squadrons near the entrance of
tlie Channel they would control the situation in eveiy point of view;
but the Spaniards, intent upon Gibraltar, declined to withdraw their
fleet from Cadiz until late in the summer, while the French jiersisted
in keeping their own at Brest. The Channel Fleet was decisively
superior to the latter, and inferior to the Spaniards in numbers
only.
No relief having been given Gibraltar since Rodney had left it in
Februarj', 1780, the question of supplying the fortress became press-
• ing. For this pui-pose, twenty-eight ships of the line, under Vice-
Admiral George Darby, sailed from St. Helen's on the 13th of INIarch,
1781, with a large convoy. Off Cork a number of victuallers joined,
1781.] RELIEF SENT TO GIBRALTAR. 503
and the whole body then proceeded for Gibraltar, accompanied by
five ships of the line which were destined for the East Indies, as well
as by the West India and American "trade." These several attach-
ments parted from time to time on the way, and on the 11th of April
the main expedition sighted Cape Spartel. No attempt to intercept
it was made by the great Spanish fleet in Cadiz ; and on tlie 12th of
April, at noon, the convoy anchored in the Bay of Gibraltar. That
night thirteen sail of transports, under the charge of t^\■o frigates,
slipped out and made their way to Minoi'ca. The ships of war
remained under way, cruising in the Bay and Gut of Gibraltar.
As the convoy entered, the besiegers opened a tremendous can-
nonade, which was ineffectual, however, to stop the landing of the
stores. More annoyance was caused by a flotilla of gunboats, specially
built for this siege, the peculiar fighting power of which lay in one
26-pounder, whose great length gave a range superior to the bat-
teries of ships of the line. Being moved by oars as well as by sails,
these little vessels could choose their own distance in light airs and
calms, and were used so actively to harass the transports at anchor
that Darby was obliged to cover them with three ships of the line.
These proved powerless effectually to injure the gunboats; but, while
the latter caused great annoyance and petty injury, they did not
hinder the unloading nor even greatly delay it. The experience
illustrates again the unlikelihood that great results can be obtained by
petty means, or that massed force, force concentrated, can Ije effect-
ually counteracted either by cheap and ingenious expedients, or by
the co-operative exertions of many small independent units. " They
were only capable of producing trouble and vexation. So far were
they from preventing the succours from being thrown into the gar-
rison, or from burning the convoy, that the only damage of any
consequence that they did to the shipping was the wounding of the
mizen-mast of the Nonsuch so much that it required to be shifted."'
On the 19th of April — in one week — the re victualling was com-
pleted, and the expedition started back for England. The fleet
anchored at Spithead on the 22nd of May.
While Darby was returning, La Motte Picquet had gone to sea
from Brest with six ships of the line and some frigates to cruise in
the approaches to the Channel. There, on the 2nd of May, he fell
in with the convoy returning from the West Indies with the spoils of
St. Eustatius. The ships of war for the most part escaped, but La
1 Beatsou : ' ililitaiy and Naval Memoii's,' v. 347.
504 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1702-1783. [1781.
Motte Picqnet carried tweiity-two out of thirty luercliant ships into
Brest before he could be intercepted, althougli a detachment of eigiit
sail sent by Darby got close upon his heels.
After a long refit, Darby put to sea again, about the 1st of
August, to cover tlie apiiroach of the large convoys then expected to
arrive. Being greatly delayed by head winds, he had got no further
than the Lizard, when news was brought him that the Franco-Spanish
grand fleet, of forty-nine ships of the line, was cruising near the
Scilly Isles. Having himself but thirty of the line, he put into
Torbay on the 24th of August, and moored his squadi'on across the
entrance to the Bay.
This appearance of the allies was a surprise to the British authori-
ties, who saw thus unexpectedly renewed the invasion of the Channel
made in 1770. Spain, mortified justly by her failure even to molest
the intrusion of succours into Gibraltar, had thought to retrieve her
honour by an attack upon Minorca, for which she asked the co-opera-
tion of France. De Guichen was sent in July with nineteen ships of
the line ; and the combined fleets, under the chief command of the
Spanish admiral Don Luis de Cordova, convoyed the troops into the <
Mediterranean beyond the reach of Gibraltar cruisers. Returning
thence into the Atlantic, de Cordova directed his course for the
Channel, keeping far out to sea to conceal his movements. But
though thus successful in reaching his ground unheralded, he made
no attempt to profit by the advantage gained. The question of
attacking Darby at his anchors was discussed in a council of war, at
which de Guichen strongly advocated the measure : but a majority of
votes decided that Great Britain would be less hurt by ruining her
fleet than by intercepting the expected convoys. Even for the lat-
ter purpose, however, de Cordova could not wait. On the 5th of
September he informed de Guichen that he was at liberty to return
to Brest; and he himself went back to Cadiz with thirty-nine ships,
nine of which were French. "This cruise of the comljined fleet,"
says Chevalier, "diminished the consideration of France and Spain.
These two powers had made a great display of force, without produc-
ing the slightest result." It ma}- be mentioned here that Minorca,
after a six moirths' siege, capitulated in February, 1782.
While Darby was beating down Channel in the earl}' dajs of
August, Vice-Admiral Hyde Parker (1), lately Rodney's second in
command in the West Indies, Avas returning from the Baltic to Eng-
land convoying a large merchant fleet. On the 5th of August, at
ITSL]
HYDE r.LUKER A XI) THE DUTCH FLEET.
505
daylight, a Dutch squadron, also with a convoy, was discovered in
the south-west, near the Doygersbank. Heading as the two enemies
then were, their courses must shortly int(a\sect. Parker, therefore,
ordered his convoy to steer to the westward for England, wliik; he
himself bore down for the enemy. The Dutch Rear-Admiral, Johau
Arnold Zoutman, on the contrary, kept the mercliant vessels \vith
him, under his lee, but drew out the ships of war from among them,
to form his order on the side towards the enemy. Each opponent
put seven sail into the line.^ The British vessels, besides being of
such different rates, were chiefly very old ships,^ dragged out from
Rotten Row to meet the pressing emergency caused by the greatly
superior forces which were in coalition against Great Britain.
Owing to the decayed condition of some of them, their batteries
1 Fleets engaged in the action off the Doggershank, Aul.
UN
t 5th, 1781.
BKITISH.
DUTCH.
SHIPS.
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
i
p
a
COMMANDEKS.
In the Line: —
Bcnrirk. . . .
74
Capt. John Fergussou.
Erfprins ....
B4
Capt. A. Braak.
Dolphin ....
44
Capt. William Blair.
Admir'aat Generaiil
74
Capt. van Kiusbergen.
Buffalo , . , .
0(1
Capt. William Truscott.
Argo
40
Capt. A. C. Staering.
Fortitude • . .
71
( V.-Adm. Hyde Parker (1)
Balavicr ....
54
Capt. W. J. Beutinck.
Princess Amelia .
80
\ Capt. George Robertson.
Capt. John Macartney.*
Adinlratil de Uttijter
OS
( Rear-Adm. Zoutman.
1 Capt. Stariiigli.
Preston ....
50
Capt. Alexander Gramme.
Admiraal Pict Ileijii
54
Capt. W. van Braani.
Bien/aisant . .
04
Capt. Richard Bratliwaite.
Holland ....
08
Capt. S. Dedel.
Frigates with the
Fleet : —
Surprise (cutter).
14
Lieut. P. Rivett.
Bdlona ....
3G Capt. Haringcarspel Decker.
Cleopatra . . .
3"i|Capt. George Murray.
Dolphijn ....
24 Capt. Mulder.
Latona ....
3S Capt. Sir Hyde Parker (2).
Ajax (cutter) . .
20 Capt. Grave van Welderen.
Bdle Pnuh . .
3fi!Capt. Philip Pattou.
Ei'nsriezindheU . .
3G Capt. Bouritius.
Artoi^s ....
40 Capt. John Macbride.
Zeiihijr
30 Capt. Wiertz.
Aniphitrilt- . , ,
30 Capt. van Woeiisel.
"With the Convoy : —
Iphifjenia . . .
32 1 Capt. Charles Hope.
Mfdnnblik . . .
36 Capt. van Rjjueveld.
Tartar ....
•28 Capt. Robert Sutton.
Venus
24 Capt. Grave vau Regteren.
Cabot ....
14 Com. Henry Cromwell.
Spio7i ....
l'> Com. Stutzer.
Alert
14 1 Com. Jame3 Vashou,
Zwaluw ....
10 Com. Butcer
Lt'ilh (armed ship).
20 Com. Peter Rothe.
Busy (cutter) . .
14 Lieut. William Furuivall.
Sprigbihj (cutter)
14 Lieut. J. B. Sw.in.
The vessels in the two lines are given above in the respective orders of battle.
The British list is founded on one in Beatson, vi. Slfj, compared with the 'Navy
Lists' of 1781, the dispatches, etc. The Dutch list is founded on a MS. of Capt.
Count van Bylandt, compared with the dispatches, and with the plan and particulars
in De Jonge, iv. 508-561. The s"n-power of each ship is taken from official papers,
British and Dutch. —W. L. C.
- The Bienfaisant had been captured in 1758, and the Buffalo in 1748; and the
Princess Amelia and Preston were both built in 1757.
506 MAjnn OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1781.
had been lightened, to the deti-iment of their fighting power. The
two seventy-fours, however, were good and new ships. The Dol-phin
also was new. It is probable that the Dutch vessels, after a long
peace, were not much better than their antagonists. In fact, each
squadron was a scratch lot, in the worst sense of the phrase. The
conduct of the affair by the two admirals, even to the very intensity
of their pugnaciousness, contributes a tinge of the comic to the
history of a desperately fought action.
The breeze was fresh at north-east, and the sea smooth. The
Dutch, behig to leeward, awaited attack, forming line on the port
tack, heading south-east by east, a point off the wind, under topsails
and foresails, a cable's length apart. There is little room to doubt
that an adversaiy who thus holds his ground means to make a
stand-up fight, but Parker, although the sun of a midsummer day
had scarcely risen, thought advisaljle to order a general chase. Of
course, no ship spared her canvas to this, while the worse sailers had
to set their studdingsails to keep up; and the handling of the sails
took the men off from the preparations for liattle. Parker, who doubt-
less was still sore over Rodne3''s censure of the year before, and who
moreover had incurred the Admiralty's rebuke, for apparent hesita-
tion to attack the enemy's islands while temporarily in command in
the West Indies, was determined now to show the fight that was in
liim. "It is related that, upon being informed of the force of the
Dutch squadron in the morning, he replied (pulling up his breeches),
' It matters little what their force is ; we must fight them if they are
double the number.'" At 6.10 a.m. the signal was made for line
abreast, the ships running down nearly before the wind. This of
course introduced more regularity, the leading ships taking in their
lighter sails to permit the others to reach their places ; but the pace
still was rapid. At 6.45 the order was closed to one cable, and at
7.56 the signal for battle was hoisted. It is said that at that moment
the 80-gun ship ^^•as still securing a studdingsail-boom, which inch-
oates how closely action trod on the heels of preparation.
The Dutch admiral was as dehberate as Parker was headlong.
An English witness writes : —
" They appeared to be in gi-eat order; and their liamniocks, quarter-cloths, etc.,
were spread in as nice order as if for show in harbour. Their marines also were
well drawn up, and stood with their muskets shouldered, with all the regularity
and exactness of a review. Their politeness ought to be remembered by every man
in our line ; for, as if certain of what happened, we came down almost end-on upon
their broadsides; yet did not the Dutch admiral fire a gun, or make the signal to
1781.] HVDE PARKER AND THE DUTCH FLEET. 507
engage, till the red flag was at the Fortitude's masthead, and her sliot finding tlieir
way into his'ship. This was a niancuuvre wliich Admiral Zutman should not be
■warmly thanked for by their High Mightinesses; as he had it ia his power to have
done infinite mischief to our fleet, coming down in that unofficer-liko manner.
Having suffered Admiral Parker to place himself as he pleased, he calmly wailed
till the signal was hoisted on lioard the Fortitude, and at the same time we saw the
signal going up on board Admiral Zutmau's ship."
The British, thus unmolested, rouiided-to just to windward of
the enemy. A pilot who was on board their leading ship was for
some reason told to assist in laying her close to her opponent. " By
close," he asked, "dojou mean about a ship's breadth?" "Not a
gun was fired on either side," says the official British report, "until
within the distance of half musket-shot." Parker, whom an on-looker
describes as full of life and spirits, here made a mistake, of a routine
character, which somewhat dislocated his order. It was a matter of
tradition for flagship to seek flagship, just as it was to signal a
general chase, and to bear down together, each ship for its opposite,
well extended with the enemy. Now Parker, as was usual, was in
the centre of his line, the fourth ship ; but Zoutman was for some
reason in the fifth. Parker therefore placed his fourth by the enemy's
fifth. In consequence, the rear Britisli ship overlapped the enemy,
and for a time had no opponent; while the second and third found
themselves engaged with three of the Dutch. At 8 a.m. the signal
for the line was hauled down, and that for close action hoisted, — thus
avoiding a mistake often made.
All the vessels were soon satisfactorily and hotly at work, and the
action continued with varying phases till 11.35 a.m. The leading
two ships in both orders got well to leeward of the lines, and the
British vessels had to tack to regain their places to windward.
Towards tlie middle of the engagement the Dutch convoy bore away
for the Texel, as the Britisli had steered for England before it began ;
the difference being that the voyage was abandoned by one, and com-
pleted by the other. At eleven o'clock Parker made sail, and passed
with the flagship between the enemy and the Buffalo, his next ahead
and third in the British order; the three rear ships following close in
his wake, in obedience to the signal for line ahead, which had been
rehoisted at 10.43.1 ^ heavy cannonade attended this evolution, the
^ Sir John Ross, in his ' Life of Saumarez,' who was a lieutenant in the flagship,
says that the flagship only passed ahead of the Buffalo, and that the rear ships closed
upon the latter. The version in the text rests upon the detailed and circumstantial
statement of another lieutenant of the squadron, in Ekius's ' Naval Battles.' As Ekins
508 MAJOR OFER.ITIONS. 1762-1783. [1781
Dutch fighting gloriously to the last. When it was completed, the
British fleet wore and the action ceased. " I made an effort to form
the line, in order to renew the action," wrote Parker in liis report,
"but found it impracticable. The enemy appeared to l)e in as bad a
conditicon. Both squadrons lay-to a considerable time near each
other, when tlie Dutch, with their convoy, Ijore away for the Texel.
We were not in a condition to follow them."
This was a most satisfactory exhibition of valour, and a most
unsatisfactory battle; magnificent, but not war. Except as regards
the sailings of the convoys, the status quo remained much as before,
although one of the Dutch ships sank next day; yet the British loss,
104 killed and o:>9 wounded, was nearly as great as in Keppel's
action, where thirty ships fought on each side, or in Eodnej-'s of
April 17th, 1780, where the British had twenty sail; greater than with
Graves off the Chesapeake, and, in jDroportion, fully equal to the
sanguinary conflicts between Suffren and Hughes in the East Indies.
The Dutch loss is reported as 142 killed, 403 wounded. Both sides
aimed at the hull, as is sho^\^r by the injuries ; for though much harm
was done aloft, few spars were wholly shot away. The Buffalo, a
small ship, had 30 shot through and through her, and a very great
number pierced between wind and water; in the British van ship as
many as 14, another proof that the Dutch fired low.
With the rudimentary notions of manoeuvring evinced, it is not
surprising that Parker was found an unsatisfactory second by au
enlightened tactician like Rodnej-. The Vice-Admiral, however,
laid his unsuccess to the indili'erent quality of his ships. George III.
visited the squadron after the action, but Parker was not open to
compliments. "I wish your ^Majesty l)etter ships and younger
officers," he said. "For myself, I am now too old for service." No
rewards were given, and it is asserted that Parker made no secret
that none woiild be accepted, if offered, at the hands of the then
Admiralty. He voiced the protest of the Navy and the nation against
the mal-administi-ation of the peace days, which had left the country
unprepared for war. The gallant veteran was ordered soon after-
wards to command in the East Indies. He sailed for his station in
the Cato, and mms never heard of again.
Though unfruitful in substantial results, Parker's action merits
commemoration, for, after all, even where sldll does its utmost,
also was present as a midshipman, this gives, as it were, the confirmation of two
witnesses.
17S1.]
KEMPENFELT AM) DE GUI CHEN.
JO!)
staunclniess such as las sliows tliu sound constitution of a military
body.
Tlie year 1781 closed with an incident more decisive in character
than most of tlie events that occurred in European waters during its
course; one also which transfers the interest, by natural transition,
again to tlie West Indies. Tlie Frencli government liad felt through-
out the summer the necessity of sending de Grasse reinforcements
both of ships and of supplies, but the transports and material of war
needed could not be collected until December. As tire British prob-
ably would attempt to intercept a convoy upon which the next cam-
paign so much depended, Rear-Admiral de Guichen was ordered to
accompany it clear of the Bay of Biscay, with twelve ships of the
line, and then to go to Cadiz. Five ships of the line destined to de
Grasse, and two going to the East Indies, raised to nineteen the total
force with which de Guichen left Brest on the 10th of December. On
the afternoon of the 12th, the French being then one hundred and
fifty miles to the soutlnvard and Avestward of Ushant, with a south-
east wind, the weather, which had been thick and squally, suddenly
cleared and showed sails to windward. These were twelve ships of
the line, one 50, and some frigates,^ under Rear-Admiral Richard
Kempenfelt (B), who had left England on the 2nd of the month, to
cruise in wait for this expedition. The French numbers should have
been amply sufficient to frustrate any attack, but de Guichen, ordi-
narily a careful officer, had allowed his fleet to be to leeward and
ahead of the convoy. The latter scattered in eveiy direction, as the
British swooped down upon it, but all could not escape; and the
French ships of war remained helpless siiectators, while the victims
were hauling down their flags right and left. Night coming on.
1 Fleet under Rear-Admiral Ek-liard Kempenfelt, December, 1781. From Beat-
sou, vi. 317, checked by Steel's 'Navy List' of Dec. 31st, 1781. — \V. L. C.
SHIPS.
Victory
Edffar . .
7-1
Britannia
100
Duke . .
OS
Queen . .
98
Union . .
00
Ocean . .
no
Alexander
74
Valiant .
74
COMMANDEKS.
( Rear-Adm. Richard Kempenfelt (B).
I Capt. Heury Cromwell.
( Commod. John Elliot.
I Capt. Thomas Boston.
Capt. James Bradby (1 ).
jCapt. Sir Walter Stirling, Kt.
iCapt. Hon. Fredk. Lewis Maitlaud.
jCapt. John Dalrjinple.
Capt. George Oiirry.
Cora. Thomas Farnham (Actg.).
Capt. Samuel Granston Goodall.
SHIPS.
COMMANDERS.
Conrnffpur . 74 Capt. Hon. Chas. Phipps(Actg.).
Ar/innrniiioa . C-l Capt. Benjamin Caldwell.
Meiliraij . . OO Capt. Harry Harmood.
Renown . . 50 Capt. John Heury.
Frigates, etc.
Aretkusa . . 38 Capt. Sir Richard Pearson, Kt.
Monsieur . . SGCapt. Hon. SejTQOur Finch.
Priidente . . SGCapt. Hon. William Waldegrave.
Tartar . . . *2S Capt. Robert Manners Sutton.
Tisiphone (f. s.) S Com. James Saumarez.
510 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-1783. [1782.
some prizes could not be secured, but Kempenfelt carried off fifteen,
laden with niilitaiy and naval stores of great money value and greater
military importance. A few days later a violent storm dispersed and
shattered the remainder of the French body. Two sliips of the line
only, the Triomphant, 84, and B7-ave, 74, and five transports, could
pursue their way to the West Indies. The rest went back to Brest.
Kempenfelt, before returning to England, sent off express to
Hood in the West Indies the fireship Tisi phone, 8, Commander James
Saumarez,! — afterwards the distinguished admiral, — with news of the
French approach. Saumarez, having been first to Barbados, joined
Hood on the 31st of January, 1782, in Basse Terra Roads, on the lee
side of St. Kitts. The campaign for the year 1782 had opened
already with an attack upon that island by the French army and
navy; and the enemy's fleet was even then cruising close at hand to
leeward, between St. Kitts and Nevis.
The original intention of de Grasse and de Bouilli^ had been to
capture Barbados, the most important of the Eastern Antilles still
remaining to the British ; but the heavy trade-winds, which in those
days made a winter passage to windward so long and dreary a beat,
twice drove him back to port. "The whole French fleet," wrote
Hood, "appeared oil" St. Lucia on the 17th of last month, endeavour-
ing to get to windward, and having carried away many topmasts and
yards in struggling against very squally weather, returned to Fort
Royal Ba}' on the 23rd, and on the 28th came out again with forty
transports, manoeuviing as before." On the 2nd of January it dis-
appeared from St. Lucia, and, after a short stay at Martinique, pro-
ceeded on the 5th to St. Kitts, anchoring in Basse Terre Roads on
the 11th. The British garrison retired to Brimstone Hill, a forti-
fied position at the north-west of the island, while the inhabitants
surrendered the government to the French, pledging themselves to
neutrality. The adjacent island of Nevis capitulated on the same
terms on the 20th.
On the 14th of the month an express sent by General Shirley,
governor of St. Kitts, informed Hood that a great fleet approaching
had been seen from the heights of Nevis on the 10th. The Rear-
^ James Saumarez, Lord de Saumarez, G. C. B. Born, 1757. Commander, 1781.
Captain, 1782. Captain of liussdl in Rodney's action, 1782. Knighted for capture
of frigate Reunion, 1793. Captain of Orion in Bridport's action, at St. Vincent, and
at the Nile (when he was second in command). Eear-Admiral and Baronet, 1801.
Defeated French and Spaniards off Algeciras, July 12th, 1801. Vice- Admiral, 1805.
Vice-Admiral of England and a peer, 1831. Died, 1836.
1782.] HOOD AND DE GRASSE AT .ST. KITTS. 511
Admiral at once put to sea, tliougli short oi' bread and Hour, wliicJi
could not be had, and with the material of his sliips ia wretched
condition. " When the Prcsidc/it joins," he wrote the Admiralty, "I
shall be twenty-two strong, witli which I ]>eg you will assui'e their
Lordships I will seek and give battle to the Count de Grasse, be his
numbers as they may." On tlie IGtli a ship reached him with word
that the French fleet had invested St. Kitts. On the 21st Hood
anchored at Antigua for repairs and supplies, indispensable for keep-
ing the sea in the operations which he contemplated, the duration of
which could not be foreseen. About a thousand troops also were
embarked, which, with the Marines that could be spared from the
squadron, Avould give a landing force of 2,400 men.
St. Kitts being less than fifty miles from Antigua, Hood doubt-
less now got accurate information of the enemy's dispositions, and
could form a definite, well-matured plan. This seems to have been
carefully imparted to all his captains, as was the practice of Nelson,
who was the pupil of Hood, if of any one. "At 9.15 a.m. the Ad-
miral made the signal for all flag-officers," says the log of the
Canada ; "and at 4 P.M. the Admirals and Commodore made the sig-
nals for all captains of their divisions." At 5 P.M. of the same day,
January 23rd, the fleet weighed and stood over for Nevis, round the
southern point of which Basse Terre must be approached; for, the
channel between the two islands being impracticable for ships of
the line, they virtually were one, and, their common axis lying-
north-west and south-east, the trade-wind is fair only when coming
from the south.
Basse Terre, where de Grasse then was, is about fifteen miles from
the south point of Nevis. The roadstead lies east and west, and the
French fleet, then twenty-four of the line and two fifties, were
anchored without attention to order, three or four deep, the eastern
ships so placed that an enemy coming from the southward could
reach them with the prevailing wind, against which the western ships
could not beat up quickly to their support. This being so, we are
told that Hood, starting shortly before simset with a fair, and prob-
ably fresh wind, from a point only sixty miles distant, hoped to come
upon the French by surprise at early daybreak, to attack the weather
ships, and from them to pass along the line so far as might seem
expedient. His column, thus passing in its entirety by a certain
exposed fraction of the enemy, the latter would be cut up in detail by
the concentration upon it. The British then, wearing to the south-
512 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
ward, would liaul tlieir wind, tack, and again stand up to the assault,
if the enemy continued to await it.
This reasonable expectation, and skilful conception, was thwarted
by a collision, during the night, betvveen a frigate, the Xijmplie, 3(\i,
and the leading ship of the line, the Alfred, 7-1. The repairs to the
latter delayed the fleet, the approach of whicli was discovered by
daylight. ])e Grasse therefore put to sea. He imagined Hood's
purpose was to throw succours into Brimstone Hill; and moreover
the position of the enemy now was between him and the four ships
of the line momentarily expected from Martinique, one of which
joined him on tlie same day. The French were all under way bj'
sunset, standing to the southward under easy sail, towards the British,
who had rounded the south point of Nevis at 1 p.m. Towards dark,
Hood went about and stood also to the southward, seemingly iu
retreat.
During the following night the British tacked several times, to
keep their position to windward. At daylight of January 25th, the
two fleets were to the westward of Nevis ; the British near the island,
the French abreast, but several miles to leeward. Foiled in his first
spring by an unexpected accident, Hood had not relinquished his
enterprise, and now proposed to seize the anchorage quitted by the
French, so establishing himself there, — as he had proposed to Graves
to do in the Chesapeake, — that he could not be dislodged. For such
a defensive position St. Kitts offered special advantages. The
anchorage was on a narrow ledge, dropping precipitately to veiy deep
water; and it was possible so to place the ships that the enemy could
not easily anchor near them.
At 5.30 A.M. of the 25th Hood made the signal to form line of
battle^ on the starboard tack, at one cal)le interval. ^ It is mentioned
in the log of the Canada, 74, Captain the Hon. William Cornwallis,
that that ship brought-to in her station, fourth from the rear, at 7
o'clock. By 10 o'clock the line was formed, and the sliij^s hove-to
in it. At 10.45 the signal was made to fill [to go ahead], the van
ships to carry the same sail as the Admiral, — topsails and foresails,
— followed, just before noon, by the order to prepare to anchor, with
springs on the cables. The French, who were steering south, on the
' See note on opposite page.
^ The times and general movements are put together from Hood's Journal and
the Log of the Canada, published by the Navy Records Society. ' Letters of Lord
Hood,' pp. 6J, 86.
17«2.]
UOOD AND DK (! HASSE AT ST. KITTS.
r,i8
port tack, wliilc the ISiitish wcri; hove-to, went about as soon as the
latter filled, and stood towards them in bow and (quarter line.
At noon tlic ISritish fleet was riinnino' alont,^ elose under the high
land of Nevis; so close that the Suleba//, 'la. Captain Charles Holmes
Everitt, one of the frigates inshore of the line, grounded and was
wrecked. No signals were needed, except to correct irregularities in
the ordei', for the captains knew wiiat they were to do. The French
were api)roacliing steadily, hut inevital)ly dropj)ing astern with refer-
ence to tlie point of tlie enemy's line; for wiiicli tliey were heading.
At 2 P.M. de Grasse's flagshij), the Ville de Paris, fired several sliot
at the British rear, which alone she could reach, wliile his left wing
was nearing the Barfleui\ Hood's flagship, and tiie vessels astern of
her, which opened their fire at "2.30. Hood, trusting to his captains,
disregarded this threat to the rear half of his force. Signals flew for
the van to crowd sail and take its anchorage, and at 3. -30 p. jr. the
leading ships began to anchor in line ahead, covered as they did so
hy the broadsides of the rear and the rear centre. Upon the latter
the French were now keeping up a smart fire. ISetween the Canada
and her next astern, the FrudeiU, G4, — which was a dull sailer, —
thei-e was a considerable interval. Towards it the French admiral
pressed, aiming to cut off the three rear vessels; but Cornwallis threw
Note. — Listof Ibe tiec-t under Rpiir- Admiral Sir Sam ut-l HdoiI, Dart., on Jan. 25tli,
1782. (Intended line of battle as the fleet stood in. It was sliglitly modified by
accidental circumstances ; and on tlie 26th the ships were anchored in the order indi-
cated by the numbers prefixed to them, the Bedford being neai'est to Basse Ten-e.)
siiirs.
O
G4
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
o
74
COMMANDERS.
4. St. Albans .
Capt. Cbarles Iiiglis.
22. Alfred . .
Capt. William Bayne.
5.Alci(le- . .
74
Capt. Cliarles Thompson.
Pegasus, 23
Capt. John Stanhope.
7. hilrepid . .
G4
Capt. Authoiiy Jas. Pye MoUoy.
Foriune-c, 40
Capt. Hugh Cluberry Christian.
8. Torbay . .
74
Capt. Joliu Lewis Gidoin.
Lizard^ 28
Capt. Edmund Dod.
("Rear-Admiral Frauds Samuel
^ Drake (B).
I Capt. Charles KnatchbulL
Chfiviplon, 24
Capt. Thomas West.
y. Princi'sa . .
70
Convert^ 3'J
Capt. Henry Harvey.
Triton, 28 .
Capt. John M'Laurin.
10. Prince George
DS
Capt. James Williams.
2. Ilttssdl . .
74
(Japt. Hon. Henry Edwyn Stan-
11. Ajnx . . .
74
Capt. Nicholas Charriugton.
liope.
Eurydicei 24
Capt. George Wilsou.
10. P.esulution .
74
Capt. Lord Robert Mainier.s.
1'2. Prinvfi William
13. S/irewshury .
?^
Capt. George Wilkiuson.
Capt. John Knight.
1, Bedford . .
74
1 Comniod. E<.!niund Affleck.
1 Capt. Thomas Graves (OV
14. Invincible
74
Capt. Charles Saxton.
21. Canada . .
"4. Capt. Hon. William Cornwallis.
i'llear-Adm. Sir Samuel Hood,
20, Prudent . .
G4('aj,t. Andrew Barkley.
15. Burjlfur . .
OS
< Bart. (R).
3. Montagu . .
''"4|Capt. George Bowen (1).
Icapt. Alexander Hood.
G. America . .
{14
('apt. Samuel Thompson.
IG. Monarch . .
74
Capt. Francis Reynolds.
Sib!/l, 2S .
('apt. John Rodney {?).
18. Belliqueut .
G4
Capt. Lord Cranstonn.
Solebag, 2S
Capt. Charles Holmes Everitt.
IT. Centaur . .
74
Capt. John Nicholson luRlefield.
From a list in Sehumberg, iv. 390, as corrci'ted in MS. by Henry Wise Harvey ;
cheolved by Steel's 'Navy List' of Dec. 31st, 1781, and Marcli 31st, 1782, and com-
pared witli dispatches, etc. — W. L. C.
VOL. HI. — 33
M4
MAJOR OPElUnOSS. lTiiL'-178:5.
[1782.
everything aback aiul clusfd iluwn iipoji lii.s (/oiisort, — a .stirring
deed in whicli lie was iniitati'd liy the Resolution and Bedford, 74's,
immediately ahead of liiiii. De (ira.s.sc; was thus foiled, but so nar-
rowly, that an olHecr, looking from one of tlie ships wliicli had
anchored, assertctl that for a moment lie could pci'ceive the Ville de
Paris's jib inside tlu; IJritish line. As tlie icar of the hitter pushed
on to its place, it cleared the broadsides of the now anchored van and
centre, and tliese opened upon tlu^ enomy, a great part of whom were
HOOD AKU DE GRASSE.
strung out behind the British column, without opponents as yet, but
hastening up to get their share of the action. The Barjleur, which
anchored at 4.03, opened lire again at 4.40 I'.M. Thus, as tlie
Canada and her few companions, who bore the brunt of the day,
were shortening sail and rounding-to, still under a hot cannonade,
the batteries of their predecessors were ringing out their welcome,
and at the same time covering their movements by giving the enemy
nuich else to think about. The Canada, fetching up near the tail
of the column, and letting go in a hurrj^, ran out two caljles on end,
17.82.]
IWOl) ASl) 1)E (IR.IHHE AT ,ST. KITTS.
51/1
and found upon sounding tliat sho had dropped her anclior in a hun-
dred and iit'ty fatiionis of water. The French column stood on, off
soundings, thoiigli close to, liring as it passed, and then, wearing to
the southward in succession, stood out dl' action un the jjort taek, its
ineffectual Ijroadsides adding to the grandeur antl excitement of the
scene, and swelling the glory of Hood's successful daring, of which
it is difficult to speak too higldy. The captain of the Resolution,
Ijord liohci't Manners, writing a week later, [lassed upon tins achieve-
'"■<^-
\
Hood and de Crasse
Fic.ll.
IlOuD AND DE Gli.iS.sE.
ment a verdict, which posterity will confirm. " The taking posses-
sion of this road was well judged, well conducted, and well executed,
though indeed the French had an opportunity — which they missed
— of bringing our rear to a very severe account. The van and centre
divisions brought to an anchor under the fire of the rear, which was
engaged with the enemy's centre (Fig. 1); and then the centre, being
at an anchor and properly placed, covered us while we anchored
(Fig. 2), luaking, I think, the most masterly manonivre I ever saw."
Whether regard be had to the tlioughtfid preparation, the crafty
516 MAJOR Ol'EUATlONH. 17(iL'-17.s:j. [1782.
management of the fleet antecedent to the final pu.sh, the (■ah.-nlated
audacity of tlie latter, or the lirm and sagacious tactical liandjing
from the first moment to the last, Nelson himself never did a more
brilliant deed tlian litis (jf Hood's. ^ All firing ceased at 5.30.
Natuially, an order taken up under such conditions needed some
rectifying bid'ore further Ijattle. As the proper stationing of tlu; fleet
dei^ended in great measure upon the position of the van ship. Hood
had [lut a local pilot on hoard her; but when the action ceased, he
found that she was not as close to the shore as he had intended.
The rear, on the other hand, was naturally in the most disorder, owing
to the circumstances attending its anchorage. Three ships from the
rear were consequently directed to place themselves ahead of the van,
closing the interval, while others shifted their berths, according to
specilic directions. The order as finally assumed was as follows.
The van ship was anchored so close to the shore that it was imjjossible
to pass within her, or, witli the prevailing wind, even to reach her,
because of a point and shoal just outside, covering her position.
From her the line extended in a west-north-west direction to the
fifteenth ship, — the Burflcur, 98, Hood's flagship, — when it turned
to north, the last six ships being on a north and south line. These
six, with their broadsides turned to the westward, prevented a
column passing from south to north, the only waj' one could pass,
from enlilading tlie main line with inipunity. The latter covered
with its guns tlu; ap[U'oach from the south.
At daylight o); the following morning, January 2Uth, the ships
began changing their places, the French being then seven or eight
miles distant in the south-south-east. At 7 a.m. the}' were seen to
be approaching in line of battle, under a press of sail, heading for
the British van. The Canada, which had begun at 5 a.m. to tackle
her 200-od(I fatiioms of cable, was obliged to cut, whereby "we lost
the small bower anchor and two cables with one 8-inch and one 0-inch
hawsers, which were bent for springs."' The ship had to work to
windward to close \vith the fleet, and was therefore ordered by the
Rear-Admiral to keep engaging under way, until 10.50, when a mes-
sage was sent her tn anchor in support of the rear. The action
began betweeji 8.30 and 9 a.m., the leading French sliip licading for
the British van, seemingly with the view of passing round and inside
it. Against this attempt Hood's precautions probably were sufli-
' llliislniUoiis of other phases of this battle can be found in ^lahaii'.s •IiifiiiL-nce
of .Sua Fuwor uiiuii Ilislon,' pp. 470, 472,
17S2.J
1100 1)- H ORDER op V.ATThE.
517
cient; but as the enemy's vessel approaeliiMl, tlie wiml lieaded lier, so
that she could only fetch the third sliij). 'J'he latUT, with tlie vessels
ahead and astern, sprung tlieir Ijatterios upon her. "The cj-asli occa-
sioned by their destructive liroadsidcs was so trrnicnddus on hoard
her that whole pieces of plank were seen flying from her olf side,
ere she could escape the cool concentrated fire of her determined
adversaries."! She put her helm uji, and ran along outside the
l>ritish line, receiving tlie first lire of eacli successive ship, lli-r
X-
I
f
Hoods Order of Battue
26 ':" ^^ "»-- /^ T" res "/^SB
5>'
1^
HOODS OKDEIl OF BATTI.E. AT AXfllOr. AT ST. KITTS.
movement was imitated by her followers, some keeping off sooner,
some later; but de Grasse in his flagship not only came close, but
pointed his after 3'ards to the wind,^ to move the slower. As he
ported his helm when leaving the Barflcni\ tliis brought these sails
aback, keeping him a still longer time beff)re tlie British ships thrown
to the rear. "In this he was supported by tliose ships which were
astern, or immediately ahead of him. During this short but tre-
1 Wliite : ' Naval Researches.'
2 f?Ii:irp up Ijy tlie starboard braces, the wiml bciii^ on the starboard quarter.
518 M.lJon UrERATIONS. 17(i-J-178;3. [1782.
niciKlous conflict in tluit part of the iield of battle, nothing whatever
could be seen of them lor upwards of twenty minutes, save de
Grasse's white flag at the main-topgallant mastliead of the Villc de
Paris., gracefully lioaling above the inonense volumes of smoke that
enveloped them, or the [lennants of those ships which were occa-
sionally perceptible, when an increase of breeze would waft away the
smoke."'
Though most gallantly done, no such routine mana'uvre as this
could shake Hood's solidly assumed position. The attempt was
repeated in the afternoon, Ijut more feebly, and upon the centre and
rear only. Tliis also was ineffectual; and Hood was left in triumph-
ant possession of tiic Held. The losses in the several affairs of the
two da3-s had been: IJritish, 72 killed, 244 wounded; French, 107
killed, 207 wounded. Thenceforth the French fleet continued cruis-
ing to leeward of the island, approaching almost daih", frequently
threatening attack, and occasionally exchanging distant shots; but
no serious encounter took place. Interest was centred on Brimstone
Hill, where alone on the island the British flag still flew. De Grasse
awaited its surrender, flattering himself that the British would be
forced then to put to sea, and tliat his fleet, increased by successive
arrivals to thirty-two of the line, would then find an opportunity
to crush the man who had outwitted and out-manoeuvred him on
January 25th and 2(ith. In this hope he was deceived by his own
inaptness and his adversary's readiness. Hood was unable to succour
Brimstone Hill, for want of troops; the French having landed G,000
men, against which the British 2,400 could effect nothing, either
alone or in co-oiieration \\ith the garrison, which was but 1,200
strong. The work capitulated on the 13th of Februar}-. De Grasse,
who had neglected to keep his ships provisioned, went next day to
Nevis and anchored there to empty the storeships. That evening
Hood called his captains on l)oard, explained his intentions, had them
set their watches by his, and at 11 p.m. the cables were cut one by
one, lights being left on the buoys, and the fleet silently decamped,
passing round the north end of St. Kitts, and so towards Antigua.
When De Grasse opened his eyes next morning, the British were
no longer to be seen. " Nothing could have been more fortunately
executed," wrote Lord Kobert Manners, "as not one accident hap-
pened from it. Taking the whole in one light, though not successful
in the point we aimed at, nevertheless it ^^•as well conducted, and
^ White : ' Naval Researches.'
1782.] BE GRASSE'S I'LAN OF CONQUEST. 519
has given the enemy ii pretty severe check ; and if j'ou give liini half
the credit the enemy dues. Sir Samuel Hood will stand veiy high in
the public estimation."
Hood's intention had been to return to Barbados; but on the
25th of February lu? was joined, to windward of Antigua, by Admiral
Sir George Rodney, who had arrived from Kngland a week earlier,
bringing with him twelve shi[>s of the line. The new Connnander-in-
Chief endeavoured to cut off de Gi-asse from Martinicjue, but the
French fleet got in there on the 2(jth. Rodnej- consequently went to
St. Lucia, to refit Hood's ships, and to prepare for the coming cam-
paign, in which it was understood that the conquest of Jamaica was
to be the first object of the allies. An inq)ortant condition to their
success was the arrival of a great couvoj-, known to be on its way
from Brest to repair the losses which Kempenfelt's raid and subse-
quent bad weather had inflicted in December. Hood suggested to
Rodney to halve the fleet, which then numbered thirtj-six of the
line, letting one part cruise north of Dominica, between that island
and Deseada, while the other guarded the southern approach, between
Martinique and St. Lucia. Rodney-, however, was unwilling to do
this, and adopted a half-measure, — ■ Hood's division being stationed
to windward of the north end of JIartinique, reaching only as far
north as the latitude of Dominica, while the centre and rear were
abreast of the centi-e and south of JLirtinique ; all in mutual touch
by intermediate vessels. It would seem — reading between the lines
— that Hood tried to sti-etch his cruising ground northwards, in
pursuance of his own ideas, but Rodney recalled him. The French
convoy consequently passed north of Deseada, convoyed by two ships
of the line, and on the 20th of JMarch reached jMartinique safely.
De Gi-asse's force was thus raised to thirty-five of the line, including
two fiftj'-gun ships, as against the British thirty-six. At the end of
the month Roduej' returned to St. Lucia, and there remained at
anchor, vigilantly watching the French fleet in Fort Royal by means
of a chain of frigates.
The problem now immediatel}" confronting de Grasse — the firet
step to the conquest of Jamaica — was extremel}- difiicult. It was to
convoy to Cap Francois the supplj- vessels essential to liis enterprise,
Ijesides the merchant fleet bound for France; making in all one
hundred and fifty unarmed ships to be protected by his thirty-five sail
of the line, in face of the British thirty-six. The trade-wind being
fair, he jjurjiosed to skirt the inner edge of the Caribbean Sea; by
.'')20
M.UOIZ OPERATIONS. 17C2-1783.
ri782.
wliicli means he would keep close to a succession of friendly ports,
wherein the convoy nii^ht find refuge in case of need.
With this ])liui the Frcucii urnianient put to sea on the 8th of
April, 1782. The fact being reported promptly to Itodney, Ly noon
liis whole fleet 1 was clear of its anchorage and in ijursuit. Then was
evident the vital importance of Barrington's conquest of St. Lucia ;
for, had the British Ix-en at Harhados, the most prohahle alternative,
the French niovenicnt not only would have been longer unknown,
hut piirsuit would have started from a hundred miles distant, instead
of thirty. If tlu; British had met this disadvantage by cruising before
Martinique, thoy would have encountered the difliculty of koejiing
tlieii- shi])s supplied with watei- and other necessaries, which St. Lucia
affoi'ded. In truth, without in any degree minimising the faults of
the loser, or the merits of the winner, in the exciting week that fol-
^ British fleet uiider Admiral Sir George Brydges Rudne}', and line of Vjattle ou
April 12th, 1782. From lists in Beatson, vi. 32-J, ami Sehomberg (revised in MS.
of H. W. Harvey), iv. 399 ; compared with dispatches and with Steel's ' Xavy Lists.'
— W. L. C.
SHIPS.
z.
O
74
COMMANDERS.
Capt. Thomas Burnett.
SHIPS.
O
74
COMMANDERS.
Royal Oak . . .
EesohUion . . .
Capt. Lord Robert Manners.!
Alfred ....
74
Capt. William Biyne.t
Profee ....
(VlCapt. Charles Buckner.
Montagu ....
74
Capt. George Bowen (1).
Ilercttles ....
74
('apt. Henrj' Savage.
Yarmouth . . .
(!4
Capt. Anthony Parrey.
America ....
iA
Capt. Samuel Thompson.
Valiant ....
74
Capt. Samuel Granstou Good-
Fortunee,^ 40 .
Capt.HughCloberryChristuxn.
all.
Endyjnion, 44 .
Capt. Edward Tyrrel Smith.
/Rear- Admiral Sir Samuel
Flora, 30 . . .
Capt. Samuel Marshall.
Jiarjlcur ....
08
- Hood, Bart. (B).
*- Capt. John Knight.
Co7ivert* 32 . .
Capt. Henry Harvey.
Alarm, 32 . .
Capt. Charles Cotton.
Monarch ....
74
Capt. Francis Reynolds.
Andromache, 32
Capt. George Auson Byron.
Warrior . ' . . .
74
Capt. Sir James Wallace, Kt.
SibiiU 28 . . .
Capt. Jolm Rodney.
Belliqueux . . .
04
Capt. Andrew Sutherland.
Pegasus,*' 28 . .
Capt. John Stanliope.
Centaur
74
Capt. John Nicholson Ingle-
field.
^/er/,14 . . .
Siflamander^t s.),
Com. James Vashou.
Magnificent . . .
74
Capt. Robert Linzee.
8.
Com. Richard Lucas.
Prince WiUi'im. .
04
Capt. George Wilkinson.
Eus.'^f'tl ....
74
Capt. James Saumarez.
Nymphe," 3(1 .
Capt. Jolm Ford.
Prudent* . . .
04
Capt. Andrew Barkley.
Lizard,* '^S . .
Capt. Edmund Dod.
Fame
'■*
Capt. Robert Barbor.
Champion^ '24 .
Capt. Thomas West.
Anson
04
Capt. WilUam Blair. §
Zt^bm,* 10 . .
Com. John Bourchier.
Torhay ....
74
Capt- John Lewis Gidoin.
Bedford ....
74
f Commod. Edmund Affleck.
Prince George . .
98
Capt. James Williams.
1 Capt. Thomas Graves (3).
1 Rear- Adm. Francis Samuel
Ajax
74
Capt. Nicholas Charringtou.
Princcsa ....
70
■ Drake (B).
V Capt. Charles Kuatchbull.
liepulxf ....
04
Capt Tliomas Dumaresq.
Cnnaihi ....
74
Capt. Hon. Wm. CornwalUs.
Conqueror . . .
74
Capt. George Balfour.
Sf. Albans . . .
04
Capt. Charles Inglis.
JVonsuch ....
("4
Capt. William Truscott.
Naniiir ....
90
Capt. Robert Faushawe (1).
Alcide
74
Capt. Charles Thomp-^on.
j Adm. Sir George Brydges
Arrogant . . .
74
Capt. Sam. Pitchford Cornish.
Formidalde •
OS
J Rodney (W).
Mnrlhoro'igh . .
74
Capt. Taylor Penny.
1 Capt. Sir Chas.Douplas(lst)
SaiiUi J/o?itcn,* 36
Capt. John Liuzce.
' Oapt. John Symons (2ud).
Triton, 28 . . .
Capt. Jolm M'Laurin.
Duke
9«
Capt. Alan Gardner.
Fun/dire, 24
Capt. George Wilson.
Agamemnon . .
04
Capt. Beujanun Caldwell.
Germaine,* 10 ■ .
Pla.st (f. s.),* S .
Com, Geo. Augustus Keppel.
Com. John Aylmer.
* These vessels were not in the action,
t Killed on April ".Hh.
t Mortally wounded on April r2th.
§ Killed on AprU 12th.
1732.] FRENCH FLEET Al'PItOACllES WMINICA. 521
lowed, the opening situation may be said to have represented on either
side an accumulation of neglects or of successes, which at the moment
of their occurrence may have seemed individually trivial. De Grasse
was tremendously handicapped from the outset by the errors of his
predecessors and of himself. That the liritisii had St. Lucia as tlieir
outpost was due not only to Harrington's diligence, but also to
d'Estaing's slackness and professional timidity; and it may be ques-
tioned whether de Grasse iiimst'lf liad sliowu a i)roj)er understanding
of strategic conditions, when he neglected that island in favour of
Tobago and St. Kitts. Certainly, Hood had feared for it greatly the
year before. That the convoy was there to embarrass his movements,
may not have been the fault of the Frencli admiral; Init it was
greatly and entirely his fault that, of the thirty -six ships pursuing
liim, twenty-one represented a force that he could have cruslied in
detail a few weeks before, — not to mention the similar failure of
April, 1781.
Large bodies of ships commoidy will move less rapidly than small.
By 2.30 P.M. of the day of starting, Rodney's look-outs had sighted
the Frenfch fleet; and before sundown it could be seen from the
mastheads of the main body. At 6 next morning, the 9th, tlu^
enemy, both fleet and convoy, was visible from the deck of the B<i rjlcur,
the flagship of Hood's division, then in the van. The French bore
north-east, distant four to twelve miles, and extending from abreast
of the centre of Dominica northwards towards Guadeloupe. The
British therefore had gained much during the night, and were now
off Dominica, to leeward of the enemy's rear, which was becalmed
under the land (b). Some fourteen or fifteen of the French van,
having opened out the channel between Dominica and Guadeloupe,
felt afresh trade-wind, against which they were Ideating; and their
numljer was gradually increased as individual ships, utilising the
catspaws, stole clear of the high land of Dominica (b). Hood's
division in like manner, first among the British, got the breeze, and,
with eight ships, the commander of the van stood north in order of
battle. To the north-west of him were two French vessels, separated
from their consorts and threatened to be cut off(i). These stood
boldly down and crossed the head of Hood's column ; one passing so
close to the leading ship, the Alfred, that the latter had to bear up
to let her pass. Rodney had hoisted a signal to engage at 6.38 a.m.,
but had hauled it down almost immediately, and Hood would not lire
without orders. These ships therefore rejoined the main body un-
A99
MAJOR OL'KRATIOSS. ITOl'-IT.S!
[1782.
liarnied. At 8.30 tlu; FreiK^li lioisted their foloius, ami .sli(jrt]y after-
wards their wliole lleet tacked and stood south, opposite to Hood.
De Grasse now had recognised that he could not escape action, if
the cciuvoy kept com[)any. lie therefore directed tlu; two fifty-gun
ships, Expcrimeal and Saqittaire, to accompany it into (iuadelou])c,
where it arrived safely that day; and he decided that the ileet should
ply to windward through the clianuel lietween Dominica and
Guadeloupe, nearly nudway in which lies a group of small islands
o¥
Lcs 5A//vr£s
C A L/l /VTH
i 0
Rodney and de: Crasse.
Position! 9-^5 AM
ndDNEY AND DI: GI'.AS
called The Saintes, — a name at times given to the battle of April
12th. By this course he hoped not only to lead the enemy away
from the convoy, bnt also to throw off pursuit through his superior
speed, and so to accomplish his mission unharmed. The French
ships, larger, deeper, and with better lines than their opponents, were
naturally better sailer's, and it may be inferred that even coppering
had not entirely overcome this original disadvantage of the British.
At the very moment of beginning his new policy, however, a
subtle temptation assailed dc Grasse irresistibly, in the exposed posi-
1782.]
RODNEY AND DE ORASSE.
523
tion of Hood's column; anrT he met it, not by a frank and licarty
accejptance of a great opportunity, but l)y a half-measure. Hood
thoroughly crushed, the Britisii fU^'t liccanie hopelessly inferior to
the Frencli; Hood damaged, and it became somewhat inferior: jjos-
sibly it woidd be deterred from further pursuit. l)c Grasse decided
for this second course, and oi'deivd lialf Ids fleet to attack. Tliis
operation was carried out under llic orders of the i\Iar([uis (h'
Vaudreuil, the second in coniniand. 'I'lii' shijis engaged in it lion^
RoDt^ElV ANO DC G R A S 3 E:
Po S I -T I O N II /2 A1
r.ODXEV AND DE OKASSE.
down from the windward, attacked Hood's rear ships, stood along on
the weather side of his column at long range, and, having passed
ahead, tacked in succession and formed again in tlie rear, whence
they repeated the same mancHuvre (Position I.). Thus a procession
of fifteen ships kept passing bj' eight, describing a continuous curve
of elliptical form. They were able to do this because Hood was
condemned to a low speed, lest he sliould draw too far away from tlie
British centre (a) and rear (c), still becalmed under Dominica. The
French, having choice of distance, kept at long gunsliot. because they
[yH MAJOR OPEIlATloNS. \lv,-2-\lK\. \\lfi2.
weru delicu.'iit in eurroiuuK'S, of wliich tlic liriti.sli liad many. These
guns, ol' sliort range but large calibre, were thus rendered useless.
Could they liave come into play, Ihe I-'rendi rigging and sails would
have suil'ered severely. This first engagement lasted, by Hood's log,
from !l.48 to 10.2;") a.m. It was resumed in stronger force at 14
minutes past noon, and eontinueil till 1.45 I'.M. (Position II.), wlien
tiring ceased for tiiat day; liodiicy liaidiiig down tjie signal for battle
MEIIAI, CllMMEMOUATIVK 111'' KoUNI'.v's Vli I'liUY, APIIU, 12T1I, 1782.
{From an OTicjinal kindhj hnt hi/ Cafd. Jl. S. It. Prince Louis of Ilattcnherrj^ R. X.)
at 2. Between the two affairs, which were identical in general
character. Hood's column was reinforced, and great part of the
British centre also got into action with some of the French main
body, though at long range only. "Except the two rear ships,"
wrote Rodney to Hood that night, " the others fired at such a distance
that I returned none."'
The injuries to the British ships engaged were not such as to com-
pel them to leave the fleet. The Royal Oak lost her main topmast,
and that of the Warrior fell two days later, not improbably from
wounds : but in tliese was nothing that the ready hands of seamen
could not repair so as to continue the chase. Rodney therefore con-
tented himself Avith reversing the order, putting Hood in the rear,
whereby he was able to refit, and yet follow fast enough not to be out
of supporting distance. One of the French ships, the Caton, 64, was
so injured that de Grasse detached her into Guadeloupe. It must be
remembered that a crippled ship in a chased fleet not only embar-
rasses movement, Init may compromise the whole body, if the latter
delay to protect it; whereas the chaser keeps Ijetween his lame birds
and the enemy.
During the night of the 9th the British lay-to for repairs. The
next morning they resumed the pursuit, turning to windward after
1782.] UDDM'IY AXIJ ])K URASSK. 525
the eiiuiii}-, i)uL ii[ic)ii tin- wIkiIc losinjj;- llii-(]UL^Iioiit the I'lih and tli(;
11th. At d;iyli-ht <>i the lOlli the French, by the h.gs of Hood and
Cornwidlis, were " iVo]u four to live k'iio-ues distant," "just in sight
from the deck." During that niglit, however, the Zrlr, 74, liad
collided witli the Jason, 04; and the latter was injured so far as to
he conipelh'd to follow the (Juton into (Guadeloupe. At sunset of
that day Rodney signalled a general chase to windward, liic effect of
which was to enable each ship to do her best according to her ca[)-
tain's judgment during the dark hours. Nevertheless, on the morn-
ing of the 11th the French seem again to have gained; for Ilnod,
who, it will he remembered, was now in the rear, notes tliat at
10 A.M. twenty-two French sail (not all the fleet) could be counted
from the masthead ; Cornwallis, further to windward, could count
thirty-three. Troude, a French authority, says that at that time
nearly all the French had doubled The Saintes, and it looked as
though de Grasse might succeed in throwing off his pursuer. Un-
luckily, two ships, the Ma</nani7ne, 74, and the Zelc, 74, the latter
of which had lost her main to[.mast, were several miles to leeward
of the I-i'rench main liody- It was necessary to delay, or to drop
those vessels. Again, trivial circumstances conspired to further a
great disaster, and de Grass« l)ore down to cover the crippled ships;
losing so much of his hard-won gidund, and entailing a further mis-
fortune that night. Rodney hung doggedly on, relying on the
chapter of accidents, as one ^^ ho knows that all things come to him
who endures. To be sure, there was not much else he could do ;
yet he deserves credit for unremitting industry and pluck. During
the afternoon, the signals noted in the logs — to call in all cruisers
and for the fleet to close — attest mutely the movement of de Grasse
in bearing down.
During the night, at 2 a.m. (}f April 12th, the Zc/r and de
Grasse's flagship, the Villc dc Paris, 110, crossing on opposite tacks,
came into collision. The former lost both foremast and bowsprit. It
has Ijeen stated ]}y John Paul Jones, who served on board the French
fleet a few months later, that this accident was due to the deficiency
of watch-officers in the French navy; the deck of the Zele being in
charge of a young ensign, instead of an experienced lieutenant. It
was necessary to rid the fleet of the Zclc at once, or an action could
not l)e avoided; so a frigate was sunnnoned to tow her, and the two
were left to make their way to (iuadeloupe, while tlie others resumed
the beat to windward. At 5 a.m. she and the frigate were again
526
MAJOR Ul'EUATWNS. 1762-17.s:i.
[1782
under way, steering lor Giuideloiipe, to the north-west, and making
from live to six miles an lionr(a); but iu the interval they had been
nearly motionless, and consequently when day broke at 5.30 they
were only two leagues from tlie Barjlcur, wiiich, still flagship of tlie
British rear, was tlien standing south on the port tack. The body
of the French was at about the same distance a.s on the previous
evening, — ten to iifteen miles, — but tlie Ville ch Paris not more
than eight (A). .Just I)efore 6 a.m. Rodney signalled Hood, who was
IIUDXEV AND DE GKASSE.
nearest, to chase the ZcU(ii); and four of the rearmost ships of the
line were detached for that purpose (b). De Grasse, seeing this,
signalled his vessels at 6 a.m. to close the flagship, making all sail;
and lie himself bore down (c) on the port tack, but running free, to
frigliten away Rodney's chasers. The British Admiral kept them
out until 7 o'clock, by which time de Grasse was fairly committed to
his false step. All cruisers were then called in, and the line was
cldscd to onc^ cable. Within an hour M'ere heard the opening guns of
17H2.J
IIODNKY AND DK CllAHSK.
527
tho great Ijattlc, since known l)y tlie names of the 12tli of Apiii, or
of The Saintes, and, in tlie b'rciirli navy, of Doniiiiiea.
'I'lu' ISiitisii a|>pi'ar Id liasc licen standing to tiic scmtli on tlie jiort
tack at daylight; bnt, soon after sending out the chasers, Itodney
had ordered tho line of hearing (from ship to ship) to he north-
north-east to soiith-soiith-west, evidently in })reparation for a close-
lianled line of hallle on the starboard tack, hi'ading northerly, to an
1
R O D fN E Y AMD OE CrASSE.
/2 ''" ^^«/^ /;^&2.
^^ C.L ' s*^ ^^ f» L f>/c /^ C!>
B,
\^
t.
a
>
pi
T!^
==1
r.ODXRY AND DE GKASSE.
east wind. Somewhat unusually, the wind that morning held at
south-east for some time, enabling the British to lie up as high as
east-north-east on the starboard tack, on Mhich they were when the
battle joined ; and this eircnmstance doubtless led to the annulling
df the signal for the line of bearing, half an hour after it was made,
and the substitution for it of the line of battle ahead at one cable.
It is to be inferred tliat Rodney's first purpose was to tack together,
thus restoring Hood to the van. his natural station ; but the accident
of the wind holding to the southward placed the actual van — regu-
528
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1702-1783.
[1782.
larly the rear — most to windward, and rendered it expedient to tack
in succession, preserving to the full the opportunity which chance had
extended for reaching the enemy. In the engagement, therefore,
Hood connnanded in the rear, and Rear- Admiral Drake in the van.
The wind with tlie French seems to have lieen more to the eastward
than with the British, — not an unusual circumstance in the neigh-
bourhood of land.
ri
R o D M e: V AND oe Chasse
/S'"' /lf»,^ : /7S2
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RODNEY AXD DE GUASSE.
As Rodney, notwitkstauding his haste, had formed line from time
to time during the past three days, his fleet was now in good order,
and his signals were chiefly confined to keeping it closed. The
French, on the other hand, were greatly scattered when their com-
mander-in-chief, in an impulse of hasty, unhalanced jiidgment,
abandoned his previous cautious policy and hurried them into action.
Some of them were over ten miles to windward of the flagship.
Though they crowded sail to rejoin her, there was not time enough
for all to take their stations properly, between daylight and 8 a.m.,
when the firing began. " Our line of battle was formed under the
178-J.J
RODNEY AND DE GRASSE.
529
fire of musketiy,"^ wrote the Marquis de Vavidreuil,^ the second in
command, who, being in the rear of the fleet on this occasion, and
consequently among the last to he engaged, hud excellent oppdrtunity
for observation. At the beginning it was in de Grasse's power to
postpone action, until tlie order should be formed, by holding his
wind under short canvas ; while the mere sight of his vessels hurry-
ing down for action would liave compelled Rodney to call in the
ships chasing the ZHc, whose rescue was the sole motive of the
Rod N ELY
AND de: C rass e:
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RODNEY AKD DE GKASSE.
French manoeuvre. Instead of this, the flagship kept off the wind ;
which precipitated the collision, while at the same time delaying the
preparations needed to sustain it. To this de Grasse added another
fault by forming on the port tack, the contrary to that on which the
British were, and standing towards Dominica. The effect of this
was to bring his ships into the calms and baffling winds which cling
to the shore-line, thus depriving them of their power of manrjeuvre.
* Probably not over one or two hundred yards.
* His brother, the Comte de Vaudreuil, was also with the fleet, as chef d'escadre.
in the Sceptre, 74.
VOL. III. — 34
r,30 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
His object probably was to confine the engagement to a mere pass-by
on opposite taclcs, by whicli in all previous instances the Freiuli liad
thwarted the decisive action that Rodney sought. Nevertheless, the
blunder was evident at once to French eyes. "What evil genius has
inspired the admiral?" exclaimed du Pavilion, Vaudreuil's flag-
eaptain, who was esteemed one of the best tacticians in France, and
who fell in the battle.
As the two lines drew near to one another, standing, the one south,
and the other east-north-east, the wind shifted back to the east-
ward, allowing the French to head higher, to south-south-east, and
knocking the British off to north-north-east (B). The head of the
French column thus passed out of gunshot, across the bows of
Rodney's leading vessel, the Marlborough, which came within range
when abreast of the eighth ship. The first sliots were fired by the
Brave, 74, ninth in the French line, at 8 a.m. The British captain
then put his helm up and ran slowly along, north-north-west, under
the lee of the French, towards their rear. The rest of the fleet
followed in his wake. The battle thus assumed the form of passing
in opposite directions on parallel lines; except that the French ships,
as they successively cleared the point where the British column
struck their line, would draw out of fire, their course diverging
thenceforth from that of the British approach.' The effect of this
would be that the British rear, when it reached that point, would be
fresh, and with that advantage encounter the French rear, which had
received already the fire of the British van and centi'c. To obviate
this, by bringing his own van into action, de Grasse signalled the
van ships to lead south-south-west, parallel with the British north-
north-east (B, a). The engagement thus became general all along the
lines ; but it is probable that the French van was never well formed.
Its commander, at all events, reached his post after the commander
of the rear did his.^
At five minutes past eight, Rodney made a general signal for
close action, followed immediately by another for the leading ships to
head one point to starboard — towards the enemy — which indicates
that he was not satisfied with the distance first taken by the Marl-
borough. The Formidahle, his flagship, eighteenth in the column,
began to fire at 8.23;^ but the Barfleur, Hood's flagship, which was
' The position, in the French order, of the sliips taken in the battle, is shown by
the crosses in Figures B, C, D.
' Canada's log, 8.15 ; reduced to Hood's times, which are generally followed.
1782.] RODNEY AND DK GKASSE. 531
tlurty-lirst, not till 9.2.J. This di flu re nee in time is to be aeeoiinted
for chiefly by the light airs near Dominica, contrasted with the fresh
trades in the open channel to the northwaid, which the leading
British vessels felt before their rear. De Grasse now, too late, had
realised the disastrous effect which this would have upon his fleet.
If he escaped all else, his ships, baffled by calms and catspaws while
the British had a breeze, must lose the weather-gage, and with it
the hope of evading pursuit, hitherto his chief preoccupation. Twice
he signalled to wear, — first, all together, then in succession, — but,
although the signals were seen, they could not be obeyed with the
enemy close under the lee. " The French fleet," comments Chevalier
justly, "had freedom of movement no longer. A fleet cannot wear
with an enemy's fleet within musket-range to leeward."
The movement therefore continued as described, the opposing
ships slowly "sliding by" each other until about 9.15, when the
wind suddenly shifted to south-east again. The necessity of keeping
the sails full forced the bows of each French vessel towards the
enemy, destroying the order in column, and throwing the fleet into
echelon, or, as the phrase then was, into bow and quarter line (C).
The British, on the contrar}-, M'ere free either to hold their course or
to head towards the enemy. Rodney's flagship (C, a) luffed, and
led through the French line just astern of the Glorieux, 74, which
was the nineteenth in their order. She was followed by five ships ;
and her laext ahead also, the Bulr. (d), seeing her chief's movement,
imitated it, breaking through the line astern of the twenty-third
French. The Glorieux, on the starboard hand of Rodney's little
column, received its successive broadsides. Her main and mizzen
masts went overboard at 9.28, when the Canada, third astern of
the FormidaUe, had just passed her; and a few moments later her
foremast and bowsprit fell. At 9.33 the Canada was to windward
of the French line. The Formidable was using both broadsides as
she broke through the enemy's order. On her port hand, between
her and the Duke, were four French ships huddled together (c), one
of which had paid off the wrong way ; that is, after the shift of wind
took her aback, her sails had filled on the opposite tack from that of
the rest of her fleet.' These four, receiving the repeated broadsides,
at close quarters, of the Formidable, Duke, and Namur, and having
undergone besides the fire of the British van, were very severely
mauled. While these things were happening, the Bedford, the sixth
• This mishap occurred to three French vessels.
532 MAJOR Ol'EKATIUNS. 17(;l'-178:5. [1782.
astern of tlie FurmidaUe, perliaps unable Lo see her next ahead in tlie
smoke, had luffed independently (b), and wa« i'ollowed by the twelve
rearmost British ships, whom she led through tlie French order astern
of the Cesar, 74, twelfth from tlie van. This ship and her next
ahead, the Hector, 74, suffered as did the Glorieux. The Barjieur,
Avhich was in the centre of this column of thirteen, opened fire at
9.25. At 10.45 she "ceased firing, having passed the enemy's van
ships;" that is, she was well on the weatlier side of the French fleet.
Some of the rearmost of Hood's division, however, were still engaged
at noon ; but probably all were then to windward of the enemy.
The British ships ahead of the Duke, the van and part of the
centre, in all sixteen sail, had continued to stand to the northward.
At the time Rodney broke the line, several of them must have passed
beyond the French lear, and out of action. One, the America, the
twelftli from the van, wore without signals, to pursue the enemy, and
her example was followed at once by the ship next ahead, the Russell.
No signal following, the America again wore and followed her leaders,
but the Bussell continued as she was, now to windw^ard of the French ;
by which she was able to take a conspicuous share in the closing
scenes. At 11.33 Rodney signalled the van to tack, but the delay of
an hour or more had given the Russell a start towards the enemy
which could not be overcome.
The effect of these several occurrences had been to transfer the
weather-gage, the position for attack, to the British from the French,
and to divide the latter also into three groups, widely separated and
disordered (D). In the centre was the flagship Ville de Paris with
live ships (c). To windward of her, and two miles distant, w'as the
van, of some dozeir vessels (v). The rear was four miles away to
leeward (r). To restore the order, and to connect the fleet again, it
was decided to re-form on the leewardmost ships ; and several signals
to this effect were made by de Grasse. They received but imperfect
execution. The manageable vessels succeeded easily enough in run-
ning before the wind to leeward, but, when there, exactitude of posi-
tion and of movement was unattainable to sliips in various degrees
of disability, with light and baffling side airs. The French were
never again in order after the wind shifted and the line was broken ;
but the movement to leeward left the dismasted Glorietix, Hector,
and Char, motionless between the hostile lines.
It has been remarked, disparagingly, that the British fleet also was
divided into three bv the manoeuvre of breaking the line. This is
1782.] FRENCH AND BIllTISIl LOSSES. 533
true; but tlie advantage reuuiiued with it incontestably, iu two
respects. IJy favour of the wind, each of the three groups had been
able to maintain its general formation in lino or column, instead of
being thrown entirely out, as the French were; and passing thus in
column along the Gloricux, Hector, and Cesar, they wrought upon
these three ships a concentration of injury which had no parallel
among the British vessels. The French in fact had lost three ships,
as well as the wind. To these certain disadvantages is prol)ably to
be added a demoralisation among the Frencli crews, from the much
heavier losses resultant upon the British practice of filing at the hull.
An officer present in the action told Sir John Ross ^ afterwards that
the French fired very high throughout; and he cited in illustration
that the three trucks ^ of the Frincesa were shot away. Sir Gilbert
Blane, who, though Physician to the Fleet, obtained permission to
be on deck thi'oughout the action, wrote ten days after it, "I can
aver from my own observation that the French fire slackens as we
approach, and is totally silent when we are close alongside." It is
needless to say that a marked superiority of fire will silence that of
the bravest enemy; and the practice of aiming at the spars and sails,
however suited for frustrating an approach, substantially conceded
that superiority upon which the issue of decisive battle depends. As
illustrative of this result, the British loss will be stated here. It was
but 243 killed and 816 wounded ^ in a fleet of thirty-six sail. The
highest in any one ship was that of the Duke, 73 killed and wounded.
Xo certain account, or even very probable estimate, of the French
loss has ever been given. None is cited by French authorities. Sir
Gilbert Blane, who was favourably placed for information, reckoned
that of the Ville de Paris alone to be 300. There being 5,400 troops
distributed among the vessels of the fleet, the casualties would be
proportionately more numerous ; but, even allowing for this, there
can be no doubt that the loss of the French, to use Chevalier's words,
" was certainly much more considerable " than that reported by the
British. Six post-captains * out of thirty were killed, against two ®
British out of thirty-six.
^ Rosa: 'Life of Saumarez.'
'■^ Circular pieces of wood whicli cap the top of the masts.
* Beatson, vi. 324, 325. Beatson's additions are slightly incorrect.
* Captain de La Clocheterie, of the Herculc ; Captain de Saint-Cesaire, of the
Northumberland; Captain de La Vicomte, of the Hector; Captain Bernard de Marigny,
of the Char ; Captain Comte d'Escars, of the Ghrieux ; and Captain du Pavilion, of
the Triomphant. Rapport du Marquis de Vaiidreuil. — W. L. 0.
^ Captain William Blair, of the Anson; and Captain Lord Robert Manners, —
534 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1782.
Rodney did not make adequate use of the great opportunity,
wliich accident ratlier than design had given liim at noon of April
12th. lie did allow a certain liberty of manoeuvre, by discontinuing
the order for the line of battle ; but the signal for close action, hoisted
at 1 P.M., was hauled down a half-hour later. Hood, who realised the
conditions plainly visible, as well as the reasonable inferences there-
from, wished the order given for a general chase, which would have
applied the spur of emulation to every captain present, without sur-
rendering the hold that particular signals afford upon indiscreet
movements. He bitterly censured the Admiral's failure to issue this
command. Had it been done, he said : —
" I am very confident we should have had twenty sail of the enemy's ships
before dark. Instead of that, he pursued only under his topsails (sometimes his
foresail was set and at others his mizzen topsail aback) the greatest part of the
afternoon, though the flying enemy had all the sail set their very shattered state
would allow."
To make signal for a general chase was beyond the competence of
a junior admiral ; but Hood did what he could, by repeated signals to
individual ships of his own division to make more sail, by setting all
he could on the Barfleur, and by getting out his boats to tow her
head round. Sir Gilbert Blane unintentionally gives a similar
impression of laxity.
" After cutting the French line, the action during the rest of the day was par-
tial and desultory, the enemy never being able to form, and several of the [our]
ships being obliged to lie by and repair their damages. As the signal for the line
was now hauled down, every ship annoyed the enemy as their respective comman-
ders judged best."
For this indolent abandonment of the captains to their own devices,
the correctest remedy was, as Hood indicated, the order for a general
chase, supplemented by a watchful supervision, which should check
the over-rash and stimulate the over-cautious. If Hood's account of
the sail carried by Rodney be correct, the Commander-in-Chief did
not even set the best example. In this languid pursuit, the three
crippled French ships were overhauled, and of course had to strike ;
and a fourth, the Ardent, 64, was taken, owing to her indifferent
sailing. Towards sunset the flagship VUh dc Paris, 110,^ the finest
ship of war afloat, having been valiantly defended against a host of
who, though mortally wounded, survived for some days, — of the Resolution. But
Captain William Bayne, of the Alfred, had fallen in the action of April 9th.
1 She is thus rated in the British Navy Lists published between the time of her
capture and the receipt of news of her loss ; but she seems to have carried 120 guns.
i7s-_'.] iioni) ciariciSES rodney. 635
enemies throughout great part of tlie iifternooii, and having expciKUd
all lier ammunition, liauled down her colours. The two Briti«li
vessels then innnediately engaged with her were the Russdl and the
Barjlcur, Hood's flagshij), to the latter of which she formally sur-
rendered; the exact moment, noted in Hood's journal, being
6.29 P.M.
At 6.4.5 Rodney made the signal for the fleet to bring-to (form
line and stop) on the port tack, and he remained lying-to during the
night, while the French continued to retreat under the orders of the
Marquis de Vaudreuil, who by de Grasse's capture had become com-
mander-in-chief. For this easy-going deliberation also Hood had
strong words of condemnation.
" Why he should bring the fleet to because the ViUe de Paris was taken, I can-
not reconcile. He did not pursue under easy sail, so as never to have lost sight of
the enemy in the night, which would clearly and most undoubtedly have enabled
him to have taken almost every ship the next day. . . . Had I had the honour of
commanding his Majesty's noble fleet on the 12th, I may, without much imputa-
tion of vanity, say the flag of England should now have graced the sterns of
upwards of twenty sail of the enemy's ships of the line."
Such criticisms by those not responsible are to be received gen-
erally with caution ; but Hood was, in thought aird in deed, a man
so much above the common that these cannot be dismissed lightly.
His opinion is known to have been shared by Sir Charles Douglas,
Rodney's Captain of the Fleet ; ^ and their conclusion is supported by
the inferences to be drawn from Rodney's own assumptions as to the
condition of the French, contrasted with the known facts. The
enemy, he wrote, in assigning his reasons for not pursuing, "went
off in a close connected lodi/," and might have defeated, by rotation,
the ships that had come up with them." "The enemy who uxnt off
in a hodij of twenty-six ships of the line,'^ might, by ordering two or
three of their best sailing ships or frigates to have shown lights at
times, and by changing their course, have induced the British fleet
to have followed them, while the main of their fleet, by hiding their
lights, miglit have hauled tlieir wind, and have been far to windward
by daylight, and intercepted the captured ships, and the most crippled
ships of the English;" and he adds that the Windward Islands even
might have been endangei'ed. That such action was in a remote
degree possible to a well-conditioned fleet may be guardedly con-
1 See letter of Sir Howard Douglas, son to Sir Charles ; ' United Service Journal,*
1834, Part II., p. 97.
^ Author's italics ; Mundy : ' Life of Rodney,' ii. 248.
53G MAJOIl OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
ceded; but it was wildly iiuprohaljle to a fleet staggering under such
a blow as the day had seen, which had changed its connnander just
as dark came on, and was widely scattered and disordered up to the
moment when signals by flags became invisible.
The facts, however, were utterly at variance with these ingenious
suppositions. Instead of being connected, as Rodney represents, de
Vaudi'euil had with him next morning but ten ships ; and no otiiers
during the whole of the 13th. He made sail for Cap Francois, and
was joined on the way by five more, so that at no time were there
upwards of fifteen ^ French ships of the line together, prior to his
arrival at that port on April 2oth. He there found four others of
the fleet. The tale of twentj^-five survivors, from tlie thirt}- engaged
on April 12th, was completed by six which had gone to Curasao, and
which did not rejoin until May. So much for the clos« connected
body of the French. It is clear, therefore, that Rodney's reasons
illustrate the frame of mind against which Napoleon used to caution
his generals as " making to themselves a picture " of possibilities ; and
that his conclusion at best was based upon the ruinous idea, which a
A ivid imagination or slothful temper is prone to present to itself, that
war may be made decisive without running risks. That Jamaica even
was saved was not due to this fine, but indecisive action, but to the
hesitation of the allies. When de Vaudi'euil reached Cap Francois,
he found there the French convoy safely arrived from Guadeloupe,
and also a body of fifteen Spanish ships of the line. The troops
available for the descent upon Jamaica were from fifteen to twenty
thousand. Well might Hood write: "Had Sir George Rodney's
judgment, after the enemy had been so totally put to flight, borne anj-
proportion to the high courage, zeal and exertion, so very manifesth-
sho-OTi by every captain, all difliculty \\'ould now have been at an
end. We might have done just as we pleased, instead of being at
this hour upon the defensive."
The allies, however, though superior in numbers, did not venture
to assume the offensive. After the battle, Rodney remained near
Guadeloupe until the 17th of April, refitting, and searching the
neighbouring islands, in case the French fleet might have entered
some one of them. For most of tliis time the British were becalmed,
but Hood remarks that there had been wind enough to get twenty
leagues to the westward ; and there more wind probably would have
1 Troude. Chevalier says sixteen, differing with Troude as to the whereabouts
■of the Brave.
1782.] THE WAR IN NORTH AMTAUCA ENDED. 537
been foimd. (Ju the ITtli Hood wius detached in [mrsuit v\ith ten sail
of the line ; and a day or two later Rodney himself started for Jamaica.
Left to his own discretion, Ilood pushed for tlie Mona Passage,
between Puerto Rico and Santo Doiiungo, carrying studding-sails
below and aloft in his haste. At daybreak of the 19th he sighted the
west end of Puerto Rico; and soon afterwards a small French squad-
ron was seen. A general chase resulted in the capture of the Jason
and Caton, sixty-fours, which had parted from their fleet before the
battle and were on their way to Cap Pran^ois. A frigate, the
Aimahle, 32, and a sloop, the Cerh, 18, also were taken. In report-
ing this affair to Rodney, Hood got a thrust into his superior. " It
is a very mortifying circumstance to relate to you, Sir, that the
French fleet which you put to flight on the 12th went through the
Mona Chaixuel on the 18th, only the day before I was in it." A
further proof of the utility of pursuit, heie hinted at, is to be foinid
in the fact that Rodney, starting six days later than de Vaudreuil,
reached Jamaica April 28th, only three days after the French got
into Cap Francois. He had therefore gained three days in a fort-
night's run. What might not have been done l)y an untiring chase !
But a remark recorded by Hood sunnned up the frame of mind which
dominated Rodney: "I lamented to Sir Geoi'ge on the 13th that . . .
he did not continue to pursue so as to keep sight of the enemy all
night, to which he only answered, ' Come, we have done very hand-
somely as it is.' "
Rodney stayed at Jamaica until the lOth of July, when Admiral
Hugh Pigot arrived from England to supersede him. This change
was consequent upon the fall of Lord North's ministry, in the
previous ]\Iarch, and had been decided liefore the news of the victory
could reach England. Rodney sailed for home from Port Royal on
the 22nd of July; and with his departure the war in the West Indies
and North America may be said to have ended. Pigot started almost
immediately for New York, and remained in North American waters
until the end of October, when he returned to Barbados, first having
detached Hood with thirteen ships of the line from the main fleet, to
cruise off Cap Francois. It is of interest to note that at this time
Hood took with him from New York the frigate Albemarle, 28, then
commanded by Nelson, who had been serving on the North American
station. These various movements were dictated by those of the
enemy, either actually made or supposed to be in contemplation ; for
it was an inevitable part of the ill-effects of Rodney's most imperfect
538 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1702-1783. [1782.
success, that the British fleet was thenceforth on the defensive purely,
witii all the perplexities of him who waits u])on the initiative of an
opponent. Notliing came of theia all, however, for the war now
was but lingering in its death stupor. The defeat of de Grasse,
partial though it was; the abandonment of the enterprise upon
Jamaica; the failure of the attack upon Gibraltar; and the success
of Howe in re-victualling that fortress, — these had taken all heart
out of the French and Spaniards ; while the numerical superiority of
the allies, inefficiently though it had been used heretofore, weighed
heavily upon the imagination of the British Government, which now
had abandoned all hope of subduing its American Colonies. Upon
the conclusion of peace, in 1783, Pigot and Hood returned to Eng-
land, leaving the Leeward Islands' Station under the command of
Rear- Admiral Sir Richard Hughes, Bart., (2)^ an officer remembered
by history only through Nelson's refusing to obey his orders not to
enforce the Navigation Acts, in 1785.
The change in the Ministry, besides occasioning the recall of
Rodney, drew Lord Howe out of bis long retirement, to command the
Channel Fleet. He hoisted his flag on the 20th of April, 1782, on
board the Victory, 100. Owing to the various directions in which
the efforts of Great Britain had to be made, either to defend her own.
interests or to crush the movements of the many enemies now com-
bined against her, the operations of the fleet were for some months
can-ied on by detached squadrons, — in the North Sea, in the Bay of
Biscay, and at the entrance of the Channel; Howe having under
him several distinguished subordinates, at the head of whom, in
professional reputation, were Vice-Admiral the Hon. Samuel Bar-
lington and Rear-Admiral Richard Kempenfelt. In the North Sea,
the Dutch were kept in their ports ; and a convoy of near 400 mer-
chant ships from the Baltic reached England unmolested. In the
Bay of Biscay, Barrington, having with him twelve of the line, dis-
covered and chased a convoy laden with stores for the fleet in the
East Indies. One of the ships of the line accompanying it, the
Pegase, 74, suri-endered, after a night action of three hours with
the Foudroya7it, 80, Captain John Jervis,^ afterwards Earl St.
^ Son of Captain Sir Richard Hughes, Bart. (1), who was for many years Com-
missioner at Portsmouth, and who died in 1782. The younger officer died a full
Admiral in )812.
^ Who \vas made a K. B. ibr this service.
17S2.] IIUII'E IN THE fILiXSEL. 530
Vincent. Of nineteen transports, thirteen, one of whieli, the Acti.on-
naire, was a G4-g'un ship a,riiu;(l enJhUr,^ were taken; a weighty Ijlow
to tlie great Suft'ren, wluise eliief dil'lii-iilty in India was inadequate
material of war, and especially of spars, of wliicli the Actionnaire
carried an outfit for four sliips of the line. After Barrington'.s
return, Kenipenfelt made a similar but uneventful cruise of a month
in the ISay.
Howe himself went first to the North Sea in the month of May.
Having there held the Dutch in clieck during a critical moment,
he was directed next to go to the entrance of tlie Cliannel, leaving
only a division in the Downs. Infurmaticin had been received that
an allied fleet of thirty-two ships of the line, five only of which were
French, had sailed from Cadiz eai-ly in .June, to cruise between
Ushant and Scilly. It was expected that they would be joined there
by a reinforcement from Brest, and liy the Dutch squadron in the
Texel, making a total of al)out fifty of the line, under the command
of the Spanish Admiral, Don Luis de Cordova. The Dutch did not
appear, owing probably to Howe's demonstration before their ports;
but eight ships from Brest raised the allied fleet to forty. To oppose
these Howe sailed on the 2nd of July with twenty-two sail, of which
eight were three-deckers. Before his return, on the 7th of August,
he was joined by eight others ; mostly, however, sixty-fours. Witli
this inferiority of numbers the British Admiral could expect only to
act on the defensive, unless some specially favourable oppoiiunity
should offer. The matter of most immediate concern was the arrival
of the Jamaica convoy, then daily expected ; with which, it may be
mentioned, de Grasse also was returning to England, a prisoner of
war on board the Sandwich.
On its voyage north, the combined fleet captured on June 25th
eighteen ships of a British convoy bound for Canada. A few days
later it was fixed in the chops of the Channel, covering the ground
from Ushant to Scilly. On the evening of July 7th it was sighted
off Scilly by Howe, who then had with him twenty-five sail. The
allies prepared for action; but the British Admiral, possessing a
thorough knowledge of the neighbouring coasts, either in his own
person or in some of his officers, led the fleet by night through the
passage between Scilly and Land's End. On the following morninp-
he was no more to be seen, and the enemy, ignorant of the manner
1 That is, with a great part of her guns dismounted, and below as cargo.
540 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17(i2-17H:}. [1782.
of his evasion, was thrown wholly off his track. ^ A strong gale of
wind afterwards forcing the allies to the southward, Ijoth convoy and
fleet slipped hy successfully, and again reached England.
Howe was ordered now to prepare to throw reinforcements and
supplies into Gibraltar, which had not received relief since Darby's
visit, in April, 1781. For this urgent and critical service it was
determined to concentrate the whole Channel Fleet at Spithead,
where also the transports and sup[)ly-ships were directed to rendez-
vous. It was while thus assem])ling for the relief of Gibraltar that
there occurred the celebrated incident of the Royal George, a 100-gun
ship, while being heeled for under-water repairs, oversetting and
sinking at lier anchors, carrying down witli her Rear-Admiral
Kempenfelt and about 900 souls, including many women and chil-
dren. This was on the 29th of August, 1782. On the 11th of
September the expedition started, 183 sail in all; thirty-four being
ships of the line, with a dozen smaller cruisers, the rest unarmed
vessels. Of the latter, 31 were destined for Gibraltar, the remainder
being trading ships for different parts of the world. With so exten-
sive a charge, the danger to wliich had been emphasised by numerous
captures from convoys during the war, Howe's progress was olow.
It is told tliat shortly before reaching Cape Finisterre, but after a
violent gale of wind, the full tally of 183 sail was counted. After
passing Finisterre, the several " trades " probably parted from the
grand fleet.
On the 8th of October, oft" Cape St. Vincent, a frigate, the
Latona, 38, was sent ahead for information. It was known that a
great combined force of ships of war lay in ^Vlgeciras Bay, — opposite
Gibraltar, — and that an attack upon the works was in contempla-
tion; but much might have hai:>pened meantime. Much, in fact,
had happened. A \'iolent gale of wind on the 10th of September
liad driven some of the allied fleet from their moorings, one vessel,
the San Miguel, 72, being forced under the l)atteries of Gibraltar,
where she had to surrender; but there still remained the formidable
number of 48 ships of the line, anchored only four miles from tlie point
which the relief ships must reach. This was the problem which
Howe had to solve. ]More important still, though of less bearing
1 Chevalier, following La Motte-Picquet's report, ascribes Howe's escape to greater
speed. ('Mar. Fran, en 17T8': p. 335.) It must be noted that Howe's object was
not merely to escape, up Channel, by better sailing, but to get to the westward, past
the allies, a feat impracticable save by a stratagem such as is mentioned.
17SL'.] ]t()U-l-: AT (Sllin.il.TMl.. r)4T
upiiii liis iiiissifiii, was tlii' clu'criiiy news brouglit liy tlio frigate,
when she rejdiucd cm tlic iMth, that the Idiig-mtended attack had
been made on the loth of Hepteniher, and had been repelled gloriously
and decisively. The heavily protected Spanish floating batteri(!s,
from which success had been expected coiilidently, one and all had
been set on tire and destroytul. If II owe could introduce his suc-
cours, the fortress was saved.
The admiral at once summoned his subordinate officers, gave
them full and particular instructions for the momentous undertakings
and issued at the same time, to the masters of the supply -sliips,.
precise information as to local conditions of wind and currents at
Gibraltar, to enable them more surely to reach their anchorage. On
the 11th of October, being now close to its destination, the fleet
bore up for the Straits, which it entered at noon with a fair westerly
wind. The convoy went first, — sailing before the wind it was thus
to leeward of the fleet, in a position to be defended, — and the ships
of war followed at some distance in three divisions, one of which was
led V)_y Howe himself. iVt G r.M. the supply-ships were off the
mouth of the Bay, ^^ith a wind fair for the mole; but, through
neglect of the instructions given, all but four missed the entrance,
and were swept to the eastward of the Rock, whither the fleet of
course had to follow tliem.
On the 13th the combined fleets came out, being induced to quit
their commanding position at Algeciras by fears for two of their
number, -which shortly before had been driven to the eastward.
During the forenoon of the same da}' the British were off the Spanish
coast, fifty miles east of Gibraltar. At sunset the allies were seen
ai)proaching, and Howe formed his fleet, but sent the supply-ships to
anchor at the Zaffarine Islands, on the coast of Barbary, to await
events. Next morning the enemy was close to land, but visible only
from the mastheads; the British apparently having headed south
during the night. On the 15th the wind came to the eastward, fair
for Gibraltar, to\vards which all the British began cautiously to
move. By the evening of the 16th, eighteen of the convoy were
safe at the mole ; and on the 18th all had arrived, besides a fireship:
with 1,.500 barrels of jjowder, sent in by the Admiral upon the govern-
or's requisition. Throughout this critical time, the combined fleets,
seem to ha\-e been out of sight. Either intentionally or carelessly,
they had got to the eastward and there remained ; having rallied their
separated ships, but allowed Gibraltar to be replenished for a year.
542 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1782.
On the morning of the 19tli ihcy iijipeared in the north-ea.st, hut the
relief was then accomplished and Howe put out to sea. He was
not willing to fight in mid-Straits, embarrassed by currents and the
land ; but when outside he l)rought-to, to allow the enemy to attack
if they would, they having the weather-gage. On the following day,
the 20th, towards sunset they bore down, and a partial engagement
ensued; but it was wholly indecisive, and next day was not renewed.
The British loss was 68 killed and 208 wounded ; that of the allies
60 killed and 320 wounded. On the l-4th of November the fleet
regained Spithead.
The services rendered to his country by Howe on this occasion
were eminentl}- characteristic of the special qualities of that great
oificer, in whom was illustrated to the highest degree the solid
strength attainable by a man not brilliant, but most able, who gives
himself heart and soul to professional acquirement. In him, pro-
found and extensive professional knowledge, which is not inborn
but gained, was joined to great natural stajdng powers ; and the com-
bination eminently fitted him for the part we have seen him plaj' in
Delaware Baj-, at New York, before Rhode Island, in the Channel,
and now at Gibraltar. The iitmost of skill, the utmost of patience,
the utmost of ^persistence, such had Howe ; and having these, he was
particularly apt for the defensive operations, upon the conduct of
which chiefly must rest his well-deserved renown.
A true and noble tribute has been paid bj' a French officer to this
relief of Gibraltar: ^ —
" The qualities displayed by Lord Howe during this short campaign rose to
the full height of the mission which he had to fulfil. This operation, one of the
finest in the War of American Independence, merits a praise equal to that of a
victory. If the English fleet was favoured by circumstances, — and it is rare that
in such enterprises one can succeed without the aid of fortune, — it was al>ove all
the Commander-in-Chief's quickness of perception, the accuracy of his judgment,
and the rapidity of his decisions, that assured success."
To this well-weighed, yet lofty praise of the Admiral, the same
writer has added words that the British Navy may remember long
with pride, as sealing the record of this war, of which the relief of
Gibraltar marked the close in European and American waters. After
according credit to the Admiralty for the uniform high speed of the
British vessels, and to Howe for his comprehension and use of this
advantage, Captain Chevalier goes on : —
' Chevalier : ' Mar. Fran, dans la Guerre de 1778,' p. 358.
1778.] PONIJICHERRY CAPITULATES. 543
■' Finally, if we may judge by the results, the Commander-in-Chiof of the Eng-
lish fleet could not but think liiniself most happy in his captains. There were
neither separations, nor collisions, nor casualties ; and there occurred none of those
events, so frequent in the experiences of a squadron, which ofteu oblige admirals
to take a couj'se wliolly contrary to the end they have in view. In contemplation
of this unvexed navigation of Admiral Howe, it is impossible not to recall the
unhapjiy incidents which from the 9th to the l'2lh of April befell the squadron of
the Count de Grasse. ... If it is just to admit that Lord Howe displayed the
highest talent, it should be added that he had in his hands excellent instruments."
To quote another French writer: "Quantity disappeared before
quality."
Tlie operations in India, both naval and military, stand by theni-
.selves, without direct influence upon transactions el.sewhere, and
unaffected also by these, except in so far as necessary succours were
intercepted sometimes in European waters. The cause of this isola-
tion was the distance of India from Europe ; from four to six rnontlis
being required by a fleet for the voyage.
Certain intelligence of the war between Great Britain and France
reached Calcutta July 7th, 1778. On the same day the Governor-
General ordered immediate preparations to attack Pondicherry, the
principal seaport of the French. The ami}- arrived before the place
on the 8th of August, and on the same day Commodore Sir Edward
Vernon 1 anchored in the roads to blockade hj sea. A French
squadron, under Captain Tronjoly, soon after appearing in the ofBng,
Vernon gave chase, and on the 10th an action ensued. The forces
engaged were about equal, the French, if anything, slightly superior;
a sixty-gun ship and four smaller vessels being on each side. As
the French then went into Pondicherry, the immediate advantage
may be conceded to them; but, Vernon returning on the 20th,
Tronjoly soon after quitted the roads, and returned to the He de
France. 2 From that day the British squadron blockaded closely, and
on the 17th of October Pondicherry capitulated.
1 British Squadron in the East Indies under Commodore Sh- Edward Vernon, Kt.,
in 1778.
Pi„g„ gf) ( Commodore Sir Edward Vernon.
( Capt. Benjamin JIarloiv.
Asia 54 Capt. George Vandeput.
Coventry 28 Capt. John Alexander Panton.
Seahorse 24 Commander Alexander M'Coy.
Cormorant .... 18 Commander William Owen.*
* Who, being killed by accident, was succeeded by Commander Charles ilorice Pole.
— W. L. C.
' Xow Mauritius.
544
MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783.
[1778.
HE
INDIA
AND Ceylon.
f^ OK Ca i. i
INDIA AND CEYLON.
1781.] SUFFJil'JN'S CAMI'AiaX J\ ISDIA. 545
On the 7tli of March, 177'.), llciir-Adiniral Sir Edward Hughes,
K. B., sailed for the East Indies with a small squadron. > Tlie
French also sent out occasional ships; but in 1779 and 1780 these
went no further than the He de France, their naval station in the
Indian Ocean. Hughes's force remained unopposed during those
years. The period was critical, for the British were at war with
Hyder All, Sultan of Mysore, and witli the Mahrattas; ami all
depended upon conuiiand of the sea. In Januaiy, 1781, when
Hughes was wintering at Bombay, the French squadron under Comte
d'Orves appeared off the Coromandel coast, but, despite Hyder All's
entreaties, it refused to co-operate with him. The different spirit
of the two commanders may be illustrated from contemporary
documents.
" We have advices from Fort St. George of a French squadron wliich aiipeared
off that place on January 25, 26, and 27, consisting of 1 seventy-four, 4 sixty-fours,
and 2 fifties. They proceeded south without making any attempt on five Indiamen
then in the roads, v;\t\\ a number of vessels laden with grain ai'd provisions ; the
destroying of which might have been easily accomplished, and would have been
severely felt."
"On December 8th, off Mangalore," ^ writes Hughes, "I saw two ships, a.
large snow, three ketches, and many smaller vessels at anchor in the road with
Hyder's flag flying ; and, standing close, found them vessels of force and all armed
for war. I anchored as close as possible, sent in all armed boats, under cover of
three smaller ships of war, whicli ancliored in four fathoms water, close to the
enemy's ships. In two hours took and burned the two ships, one of 28 and one of
26 guns, and took or destroyed all the others, save one which, by throwing every-
thing overboard, escaped over the bar into the port. Lost 1 lieutenant and 10 men
killed, 2 lieutenants and 51 wounded."
D'Orves returned to the He de France.
When war with Holland began, the British government decided
to attempt the capture of the Cape of Good Hope. For that object a
squadron of 1 seventy-four, 1 sixty-four, and 3 fifties, witli numerous
smaller vessels, under Commodore George Johnstone, convoying a
^ Squadron which, under Rear-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K. B. (B), sailed
for India from St. Helens in 1779. — W. L. C.
Rpar-Adiiiiral Sir Edward Hu"hes, K. B.
iiuperb 74
Capt. Robert Simontoii.
Exeter 64 Capt. Richard Kins.
Eagle 64 Capt. Ambrose Reddall.
Burford 64 Capt. Peter Rainier (1).
Worcester .... 64 Capt. George Talbot.
Belleish 64 Capt. John Brooks.
Kymph 14 Commander John Blankett.
■ On the Malabar — western — coast.
VOL III — 35
54G
MAJUK OPJiUAriOXS. 1702-1783.
[1781.
considerable body of troops, sailed from England on the 13th of
March, 1781, in company witli the Channel fleet nnder Vice-Admiral
George Darby, then on its way to relieve Gibraltar. The French
government, having timely notice of the expedition, undertook to
frnstrate it; detailing for that purpose a division of 2 seventy-foure,
and 3 sixty-fours, under the since celebrated Suffren.^ These ships
left Brest on the 22nd of March, with the fleet of de Grasse. They
also carried some battalions of troops.
On April 11th the British squadron reached Porto Praya, Cape
de Verde Islands. This bay is open to the southward, extending
from east to west about a mile and a half, and is within the limits
of the north-east trade-winds. Although aware that a French division
was on his track, and conscious, by the admissions of his report, that
protection could not be expected from the neutrality of the place,
Johnstone permitted his vessels to anchor without reference to
attack. His own flagship, the Romney, 50, was so surrounded by
others tliat she could fii'e only with great caution through intervals.
On the IGth of April, at 9.30 a.m., the Isis, 50, which was the
outermost of the British squadron, signalled eleven sail in the
north-east. Fifteen hundred persons were then ashore engaged in
watering, fishing, embarking cattle, and amusing themselves. The
strangers were Suffren's division. The meeting was not expected by
^ Squadrons under Commodore George Johnstone and M. de Suffren in the
action in Porto Prava, on April 16th, 1781.
BRITISH. j
FRENCH.
SHIPS
O
50
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
74
COMMANDERS.
Eomney . . .
( Commod. George Johnstone.
1 Capt. Roddaiu Home.
Ilcros ....
M. le Bailli de Suffren.
Annibul . . .
74
Capt. de Tremigon, Senr.t
Hero ....
74
Capt. James Hawker.
Artesien . . .
64
Capt. de Cardaillac.J
Monmouth . .
64
Capt. James Alms (1).
SvhiTtx. . . .
64
Capt. du ChOleau.
Jupiter . . .
50
Capt. Thomas Pasley.
Vengeur . . .
&1
Capt. de Forbin.
Isis
50
Capt. Evelyn Sutton.
Diana ....
32
Capt. Sir William Chaloner Bura-
aby, Bart.
Ju^son ....
32
Capt. James Pigott.
Active ....
32
Capt. Thomas Mackenzie.
Eattlemake . .
U
Commander Peter Clements.
I'orto ....
IG
Commander the Hon. Thomas
Charles Lumley.
* Armed ships. 1
lie Eoyal Charlotte was hired.
Infernal (f. s.) .
8
Commander Henry d'Esterre Darby.
t Armed trauspor
t.
Terror (bomb) .
8
Commander Charles Wood.
J Killed.
Tifp)i(/eur {cnttGT)
14
Lieut. Phili]> d'Auvergne.
S'lit Carlos * . .
20
Commander John Boyle.
Pondicherry t .
20
Lieut. Thomas Saunders Grove.
Jioyal Charlotte *
20
Commander Thomas Stanhope Ben-
nett.
and ten East Iiidiiii
lei
1, each of 26 guns.
W. L. C.
1781 .J
aUFFRKN AM) JumWSTUNE.
the French commaiuler, whose object in entering was simply to
complete the water of the ships; hut he determined at once to attack,
and hauled round the east jioiut of the bay in column, the two
seventy-fours at the head, his own ship, the Ili'ros, leading with the
signal for battle (line al)). lie luffed to the wind, and anchored five
hundred feet from the starboard beam of the IJritisli Hero, 74 (f^,
whence he at once opened fire from botli broadsides. His next
astern, the Amdbal (b), brought up immediately ahead of him, Ijut
SITFFREN AKD JOHNSTONE. PORTO PRAYA.
SO close that the Hcros had to veer cable and drop astern (a), which
brought her on the beam of the Blonmouth, 64. ^ The captain of the
Aniiihiil had thouglit the order for battle merely precautionary, and
had not cleared for action. He was therefore taken unawares, and
his ship did no service proportionate to her force. The third French
vessel (c) reached her station, but her captain was struck dead just
1 I infer, from the accounts, that the Monmouth was well east of the Heiv, that
the French had passed her first, and that the He'ros was now on her port heani ; but
this point is not certain.
548 MAJOR (JPJil'ATIOyS. 1702-1783. [1781.
when about to anchor, and in the confusion the anchor was not let
go. The ship drifted foul of a British East Indianian, which she
carried out to sea (c' c") The two remaining French (d, e) simply
cannonaded as they passed across the bay's mouth, failing through
mishap or awkwardness to leaeli an effective position.
The attack thus became a mere rough and tumble, in which the
two seventy-fours alone sustained the French side. After three
quarters of an hour, Suffren, seeing that the attempt had failed,
slipped his cable and piit to sea. The Annihal followed, but she had
been so damaged that all her masts went overljoard ; fortunatel}-, not
until her head was pointed out of the harbour. Johnstone, thus
luckily escaping the consequences of his neglect, now called his cap-
tains together to learn the condition of their ships, and tlicn ordered
them to cut their cables and pursue. All obeyed except Captain
Sutton of tlie Ids, who represented that the spars and rigging of liis
ship could not bear sail at once. Johnstone then ordered him to
come out anyhow, Mhich he did, and his fore topmast shortly went
overboard. The disability of this ship so weighed upon the Commo-
dore that his pursuit was exceedingly sluggish; and, the Annihal
having got a bit of canvas on a jury foremast, the French kept draw-
ing him away to leeward. Night, therefore, was falling as he came
near them; the /s/s and Monmoutli were two or three miles astern;
the sea was increasing; if he got much further to leeward, he could
not get back; lie had forgotten to appoint a rendezvous where the
convoy might rejoin; a night action, he considered, Avas not to be
thought of. Yet, if he let the eneni}- go, they might anticipate him
at the Cape. In short, Johnstone underwent the ''anguish" of an
undecided man in a "cruel situation," ^ and of course decided to rim
no risks. He returned therefore to Porto Praya, put the captain of
the Isis under arrest, and remained in port for a fortnight. Suffren
hurried on to the Cape, got there first, landed his troops, and secured
the colony against attack. Johnstone arrived in the neighbourhood
some time later, and, finding himself anticipated, turned aside to
Saldaidia Bay, where he captured five Dutch East Indiamen. He
then sent the Hero, Monmouth, and Isis, on to India, to reinforce
Hughes, and himself went back to England.
No accusation of misbehaviour lies against any of the British
subordinates in this affair of Porto Praya. The captain of the Isis
was brought to a court-martial, and honourably acquitted of all the
^ Expressions in Julinstoiie's Report.
1782] SUFFREN AN J) IICdllES. 549
chars^es. The discredit/ of tlic .surprise was not redeeuieil liy any
exliil)ition of intelligence, energy, or professional capacity, on the
part of the officer in charge. It has he(!ii said that lie never iiad
commanded a post-ship ' before he was intrusted with this very
important mission, and it is reasonably sure that his selection for it
was due to attacks made by him upon the professional conduct of
Keppel and Howe, when those admirals were at variance witli the
administration. His preposterous mismanagement, therefore, was
probably not wholly bitter to the Navy at large. In the British ships
of war, the entire loss in men, as reported, was only 9 killed, 47
wounded. Several casualties from chance shots occurred on Ixiard
the convoy, bringing up the total to 3G killed and 130 wounded.-
The French admit 105 killed and 204 wounded, all but 19 being in
the Heros and Annihal. Although precipitated by Suffren, the affair
clearly was as great a surprise to his squadron as to the British.
Therefore, the latter, being already at anchor and more luimerous
as engaged, had a distinct advantage; to which also contributed
musketry fire from the transports. Nevertheless, the result cannot
be deemed creditable to the French captains or gunner}-.
Suffren remained in the neighbourhood of the Cape for two
months. Then, having seen the colony secure, independent of his
squadron, he departed for the He de France, arriving there October
25th. On the 17th of December the whole French force, under the
command of d'Orves, sailed for the Goromandel coast. On the way
the British 50-gun ship Hannibal, Captain Alexander Christie, was
taken. On the 9th of February, 1782, Comte d'Orves died, and
Suffren found himself at the head of twelve ships of the line: 3
seventj'-fours, 7 sixty-fours, and 2 fifties.^ On the 15th Hughes's
fleet was sighted, under the guns of Madras. It numbered nine of
the line: 2 seventy-fours, 1 sixty-eight, 5 sixty-fours, and 1 fifty.
Suffren stood south towards Pondicherry, which had passed into the
power of Hyder Ali. After nightfall Hughes got under way, and
1 Charnock, however, says that in 1762, immediately after receiving his post-
commission, he commanded in succession the Hind, 20, and the Wager, 20. Moreover,
before his appointment to the expedition of 1781, he had been Commodore on the
Lisbon Station. But he had spent comparatively little time at sea as a captain. —
W. L. C.
2 Details are in Schomherg, iv. ."385. — W. L. C.
^ One being the captured British Hannibal, 50, which was commissioned by Cap-
tain Morard de Galles, retaining tlie English form of the name, Hannibal, to distinguish
her from the Annibal, 74, already in tlie squadron.
550
MAJUlt. Ul'EHATIONS. 17Gl'-178:3.
[1782
also steered soutli. II(! feared for Trincomale, in Ceylon, recentl}'
a Dutch port, which the British had cajjtured on the 5tli of January.
It was a valuable naval station, and as yet most imjjerfectly defended.
At daylight the British saw the French squadron ^ twelve miles
east (A, A) and its transports nine miles south-west (c). Hughes
chased the latter and took six. Suffren pursued, but could not over-
take before sunset, and both fleets steered south-east during tlie night.
Next morning there were light north-north-east airs, and the French
were six miles north-east of the British (B, B). The latter formed
line on the port tack (a), heading to seaward; Hughes hoping that
thus the usual sea-breeze would find him to windward. The breeze,
however, did not make as expected ; and, as the north-east puffs were
bringing the enemy down, he kept off before the wind (b) to gain
time for his ships to close their intervals, which were too great. At
4 P.M. the near approach of the French compelled him to fonn line
again, on the port tack, heading easterly. The rear ship, Exeter, G4,
was left separated, out of due support from those ahead (C). Suffren,
leading one section of his fleet in person, passed to windward of the
British .ami French Squ;uh'ons in the action off Sadras, Feb. 17th, 17S2.
BRITISH.
FBENCH.
SHIPS.
z
p
o
64
64
64
64
74
74
50
68
64
24
14
COMMANDERS.
smps.
2
S
a
CA
CA
64
.W
74
74
74
m
64
50
C4
3S
3-2
32
22
16
10
COMMANDERS.
Eugle ....
Monmouth . .
Worcester . .
Surford . . .
Superb. . . .
Hero ....
Isis
Monarca . . .
Ezeter ....
Seahorse . .
Manilla . .
Capt. Ambrose Reddall.
Capt. James Abus (1).
Capt. George Talbot.
Capt. Peter Rainier (1).
Vice-Admiral Sir Edward
Hughes, K.B. (B).
Capt. William Stevens.
Capt. Charles Wood.
Capt. the Hon. Thos. Chas.
Lumley.
Capt. John Gell.
I Commod. Richard King.
! Capt. Henry Reynolds.
Capt. Robert Montagu.
Lieut. William Robinson.
Severe ....
Vp7igeur . . .
Brillant . . .
Flam and , . .
.iimibal . . .
IfcTOS ....
Orient ....
Arlcsien . . .
Sphinr ....
Ajax ....
Hannibal . . .
Bizarre . . .
Ponrvoyeuse . .
Fine ....
Bellotie . . .
Subtile. . . .
Syljihide . . .
Diligent . . .
Capt. de ViUeneuve-Cillart,
Capt. de Forbin.
Capt. de St. Felix.
Capt. de CuvervUle.
Capt. du Tromeliu.
( M. de Suffren, Chef d'Esc.
\ Capt. de Moissac.
Capt. de Lapalliere.
Capt. Bide de Maurville.
Capt. du Chilleau.
Capt. Bouvet.
Capt. Morard de Galles.
Capt. de Lalandelle.
Capt. de Beaulieu.
Capt. Perrier de Salvert.
Capt. de Ruyter.
Capt. deGaUfet.
The Briti-sh list is founded upon that in Beatson, vi. 298, Steel's 'Navy List'
(1782), and dispatches; the French list, on Trublet : 'Hi.st. de la Campagne de
rinde' (1801); 'Relation Detaille'e,' etc. (1783); Chevalier: 'Hist, de la Mar.
Fran9.' and Cuiuit : ' Hist, du Bailli de Suffren.' But some of these contradict the
others. From some it would appear that the Pourvoyeusc was also in the line. —
W. L. C.
_j!V.«f i*rtv ^- y- /-K .
'/y.t'Xf'.
.-^w- a^^!^ iS^s^^^a^t^ 1^ ,. _2^^ia^«'.
17S2.]
aUFFUEK AND ilUdllES.
B51
British line, from the re;ir, ;ih far as Hughes's ilagship, which was
fifth from tlie van. Tliere he stopped, and kept at lialf cannon-sliot,
to prevent tlie four van ships from tacking to relieve their consorts.
It was his intention that the second half of liis fleet should attack the
other side of the English (D), but only two of them did so, engag-
ing to leeward the extreme rear (C). The result was, to use
Hughes's own words, that "the enemy brought eight of their best
ships to the attack of live of ours."' It will be noted with interest
A ^ N
0'
-i5
SuFFBEN AND HuOHES
/P" '~ rra "' /T32
On
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SUFFllEN AND HrOllKS.
that these were exactly the numbers engaged in the first act of the
battle of the Nile. The Exeter (like the Guurricr at the Nile)
received the fresh Ijroadsides of the first five of the enemy, and then
remained in close action on both sides, assailed Ijy two, and at last by
three, oj^ponents, — two fifties, and one sixty-four. "When the third
approached, the master of the ship asked Commodore Richard King,
whose broad pennant flew at her masthead, " "What is to be done ? "
"There is nothing to be done," replied King, "but to fight her till
she sinks." Her loss, 10 killed and 45 wounded, was not creditable
552 MAJOR OFEUATIOKS. 1702-1783. [1782.
under the circumstances to the French gunner}-, which liail been
poor also at Porto Praya. At 6 p.m. the wind sliifted to south-east,
tlrrowing all on tlie other tack, and enabling the British van to come
into action. Darkness now approaching, Suffren hauled oE and
anchored at Pondicherry. Hughes went on to Trincomale to refit.
The British loss had been 32 killed, among whom were Captain
A\'illiam Stevens of the flagship, and Captain Henry Reynolds, of the
Exeter, and 83 wounded. The French had 30 killed ; the number of
their wounded is put by Professor Laughton at 100.
On the 12th of IMareh Hughes returned to ^Madras, and towards
the end of tlie month sailed again for Trincomale, carrying reinforce-
ments and supplies. On the 30th he was joined at sea by the Sultan,
74, and the Magnanime, 64,' just from England. Suffren had
remained on the coast from reasons of jiolicj', to encourage Hyder
Ali in his leaning to the French; but, after landing a contingent of
troops on the 22nd of March, to assist at the siege of the British joort
of Cuddalore, he put to sea on the 23rd, and went south, hoping to
intercept the Sultan and Magnanime off the south end of Ceylon.
On the 9th of April he sighted the British fleet to the south and west
.of him. Hughes, attaching the first importance to the strengthening
of Trincomale, had resolved neither to seek nor to shun action. He
therefore continued his course, light northerly airs prevailing, until
Hie 11th, when, being about fifty miles to the north-east of his port, he
bore away for it. Next morning, April 12th, finding that the enemy
could overtake his rear sliips, he formed line on the starboard tack,'
1 Line of battle of the squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K. B.,
in the action off Providien, on April 12th, 1782.
I Commodore Richard King.
Capt. Charles Hughes.
Capt. James Hawker.
Capt. the Hon. Thos. Chas. Luralej'.
Capt. Peter Rainier (1).
Capt. John Cell.
( Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, K.B. (B).
I Capt. the Hon. Dunbar Maclellan (Actg. ).
Capt. James Alms (1).
Capt. George Talbot.
Capt. Ambrose Eeddall.
Capt. James Watt.
Capt. Charles Wolseley.
Capt. Robert Montagu.
Commander Henry Xeweome.
The above is taken, the spelling of names being corrected, from Beatson, vi. 298 ;
but the order of the line was slightly modified at the last moment. — AV. L. C.
Exeter 64 \
{ I
Hero
74
Isis
50
Burford
64
Monarca
6S
Superh
74
Monmouth
64
TForccstcr
64
Eagle
64
Sultan
74
Magnanime
64
Seahorse
24
Combustion (f. s. )
14
1782.]
SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
553
at two cables' intervals, headintj to the westward, towards the coast
of Ceylon, wind north by east, and the French dead to windward
(A, A). Snffren drew u[) liis line on the same tack, parallel to
the Britisli (a), and at 11 a.m. gave the signal to steer west-south-
west all togethe]'; his vessels going down in a slanting direction,
each steering for one of the enemy. Having twelve ships to eleven,
the twelfth was ordered to place herself on the off side of the rear
British, which would thus have two antagonists.
= — -■ ■
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SuFFREN AND HuCHES
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SUFFKEN AND HUGHES.
In such simultaneous approach it commonly occurred that the
attacking line ceased to be parallel with the foe's, its van becoming
nearer and rear more distant. So it was here. Further, the British
opening fire as soon as the leading French were within range, the
latter at once hauled up to reply. Suffren, in the centre, wishing
closest action, signalled them to keep away again, and himself Imre
down wrathfuUy upon Hughes to within pistol-shot; in which he
was supported closely by his next ahead and the two next astern.
The rear of the French, though engaged, remained too far distant
5'A MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17(iL'-17.s3. [1782.
Their line, tlierefore, resembled a curve, the middle of which — four
or five ships — was tangent to the British centre (B). At tliis jjoint
the heat of the attack fell upon Hughes's flagship, the Superb, 74
(C, d), and her next ahead, the Monmouth, 64 (c). Suffren's ship,
the Heros, having much of her rigging cut, could not shorten sail,
shot by the Superb, and brought up abreast the Monmouth. The
latter, already hotly engaged by one of her own class, and losing her
main and mizzen masts in this unequal new contest, was forced at 3
P.M. to bear up out of the line. The place of the Hcros alongside
the Superb was taken by the Orient, 74, supported by the Brillant,
64 ; and when the Monmouth kept off, the attack of these two ships
was reinforced by the half-dozen stern chasers of the Heros, which
had drifted into the British line, and now fired into the SxipcrVs
bows. The conflict between these five ships, two British and three
French, was one of the bloodiest in naval annals; the loss of the
Superb, 59 killed and 'Mi wounded, and of the Monmouth, 45 killed
and 102 wounded, equalling that of the much larger vessels that
bore the flags of Nelson and CoUingwood at Trafalgar. The loss of
the three French was 52 killed and 142 wounded ; but to this should
be added properly that of the Sphinx, 64, the Monmouth'' s fu-st adver-
sary: 22 killed and 74 wounded. At 3.40 p.m., fearing that if he
continued steering west he would get entangled with the shore,
Hughes wore his ships, forming line on the port tack. The French
also wore, and Suffren hoped to secure the Mojwiouth, which was left
between the two lines: but the quickness of a British captain.
Hawker, of the Hero, ran a tow-rope to her in time, and she was
thus dragged out of danger. At 5.40 Hughes anchored, and Suffren
did the same at 8 p. m. The total British loss in men on this occasion
was 137 killed and 430 wounded; that of the French 137 killed and
357 wounded.
The exhausted enemies remained at anchor in the open sea, two
miles apart, for a week, repairing. On the 19th of April the French
got under way and made a demonstration before the British, inviting
battle, yet not attacking ; but the condition of the Monmouth forbade
Hughes from moving. Suffren therefore departed to Batacalo, in
Ceylon, south of Trincomale, where he covered his own convoj-s from
Europe, and flanked the approach of his adversary's. Hughes, on
the 22nd of April, got into Trincomale, where he remained till June
23rd. He then went to Negapatam, formerly a Dutch possession,
but then held by the British. There he learned that Suffren, who
1782.]
SUFFREN AND llVtJllES.
555
iiieauwliile had captured .several Ikitisli tnuisports, was a few miles
north of liim, at Cuddalore, wliich had surrendered to Ilyder Ali on
April 4tli. On the 5th of July, at 1 p.m., the French squadron
appeared. At 3 p.m. Hughes put to seu, and stood soutli during
the night to gain the wind, — the south-west monsoon now blowing.
Next morning, at daylight, the Frencli were seen at anchor,
seven or eight miles to leeward. At 6 a.bi. they began to get under
way. One of their sixty-fours, the Ajax, liad lost her main and
SuFFREf^ AMD HoGHES
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SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
mizzen topmasts in a violent squall on the previous afternoon, and
was not in the line. There wei'e therefore eleven ships on each side.
The action, known as that of Negapatam, began sliDrtly before 11,
when both fleets were on the starboard tack, heading south-south-east,
wind south-west. The British being to windward, Hughes ordered
his fleet to bear up together to the attack, exactly as Suffren had
done on the 12th of April. As commonly happened, the rear got
less close than tlie van (Position I.). The fourth shij) in the French
55G MJJOR OPERATIONS. 170-2-1783. [1782.
order (a), losing her mainmast early, dropped to leeward of the line
(a'), and astern of her place (a"). At half -past noon the wind flew
suddenly to south-south-east, — the sea-breeze, — taking the ships a
little on the port bow. Most of them, on both sides, paid oft" from
the enemy, the British to starboard, the French to port; but between
the main lines, which were in the momentary confusion consequent
upon such an incident, were left six ships . — tour British and two
French — that had turned the other way (Position II.). These were
the Burford, Sultan (s), Worcester, and Eagle, fourth, fifth, eighth,
and tenth, in the British order ; and the Severe (b), third in the
French, with the dismasted Brillant, towards the rear of the fight (a).
Under these conditions, the SSvlre, 64, underwent a short but close
action with the Sultan, 74; and with two other British ships, accord-
ing to the report of the Sevire's captain. The remainder of the
incident shall be given in the latter's own words.
" Seeing the French squadron drawing off, — for all the ships except the
Brilhml liad fallen off on the other tack, — Captain de Cillart thought it useless to
prolong his defence, and had the fiag hauled down. The ships engaged with him
immediately ceased their fu'e, and the one on the starboard side moved away. At
this moment the Severe fell off to starboard, and her saDs filled. Captain de Cillart
then ordered the fire to be resumed by his lower-deck guns, the only ones which
remained manned, and he rejoined his squadron " (Position III.).
When the Severe' s flag came down, Suffren was approaching with
his flagship. The Sultan wore to rejoin her fleet, and was raked by
the Scrh-c in so doing (Position III.). The Brillant, whose main-
mast had been shot away in conflict with either the Sultan or the
Burford, both much heavier ships, had at this later phase of the fight
fallen under the guns of the Worcester and the Eagle. Her captain,
de Saint-Ft^lix, was one of the most resolute of Suffren's officers.
She was rescued by the flagship, but she had lost 47 killed and 136
wounded, — an almost incredible slaughter, being over a third of the
usual complement of a sixty-four; and Suffren's ships were under-
manned.
These spirited episodes, and the fact that his four separated ships
were aijproaching the enemy, and being approached by them, caused
Hughes to give the orders to wear, and for a general chase ; the flag
for the line being hauled down. Two of his fleet, however, made
signals of disability; so he annulled the orders, and at 1.30 formed
on the port tack, recalling the engaged vessels. Both squadrons
now stood in shore^ and anchored at about G p.m. ; the British near
1782.] SUFFREN AND IlUdllliS. Bh"
Negapatani, the French some ten miles north. The hiss in tlic aulioii
had been: British, 77 killed, 233 wounded; French, 178 killed, 601
wounded. Among the slain was Captain the Hon. Dunhar Maclellan
of Hughes's flagsliip.
On the following day Suffren sailed for Cuddalore. There he
received word that two ships of the line — the Illustre, 74, and St.
Michel, GO, with a convoy of supplies and 600 troops — were to Ijo
expected shortly at Points de Galle, then a Dutch port, on the south-
west side of Ceylon. It was essential to cover these, and on the ISth
he was ready for sea; but the necessity of an interview with Hyder
Ali delayed him luitil the 1st of August, when he started for
Batacalo. On the 9th he arrived there, and on the 21st tlie reinforce-
ment joined him. Within forty-eight hours the supply-ships were
cleared, and the squadron sailed again with the object of taking
Trincomale. On the 2oth he was off the port, and, the opei'ation being
energetically pushed, the place capitulated on the 31st of August.
It is difficult to resist the impression that greater energy on
Hughes's part might have brought him up in time to prevent this
mishap. He reached Madras only on July 20th, a fortnight after the
late action; and he did not sail tlienco luitil the 20th of August,
notwithstanding that lie apprehended an attempt upon Trincomale.
Hence, when he arrived there on the 2nd of September, not only had
it passed into the hands of the enemy, but Suffren had re-embarked
already the men and the guns that liad been landed from his fleet.
When Hughes's approach was signalled, all preparations for sea were
hastened, and the following morning, at daybreak, the F'rench came
out. Hughes had been joined since the last action by the Sceptre,
64, Captain Samuel Graves, so that the respective forces in the action
fought off Trincomale on September 3rd were twelve of tiie line to
fourteen, viz.: British, 3 seventy-fours, 1 seventy, 1 sixty-eight, 6
sixty-fours, 1 fifty; French, 4 seventy -fours, 7 sixty-fours, 1 sixty,
2 fifties. Suffren had also put into the line a o6-gun ship, the
Co7isolante.^
While the French were getting under wa}', the British fleet was
standing towards the entrance, closehauled on the starboard tack, a
fresh south-west monsoon blowing. When Hughes made out the
hostile flags on the works, he kept away four points,^ and steered
east-south-east, still in cohunu, under short canvas. Suffren pursued,
1 Previously the British East Imliauian, Elizabeth.
^ Forty-five detrrees.
558 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17G2-178:i. [1782.
being to windward yet astern, with his fleet on a line of bearing:
that is, the line on vvhieh the ships were ranged was not tlie same as
the course which they were steering. This formation, wherein the
advance is oblique to the front, is very difficult to maintain. Wish-
ing to make the action, whatever the immediate event, decisive in
results, Ijy drawing the French well to leeward of the port, Hughes,
who was a thorough seaman and had good captains, plajed with his
eager enemy. " He kept avoiding me without taking flight," wrote
Suffren ; " or rather, he fled in good order, regulating his canvas by
his worst sailers ; and, keeping off by degrees, he steered from first
to last ten or twelve different courses." Hughes, on his pjart, while
perfectly clear as to his own object, was somewhat perplexed by the
seeming indecision of an adversary whose fighting purpose he knew
by experience. "Sometimes they edged down," he wrote; "some-
times they brought-to ; in no regular order, as if undetermined what
to do." These apparent vacillations were due to the difficulty of
maintaining the line of bearing, wliich was to be the line of battle;
and this difficulty was the greater, because Hughes was continually
altering his course and Suffren's ships were of unequal speed.
At length, at 2 p.m., being then twenty-five miles south-east of
the port, the French drew near enough to bear down. That this
movement might be carried out with jarecision, and all the vessels
come into action together, Suffren caused his fleet to haul to the
wind, on the starboard tack, to rectify the order. This also Ijeing
done poorly and slowly, he lost patience; and at 2.. 30, to si^ur on
the laggard ships, he gave the signal to attack, specifying pistol-
range (A). Even this not sufficing to fetch the delinquents promptly
into line with the flag-ship, the latter fired a gun to enforce obedi-
ence. Her own side being still turned towards the British, as she
waited, the report was taken by the men below to be the signal
for opening fire, and her whole broadside was discharged. This
example was followed by the other ships, so that the engagement,
instead of being close, was begun at half cannon-shot.
Owing to his measured and deliberate retreat, Hughes had his
fleet now in thoroughly good shape, well aligned and closed-up. The
French, starting from a poor formation to perform a difficult evolu-
tion, under fire, engaged in utter disorder (B). Seven ships, round-
ing-to too soon and fore-reaching, formed a confused group, much to
windward and somewhat ahead of the enemy's van. Imperfectly
deployed, their fire could not be adequately developed. In the
178-2.]
SUFFREN AND HUGHES.
55y
re;ir a somewhat similar uoiulitioii existed. Suffren, expecting tlie
liulk of liis line to liglit tlie British to windward, had directed
the Vengeur, 6-1, and the Cunsolante, 30, to double to leeward on the
extreme rear; but they, finding that the weather sides of the enemy
were not occupied, feared to go to leeward, lest they should be cut
off. They attacked the rear British ship, tlie Worcester, 04, CJaptaiu
Charles Wood, to windward; but the Monmouth, G4, Captain James
Alms (1), dropping down to her support, and the Vcnge^tr catching
5uffre:n and Huches.
C<P
a <y
V-'
, <r) c3 <r:i «o '^J
SUFFREN AXn HUGHES.
fire in the mizzen top, they were compelled to haul off. Only Suffren's
own ship, the Hcros, 74 (a), and her next astern, the Illustre, 74,
came at once to close action with the British centre ; but subsequently
the Ajax, 64, succeeding in clearing herself from the snarl in
the rear, took station ahead of the fferos. Upon these three fell the
brunt of the fight. They not only received the broadsides of the
ships immediatel}' opposed to them, but, the wind having now become
light yet free, the British vessels ahead and astern, by luffino- or
560 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 17(52-178:3. [1782.
keeping off, played also upon them. "The enemy foi-med a .semi-
circle around us," wrote Suffren's chief of staff, "and raked us ahead
and astern, as the ship came up and fell off with the helm to lee-
ward." The two seventy-fours were crushed under this lire. Both
lost their main and mizzen masts in the course of the day, and the
foretopmast of the flagship also fell. The Ajax arriving later, and
prol)ably drawing less attention, had only a topmast shot away.
The British total of killed and wounded was very evenly dis-
tributed throughout the fleet. Only the rear shij) lost an important
spar, — the main topmast. It was upon her, as already mentioned,
and upon the two leading ships, the Exeter and Isis, that fell the
heaviest fire, proportionate^, of the French. From the position of
the seven van ships of the latter, such fire as they could make must
needs he upon the extreme British van, and the Exeter was forced to
leave the line. The loss of the French that day was 82 killed and
255 wounded ; of which G4 killed and 178 wounded belonged to the
Hiros, Ilbtstre, and Aja.r. The British had 51 killed and 283
wounded; the greatest number of casualties in one ship being 56.
Singularly enough, in such a small list of deaths, three were com-
manding officers: Captains -Tames Watt, of the Sultcm, Charles
Wood of the Worcester, and the Hon. Thomas Charles Lumley of the
Isis.
At 5.30 P.M. the wind shifted suddenly from south-west to east-
south-east (C). The British wore together, formed on the other tack,
and continued the fight. It was during this final act, and at 6 P.M.,
that the mainmast of the French flagship came down. The van
sliii)S of the French had towed their heads round with boats before
4, in order to come to the support of the centre, in obedience to a
signal from Suffren ; but the light airs and calms had retarded tliem.
With the shift they approached, and passed in column betM'een their
crippled vessels and the enemy. This mauu;u\Te, and the failure of
(la\"light, brought the battle to an end. According to Hughes's
report, several of his fleet " were making mucli ^^•ater from sliot-holes
so very low down in the bottom as not to be come at to be effectually
stopped; and the whole had suffeied severely in their masts and
rigging." Trincomale being in the enem3-'s possession, and the east
coast of Ceylon an unsafe anchorage now, at the change of the
monsoon, he felt compelled to return to JNIadras, where he anchored
on the 9tli of the month. Suffren regained Trincomale on the 7th
of September, but the Orient, 74, running ashore at the entrance
178;j.] SUFFREN AND HUGUES. 561
and being lost, he remained outside until the 17th, saving material
from the wreck.
The break-up of the south-west monsoon, then at hand, is apt to
be accompanied by violent luuricancis, and is succeeded by the north-
east monsoon, during which tlie east coast, of the peninsula and of
Ceylon, is a lee shore, with heavy surf. Naval operations, there-
fore, were suspended for the winter. During that season Trincomale
is the only secure port. Deprived of it, Hughes determined to
go to Bombay, and for that purpose left Madras on the ITtli of
October. Four days later a reinforcement of five ships of the line
arrived from England, under Commodore Sir Richard Bickerton, Bart.,
who followed the Commander-in-Chief at once to the west coast. In
the course of December the entire British force was luiited at Bombay.
In Trincomale Suffren had a good anchorage; Imt tlie insuffi-
ciency of its resources, with other military considerations, decided
him to winter at Acheen, at the west end of Sumatra. He arrived
there on the 2ud of November, having first paid a visit to Cuddalore,
where the Bizarre, 64, was wrecked by carelessness. On the 20tli of
December he left Acheen for the Coromandel coast, having shortened
his stay to the eastward for reasons of policy. On the 8th ot
January, 1783, he was off Ganjam, on the Orissa coast, and thence
reached Trincomale again on the 2ord of February. There he was
joined on the 10th of March by three ships of the line from Europe : 2
seventy-fours and 1 sixty-four. Under their convoy came General de
Bussy, with 2,500 troops, who were at once dispatched to Cuddalore.
On the 10th of Ajiril Vice-Admiral Hughes, returning from
Bombay, passed Trincomale on the way to Madras. The various
maritime occurrences since the battle of September 3rd had reversed
the naval odds, and Hughes now had eighteen ships of the line, one
of which was an eighty, opposed to fifteen luider Suffren. Anotliei
important event in the affairs of India was the death of Hyder Ali,
on the 7th of December, 1782. Although his policy was continued
by his son, the blow to the French was serious. Under all the con-
ditions, the British authorities were emboldened to attempt the
reduction of Cuddalore. The army destined to this enterprise
marched from Madras, passed round Cuddalore, and encamped south
of it by the shore. The supi)ly-ships and lighter cruisers anchored
near, while the fleet cruised to the southward, where, l)eiug to wind-
ward, for the south-west monsoon had then set in, it covered the
operations against disturbance from the sea.
VOL III. — 36
562 MAJOR OPERATIONS. 1762-1783. [1783.
Towards the bcgiiminj;' uf June the investineut of the phxce was
complete by land and by water. Intelligence of tliis state of things
was brought on the 10th of June to Suffren, who by Bussy's direc-
tion was keeping his inferior fleet in Trinconiale until its services
should be absolutely indispensable. Innnediately upon receiving
the news he left port, and on the 13th sighted the British fleet, then
at anchor off Porto Novo, a little south of Cuddalore. Upon his
ap2)roach Hughes moved off, and anchored again five miles from the
besieged place. For the next two days tlie French were baffled by
the winds; but on the ITtli, the south-west monsoon resumed, and
Suffren again di'ew near. The British Viee-Admiral, not caring to
accept action at anchor, got under way, and from that time till the
20tli remained outside, trying to obtain the weather-gage, in which
he was frustrated by the variableness of the winds. Meanwhile
Suffren had anchored near the town, communicated with the general,
and, being very short of men at the guns, had embarked 1,200 troops
for his expected battle; for it was evident that the issue of the siege
would turn upon the control of the sea. On the 18tli he weighed
again, and the two fleets manoeuvred for the advantage, with light
baffling airs, the British furthest from shore.
On the 20tli of June, the wind holding at west with unexpected
constancy, Hughes decided to accept the attack wliich Suffren evi-
dently intended. The latter, being distinctly inferior in force, — fif-
teen to eighteen, — contemplated probably an action that should be
decisive only as regarded the fate of Cuddalore ; that is, one wliich,
while not resulting in the capture or destruction of ships, should
compel his opponent to leave the neighbourhood to repair damages.
The British formed line on the port tack, heading to the northward.
Suffren ranged his fleet in the same manner, parallel to the enemy,
and was careful to see the order exact before bearing do^\•n. ^ When
the signal to attack was given, the French kept away together, and
brought-to again on the weather beam of the British, just within
point-blank range. The action lasted from shortly after 4 p.m. to
nearly 7, and w^as general throughout both lines; but, as always
experienced, the rears were less engaged than the centres and vans.
No ship was taken; no very important spars seem to have been shot
away. The loss of the British was 99 killed, 434 wounded ; of the
French, 102 killed, 386 wounded.
As the ships' heads were north, the course of the action carried
^ See note on next page.
1783.]
SUfFJlEN AND HUGHES.
563
them in that direction. Suft'reii anchored next morning twenty-five
miles north of Cuddalore. There he was sighted on the 22nd hy
Hughes, who had remained lying-to the day after the fight. The
British Vice-Admiral reported several ships much disabled, a great
nund)er of his men — 1,121 — down with S('uj'vy, and the water of the
fleet very short. He therefore thought it necessaiy to go to Madras,
where he anchored on the 25th. Suffren regained Cuddalore on tiie
afternoon of the 23rd. His return and Huglies's deimrture com-
pletely changed the military situation. The supply-shijjs, upon
which the British scheme of operations depended, had been forced
to take flight when Suffren first approached, and of course could not
come back now. " My mind is on the rack without a moment's rest
since the departure of the fleet," wi-ote the commanding general on the
25th, "considering the character of M. de Suffren, and the infinite su-
periority on the 2iart of the French now that we are left to ourselves."
The battle of June 20th, 1783, off Cuddalore, was the last of the
maritime war of 1778. It was fought, actually, exactly five months
Note. — List of the British and French flebts in the action off Cuddalore, on
June 20th, 1783: —
BRITISH.
FRENCH.
SHIPS.
i
COMMANDERS.
SHIPS.
COMMANDERS.
Cumberland . .
74
Capt. William Allen.
Heros ....
74
Monmouth . .
G4
Capt. James Alms (1).
Fendmit . . .
74
Bristol ....
.'30
Capt. James Burney.
i Commod. Richard King.
Annjbdl .
74
JIe7-o ....
74
Illustre . . .
74
t Capt. Theophilus Jones.
Argonauff . .
74
J^dffle ....
64
Capt. William Clavk.
VejKjeuT . . .
64
Magnanimc. . .
64
Capt. Thomas Mackenzie.
Sphinx . . .
64
Sceptre . . .
64
Capt. Samuel Graves.
Artenen . . .
04
Bur/ord . . .
I'vt
Capt. Peter Rainier (1).
Ajax ....
64
Monarca . . .
(!8
Capt. John Gell.
Sevire. . . .
G4
r Vice- Admiral SirEdward Huglies,
K. B. (B).
Brillimt . . .
64
Superb ....
74
Uurdi ....
W
'Capt. Henry- Newcome.
W. MiclirJ . .
00
Sultan ....
74
Capt. Andrew Mitchell.
FlamanO . - .
50
Africa ....
64
Capt. Robert M'Douall.
Hannibal . . .
50
Worcester . . .
64
Capt. Charles Hughes.
Apollon . .
40
Exeter ....
Hi
Capt. John Samuel Smith.
Cleopatre .
36
Inflexible . . .
64
Capt, the Hon. John Whitmore
Chetwynd.
I Commodore Sir Richard Bicker-
Coventry
28
Gibraltar . . .
SO
j ton, Bart.
' Capt. Thomas Hicks.
Isis
.'•.n
Capt. Cliristopher HaUiday.
Defence . . .
74
Capt. Thomas Newuham.
Juno . . .
32
Capt. James Montagu.
Medea . .
28
Capt. Era-smus Guwer.
Seahorse . .
20
■\V. L. C.
5G-4 MAJun UPFAUTIONS. 1702-178:j. [1783.
al'ler the preliminaries of peace had heen signed. ^ Although the rela-
tive force of the two fleets remained unchanged, it was a French vic-
toiy, both tactically and strategically: tactically, because the inferior
fleet held its ground, and remained in possession of the field : strate-
gically, because it decided the object innuediatelj^ at stake, the fate
of Cuddalore, and with it, momentarily at least, the issue of the
campaign. It was, however, the triumph of one commander-in-chief
over another; of the greater man over the lessei-. Hughes's reasons
for quitting the field involve the admission of liis opponent's greater
skill. " Short of water," — with eighteen ships to fifteen that should
not have happened ; " injury to spars, " — that resulted from the action ;
"1,121 men short,"" — Suffrenhad embarked just that number — 1,200
— because Hughes let him communicate with the port without fight-
ing. This is not the place, nor is there room, for enlargement upon
the merits of Suffreu; ujjon the difficulties he surmounted, and the
genius he showed. He was a great sea-captain, Hughes was not-,
and with poorer instruments, both in men and ships, the former over-
came the latter.
On the 29th of June a British frigate, the Medea, bearing a flag of
truce, reached Cuddaloie. She brought well-authenticated intelli-
gence of the conclusion of peace ; and hostilities ceased by common
consent.
' January 20, 1783.
-ij^'
APPENDIX.
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INDEX.
VOLUME III.
Note — Britisli naval o^kir^ in Ihrfvllowini/ are dezcribed as of Ihe rank lo whkh
they attained upon thf romphtioii of their active servic:
Abercrombie, General, 172, 185
Aberdeen, 340
Abola, 37
Abraham, Heights of, 209, 357
Acadia : see Nova Scotia
Acapulco, 108, 241, 323
Ache, Admiral Conite d", l(i4, 174-182,
197-199, 274
Acheeu, 132, 561
Achille, 119, 120 n., 121, 305, 306, 311, 313
AchiUen, 215 n., 216, 234 n., 235, 299, 301,
311, 313
Aokworth, Jacob, 3
Aetseori, 233, 234 n., 236 and n., 242 n.,
313, 373, 376
Actif 198 n., 415
Action for wrongful trial by court-martial,
350
Actions (principal) : battle of Cape Paesa'.o,
33-38 ; capture of Puerto P.ello, 54-57 :
capture of Chagres, 61, 02 ; Lord Aubrej'
Beauclerk and M. de Boisgeroult, 64
and n. ; at Cartagena, 70-75 ; at La
Guayra, 85-86 ; at Puerto Cabello,
87-88 ; off Toulon, 93-107 ; Lion and
EUsaheth, 110, 111 ; Peyton and La
Bourdonnais, 120 ; Anson and de La
Jouqidere, 124-126 ; Hawke and de
L'Eteuduere, 126-129; Kuowles at Port
Louis, 133, 134 ; Knowles's off Havana,
135-137; Watson at Geriah, 143, 144;
Byng and de La Galissouniere, 147-155 ;
capture of Calcutta, 161, 162 ; capture of
Chandernagore, 163 ; Forrest and de Ker-
saint, 165, 166 ; off Cuddalore, 174-176 :
off Negapatam, 179-181 ; reduction of
Louisbourg, 183, 184; Boscawen and
du Chaffault, 185, 186 ; capture of Goree,
188, 189; Osborn and Duquesne, 189,
190; Pocock and d'Ache (Sept. 10th,
1759), 198, 199 ; capture of Guadeloujie,
202, 203 ; capture of Quebec, 204-210 ;
Boscawen and de La t'lue, 211-215;
Hawke and de Conflans, 216-223 ; Cap-
tain Norbury and a French squadron,
225, 226 ; Captain Elliot and M. Thurot,
230 ; capture of IJelle Isle, 234-236 ; cap-
tvu-e of Manilla, 239-242 ; capture of
Martinique, 243; in the River Plate, 251,
252 ; capture of the Nortliumherland,
274, 275; Nuttimjhim and Mars, 281,
282; the Ghrioso taken, 285, 286; the
Magnanime taken, 287 ; Buckin'/hain
and Florissant. 300 ; Vestal and Bellone,
300, 301; Ihe' Danae taken, 301; Uni-
corn and Vestale, 304; Minerva and
Warwick, 304, 305 ; Bellona and Coura-
geux, 306, 307 ; Phcenix and Resohi,
352 ; off Valcour Island, 363-368 ; Parker
at Charleston, 373-379 ; Keppel and
d'Orvilliers, off Ushaut, 413-426 ; Bar-
riugton and d'Estaing, 431, 432 ; Byron
and d'Estaing, oft' Grenada, 434-440 ;
Rodney's action oft' St. Vincent, 449, 450 :
Rodney's relief of Gibraltar, 451 ; Rodney
and de Guichen, 453-463 ; Rodney and
de Guicheu again, 463-466 and 466-468 ;
Coi'nwallis and La Motte-Picqiu't, 473,
474;, Cornwallis and de Ternay, 474-
477 ; capture of St. Eustatia, etc., 480,
481 ; Hood and de Grasse, 482-488 ;
Arbuthnot and des ToucheF, 489-493 .
Gi'aves and de Grasse, 495-502 ; battle
of the Doggersbauk, 504-509 ; Kenqien-
fult and de Guichen, 509, 510 ; Hood and
de Grasse at St. Kitts, 512-519 ; Rodney
and de Grasse, April 9th, 1782 . . 520-
524 ; April 12th, 1782. .525-535 ; Howe's
relief of Gibraltar, 540-543 ; "Veniun and
I'ronjol}', 543 ; Johnstone and Suft'i-en,
546-549; Hughes and Suft'ren, oft' Sadras,
550-552 ; Hughes and Suft'ren, off Pi-o-
vidien, 552-554 ; Hughes and Suft'ren,
oft' Negapatam, 555-557 ; Hughes and
Suft'ren, oft' Tiincomale, 557-560 ; Hughes
and Suffren, otf Cuddalore, 562-564
i70
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Actionnaire, 415, 458, 539
AcHre, 212 n., 308, 373, 374, 404, 4it5,
54a D.
Adamunt, 492 n., 497 n.
Adams, George, 3
Adams, H., shiiiliuildcr, 12
Adams, Captain Sir Tlidmas, Bart., 232
Adauis, Captaiu William (1), 131 n., 132
Adams, Captaiii William (2), 206 u., 208,
226 u., 253
Administration of the Navy, 1, 325
Adminud he llidjter, 505 n.
Admimal Gcncraal, 505 n.
Admiriial Piet ffeijn, 505 n.
Admirals, 19, 20
Admirals of the Fleet, 19, 39 and n., 237
Admiralty's attemiit to inflict punishment
irresjiective of the sentence of a court-
martial, 350, 351
Admiralty Board, 1, 2, 3, 325
Admiralt)' Buildings, 2
Admiralty, Court of, 350
Adndralty's politeness to La Perouse, 352
Adventure, 8, 234 n., 293, 311, 337
Advice, 86, 88, 121
^olus, 230 and n., 301, 313
yEtna or Etna, 70 n., 212 n., 215, 234 n.,
335
Affleck, Rear-Admiral Sir Edmund, Bart.'
234 u., .395 n., 492 n., 513 n., 520 u., 567
Aftleck. Admiral Philip, 212 n., 225, 466 n.,
567
Affleck, Captain William (1), 434, 454 n.
Africa, 71 n., 72, 135 u., 136, 314, 315,
563 u.
Africa Company, The lloyal, 260
Agatiumnon, 509 n., 520 n.
A<juihi, 34, 314
Aguirre, Captain Don Pablo Augustin de,
268
Aifile, 314
Aifjrette, 218 n., 300 u., 304
Aiguillou, Due d', 19.5, 196
Aiken, Captain, (lUissian Navy), 341
Aimahle, 537
Aislabie, John, 3
Aix, Isle d', 124, 126, 171, 172, 190, 191,
236
Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 29, 132, 138 ;
Congress of, 130
Ajaccio, 273, 314
AJax, 254 n., 482 n., 497 n., 505 n., 513 n.,
520 n., 550 u., 555, 559, 560, 563 n.
Alarm, 14, 224 n., 246 n., 247 and n.,
315 (2), 336, 520 n.
Alassio, 85
Albanv, New York, 360, 370, 389, 391, 393
A/bat,]/, 311, 313, 318
Albemarle, 537
Albemarle, General George, Earl of, 238,
240, 248, 249
Alberoni, Cardinal, 30, 33
Albert, Marquis d', 96, 287 and n.
Albion, 395 n., 434, 453, 454 n., 459
Alcidf:, 141, 142, 206 n., 209, 220 n., 226 n.,
242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 250, 289, 312, 313,
482 n., 497 n., 513 n., 520 u.
Akion, 96, 123 n., 295, 297, 312
Alcion, 96
Aldlioroutjh, 234 n.
Alderete, Cajitain Don tjabriel, 34
Alderney, 60, 62 n., 76 n., lu-i, 223 n.
Ahcto, 335
Ah-rt, 41.5, 505 n., 520 n.
Alexander, 282, 509 n.
Alexander, shipbuilder, 12
Alexandre, 415
Alfred, 482 n., 497 n., 512, 513 n., 520 n.,
521, 534
Algeciras, 292, 448, 540, 541
Algier or Algiers, 288
Alicant, 51
Allen, Captain Edward, 00, 276, 310
Allen, Ethan, 355
Allen, E., shipbuilder, 12, 335
Allen, .J., shipbuilder, 12
Allen, Lieutenant James, 311
Allen, Admiral John Carter, 188, 233 n.,
242 n., 415, 567
Alliance : with Russia, Denmark, and
Holland, 26 ; with France and the
Empire, 29 ; with France, the Empire,
and Holland, 29 ; with France and
Prussia, 42 : with Denmark, 43 : with
S]iain, France, and Holland, 48 ; with
Holland, Austria, Saxony, and Sirdinia,
89 n. ; of France with Prussia, Hessen,
and the Pfalz, 89 n. ; of France with
Spain, 89, 238 ; with Portugal, 238 ; be-
tween America and the Bourbon king-
doms, 354, 368, 3b8, 394 : of France and
Spain, 443, 447
Alliances, Disadvantages of, 40
Allin, Joseph, 3
Alms, Captaiu James (1), 242 n., 246 n.,
247, 546 n., 550 n., 552 n., 559
Alvario, Captain Don C, 96
Alverera, Captain Don Francisco, 34
Amaranthe, 229 and n., 230 u.
Amazon, 201 n., 283 n., 284, 312
Amblimont, Captain d', 127 n., 415
Amboy, New Jersey, 388
Ambrose, Captam John, 96, 104
Ambuscade, 125 n., 212 n., 251, 296
America : see also North America, etc., 310
America, 96, 98, 212 and n., 213, 214, 215.
222 n., 224, 225, 240 n., 247 n., 315, 415,
492 n., 497 n., 513 n., 520 n., 532
American Colonies, 14, 58, 109, 113-115,
116, 117, 166-109, 243, 262, 331, 354
et sei].
American Lidians, 109, 115, 139, 226, 366
Amethyst, 303
Amherst, Admiral John, 148 n., 206 n.,
311, 566
Amherst, Field-Marshal Jefl'rey, Lord Am-
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
571
herst, 182, 183, 186, 20i, 205, 208, 210,
226, 228
Amj'hion, 415
Amphitrite, 335, 505 u.
Anchors, 9
Andrews, Captain Thomas (2), 123 n.,
133 n., 141, 148 n., 150
Andre, Port, 235
Andromache, 520 n.
Andromaque, 415
Andromeda, 415, 454 n., 4711 n.
Anemone, 313
Angell, Captain Henry, 223 n., 242 n.
Anglesey, 57, 278, 311
Angria, Tulagee, 143, 144
Anguilla, lOiV
Anna, 310, 320
Anuamaboe, 13i;i
Annapolis Roval, 100, 168
Anne Oalley^iil, 'J6, 100, 273, 310
Annibal, 452, 453, 473, 474, 546 n., 547,
548, 549, 550 n., 563 n.
Anson, Admiral of the Fleet, George, Lord,
2, 20, 52, 108, 124, 125 and n., 126,
128 n., 129, 192, 19-% 237, 247, 267, 281,
283, 299, 312, 320-324, 338
Anson, 222 n., 520 n., 533 u.
Antelope, 155, 156, 186, 223 n., 250, 251,
295, 312, 313
Antibes, 123
Anticosti, 358
Antigua, 22, 23, 54 n., 85, 203, 347, 427,
428, 429, 479, 486, 494, 511, 518, 519
Antigua, 201 n., 242 n.
Antilles : see "West Indies
Antin, Admiral the JIarquis d', 58, 63,
64 n., m, -Zrl
Antonio, Captain Don J., 247 n.
Autrobus, Captain Charles, 223 n., 234 n.
Anville, Due d', 117
Apliii, Admiral Peter, 406 n.
Apollo, 131 n., 311, 406 n., 407, 408
Apollon, 125 and u., 183, 278, 280, 311,
313, 563 n.
Apprenticing seamen's children, 342
Apraxine, General-Adi.iiral, 43
Apret, Cai'tain d", 174 n., 176
Aguilon, 96, 224 u., 235 n., 244, 245, 252,
271, 291, 295, 312
Aquilon, 247 n., 315
Arbutlmtit, Admiral Marriot (originally
Marriott), 218 n., 246 n., 248, 250, 327,
401 n., 440, 469, 470, 471, 472, 489-
493, 494, 502, 566
Arc en del, 293, 312
Arcbantel, Captain de 1', 415
Arcot 224
Arctic, The, 318-320, 389
Ardent, 64 u., 283, 312, 400, 406 n., 444,
492 n., 534
Ardesoif, Captain John Plummer, 497 u.
Arethiisii, 397, 412, 415, 509 n.
Arethuse, 302, 313
Argo, 223 u., 239, 241 and n., 303, 505 n.
Argonaut, 335
Argonaute, 563 n.
Argote, Captain Don D., 247 n.
Argijle, 34, 35, 36
Ariadne, 335, 430, 431, 434
Ariga, Gulf of 1', 38
Armed Neutrality, The, 478
Armed ships, 330, 392, 546 n.
Armourers, 342
Arnold, General Benedict, 354-369, 379,
385, 389, 472, 473, 488, 489, 493
Avrisago, Caiitain Don Antonio, 34
Arrogant, 520 n.
Arrows, Poisoned, 266
Arsic, Fort d', 235, 236
Artesien, 415, 546 n., 550 n., 563 n.
Articles of War, The, 17 and n., 129, 137,
157 and n.
Artois, 505 n.
.4s(((, 247 n., 315, 543 n.
Assendelft, 91
Assiento Treaty, The, 262
Assistance, 86," 87, 139, 273, 300
Astrcea, 57 n., 70 n., 310, 314
Astronomer Royal, The, 338
Asuncion, 249 and n.
Atalanta, 352
Atalante, 96, 227, 290, 300 n., 313
Atkins, Captain Christopher, 373
Atkins, Samuel, 3
Atkins, (Aaptain Samuel, 34
Aubenton, Cajitain d', 415
Aubigny, Vice-Admiral d', 125 n., 126, 145,
290
Audacieux, 312
Audierne Bav, 295, 299, 313
Augusta, 76," 165 and n., 278, 335 (2), 343,
391, 392
Auguste, 27 and n., 282, 310, 312
Augustus II., Elector of Saxony and King
of Poland, 49
Aurora, 8, 12, 224 u., 431
Aurore, 8
Austria: (see also Empire, The); 123, 124,
190
Auvergne, Prince de Bouillon, Vice-Admiral
Phiiip d', 546 n.
Avery, Daniel, 15
Avery, the buccaneer, 259
Aylu'ier, Admiral John (I), 520 n.
Aylmer, Admiral of the Fleet Matthew,
Lord, 112 u.
Azores, The, 285, 443 n.
Badger, 16, 223 n.
Bahama, Old Strait of, 247, 312, 496 and n.
Bahamas, The, 266, 311, 469
Baillie, Captain Thomas (1), 212 u., 293,
311
Baird, Mr. Henrv Carey, of Philadelphia
cited, 333 n.
Baird, Captain Patrick, 148 n., 218 n.
572
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Baird, Captain Sir William, T5art., 198 n.
Baker, Captain Jaines, 211, 212 ii.
Baker, Vice-Admiral John, 258
Balchen, Admiral Sir John, 34, 4'J, (53, 05,
90 u., 91, 107, 108 and n., 2t;7, 284, 310
Baleine, 224, 313
Balfour, Captain George, 184, 185, 222 n.,
346 and n., 395 n., 489, 520 n.
Ballasore, 103
Baltic, The, 26, 27, 28, 38, 40-43, 47, 256,
257, 310, 478, 504, 538
Baltimore, 113, 206 n., 282
Banca, Strait of, 108
Banks, or Bancks, Captain Francis (1),
242 n., 246 n., 385, 387
Bar, Xew York, 401 and n.
Baradera, The, 69, 71, 72
Barbados, 201, 233, 242, 245, 338, 427, 428,
429, 466, 468, 478, 479, 487, 488, 502,
510, 519, 520, 537
Barbados, 242 n., 246 n., 479 n.
Barbarat, Keys of, 88
Barbary, Coast of, 211, 257, 258, 541
Barbor, Captain Robert, 520 n.
Barbuda, 311, 468, 470
Barcelona, 32, 66, 67, 155
Barclay, Captain Sir James, Bart., 406 n.
Barfleur, 12, 34, 35, 36, 96, 97, 98 and n.,
171, 172, 335, 343, 482 n., 497 n., 513
and n., 514, 516, 517, 520 n., 521, 526,
530, 532, 534, 535
Barliam, Lord: see Middleton, Admiral Sir
Charles
Barker, Rear-Admiral John (T), 212 n.,
245 n., 246 n., 566
Barkley, Captain An.'rew, 513 n., 5-0 n.
Barlow, the navigator, 318
Barnard, shipbuilder, 12
Barnet, Captain Curtis, 81, 82, 91, 105, 103,
109, 119, 270, 271
Bamsley, Captain Henry, 169 and n., 311
Barrabas Point, 188
Barradell, Captain Bloomfield, 125 n.
Barrailh, M. de, 90, 91
Jiarras, Commodore de, 492, 495, 490, 501
Barre, Isaac, 326
Barre, Major, 228
Barrella, C'aptain Don, 135 n.
Barrida, Captain Don B. de La, 96
Barrington, Major-General Hon. John, 203
Barriugton, Admiral Hon. Samuel, 139 n.,
215 n., 216, 234 n., 236, 284, 299, 301,
427-433, 434, 436, 437, 440, 477, 520,
521, 538, 539, 566
Barrington, William Wildman, Viscoimt,
3, 326
Barton, Admiral Matthew, 188 and n.,
234 u., 235, 242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 248,
311, 506
Bashee Islands, 318, 323
Basilisk, 34, 131 n., 132, 215 n., 242 n.,
246 n., 312
Basin of Quebec, 207, 227
Basque lioad, 126, 191, 223, 236, 239, 252
Basse Terre, St. Kitts, 510, 511, 513 n.
Basse 'J'erre, Guadeloupe, 202, 203
Basset, Captain Cln-istopher, 150, 212 n.
Bastard, M.P., Mr., 346, 347
Bastia, 116
Bastiraentos, The, 43, 46, 79
Batavia, 131, 201
Jlalaviar, 505 n.
Bateley, William, 3, 326
Bateman, Captain Nathaniel, 226 n., 434,
454 n., 456 n.
Bateman, Captain Hon. William, 3, 4, 326
Batiscan, 207, 209
Batson, M., 6hi]jbuilder, 12
Batteries v. Shii)s, Washington's \-iews on,
385
Batticaloa, 197, 554, 557
Bayne, Captain William, 201 n., 242 n.,
482 n., 497 n., 513 n., 520 n., 534
Bayona Islands, 302
Bayonets, 9, 158, 183, 209
Bayonne, 308
Bazely, Admiral John (1), 415, 417, 454 n.
Heachv Head, Battle of, 439
Beatson quoted, 07, 69, 70, 95, 101, 138,
151 n., 210, 214, 388, 499, 503
Beauclerk, Captain Lord Aubrey, 64, 65, 71,
72
Beauclerk, Admiral Lord Vere, later Lord
Vere, 4
Beauffremont-Listenois, Commodore the
Prince de, 218 n., 220, 223
Beauft'remont, Commodore de, 146, 167
Peaulieu, 12
Beaumier, Captain de, 415
Beauues, Captain de, 415
Beauport, 206
Beaussier, Commodore de, 145, 182
/leaver's Prize, 479 n.
Beavor, Captain Edmund, 311
Bee de Lievre, Captain, 174 n., 179 n.
Beccart, Captain, 125 n.
Becher, Commander John, 400 n.
Bedford, John, Duke of, 2, 20
Bedford, , Duke of, 230, 253
Bedford, 83 n., 96, 98, 206 n., 235 n., 281,
305, 310, 313, 395 n., 489, 492 n., 497 n.,
513 n., 514, 520 n., 531
Bedoyere, Captain de La, 127 n.
Beekvliet, 91
Becjon, 229, 230 n.
Belfast, 229, 230
Bell, Governor, 169
Belleisle, JLar&hal de, 124
Belleisle, 246 n., 545 n.
Belle Isle, 110, 217, 218, 219, 234-236, 242,
254, 283, 284, 311, 314
Belle Poule, 397, 412, 505 n.
Bellingham, AVilliam, 326
Belliqueux, 185, 186, 217, 313, 482 n.,
497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Bellona, 284, 306, 307, 313, 505 n.
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
573
Bellone, 113, 284, 300, 301, 312, 313, 550 n. ,
Bencote, (Fort Victoria), 143
Bencal, 121, 100, Kil n., Ili2-l(j4, 201, 251
Bengal, Bay of, lOll
Bennett, Oommauder 'Pliouias Stanhope,. ]
54Gn.
Bentinck, Captain Jolin Albert, 303
Bentinck, Captain W. J., 505 n.
Bentley, Yice-Admiral Sir John, Kt., 4,
125 n., 127 n., 182, 212 n., 215, 218 n.,
311, 326, 565
Beretti-Lanrti, Marques de, 36, 38
Bergen, 221.)
Berkeley, Cajitain George, 57, 61, 96, 273
Berkeley, Admiral of the Fleet James, Earl
of {ifarlUr Lord DurBlev), 2, 39 and n.,
112 n., 261
BtrkvJmj, 313
Bermnda, 426, 429, 474
Berniudez, Captain Don P., 247 n.
Bertie, Captain Lord Thomas, 120 n.
Bertie, Colonel Lord Robert, 147, 154, 157
Bertin, 305, 313
Berwick, 43 n., 46 n., 92, 96, 98, 100, 101,
169, 189, 201 n., 202, 203, 313, 315, 415,
505 n.
Betagh, William, 316, 318
Bethell, Captain Christopher Codrington,
223 n.
Beverley, Cajitain Thomas, 34
Bio, Isle, 206
Biche, 183, 313
Bickerton, Rear-Admiral Sir Eichard, Bart.,
212 n., 246 n., 343, 415, 482 n., 561, 567
Biddtford, 262, 302, 311
Bien Acquise, 295, 297, 312
Bieii Aime, 83 u., 174 n., 175, 176, 313,
415
Bienfaisuvt, 184, 185, 222 n., 228, 313 (2),
415, 505 n.
Biggs, Vice-Admiral Robert, 415
Bird, H., shipbuilder, 335
Biscaj', Bay of, 129, 147, 232, 233, 283,
295, 297, 310, 313, 481, 509, 538
Bizarre, 218 u., 299, 300, 550 u., 561
" Blackboard " : see Thatch, Edward
Black Hole of Calcutta, The, 161
Blacksmiths, 342
Blair Captain William, 395 n., 434, 505 n.,
520 n., 533 n.
Blake, Commander Peter, 311
Blake, Governor, 161
Blakeney, General William, 63, 74, 146,
148, 153
Blanche, 479 n.
Blandfvrd, 289, 310, 311 (2)
Blaue, Sir Gilbert, 450, 533, 534
Blankett, Rear-Admiral John, 545 n.
Blast, 34, 215 n., 236 and n., 311, 520 n.
Blaze, 161 n.
Blenac, Commodore de, 244, 245, 246, 252
Blenheim, 12
Bligh, Lieutenant-General Thomas, 193-195
Blockade in winter, Difficulties of, 189, 21(),
217
Blockade: of Puerto Bello, 44; of Chagres,
61 ; of Santiago, 76 ; of Toulon by
Mathews, 84, 85, 89 ; of Cartagena, IKi,
124 ; of Antibes, 123 ; of Pondichei-ry,
131 ; of Brest, 145, 146, 170, 171, 195,
196 ; of Louisbourg, 115, 141, 168, 172,
182 ; of French Channel ports, 173 ; of
Cartagena, 189, 190; of 'J'oulon by Bos-
caweu, 211 ; of Cadiz, 215; of Brest by
Ha«ke, 216, 223; of Dunquerque, 223;
of Le Havi'e, 224 ; of Pondicherry, 224,
225; of Quiberon Bay, 231, 232; of
Martinique, 242 ; of Grenada, 244 ; of
Cape Frant/ois, 246 ; of St. John's, 251 ;
of French ports, 252; of Fort Royal,
481
Blookmakers, 342
Blonde, 230 and u., 231, 301, 366
Blue uniform. Origin of the, 20
Board of Longitude, 13, 338
Board of Ordnance, 332
Boatswains, 19, 21
Boca Chica, 69
Boca Nao, River, 248
Boisgeroult, Captain d'Epinai de, 64 n.
Boles, Commander John, 201 n.
Bolt-drawing machine, 337
Bolt Head, 231, 311
Bolton, Duke of: see Powlett, Admiral Lord
Harry
Bombardment : of Cartagena, 60, 61 : of
Chagres, 62 ; of Bastia, 116 ; of Madras,
121 ; of Chandernagore, 163 ; of St.
Pierre, 202 ; of Le Havre, 216 ; of Palais,
236 ; of Fort Royal, 243 ; of Moro Castle,
248
Bombay, 143, 161 n., 164, 181, 197, 200,
232, 545, 561
Borabay, 143
Bombay Castle, 340
Bombs, 12, 30, 33, 34, 40, 42, 46 n., 47, 59,
60, 61, 62, 70 n., 73, 74, 76 n., 84 n., 86,
117, 131 n., 161 and n., 172, 188, 192,
201 n., 200, 206 n., 209, 215 and n., 216,
234 and n., 235, 236 n., 242 n., 245 n.,
261, 276, 281, 314, 330, 335, 428 n.,
546 n.
Bompart, Commodore de, 203, 210, 217
Bond, Captain Robert, 206 n.
Bonechea, Captain Don D., 247 n.
Bonetta, 76 n., 80, 201 n., 246 n., 248, 276,
310
Bonne Homme Richard, 279, 298
Bonnet, Stede, 260
Booms, 69, 72, 76, 135, 389, 445
Boreas, 185, 215 n., 225, 226, 246 n., 298,
313 (2)
Boree, 96, 271
Bornholm, 27
Boscawen, 206 n., 207, 280
Boscawen, Admiral Right Hon. Edward,
574
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
57 n., 71,
73 u., 113, 125 II., 126,
130-132, 140, 141, 144, 145, 146, 171,
172, 173, 182-186, 196, 210-215, •.^17,
222, 223, 224, 231 and u., 266, 267, 274
and n., 289, 291 n., 297, 302, 303, 311,
313, 444 n.
Boscawen, General Hon. George, 193
Boston, 134, 335
Boston, Massachusetts, 113, 185, 370, 371,
387, 409, 410, 428, 488, 495
Boston, Captain 'J'honias, 509 n.
Bot-Deru, Captain <le, 415
Boteler, Captain Philii), 246 n., 444
Botterell, Captain John, 242 n.
Bouffonne, 306, 313
Bougainville, Vice-Admiral Louis Antoine
de, 208 and n.
Bouille, Marquis de, 453, 463, 510
Boulogne, 16
Boulogne, 308
Bounties to seamen, 18, 19, 49, 140, 339,
340, 342
Bounty, 339
Bourbon, or Reunion, 197, 231, 232, 234
Bourbon, 1 20 n.
Bourbon assistance to America, 354
Bourchier, Captain John, 520 n.
Boiudonnais, M. Mahe de La, 119-122, 124
Bouritius, Cajitaiii, 505 n.
Bourke, Commander William Fraucis, 246 n.
Bouvet (2), Commodore, 130, 132, 174 and
n., 176, 179 n., 198 n.
Bouvet, Captain Comte de, 289
Bouvet, Eear-Admiral Frant-ois Josej)h,
Baron, 550 n.
Bow and quarter line, 513, 531
Bowater, Admiral Edward, 497 n.
Bowdler, Captain John, 84 n.
Bowen, Admiral George (1), 497 n. 513 n.,
520 n.
Bowver, Admiral Sir George, Bart., 395 n.,
434, 454 n., 459, 460
Boyd, Captain John, 233 n., 242 n.
Boyle, Captain John, 54(i n.
Boyle, Hon. Bobert : see Walsingham, Cap-
tain Hon. Robert Boyle
Boi/ne, 66, 70 n., 71, 72, 75 n., 76 n., 79 n.,
80, 92, 96, 98, 104, 395, 428, 431, 434,
436, 454 n., 466
Bovs, Captain William, 196, 223 and n.,
229
Braak, Captain A., 505 n.
Braam, Captain W. ynn, 505 n.
Brach, Caj^tain de, 415
Bradby, Cajitain James (1), 415, 509 n.
Braddock, General, 139, 140, 141
Brand, Captain Ellis, 27 n.
Brathwaite, Admiral Richard, 387, 404,
406 n., 428 n., 454 n., 505 n., 568
Braoe, 510,530, 53G n.
Bray, Captain John, 206 u., 347
Braziers, 342
Brazil, 50, 260
Brerla, 34, 35, 43 n., 45
Brederode, 91
Brereton, Cajrtain William, 174 n., 177,
179 n., 198 n., 199, 225, 241 and n., 415
Brest, 58, 89, 90, 92, 95, 107, 117, 126, 128,
140, 142, 145, 146, 164, 167, 169, 170,
172, 182, 192, 195, 196, 210, 216, 217,
221, 224, 233, 235, 239, 244, 250, 252,
275, 276, 277 and n., 283, 287, 289, 294,
295, 299, 302, 305, 308, 311, 312, 313,
352, 394, 396, 397, 413, 414, 433, 443,
446, 447, 452, 469, 478, 482, 502, 503,
504, 509, 510. 519, 539, 546
Bretayne, 415, 420
Brett, Caiitain John, 276, 278
Brett, Admiral Sir Piercy (1), Kt., 110,
125 n., 196, 223, 224 and n., 232, 233,
239, 252, 308, 324, 565
Brett, Timothy, 3, 326
Brett, Captain William, 234 n.
Brice (/o^er Kingsmill), Robert: see Kings-
mill, Admiral Sir Robert, Bart.
Bricklayers, 342
Bricqueville, Cajitain de, 415
Bridejewater, 140, 143, 161 and n., 162,
174, 258, 311
Bridport, Lord : see Hood, Admiral Alexander
Arthur
Brigs, 330
Brillant, 121, 218 n., 244, 550 n., 554, 556,
563 n.
Brillante, 96
Brilliant, 8, 12, 215, 230 n., 306
Brimstone Hill, St. Kitts, 510, 512, 518
Brine, Admiral James, 482 n., 497 n.
Brisbane, Admiral John, 403, 568
Brisk, 335
Bristol, Earl of: see Hervey, Hon. Augustus
John
Bristol, 259, 335, 340. 563 n.
Bristol, 76, 125 n., 201 and n., 202, 372,
373, 374, 376, 378, 379, 473, 474
Britannia, 509 n.
British oHicers in the Portuguese service,
238 and n.
Brittany, 113, 118, 119, 196, 302
Broderick (2)roperh/ Brodrick), Yice-Ad-
miral Thomas, 60 and n., 73, 152 and n.,
155, 156, 170, 171, 190, 210, 211, 212
and n., 214, 215, 298, 311, 565
Brodie, Captain David, 133 n., 135 n., 344
and n.
Bromedge, Captain Hugh, 215 n.
Brooks, Captain John, 545 u.
Brown, Captain Cliarles, 4, 51 n., 54, 55,
60, 266, 267
Brown, Admiral Jolrn, 474 n.
Browne, Field-Marshal Maximilian LTlysses,
Count, 123
Bruevs, Vice-Admiral Comte de, 400 n.
Brune, 305, 309, 313, 314
Brunswick, New Jersey, 388
Brunswick, 335
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
575
Bryne, Captain Henry, 415, 454 n., 479 n.
Buccaneers, 61, 79
Buckingham, 40 n., 03, 96, 148 n , 151 n.,
201 n., 234 n., 230 and n., 300
Buckle, Admiral Matthew (1), 139, 185,
212 n., 215, 218 n., 222, 234, 235 and n.,
2S6, 305, 566
Bucklershard, 335
Buoknall, J., shi]ibLnlder, 335
Buckner, Admiral Charles, 520 n.
Buenos Ayres, 251, 252
Buffalo. 505 n., 507 and n., 503
Bunker's Hill, 378
Buoys, 338
Burchett, Josiah, 3, 204
Burford, 34, 46 n., 55, 56, 57 n., 59, 02,
70 n., 75 n., 86, 87, 88, 96, 201 n., 202,
218 n., 234 n., 310, 545 n., 550 n., 552
n., 556, 503 n.
Burgoyue, Lieutenant-General John, 354,
359, 360, 366, 370, 389, 390, 391, 392.
398
Burke, Edmund, quoted, 379
Burlington, 388
liurnaby, Vice-Admiral Sir William, Bart.,
250, 292, 415, 565
Burnaby, Captain Sir William Chaloner,
Bart., 540 n.
Burnett, Captain Thomas, 201 n., 202, 227 n.,
242 n., 246 n., 312, 492 n., 520 n.
Burrish, Captain George, 96, 103
Bursledon, 335
Burslem, Captain Francis, 218 n.
Burton, Richard, 3
Bury, Captain Thomas (1), 310
Busses, 187
Bussy, General de, 501, 502
Basil, 505 n.
Butchart, Captain John, 434
Butger, Commander, 505 n.
Button, the navigator, 318
Bylandt, Rear-Admiral Count Lodewijk
van, 351
Byng, Sir George : see Torjington, Admiral
of the Fleet Sir George Byng, Viscoun i
Byng, Admiral Hon. John, 105, 100, 113,
12'3, 124, 130, 137, 142, 140-160, 196 n.,
289, 290 and n., 292, 293, 423, 467, 46K,
498 n., 499
Byng, Hon. Henry Pattee, 3, 33 n.
Byng, Robert, 3, 4
Byron, Captain George Anson, 520 n.
Byron, Vice-Admiral Hon. John, 190 n.,
"224, 228, 235 n., 313, 322, 324, 395 and
n., 396, 399, 404, 408, 409, 410, 412, 428,
433, 434-440, 443, 452, 400, 473, 500
Cables, 9
Cahot, 505 n.
Cadiz, 31, 38, 39, 47, 62, 65, 66, 67, 107,
116, 212 and n., 215, 280, 285, 306, 308,
448, 449, 450, 452, 408, 469, 477, 478,
502, 503, 504, 509, 539
Cvsar, 335
(Jaimamera, 70 n.
(Calabria, 33
Calais, 112
Calcutta, 201
Calcutta, 100, 161-163, 543
Caldwell, Admiral Benjamin, 509 n., 520 n.
California, 317
California, 319, 320
Callis, Rear-Admiral Smith, 86, 211, 212 n.,
273, 285 n., 310
Calmady, Admiral Charles Holmes Everitt
{formerly Charles Holmes Everitt), 497 n.,
513 and n.
Cabiiady, Captain Warwick, 115, 311
Calypso, 218 n., 244 n., 299, 313
Cambridge, 90, 101, 201 n., 202, 240 n., 248
Camden, 472
Camiily, Vice-Admiral Blouet de, 91
Cammock, Ca]:itain George (Rear-Admiral
in the Sjianish Navy), 34, 35 and n., 38
Campbell, Captain Alexander (1), 322
Campbell, Colonel Archibald, 441
Campbell, Captain James (1), 41 n.
Campbell, Captain James (2), 167 n., 200 n.,
242 n., 245 n., 246 n.
Campbell, Vice-Admiral John CI), 218 n.,
222, 324, 341, 413 n., 415, 500
Campbell, William, 320
Cam])eche, 203
Canada, 511, 512 and n., 513 and n., 514,
516, 520 n., 530, 531
Canada, 117, 118, 139, 140, 164, 196, 197,
204-210, 220-228, 242, 253, 354, 355,
350, 370, 380, 539
Canary Islands, The, 188, 302
Cancale Bay, 192, 193
Candia, 229
Candles in lighthouses, 14, 15
Canoa, Point, 68 n.
Canso, 109, 113, 115
Canterbury, 33, 34, 35, 133 n., 135 n., 136
Canton, 323
Cape Breton, 109, 115, 116, 124, 166-108,
184, 191, 206, 253
Cape Cabron, San Domingo, 294
Cape Charles, 496
Cape Clear, 282, 311
Cape Coast Castle, 169, 287
Cape de Gata, 189
Cape de Verde Islands, 546
Cape Digges, 320
Cape Dobbs, 319, 320
Cape Fear, 372
Cape Finisterre, 283, 301, 303, 448, 540
(Jape Francois, 123, 165, 225, 245, 240, 314,
408, 409, 470, 473, 474, 488, 492, 495,
490, 519, 530, 537
Cape Henry, 489, 496
Cajie Hojie, 319
Cape Horn, 207, 317, 321
Cape Lopez, 260
Cape May, 403
576
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Cape Mola, 15.3
Cape of Good Hope, 130, 197, 232, 350, 545,
548
Cape San Lucas, 317
Cape Spaitel, 503
Cape St. Martin, 281
Cape St. Nicolas, 123, 245, 246
Cape St, Vincent, 2bo, 477
Cape Tiburon, 308
Cajiriciev.f, 184, 313
Captain, 12, 34, 35, 148 n., 151 n., 153,
154, 172, 182, 185, 206 n., 276, 277, 284
Captain of tlie Fleet, 341
Captains, 19, 20, 22, 340
Captures, 138, 310-315, 39G n.
Caracas, 85, 272
Carcass, 84 n., 215 n., 406 n., 428 n.
Cardaillac, Captain de, 546 n.
Cardinals, TLe, 219,220
Cardonnie, Captain de La, 4 15
Carenage, St. Lucia, 429, 430, 431
Caribbee Islands (see also West Indies, Lee-
ward Island,s, etc.), 201, 238, 244, 519
Carical, 178, 181, 224
Carkett, Benjamin, 265
Carkett, raji'tain Robert, 190 and n., 223 n.,
312, 434, 454 n., 400, 4C1 and n., 462,
468, 479 n.
Carleton, ;!61, C65, 366, 369
Carleton, Sir Guy, K.B., 356, 357, 358, 359,
362, 363, 365, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371,
386, 389
Carlisle Bay, Barbados, 201, 233, 242
Carlos de Bourbon, Don, 48
Carlos III., King of Spain, 84
Carnarvon, 185, 186
Carnatic, 339, 340
Carnegie, Hon. George : see Nortbesk, Earl of
Carnegie, Lieutenant Patrick, 366
Carolina, 259, 269, 289, 299, 311, 371, 372,
441, 442, 470, 472, 488, 493, 496
Carpenter, Captain Robert, 206 n.
Carpenters, 19, 205
Carpenters, American lack of, 359, 361
Carrickfergus, 229, £30
Carronades, 330-333, 524
Carron Fonndiy, 330, 331
Cartagena, (S. America), 44, 52 n., 54, 59,
60, 61, 62, 63, 68-75, 78, 272, 274, 279,
314
Cartagena (Spain), 107, 116, 124, 189, 190
Carteret, Lord, 41
Carteret, Cajitain Pbilip (1), 120 u., 131 n.
Carteret, Cftptain Richard, 14, 246 n.
Cartridge boxes, 9
Casauhon, 312
Cas de Navires, Bay of, Martinique, 201,
243, 245
Caskets, Tlie, 108
Cassilis, Earl of: see Kennedy, Cajitain
Archibald
Cassimbazar, 160
Castaneta,A'ice-Aduiiial Don Antonio, 34,37
Castejon, Captain Don P., 247 n.
CasHlla, 34
Castillo de Ferro, 54, 55
Castillo Grande, Cartagena, 69, 72, 73
Castor, 127 n., 312, 335
Castro, Captain Don J. B., 96
Catford, Cajitain Charles, 148 n.
Cathcart, Major-General Lord, 58, 63, 64
and n., 68
Catherine : see Katherine
Catherine, 263
Cato, 412 n., .508
Caton, 524, 525, 537
Caulfeild, Captain Toby, 387, 473, 474 n.
Cavaigne, Captain, 34
Cavendish, Admiral Philip, 66
CayluK, Captain Chevalier de, 96, 116, 271
Cayo Confite, 249
Celehre, 184, 313
Centaur, 233, 246 n., 2.50, .303, 306, 41.5,
482 n., 486, 487, 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Centaure, 121, 198 n., 199, 212 n., 213, 214,
215, 313
Centurion, 125 n., 139 n., 206 n., 208, 246
n., 247, 288, 315, 320-323, 387, 404
406 n., 408, 428 n., 431, 454 n.
Cerberus, 246 n.
Ceres, 537
Cerf, 293
Cesar, 409, 532, 533 and n.
Ceuta, 35, 211
Ceylon, 197, 550, 552, 553, 554, 557, 560,
51 :i
Chacon, Rear-Admiral Don Fernando, 34, 35
Chads, Captain James, 206 n., 234 n.
Chadwick, Captain Richard, 133 n.
Chagres, 61, 62
Chaise, Captain de La, 174 n., 179 n., 198 n.
Chalay, Captain Principe de, 34
Clialeur Bay, 228, 313
Chamba battery, Cartagena, 69, 70
Chambers, Rear-Admiral "William (1) 79,
130
Chambly, 361
Chambon, Governor of Louisbourg, M. de,
115
Chameleon, 479 n.
Chamjnon, 513 n., 520 n.
Champlain, Lake, 205, 226, 354-370, 371,
379, 380, 385, 386, 389
Chandernagore, 163
Channel, The, 39, 66, 89, 107, 113, 129,
147, 196, 215 n., 222, 224, 232, 2^0, 252,
257, 278, 281, 308, 310, 311, 339, 396,
443, 445, 446, 470, 477, 502, 504, 538,
546
Channel Islands ; (see also Jersey, etc.),
291
Chaplains, 19
Chaplen, Commander James, 234 n., 236 n.
Charente River, 191, 218 n., 223, 224, 233,
237, 252
Chariot Royal, 293, 312
INDEX TO VOLUME 111.
Ull
i.'harles, 34
Charles II., Act of the 13th of, 82, lOG
Charles VI., The Emperor, 59
Charles VII., The Emijeror, 50
Charles XII., Khig of Sweden, 2G, 27, -11
Charles Edward, Prince : see Pretender, The
Young
Charleston, 372-379, 383, 442, 470, 472,
489
Charleston, 335
Charlotte, Queen, Princess of Mecklenburg-
Strelitz, 237
Charlotte, 137
Charnock quoted, 80, 81-83
Charriugton, Captain Nicholas, 497 n.,
513 n., 520 n.
Charti'es, Vice-Adniiral the Due de, 145
Charts, 118, 243, 247
Chase, A general, 125, 126, 128, 148, 174,
176, 178, 180, 191, 197, 198, 212, 414,
435, 449, 453, 486, 506, 525, 534, 537,
556
Chateauneuf, Captain de, 96
Chatham, 12, 83 n., 103, 326, 335, 336
Chatham, 215 n., 217, 218 n., 232, 313, 387
Chatham, John, Earl of, 325
Chausey Islands, 291
Chauvelin, 296, 297
Cheap, Captain David, 310, 320-322
Cheap's Bay, 322
Chebucto, 312
Chelsea Hospital, 320
Cherbourg, 193, 194, 304
Chesapeake, The, 359, 370, 390, 392, 405,
442, 472, 488, 489, 491, 492, 493, 494,
495, 496, 501, 508, 512
Chest at Chatham, The, 104
Chester, 76 n., 131 and n., 253, 278, 283 n.,
312
Chester, Pennsylvania, 391
Chesterfield, 148 and u., 153, 154, 249, 287,
288, 312
Chevalier, Captain, quoted, 486, 487, 504,
531, 533, 542, 543
Cheure, 183, 313
Chezine, 210
Chichester, 70 n., 75 n., 92, 96, 98, 104,
218 n., 234 n.
Child. Admiral Smith, 492 n., 497 n.
Childers, 335
Children, Provision for seamen's, 342
Chile, 321
Chilleau, Captain du, 546 n., 550 n.
Chiloe, 317, 322
Chimere, 212 n.
Chimene, 125 n.
China, 108, 317, 323
Chinsura, 201
Cheque Bay, St. Lucia, 463
Chorera, River, 249
Christian, Commander Brabazon, 406 n.
Christian, Rear-Admiral Sir Hugh Cloberry,
392, 434, 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Christie, Captain Alexander, 549
Chronometers, 13, 14
Churchill River, 318, 319
Cillart de Suville, Captain, 415
Cilliut, Caiitain de Villeneuve, 550 n., 556
Ciudadella, 142
(,'ivil law. Supremacy in naval aflairs of the,
105, 106
Cizarga, 443
(!laigeann Bay, Islay, 229
Clarence, Duke of (later William IV.) : see
William Ileury, Duke of Clarence, Prince
Clark, Captain Cliarles, 352
Clark, Captain Edward (1), 123 n., 135 n.,
201 n.
Clark, Captain John (1), 212 n., 215 n.
Clarke, Captain, (mil.), 171
Clarke, Captain Peter, 246 n.
Clayton, Colonel Jasper, 46
Cleland, Captain John (1), 183, 206 n , 294,
311
Cleland, Captain William, 80
Clements, Captain Micliael, 230 n., 303, 415
Clements, (-Commander Peter, 546 n.
Cleopatra, 505 n.
Cleopdtre, 563 n.
Clerks of the Acts, 3, 320
Cleveland, Captain Archibald, 194
Cleveland (or Cleaveland;, Captain William,
3, 27
Cleverly, Gravesend shipbuilder, 335
Clevland, John, 3, 155, 326
Clinton, 335
Clinton, Admiral of the Fleet the Hon.
George, 42 n., 310
Clinton^ General Sir Henry, 372, 379, 383,
387, 390, 392, 393, 398, 441, 442, 443,
471, 472, 473, 488, 489, 493, 496
Clipperton, John, 316-318
Clive, Captain Benjamin, 192, 227 n., 236 n.
Clive, Lord, 132, 139, 14.3, 144, 161, 162,
163, 164, 201
Clocheterie, Captain de La, 415, 492 n.,
533 n.
Clue, Admiral de La, 148 n., 149, 189, 190,
196, 211-214, 217, 302, 303
Clutterbuck, Thomas, 3
Co istjr"s Harbour, Rliode Island, 403
Coats, the navigator, William, 320
Cobham, Viscount, 40, 261
Cockatrice, 335
Cockburn, Lieutenant, (of the Hunter), 145,
146
Cockburne, Captain George, 3, 326
Cockburne, Captain John (1), 41 n.
Codriugtou (later Bethell), Christo])her : see
Bethell, Captain Christopher Codrington
Coffin, Admiral Sir Isaac, Bart., 350, 351
Cohorns, 136 and n.
Colby (or Coleby), Captain Charles, 4, 71,
141, 327
Colby, Captain Stephen, 311, 395 n.
Colby, Thomas, 4
578
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Cokhesh-r, 46 u., 274, 291, .".111
Coleman, Captain Robert, 41 n.
Coles's jiump, 337
Collier, Vice-Admiral Sir George, Kt., 346
C'olliiiyic'ood, 317
Collingwood, Vice-Admiral C'utlibert, Lord,
379, 554
Collingwood, Captain Thomas, 242 n., 245 ii., '
246 n., 312, 395 u., 410, 434, 454 n.
Collins, Captain Richard (1), 206 n., 310
Collins, Captain Richard (2), 240 n., 241
Colonels of Marines, 223 '
Colonial vessels, Authoritj' granted to cap-
ture, 371
Colonies, see American Colonies
Colours, Captured, 242
Colville, Rear-Admiral Alexander, Lord, 96,
169, 206 n., 209, 224, 226 and n., 227,
228, 232, 239, 251, 565
Colville, Captain the Hon. James, 174 n.,
179 n., 198 n., 225, 311
Comhustion, 552 n.
Comet, 86, 88
Comete, 305, 313
Commanders, 20, 330 and n., 336
Commanders-in-Chief, 15, 26, 33 u., Ill n.,
112 n.
Commissioners of Sick and Wounded, 1, 2
Commissioners of the Navy, 3, 4, 326, 327
Conmiissioners of the R.^gister Office, 2
Commons, Enquiry by the House of, 103 ;
Address to the, 276 and n.
Comptou, Captain James, 4
Comte de Oramont, 296
Comte de Provence, 174 and n., 179 and n.,
198 n.
Comte de St. Florentine, 301
Conanicut, 402, 403, 405
Conc^entration, Tactics of, 176, 455, 456,
458, 511, 551
Concepcton, 279, 315, 317
Conde, 174 n., 175, 179 n., 180
Conde de Chincan, 315
Conde de Toidouse, 34, 314
Conflans, Vice-Admiral the Marquis de, 122,
123, 196, 217-223, 274, 284, 311, 435 n.
Congress, 367
Congress and the outbreak of the war in
America, 356
Conquerant, 415, 492 n.
Conqueror, 211, 212 n., 215, 311, 395 n.,
434, 452, 453, -'54 n., 466 and ti., 520 n.
Conquistador, 12, 72 n., 135 n., 136, 247 n.,
314,315(2)
Consolante, 557 and n., 559
Constante, 96, 98, 99
Contempt of court by a court martial, 105,
106
Content, 127 and n., 148 n., 151 n., 274, 275
Contraband of war, 252, 253
Controllers of the Navy, 3, 4, 326, 343
Controllers of the Storekeeper's Accounts, 3,
326
Controllero of the Treasurer's Accounts, 3,
326
Controllers of the Victualling Accounts, 3,
326
Convert, 513 n., 520 n.
Convoys, 65, 75, 78, 91, 119, 122, 123, 124,
125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136,
137, 139, 140. 144, 165, 166, 188, 190,
196, 203, 210, 225, 250, 252, 280, 283,
284, 286, 291, 292, 294, 298, 299, .300,
301, 302, 303, 351, 390, 391, 395, 396,
4,33, 434, 435, 438, 445, 448, 451, 452,
469, 470, 473, 474, 477, 478, 479, 480,
482, 486, 489, 495, 503, 504, 509, 519,
521, 536, 538, 539, 540-542, 549, 554,
557
Convvay,Henry Seymour, Field-Marshal, 171
Conway, Hon. Hugh Seymour : afterwards
Seymour, Vice- Admiral Lord Hugh (q.v.)
Cook, Captain James, 337, 341 n., 352
Cooks, 19
Cooper, Captain Thomas, 4, 96, 104, 116
Coote, General Sir Eyre, 225
Copeliind Island, 2,30
Copenhagen, 26 and n., 27, 28, 41, 43, 47,
380, 412 n.
Copjier fastenings, 14
Coopering ships, 14, 336, 451, 470, 483,
486, 487, 489, 522
Corbett, Thomas, 3
Corbett, William, 3
: Cordova, Admiral Don Luis de, 446, 450,
504 539
Cork, 144, 167, 188, 372, 502
Cormorant, 206 n., 543 n.
Comewall, Captain Thomas, 169
Cornish, Vice-Admiral Sir Samuel, Bart.,
23, 96, 196, 200 and n., 224, 225, 232,
239-242, 565
Cornish (formerly Pitchford), Admiral
Samuel Pitchford, 240 n , 241, 520 n.,
568
Cornwall, 446
Cornwall, 12, 133 n., 134, 135 n., 136, 137,
235 n., 395 n., 404, 406 a., 408, 434, 437,
438, 4,39, 454 n., 458, 466
Cornwall, Vice-Admiral Charles, 3, 32, 34,
35, 36, 258
Cornwall, Captain James, 52, 96, 100 and n.
Cornwall, Captain Frederick, 99, 148 n.,
289
Cornwallis, 406 n.
Cornwallis, Charles, 1st Marquis, 372, 388,
405, 442, 472, 473, 488, 493, 494, 496,
501, 502
Cornwallis, Admiral the Hon. Sir William,
351, 434, 438, 473-477, 512, 513 and n.,
520 n., 525
Cornwallis, Major-General, 154, 171
Coromandel Coast, The, 119, 124, 130, 164,
174, 197, 225, 545, 549, 561
Corsica, 116, 123, 124, 27.3, 351
Corvettes, 330
INDEK TO VOLUME III.
bli>
Oorunna, 39, 308
(Josby, Admiral riiilliiis, 415, 492 n., 5fi8
Cost of Sliips, 10
Cotes, Vice-Ailiiiinil Thoiii.iK, 71, lis, 127 ii.,
165, 182, 204, 224, 313, 5(;5
Cotterell, Captain Charles, 64
Cotton, Admiral Sir Charles, Bart., 454 n.,
520 n.
Couchnian, the niutiueer. Lieutenant Samuel,
287, 288
Coudres, Isle, 206, 207
Councils of War, 07, 68, 74, 78, 79, 87, 118,
123, 151, 154, 172, 177, 194, 202, 270
Courageuj; 306, 307, 313, 415, 509 n.
Omimine, 148 n., 151 n., 415, 450, 458
Court, Admiral La Bruyere de, 07, 89, 92,
94, 95, 101, 102
Courts Manial, 17, 88 n., 95 n., 97, 103-106,
106 n., 123, 128, 129, 135, 137, 156-158,
177, 196 n., 275 and n., 276 and n., 277,
279 and n., 281 and n., 288 and n., 289 n.,
290 and n., 291, 294 and n.. 302 n., 339,
350, 423, 425, 426, 435 n., 456 n., 459 n.,
462, 478, 548
Coventry, 12, 217, 218 n., 302, 543 n.,
563 n.
Cowardice, 123, 125
Cowell, Captain Henry, 232
Cowling, Captain John, 474 n.
Coximar, I liver, 248
Cozens, Midshipman of the Wagei; 322
Craggs, Mr. Secretary, 30
Craig, Captain Robert, 298
Cranstoun, Captain James, Lord, 513 n.
Craufurd, Major-General John, 235
Craven, Eear-Admiral Thomas, 275, 560
Crescent, 12, 242 n., 299, 313
Crespin, Captain Abraham, 454 n.
Criminals in the Navy, 21, 23
Croisic, Le, 220, 221
Cromwell, Henry : see Frankland, Yice-
Admiral Henry
Crookshanks, Captain John, 285 and n.
Crowle, George, 3, 4
Oroimi, 206 n., 310
Crown Point, 141, 204, 205, 208, 228, 356,
358, 359, 367, 368, 370, 371, 380
Crozon, 313
Cruiser, 46 n., 310
Cruse, Admiral (Russian Navy), 341 n.
Crutched Friars, 2
Cuba, 07 n., 70, 77, 220, 240-249, 266,
207, 408, 494, 496 n.
Cuddalore ; see also. Fort St. David ; 177,
552, 555, 557, 561-564
Cul de Sao Royal : see Fort Royal, Marti-
nique
Culloden, 66 n., 113
Cnlloden, 148 n., 156, 169, 211, 212 and n.,
213, 215, 245 n., 240 n., 249, 250, 395 n.,
489
CumberJand, 35, 40 n., 60, 62 n., 63, 70 n.,
70 n., 79 n., 140, 161 n., 174 n., 175, 177,
179 and n., 198 u., 199, 303, 3,04 and ii.
311, 41.5, .563 r.
Cumberland Bay, 321
Cumberland Harbour, 76 and n., 77
CundxMlaiid, Duke of: see William Augustus,
Duke of Cumberland, Prince
Cumberland, Duke of: see Henry Frederick,
Duke of Cumberland, Prince
Cumuiing, Admiral James, 431
Cummin j;, the Quaker, Mr. Thomas, 186,.
187
Cunningham, Commander James, 253
Curacoa, 85, 86, 536
Curieiise, 415
Curling, Mr. John, master's mate, 366
Curtis, Admiral Sir Roger, Bart., 400, 406 n.
Cusack, Cajitain .lames, 80
Cust, Captain William, 134 and n.
Cutlasses, 9
Cutters, 330
Cutting-out Expeditions, 224, 292
Cuverville, Captain de, 550 n.
Cybele, 291 n.
Gi/gnet, 246 n., 335
Dacres, Vice-Admiral James Ricliard (1),.
361, 365
Dalrymple, Admiral John, 224 n., 509 ii.,
567
Dalrymple, Sir John, 332
Daraaquart, Captain de, 96
Damiateit, 91
Dampier, Captain William, 258, 316, 323
Danae, 223 n., 250, 301
Danae, 301, 313
Dandridge, Captain William, 63, 68, 269
Daphne, 336
Darby, Vice-Admiral George, 215 n., 226 n.,
242 n., 243, 477, 502, 50^3, 504, 540, 546,
566
Darby, Admiral Sir Henry d'Esterre, 540 n.
Darien, or Panama, Isthmus of, 52 n., 01, 70
Dartmouth, 125 and n., 280, 311
Dauphin, 108
Dauphin Boynl, 218 n., 415
Davers, Vice-Admiral Thomas, 71, 76, 91,
109, 115, 122, 123
Davis, Howel, 260
Davis Strait, 318
Dawson, Captain George, 404, 406 n., 409,
492 n.
Deacon, Commander Sabine, 201 n.
Deal, 10
Deal Castle, 131 n., 224 n., 257, 454 n.,
479 n.
Deane, Captain Joseph, 206 n., 208, 227
and n., 228, 235 n., 311
Death penalty. The, 279, 288, 339 (see also-
Byng)
Debt, The National, 254
Decay of shijis, 303, 304
Decker, Captain Haringcarspel, 505 n.
Dedel, Captain S., 505 n.
580
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Defence, 5G3 n.
Defenseur, "244 n.
Defiance, 41 n., 62, 70 n., 79 n , 80, 125 n.,
126, 127 n., 141, 148 ii., 149, 150, 151 n.,
153, 154, 218 n., 219, 246 n., 247 n., 312,
315 (2), 415
Delavall, Vice- Admiral George, 34, 35, 36
Delaware, Bay and Capes of the, 390, 394,
397, 402, 542
Delaware River, 386, 388, 391, 392, 398,
399, 496
De I'Angle, Captain Merrick, 84 and n., 96
Delfino V Barlande, Captain Don J., 34
Delft, 91
Delgarno, Captain Arthur, 258
Denis, Vice- Admiral Sir Peter, Bart., 125 n.,
218 n., 237, 239, 252, 299, 566
Denison, Captain (Russian Navy), 341
Denmark, 26 et see/., 41—43
Dennis, Captain Henry, 78
Dent, Captain Digby (2), 3, 4, 55, 71, 123 n.,
124, 133 u., 134, 135
Dent, Captain Sir Digby (3), Kt., 179 n.,
198 n., 225, 311, 434
Dentelle, 110
Depredations by Spain, 50, 51
Deptford, 4, 12, 105, 137
Deptford, 13, 70 n., 76, 108, 131 n., 148 n.,
154, 215 n., 246 u.
Derby, 113
Derltj, 143
Dering, Captain Daniel, 187, 201 n., 203,
224^n.
Derrick, ' Memoirs of the Rise and Progress
of the Royal Navy,' 5
Derwentwater estates. The, 18
Deseada, 519
Desertion, 339, 378
Desirade, La, 203
Desorquart, Captain de, 96
Devert, Daniel, 3
Devonshire, 125 n., 127, 206 n., 222 n., 226
n., 242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 249, 250
Diademe, 244, 294, 303, 415
Diamant, 64 n., 96, 125 n., 126, 312
Diamond, 43 n., 57, 61, 62 and n., 96, 267,
314
Diamond, Cape, 208, 227
Diana, 8, 173, 183, 206 n., 227 and n., 253,
546 n.
Ditme, 186 u., 281, 298, 313
Dickson, Admiral AVilliam, 454 n.
Dictator, 339
Digby, Admia-al Hon. Robert, 188, 218 n.,
415, 502, 567
Digges, Captain Dudley, 13, 167 u., 183,
218 n., 246 n.
Di.ion, 231 n.
Diligence, 192
Diligent, 550 n.
Diligente, 174 and n., 179 n., 198 n., 244 n.,
449
Dilkes, Captain William, 96, 104 and n.
Dimensions of ships, 9, 12, 190, 335
Discontent on the lower deck, 339
Discovert/, 318, .'tl9
Disease: see Sanitation, Mortality, Fever,
Scurvy, etc.
Disguise, Successful, 244
Disobedience to orders justifiable, 161, 460
Distillation of fre-^h water from salt, 337
Dixon, Master of the Northumberland, Mr.,
275
Doake, Captain James, 206 n., 226 n., 233 n.,
242 n.
Dobbs, 319, 320
Dobbs, Arthur, 319
J'obree, Captain Daniel, 434
Dockyards, 4, 326, 327, 335, 336, 342 and
n., 343
Dod, Admiral Edmund, 513 n., 520 n.
Dodd, Captain Edward, 311
Doddington, George, 3
Doggersbank, The, 314, 343, 505-509
Dolphijn, 505 n., 506
Dolphin, 12, 147, 148 and n., 153, 265,
283 n., 297, 298, 299, 312, 336, 505 n.,
Dominica, 64, 203, 233, 244, 254, 427, 428,
453, 519, 521, 522, 523, 527, 529, 531
Donan Castle, 39
Dorchester, Lord, 350
Dordrecht, 91
Dorsetshire, 12, 34, 96, 101, 103, 218 n.,
219, 299, 313
Douglas, Colonel, (Mar.), 63 n.
Douglas, Rear- Admiral Sir Charles, Bart.,
206 n., 207, 235 n., 357 and n., 360, 361,
362 and n., 363, 366 and n., 368, 369,
415, 520 n., 535, 568
Douglas, Sir Howard, 357 n.
Douglas, Admiral Sir .James (1), Kt., 115,
206 n., 209, 224, 232, 233, 239, 242 and
n., 243, 244, 245 and n., 246, 247, 565
Douglas, Captain John, 454 n., 459, 460
Douglas, Captain Stair (1), 242 n., 246 n.,
482 n.
Douglas, Captain William, 60 n.
Dove, Captain Francis, 4
Dover, 16, 335
Dover, 242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 284, 312
Downs, The, 90, 111 n., 112, 196, 200, 224
and n., 232, 250, 252, 312, 352, 539
Drac/on, 43, 72 n., 81 and n.,82, 92, 96, 98,
191, 218 n., 234 n., 235, 242 n., 244, 245
n., 246 n., 248, 249, 270, 284, 302, 314
Dragon, 135 n., 314
Drake, 123 n., 225, 267, 310
Drake, Captain Francis, 34
Drake, Rear-Admiral Sir Francis Samuel,
Bart., 218 n., 227 n., 233 n., 242 n.,
395 n., 482 n., 487, 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.,
528, 567
Drake, Vice-Admiral Francis William,
212n., 24Gn., 248, 311, 566
Draper, General Sir AViUiam, K.B., 239
242
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
581
Drmdnour/lit, 34, 165 and u., '-~ i mid ii.,
•276, 277, 280, 284, 300, 312
Droits de V Homme, 286
Druid, 234 n.
Drummond, Captain Charles, OH
Drummond, Commander John Auriol, 479 n.
Drunkenness, 273, 274, 317
Dublin, 230, 342
Dublin, 182, 206, 242 n., 245 u., 246 u.,
250
Dubois de La Motte, Vioe-Adiniral, 140,
141, 167, 168, 170, 172, 283, 286, 287,
297
Duo d'Aiouillon, 293
Due d'Aquitaine, 200 n., 225, 295, 311,
312
Due d'Hanovre, 299, 313
Due d'OrUans, 96, 120 u., 121, 174 n., 179
n., 180, 198 n., 312
Due de Bourijogne, 174 n., 175, 17(i, 179
and n., 198' n., 244 n., 414, 415, 492 n.
Due de Chartres, 301, 313
Due de Ghoiseul, 225 n.. 226
Due de Fr ansae, 209
Du Chaft'ault, Admiral Louis Charles, Comte,
127 n., 182, 185, 290, 415
Ducie, Lord: see Moreton, Captain Francis
Beynolds
Dudgeon Shoal, 15
Dudley, Captain O'Brien, 287, 288
Duels, 88 n.
Duff, Rear-Admiral Robert, 193, 216, 217,
218 and n., 242 n., 566
Duffus, Captain Kenneth, Lord, 43 n.
Duke, 218 n., 273, 280, 310, 311, 415, 509
n., 520 n., 531, 532, 533
Dumaresq, Admiral Thomas, 520 n.
Dumet, Isle de, 220
Dumont d'LTrville, Rear-Admiral T. C,
352 n.
Dunbar, 311
Duncan, Admiral Adam, Viscount, 139 n.,
234 n., 246 n., 568
Duncan, Captain Henry (1), 327, 400 n.,
406 n., 492 n.
Dundas, Henry : see Melville, Viscount
Duudonald, Admiral Thomas Cochrane,
10th Earl of, 301
Dimgeness, 90
Dunkirk, 34, 43, 70 n., 76, 96, 101, 141,
188, 218 n., 291, 295, 296, 312 ,
Dunnose, 293
Duuquei-que, Dunkerque, or Dunkirk, 89,
90, 112, 196, 223, 229, 230 n., 254, 314
Dupleix, M., 12], 122, 124, 130, 139, 140,
178
Duplessis Perseault, Captain, 4 1 5
Duquesne, Commodore, 189
Durell, Vice-Admiral Philip (I), 88, 115,
127 n., 148 n., 172, 173, 185, 205, 206
and n., 207, 209, 283 n 565
DureU, Captain Thomas (1), 53, 263, 268
Durfort, Captain Baron de, 492 n.
Darshy Oalley, 4G n., 47, 84 n., 96, 201,
263
Dursley, Lord : see Berkeley, .Tames, Karl of
Dury, Major-General, 195
Dutabil, Capjtain Don L, 96
Dutch volunteers in British ships, 87
Duvivier, Captain, 109
Eaijle, 127 n., 128, 283 n., 28!, 295, 312,
380, 400, 406 n., 407, 408, 545 n., 550 n.,
552 n., 556, 563 n.
East India Company, 108, 120, 121 n.. 130,
131, 132, 139, 140, 143, 161, 177. 181,
18.5, 197, 200, 201, 232, 240, 241, 251,
340, 445, 545, 546 n., 548
East India Company (Dutch), 130, 131,
201, 548
East India Company (French), 119, 121,
124, 125 and n., 126, 1.39, 160, 164, 174,
197. 294, 295, 301, 305
E.ast Indies, 91, 108, 109, 119-122, 124,
130, 139, 143, 160, 173, 174-182, 196,
197-200, 224, 225, 239-242, 284, 287,
304, 311, 312, 313, 482, 503, 508, .509,
538, 543-564
East River, New York, 382, 385, 409
Eastwood, Commander Joseph, 192
Eeho, 18.5, 186 n., 206 n., 242 n., 246 n.,
313
Ecureuil, 314, 415
Edam, 91
Eddystone, The, 14, 15, 90
Edgar, 212 n., 215, 246 n., 250, 509 n.
Edgcumbe, Admiral Hon. George, Earl
Jlount Edgcumbe, 84 n., 147, 148 and n.,
218 n., 296, 565
Edinburgh, 340
Edinburgh, 127 n., 165 and n., 284
Education of naval officers, 22
Edward Augustus, Duke of York, Admiral
Prince, 193 and n., 216, 239, 252, 343 n.,
565
Edwards, Admiral Edward, 339, 406 n.,
428 n.
Edwards, Admiral Richard (2), 415, 5157
Edwards, Captain Richard {a), 35 n.
Edwards, Captain Timothy, 212 n., 395 n.,
404, 406 n., 434, 454 n.
Eensgezindheit, 505 n.
Bfiin:.;ham, Lord, 154
Egmont, 415, 417
Egniont, .John, Earl of, 325
Eleanor, G2 n., 70 n.
Elephant, 278, 312
Elibank, Lord : see Murray, Captain Hon.
George (1)
Elisabeth, 110, 111, 210, 279
Elizabeth, 53, 92, 96, 133 n., 134, 174 n.,
175, 179 and n., 198 and n., 199, 240 n.,
241, 415, 417, 434, 454 n., 557 n.
Elizabeth River, 489
Elliot, Captain Elliot, 108
Elliot, Sir Gilbert, Bart. : see Minto, Lord
38
582
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Elliot, Admiral John, liJl, 230 andn., 297,
301, 400 u., 406 11., 509 n., 5G7
Ellis, the navigator, Henry, 320
ElliB, ■\Velbore, 321)
Ellys, Cajitain Charles, 234 n.
Eljihinstone, Admiral Hon. George Keith :
\'iscount Keith, 333
Elpliiustone, Captain John (1), 195, 206 n.,
22G n., 245, 246 n., 304, 311, 341 n., 434,
454 n.
Elpliiustone, Captain Samuel Williams, 341
and n.
Eltham, 86, 87, 88, 115, 272
Elton, Captain Jacob, 278, 279, 311
Embargo on shipping, 45, 166, 167, 396
lirnhusmde, 312
Emden, 173, 190
Emerald, 201 n., 297
Emeraudc, 125 n., 295, 297, 312
Empire, The Holy Roman, 29 and n., 40,
42, 47, 49, 50, 110
Endeavmir, 479 n.
Endymion, 520 n.
England, Edward, 260
English Harbour, Antigua, 23
Enterjyrise, 39, 246 n., 262
Entrepreiuiiit, 183, 305, 313
Eole, 96
Epreure, 311, 313
Er/prins, 505 n.
Erie, Lake, 204, 205
"Error of judgment," 293, 294, 468 (see
a/so Byng)
Errutia, Captain Don K., 96
Erskine, Caj^tain Robert, 285
Escarboucle, 313
Escars, Captain (.'omte d', 533 n.
Escort, 234 n.
Escudero, Captain Don Antonio, 34
Eskimos, 319
Esperanto, 34, 314
Esperance, 96, 289, 312, 335
Essex, 14, 34, 35, 94, 96, 101, 218 n., 221,
234 n., 236, 281, 311, 313
Establishment for guns, 11, 331-334
Establishment of tlag-otfieers, 20
Establishments for ships, 8, 9, 10
Estaing, Vice-Admiral Comte d', 308, 394
and u., 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403
and n., 405 and n., 408-412, 428-432,
433, 435, 438, 440, 442, 443, 471, 478,
521
Estepona, 211
Estournel, Captain d', 64 n.
Eteuduere, Admiral des Herbiers de I', 64 n.,
127 and u., 129, 137, 284
Etoile, 283, 286, 312
Etm'iago, Captain Don A., 96
Europm, 247 n., 315
Europa Point, 211
Europe, 492 n., 497 n.
Eur us, 206 n., 226 n., 311
Eurydice, 513 n., 520 n.
Evans, Captain Henry Francis, 395 n.
Evans, Admiral John, 218 n., 223 n., 395 n.,
566
Evans, Ca])taiii Thomas, 185, 235 n.
Ei'eille, 218 n., 294, 415, 492 n.
Everitt, Charles Holmes : see Calmady,
Charles Holmes Everitt
Everitt, Caijtaiii Michael, 148 n., 156, 206
and n., 233 n., 242 n., 245 n., 246 n.
Ewer, Captain, (Mar.), 191
Exchequer, Captain Sutton's action in the
Court of, 350
Execution of Admiral Byng, 158-160. See
Death Penalty
Exeter, 118, 131 and n., 415, 545 n., 550
and n., 551, 552 and n., 560, 563 n.
Exmouth, Lord : see Pellew, Admiral Sir
Edward
Expenditure on the Xavy, 5, 327
Experiment, 522
Experiment, 68, 70 n., 73, 76 u., 78, 79 and
n., 148 n., 156, 188, 276, 296, 373, 374,
376, 387, 406 n., 409
Exploration, Services of, to the Navy, 318,
324
Extra Commissioners of the Xavy, 4, 32C
Eyesight, Defective, 103
FAiBrAX, Vice-Admiral Sir William George,
415
Fairleigh, 16
Faisan, 313
Falcon, 125 and n., 201 n., 285, 311 (2),
403 n.
Falkuigham, Captain Edward (1), 3, 4, 34,
53
Falkinghani, Captain Edward (2), 167 and n.
Falkland, 125 n., 218 n., 227 n., 233 n.,
242 n.
Falkland Islands, 208 n., 339
Falmouth, 262, 446
Falmouth, 60 n., 62 and n., 70 n., 75 n.,
200 n., 225, 240, 241, 267
False musters, 350, 351
Fame, 235 n., 311, 314, 395 n., 434, 438,
439, 520 n.
Family Compact, The, 238, 307
Fandiuo, Juan de Leon, 265, 266, 272
Fanshaw, Captain Charles, 269
Fanshawe, Captain Robert (1), 327, 434,
520 n.
Fantasque, 212 n., 439, 492 n.
Farnham, Captain Thomas, 509 n.
Faro of Messina, The, 32, 33, 36, 37
Faroe Islands, 229
Farragut, Admiral, cited, 150
Faurun, 229, 230 n.
Faulkuor, Admiral Jonathan (1), 188, 215 n.,
415, 567
Faulkuor, Captain Robert (2), 306
Faulknor, Captain Samuel (1), 108 and n.,
284, 310
Faulknor, Captain Samuel (2), 284, 301
ISDKX TO VOLUME III.
583
Fiiulknoi', Captain William, 10 ii.
I'avorile, 415
Favourite, 212 ii., 2!)S, :!0(!, 308
Fawler, John, 3, 4
Fawler, (Japtain John, 2)-H
FciMiiig, Oaptain Charles (1), .'!")]
Fvlkit^', 304, 313
Fellowes, shipbuilder, 12
Fi'niT, 247 and n., 315, 335, 4 10
Fiiulaiit, 415, 45H, 663 n.
Ferguson, Captain James, 251^ 428 n., 482 n.
Fergusson, Admiral John, 454 n., 505 n.
Ferine, 9ti, 281 (2), 312
Ferrers, Earl: see Shirley, Vicc-Aduiiral
Hon. Washington
Ferret, 167 n., llit), 242 n., 240 n., 311, 33,5,
406 a.
Ferrol, 62, 65, 66, 267, 285, 451, 452
Jever, 23, 272
Feuersham, 84 n., 90, 270, 271
Fidele, 183, 291 and n., 313
Field, Captain Arthur, 34
Fier, 148 n., 151 n., 212 n., 415
Fighting Instructions, The, 82 and n., 94 n.,
103
Finch, Captain Hon. Seymour, 509 n.
Finch, Rear- Admiral Hon. William Clement,
497 n.
Fincher, Captain Thomas, 125 n., 131 n.,
132 and n., 311
Fine, 312, 550 n.
Firdsterre, Cape, 124, 127
Finland, Gulf of, 43
Fire discipline, 55
Fire, Ships destroyed hy, 273, 277 n., 297,
298, 310-315
Firebrand, 70 n.
Firedrake, 172, 188, 215 n., 234 n.
Fireships, 28, 30, 33, 34, 41, 42, 43, 46 n.,
59, 70 n., 76 n., 79 n., 90, 100, 101, 117,
125 n., 134, 149, 161 n., 162, 103, 185,
192, 206 n., 207, 212 u., 215, 225, 234
and n., 237, 273, 283 u., 330, 335, 374,
391, 415, 497 n., 509 n., 520 n., 541,
546 n., 552 ?.
Firing-tubes for guns, Tin, 334
Firm, 216, 222 n.
First Captain : see Captain of the Fleet
First Lords of the Admiralty, 2, 325
Fishermen in the American army, 384
Fishing Industry, The, 115, 186, 253, 254
Fitzgei'ald, Vice-Admiral Lord Charles :
Lord Lecale, 497 n.
I'itzherbert, Vice-Admiral Thomas, 404.
400 n., 568
Fitzroy, Captain Lord Augustus, 04, 70 n.,
208
Flag, The Honour of the, 190 n., 351, 352
Flag-officers, 20, 343-347
Flamand, 550 n., 503 n.
Flamborough Head, 311
Flainborough, 39, 192, 234 7!., 269, 302
-Flanders, 118, 119, 130
Fleehi, ;i(
Fleet at difl'erent periods, Strength of tlie,
5-7, 328
"Fleet in Being" (see also " Potwitial "
Fleet), 405
Fleming, Colonel, (Mar.), 03 n.
F/ear, 96
Fletir de Lijs, 225 n., 226, 313.
FJeurun, 270, 277 and n., 280, 312
Floating batteries, 75, 207, 391, 392, 511
Flobert, Brigadier-General de, 229 and n.,
230
Flora, 304, 403 n., 520 n.
F'/ore, 271, 312
Floii.la, 03 n., 250, 254, 269, 270, 371, 441
Florida, Gulf of, 135, 311
Florissant, 191, 300
Flushing, 297
" Flute," " En, 539 n.
Fly, 234 n., 236 and n.
Fog, 141, 163, 182, 189, 250, 366, 384, 489,
490
Folkestone, 16
Folkestone, 270
Fontainebleau, Treaty of, 89; Prelinnnaries
of peace signed at, 253
Fooks, Rear-Admiral William, 454 n.
Foote, Vice-Adnural Sir Edward James, 352
Forbes, Captain Hugh, 123
Forbes, Admiral of the Fleet Hon. Jolui,
96, 158, 565
Forbin, Captain de, 540 n., 550 n.
Ford, Rear-Admiral John, 497 n., 520 n.
Foreign service, British naval officers in,
340, 341
Formation, Bad, of Byron's tleet, 435, 439
Formidahile, 202, 313
Formidable, 218 n., 219, 415, 417, 418 n.,
419, 421, 424, 425, 520 n., 530, 531, 532
Forrest, Captain Arthur, 165 ami n., 166,
233, 245, 294, 306
Forrestal, Captain Don, 135 n.
Forrester, Mai'k, 258
Fort Beau Sejour, 141
Fort Bougee-Bougee, 161
Fort Bourbon, Davis Strait, 318
Fort Charles, Davis Strait, 318
Fort Charlotte, St. Lucia, 430
Fort Churchill, 319
Fort Cumberland, 141, 108
Fort Diego, Florida, 209
t'ort Duquesne, 141
Fort Edward, 205
Fort Edward, New York, 389, 390
Fort Lee, 384, 386
Fort Louis, Senegal, 187
Fort Mancinilla, Cartagena, 09, 72
Port Mifflin, Mud Island, 391, 392
Fort iloosa, 270
Fort INIovdtrie, 372, 373, 379, 38c
Fort Punta, Havana, 249
Fort Roval, GuadeIou[)e, 203
Fort Royal, Martinique, 201,203, 243, 4-9,
38—2
584
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
431, 432, 433, 452, 453, 463, 400, 468,
480, 481, 482, 483 n., 484, 488, 510, 519
Fort Kalvatore, Messina, 32
Fort Sail Aiitunio, San Sebastian, 201
Fort San Felipe, Cartagena, 69, TO
Fort San Jose, Cartagena, 69, 72
Fort San Lazar, Cartagena, 69, 73, 74
Fort San Lorenzo, Chagres, 61, 02
Fort San Luis, Cartagena, 69, 70, 71, 72
Fort Santiago, Cartagena, 69, 70
Fort San Sebastian, Vigo, 202
Fort St. David, (Cuddalore), 119, 122, 131,
132, 100, 174, 177 : so,- aha Cuddalore
Fort St. George, (Madras) : see also Madras,
177, 178, 545
Fort Ste. Slarguerite, 84
Fort Tanna, 161
Fort AVasliingtou, 384, 385, 380
Fort William, (Calcutta), 102
Fort York, Hayes River, 318
Forte dv Nantz (?), 315
Fortescue, Captain William, 188, 218 n.,
234 n., 235 n.
Forth, Firth of, 257
Fortitude, 343, 505 n., 507
Fortune, 148 n., 150, 198 n., 290
Fortiinee, 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Foudroyant, 148 n., 151 n., 182, 189, 190,
222 u., 242 n., 313, 415, 538
Fou<i<i,,i.r, 127 n., 141, 188, 312
Four Bank, The, 220, 221, 311
Foivey, 200 n., 242 n.. 246 n., 308, 311.
315
Fowke, Captain Thorpe, 80, 200 n., 276
Fowke, General, 147
Fowkes. Commander Henry, 45
Fox, 78 n., 311, 415,425
Fox, Right Hon. Charles James, 347
Fox. Cajitain Thomas, 120, 127 n., 128,
129, 283 and n.
France, 29 and n.. 42, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 68,
59. 89, 108, 110, 117-119, 124, 132, 138,
140, 103, 238, 201, 322. 354, 370
France, Isle de (see also Mauritius), 119,
104. 308, 451. 54.3, 545, 549
Francis, Captain Thomas, 226 n., 242 n.
Frankfurt. Treaty of, 89 n.
Franklaud, Vice- Admiral Henry : formerly
Henry Cromwell, 505 n., 509 u.
Franklaud, Admiral Sir Thomas, Bart., 145,
104, 266 and n., 279, 290, 505
Frederick IV., King of Denmark, 26 u.
Frederick, King of Sweden, 41 n.
Frederikshald, 41
French aggressions, 138-140
French coasts, Expeditions against the,
171, 172, 173, 190-196, 231, 234-237
French men-of-war fitted out as privateers,
280
French politeness to Captain Cook, 352
Freshwater Cove, Louisbourg, 183
Friedrich of Hessen-Cassel, King of Sweden,
41 n.
Frigates, 7, 8, 330
Friponne, 231 n.
Frogmere, Captain Rowland, 96, 104
Fromenti^res, (Captain de, 127 n., 128
Frozen Strait, 3111,320
Frye, Lieutenant George, (Mar.), 105
Fuerte, 272, 314
Fulta, 161
Fundy, Bay of, 168
Funnels of a fireship), 100 n.
Fu/rieux, 96
Furnaee, 12, 188, 215 n., 234 n., 236 n., 319
Furneavix, Captain Tobias, 37.3
Furnivall, I,ieutenant William, 505 n.
Furzer, Cajitain John, 34, 310
Gabaret, Admir.al, 94, 96, 107
Gabarus Bay, 115, 168, 182
Gage, Captain John, 86, 88, 310
Gage, General Thomas, 204
Galapagos Islands, 318
Galatee, 313
Galbraith, Captain James, 171, 246 n.
Cfalera, 34
Galga, 135 n.
Oalicia, 71 n., 72 and n., 75 and n., 310, 314
Galifet, Captain de, 550 n.
Galissonniere, Admiral de La, 139, 142, 148
n., 149, 1.50, 151 n., 152
Galle, Vice-Adrairal Morard de, 549 n.,
550 n.
Galleons (.see also Treasure ships), 44, 45,
46, 54,61, 241,246,323
Galleys, 33, 34, 37, 38, 84, 269, 270, 273,
314, 391, 400, 402, 406 n., 442
Galvanic action on coppered ships, Effects
of, 14, 336
Gambier, Vice-Admiral James (1), 201 n.,
202, 218 n., 233, 2.34 n., .326 (2), 566
Gambier, Admiral of the Fleet James (2),
Lord, 406 n.
OaiKjes, 340
Ganges, River, 161, 201
Ganjam, 561
Gardiner's Bay, 471, 489
Gardiner, Captain Arthur, 148 n., 150, 156,
157, 189
Gardner, Achuiral Sir Alan, Lord, 434, 474
n., 520 n.
Garganta, Ca]itain Don F., 247 n.
Garland ov Guardland, 27 and n., 34
Garonne, River, 171
Garreoooha, Captain Don, 135 n.
Gascoigne, Captain Edward, 242 n., 245 n.,
246 'n.
Gascoigne, of the Carron Foundry, Mr., 332
Gascoigne, Captain John, 96
Gashry, Francis, 3, 4
Gaspee, 184
Gaspee, 22.S
Gastrien, boatswain of the Chesterfield, Mr.,
287, 288
Gata, Cape de, 67
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
585
Gates, Major {later General U.S.A.), 243,
364, 472
Gayton, Admiral Clarke, 201 ii., 202, 500
Gayton, Kear-Ailmiral George, L'31 n., 236
n., 489
Geary, Admiral Sir Francis, Bart., 108, 222
and n., 231, 278, 477, 505
Geddes, Captain Alexander, 4
Gell, Admiral Jolm, 550 n., 552 n.
Generals of Marines, 215, 222, 2li3
Genoa, 85, 116, 124, 137, 273
Oentille. 492 n.
George I., King, 25, 27, 30, 47, 48
George II., King, 20, 48, 50, 51, 00, 103,
105, 231
George III., King, 237, 342, 343, 508
George, Lalie. 185, 205, 354, 350, 389
George's Bank, 410
Georgetown, Grenada, 435, 436
Georgia, 372, 441, 442, 472
Geraldiue, Captain Don N., 90
Geriah, 143, 144
German mercenaries in America, 359, 360,
383
German troops in British ships, 32.
Crermaine, 520 n.
Gibraltar, 4, 32, 42, 40, 48, 59, 00, 89, 91,
104, 107, 116, 147, 148, 151, 153, 154,
155, 157, 160, 169, 190, 210, 211, 215,
270, 281, 292, 327, 394, 395, 447, 448,
449, 451, 409, 477, 502, 503, 504, 540-
543, 540
Gibraltar, 12, 80, 83, 211, 212 n., 215, 217,
335, 449, 482 n., 503 n.
Gideon, Captain Solomon, 84 n.
Gidoin, Bear-Admiral Jolm Lewis, 406 n.,
482 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Gilchrist, Captain James, 148 n., 290, 297,
301
Gillam, the voyager, 318
Glandevez, Commodore de, 148 n., 149
Glasgow, 50
Glanj/ow, 212 n., 240 n.
" Glasses," 367
Glenshiel, 40
Gloire, 123 n., 125 n., 308, 312
Gloria Castle, 54, 56, 57
Olorkax, 83 u., 218 n., 415, 451, 531, 532,
533 and n.
Olorioso, 6, 285, 303, 311, 315
Glory, 335
Gloucester, 127 n., 310, 320, 321, 323
Glover, Captain Bonavia, 473, 474
Glover's ballad, ' Admiral Hosier's Ghost,'
45 n.
Goa, 303, 311
Goat Island, Newport, 402, 403
Goccocea, Captain Don J., 34
Godsalve, Captain Henry, 96
Goes, 91
Gogland, Battle of, 341 n.
Golston, 42 n.
Gombroon, 200
" Gondolas," 359, 300, 302 and u., 365, 300,
307, 308
Gongee, 103
Gonzales, Captain Don Antonio, 34
Gonzales, Cajitain the Marque's, 247 n.
Gooilall, Admiral Samuel Granston, 246 u.,
415, 509 n., 520 n., 568
Goodly, 60, 62 n., 70 n.
Goostrey, Captain William, 206 n., 246 n.,
248
Gorcum, 91
Gordon, Captain Thomas (1) (later Vice-
Admiral in the Russian service), 43 and n.
Gordon, Captain Thomas (2), 311
Gordon, Rear-Admiral WiUiaui, 206 n.,
222 n., 505
Goree (Goeree), 186-189, 254
Gosport, 190 n., 250
Gothenburg, L'29
Gotho, Captain, 174 n.
Oouderak, 91
Gough, Captain William, 150, 227 and n.
Governor's Island, 382, 384
Gowanus Cove, 383
Gower, Rear- Admiral Hun. Jolm Leveson,
212 n., 415, 507
Oracieiise, 148 n., 212 n.
Gramme, Admiral Alexander, 400 n., 428 u.,
505 n.
Grafton, 33, 34, 35, 76 n., 144, 109, 197,
198 and n., 240 n., 395 n., 434, 437, 438,
439, 454 n., 402
Graham, Captain Mitchell, 234 n.
Gramont, 183, 212 n., 293, 312
Grampus, 274,310(2), 312
Grand Cul de Sac, St. Lucia, 429, 432
Grand Gideon, 293
(.3 rand Island, 363
Grande Terre, Guadeloupe, 203
Grantliere, Captain de La, 41 5, 492 n.
Grant, Capjtain Charles Cathcart, 240, 241 n.,
304 n.
Grant, General James, 430, 432
Granvdle, L'91
Granville, Earl, 41
Grasse, Vice-Admiral Comte de, 369, 385,
405, 443, 482-488, 494, 495-502, 509-
518, 519-535, 538, 539, 543, 546
Grasse-Tilli, Captain de, 415
Grave, Commodore Hendrik, 26
Graves, Captain David, 492 n., 497 n.
Graves, Admiral Samuel (1), 171, 565
Graves, Captain Samuel (2), 557
Graves, liear-Admiral Thomas (1), 70
Graves, Admiral Thomas (2), Lord, 215 n.,
218 n., 250, 251, 294 n., 471 and n., 492
u., 494, 495-502, 508, 512, 567
Graves, Admiral Sir Thomas (3), 395 u.,
497 u., 513 n., 520 n.
Gravelines, 258
Graveseud, 320, 335
Gravesend Bay, New York, 383
Gravier, Captain de, 96
586
INDEX TO VOLUilK 111.
Greene, ticin-ral, U.S.A., 472
Grteuliill, lleiiiT, -I
Greenwicli, 15G, 425, 444 ii,
Greenwich, .59, GO, Gl, 62, 78 ii.. 79 n.,
16.5 n., 166, 274, 275, 276, 294, 'MO, 311,
313
Greenwich Hosiiital, 18, 342
Greenwood, Captain William, 20G n.
Gregory, Captain Thomas (1), 86, 8S and n.
Gregory, Captain Thomas (2), 310
Grenada, 244, 254, 434, 435 n., 438, 440,
473, 488
Grenades, 9
Grenada, 201 n., 24S
245 n., 246 n.
Grenadines, The, 244, 254
Grenville, lit. Hon. George, 2, 3, 18, 325
Grenville, Captain 'I'homas, 125 n., 126
Greyhound, 43 n., 113, 226 n., 242 n., 262,
310, 312, 454 n.
Grieg, Admiral Samuel, (lUissian Navy),
340, 34 1 and n.
Grillin, Admiral Tliomas (1), 120, 122, 124,
130, 131, 27G, 277, 5G5
Griffin, Commander Thomas (2), 120 n.
Griffin, or Griffon, PA, 201 n., 311, 313
Griffith, Captain Walter (1), 400 n., 406 n.,
428 n., 434, 452, 453
Grimao, Admiral Don F. de, 34
Groix. Isle, 124, 303
Gros Ilet Bay, St. Lucia, 432, 4G3, 487
Grove, Comnianiler Tliomas Saunders, 546 u.
Guadeloupe, 202, 203, 210, 254, 428, 463,
468, 521, 522, 524, 525, 526
Guafleloupe, or Guadaloupe, 395 n., 492 n.,
536
Guantiinamo, Punto, 76 n.
Guarda Costas, 262, 263, 264, 265, 310
Ouarduiii, 143
Guav, Commodore Comte du, 127 n., 142,
289
Guerin, M. Leon, quoted, 222 n.
Guernsey, 310
Guernsci/, 41 n., 9(). 1G9, 170, 212 and n.,
21.3, 304 n.
Guerrera, Captain Don Francisco, 34
Guerrier, 148 n., 151 n., 212 n., 213, 551
Guevara, Kear-Admiral Don Balthazar de,
34, 36, 37, 38
Guichen, Rear-Aihniral Comte de, 415, 443
and n., 453, 456, 458, 461, 463, 464, 465,
466, 468, 469, 470, 478, 480, 488, 504,
509
GuiJhiume Tell, 286
Guinea, 169, 259, 260
Guipiiscoa, 314
Guijniscoana, 448 n.
Gmrlaiide, 193, 308, 313 (2)
Guise, Cieneral John, 63, 68 n., 70, 76
Gunhoats, on the American lakes, 362, 365 ;
at Gibraltar, 503
Gunfleet, The, 43
Guu-locks, 334
Gunners, 19, 111 n., 112 n.
Gunneiy exercise, 54, 333
Gunnery, Poorness of Frencli, 549, 552
Guns, liursting of, 180, 305, 306
Guns, Naval, 11, 12, 330-334
Gunwharf, Portsmouth, 343
Gwynn, Captain Eichard, 125 n.. 212 n.,
296
Gyldenlove, Ulrich Christian, 26 an<l n., 27
Haarlem, 91
Haarlem River: see Harlem River
Hackman, Captain James, 311
Haddock, Admiral Nicholas, .34, 49, 50
and n., 65, 66, 67, SO, 270
Haddock, Captain Richard (2), 3
Haddock, Captain WilUam, 34
Hadley's Quadrant, 10, 13
Hague, The, 36
Haiti ; see San Domingo.
Hakluyt Society, The, 320
Haldane, Cajitain Robert, 224, 225
Hale, Captain Jolm, 238, 246 n., 299, 311
Half-pay, 19, 104, 340
Half- pay officers: piroposal to subject them
to martial law, 17, 104
Halifax, Nova Scotia, 141, 167, 168, 169,
172, 182, 206, 210, 251, 289, 311, 327,
350, 371, 379, 397, 404
HaUfax, lb 3, 206 n.
Halifax, George, Earl of, 2
Hall, Richard, 3
Haniblin, Robert, 15
Hamilton, Captain Archibald (2), 34
Hamilton, Captaiu George, 206 n., 208
Hamilton, Captain James (2), 286, 311
Hauiilton, Captain Sir John (2), Bart.>
415, 474 n.
Hamilton, Lieutenant , (Mar.), 322
Hamond, Captain Sir Andrew Snape (1),
Bart , 327, 343, .391, 406 n.
Hampden, Richard, .3
Hampshire, 225, 22G, 246 n.
Hampton Court, 41 n., 54, 55, 56, 57 n.,
70 n., 71, 72, 75 n., 152 n., 189, 234 n.,
236, 246 u., 250, 266 and n., 267, 276-
278, 283 n., 295
Hancock, 335
Hands, Israel, 260
Hankerson, Captain Thomas, 20G n., 226 n.,
242 D., 245 n., 246 n.
Hannibal, 549 and n., 550 n., 563 n.
Hannover, Evils of the connection with, 27,
89
Hannover, Treaty of, 42
Hanway, Captain Thomas, 4, 125 n., 127 n.,
326 (2)
Happttj, 43 n., 45
Hapipy h'cturn, 317
Hardi, 191, 563 n.
Hardships of naval life, 21, 22
Hardy, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles (1), 41 n.,
89,' 91, 107, 274, 444 u.
Hardy, Adnnral Sir Cliarles (2), Kt., 167,
INDEX TO VOIJIMK HI.
587
lfJ8, 1G!I, 172, IH:^, IKl, 18(i n., 218 n.,
232, 23;:!, 239, 252, 280, 414:, 44G, 505
Hardy, Vice- Admiral Sir Tliomas, 26
Hai-land, Admiral Sir Robert (2), Bart.,
127 n., 212 n., 287, 415, 418, 419, 420,
421, 424, 436, 566
Harlem River, 382, 384, 385
Harman, Captain William, 201 n., 202, 203
Harrnood, Captain Harry, 434, 454 n., 509 n.
Harmood, Commander James,. 24(i ii.
Harris, Captain Barrows, 34
Harris, Captain Williim, 302, 3 1 1
Harris, J., sliipbnilder, 335
Harrison, George, smuggler, 1 7
Harrison, Vice-Admiral Henry, 125 n., 127 n.
Harrison, Captain John, 161 n., 174 n.,
179 n., 198 n., 24G n.
Harrison, Captain Thomas (2), 218 n., 252,
302, 308
Harrison, Mr. William, the chronometer
maker, 13, 14, 338
Hai-twell, Captain Brodrick, 20G n., 299
Harvev, Admiral Sir Henry (1), 513 n.,
520"n.
Harwich, 12, 237, 335
Harwich, 120 n., 131 n., 132, 186, 311
Haswell, Captain Robert, 242 n., 245 n.,
246 n.
Hatchlands, near Guildford, 231
Hatley, Simon, 31G, 317
Haussonville, General Comte d', 250, 251
Havana, 44, 59, 67, 76, 77, 107, 135, 136,
137, 238, 245, 246-249, 250, 254, 265,
266, 267, 272, 279, 312, 314, 315, 468
Haviland, Colonel, 226, 228
Havre, Le, 193, 196, 21G, 224, 231, 293,
445, 446
Hawk, 46 n., 269
Hawke, 311, 352
Hawke, Admiral of the Fleet. Sir Edward
Hawke, K.B., Lord, 96, 97, 100, 126-129,
130, 137, 138, 142, 145, 152, 155, 156,
160, 169, 171, 172, 173, 190, 191, 192,
195, 196, 216-223, 224, 230, 231, 232,
233, 234, 239, 250, 252, 284. 287, 292,
297, 309, 312, 313, 325, 345 n., 435 n.,
444 n., 565
Hawker, Captain James, 242 n., 246 n.,
546 n.. 552 n., 554
Hawkins, James : sec Whitshed, Admiral
of the Fleet Sir James Hawkins
Hay, Captain William, 253
Hayes, A., shi]:ibuilder, 335
Hazard, 238, 311
Hazardous, 310
Haze, 213 : see also Fog
Hazeborough Sand, The, 312
Hehe, 335
Hebrides, 110, 113
Hector, 244 n., 269, 283 n., 415, 474 n.,
532, 533 and n.
Hector, Captain, 415
Hell Gate, 385, 409
Hemmington, Captain John (or James),
70, 71"
Heni]), 5
Henley, Commander Sir Robert, Bart., 62 n.
Henry the Seventh's Chajiel, 193 n.
Henry, Admii'al John, 509 n.
Henry Frederick, Duke of Cundicrland,
Admiral Prince, 343 n., 566
Henslow, Sir John, Kt., 326
Hepburn, Captain David, (Mar.) 23G
Herbert, Captain Edward (1), 272, 310
Herbert, Cajitain Richard, 54, 55, 62
Hercide, 108, 533 n.
Hercules, 9G, 101, 218, 302, 520 n.
Hermione, 34, 224, 295, 297, 30G, 308, 312,
313 (2), 314 (3), 492 n.
Hero, 218 n., 234 n., 235 n., 305, 313, 546
n., 547 and n., 548, 550 n., 552 n., 554,
563 n.
Heroine, 335
Heros, 185, 218 n., 220, 221, 313, 546 n.,
547 and n., 549, 550 n., 554, 559, 560.
563 n.
Hervey, Vice-Admiral Hon. Augustus John
(later Earl of Bristol), 148 and n., 153,
189, 216, 234 n., 242 n., 243, 244, 245 n.,
246 and n., 248, 249, 302, 5GG
Hervey, Captain John Augustus, Lord, 339
Hervej', Captain Hon. William, 63
Hewett, Captain Sir William, Bart., 310
Hewitt, Captain Sir ^Villianl, Bart., 200 n.,
225, 311
Hibernian Marine Society, 342
Hill, Captain Benjamin, 428, 434
Hill, Rear-Admiral Christopher, 566
Hill, Mr., carpenter; Ins mventions, 337
Hind, 206 n., 258, 310, 549 n.
Hipimxjotame, 148 n., 151 n.
Hirondelle, 415
Hispaniola, 59 and n., 64, 68, 78, 133, 273
Hoare {or Hore), Captain Daniel, 61, 62 n.,
75, 80, 310
Hocnuart, Captain de, 125 n., 141
Hodgson, General Studholnj, 234 and n.
Hodgson, J., shipbuilder, 335
Hodsell {or Hodsoll), Captain James, 81, 96
Hoedic, 119
Holbourne, Captain William, 212 n.
Holburne, Admiral Francis, 140, 141, 145,
146, 156, 167-169, 232, 239, 565
Holland, J., shipbuilder, 12
Holland, 505 n.
Holland, 26, 47, 48, 51, 91, 143, 173, 201,
242, 252, 253, 266, 351, 478. 502, 539,
545 ♦' •
Hollowav, Admii^! 'John, 454 n.
Hollwelf, Captain John, 215 n., 242 n., 352
Holmes, Rear-AflmiJ-al Charles, 135 and n.,
13G, 137, 144, 169 and n., 173, 190, 195,
205, 206 and n., 208, 209, 224, 225, 232,
233, 239, 245, 300, 313
Holmes, Captain Lancelot, 246 n.
Holmes, Tempest, 3
588
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Holyhead, 15
Home, Vice- Admiral Sir George, Bart., 45-t n.
Home, liear-Adrairal Uuildam, 54G u.
HomhiraH, Bay of, 80
HoiiHeur, 216
Hood, Captain Alexander, 497 n., -il.') u.
Hood, Admiral Alexander Arthur, K.B.,
Lord Bridport, 218 n., 238, 295, 305,
413 n., 415, 567
Hood, Admiral Sir Samuel (1), Viscount
Hood, 215 n., 283, 300, 326 and n., 346,
369, 479, 481-487, 482 n., 494, 495, 497
and u., 499, 500, 501, 502, 510-519,
520 n., 521-528, 530, 532, 534-538, 567
Hoj3e, Captain Charles (1), 505 n.
Hopewell, 263
Hopson, Major-General, 196, 201, 202, 203
Hopsonn, Vice-Admiral Edward, 42, 43, 45,
46 and n.
Hore, Captain Daniel : see Hoare, Captain
Daniel
Hornet, 144, 245, 310, 311
Horse Shoe Shoal, Chesapeake Bay, 501
Hosier, Vice- Admiral Francis, 39 n., 42, 43
and n., 44, 45 and n.
Hospital ships, 31
Hotham, Admiral William (1), Lord Plot-
ham, 234 n., 296, 301, 383, 385, 387,
406 u., 409, 428 and n., 429, 454 u., 469,
567
Houat, 119
Hougue, Cape La, 192
Houltou, Hear- Admiral John, 246 n., 454 n.,
462 n., 482 n., 568
House carpentei's, 342
Howe, Admiral of the Fleet, Hon. Sir
Richard, Earl Howe, 141, 171, 173, 192-
195, 216, 218 n., 220, 223, 237, 239, 252,
282, 291, 296, 325, 326, 340, 345, 350,
351, 366, 371, 379, 380, 390, 391, 394,
397, 398, 399, 400 and n., 401-412, 425,
426, 538-543, 549, 560
Howe, General Sir William, K.B., 359, 360,
370, 371, 372, 379, 3S3-387, 388, 390,
391, 392, 393, 398, 442
Howitzers, 362 and n.
Hudson, Capitaiu Charles, 497 u.
Hudson River, 354, 360, 370, 371, 380, 382,
384, 385, 386, 388, 389, 391, 392
Hudson's Bay, 318-320, 352 n.
Hudson's Bay Company, The, 318, 319,
320
Hudson's Strait, 319
Hughes, Captain Charlo:<, 552 n.
Hughes, Admiral Sir'.-J5%vartl, K.B., 183,
185, 206 n., 222 ,uV'rtl9 Ai., 508, 545
and n., 548, 549-564, §^.
Hughes, Captain Ricliali (Tl), 4
Hughes, Captain Sir Ricliafd (2), Bart., 4,
84 n., 326, 327, 343, 538 u.
Hughes, Admiral Sir Richard (3), Bart.,
200 n., 538 and n., 567
Hughes, Rear- Admiral Robert (1), 47
Hughes, Rear- Admiral Robert (2), 196, 201
and n., 202, 566
Hugh, 162
Hull, 335, 342
Humber, 312
Hunt, Captain Anthony (1), 373
Hunt, Captain Joseph, 215 n., 304
Hunt, Edward, 326
Hunter, 145, 206 n., 208, 252, 253
Hurricanes : see Storms
Hussar, 191, 223 n., 297, 312 (2), 335,
406 n.
Hutchinson, William, quoted, 278, 279
Hyder Ali, 545, 549, 552, 555, 557, 561
Hyeres, 84, 92, 93, 96
Ibbetson, John, 326
Ice, 357, 358
" Idlers " in men-of-war, 19
Ilfracombe, 186, 313
Hlnstre, 198 n., 443 n., 557, 559, 560,
563 n.
Impregnable, 343
Impressment, 18, 23, 140, 396
Impress Service, The, 347
Imprisonment, 275
Improvements, Naval, 10, 13-15, 330-334,
336-338
Inadequate force. Danger of employing, 370
Indefatigable, 286
India : see East Indies.
Indian auxiliaries in America, 366
Iiidien, 415
Industry, 320
Infante, 247, 249, 315
Infernal, 172, 201 n., 234 n., 242 n., 293,
311,546
Inflammables, Alleged use of, 179
Inflexible, 218 n., 313, 361, 362, 363 and n.,
365-369, 563
Inglefield, Captain John Nicholson, 497 n.,
513 n., 520 n.
IngUs, Rear-Admiral Charles (1), 215 n.,
513 n., 520 n., 568
Innes, Rear-Admiral Alexander, 246 n., 567
Innes, Captain Thomas, 133 n., 135 n.
Inspection of Dockyards, 335
Instructions, Admirals', 15
Instructions, Secret, 66
Instructions, Vernon's, 54
Insurance, Marine, 396
Insulaire, 120 and n.
Intelligence, Admiraltv, 126
Intrepid, 126, 148 n., 150, 151 n., 154, 191,
212 and n., 213, 214, 215, 218 n., 246 n.,
299, 312, 454 n., 462, 482 n., 486, 497 n.,
513 n.
Intrepide, 127 n., 12S, 165 n., 185, 218 n.,
415, 458
Invasion of England projected or threatened,
39, 89, 90, 142, 145, 196, 210, 216, 261,
445
Invencible, 135 n., 314
JNDKX TO VOLIJMI': 111.
589
InHncible, 6, 12, 125 n., 182, 288,290, 297,
311, 312, 395 n., -182 n., 497 n., 513 n.
Iiiwooil, Tl., sliipbuilder, 335
Ilihi':/! I, i'l, .'.05 n.
Ipliiiji'iiii', 415
Ipswich, 52
Ipswich, 84, 122, 152 ii., 273, 280
Ireland, 39, 110, 119, 1(J7, 19G, 210, 223,
229, 230, 311
Iris, 292, 335, 492 n.
Irish Viceroy's yacht, The, 330 n.
Isabela, 96, 98 and n.
Isis, 126, 152 n., 215 n., 224 u., 301, 306,
312, 313 (4), 350, 357, 366, 406 n., 409,
410, 428 n., 431, 546 and n., 548, 550 n.,
552 n., 560, 563 n.
Islay Ishand, 229
Isle Dieu, 301
Isle Bas, 333
Italy, 30, 66, 84, 102, 107, 116
Jacobites, The, 39, 40, 43 n., 279 and n.
Jamaica, 13, 44, 45, 51 n., 54, 58, 59, 60,
61 n., 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 75, 76 and n.,
77, 78 and n., 79, 80, 88, 109, 122, 123,
124, 135, 136, 145, 164-166, 182, 188,
204, 224, 225, 232. 233, 239, 245, 246,
. 247, 250, 263, 264, 266, 272, 275, 300,
306, 308, 310, 311, 313, 327, 379, 438,
445, 470, 473, 479, 494, 502, 519, 536,
537, 539
Jamaica, 144
James Island, 372
James River, Virginia, 473, 488, 494, 496
James, the historian, William, quoted, 330,
et seq.
James, Mr., (Commodore iu H.E.I. Co.'s
Service), 143, 144, 164
Janus, 473, 474
Jason, 108, 125 n., 312, 336, 492 n., 525,
537, 546 n.
Jasper, Sergeant, at Fort Moultiie, 374
Jekvll, Captain Edward, 192, 201 and n.,
202, 235 n., 246 n., 248, 305
Jenkins's ears, Richard, 50, 51, 265 and n.,
266, 272
Jenner, J., shipbuilder, 335
Jennings, Admiral Sir John, 42, 43, 257
Jennings, Captain Thomas, 3
Jennings, Lieutenant-Colonel, 229
Jersey, 291
Jersey, 70 and n., 211, 212 n., 280, 292
Jervis, Admiral of the Fleet, Sir John, K.B.,
Earl St. Vincent, 206 n., 207, 250, 415,
443, 445, 538 and u., 539, 567
Jesuit's bark, 62
Joannis, Captain, 174 u.
Jocelyn, Captain Robert, 200 u , 240 n.
Johnson, Captain Sir Robert, Kt., 27 n.,
261, 310
Johnson, Dr. Samuel, 21 n.
Johnson, Colonel Sir William, Bart., 141,
204, 226
.Johnston, Lieutenant William, 279 n.
Johnstone, Captain Gideon, 492 n., 497 n.
Johnstone, Captain George, 245, 350, 545-
549
Johnstone, Commander James, 479 n.
Joiners, 342
Jolly (or Jolley), Captain ThoiiKis, 71, 76 n.
Jones, Captain John Paul, U.S N., 298, 525
Jonquiere, Admiral the Marcpiis de La, 117,
124, 125 and n., 126, 139, 281, 283
Jonquiere de Tafl'anel, Captain de La, 125 n.
Joy, William, 265
Juan Fernandez, 310, 3!7, 318, 321
Judges, The, pronounce upon Byng's sen-
tence, 158; ujion Collin's case, 351
Jumper, Captain Sir William, Kt., 4
Jmw, 12, 34, 35, 37, 18(5 n., 215 n., 222 n.,
305, 313 (2), 314, 403 n., 563 n.
Junon, 148 n., 314, 41.")
Jupiter, 143, 546 n.
Juste, 218 n., 313
Karlskruna, 27
Kasteel van Medemhlik, 91
Katherine I., Empress of Russia, 42, 47
Kearny, Commander Michael, 212 n.
Keene, Sir Benjamin, 139, 155
Keith, Captain Sir Basil, Kt., 223 n.
Keith, Viscoimt: see Elphinstone, llf)n.
George Keith
Kempenfelt, Rear-Adniiral Richard, 174 n.,
179 n., 181, 182, 198 n., 225, 240 n., 241,
242, 341, 443 n., 509, 510, 519, 538, ■ 39,
540, 567
Kempthorne, Captain Thomas, 4, 34
Kennebec River, 356
Kennedy, Captain Archibald {laUr Earl of
Cassilis), 302
Kenninyton, 167 n., 183
Kent, H.R.H. Prince Edward, Duke of,
184 n.
Kent; 33, 34, 35, 46 and n , 53, 76 n., 78,
79 n., 83 n., 127 n., 128, 129, 140, 101
and n., 162, 163, 267, 268, 283 and n.,
314
Kentish Knock, The, 310
Keppel, Admiral Hon. Augustus : Viscount
Keppel, 139 and n., 171, 188, 189, 218 n.,
220, 223, 231, 232, 234-236, 238, 246 n.,
247, 249, 250, 283, 284, 288, 289, 299,
311, 324, 325, 341, 396, 397, 412-426,
428, 435 n., 436, 440, 443, 508. 549, 565
Kepptl, Vice-Admiral George, 400 n., 406 n.
Keppel, Captain George Augustus, 520 n.
Kermadec, Captain Baron de, 415
Kersaint, Commodore Guy Simon de Caet-
nampreu, Comte de, 114 and u., 146, 165,
166, 169, 219 and n.. 220 n.
Kersaint, Mce-Admiral Comte de, 415
Kidd, Captain Dandy, 320
Kidd, the i)irate, 258, 259
Killed in action in the Seven Years' AVar ,
Seamen and Marines, 339
5!i0
INDEX TO VOLUME HI.
Kili-odt Point, 22(1
Klnti George, 285, 2,S(j
Kinii, Admiral Sir llicliard (1), Bart., 102,
201 n., 239, 2-11 u., 545 n., 550 n., 551,
552 n., 567
King's College, Caniliridge, Chajiel of, 242
Kingfisher, 140, 143, IGl and n., 162, 201
11., 402
Kingsmill {previously Brice), Admiral Sir
Hobert, Bart., 242 n., 415
Kingsale, 230, 250, 27H
KinysaJe, 262
Eiiif/ston, 84, 96, 98, 148 n., 218 n., 227 n.,
251, 273
Kinsbergen, Cairtain van, 505 n.
Kirk, t^'aptain Robert, 198 u., 303, 311
Kirke, Captain James, 212 n., 214, 222 n.
Kittery, 110
Kjoge Bay, 27
Knatchbull, Captain Charles, 482 n., 497 ii.,
513 I!., 520 n.
Knight, Captain John (1), 224 n., 238
Knight, Admiral Sir John (2j, 482 n.,
513 n., 520 n.
Knight, Rear -Admiral Sir Joseph, Kt.,
131 u., 188, 240 n., 343, 566
Knight, Captain Richard, 223 n.
Knight, Captain William, 276, 310
Knigliton, Capitain Fi-ancis, 34
Knowles, Admiral Sir Charles, Bart., 23,
57, 61 and n., 62, 64, 68, 72, 73, 85-88,
112, 124, 1.30, 132-137, 14f;, 171, 267,
294, 315, 340, 565
Knowles, Commander Edward, 312
Ladkone Isl.^nds, 323
Lafayette, General, 469, 496
Laforev, Admiral Sir John, Bart., 184, 185,
206 'n., 242 n., 327 (2), 347 and n., 415,
417, 424 n., 425 n., 567
Lage de Cueilli, Captain, 96
Lage, the privateer, M. de, 280, 281
Lagos, 214, 285, 439 n.
La Guayra, 85, 86, 88
Lake, Captain Thomas, 118, 131 n.
Lakes, Campiaign on the American, 353
ef sey.
Lalandelle, Captain de, 550 n.
Lallv, Baron de Tollendal, General Comte de,
104, 174, 176, 177, 181, 199, 200, 394 n.
Lambart, Captain, 492 n.
Lamliart, Brigadier-General Handltou, 235,
236
Lambert, Cajitain Robert Alexander, 327
Lampr.aavy, 176, 177, 178
Lancaster, 148 n., 151 n., 201 n., 295, 296,
312
Lan.l's End, 249, 250, 338, 539
Langara, Admii-al Don Juan de, 449, 451
Langiion, Rear-jVdmiral William, 165 and n.,
507
Langridge, 259
Laiigunlvc, 409, 429
Lapjelliere, C.apjtain de, 550 n.
Lark, 276, 285 and n., 310, 403 n.
Larr, Captain, 125 n.
Lascars in the Navy, 177, 225
Latham, Cajitain Thomas, 161 n., 174 n.,
179 n.
Latona, 505 n., 540
Laughton, Professor .1. K., R.N., quoted,
229 n., 296, 297
iMuncestoii, 115, 234 n., 310
Laurel, 479 n.
Law, Naval, 350, 351
Lawrence, Captain Peter, 70, 123 n., 273,
310
Laws, Captain William, 71, 269
Lea, Commander William, 80, 276, 310
Lecale, Lord : see Fitzgerald, Lord Charles
Lecky, Mr. W. E. H., quoted, 51
Le Cras, Captain Edward, 201 and n., 203,
235 n., 326, 327
Lede, Marques de, 32, 37, 38
Lee, Vice-Admiral Hon. Fitzroy Henry, 122
Lee, Captain Thomas (1), 238
Lee, William, 3
Leeuwetihorst, 91
Leeward Islan.ls, 57, 88, 122, 124, 137, 142,
145, 164, 182, 188, 196, 201-203, 224,
225, 232, 233, 239, 245, 300, 311, 327,
427, 440, 445, 448, 469, 538
Leeward, Reasons for engaging from, 214,
408, 420 ; disadvantages of engaging from,
in narrow waters, 363, 364, 369 ; engaging
from, 449, 490
Legge, Cajitain Hon. Edward, 54, 122, 124,
284, 320
Legge, Captain George, 174 n., 177
Legge, Hon. Henry Bilson, 3
Legge, Cajjtain Julian, 206 n., 226 n.,
233 n., 242 n., 245 n., 240 n.
Leghorn, 48, 292, 311
Leitli, 505 n.
Lempriere, Captain Thomas, 246 n.
Lendrick, (Japtain John, 246 n.
Lenio, Captain Don Francisco, 34
Lenox, 34, 43 n., 46 n., 53, 81, 123 and n.,
135 and n., 136, 200 n., 240 n., 267, 268,
280, 314
Lenses in lighthouses, 338
Leopard, 43 n., 45
LeojKird, 313
Leslie, Captain Lachlin, 66, 201 and n.
Leslie, General, 488
Leso, Admiral Don Bias de, 59, 01, 69, 71 n.
Lestock, Admiral Richanl (2), 34, 63, 68,
70, 71, 73, 75, 80-84, 92-107, 118, 119,
257, 283, 423
Letters of Marque (see also Reprisals), 52
Levant, 242 n.
Leviathan, 399 n.
Levis, M. de, 227
Levis, Point, 207
Lichfield, 70 n., 76, 80, 188, 311, 312
Licornc, 105 n.
INDEX TO VOLUMK 111.
'.m
Liddell, Dennis, 3
Lieuti'iiant-Gouerals of Marines, '223
Lieutenants, ]!), 20, 22, 103, 330, 341
Lighthouses, 14, 15, 108, 338
Liglits, 33 and n., 338
Lifildiiinri, 31 1
Liglilning con<luctors, 338
Liglitships, 15
Ligomles, Captain de, 415
Lima, 308, 318
Lindsay, Ttear-Adniiral Sir John, K.B., 185,
206 ii., 207, 24G n., 248, 338, 347 and n.,
415, 567
Line, 15reaking tlie, 531, 532
Line-ol'-battle, Use and abuse of the, 38, 81-
83, 97, 105, 125, 127, 128, 136, 149, 150,
154, 156, 174, 175, 178, 179, 198, 218,
219, 423, 460-462, 467, 468, 401
Line of bearing, 558
Lingen, Captain Joseph, 96, 122
Linzee, Captain John, 406 n., 520 n.
Linzee, Admiral Robert, 520 u.
Lion, 64, 66, 70 n., 110, 111, 127 n., 148 n.,
151 n., 201 n., 202, 203, 212 n., 235 n.,
264, 279, 283 n., 308, 314, 434, 437, 438,
439 473
Lisboii, 31, 50, 54, 62, 63, 91, 107, 245,
295, 301, 302, 322
Lisle, Captain William, 122, 131 and u.,
132, 143, 311
Lissa, 202
Littleton, Vice-Admiral James, 4, 39 n.
Lively, 86, 87, 88, 108, 120 n., 131 n., 225,
226,272, 313,415
Liverpool, 335, 338
Liverpool, 223 n.
Lizard, The, 65, 310, 311, 313, 444, 504,
520 n.
Lizard, 206 n., 226 n., 233 n., 242 n., 246
n., 299, 482 n., 513 n.
Lloyd, Commander , 415
Lloyd, Captain' James, 96, 104
Llovd, Vice-Admiral John (2), 131 n.,
148 n., 5(;6
Lloy<l, Caiitaiu Thomas (1), 479 n.
Lloyd, William (1), 212 n., 566
Lloyd's List of losses and captures, 1775-83,
396 n.
Lobb, Commander Jacob, 187
Lochaber, 111, 113
Lockhart, John : see Hoss, Sir John Lock-
hart, Bart.
Loomaria, I'oint de, 235
Loggie, Captain James, 230 n., 306
Loire, River, 313
Loire, 298, 313
London, 339
London, Recognition of public services by
the City of, 58
London, i03, 187, 311, 491, 492 n., 497 and
n., 499, 500 n.
Londonderry, 229
Long, Captain Robert, 71, 96, 107
Fiong Island, (!liarleston, 372
Long Island, Lake Chanijilain, 363
Long Island, New York, 382, 383, 385, 397,
409, 471, 489, 495
Longcroft, Cajitain Edward, 365
Longford, Lord : see Pakenham, Cajrlain
Hon. Edward Michael
Longitude, ])isco\-ery of the, 13, 14, 338
Longueville, M. de, 244
Longships' Light, 338
Looe, 34, 310"
Lord ('live, 251, 252
Lorient, 1 18, 224, 283, 295
Loring, (;a]>tain Joshua, 205, 228 and n.
Loss of life in the Seven Years' War, 255
Losses of ships, 310-315, 396 n.
I/OudouD, General the Earl of, 144, 166,
167, 168, 172, 204
Louis XV., King of France, 138
Louisbourg, 109, 110, 113-115, 116, 117,
122, 140, 141, 145, 167-169, 170, 172,
182-184, 206, 224, 228, 251, 289, 293,
297, 299, 311, 312, :;i:!
Louishotiry, 311
Louisiana, 253, 254
Loup, 284
Lovett, Captain John, 96
Lowestoft, 206 n., 208, 227 and n., 311
Lowfield, Commander , 246 n., 312
Lowther, Colonel, (Mar.), 63 n.
Lowther, the buccaneer, 61, 78
Jjoyal Convert, 361
Lucas, Captain Richard, 520 n.
Lucas, ^lajor, 87
Ludlow Castle, 12, 201 u., 284
Lumley, Captain Hon. Thomas Charles,
546 n., 550 n.. 552 n., 560
Lunars, 338
Lunette, 415
Lurcher, 246 u., 249
Lushington, Cajitain Eranklin, Sti, 88
Luttrell, Hon. .lohn : see Olmius, Captain
Hon. John Luttrell.
Lutwidge, Admiral Skeftington, 389
Lutwidge, Lieutenant , 163
Luzon, 241
Lyme, 211, 212 n., 2511, 2;)l, 298, 311 (2)
Lynn, Captain Thonias,i201 and n., 203, 2.'!2
Lynn, Dr. ; his still, 337
Lynn, 340
Lynn, 234 n , 236
Lynnhaven Bay, 493, 496
Lynx, 238
Lyons, Mr. Isaac, 338
Lijs, 120 n., 121, 141, 142, 289, 312 (2)
M.\CA0, .'!17, 323
Macartney, ( -aptain Jolm, 2ti9, 226 u., 505 n.
Macarty, Captain, 125 n.
Macbride, Admiral Jolm. 333. 346, 413 n.,
415, 505 n.
M'Clevertv, Cajitain William, 211. 212 n.,
217, 226 n.. 233 n., 242 n.
592
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
M'Coy, Captaiu Alexander, 543 n.
Macdouald, Flora, 372
Machaalt, 210, 228, 294, 313
Jfackeuzie, Vice-Admiral George, 193,
201 n., 203, 246 n., 566
Mackenzie, Commander James, 201 n.,
234 n., 242 n.
Mackenzie, Admiral Thomas, 546 n.
Mackenzie, Lieutenant-Colonel, (Mar.) 237
Mackie, Commander , 96, 100, 101,
310
M'Laurin, Captain John, 245, 513 n., 520 n.
Maclellan, Captain Hon. Dunhar, 552 u.,
557
Macnamara, master in H. E.I.C.S., 251
Macnamara, Commodore de, 140
iladagascar, 197
Madariaga, Captain Don J. Y., 247 n.
Madeira, 13, 65, 320, 338
Madras, 109, 119, 121 and n., 124, 130, 132,
160, 174, 177, 181, 182, 186, 199, 200,
232, 239, 394 n., 549, 552, 557, 560, 561,
563
Madrid, 37, 47, 51, 139, 368, 447
Madi'id, Convention of, 263
^Magellan's Strait, 322
McKjnatiime, 138, 171, 172, 216, 217, 218
and n., 219, 220, 280, 287, 312, 524, 552
and n., 563 n.
Magnificent, 343, 434, 454 n., 520 n.
Magnificjue, 218 n., 415
Mahan, Captain A. T., U.S.N., quoted, 33,
38, 96, 97, 126, 129, 149, 150, 176, 200,
222 n., 254, 255
Mahe, Captain, 174 n.
Mahe, 232, 351
Mahrattas, The, 143, 545
Maidstone, 217, 218 and n., 283, 284, 308,
311
Maitlaud, Captain Hon. Frederick Lewis (1),
225, 415, 417, 454 n., 509 n.
Majorca, 148, 153, 273, 295, 313
Malabar coast, The, 351, 545 n.
Malacca, 241
Malaga, 32, 39, 51
Malicieuse, 302, 306
Maligne, 312
Malta, 34 n., 38, 298, 313
:Malta Channel, 38
jMan, Admiral Robert (2), 201 u., 235 n.,
239, 252, 308 n., 309, 566
Man, Isle of, 230
Mangalore, 352, 545
Manhattan Island, 382, 383, 384
Manilla, 550 n.
Manilla, 108, 239-242, 312, 315, 323
Mann, Captain Eobert, 308 and u.
Manners, Captain Lord Kobert, 482 n.,
497 n., 513 n., 515, 518, 520 n., 533 n.
Manning, Captain Thomas, 174, 311
JLanning the fleet : (see also Bounties, etc.),
394, 395
Mantell, Captain "William, 206 n., 208
Manvers, Earl : see Meadows, Captain
Charles
Maplesden, Captain Jervis, 148 n., 195,
212 n., 218 n., 235 n.
Maps, 118
Mapson, Mr., 338
Marais Bay, 194
Maredial de Bdleisle, 230 and n., 296, 297,
298, 299
Mari, Chevalier de, 116
Mari, Rear-Admiral Marques de, 34 and n.,
36 n., 37, 48, 314
Maria, 361, 365, 369
Maria Theresia, the Empress, 89
Marie Galante, 203, 254
Mariel, 247 n.
Marigny, Captain de, 492 n., 533 n.
Marine Society, The, 342
Marine School at Hull, 342
-Marines, The, 5, 22, 58, 63 n., 87, 131, 140, '
147, 158, 159, 183, 187, 189, 191, 207,
208, 215, 222, 223, 224, 236, 240, 241,
243, 248, 281, 2-S7, 322, 327, 338, 506,
511
" Marines " in a privateer, 316, 317
Marischal, Earl of, 39
Marlborough, General the Duke of, 191, 192
Marlborough, 92, 96, 98, 99, 100 and n.,
103, 242 n., 246 n., 248, 249, 250, 312,
520 n., 530
Marlow, Admiral Benjamin, 148 u., 297,
298, 543 n., 567
Marocco, 47 n., 188 and n.
Marooning, 260
Marquis de Marloze, 228, 313
Manilart, Captain de, 96
Mars, 12, 121, 128 n., 218 n., 235 n., 274,
276, 281, 289, 311, 312, 313
Marseillais, 409
Marseilles, 107
Marsh, George, 326 (2)
Marsh, Captain Henry, 173, 186-188
Marsh, Captain WiUiam, 96, 311
Marshal of the Admiralty, 159
Marshall, Captain, (Prussian Navy), 341
Marshall, Captain Samuel (1), 131 n., 238,
242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 311
Marshall, Captain Sii' Samuel (2), 397, 415,
520 n.
]\[arshalsea. The, 275
Marte, 247 n., 315
Martial law. Proposal to subject half-pay
officers to, 17
Martin, Captain Sir Henry (2), Bart., 223 n.,
250, 326, 327
Martin, Admiral William (1\ 84 and n., 85,
89, 91, 112 n,, 113, 273, 312
Martin, Captain William (2), 123, 161 n.,
179 n., 311
Martinique, 59, 63, 88, 116, 138, 145, 201,
202, 242-244, 245, 246, 252, 254, 271,
276, 280, 281, 290, 300, 303, 304, 311,
427, 428, 452, 453, 463, 464, 466, 468,
INDEX TO VOLUME TIL
593
470, 473, 481, 482, 484, 487, 488, 494,
510, 512, 519, 520
Mary Hour, 258
Maskelyne, Di-. Neville, 338
Masnata, Ca]itain Don Lucas, 34
Mason, Edward, 3, 4, 326
Mason, Major, (Mar.), 187
Massachusetts, 109, 110, 11:'., 370
Masson, Captain, 125 n.
Master, Captain Streynshani, 34
Masters, 19, 336 and n., 340
Masters-and-Commanders, 33() and n,, 33G n.
Masts, 329
Matanzas, Cuba, 2(17
Mataro, 84
Match-tub, 334
Mathews, Admiral Thomas, 4, 34, 83 and
n., 84, 85, 92-107, 150, IfiO, 273, 423
Mauritius, 122, 130, 131, 174, 178, 181,
197, 199, 231, 232, 234, 543 u. See also
FrancH, Isle de
Maurville, Captain Bide de, 550 n.
Maynard, Captain Robert, 259 and n., 2G0
Mayne, Captain Covill, or Colvill, 41 u.. 53,
267, 268
Mayne, Vice-Admiral Peri-y, 54, 55, 105,
106, 310
Mead, Captain Joseph, 201! n., 242 n., 246 n.,
308
Meadows (properly Meilows), Captain
Charles (later Charles Pierrepont, Vis-
count Newark, Earl Manvers), 183 and
n., 212 n.
Meadows, Cxeneral, 350
Medals, 282
Medea, 492 n., 563 n., 564
Medee, 274, 280, 312
Medemhlik. 505 n.
Mediator, 311
Jledical Stores, 2
Medina, Captain Don F. de, 247 n.
M&line, Captain de, 492 n.
Mediterranean, The, 30 et aeq., 43, 46, 47,
50, 65, 80 et sei/., 89 et scq., 92 et see/.,
116, 123, 124, 130, 137, 142, 145, 146-
157, 160, 169, 170, 18!i, 190, 19R, 210-
215, 224, 228, 229, 232, 233, 239, 252,
258, 273, 280, 286, 288, 292, 304, 306,
309, 310, 313, 448, 469
Medley, Yioe-Achniral Henry, 116, 123, 124
Medway, 120 n., 191, 206 n., 225, 295, 312,
434, 454 n., 509 n.
Medway's Prize, 120 and n., 121
Meer, Jaffier, 164
Mekimpe, 234 n., 293, 301, 313
Meliimpus, 335
Melville, Henry, Viscount, 326 and n.
Melville, General Robeit, 330
Merchant seamen, 19
Merclraut seamen and Greenwich Hospital,
18
Merchants in Spanish territory, Difficulties
of, 262
Merci, General Count de, 40
Mercure, 64 n., 281, 312
Mercury, 96, 246 n., 248, 311
Merlin, 13, 14, 133 n., 246 n., 294, 311,312,
391, 392
Mermaid, 115, 121, 311
Messina, 32, 33, 34, 40, 314
Metelle. Cape della, 36
Mexico! 272, 310, 317
Michell, Caiitain Matthew, 310, 320
Michie, Captain Colin, 198 n., 199
Micoiid, Chevalier de, 432
Middelbunj, 91
Middle (iround, Chesapeake Bay, 496, 497
Middleton, Admiral Sir Charles ; Lord
Barhani, 326, 347 and n., 567
Middleton, the navisator, Christopher, 319,
320
Midshipmen, 20, 22
Mighells, Vice-Admiral James, 3, 40, 41,
261, 262
Mignonne, 301, 313
Milan, 30, 32
Milbanke, Admiral Mark, 566
Milbanke, Captain Ralph, 479 n.
Milford, 123 n., 308, 310, 415
Militia embodied, 196
Millar, Captain Arcliibald, 187
Miller, Captain, (Russian Navy), 341
Miller, Commander George (1), 209, 210
Milnes, Jolm, 3
Minerva, 218 n., 238, 305, 313, 330, 335
Minerve, 212 n., 314
Minorca, 4, 42, 48, 65, 92, 105, 107, 142,
146-157, IHO, 252, 254, 327, 423, 447,
448, 451, 503, 504
Minotaure, 198 n.
Minto, Gilbert, Lord, 326
Miquelou, Island of, 253
Miramichi, 184
Missing men, 339
Mississippi, River, 253, 278
Mitchell, Ca]itain Cornelius, 63, 78 and n.,
122, 123 and n.
Mithon de Genouilli, Captain, 415
Mobile, Farragut at, 150
Modeste, 125 and n., 212 n., 214, 215, 242
n., 306, 313 (2)
Mohaivk, 226
Mohawk River, 204
Moissae, Captain de, 550 n.
Mollov, Capiain Anthony James Pye, 400 n.,
406 n., 434, 454 n., 459 and n , 460, 482 n.,
497 u., 513 n.
Mona Passage, The, 246, 537
Monaco, 193 n.
Monarca, 449, 550 n., 552 n., 563 n.
Monarch, 156, 158, 190, 313, 415, 482 n.,
497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Monarque, 127 n., 312
Monck, or Monl; 42 n., 310
Monckton, General Hon. Robert, 141, 207,
233, 243, 245
594
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Mijiiiiwulh, VI, Vlo ami n., 127 ii., 189, 190,
iilG, 234 n., 2;5(i and n., 298, 313 (2),
395 11., 410, 434, 438, 439, 546 n., 547 ^
and n., 548, 550 n., 552 n., 554, 559,
563 n.
Monjieroux, Cajitain de, 415
Monsieur, 509 ii.
Mont Ozkr, 293
Montagu, 34, 35, 70 n., 76 n., 79 and n.,
190, 193, 218 n., 219, 220, 276, 313,
454 n., 459, 460, 462 n., 4S2 n., 497 n.,
513 n., 520 n.
Montagu, Admiral Sir George, 492 n.
Montagu (fornu-rly Mountas;u), Admiral
John, 12o n., 190, 235 n., 5G(i
Montagu, Admiral llobert, 550 ii., 552 n.
Montagu, Ca]itain Htju. William, 125 n.
Montcalm, General the Marquis de, 206, 207,
209
Monte Carmclo, 821
Atonte Christi, 473
^lonteil. Captain de, 415
Montgomery, General, 35G, 357
Montmorency, Falls of, 207
Montreal, 226-228, 354, 356, 358
Montrose, 258, 312, 340
Moor, the navigator, ^^'illiam, 320
Moore, Admiral Sir Joan (1), Bart., 127 n.,
164, 173, 182, 201 and n., 202-204, 224,
239, 252, 253, 565
Moore, Eear-Admiral Matthew, 234 n., 567
Morals in the Navy, 22, 23
Moma, 174 n., 175, 179 n., 180
Morbihau, The, 216, 217
Mordaunt, General Sir Jolin, 171
Moreton, Captain Francis Keynolds [later
Lord Ducie), 391, 482 n., 497 n., 513 n.,
520 n.
Moreton, Colonel, (Mar.), 63 n.
Morgan, Sir Henry, 79, 259
Morgan, the mutineer, Lieutenant, (JIar.),
Jolm, 287, 288
Morne Fortune, St. Lucia, 429, 430
Mora, 247 n.
Moro Castle, Havana, 248, 249
Morphet, Zebidon, smuggler, 17
Morrice, or Morris, Vice-Admiral Salmon,
47
Morris, Captain John, 372, 376
IVIorristown, 368
Mortality on board ship: (see also Disease,
etc.), 45, 46, 320, 339
Mortar, 215 n.
Mortars : (see also Bombs), 57, 184, 187, 261,
374
Mosquito Indians, The, 78
jMostvn, Vice-Admiral Savage, 3, 113, 146,
276-278, 283 n.
Motte, La : see Dubois de La Motte
ilotte-Picquet, Admiral La, 415, 443, 452,
473, 474, 503, 504
Mouat, Captain Patrick, 206 n., 312
Moultrie, General, 373, 374, 376
Mountaine; 'Practical Sea-Guimer'b Com-
panion,' 11
Mountford, Commander Edward, 206 n.
Moutray, Captain John, 212 n., 300, 327,
478
Moyana, Captain, Itou Pedro, 34
Mud Island, 391, 392
Mulder, Captain, 505 n.
Mulgrave, Lord: see Phipps, Cajitain Hon.
Constautine .John
Munro, Major Hector, 232
.Murray, Captain, (Mar.), 236
Murray, Brigadier-General, 209, 226, 227,
228
JIuiray, Captain Hon. George (1), later Lord
Elibank, 320
Murray, Captain James, (mil ), 71 n.
Murray, Vice-Admiral Hon. George (2),
505 n.
Muskets, 9
Mutine, 314
Mutiny, 229, 287, 288, 322, 339, 340
Mysore, 545
Naniur, 48 u., 83, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101
and n., 125 n., 126, 131 n., 132, 185, 211,
212 and n., 213, 214, 215, 218 n., 231,
235 n., 245, 246 n., 249, 311, 312, 351,
520 n., 531
Nantes, 110, 284, 289
Napier, Captain Hon. Clias. (1), 246 n.
Naples, 30, 32, 38, 40, 84
Narbrough, Admiral Sir .John, 321
Narcissus, 339
Narragansett Bay, 382, 387, 393, 397, 402,
405, 409, 433, 443, 470, 477
Narrows, The, New' York Harbour, 382,
383
Nassau, 81, 96, 98, 152 n., 187, 188, 203,
236 and n.
Naturalisation of foreign seamen, 18
Nautical Almanac, The, 338
Nautilus, 406
Naval Discipline Act, 15 n., 17 n., 276, 293,
294
Naval Expenditure, 5
Naval Hospitals, 2
Navarro, Admiral Don .Jose, 67, 89, 92, 94,
96, 102
Navesink Highlands, 398
Navigating officers, 336 n.
Navigation Acts, The, 538
Navy, Early influence of the American, 354,
359, 360
Navy Office, The, 2, 21, 326, 339
Navy Pay Office, 2
Navy, State of the, 7
Needles' Light, 338
Negapatam, 119, 179-181, 199, 554-557
Negro Point, Martinique, 201
Negroes, 262
Nelson, Commander Bartholomew (-), 311
Nelson, Vice-Admiral Sir Horatio, Lord
INDEX TO VOLUME HI.
59;')
Nelson, 1(15 n., IGO, :_!7L', ;i7!), ;i80, 383,
389, 404 II., 41:i n., 437, 451, 456, 462,
474, 511, 514, 537, 538, 554
Kepotisra, 35'1
Neptune, 81, 82, !)6, 120 ii., 12:) n., 124,
127 u., 128, 171, 172, 206, 276, 277,
492 11.
Neptimo, 96, 98 and n., 247, 312, 315
Nesniond, Admiral the Chevalier, 58
Neutrality, Breaches of, 252, 253, 292, 351,
352, 480, 481, 546
Nevis, 510, 511, 512, 513, 518
Kew England, 109, 110, 113, 117
New Jersey, 371, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388,
390, 391, 393, 397, 399
New Orleans, 253
New York, 23, 167, 168, 210, 354, 355, 359,
371, 379-386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 393,
395, 397-401, 403, 404, 408, 409, 410,
411, 412, 428, 440, 443, 444 n., 469, 471,
472, 478, 488, 493, 494, 495. 496, 501, 537
New Zealand, 337
NeivaH; 212 u., 213, 215
Newark, Viscount: .see Meadows, Cajitain
Charles
Newcastle, 174 u., 175, 177, 179 and u., 198
n., 199, 225, 311
Newcastle, Duke of, 72 n., 78, 264
Newcome, Captain Henry, 552 u.
Newfoundland, 115, 141, 25n, 251, 253, 254,
260, 309
Newnham, Captain Tlioiiias, 454 n., 462 n.
Newport, Kliode Island, 387, 402, 409, 410,
428, 470, 471, 488, 489, 491, 492, 494,
495, 496
Newsoni, Captain William, 188, 224, 240 ii.,
312
Newton, Cajitain, (mil.), 54, 57
Newton, Sir Isaac, 13
Niagara, Fort, 141, 204, 205
Nicknames of officers, 19(; n., 274 n., 453,
477
Nicholas, Captain Robert Boyle, 479 n.
Nieuil, Captain de, 415
Niger, 303, 313, 474 and n.
Niylitinyale, 167 and n., 206 n., 242 n.
Nightingale, Captain Gamaliel, 217, 218 u.,
227 n., 305
Nile, Battle of the, 551
Nivernois, Due de, 253
Noiil, Captain, 125 n.
Noel, Captain Thomas, 113, 118 n., 150
Nombre de Dios, 79
Nonsuch, 96, 318, 400, 406 n., 428 n., 431,
434, 503, 520 n.
Norbury, Captain Coningsljy (1), 34
Norbury, Captain Coningsljy (2), 225
Norbury, Captain Richard, 222 u., 234 u.,
23(i n.
Nora, The, 15, 26, 27, 42, 43, 113, 343
Nurfdlk, 48 n., 70 and n., 75 n., 83 n., 96,
98, 99 and n., 201 u., 202, 225, 240 n.,
242
Normandy, 196
Norris, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John, 26,
27, 39, 40-42, 47, 49, 65 u., 66, 67, 89,
90 and ii., 112 n.
Norris, Captain Matthew, 4
Norris, Captain Richard, 96, 104, 273, 320
Norris, Vice-Admiral Harrv, 70, 71, 84,
125 u., 146, 156, 365
North America (see also American Colonies),
113-115, 116, 117, 139, 140, 141, 142,
144, 166-169, 172, 182-186, 189, 190,
196, 204-210, 224, 232, 233, 238, 239,
242, 243, 246 n., 249, 269, 270, 289, 300,
371, 440
North, Captain AViraham, 152 n.
North Hero, 363 n.
North, Lord, 537
North River, 382, 383: see ii.hu Hudson
River
North Sea, 224 n., 301, 311, 538, 539
Northern Powers, Difficulties witli the, 25
et se<]., 41-43, 478
Northesk(l), Admiral George Carnegie, Earl
of, 108, 120 n., 565
Northumberland, 169, 206, 209, 218 n.,
226 n., 274 and n., 275 and n., 310,
533 n.
North-west Passage, The, ■■il9, :!20
Norton, Captain William, 201 n.
Norway, 229, 258
Norwich, 54, 55, 56, 61, 62 and n., 86, 88,
139 n., 215 n., 226 n., 233 n., 242 n.,
312
Norwood, Captain Joseph, 238
Nott, Captain John Neale Pleydell, 242 n.,
24(i n., 415, 482 n., 487
Nottin'iham, 43, 125 and n., 127 n., 128,
144,' 238, 242 n., 245 n., 246 n., 282, 284,
287, 312 (2)
Nova Colonia, 251
Nova Scotia, 109, 117. 138, 139, 141, 144,
371
Nucella, ('aptain Timothy, 131 n.
Nuestra Seiiora de Vavadonga, 315, 323
Nuestra Senora del linsario, 47, 314
Nuera Espaita, 135 n.
Nuits, 231 n.
Nymph, 545 u.
Nymphe, 148 n., 295, 313. 415, 497 n., 512.
520 n.
Nystadt, Treaty of, 42
O'Bhien, Captain Christopher, 34
G'Brien, Rear - Admiral Lucius, 21b n.,
242 n., 291, 311, 566
O'Bryeu, Rear-Admiral Edward (1), 406 n.
Ocean, 212 n., 213, 214, 313
Ocean, 415, 417, 424 and u., 425 n., 509 n.
Ocracoke Iclet, 259
Officers, Naval, 19, 21, 22, 340, 341
Ogle, Admiral of the Fleet Sir (,,'haloner (1),
"Kt., 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 79, 80,
85, 91, 103, 105, 109, 260, 261, 275
596
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Ogle, Admiral Sir Chaloner (2), Bart., 224 n.,
23.'5 n., 244, 567
Ogle, Captain Chaloner (3), 242 n., 245 n.,
24Gn.
Oglethorpe, General James Kdward, 269,
270 and n.
O'Hara, Captain William Henry Kini;, 406 n.
Oismu, 309, 314, 335
Old Broad Street, 2
Olivares, Captain Don H., 9(i
Olniius, Captain Hon. Jolm Liittrell : earlier,
Luttrell ; 234 n.
Onondaga, 226, 228
Onslow, Admiral Sir Hichard, Bart., 312,
34.3, 400 n., 406 n., 428 n.
Onslow, Arthur, 3
Ontario, 311
Ontario, Lake, 144, 204, 205, 226
Opale, 244 n., 302, 314
Opinidtre, 165 n., 166, 313
Oporto, 54
Orbetello, 67
Ordinary, Ships in, 335, 336
Orford, 33, 34, 35, 64, 70 n., 76 n., 79 n.,
206 n., 246 u., 2.50, 267, 268, '274, 289,
310, 314
Orient, 218 n., 415, 550 n., 554, 560
Orientc, 96, 98
Ori/lammc, 190, 212 u., 281, 306, 313 (2)
Orion, 510
Orissa, 561
Orleans, Isle d', 206, 207
Ormonde, James Butler, Duke of, 39
OrpUc, 148 n., 151 u., 189, 313
Orpheus, 403 n.
Orrok, Captain James, 187, 188, 215 n.,
234 n., 311
Ortegal, Cape, 53
Orves, Commodore Comte d', 96, 415, 545,
549
Orvilliers, Vice-Admiral Comte d', 413, 414,
415, 417, 420, 422, 443, 444, 445, 446
Osborn, Admiral Henry, 63, 96, 116, 145,
170, 189, 190, 280, 565
Osborn, Captain Peter, 96
Osborne, Kobert, 3, 326
Osnabriick, 48
Ossonville, Captain d', 127 n.
Ostend, 316
Oswald, James, 4
Oswego, 204, 311
Otter, 86, 88, 310
Oud Tijlinyen, 91
Ourry, Captain George, 240 n., 241, 400 n.,
406 n., 509 n.
Ourrv, Captain Isaac Florimond, 224, 240 n.
Ourry, Captain Paul Henry, 192, 234 n.,
236 n., 242 n., 327
Outarde, 165 n., 166, 313
Owen, Captain Thomas, 188
Owen, Commander William (2), 543 n.
Oxford, 12, 84 n., 96, 133 n., 135 n., 273,
285 and n., 313
Pacific, The, or "South Seas," 52, 310,
316-318, 320-324
Pakenham, Captain Hon. Edward Michael :
Lord Longford, 415
Palais, Belle Isle, 235, 236
Palamos, 84
Palapa, 241
Palermo, 34
Pallas, 8, 194, 230 and n.j 303
Palliere, Cajjtain de La, 174 n., 179 n.,
198 n
Palliser {properly Pallisser), Aduiiral Sir
Hugh, Bart., 206 u., 209, 229, 251, 295,
2C9, 326, 341, 343, 414, 415, 417, 419,
420, 421, 423-425, 435 n., 566
Palma, 148
Palmer, Colonel, 270
Palmer, William, 326
Palmetto logs, 373
Palmier, 300, 302, 415
Palmyra Point : see Pedara Point
Pamlico Soimd, 259
Pamphleteering bj- naval officers, 112 n.
Panama, 52 n., 54, 58, 76, 78, 79
Panic in England, 142, 445
Panther, 84 n., 201 n., 202, 203, 225, 240 n.,
241, 257
Panthh-e, 312
Panton, Captain John Alexander, 543 n.
Papagena, Captain Don Juan, 34
Paragon, 273
Pardaillan, Captain de, 271
Pardon to surrendering pirates, 17
Parfait, 312
Paris, 90, 253, 254
Parker, Vice- Admiral Sir Hyde (1), Bart ,
215 n., 240 n., 241, 324, 343, 395 n., 412
and n., 434, 440, 452, 453, 454 n., 459,
460, 474, 504-509, 566
Parker. Admiral Sir Hyde (2), Kt., 380,
385, 386, 406 n., 412 n., 441 and n., 442,
479 n., 505 n.
Parker, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter (1),
Bart., 201 and n., 234 n., 236 and n.,
372, 373, 374, 376, 378, 379, 380, 383,
387, 470, 473, 479, 494, 502, 566
Parliament, Recognition of public services
by, 58, 186, 222, 231, 242
Parma, 48
Parrey, Captain Anthony, 395 n., 520 n.
Parry, Admiral William (2), 148 n., 227 n.,
565
Parsons, H., shipbuilder, 335
Pascal, Captain Michael Henry, 234 n., 238
Pasley, Admiral Sir Thomas, Bart., 546 n.
Passaro, Cape, 32 n., 33-38, 83 n.
Paston, Captain William, 195, 223 n., 235 n.
Patagonia, 322
Patent, The Admiralty, 1
Patereroes, 11 n., 57, 62 and n.
Patersou, Lieutenant , 406 n.
Patton, Admiral Philip, 505 n.
Pavilion, Captain du, 530, 533 n.
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
597
l>ay, Naval {u-r aho W'at^cs), 1!), 20, 104,
i23
Payta, 317, 321
Paz, Cajitaiu de La, 135 n.
Peace: with France aiul Spain, 253-255, 564
Peadle, Commander M., 96
Pearce, Captain Vincent (1), 260, 270
Pearce, Captain Vincent (2), 200 n.
Pearce, Thomas, 3
Pearl, 54,257,259,320, 321, 406 ii., 428 n.,
492 n.
Pearson, Captain Sir Richard, Kt., 509 u.
Pedara, or Palmyra, Point, 197
Pegase, 538
Pegasits, 454 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Peighiu, Captain John, 223 n., 241 n.
Pelham, Henry, 18
Pelican, 20G n.
Pellew, Admiral Sir Edward : Loi'd Exmouth,
286, 365, 366, 379, 389
Pemhro/cc, 125 n., 131 and n., 132, 206 n.,
209, 226 n., 246 n., 311, 312
Pefias, Gulf of, 322
Penelope, 286
Penguin, 302, 311
Penkcvel, 231 n.
Penniarck, 304
Pennsylvania, 386
Penny, Captain Taylor, 520 n.
Penryn, 52
Pensacola, 371
Pensions for woimds, 301
Pensions to dockyard artificers, 342
Penzance, 227 and n., 233 n., 242 n., 246 n.
Pepperel, Sir William, Bart., 110, 113-115
Perceval, Captain Hon. Philip Tufton, 206 n.
Peregrine, 3l2
J'erla, 34, 37
Perle, 415
Perouse, Capitain J. F. de G., Comte de La,
352 and n., 415
Perrier, Captain du, 274
Perseverance, 352
Persian Gulf, The, 200
Peru, 317, 321
Peter the Great, The Tsar, 26, 27, 41, 42
Peterhead, 257
Petersburg, Virginia, 473, 493
Petersham, Lord, 358
Petit Terre, 203
Petruche, Captain Don A., 96
Pett, Captain Robert, 96, 104
Pettigrew, Captain William, 125 n.
Peyton, Captain Edward, 119, 120 and n.,
121
Peyton, Admiral .Joseph (1), 190, 212 n.,
298, 311, 415, 567
Peyton, Captain Sir Yelverton, Bart., 269,
270 n.
Phaeton, 70 n., 76 n.
Pheasant, 311
Phenix, 120 n., 121
Pliiladelphia, 406 u.
Phil.adeli)hia, 370, 387, 390, 391, 392, 393,
397, 403, 404
PhiUhert, 125 n.
Philip v., King of Spain, 29, 30, 31, 40, 89
Philippine Islands, The, 239-242
Philijis, Henry John : see Towry, Henry
John Philips
Philipson, John, 3
Pliinijis, Lieutenant Baker, 278, 279
Phillips, Captain Erasmus, 310
Phillips, General, 473, 493
PhilliiiS, the privateer, 282
Phillipson, Captain John, 84 n., 108
Phipps, Captain Hon. Charles, 509 n.
Phipps, Captain Hon. Constantino John ;
Lord Mulgrave, 346, 415
Phoenix, 12, 123, 148 and n., 149, 153,
223 n., 257, 269, 313, 314, 352, 386,
406 n., 408, 412 n., 441, 479 n.
Physician of the Fleet, 341, 450, 533
Piacenza, 48
Piece-work, Paying by, 336
Piercy, or Percy, Captain Francis, 41 n.
Pierrepont, Charles: see Meadows, Captain
Charles
Pigeon Island, St. Lucia, 487
Pigot, Admiral Hugh (1), 206 n., 235 n.,
537, 538, 566
Pigot, General Sir Robert, 402, 409
Pigott, Admiral James, 546 u.
Pilotage, Rates for, 15
Pilots, Incompetent, 243
Pines, Isle of, 311
Pintado, Admiral, 65
Piracy, 17, 143, 257, 258-261, 262, 264,
288, 318
Piscataqua, 310
Pisco, 317
Pistols, 9
Pitchford, Samuel : see Cornish, Samuel
Pitchford
Pitch-heaters, 342
Pitt, Rt. Hon. AVilliam (1), later Earl of
Chatham, 210, 238, 254
Pitt, Rt. Hon. William (2), 347
Pittsburg, 141 n.
Pizarro, Admiral, 65, 267
Placentia, 251
Plague, 313 : see also Sickness, Sanitation,
etc.
Plassev, Battle of, 164
Plate, River (Rio de la Plata), 251
Plava Grande, 60, 68
Plciade, 190
Plumbers, 342
Pluto, 283 n., 313, 415
Plymouth, 4, 12, 15, 21, 43, 53 n., 65, 108,
122, 126, 140, 187, 195, 196 u., 282, 296,
316, 327, .33.5, 336, 343, 347, 397, 425,
445 446 448
Plyvwuth'll, 123 n., 133 n., 134, 135, 444
Pocahontas, 482 n.
Pocock, Admiral Sir George, K.B., 124, 128,
39
598
INDEX TO VOLUME 111.
130, 137, 143, IGl n., 163, 164, 174-182,
197-200, 238, 245-250, 284, 565
Poder, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102, 315
Podor, 187
Point Judith, 403, 405
Pointe au Fer, 359
Pointe aux Ti'embles, 356
Pointe de Galle, 557
Poising, Captain de, G4 n.
Pole-axes, 9
Pole, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Cliarles
Morice, Bart., 543 n.
Politics in the Navy, 424, 467, 549
Pomona, 474 and n.
Pomone, 227, 313
Pompey, 60, 62 n., 70 n., 76 n.
Pondicherry, 121, 122, 131, 139, 164, 174,
176, 177, 178, 181, 197, 199, 200, 224,
225, 232,311,543,549,552
Pondicherry, 546 n.
Ponte Vedra, 262
Poole, 46 n.. Ill n., 112 n.
Popham, Rear-Adrairal Sir Home Riggs,
341n.
Pore-epic, 34
Porcnpine, 206 n., 207, 209, 226 n., 227,
246 n.
Porlier, Captain Don J., 247 n.
Porquerolles, 94
Port au Paix, 226
Port au Prince, 300
Port Castries, St. Lucia, 429
Port Louis, France, 118
Port Louis, Guadeloupe, 203
Port Louis, Hispaniola, 61 n., 68, 133, 134,
272
Port Mahon, 32, 34 n., 36, 37 n., 40, 65,
101, 102, 104, 107, 146, 147, 148, 150,
151, 153, 154, 155, 157, 314, 439 n.
Port Mahon, 246 n., 257
Port Royal, 246 n.
Port Roj'al, Jamaica, 54, 59, 62, 63, 76,
132, 266, 267, 537
Port St. Julian, 320
Porte-Vezins, Captain de La, 415
Porter, Captain Jervis Henry, 302
Porter, Lieutenant , 242
Portland, 194, 296, 314, 338, 343
Portland, 43 n., 46 n., 127 n., 148 n., 151 n.,
169, 212 and n., 213, 214, 215, 218 n.,
282, 283, 287, 312 (3)
Portland's Prize, 283, 312
Porto, 546 n.
Porto Jlaria, Cuba, 267
Porto Kovo, 178, 562
Porto Praya Bay, 350, 439 n., 546-549,
552
Porto Santo, 338
Portsmouth, 4, 12, 13, 14, 23, 46, 53, 90,
117, 128, 156, 158, 182, 232, 278, 288,
326, 335, 336, 337, 342, 396, 426 n.
Portsmouth, 187, 188
Portsmouth, A'irginia, 488, 493, 494
Portugal, 50, 214, 238, 239, 251, 254, 274,
282, 302, 448
Postigo, Captaiu Don J. del, 247 n.
" Potential " fleets, 76, 77, 493
Pourvoyeuse, 550 n.
Povvlett, Captain Cliarles, 135 n.
Powlett, Admiral Lord Harry : Duke of
Bolton, 84 n., 96, 131 n., 565
Pownall, J., shipbuilder, 12, 335
Pownall, Captain Philemon, 306, 308, 406 n.
Pratten, Captain Edward, 191, 212 n., 214,
299
Prescott, Adiiural Isaac, 415
President, 511
Preston, 108, 120 u., 131 n., 223 n., 387,
406 n., 409, 428 n., 431, 452, 466 n.,
505 n.
Preston, Captain William, 131 n.
Pretender, The Young, 16, 28, 66, 90, 110-
113, 257, 258, 279
Prevost, General, 441
Prices, in the West Indies, Effect of the
American war uijon, 396 ; at Gibraltar,
448
Pi'ideaux, Brigadier-General, 204
Prince, 212 and n.
Prince Edoaurd, 313
Pritice Edward, 188, 189, 225 n., 226
Prince Edward's Island, 184 n.
Prince Eugene, 316
Prince Frederick, 41 n., 64, 70 n., 71, 72
and n., 125 n., 206 n., 235 n., 280, 286
Prince George, 125 n., 152 n., 190, 280,
297, 298, 311, 415, 449, 513 n., 520 n.
Prince Noir, 218 n.
Prince of Orange, 63, 105, 206 n., 209,
220 n., 226 n., 234 n., 2.35, 236 n., 276
Prince of Wales, 428, 431, 434, 436
Prince Rupert's Bay, Dominica, 63, 64, 203
Prince William, 265, 335, 448 n., 482 n.,
513 n., 520 n.
Prince's battery, Gibraltar, 46
Princesa (^\TongIv frincessa), 12, 66 and n.,
92, 96, 98, 122,"267, 268, 314, 449, 482 n.,
497 n., 513 n., 520 n., 533
Princess Amelia, 12, 70 and n., 71, 75 n.,
171, 206, 235 n., 505 u.
Princess Augusta, 12
Princess Caroline, 70 n., 71, 75 n., 83 n.,
96, 98 and n., 335
Princess Louisa, 54, 55, 50, 62 and n., 70 n.,
125 n., 127 n., 148 n., 150, 151 n., 153,
156, 1G9, 170, 212 n., 215, 310
Princess Mary, 121
Princess Poyal, 72, 76 n., 395 n., 434, 454 n.
Principe de Asturias, 34, 35, 37, 314
Pringle, Vice-Admiral Thomas, 365, 431,
434
Prins Friso, 91
Prisoners of War, 2, 88
Privateers, 18, '26, 113, 115, 134, 137, 186,
228, 231 n., 232, 233, 245, 253, 257, 265,
272, 278, 279, 280, 282, 284, 285, 291,
INDEX TO VOLUME HI.
59f>
292, 293, 294, 295, 290, 331, 387, 390,
428
Privy Councillorslii|i as a. naval reward, 215
Prize-money, IS, 211, 249, 200, 311, 342,
350, 470
Proby, Captain Charles, 191, 200 n., 295,
300, 323 and n., 324, 320 (2)
ProiBHi, Captain de, 415
Promotion to flat;-rank, 20, 343-347
Promotions on the occasion of a review, 343
Proserpine, 415
Protector. 143, 174 n., 225, 311
Protee, 185, 244, 335, 452, 520 n.
Protestant Succession, The, 29
Provence, 492 n.
Providien, Action ofiF, 552-554
Prudent, 184, 290, 313, 491, 492 n., 513
and n., 520 n.
Prudente, 335, 509 n.
Prussia 42 192
Puerto Belio, 43, 44, 52 n.. 54-57, 58, 59,
61, 78, 79 and n., 80, 274, 314
Puerto Cabello, 85, 87, 88
Puerto Rico, 254, 272, 537
Puerto Seguro, 317
Pulicat, 121
Pultenev, Mr., 07 n., 78 n.
Pamps,"Ships', 330, 337
Punta Brava, 87
Pursers, 19
Purvis, Captain Charles Wager, 90
Purvis, Captain George, 3
Pye, Admiral Sir Thomas, Kt., 310, 343,
565
Quadrant, The, 3, 10
Quadruple Alliance (1718), The, 29 and n.,
39, 40
Quebec, 116, 117, 140, 141, 182, 196, 204-
210, 222, 226, 227, 281, 313, 354, 356,
357, 361, 360, 368
Queen, 415, 509 n.
Queen Anne''s Beren(/c, 259
Queen CItarlotte, 335
Queenboruuqh, 174 n., 170, 179 n., 181,
198 n., 200, 225, 311
Queen's (or King's) Regulations and Ad-
miralty Instructions, 15 and n.
Quenel, Governor of Capo Breton, M. de,
109
Quiberon Bay, 118, 217-223, 224, 231, 232,
283, 307, 311, 324, 341 n.
Quibo, 317, 321, 323
Quinta, La, 73
Racehorse, 200 n., 209, 210, 226 u., 227
llackam, John, 200
Radeaux, 301, 302 and n., 305
Radstock, Lord : see Waldegrave, Admiral
Hon. Sir William
Piainhow, 212 n., 332 (2)
Rainier, Admiral Peter (1), 545 n., 550 n.,
552 n.
h'aisonuahh, 203, 242 n., 243, 299, 311,.
313, 339, 404, 406 n.
Bamhorst, 91
y/am «/«>«, 148 n., 151, 15.3, 156,171, 231,
311, 335 f2), 415
Ramsay, 230
Ramsgate, 10
Ranee, River, 194
Randall and Co., shi]ibuilderF, 335
Rating of ships, 7, 328, 330
Rattlesnake, .540 n.
Rawdnn, Lord, 344, 346
Rawling, Captain John, 290 and n.
Rayner, Captain John, 406 n., 409, 428 n.,
431
Real, 34, 314
Real Famiiia, 135 n.
Real Felipe, 90, 97, 98 and u., 100 and n.,
102, 314
Real San Felipe, 34 and n., 35, 37, 38
Real Trasporte, Admiral the JIarques del,
247 n.
Reals, Captain de, 415
Rear-Adrairals, 19, 20
Rebecca, 50, 205 n.
Recover//, 317
Red Bank, New Jersey, 391, 392
Heddall, Captain Ambrose, 545 n., 550 n.,
552 n.
Reddish, Captain Henry, 57
Redoubtable, 148 n.. 151 n.,212 n.,214, 313
Reeve, Vice-Admiral Samuel, 391
Re-em barking in face of an enemy, 195
Reftechi, 415, 452
Reflectors in lighthouses, 338
Reggio, 32 n., 37
Reggio, Admiral Don Andrea, 34, 135 n.
Regiments : 15^, 63 n. ; "iith, 03 n. ; Dal-
. zelVs, 87 and n. ; i-Oth, 109 ; Roijal Fusi-
liers, 147 ; Royal Highlanders, 201 n. ;
Louisbourg Grenadiers, 10^ ; 02«c?, 229 ;
IWt, 239 ; Royal Artillery, 240
Registration of seamen, 18
Regteren, Captain Grave van, 505 n.
Reid, Captain James, 373
h'eina, 247, 315
Relief of Quebec, by Douglas, 357, 358
Remittances by seamen, 18
Rennes, Bishop of, 102
Revommee, 114, 115, 120 u., 219 n., 284,
308, 312
Renmon, 193, 201 n., 203, 313, 387, 404,
400 n., 409, 509 n.
Rentone, Captain James, 57 n., 58, OS, 73,
76, 133 n., 134 and n.
Rentorin, Captain Don J., 96
Reprisals, 44, 51
Repulse, 233 n., 242 n., 301, 520 u.
Repulse Bay, 319
Resolu, 352
Resolution, 218 n., 219, 221, 311, 337,
341 n., 482 n., 497 n., 513 n., 514, 515,
520 n., 534
39—2
■(iUU
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Besiilution, 178
liestoration, 143
Ketez, Don Francisco Martinez de, 57
Itetirement: sue Superannuation, Pensions,
etc.
lietiro, 96
Jteuiiion, 510 n.
Keval, 41, 42
Heimige, 96, 143, 148 n., 164, 181, 189, 197,
199', 218 n., 219, 273, 289, 313
Eevei-t, Conuiiodore du, 167, 169
Keviewg, Naval, 343
Iveward for discovery of a Nortli-west
Passage, 319
Kewards for capturing jiirates, 17
Ke.ynolds, Francis (latir Moreton) : see
Moreton, Captain Francis Reynolds ;
a/lerwards Lord Ducie
lleyuolds. Captain Henry, 550 n., 552
Kevnolds, Admiral John (1), 216, 222 n.,
566
lihiS, Isle de, 191, 282
h'hinoeeros, 313
liliode Island, 387, 402, 403, 404, 407, 409,
410, 411, 443, 471, 542
Hicli, Admiral Sir Thomas, Bart., 482 n.
Ilich, Captain Edward, 123 n.
Kichards, Commander Francis, 206 n.
Kichelieu, Marshal the Due de, 142, 146,
149
Richelieu Eiver, 356, 358, 361
Richmond, 206 n., 226 n., 245, 246 n., 304,
313, 406 n., 497 n.
Eiehmond, Virginia, 488
Jtidle.y, Sir MaUhew White, 344
liiedesel. General Baron, 359, 365, 367, 368
:i;ig2ers, 342
Rigging of a man-of-war, 329
liijueveld, Capitain van, 505 n.
Rijsbraak, the sculptor, 231 n.
Rio de Janeiro, 251
Rio Grande (S. America), 322
Ripou (or Rippon), 12, 34, 43, 70 n., 71,
76, 201 and n., 202, 235 n., 246 u., 267,
:'.05, 315, 543 n.
Rivadco, 261
Rivarole, Marchese de, 38, 116
Rivett, Lieutenant P., 505 n.
Roatan Island, 80 and n.
Roberts, Bartholomew, 260 and n., 261
Roberts, Captain John, 310
Robertson, Captain George, 505 n.
liobiuson. Captain Hugh, 395 n., 492 n.
Rcibinsun, Captain Mark (1), 201 n., 311,
413 n., 415, 482 n., 497 n.
Robinson, Colonel, (Mar.), 63 n.
Robinson, Commander WiUiam, 550 n.
Robust, 415, 491, 492 n.
Rohuste, 218 n., 313, 415
Roca Partida, 317
Rochambeau, Admiral de, 107, 274, 282
Rochambeau, General de, 488, 495, 501
Roche-AUard, Admiral the Marquis de La, 59
Rochechouart, Captain Yicomie de, 415
Rochefort, 89 n., 140, 14.5, 171-172, 224,
252, 291, 302
Rochelle, La, 293
Rochester, 33, 34, 193, 216, 218 and n.,
227 n., 242 n., .308, 313
Roddam, Admiral Robert, 294, 311, 566
Rodney, 206 n.
Rodney, Adrnual Sir George Brydges : Lord
Rodney, K.B., 127 n., 183, 190 n., 196,
215 and n., 224, 231, 232, 233, 239, 242-
245, 252, 283 n., 387, 393, 408, 425, 432,
440, 443 and n., 448-471, 472, 477-488,
494, 502, 504, 506, 508, 519-538, 565
Rodney, Captain Hon. John, 513 n., 520 n.
Roebuck, 80 n., 201 and n., 202, 203, 335,
386, 406 n.
Rogers, Captain Sir Frederick, Bart., 4, 327
Rogers, George, 326
Rogers, Woodes, 316
Roland, 415
RoUo, Colonel Lord, 228, 233
Roman Emperor, 188
Romney, 12, 81, 96, 546 and n.
Romulus, 489, 492 n.
Roofing ships in ordinary, 336
Rooke, Admiral of the Fleet Sir George,
26 n., 112 n.
Roquefeuil, Admiral Comte de, 59 n., 89,
90, 92
Rosas Bay, 102
Eosbau, Captain de, 174 n.
Roscofl", 113
Rose, 148 n., 192, 242 n., 246 n., 266, 279,
298, 313, 315, 335
Rosewell, Captain Henry, 120 n.
Rosewell, J., shipbuilder, 12
Ross, Captain Sir John, Kt., C.B., quoted,
533
Ross {previously Lockhart), Vice-Admiral
Sir John Lockhart, Bart., 215 n., 218 n.,
293 and n., 415, 567
Ross-shire, 39
Rostan, 299
Rothe, Commander Peter, 505 u.
Rouge, Cape, 209
Rouret, Captain du, 127 n.
Rous, Captain John, 113-115, 141, 168, 183,
206 n., 208
Routh, Captain Robert, 206 n.
Row-galleys, 359, 360, 363, 365
Rowley, Vice-Admiral Sir Joshua, Bart.,
190, 193, 195, 218 n., 250, 415, 434, 435,
437, 438, 452, 454 n., 460, 567
Rowley, Admiral of the Fleet Sir WiUiam,
82 and n., 94-97, 101, 103, 107, 108, 116,
565
Rowzier, Captain .John, 131 n.
Rowzier, Captain Richard, 34
Royal Anne, 257, 310 (2)
Royal Caroline, 237
Royal Cluirlotte, 12, 237, 546 n.
"Royal Family," 'Ihe, 285
INDEX TO VOLUME JIT.
601
]t(jij(i? Fortune, 2fi0
Ji,n/al Geori/e, 12, 44, 218 n., 231, 419,
540
Koyal Nav.al Exhibition of 1891, 338
Jioyal Oak, 34, 35, 46 n., 47, 81, 92, 90,
iOl, 103, 314 (2), 395 n., 434, 492 n.,
497 n., 520 n., 524
Uoyal Sauor/e, 365, ;'GG
Uoyal Society, The, 203 n., 352
Hoyal tSovereii/71, 12
Royal United Service Institution, 21
Boyal WiUiam, 171, 185, 206, 209, 231,
235 n., 303
7?«Ws, 125 n., 312
Ruby, 131 n., 395, 474 and n., 475, 470
Uudvard's Eddystone Lighthouse, 14
Rufcrl, 31, 32, 34, 35, 96, 101, 104
liusliout. Sir Jolin, Bart., 3
Ivushworth, Captain John, 224 n.
Russel, Cai)tain John, 96, 101 n.
Btissdl, 70 and n., 71, 75 n., 96, 101, 286,
315, 395 n., 482 n., 483 n., 486, 510 n.,
513 n., 520 n., 532, 535
llussell, Admiral of the Fleet Edward : Earl
of Orford, 2, 112 n.
Russell, John, 4
Russia, 26 H seq., 41-43, 47, 01 n., 340
Ruyter, Captain de, 550 n.
Bye, 187, 188, 201 n.
Saba, 480
Sada, Captain Don Michael de, 34
Sadras, 176, 550-552
Sage, 148 n., 151 n.
Sagittaire, 522
Sail-cloth, 14
Sailing Instructions, 94 and n.
Sail-makers, 342
Saint-Cesaire, Captain de, 533 n.
St. Albans, 78 n., 79 n., 212 n., 267, 274,
276, 298, 310, 313, 400, 406 n., 428 n.,
431, 513 n , 520 n.
St. Anne's Bav, Martinique, 243
St. Augustine," Florida, 63 u., 269, 270, 314,
441
St. Bon, Captain (afterwards Admiral) de,
at Lissa, 202
St. Brieuc, 194
St. Cas, Disaster in the Bay of, 194, 195
St. Catlierine's, 314
St. Catherine's Light, 338
St. Charles River, Quebec, 207
St. t^hristopher : see St. Kitt's
St. Clair, General Hon. James, 118
St. Croix, Chevalier de, 230
St. Esprit, 96, 280, 415
St. Eustatia, Florida, 209
St. Eustatia, or St. Eustatius, West Indies,
242, 300, 480, 481, 486, 503
St. Felix, Captain de, 550 n., 556
St. Foy, 235
St. Francis de Pupa, Fort, 269
St. George, 156, 201 n., 202, 292
St. George, Chevalier de : see Pretender, The- '
Young
St. Georges, M. Grou de, 124, 125 n.
St. Helen's, 43, 66, 107, 118, 147, 107, 1S2,
216, 231, 234, 261, 311, 320, 445, 502,
545 n.
St. James's Square, 2
St. John, Captain Hon. Ilonry (1), 238,
454 n., 462 n.
St. John, Island of (Prince Edward's Island),
184 and n., 185
St. John's, Lake Champlain, 350, 358, 359,
300, 301, 362, 366, 368, 370, 371
St. John's, Newfoundland, 210, 250, 251,
253, 312
St. John's River, Florida, 209
St. Kitt's (or St. Christopher), 54 n., 64, 85,
122, 309, 433, 440, 469, 479, 480, 486,
501, 510-519, 521
St. Lawrence, River, 182, 205, 206-210, 220,
227, 228, 311, 354, 355, 350, 357, 358,
361.
St. Loe, Commander Edward (2), 311
St. Loe, Rear- Admiral Edwanl (1), 45 and
n., 204
St. Louis, 120 n., 174 n., 175, 179 n.,198 n.
St. Lucia, 242 n., 244, 254, 428, 429, 431,
432, 433, 434, 452, 463, 464, 466, 469,
478, 481, 482, 484, 480, 487, 510, 519,
520
St. Lunaire Bay, 194
St. Malo, 11.3, 192, 193, 194, 229, 291, 29.3,
290, 445
St. Martin, Rh(5, 191, 282
St. Martin, West Indies, 480
St. Michel, 415, 557, 563 n.
St. Nazaire, 110
St. Nicholas Island, 311
St. Philip's Castle, Minorca, 148, 153, 151
St. Pierre, Island of, 253
St. Pierre, Martinique, 202, 245
St. Poissonniere, M. de ; his still, 337
St. Servand, 313
St. Tropez, Gulf of, 84, 273, 310, 314
St. Vincent, 244, 254, 433, 434, 479, 488
St. Vincent, Cape, 438, 449, 540
St. Vincent, Earl : see Jervis, Sir John
Ste. Anne, 306, 313
Ste. Marguerite, 123
Ste. Theiese, Isle, 228
Saintes, The, 203, 311, 522, 525, 527
Salamander, 84 n., 2 12 n., 2 1 5, 497 n., 520 n.
Salavarria, Captain, 318
Saldanha Bay, 350, 548
Salines, Pointe des, Martinique, 482, 483,
484
Saliez, Captain de, 125 n., 120
Salines, The, 244
Salisbury, 41 n., 43 n., 90, 140, 161 and n.,.
163, 174 n., 175, 179 n., 198 u., 311
Sallee, 258
Salon, 211
Salt at the Tortugas, Right to collect, 26a
€02
INDEX TO VOLUME in.
Salt, Comnianiler Samiisoi], KiT n.
Saltash, 188, ;ilO, .'ill
Salter, Captain Elliot, 497 ii.
Salvert, Commodore Perrier (1) tie, 13',l
Salvert, Captain Perrier (2) de, 550 n.
Samar, Island of, 241, 3'.'3
Sambala Keys, 50, 310
San Antonio, -47 ii., 315
San Bias, Gulf of, 79
San Bruno, 448 n.
San Carlo!,, 34, 35, 37, 71 n., 72, 314 (2),
448 n., 54G n.
Sandfcate, 335
San Domingo (see also Hispaniola), 145,
284, 28G, 294, 308, 453, 468, 469, 470,
473, 494, 495, 496, 537
Sandwich, 222 n., 231, 234 n., 235, 230
and D., 415, 449, 454 n., 456, 458, 459,
486, 539
Sandwich, John, Earl of, 2, 111 n., 325,
345, 366 and n.
Sandy Hook, 379, 390, 398, 399, 400, 404,
408, 441, 470, 495, 502
Sa7t Eugenic, 449
San Felipe, 71 n., 72, 314 (2)
San Fermin, 448 n.
San Fernando, 34, 37, 96, 314
San Fernando Menor, 34
San Francisco d'Assis, 34
San Genaro, 247 n., 249, 250, 312, 314, 315
San Isidoro, 34, 35, 36 n., 273, 314, 315
Sanitation, 23, 44-46, 337
San Jeronimo, 54, 56, 57
San Joaquin, 314
San Jose, 314
Sa7i Juan, 314
San Juan Baiitista, 34, 314
San Juan de Puerto Eico, 59
San Juan Menor, 34, 314
San Julian, 449
San Justo, Captain Don de, 135 n.
San Lucar, 449
San Luis, 34, 35
San Miguel, 540
San Pedro, 34, 37, 314
San Bafael, 448 n.
San Sebastian, 261, 308
Santa Cruz (Canaries), 188
Santa Fe, 62
S'inia Isahela, 34, 36, 37, 314
Santa Maniariita, 497 n.
Santa Martha, GO, 314
Santa Monica, 520 n.
Santander, 47, 65
Santa Bosa, 34, 35, 37, 314
Santa Bosalia, 3,14
Santa Teresa, 314, 448 n.
Santiago de Cuba, 76, 77, 78, 133, 134, 135,
272
Santisima Trinidad, 241, 315
Santo Domingo, 449
San Vinceiite, 448 n.
Sapphire, 218 n.
Sapphire's Prize, 311
Saratoga, 354, 370, 391
Sardinia, 29, 40, 49, 92 n., 116, 253
Sardoine, 313
Sartine, 335
Saumarez, Admiral Sir James: Lord de
Saumarez, 376, 379, 509 n., 510 and n.,
520 n.
Saumarez, Captain Philip de, 125 n., 127 n.,
128 and n., 282, 321, 323, 32__4
Saumarez, Captain Thomas, 217
Saunders, Admiral Sir Charles, K.B., 3,
127 n., 128, 152, 155, 160, 169, 189, 190,
195, 196, 204-209, 210, 222 and n., 223,
224, 228, 232, 239 and n., 252, 310, 324
325, 565
Saimders, Rear-Admiral (Russian service),
43 n.
Saunders, Eear-Adrairal Sir George, Kt., 3,
4, 32, 34
Saurins-Murat, Captain de, 96
Sauvage, 165 n.
Sauzon, 235
Savage, Admiral Henry, 520 n.
Savage, 311, 312
Savannah, River and Town, 441, 442, 471,
472
Savoy, 29 ef seg., 40, 89
Sawkins, the buccaneer, 258
Sawyer, Admiral Herbert (1), 212 n., 308,
428, 434, 567
Saxe, Marshal, 118, 119
Saxton, Captain Sir Charles, Bart., 327,
497 n., 513 n.
Sayer, Vice-Admiral James, 152 n., 187,
188, 566
Scarborough, 72, 76 n., 86, 88, 186' n., 206 n.,
259, 263, 264, 479 n.
Sceptre, 165 n., 557, 563 n.
Schanck, Admiral John, 361
Schenectady, 204
Scheveningen, 304
Schomberg, Captain Sir Alexander, Kt., 14,
183, 206 n., 227 and n., 234 n., 330 n.
Schooners, 330
Schuyler, General, 358
Schuyler's Island, 367
Schuylkill River, 391 n.
Scilly Isles, The, 14, 91, 445, 446, 504, 539
Scijno, 339
Sclater, or Slaughter, Captain George, 96,
104
Scorpion, 12, 206 n., 312
Scott, Captain Alexander (1), 373
Scott, Captain Arthur, 4, 127 n., 283 n.
Scott, Commander James (1), 16, 60
Scott, Captain Samuel, 224 n.
Scotland, 110-113, 196, 201 n., 223, 224, 261
Scouting, Inefficient, 67 n.
Scroggs, the navigator, 318, 319
Scrope, Captain Carr, 147, 148 n., 153,
234 n., 311
Scurvy, 117, 319, 321, 323, 563
INDEX TO VOLUME HI.
mi
Seaford, 241 and n., 274, 310, 337
Seahorse, 70 ii., 190, 20G n., --'08, 231 n.,
240, 241 and n., 297, 304 and n., 543 ji.,
550 n., 552 n., 503 n.
Sea Islands, 'I'he, 372
Scakonnet Cliaimtl, ■!02
Seamen, Encouragement of, 1,S, 19, 339, 340
Seamen on the Authorised Establishment,
Number of, 5, 327
Sea-power, Strildna; illustrati(>ns of the in-
fluence of, 1S1,1S2, 180, 200, 358; In-
fluence of, in the N. American campaign,
353 et seq., 393, 394
Search, Right of, 138, 252, 253, 203, 351, 352
Secrecy at a court-martial. The oath of, 158
Secretaries of the Admiralty, 3, 320
Seething Lane, 2
Seizure of British ships, 26
Senecterre, 209
Senegal, 186-189, 254, 311
Seniority, Objections to jiromotion to flag-
rank b}-, 345
Sensible, 415
Sepoys, 131, 161
Serapis, 279
Serieux, 96, 125 n., 126, 312
Serin, 415
Serpent, 335
Servants, Officers', 19
Seven Years' War, The, 7, 84, 140, 222 n.,
264, 255, 289 et seq., 295
Severe, 550 n., 556, 563 n.
Severn (called Severne while in French
hands), 122, 127 n., 311, 312, 320, 321
Severndroog, 143
Seville, Tre'aty of, 48, 50
Seymour, Admiral of the Fleet Sir George
Francis, 317
Shannon, 183, 212 n.
Shauiicn, The, 445
Sheerness, 54 n., 57, 70 n., 70 n., 112 n.,
212 n., 294, 314
Slieerness, 336, 339, 351
Shell-fire (spc aho Bombs), 136, 374
Shelvocke Island, 317
Shelvocke, Lieutenant AVilliam, 316-318
Shipbuilders, 12, 335
Ships, Advantages of large, 411, 412
Shij.is captured and lost, 310-315
Ships, Cost of, 10
Ships, Dimensions of, 9, 12, 335
Ships on the strength of the Navy, 7, 328
Ships, Superiority of French, 522
Shipwrights, 342 and n.
Shirley, Cajitain Thomas, 218 n., 347
Shirley Galley, 113, 115
Shirley, General, 510
Shirley, Governor of Massachusetts, 77, 109,
10, 115
Siiirley, Vice-Admiral Hon. AVashiugtou :
later Earl Ferrers, 218 n., 284, 566
Shoreham, 57 n., 70 n., 71, 73, 76 n., 266,
267, 285
Shot-hole stopyiing apparatus, 3,37
Shovell, Admiral Sir Clowdislej', 1 12 n.,
I 288 n.
Shrewsbury, 34, 70 and n., 75 n., 206, 229,
I 299, 303, 415, 482 n., 486, 497 n., 498,
513 n.
Shuldham, Admiral Molyne\ix: Lord Shuld-
ham, 201 n., 202, 203, 242 n., 243, 290
andn., 291, 311(2)566
Sibyl, i'Jl n., 513 n., 520 n.
Sicie, Cape, 95,211
Sicily, 29, 3,0, 32, 35, 36, 38, 40, 84
j Sick and Wounded Board, The, 1
! Sickness (see also Sanitation), 71, 72, 74,
117, 118, 132, 141, 154, 178, 182, 193,
203, 250, 276, 278, 281, 282, 280, 290,
321, 322, 323, 339, 443, 444, 440, 408
Signals, 175, 220, 221, 225, 444
Siilery, 208, 227
Simonton, Captain Kobert, 545 n.
Sincere, 415
Sirene, 225 n., 220, 313
Sir Thomas Roe's Welcome, 318, 319, 320
Skerries, The, 15
Skynner, Captain Lancelot, 302 and n.
Skyrm, tlie pirate, 260
Slade, Sir Thomas, Kt., 3, 8, 326, 335
Slaves released, 144
Sloops, 330
Small-pox (sec also Sickness, Sanitation),
358
Smalls Rock Lighthouse, 338
" Smasher," The, 331
Smeaton, John, 14, 15
Smith, Admiral Edward Tvrrel, 520 n.
Smith, Admiral Thomas (4), 112, 156, 196
andn.
Smith, Admiral Sir William Sidney, 341
Smith, Captain Edward, 272
Smith, Captain Elliot, 86
Smith, Captain Henry, 161 n.
Smith, Captain James, 200 n., 208, 304
and n.
Smith, Captain Richard, 200 n.
Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel, 157
Smiths, 342
Smoke in action, 150
Smollett, quoted, 47
Smuggling, 15, 16, 17, 262, 263
Soanes, Captain Joseph, 41 u.
Soberano, 247, 315
Sohiero, 90
Soissons, Congress at, 47 and n., 48
Solebay, 47, 224 n., 274, 282, 298, 310, 373,
374, 497 n., 513 and n.
Solebav, or Southwold Bay, 40
Soleil Royal, 209, 218 n., 220 n., 221, 313
Soledad, 314
Solide, 96
Solitaire, 218 n., 415
Somers, Captain Thomas, 115
Somerset, 92, 96, 101, 185, 200 n., :
400, 406 n.
n..
(iOl
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Somerset, Captain JdLii Stukk-v, ITi n.,
179 n., 198 11., 199
SommelBdijck, Vice- Admiral van, 48 n.
Sorel, 358
Sorlings, 310
Sorpresa, 34, 314
SouJanges, Cajitain de, 415
Sound, The, 20
South Africa, 197
South Sea Company, The, 44, 58
Southampton, 8, 231 n., 234 n., 296, 297,
301, 312, 313, 343
•Southill, 160
Soutlisea Castle, 224, 241 n., 312
Souveraiii, 212 n., 213, 302
Spain, 29 et se^., 39, 42, 46, 47, 48, 49-52,
58, 65, 66, 89, 102, 139, 238, 239, 261,
265, 292, 443
Spanish humanity, 322
Spartel, Cape, 32^ 271
Spartivento, Cape, 37
Speedwell, 311, 316, 017
Spake, Captain Henrv, 161 n., 162, 218 c,
311
Spence, 209, 270
SpMnx, 191, 218 n., 373, 400 n., 415, 546 n.,
550 n., 554, 563 n.
Spilbergen, the voyager, 317
Spinola, Rear- Admiral, 135 n.
Spion, 505 n.
Spithead, 30, 47, 48 n., 50, 63, 66, 90, 108,
117, 141, 142, 156, 158, 172, 186, 191,
192, 193, 206, 210, 231, 250, 289, 301,
324, 338, 343, 395, 412, 445, 446, 503,
540, 542
Split Rock, 367
Spottiswood, Colonel, 58 and n.
Sprightli/, 505 n.
Springs, 'Use of, 399, 400, 512, 516
Spry, Rear-Admiral Sir Richard, 131 n.,
141, 144, 206 n., 235 n., 239, 244, 252,
343, 566
Spry, Lieutenant , 406 n.
Spy, 201 u.
Squirrel, 70 n., 183, 206 n., 208, 269, 272,
314, 335
Stag, 223 n., 242 n.
Staering, Captain A. C, 505 n.
Stanhope, Admiral Hon. Sir Henry Edwyn,
513 n.
Stanhope, Rear- Admiral John, 513 n., 520 n.
Stanhope, Cajitain Mr Thomas, Kt., 189,
190, 212 n., 215, 218 n., 234 n., 235, 236
and n., 237, 283 n.
Stanhope, Colonel, Minister to Sjiain, 31
Stanhope, Lord, 30
Stanton, Captain John, 174, 311
Stanwix, Brigadier-General, 204, 205
Stapleton, Ca])tain Miles, 54 n., 58
Starhemherg, 316
Staringh, Captain, 505 n.
Starke, Lieutenant ; 361, 365
Start, The, 63
Staten Island, 380, 382, 383
Stephens, Captain Nathaniel, 120 n., 131 ii.
Stephens, Sir Philip, Bart., 326
Steijney, Captain George, 90
Stevens, Rear-Admiral Charles, 127 n., 164,
174, 175, 179 n., 181, 198 and n., 200,
224, 225, 232, 282, 287, 289
Stevens, Captain William, 550 n., 552
Stewart, Captain Henry, 86, 88, 272
Stewart (or Steuart), Admiral of the Fleet
James, 63, 91
Stewart, Vice-Admiral Hon. Keith (1), 238,
415, 568
Stills fitted in men-of-war, 337
Stillwater, 391
Stirling, Captain Sir Walter, Kt , 188,
234 n., 509 n.
Stirling Castle, 23 and n., 46, 96, 98, 190 u.,
206 and n., 233 u., 242 n., 245 n., 246 n.,
281, 415, 434, 454 n., 456, 479 n.
Stock market. The, 445
Stockholm, 26, 41, 42, 43
Stores, Lack of, 440
Stork, 300, 311
Storms, 27, 39, 58, 59 (2), 63, 90, 108, 121,
122, 132, 166, 169, 172, 186, 190 u., 193,
209, 215, 217, 219-221, 225, 231, 250;
272, 275, 276, 311-315, 321, 397, 404,
408, 449, 478, 479, 489, 540
Storr, Rear-Admiral John, 189, 218 n.,
234 n., 236 n., 567
Stott, Captain John, 183, 206 n.
Strachan, a seaman, 161
Strachan, Capt;iin Sir John, Bart., 218 n.,
296
Strachan, Admiral Sir Richard John, Bart.,
352
Strafford, 54, 55, 56, 59, 61, 62 and n., 70 n.,
76, 123 n., 133 n., 134, 135 n.
Strait of Le Maire, 320, 321
Strange, Captain Edmund (or Edward), 96
Strickland, Vice-Admiral Charles, 34
Stromholi, or Stromholo, 70 n., 76 n., 190,
206 n., 406 n.
Stromo, 229
Stuart, General, 154
Stuart, A'ice-Admiral Hon. Charles. 257 and
n., 264, 265, 266
Stuarts, The, 42, 89, 257, 258
Stutzer, Commander, 505 n.
Subtile, 283 and n., 284, 312, 550 n.
Success, ;)4, 61, 62 n., 70 n., 192, 316, 317
Suckling, Captain Maurice, 165 and n., 106,
236 n., 300, 326
Suffolk, 70 n., 71, 76, 85, 86, 87, 434, 438,
454 n.
Suffren, Vice-Admiral Pierre Andre, Bailli
de, 200, 212 n., 402, 439 and n.,4ol, 457,
482, 508, 539, 546-564
Sugar, 21
Sullivan, General, (U.S.A.), 409, 410
Sullivan's Island, 372, 373
Sulphur, 406 n.
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
605
Sultan, 305 n., -l.'U, 430, 137, 171, 552
aucl n., 55G, 5(iO, 503 n.
Sumatra, 200, 5(il
Sunday observaiuies, 21, 23
Sunderland, 167 and n., 197, 19!S n., 199,
^ 20(5 n., 225, 27G, 277, 278, 311, 312
Sunderland, Lord, 30
Superannuated Rear-Adnurals, 344, 340
Superannuation of otKcers, 20, 344
Superb, 115, 250, 545 n.. 550 n., 552 n.,
554, 503 n.
Superbe, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 43, 45, 03, 88 n.,
90, 218 u., 220, 313
Superstition, 317
Surajah Dowleli, Nawab of Ben<j;al, 100, 103,
164
Surf, 183, 193, 241
Surgeons, 2, 19, 340
Surgidero at Cartagena, The, 72 and u., 73
Surprise, 223 n., 357, 505 n.
Surveillanie, 415
Surveyors of the Navy, 3, 326, 335
Surviile, Captain de (1), 198 n.
Surville, CaiJtain de (2), 174 n., 179 n.,
198 n.
Sutherland. 90, 183, 208, 227 n., 233 n.,
242 n., 245 n., 240 n.
Sutherland, Captain Andrew, 482 n., 483 n.,
484, 520 n.
Sutton, Captain Evelyn, 350, 415, 546 n., 548
Sutton, ("aptaiu Robert Manners, 505 n.,
509 n.
Swallow, 46 n., 131 and n., 143, 200, 311,
494, 495
Swan, 187, 188
Swan, Lieutenant J. B., 505 n.
Swanton, Rear-Admiral Robert, 172, 200 n.,
222 n., 224, 227 and n., 232, 242 n., 243,
244, 245, 310, 313, 565
Swanton, Captain Thomas (1), 3, 4
Sweden, 26 et seq., 40-42, 43, 47, 229, 257,
340, 341
Sweeps, 226, 503
Swift, 3;^5
Swlftsure, 189, 190, 212 and a., 213, 215,
218 n.; 219, 234 n., 230
Swivels, 11 n.
Swiney, Admiral William, 492 u.
Sylphide, 174 n., 175, 198 n., 550 u.
Symonds, Captain Thomas, 373
Symons, Vice-Admiral John, 482 n., 520 n.
Sj'raouse, 35, 30, 38
Syren, 373
Taafe, Lieutenant , 278
Tagus, The, 50, 91, 107, 274, 310
Talbot, Captain George, 545 n., 550 n.,
552 n.
Talbot, the privateer, James, 280, 285
Tangier, 47 n.
Tanjore, 132, 178
Tapageur, 540 n.
Tarragona, 211 n.
Tarrytown, 380, 385
Tartar, 224 n., 238, 209, 293, 338, 380,
505 n., 509 n.
Tartar's Prize, 212 n., 293, 311
Tathwell, Commander Joseph, 399 n.
Taylor, Captain Polycarpus, 133 n., 135 n.
Taylor, Captain Thomas (1), 311
Taylor, Captain Wittewronge, 172, 231, 31 1
Tchesme, Battle of, 34 1 n.
Tea, 21
Teach, or Thatch, Edward : see Thatch
TeJemaque, 290
Timirairi; 148 n., 151 n., 212 u., 214, 215,
233, 234 n., 242 n., 245 n., 240 n., 313
Temple, 218 n., 242 n., 245 n., 240 u., 24!t,
250, 312, 313
Temple, Richard, Earl, 2
Temple, Sir Richard, 4, 326
Ternay, Commodore de, 250, 251, 252, 471,
475-477, 488
Tenerife, 187
Terpsichore, 230 and n., 231, 232
Terrible, 8, 12, 00, 62 n., 70 u., 84 n., 90,.
97, 98, 122, 123 and n., 127 n., 206, 312,
415, 454 n , 459, 482 n., 497 n., 501
Terror, 12, 113, 282, 540 n.
Texel, The, 507, 508, 539
Thalia, 335
Thames, 302, 313
Thames, River, 12, 335
Thatch, Edward, known as " Blackbeard,"
259, 260
Thesce, 218 n., 219, 220, 313
Tliitis, 125 and n., 120, 299
Thetis 212 n., 247 and u., 306, 313, 315,
339
Thiercelin, Captain, 125 n.
Thisbe, 350, 351
TholcH, 91
Thompson, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles (1),
Bart., 482 n., 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Thompson, Captain Edward, 19, 21 and n.,
22,23
Thompson, Ca|rtain Samuel, 234 n., 340 and
n., 492 n., 497 n., 513 n., 520 n.
Tliree Brothers, 203
Thunder, 40 n., 101 and n., 242 n., 245 n.,
240 n., 276, ;;10, 373, 374, 406 n.
Tliunderer, 300, 313, 361, 305, 415, 479 n.
Thurot, Commodoi'e Franfois, 190, 223,
224, 229-231 and n., 290, 297, 298, 299
Tiburon, Cape, 08, 308
Tioonderoga, 185, 204, 205, 355, 350, 359.
303, 364, 368, 370, 386, 389
Tiddeman, Captain Richard, 173, 198 n.,
240 and n., 242
Tierra Bomba, 09, 73
Tiger, 43, 40 n., 47, 70 n., 140, 161 and n.,
102, 163, 174 n., 175, 179 .and n., 180,
198 n., 199, 272, 310
Tigre, 34, 90, 247, 314, 315
Tilbury, 02, 70 n., 71, 70 u., 127 n., 135 n.^
109, 273, ;-10, 311
rm
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
'lilly, (_':ii)tiiiii (le, ■l'J2 n.
'I'iniber, 5, H35 I
'riniekeeperK, 13, 14 and n.
'liiiiewell, Benjamin, 3 !
" Tin-clails," PrecursorB of tlie American,
4-12
'i'indall, ('aiitain George, 224 n.
'I'lTiiar., 323
'J'inker, Cairtain Jolm Bladon, 223 n., 225
'J'ilJlioo Sultan, 351
Tisiphone, 509 n., 510
I'obago, 138, 254, 487, 521
'IViby, Commander Eicliard, 161 n.
Toll, C'a])tain Edniond, 133 n., 135 n.
Toms, Ca]itain Peter, 310
Toimage, Computation of, 9 n.
'lonnant, 127 n., 128, 12i:l, 185, 218 n.
Tonyn, Captain George AuthoDv, 206 n.,
309
I'lipage, 148 n.
Torbav, 66, 70 n., 217, 312
Tvrbai/, 46 n., 75 n., 96, 141, 171, 188,
218 n., 219, 220, 234 n., 299, 312, 482 n.,
504, 513 u., 520 n.
Torres, Admiral Don Kodrigo de, 34, 58, 59,
62, 63, 65, 76, 77, 107
Torres, Conde de las, 46
'J orriiigton, 267
Torrington, Admiral of the Fleet Sir George
Byng, Viscount, 3, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33-
38, 38 n., 40, 112 n., 257, 314
Tortuga, 136, 263, 272, 310
Tortuga Banks, The, 135
Touche. Captain de La, 492 n.
Touches, Conunodore des, 415, 488, 489-
493
Touchet, Mr. Samuel, 186
'J'oulon, 59, 66, 84, 85, 89,
107, 124, 142, 146, 160,
210, 211, 215, 229, 274,
397, 411, 442, 469
Toulouse, 96
Tournel, M., 117
Tower Hill, 2
'I'owTieseud, Captain Sir Isaac, Kt., 4
Townley, Captain Edmund, 161 n.
Townsend, Admiral Isaac {2), 70, 116, 117,
122, 280, 565
Townsend, Charles, 326
Townshend, Admiral Hon. George, 96, 116,
130, 145, 269, 281, 565
Townshend, General Hon. George, 209
T'owry, Captain John, 4, 96
'I'owry (jircriously Philips), Captain Henrv
John Philips, 215 n., 222 n.
Trade, Effect of war on : (see also Convoys,
Privateers, etc.), 130, 138, 231, 232, 245,
^ 253, 257, 296, 478
Trafalgar, 554
Tranquebar, 178
Transit of A'enus, Expedition to observe the,
304 and n.
1'reachery ; Dutch, 85 n. ; Bengalese, 163
92, 93, 95, 96,
169, 189, 190,
280, 310, 394,
Treasure ships, Spanish, 44, 53, G5, 125,
136, 238, 241, 271, 279, 280, 308, 315
Treasurers of tlie Navy, 3, 326
Treaty; of Paris (1763), 254; between
France and the United States, 394, 426
Tiefusis, Captain Thomas, 4
Trelawney, Caj^tain Sir William, Bart.,
201 n., 202, 203
Trelawney, Governor of Jamaica, 68 n., 76,
79 and n., 80
Trtmigon, Captain de, 415, 546 n.
Trent, 185, 206 n., 207, 246 n., 248, 301
Trenton, 388
Tres Montes, Peninsula of, 322
Trevanion, Captain Sir Nicholas, Kt., 4
Trevenen, Captain, (Russian Navy) 341
and n.
Trevor, Captain John, 62
Trevor, Captain Thomas, 54, 55
Trevor, Captain Tudor, 41 n.
Trial, or Tryal, 253, 310, 320, 321
Trial's Prize, 321
Trident, 96, 127 n., 148 n., 1.50, 156, 206
n., 209, 226 n., 236 and n., 312, 400, 406
n., 434, 454 n., 459
Trincomale, 121, 131, 132, 181, 197, 224,
225, 550, 552, 554, 557-560, 561, 562
Trinite, La, 243
Trinity House, Corporation of, 14 n., 342
'Iriomjtliaiit, 458, 510, 533 n.
Triple Alliance (1717), The, 29
Tripoli, 288 n.
Triton, 76 n., 78, 79 and n., 148 n., 151 n.,
161 n., 164, 174, 212 n., 311, 415, 513 n.,
520 n.
Triumph, 57 n., 59, 14.3, 310, 466 n., 486
Triiinfc, 314
Trobriand, Captain de, 415
Trollope, Admiral Sir Henry, 333
Tromeliu, Captain du, 550 n.
Tronjoly, Commodore, 543
'I roude, M., quoted, 129, 486, 525
Truscott, Eear-Admiral William, 466 n.,
505 n., 520 n.
Tucker, Captain William, 242 n., 311
Tullibardine, Marquis of, 39
Turin, 92
Turpin, Captain de, 415
Tuscany, 67, 292
2'w.'f-erf,223 n., 235 n.
Two Sisters, 263
Tyranny, Naval, 21, 22
Tyrrell, Pear-Admiral Pachard, 86, 152 n.,
201 n., 222 n., 300 and n., 565
Ulrica Eleanoea, Queen of Sweden, 41
Unclaimed prize and bountv money, 342
Unicorn, 215 n., 235 n.,"296, 299, 304,
313
Uniform, 20, 21, 347-350
Union, 218 n., 235 n., 509 n.
Uppleby, Captain Samuel, 387, 406 n., 409,
428 n., 479 n.
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
607
Upton, Commander Arthur, 167 n., 1(59, 31 L
Urry, ('a])tiun Jolm, 24(j n.
Ushant, Cape, (io, 270, 287, 413, 415, 42G
n., 443 II., 444, 445, 4()5, 50!», 539
Usher, Captain Arthur, 24(j n.
Utrecht, Treaty of, 29, 109
Utting, Captain Ashby, 310
Uvedale, Captain Samuel, 225, 246 n., 347,
454 n.
Vachell, Commander George, 284 an dn.,
311 (2)
Vado Bay, 124
Vaillant, 303
Vainijnnir, 290
Valeur, 225 n., 220, 313
Valevale, Captain Don Ignacio, 34
Valcour Island, 361-308, 385
Valiant, 234 n., 235, 240 n., 415, 509 n.,
520 u.
Valparaiso, 322
Vanbrugh, ('aptain Charles, 34, 310
Vanbnigh, Captain Giles Kichard, 96
Vanbrugh, ( 'aptain Philip, 4, 34
Vandeput, Admiral George, 543 n.
Vanderdussen, Colonel, 270 and n.
Vandore, Captain de, 492 n.
Vanguard, 172, 200, 222 n., 227 and n.,
242 n.
Vanicoro Island, 352 n.
Vannes, 196
Var, River, 123, 124
Varlo, Captain Weston, 201 n.
Vaslion, Admiral James, 505 n., 520 n.
Vaudreuil, Vice-Admiral the Marquis de,
96, 127 n., 207, 228, 415, 523, 529, 530,
535, 536, 537
Vaughan, Admiral John, 566
Vaughan, General, 479, 480, 481
Vaughan, the navigator, 318
Vavmeulun, Captain, 125 n.
Vaux, Marechal de, 446
Vega Florida, Captain Conde de, 90
Velasco, 248
Velasco, Captain Don Luis de, 247 u., 248
Venezuela, 85
Venganza, 247 n., 315
Vengeance, 217, 218 n., 227 n., 305, 415,
454 n.
Vengeur, 174 n., 179 n., 198 n., 415, 452,
546 n., 550 n., 559, 563 n.
Ventura, 308, 315
Venus, 218 n., 302, 305, 308, 313 (4), 406
u., 428 n., 431, 454 n., 505 u.
Venus, 274
A^era Cruz, 135
Vere, Lord : see Beaiiclerk, Admiral Lord
Vere
Verger, Commodore St. Andre du, 218 n.,
219
Vemon, Admiral Edward (1), 6 n., 16, 17,
52 and n., 53-65, 07-80, 85, 111 and n.,
112 n., 134, 207, 271, 274, 277 u. I
Veruon, Admiral Sir Edward (2), Kt., 212 n.,
291, 311, 343, 543 and n., 507
Versailles, 119
Vestal, 8, 215 n., 300, 301 ami n., .■',13
Vcstale, 218 n., 304, 313
Vesuvius, 70 n., 76 n., 206 n., 234 n.
Veth, Rear-Admiral Lucas de, 20
Vice-Admirals, 19
Vicomte', (.'aptain de La, 533 n.
Victoire, 293
Victor, 479 u.
Victori/, 00, 107, 108, 274 and n., 310, 335,
415, 417, 419, 420, 421, 424, 509 n., 538
Victualling Office, Portsincmth, 343
Victnals, 21
Vienna, 310
Vienna, Treaty of, 42
Viergc, 313
Vigie, La, St. Lucia, 429, 431
Vii/i/ant, 122, 125 and n., 131 n., 392,
406 u., 415, 434, 454 n.
Vigilante, 115, 312
Vignault, Captain de, 127 n.
Vigo, 40, 261, 262, 306, 311
Vilaine, River, 218 n., 221, 223, 224, 233,
313
Vilena, Captain Don M. de, 96
Villa Franca, 84, 92, 314
Villalobos, the voyager, 317
Villavicentia, Captain Dun Manuel, 34
Ville de Paris, 335, 415, 496 n., 513, 514,
518, 525, 520, 53'2, 533, 534, 535
Villebrune, Captain de, 492 n.
Vincent, Admiral Nicholas, 174 n., 177,507
Vincente, Captain Don J., 247 n.
Viper, 143, 246 n.
Virgin, 242 u., 311, 313
Virgin Queen, 70 n.
Virginia, 335
Virginia, 139
Virginia, 259, 399, 442, 473, 488, 489, 493
Fo/rt-/e, 96, 281,312
Volante, 34, 35, 37, 314
Volcano, 406 n.
Vriesland, 91
Vulcan, 70 n., 76, 125 n., 415
Vulture, 167 n.
Wachtmeister, Admiral Baron, 41
Wager, 310, 320, 321-a23, 549 n.
Wager, Admiral Sii- Charles, Kt., 2, 3, 43,
4(3, 47, 48, 112 n., 319
Wager River, 319, 320
Wages, Payment of, 18
Waldegrave, Admiral Hun. Sir William (1);
Lord Radstock, 509 n.
Wales, H.R.H. Frederick, Prince of, 193
Wales, of Greenwich, Mr., 338
Walker, Captain Samuel Hood, 479 n.
AValker, Lieutenant , 240 u., 249
Walker, the privateer, (Jeorge, 270, 280,
282, 285, 280
Wallabout Bay, 383
G08
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
Wallace, Admiral Sir James, Kt, 387,
4011 n., 40ft, 5li0 ii.
Walliiigford House, '_'
Wallis, Cai)tain Samuel, liOU u., 2iiG n.,
234 n., 236 n., 326 (2)
Walpole, Sii- Robert, 67, 3Hi
Walsh, merchant of Nantes, 110
Walsingham, Cajiaiin Hon. Kobert Boyle
(earlier Hon. liobert Bovle), 18o, 215 n.,
242 n., 298, 306, 415, 469, 469 n.
Walthenhara Bav, 76
Walton, Admiral Sir George, 34, 35, 36
and n., 43, 314
War declared with Spain, 39, 52 ; ■with
France, 91, 142 : with Spain, 238 ; begun
with France, 397 ; by Spain with Britain,
443 ; by Britain against Holland, 478
Ward, Captain Henry, 148 n.
Ware, M., shipbuilder, 335
Warrant officers : see Masters, Gunners,
Pursers, Surgeons, Boatswains, Carpen-
ters, etc.
Warrants, 111 n., 112 n.
Warren, Vice- Admiral Sir Peter, K.B., 88 n.,
110, 113-115, 124, 125 n., 126, 129, 130,
138,269, 272,283,312
Warrior, 520 n., 524
WarspUe, 212 and n., 21.3, 214, 215, 218 n.,
219, 220
Waru-ick, 92, 96, 98, 133 n., 135 n., 136,
191, 285, 290, 304, 305, 311, 313, 335
Warwick, Captain Thomas, 161 and n.,
163
Washington, 367
Washington, Captain, (uiil.), 71 n.
Washington, General George, 139 and n.,
371, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388,
390, 393, 398, 401, 402, 405, 469, 470,
471, 472, 488, 495, 496, 501, 502
Water, 23, 337
Waterbury, Colonel, 364, 366, 367, 369
Waterhouse, Captain Thomas, 54, 55
Watkins, Captain John (2), 96
Watkins, Captain Eichard, 86, 88, 96, 289
and n., 311
Watson, A'ice-Adniirnl Charles, 96, 125 n.,
127 n., 140, 142-144, 160-164
Watson, Captain Thomas (1), 55, 71, 72,
274, 27.5, 310
Watson, Captain Thomas (2), 454 n., 466 n.
Watt, Captain James, 406 n., 552 n., 560
Weather gage, Advantages of the, 484, 486,
531, 532
Weazel, 128, 133 n., 137, 201 n., 284, 300 n.
Webb, Captain James, 152 n., 223 n.
Webber, Rear-Admiral Charles, 246 n., 567
Welderen, Captain Grave van, 505 n.
Wellard, Captain Robert, 300
Wells and Co., shipbuilders, 335
Wells, Vice-Admiinl Thomas (1), 495
Wentworth, General Thomas, 63, 64 n., 68,
70-80
West, Admiral 'I'liounis, 513 n., 520 n.
West Afiica, 21 n., 138, 139, 169, 17.3,
186-189
West Indiaman, 283
West Indies, 17, 42-46, 48, .50, 52 etc., 58,
62, 67-80, 8.5-88, 91, 10.5, 110, 114, 115,
116, 126, 128, 130, 132-137, 142, 146,
167, 173, 189, 196, 20.3, 204, 217, 225,
226, 233, 238, 239, 242-250, 267, 271,
272, 279, 284, 289, 302, 303, 310, 311,
312, 315, 395, 426 el seq., 447, 448, 451,
471, 478, 480, 509, 510
Westminster Abbey, 128 n., 209
West Point, 385, 392
West, Vice- Admiral Temple, 96, 104, 125 n.,
142, 146, 148 n., 152, 154, 155, 156, 158,
170
Wetzel, General, 32 n., 37 n.
Weymouth, 343
Weijmouth, 64, 68, 70 n., 73, 174 n., 175,
177, 179 n., 198 n., 199, 240 n., 261, 310
Whahhone, 319
Whalebone Point, 319
Wheeler, Captain Edward, 152 n., 215 n.,
224 n., .301, 306
Wheelock, Captain John, 206 n., 226 n.,
246 n., 248, 395 n.
White, Captain Thomas (1), quoted, 500 n.,
517,518
White Point, Louisbourg, 183
White, the navigator, Francis, 320
Whitehall, 2
Whitehaven, 311
Whiteside, Henry, 338
Whitshed, Admiral of the Fleet Sir James-
Hawkins {earlier James Hawkins), 479 n.
Whitwell, Captain Matthew, 222 n.
Whorwood, Captain Thomas, 4
Widows and Children, Provision for, 18, 19
Wiertz, Captain, 505 n.
Wight, Isle of, 17.3, 193, 351, 396, 445, 446
Wilkinson, Captain Andrew, 212 n.
Wilkinson, Captain George, 513 n., 520 n.
Wilkinson, Captain Thomas, 395 n.
W^illes, Sir John, Lord Chief Justice of the-
Common Pleas, 105, 106
Willett, Captain William Saltren, 218 n.,
2,34 n.
William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland,
Prince, 66 and n.
William Hemy, D\ike of Clarence Qater
King William IV.), Admiral of the Fleet
Prince, 343 n., 568
Williams, Captain Edmimd, 96, 103, 104
andn.
Williams, Captain .James, 513 n., 520 n.
Williams, Sir John, Kt., 326
Williams, Captain William, 373
Williams, William Peere, afterirarrh Ad-
miral of the Fleet William Peere AVilliams
Freeman, 406 n., 431
Willis, Captain Fr.ancis, 310
Willis, Captain Thomas, 215 n.
Willis's battery, Gibraltar, 47
INDEX TO VOLUME III.
609
Wilmington, il'Z, 17;!
Wilson, Ailniiral George (1), 513 n., 520 n.
Wilson, Lieuteiiiuit liobert, 131 n.
Winchehm, 4:! n., !)4, 00, 108, 201 and n.
283, 2911, 311
Wincliclsea, Daniel, Earl of, 2
Winchester, 41 n., 46 n., 120 u., 203, 238,
261
Windage allowance in guns, 11
Winder, Captain Josejih, 34
Windsur, 41 u., 57, 61, 62, 70, 75 n., 125 n.,
127 n., 267, 301, 313
Windsor, Captain Hon. Thomas, 415
Windward Islands (see also West Indies,
Martinique, etc.), 468, 469, 535
Windward Passage, The, 134
Winter, Ships laid up in, 6, 323
Witchell, Mr., 338
Woensel, Captain van, 505 n.
Wolf, 63, 68, 70 n., 215 n., 269, 270, 284,
310, 311 (2)
Wolfe, Colonel, 70
Wolfe, General James, 183, 184, 196, 201-
209, 357
Wolseley, Admiral Charles, 552 n., 568
Women on sliipboard, 22, 23, 540
Wood, Captain Charles, 546 n., 550 u., 559,
560
Wooldridge, Captain Francis, 479 n.
Woolwich, 4, 12, 335, 336
Woolwich, 122, 201 and n., 203, 224 n.,
242 n.
Worcentcr, 39, 54, 55, 56, 57 n., 70 n., 76 n.,
79 n., 80, 123 u., 133 n., 272, 314, 415,
545 n., 550 n., 552 n., 556, .559, 560,
563 n.
Worge, Lieutenant-Colonel, 188, 189
Worms, Treaty of, 89 n.
Wright, Captain Lawrence, 4
Wright, the privateer, Fortunatus, 276, 292
Wyborg, Battle of, 341 n.
Wyndham, Captain Charles, 59, 01
Wynyard, Colonel, (Mar.), 03 n.
XlMANI, C9
Yachts, Royal, 237, 330, 335
Yards, 329
Yarmouth, 125 and n., 127 n., 128, 174 n.,
175, 176, 179 n., 180, 198 n., 434, 458,
520 n.
Yarmouth, 224,310, 151 n.
"Yellow Admirals," 344
York, 46 u., 70, 76, 79 n., 131 n., 200 n.,
232, 434
York, Duke of: srr Edward Augustus,- Duke
of York, Prince
York Factory, 320
York River, 494, 496
Yorktown, 405, 442, 471, 494, 502
Young, Admiral James (1), 148 n., 218 n.,
223, 239, 252, 565
Young, Captain Walter, 450, 454 n., 458,
459
Zaffamne Islands, 541
ZavalloB, Don Juan Carlos Gutierrez de,
62
Zebra, 335, 520 n.
ZeU, 525, 526, 529
Zeuohie, 314
Zephijr, 505 n.
Zephijr, 96, 244 n., 29U, 309, 313
Zephyr, 206 n., 212 ii.
Zierikzee, 91
Zodiaque, 174 n., 175, 179 n., 180, 181,
198 and n., 199, 415
Zoutman, Rear- Admiral Julian Arnold, 505-
508
Zwaluw, 505 n.
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